T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

URBANIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION PROCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN BEFORE AND AFTER WAR

MASTER'S THESIS

MOHAMMAD AMIN ABDULRAHIMZAI

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ANKARA, 2021

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ACCEPTATION AND CONFIRMATION PAGE

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my honorable mother Khaybara my father Bahram Gul and my older brother Mukhtiar Gul Dalil.

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ABSTRACT

URBANIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION PROCESSES IN AFGHANISTAN BEFORE AND AFTER WAR

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M.A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Selcen Özkan

December 2021, 118 pages

This study aims to investigates the urbanization and globalization processes of Afghanistan before and after war. Since the Soviet Union invasion to Afghanistan in 1979, the rule of Taliban in 1996 and the reestablishment of Afghan government in 2001. After the great efforts made by Afghan state and foreign organization to develop Afghanistan and to make it a peaceful and democratic state couldn't give a good result. Taliban came back to power on 15th / 8/ 2021 till today no country has recognized Taliban officially. In last two decades the country magnificently developed its urbanization and globalization processes even though the globalization and urbanization processes has stopped back with the rule of Taliban. Afghanistan is one of the most corrupted countries in the world. In this research, a secondary data source of different decades which covers 2009-2019 and 1970-2018, were analyzed to the both of variables (urbanization and globalization), and two data sources were taken from Statista and The Global Economy. The main objective of the study is to know the improvements and the effects of urbanization and globalization also to find gaps in both processes to point out. This study seeks answers to the questions of improvements and the effects of urbanization and globalization processes also the formal and informal urbanization. To inspect this, many simple regressions were employed as the study concludes that there are both formal and informal urbanization and globalization processes also the improvements in both processes is great. Finally, this study recommends that the comprehensive observing and good assessment are required to identify the main issues of urbanization and globalization processes in Afghanistan. This observing and assessments might help the state authorities, policy makers and civil society institutions to find the main barriers to of the processes.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Urbanization, Globalization, Recent achievements, Soviet Union, America.

ÖZET

AFGANİSTAN'DA SAVAŞ ÖNCESİ VE SONRASI KENTLEŞME VE KÜRESELLEŞME SÜREÇLERİ

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Bu çalışma Afganistan'ın savaş öncesi ve sonrası kentleşme ve küreselleşme süreçlerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. 1979'da Sovyetler Birliği'nin Afganistan'a işgali, 1996'da Taliban'ın yönetimi ve 2001'de Afgan hükümetinin yeniden kurulmasından bu yana. Afganistan devleti ve dış örgütünün Afganistan'ı geliştirmek ve barışçıl ve demokratik bir devlet haline getirmek için gösterdiği büyük çabalardan sonra iyi bir sonuç veremedi. Taliban 15 / 8 / 2021'de iktidara geri döndü, bugüne kadar hiçbir ülke Taliban'ı resmen tanımadı. Son yirmi yılda ülke, Taliban'ın yönetimiyle küreselleşme ve kentleşme süreçleri durmuş olsa da kentleşme ve küreselleşme süreçlerini muhteşem bir şekilde geliştirdi. Afganistan dünyanın en yozlaşmış ülkelerinden biridir. Bu araştırmada 2009-2019 ve 1970-2018 yıllarını kapsayan farklı on yıllara ait ikincil bir veri kaynağı her iki değişkene (kentleşme ve küreselleşme) göre analiz edilmiş, Statista ve Küresel Ekonomiden iki veri kaynağı alınmıştır. Çalışmanın temel amacı, kentleşme ve küreselleşmenin gelişmelerini ve etkilerini bilmek ve her iki süreçte de işaret edilecek boşlukları bulmaktır. Bu çalışma, kentleşme ve küreselleşme süreçlerinin resmi ve gayri resmi kentleşmenin yanı sıra gelişmeler ve etkileri sorularına cevap aramaktadır. Bunu incelemek için, hem resmi hem de gayri resmi kentleşme ve küreselleşme süreçlerinin olduğu ve her iki süreçteki gelişmelerin de büyük olduğu sonucuna varıldığı için birçok basit gerileme kullanılmıştır. Son olarak, bu çalışma Afganistan'daki kentleşme ve küreselleşme süreçlerinin temel konularını belirlemek için kapsamlı gözlem ve iyi değerlendirmenin gerekli olduğunu önermektedir. Bu gözlem ve değerlendirmeler, devlet yetkililerine, politika yapıcılara ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarına süreçlerin önündeki temel engelleri bulmalarında yardımcı olabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afganistan, Kentleşme, Küreselleşme, Son gelişmeler, Sovyetler Birliği, Amerika.

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LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

UN:	United Nations
NATO:	North Athlantic Treaty Organization
ADB:	Asia Developed Bank
WB:	World Bank
UNHABITAT:	United Nations Human Settlement Program
IDPs:	Internally Displaced Persons
SIGAR:	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
AREU:	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
US:	United States
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NISA:	National Intelligence and Security Agency
PRT:	Provincial Reconstruction Team
OHDOHDCA:	Department of Defense's Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
NSIA:	National Statistics and Information Authority
UNAMA:	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
ISAF:	The International Security Armed Forces
JICA:	Japan International Cooperation Agency
SPA:	Strategic Partnership Agreement
BSA:	Bilateral Security Agreement
EU:	European Union

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of The Study

The Afghan republic is officially known as Afghanistan and it is located in Asia's heartland. Afghanistan is a landlocked country at the crossroads of Central and South Asia. Iran borders Afghanistan on the west, Pakistan on the south and east, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan on the north and China on the northeast. It's a mountainous country with plains in the north and southwest, with a total area of 652,000 square kilometers (252,000 square miles). Kabul is the capital and largest city of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's constitution recognizes fourteen ethnic groups. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks make up the bulk of these ethnic groups. Over 36 million people are believed to live there. The current condition of Afghanistan's political history is due to the Hotak dynasty, whose founder Mirwais Hotak declared southern Afghanistan independent in 1709. The Durrani empire was created in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, with Kandahar as its capital. In 1776, the Durrani capital was moved to Kabul, with Peshawar serving as the winter capital, the latter was conquered by Sikhs in 1823. In the late 1800s, Afghanistan functioned as a buffer state in the "Great Game" between British India and the Russian Empire (Ahmad, 2017, pp. 195–197).

During the first Anglo-Afghan war, the British East India Company briefly seized control of Afghanistan, but after the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919, the country was free of foreign influence, and it eventually became a monarchy under Amanullah Khan until Zahir Shah was overthrown and a republic was established nearly 50 years later. Following a second coup in 1978, Afghanistan became a communist state and then a Soviet protectorate, sparking the Soviet-Afghan war against mujahideen militants in the 1980s. By 1996, the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban had seized the bulk of Afghanistan and ruled it as a totalitarian dictatorship for over six years. Taliban were toppled in 2001 after the US invasion, although Taliban still control a significant portion of the country. The ongoing struggle between the government and the Taliban has exacerbated Afghanistan's dismal

human rights record, notably in relation to women's rights, with both sides committing numerous crimes, including civilian deaths (Ahmad, 2017, pp. 195–197).

Since Ahmad Shah Abdali seized Afghanistan from the Persian and Moghul empires in 1747, it has never been controlled by any empire, but has always been torn apart by conflicts between empires, such as the Afghan-Anglo war in the nineteenth century. Warriors of an aggressive disposition are known to be Marshal races in Afghanistan. The Afghans sense of adventure was heightened by poetry tales and mythology. The populace hated and distrusted modernity after King Amanullah Khan's vigorous attempts at modernization were blocked by the Ulema. Modernization remained frozen for a long time with the help of the British empire, who was thinking of modernizing the Western lifestyle in Afghanistan. The Afghan-Anglo war, which lasted three times as long as the India-British war, was won by Afghans in 1919, when King Amanullah Khan declared independence (Ahmad, 2017, p. 198).

In today's globe, urbanization is the most pressing issue in global transformation processes. Understanding urbanization and globalization processes and outcomes of land use are vital both their power and patterns are important with due respect to natural resource use, health, global environmental change, and sociodemographic changes. Urban areas are expanding globally and locally in the world. The first cities emerged several millennia ago. Ever since, urbanization dynamics have significantly improved, but the most essential element has remained the same people. In the 1800s, just three percent of the world's population survived, but by the end of the twentieth century, this figure had risen to 47%. In 1995, there were roughly 83 cities with populations of one million or more; by 2010, that number had climbed to 460. There is a systematic relationship among urbanization and demographic change, with less developed countries being highly rural and having higher birth rates. When a country's economy improves, more people move to cities, and birth rates decline, as seen by the demographic fertility action of migrants. If it will be defined urban as administrative definition, the most urbanized regions in the world are Latin America and the Caribbean (80 percent), North America (82 percent), Oceania (71 percent) and Europe (74 percent). Asia and Africa stay mostly rural with 41 percent and 49 percent of the population living in rural areas. In Asia, Indonesia, India, China, and Myanmar, as

well as Africa's Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, have substantial rural populations. According to a new United Nations (UN) survey, Asia and Africa are growing faster in terms of urbanization due to their less urbanized regions that are less urbanized than the regions that have already urbanized. The pace of urbanization is continuing to accelerate in Asia and Africa, with two out of every three people living in cities by 2050. In the coming decades, all regions will become more urbanized. There are around 350-400 shrinking cities in the globe most of them located in post-industrialized countries such as Japan, Europe, and the United States. Multiple cities, such as Istanbul, which served as the capital of four empires over the course of two millennia and Rome, the world's first big metropolis have shrunk and gone through many cycles of expansion. In any case, according to global data the growth rate in emerging nations is anticipated to drop from three to five percent per year to around two percent in 2030. According to UN estimates sixty five percent of the world's population and ninety percent of the population of developed nations would live in cities by 2050 (Haase et al., 2011, pp. 20–22).

1.1.1. Movements of Urbanization Around the World

City areas have shown great variation and variability throughout history, spanning various cultures and geographies, as well as within the same cultural or geographical location. The first settlements in the Indus Valley, Mesopotamia, and the Mediterranean region were tiny, although some had dense populations and huge densities. For example, Rome had 1.5 million residents in the early third century a figure it did not reach again until the 1930s. Post–Countries War II motorization, poor planning, and failed markets, particularly in the developed world, resulted in urban lounge, which is roughly described as uncontrolled geographical development of cities. Metropolitan sprawl is defined as the low-density growth or leapfrog development of major urban areas into the rural environment. For example, Europe's urban area and accompanying infrastructure increased at a rate of around 1,000 kilometers per year between 1990 and 2006, almost comparable to the German capital Berlin. The development of cities in the United States following World War II is the most renowned example of this sort of urban growth. The growth of vast suburbanized districts around historically compact European cities, a settlement structure that straddles the rural-urban split, is known as in-between cities. The major gap is between houses and

industry, residential sites, and commercial which enables urban-rural interaction. Rapidly expanding metropolitan areas in Africa and Asia exhibit a variety of rural characteristics in their peri-urban settings, including various types of farming and gardening. This type of expansion is similar to that observed in Europe and North America, and this peri-urban space is known in Indonesian as "desa" and "Kota," which mean village and city, respectively, and is also utilized throughout East and Southeast Asia. After 1990, several cities in Japan, as well as a significant portion of European cities, began to lose population due to out-migration and fertility declines, and they began to shrink. The United States is another important shrinking case, where there has been a large shift in population internally due to the disintegration of economies that were based on producing some of the companies were in different regions, for example, the Rust Belt, and they were heavy industries, as well as fertility drops. Today, shrinkage is occurring, but it will reverse with the return of the city's mostly young and educated generation. People in developing world cities still confront significant and difficult access to many urban amenities, and developing country cities have distinguished themselves over the previous three decades. These obvious contrasts may be seen in fast-growing Indonesian cities, Mexico, India, China, Brazil, and South Africa, where rich households frequently differentiate themselves from the destitute majority. In many parts of the world, urban high population densities have become a hallmark of rapid urbanization in recent decades (Haase et al., 2011, pp. 29-30,32).

1.1.2. Urban Shrinkage

For urban policymakers and planners in particular parts of the world, the rate of urban expansion is posing problems and barriers. A very distinct phenomena is posing a very different set of challenges. Most aspects of urban shrinkage are well-known, such as shrinking population densities, vacant housing, decreasing manufacturing and other economic activities, underuse of buildings and urban infrastructure, population decline, and an increase in derelict land, as well as a phenomenon of large population loss in cities caused by a clear interplay of (1) demographic (2) financial (3) economic factors (4) environmental and (5) political changes. The systematic changes that occurred in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as eastern Germany, are particularly noteworthy. Short shrinkage may also arise from natural calamities, like as Hurricane Katrina, which

devastated New Orleans in 2005 and caused the city to lose a massive population. The Ukraine catastrophe might be another example of a nuclear accident that resulted in a large or enormous loss of urban population, with people still unable to access the accident region. Another reason for urban decline is demographic shifts, which include large-scale outmigration and low fertility. Post-Soviet transition reductions in traditional hard industries have accelerated the present processes of urban shrinking in Eastern and Central Europe. As a result, unemployment is a general economic crisis, a consequent decrease in fertility an increase in people aging, and out-migration to other prosperous regions are reduced. These ideas may appear absurd, but the understanding is growing that cities play a critical part in the global change process. It is the fulfillment of the SUA general assembly's decision in 2015 to adopt a fully developed, sustainable goal with a strong urban focus. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to bring people and cities together to save be inclusive and live longer. The many SDG goals are commendable, and they will require continued efforts to find out the difficulties that urban regions confront today (Haase et al., 2011, p. 30,32).

One of the future challenges that urban areas will face is climate change. Availability of basic amenities to save human life, such as medical services, clean air, clean water and food (which includes basic sanitation requirements); and disaster resilience, that is listed in the SDG for 2030. In rich nations, the yearly pace of urban population growth is anticipated to be 0.5%, whereas in underdeveloped ones, it will be 2%. This includes the rapid growth of metropolitan regions in Africa and Asia, as well as the decline of cities in the United States, Russia, and Europe. This will result in an increase in the number of stagnant, prosperous, and declining cities, particularly in developed countries. Both trends provide a significant challenge to local government, infrastructure, and management, with 33% of the world's urban population now living in slums with inequitable living conditions and a lack of essential amenities. The concept of circular migration, circular urbanization, and circular floating population, in which people migrate to cities in order to work and improve their lives, but can also be mobile, traveling between rural and urban areas are more difficult. To fit with such diverse types of cities and development trajectories, new urban and governance techniques are required. In any case, it is important to increase public

engagement and empower city residents. Anyone may enhance fine-grain mix home types and create pedestrian-friendly streetscapes, effective public transit, and green places in public locations. All of these have been proposed by proponents of urban design movements such as new urbanism. To reduce poverty and eliminate unemployment, long-term urbanization strategies must focus on pro-poor reforms, developed fund usage, and broad access to local businesses. The new approach to urban government should be appropriate and adaptable to new difficulties; for example, a logical framework may be preferable to a comprehensive plan; such an approach must emphasize the regularization and formalization of land tenure, which is a major issue in modern cities. The development of cooperation among national, international, and urban governance and regional planning was necessary to connect rural, urban, and peri-urban areas (Haase et al., 2011, p. 36).

1.1.3. The Spatial Distribution of Urban Population Over Time

In the 1990s, correlation coefficients in virtually all macro-regions began to fall, with the exception of Europe and Russia, but they remained statistically significant. Negative and significant correlation coefficients were found in North America, Latin America, and Africa they were lower than those found in the macro-regions mentioned above. The largest concentrations of negative coefficients were found in the African and Asian macro regions, as well as the Middle East. In North America, the link between city size and population growth was both strong and negative. In most macro-regions, the correlation coefficients between size and population growth have decreased during the last decade. Only three macro-regions show a substantial negative relationship based on population predictions for 2020, (North America, Africa, and the Middle East). In China, there is minimal evidence of a detrimental link between the two. The link between city size and population growth has been shown to be non-significant in all macro-regions throughout the previous decade of research (Cividino et al., 2020, pp. 7–8).

1.1.4. Urbanization as In Modern Perspective

Although the world's population remained primarily rural and agrarian until the twentieth century, there is evidence of urbanization dating back to 3,500 BC. Despite the fact that 80

million people is a large number, they were dispersed throughout the globe in hundreds of cities. Only three cities had more than a million people in the 1850s: Beijing, Paris, and London; now, only 110 cities have more than 100,000 people. Eight of the top twenty-five cities were located in East Asia, eleven in Europe, four in South Asia, and two in North America. Over the next century, the world's great cities rose from 110 to 946, and the population of major cities increased from 2,3 to 12,3 million. In any case, there was a clear urban-rural balance throughout history, with 16 percent of the population living in cities of 100,000 or more and 29 percent living in urban regions by 1950. Since 1950, global urbanization has accelerated. It applauds the UN statistical agencies' hard work and efforts; the process is well-organized, despite issues like as irregular or incomplete national censuses in various nations and international statistical concept comparability. In the beginning, certain fishermen, hunters, and farmers congregated at specific locations for commerce or employment in order to be protected from marauding marauders, as the population expanded the urban structure evolved. The uneven pattern of city distribution by space and size, as defined by the rank size rule and central space theory, appears to represent the ranking of the social, economic, and political activities in which cities specialize. The majority of urban expansion is driven by political or economic considerations, whereas quick growth and transitional forms are influenced by demographic factors. The major mode or circumstance of urban expansion in the early years was rural to urban and urban to rural international migration. The future increasing element will be natural improvement in the near future. Throughout human history, urban areas have been less clean and healthy than rural areas due to bad agreements such as shared water supplies, which allowed disease and infection diseases to spread quickly. nowadays many high densities of life in most parts of the globe have been corrected by systematic population health and asset in urban infrastructure. Newborn infant mortality rates in recent urban regions have been lower than in rural areas of the same region. The causes for the lower birth rates in urban areas compared to rural areas are economic and social factors. As it can be seen, the majority of the rural population is engaged in agriculture, which allows them to maintain more children. However, some issues exist, such as the absence of essential amenities in Asia and Africa. The rural-urban fertility gap has narrowed in recent years, although it remains significant in South Africa and South America. Concerns

about urbanization have been highlighted by national governments, development economists, and international commission procedures due to the rapid expansion of the urban population in emerging nations. These concerns, although focused on the adaptation of large cities, also address the issue of population balance between urban and rural areas. Overurbanization manifests itself in standard living conditions for city dwellers, urban unemployment and poor wages, as well as the provision of infrastructure and services to bring about positive improvements and make life more pleasant. In comparison to rural areas, metropolitan areas have greater job creation, better education, better income, and better health care. The natural growth of major cities was not high and negative at the same time in the past, but rural-urban migration, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, accelerated the rise of big cities like London. Even though in less developed states, public health has affected the urban birth and mortality rate, which has grown by around 2% to 3% yearly. According to estimates, in 1960, the world's less developed countries had a low rate of rural outmigration of approximately 1% per year, whereas the high pace of urban immigration was projected to be 1.5 to 3.2%. The natural rise in rural and urban areas was roughly the same. The urban rate of growth was around two to five times that of rural growth. The most developed regions have a high rate of rural outmigration, estimated to be between 1.5 and 3.4 percent, although the average rate of urban migration is half that of less developed areas (Lowry, 1990, pp. 150-151,153).

1.1.5. Urbanization in General Meaning

Urbanization is the shift from rural to urban life involving land use, economic activity, population, land and cultural activities, with the goal of bringing all societies together on the same land and in the same culture. It is nevertheless, used to indicate changes and developments in the land for construction and new accomplishments for specific locations on the outskirts of urbanized regions that are ready to be utilized for urban and prepared and marketed for urban area, such as flats used for housing. The difficulty with using the word "urbanization" is that simultaneous changes are difficult to achieve. A clear concept is that there is a net difference in cultural norms or economic activity between rural and urban areas, which is difficult to demonstrate. According to the United Nations, half of the world's population now lives in cities. Some nations, on the other hand, claimed to have

their own definitions of urban, and that their current urban population numbers were, in fact, predictions based on census data from various vintages and relatively basic projection methodologies (Mcgranahan & Satterthwaite, 2014, p. 6).

The economic, social, and cultural components of society all alter as a result of urbanization. It is the transfer of people or processes to urban regions, as well as the expansion of urban areas, population, or processes. Urbanized civilizations, in which the majority of people live in densely populated towns and cities, constitute a new and significant phase in man's social evolution. The massive and dense agglomerations that make up the urban population include unprecedented levels of human touch and social complexity. The reason for this intricacy is because modern urbanized cultures have grown to such enormous proportions and have attracted such a large population, both of which have never been seen before in human history. As a result, the tale of human population urbanization is one of change and transition – not just in settlement patterns, but also in normative and institutional domains of social life. The tale behind this change exemplifies human beings' inherent predisposition and inbuilt desire to evolve and advance along the road of development (Zhu et al., 2020, p. 23514).

By 1801, about a tenth of England and Wales' inhabitants lived in cities with populations of 100,000 or more. In 40 years, this share quadrupled, then doubled again in another 60 years. By 1900, Britain had become a highly urbanized society. Generally speaking, the later a country got industrialized, the faster it urbanized. It took 79 years in England and Wales, 66 years in the United States, 48 years in Germany, 36 years in Japan, and 26 years in Australia to go from a population with 10% of its members living in cities of 100,000 or bigger to one with 30% living in such places. In 1800, around 15.6 million people lived in cities with populations of 100,000 or more. It had grown to 313.7 million by 1950, more than double the previous total. Rural-urban migration, certainly the most extensive movement in recent times, has accounted for a large portion of this growth. In 1800, there were reportedly less than fifty cities with populations of 100,000 or more. This was a fraction of the number of cities in the million-plus category today, and a fraction of the number of cities with populations of 100,000 or more found in many single nations. By 1950, there were about 900 cities with populations of 100,000 or more, which was nearly

double the number of towns and cities with populations of 5,000 or more in 180026. The world's urban population increased from an estimated 0.7 billion in 1950 to an estimated 3.9 billion in 2014. The global urban population was more than five times larger at the conclusion of this period than it was at the beginning. During this time, the average annual growth rate of the urban population was 2.58%, which was more than 50% higher than the global population as a whole (1.65%). Thus, between 1950 and 2014, the global population quickly urbanized, with the proportion of people living in cities growing from 30% in 1950 to 54% in 2014. However, less developed countries are becoming the epicenters of growing urbanization. Cities are byproducts of the urbanization process. Urbanization, in other terms, is the social process that leads to the formation of cities. As a result, cities and urbanization have a cause-and-effect connection. Urbanization is a multifaceted phenomenon with several characteristics that may be examined from various angles. Because of the complexity of this process, the study of urbanization is a multidisciplinary endeavor. As a result, contributions to urbanization are multidisciplinary (Zhu et al., 2020, p. 23516).

1.1.6. Rural to Urban Migration and Transformation

The voluntary movement of people is defined as migration in the context of this study (as individuals, family units or large groups). Due to economic and technical progress or advancement in their preferred destination, people are moving from their place of birth or residence to a new area with the goal of settling down temporarily or permanently. In most developing countries, the lack of important basic amenities, government presence, and little or no commercial activities serve as a push factor that drives people away from rural settlements, whereas cities remain the focus of government developmental projects and the center of many opportunities, forcing rural dwellers to relocate. Rural-urban migration is a key that cause, particularly in developing countries. Because urban areas have distinct pay structures, the government prefers rural communities. Many sectors pay highly, and cities are thought to have a surplus of work opportunities. There are many educational institutions, health facilities, beautiful housing amenities, robust road networks, and larger marketplaces for residents to enjoy. Because of living and some of the world’s poorest countries most people lack access to electricity. They often wish for a city lifestyle with

appealing street lights at night, rather than a country existence where they must rely on the moonlight. As a result of this, natural growth is more evident in cities. Due to a lack of fundamental information about family planning methods, families in rural regions have more children than their counterparts in cities; nevertheless, the multiplier effect in urban areas makes the problem of natural growth more evident, as opposed to rural communities. Polygamy, which is common in rural regions, raises the number of children in a household (Bodo, 2019, p. 39).

The urbanization process has an influence on communities of all sizes; for example, villages become small towns, small towns become larger towns, and major towns become cities. As a result of this trend, megacities have grown up, residents in some regions may not need to move or relocate to neighboring cities. For greener pastures when certain rural villages transformed into urban settlements, but instead maybe seen the opportunities they want come to them. Continuous inputs of scientific and technical information can progressively convert a small rural community into a city over time. Following the discovery of minerals, resource exploitation, and automated agricultural operations, incoming enterprises may begin to establish commercial activities around their surroundings and beyond. There will be an increase in production and availability of commercial items and services as the rural settlement expands. All of which will lead to enhanced economic growth and more jobs for the people. In most cases, the skills required for specific employment in the industries are not readily available. The immigration of specialized or trained employees is required in such a distant community. Commercial and industrial activity have progressed. To maintain the rate of economic expansion or new businesses to be established in the region, policymakers are likely to order the construction of basic social amenities, health, and housing facilities. People from surrounding villages may migrate across to take advantage of the economic possibilities in such rural settlements, which would progressively urbanize (Bodo, 2019, p. 40).

1.1.7. Elements of Urbanization

At a general level, the city is composed of urban tissues. Karl Kropf, in his paper ‘Urban tissue and the character of towns’, strongly influenced by the Italian tradition, defines urban

tissue as an organic whole that can be seen according to different levels of resolution. These different levels correspond to different elements of urban form. The higher the level of resolution, the greater the detail of what is shown and the greater the specificity of morphological description. The urban tissue consists solely of streets and street blocks at the most basic level. The tissue might incorporate a multitude of features, such as the construction materials of an open area or structure, at a high degree of resolution. All cities and its tissues are made up of a collection of urban form components, such as roadways, street blocks, plots, and buildings. However, these roadways, street blocks, plots, and buildings are integrated differently in each city, resulting in distinct sorts of tissues. Some of these tissues are easily recognized and may give their towns a distinct personality. In each first aim of human settlement, the land relief has its own structure as well as a geometry that determines the location and shape of that settlement in various historical times (Oliveira, 2016, p. 8,11).

People navigate and get to know a city through its street system (in the broad sense, which includes avenues, boulevards, and so on). Streets divide what is public, and so available to all inhabitants, from what is private or semi-public, and hence identify the distinct street blocks that make up a city. In general terms, streets represent the city's public and democratic area, the location where all people gathered, with all public diversity and interacted socially. A city's plot system is one of the most essential aspects of its urban structure, dividing the public and private areas (or the different private domains). Despite this, the function of this core structure is frequently overlooked by the primary agents and stakeholders in the city-building process, owing to plots ostensibly diminished urban visibility. The definition of a territory's plots system is an important part of its urbanization process and it has a lot of consistency through time. The definition of a territory's plots system is an important part of its urbanization process, and it has a lot of consistency through time. The subdivision of a number of huge plots might be part of the choice on what would be the new structure of private ownership in a given region. The procedures of plot subdivision and plot amalgamation are not particularly widespread in many cities, despite the significant distinctions between each individual environment. The dimensions of the city's street blocks and, within these, of its plots, are crucial in describing and

explaining the city's physical structure. As people relocate from the historical center to the outskirts of the city, the size of street blocks and plots grows in general. Buildings are one of the most essential parts of urban form and, possibly, the most obvious of these features, despite their lack of temporal stability compared to streets and plots. In general, the city is made up of two sorts of buildings regular structures and extraordinary structures. The key qualities that distinguish these two categories are connected to the structure's shape as well as its use. For the nature of the urban environment, the location of each structure inside its plot is critical. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the continuous alignment of different buildings dictated the street shape in most towns in a fairly unambiguous fashion. Another essential feature of a structure is its height particularly the connection between its height and the width of the street on which it is located. Variation in these two measures has the potential to cause considerable changes in the urban environment (Oliveira, 2016, pp. 15,23,25-26).

1.1.8. Urban Livelihoods in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is one of the fastest-urbanizing countries in the world, with most of the major cities, including Kabul, Nangarhar and Herat, have experienced urbanization. After the Taliban administration fell apart in 2001, hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan, with the majority of them migrating to Pakistan, Iran, and other countries. Afghanistan is also one of the world's fastest-growing population countries and when the present government was established in 2001, urbanization grew more significant, and cities became overcrowded. This trend is expected to continue as the country's metropolitan regions quadruple in size, with urban populations in Afghanistan expected to double by 2015. There are several problems in urban planning and administration that have yet to be overcome. Corruption among the country's government administrations, municipalities, government agencies, and international partners must be addressed in order to alleviate the poverty and vulnerability that has resulted from such fast growth. The living conditions of Afghan city dwellers are poor and unplanned, and the majority of families confront several challenges. For example, there is no canalization system in more parts of major cities, including Kabul, and people face many problems as a result. For example, most families have drowned the land deep and take water from the land and live their lives

with it, and when this machine breaks down until the family fixes it, the young people go to a far water well and carry it to their homes, and more families face similar problems. Afghanistan is still dealing with a slew of urban issues, which will be detailed in this research (Beall & Schütte, 2006, p. 7).

1.1.9. Globalization a Historical Perspective

Globalization, according to certain authors, began with the migration of Africans to other areas of the world in the third millennium before Christ (BC). When the world system developed, from significant geographical discoveries or after 1945. Alternatively, it might be based on different eras and centuries, with all of it having a purpose. The history of globalization has been periodized in several ways. The most common kind is represented by a trinomial, which appears to be the most reasonable. Three periods, according to Gellner, are the optimum for periodization. Archaic globalization, early modern globalization, and modern globalization are the three types of globalization. Those who began globalization at the time of major geographic discoveries employ trinomial periodization. Globalization is divided into three phases, according to Thomas L. Friedman (2005): first globalization (1492–1800), second globalization (1800–2000), and third globalization (2000–present). He mentioned that each of these three globalization eras has a different meaning. The first refers to the globalization of countries, the second to the globalization of corporations, and the third to the globalization of persons. This periodization begins in 1957 with the period of regional events, which is followed by the period of fragmentary events and which is followed by the Period of Cosmic Expansion. Early modern globalization accurately represents the magnitude and character of this period, which began in the nineteenth century and lasted until the 1970s, when the level of intersocietal connectivity began to rapidly increase (Magnani, 2013, p. 2).

1.1.10. Globalization

Globalization is defined as the expansion of the size of social systems and the complexity of intersocietal connections. Globalization is now a highly important and contentious topic

that is yet poorly defined. The word "globalization" refers to a reduction in transportation costs, technological transfer, and increased commerce. In terms of impact, debates about globalization frequently focus on its impacts on the economy, jobs and income distribution – often without differentiating among countries or within-country inequalities – as well as other social effects such as poverty alleviation chances, human and labor rights, environmental consequences and so on. According to Anthony McGrew, globalization is defined as a multiplicity of links and interconnections that transcend the country states and by extension, the societies that make up the current world system. It describes a process through which behaviors, decisions and events in one area of the world can result in wonderful outcomes for individuals and communities in other parts of the world (Magnani, 2013, p. 3).

1.1.11. Globalization in Afghanistan

Afghanistan now is more developed and diverse than Afghanistan in the 1990s. After the Taliban regime fell in 2001, Afghans are still facing security challenges, poverty, and corruption. However, thanks to the efforts of the Afghan government and the assistance of the United States, the European Union, NATO, Turkey, and other foreign countries such as Japan, most of the administration has been reformed. Globalization is improving day by day in the country from an economic and political standpoint. Globalization is defined as the acceleration of human movements and exchanges in various parts of the production process, such as trade, cultural activities, goods, technology and many others. At the same time, one of the benefits of globalization is that it promotes interaction between different people and social groups. Afghanistan's GDP is around $3.50 USD, and agriculture controls the Afghan economy (32% of projected total GDP in 2003). Cereal crops 27% and the opium economy account for around 35% of the public's income, although with more government knowledge, opium has shifted to more useful goods in recent decades, with manufacturing accounting for roughly nine percent of the total. Afghanistan is a rich nation in terms of internal resources, but owing to the war, the government is unable to develop many resources because some minerals are controlled by the Taliban. Narcotics will be a component of the illicit economy; most of the time, individuals in rural regions manufacture it more and rely on it for money. Helmand region is Afghanistan's major

producer of opium, and from opium, business people and physicians create medicine for patients, such as Morphine, a pain reliever that doctors recommend to patients. One of the biggest challenges in Afghanistan is corruption and strife amongst political leaders, which has an impact on globalization (Riphenburg, 2006, pp. 508–509).

1.1.12. Jirga- A Traditional Form of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan

Conflicts have existed for as long as human cultures have lived. Individuals, social groups, and societies have historically fought and battled over limited goods and resources such as land, money, political power and ideology. Afghanistan has been used as a battleground between competing regional and global forces and organizations since the Soviet army invaded the nation in 1979. A battleground between the erstwhile Communist Soviet Union and the Capitalist West (mainly the United States) in the 1980s. In the 1990s, it was a battleground between Pakistan, the Arab Gulf nations, Iran, and Russia; more recently, it was a battleground between Pakistan, the Arab Gulf countries, Iran, and Russia. As a result of this struggle, Afghanistan's main close neighbors have strongly influenced Afghan politics. Because they had competing interests in the country, they formed client factions/warlords and backed them militarily, financially, and politically. These groups had become so dependent on their foreign benefactors that they began to perceive Afghanistan through the eyes of strangers. The neighbors also took advantage of Afghanistan's cultural and religious diversity, saying that they shared religious and ethnic ties with their clients to legitimize their involvement. Afghanistan's economic, political, and social infrastructure were badly destroyed as a result of the military battle that lasted several years following the fall of the old Red Army. The western world, notably the United States, which supported the Afghan mujahedin (Islamic fighters) financially, politically and militarily and enticed the Soviets to invade Afghanistan. After the Red Army had destroyed, the nation was almost totally abandoned (Wardak, 2003, p. 2).

According to this source, Jirga is an indigenous Pashto term that refers to a gathering of a few or a big number of people; it also implies counsel. Others claim that the word jirga comes from Turkish, where it has a similar connotation to Pashto and Persian/Dari. These definitions of jirg and jirga vividly depict the rituals and customs of the Pashtun traditional

tribal jirga, in which people gather in a large circle to resolve disagreements and make collective decisions on major social issues. In principle, a jirga can be convened at any level of tribal organization, from a single lineage to an entire confederation. Jirgas are often held at the lineage level, although they can also be tribal or even inter-tribal, at least among eastern Pashtuns. According to an Afghan scholar, the jirga is a historical and cultural institution and gathering of Afghans. That has resolved all tribal and national political, social, economic, cultural, and even religious concerns in the country by rendering authoritative judgements over the years (Wardak, 2003, p. 3).

The jirga is a historic institution more strongly linked with the tribal economics and society of Afghanistan's Pashtuns, who make up over half of the population. As a result, Pashtuns use it as a method of dispute resolution more frequently and effectively. In large urban areas where non-Pashtuns and Pashtuns coexisted or where non-Pashtuns predominated, the central government was able to exercise its official power more effectively. The bulk of conflicts in different parts of the country were resolved by Afghan government institutions. The Afghan legal system before to the conflict was mainly based on the Hanafi School of Islamic law and Western (particularly French) notions of legality. It showed a comprehensive harmony between Islamic teachings, Afghan tribal customs (customary law), and modern legal concepts. However, excessive delays, bribery, and corruption plagued the administration of this judicial system. Judges and magistrates have an especially shady reputation. Most Afghans in rural regions avoided engagement with official legal systems, preferring to have their disputes settled through jirgas outside of the courts (Wardak, 2003, p. 4).

This definition of the jirga might be taken to mean that it was a Pashtun tribal institution that exclusively served as a conflict-resolution mechanism in Pashtun-populated areas of Afghanistan's east and south. Several warlords and faction leaders who claim to defend the rights of various ethnic and tribal groups in Afghanistan have advocated this position throughout the previous twenty-eight years of Afghan civil war. However, there is mounting evidence that jirgas, or their counterparts, are being utilized as informal dispute resolution procedures in rural and less urbanized regions where Afghan Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks constitute the majority or single ethnic group. The strong parallels

between both the Pashtun jirga and the non-Pashtun shura are evident in these reports. Jirga-like councils, also known as shura, served as a vehicle for conflict settlement among Afghan Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. Afghans use shura to cope with minor conflicts, issues, and obstacles informally. A shura is a group of people who only get together when there is a specific need to discuss how to address that need. This urge is most often to resolve a conflict between people, families, groups of families, or entire tribes. Shura and jirga are basically identical Afghan informal (non-state) conflict resolution systems that operate in a range of socioeconomic and tribal situations, according to this description. During the Ghani era, however, state conflict resolution spread to certain rural regions of the nation and the state was enforcing state control on the general population (Wardak, 2003, pp. 4–5).

1.2. Problem Statement

There are many changes in globalization and urbanization processes in Afghanistan since the collapsed of Taliban regime in 2001. There is reformation in government and reconstruction process of Afghanistan since the establishment of the state of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2001. The unplanning urbanization and corruption is the main problem for urban development. The illicit investment in globalizing Afghanistan and government doesn't provide the basic services to people, investors, foreign investors, businessmen. How Afghan state can give an end to poverty and provide jobs for citizens? Also, four decades of war had a negative effect to develop Afghanistan even by providing basic services, how the government can solve these problems? Not having good plans for urbanization and to implement of projects in the country is also problematic in the state because of the corruption and some authorized people are responsible for the projects and reconstruction processes. Corruption can be one of the reasons that the government is not improving because most of the people think for themselves not for nation. Beside all problems it is mentioned above security problems and conflicts in the region and in Afghanistan can be counted one of the main problems in urbanization and globalization processes. If Afghanistan develops as much as it was before the Soviet Union invasion in 1979, it is clear that the country will be comparable with many developed countries. Although there is no good security in the country may go back to 1990s period because

security plays an initial role in improving process or staying in its own position and to depend the rights of the public. If there is no great security in the state the country can be divided to parts and many different groups would be rise also neighbor countries will take benefits of it. Conflicts between political and tribal leaders is very common in Afghanistan which really make obstacles in progress process in state at the same time the existence of different terrorist groups that they want their dreams to come true. In this case the government should destroy their worse plans and work for a better Afghanistan. Neighbor countries also entrap in Afghanistan's internal politics and in differ organizations to have supporters and to achieve their goals. The state nowadays is constructing electric dams from its budgets and foreign assistance especially India which have constructed Salma dam, Kamal khan dam, parliament and some more. Afghanistan is managing its water anymore and will construct more dam like Salma dam, but neighbor countries did not like and cannot see Afghanistan progress because Afghanistan's water still goes to neighbor countries free due to conflicts in the state, it will not be free anymore to use Afghanistan's sources.

1.3. Aims and Benefits of The Study

The aim of this research is to find the gaps in urbanization and globalization processes and fill it. Finding more about Afghanistan's urbanization and globalization processes before and after war and to explore more about the country especially in urbanization and globalization processes and also to know how much Afghanistan is globalized and urbanized. Afghanistan is one of the most vital countries in the world for its natural resources and geographical location. Unfortunately, four decades of war having negative effects on the state the misuse of the plans and would try to specify and focus how to implement the projects and city structure to be well organized for the whole country especially for big cities. Afghanistan is rich by resources and have a lot sources if Afghans use the resources correctly than the country will develop well and would may have a lot of great opportunities in every aspect. There will be good life expectation and the state would be independent for instance, Kamal Khan the electric dam after seventy years it's just inaugurated back by president Ghani and now it produces electricity to thousands of Afghans families. Afghan state could manage Afghanistan's water back which not only

enlightened people's houses it also strengthened Afghanistan's economy and people will start benefiting from the dam.

1.4. Objective of The Study

The main objective of the study is to find out the gaps in urbanization and globalization processes of Afghanistan and fill it. The informal and formal processes of urbanization and globalization. How much the government implemented its urbanization and globalization projects in a formal and adjustable way. The illegal economy income and obstacles in globalization process in the state and how the country can be globalized in the future decades. The ongoing corruption in the state and how to finish or decrease it.

1.5. Literature

Afghanistan is a landlocked country in the heart of Asia. Unfortunately, four decades of war has been a negative effecting on the state, its people and region. Since four to five decades the country has a lack of good governance and adjust. Also, some neighboring countries have interfered the internal politics of the state and till today are trying to put Afghanistan in a worse condition. According to last two decades of urbanization and globalization processes in Afghanistan has developed than in 1990s, urbanization process was fast growing while globalization was in low in Asia, till 15th 8/2021 that the government took back by Taliban. In Afghanistan there is still informal urban settlements and illegal economic investments that the previous government could not managed well. After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 2001, many foreign countries, USA, NGOs, donors assisted to the reconstruction processes of Afghanistan to stand back by its foot and develop economically, politically and sociologically and in every aspect. But unfortunately, politicians, political leaders and some ministers and official people were lost in bribe and could not rescue the country from the bad days.

To examine the urbanization and globalization processes in Afghanistan before and after the war, the study employed both qualitative and quantitative data for using a secondary data from two different sources. This study has independent and dependent variables, the independent variable is urbanization and to measure it the study used a set of data which

covers from 2009 to 2019 and this data was obtained from Statista. On the other hand, our dependent variable is globalization and to measure it the study employed a data set which covers from 1970 to 2018, the data was gotten from the Global economy.

1.6. Research Question

How the urbanization being planned in Afghanistan especially in Kabul? The formal and informal urban planning at Kabul city and recent developments at Afghanistan's urbanization and globalization processes. Since 1970 and 2009 how much globalization and urbanization processes have developed. Will Afghanistan develop its urbanization and globalization processes more.

1.7. Research Method

To examine the urbanization and globalization processes in Afghanistan before and after the war, the study employed both qualitative and quantitative data for using a secondary data from two different sources. This study has independent and dependent variables, the independent variable is urbanization and to measure it the study used a set of data which covers from 2009 to 2019 and this data was obtained from Statista. On the other hand, our dependent variable is globalization and to measure it the study employed a data set which covers from 1970 to 2018, the data was gotten from the Global economy. The study was aimed to collect a primary data of urbanization and globalization of Afghanistan unfortunately, the country was in war many decades and the government institutions were not well organized and didn't provide the kind of data that this was needed to be employed, also it was impossible for the researcher to collect primary data for many reasons and since the country's rule fall in the Taliban's rule. Therefore, the only choice to get data was to use secondary data.

CHAPTER TWO

URBANIZATION IN AFGHANISTAN

2.1. Principle of Urbanization

Urbanization is the systematic accumulation of people in urban areas. The city becomes a narrative tool for understanding and learning about urbanization. The continuous rate of urbanization development is the result of a deliberate, human-oriented act, rather than the natural order of things. As part of the urbanization process, which corresponded with the move from agriculture to industry, people relocated from rural to urban areas. These urban environments have a completely different sense of community than rural communities based on kinship and cultural ties. Because of the quick speed of life and the constant competitiveness of city dwellers, connecting with the community is much more difficult in cities. In contrast, urban expansion in urban concentration areas is just population growth. Such growth can occur without altering the degree of urbanization if the rural population grows faster or at the same pace as the urban population. However, in most developed countries, urbanization and city development go hand in hand. As a result, places with a lot of industrial growth also have a lot of people. The shaped urbanization cycle indicates that in the early stages of development, the growth in the urbanization curve is rapid. The main reasons for this are natural population growth and economic development. Cities will have the biggest impact on the development of the first half of the twenty-first century (Kumar, 2014, pp. 1433–1434).

All urban designers, both avant-garde architects and mass-market homebuilders, follow a set of guidelines. Many of the twentieth century's ugliest metropolitan landscapes were meticulously designed. As a result, a pattern language that creates high-quality locations must pervade the process. A healthy pattern language will be essential to what Alexander refers to as 'living structure,' and it will be led by careful attention to the geometric features of the structures and urban areas created. The test of urban planning is how it appears in three dimensions on the ground and how it promotes human flourishing. Without a change away from design mindsets that support either the egotistical stunts of avant-garde

architects or the mundane, sprawl landscapes of mass production builders, process alone will not yield excellent city form. The latter is by far the more important occurrence in terms of quantity, which is why New Urbanists have worked so hard to change the architectural ideas that underpin common middle-class construction practices (Ellis, 2014, pp. 47–48).

Towns and urban agglomerations play a critical role in economic, social, and environmental growth, as the European Union and its Member States are well aware. As a result, Europe is seeking for a single model that can successfully address urban policy concerns at the European level. The experience of different European nations with urban policy over the last decade has opened the way for the creation of a set of broad principles that support effective urban development plans. Specific proposals in the relevant papers are considered as an "open" body and framework of options to be implemented at the national level, given the highly various geographical locations and institutional, legislative, and administrative cultures of the individual Member States. The texts approved represent the EU Member States' collective work to form an urban development strategy that is closely aligned with the evolution of settlement patterns, territorial cohesion policy, and regional development policy. The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), published by the European Commission in 1994, was the first paper to address the role of towns and urban agglomerations in sustainable territorial development. Ministers responsible for land use planning and regional development from EU Member States endorsed the final draft in Potsdam in May 1999 (Czech & Republic, 2010, p. 14).

Ultimately, cities must assume responsibility for their own future. While they are ‘state creatures,' they are also beings with the potential to act, for good or for bad. Furthermore, they are the entity on the ground with direct accountability for the welfare of their residents, as well as the responsibility to make the precise decisions that will shape their future. Furthermore, state governments must acknowledge that their intelligence is rarely so superior to that of local authorities that it can compensate for those officials' superior grasp of local situations to the advantage of the cities. While there are certainly grave circumstances in which the state government may be forced to intervene. These scenarios are uncommon, such as when a financial or other crisis necessitates the appointment of an

emergency manager or control board, and the results of those encounters do not support the idea that state authorities always perform better than local officials. Aside from direct state intervention, state urban policies frequently err by imposing narrow and often arbitrary constraints on local discretion, or by imposing the state's preferences on local governments despite local officials' judgment that those preferences are inconsistent with the city's needs or policy goals. While states may believe that by doing so, they are promoting revitalization by preventing waste and abuse by irresponsible local officials, they are overlooking the fact that long-term revitalization cannot be imposed from without, but must be the result of active participation by local stakeholders, including but not limited to local officials. State policies that stifle local leaders' capacity to devise innovative, locally-specific methods will not help cities revitalize in the long run (Yayat Rahmat Hidayat et al., 1967, p. 43).

States are already heavily invested in the long-term viability of older cities. States have positioned themselves to have a major effect on the future of the cities where such facilities are situated by investing in state facilities, colleges and medical institutions. States' actions may either permit those institutions to contribute to urban development and economic growth or keep them on the sidelines. States also pour billions of dollars into older communities every year in the form of educational aid, municipal aid, public assistance and workforce development funding, all of which are exacerbated by the poverty of these cities and their citizens. These costs will continue to be a drag on public budgets in the absence of revival. States should use their money to establish the basis for economic recovery rather than allowing the economy to continue to deteriorate. Ironically, the amount to which cities have become plainly more appealing, both as economic sites and places to live, than at any time in recent history is arguably the most convincing justification for a constructive state engagement in urban redevelopment. While cities still require state government assistance, the climate in which that assistance is provided is fundamentally different than in the past. As a result, unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, when revitalization initiatives were mostly against the tide and frequently resulted in little or no long-term change, revitalization now has the potential to revolutionize the economic character and quality of life of America's older industrial communities. However, whether such a transition will occur is far from

certain; the point is that it provides a viable, possibly once-in-a-lifetime chance. States will have a big say in whether the opportunity is taken advantage of or not (Yayat Rahmat Hidayat et al., 1967, pp. 44–45).

While a focused approach to center cities is critical, it cannot happen in isolation. Despite frequently significant administrative fragmentation, cities and their suburban hinterlands create an interconnected economic entity. Housing markets, employment markets, transit networks and commercial networks all function primarily outside of artificial city and county borders. State governments must use their resources to promote greater cooperation and coordination across municipal and county boundaries in areas such as transportation, economic development, housing and land use, and other areas where the actions of one municipality or county affect the actions of others or where regional cooperation can improve the capacity and quality of public service delivery. This can be accomplished by a variety of methods, such as developing regional economic development organizations to better coordinate and integrate local economic development initiatives; Strengthening regional planning bodies and giving them control over local choices that have a regional impact, such as the approval of large-scale developments and infrastructure projects Strengthening the function of current Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) so that they can better fulfill their transportation planning obligations and integrate transportation planning to economic growth and land use planning and Making funding in places where intermunicipal coordination or collaboration is required for initiatives with regional significance. States may play an important role in reversing these tendencies and incorporating inclusiveness into the rebuilding process. First and foremost, governments can enact laws to promote inclusion, such as raising the minimum wage or expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, or by implementing proactive policies, such as inserting explicit community benefit requirements into economic development incentives. Second, they can pass legislation that gives towns broad legal power to pursue inclusionary zoning rules or local hiring and living wage criteria for projects receiving discretionary municipal benefits. Third, as shown in the chart, they can implement state initiatives that assist inclusiveness in the revitalization plan. Finally, governments might create clear inclusion requirements that towns must achieve in order to receive discretionary state funds, whether

general municipal aid or project-specific help (Yayat Rahmat Hidayat et al., 1967, pp. 46–47).

2.2. Overview of Urbanization in Afghanistan

Afghanistan's culture is still mostly rural, with just around 25% of the population residing in cities. However, this is fast changing just one out of every twenty Afghans lived in cities in the 1950s, whereas one out of every five Afghans did in 2014. If present trends continue, half of the world's population will live in cities by 2060. The urban population of Afghanistan has increased substantially since 2001, growing from 20% to 27% in absolute terms, from 4.6 million in 2002 to 8.2 million in 2017. Exile migrants from neighboring countries, internally displaced persons (IDP), and voluntary rural-urban migrants all have an influence on Afghanistan's urban transformation. In large towns like Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Balkh, and Herat, urban-rural migration outweighs the cities' capacity. Kabul, Afghanistan's capital and largest city, for example, is home to over half of the country's urban population, which has increased from 1.5 million in 2001 to 4.9 million in 2018. Kabul's infrastructure was built to serve 700,000 people, but the city today has a population of over 5 million. Kabul's population has exploded from 1.5 million in 2001 to over 5 million in 2017, making it the world's sixth fastest growing metropolis. Approximately 69% of Kabul's residents live in illegal and unofficial settlements. In 2017, United Nations Human Settlement Program (UNHABITAT), stated that just 32% of IDI persons living in slums have access to power, compared to 82% of those living in cities. About 72.4% of Afghans live in slums, illegal or informal housing complexes, according to a 2017 evaluation of living circumstances. Internally displaced individuals (IDIs), or those who have been forced to leave their homes but remain inside Afghanistan's borders, make up a significant portion of the country's urban population. Metropolitan regions in Afghanistan are considered safer than rural places, and the most of them are under official control, thus they give protection from insurgent attacks (Ahmadi, 2019, pp. 6–7).

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 2.9 million Afghans are "internally displaced" with 22% leaving in 2016. According to estimations, for every security event (victim) that occurs in a certain region,

an additional 9-10 people will be compelled to join the Afghanistan IDP group. According to ALCS 2013-14, urban regions are home to 48.1 percent of displaced households. People prefer to relocate willingly from rural to urban regions in pursuit of better education, healthcare, and employment prospects because there are no basic services accessible in rural areas of Afghanistan. In metropolitan regions, administration, market-oriented types of production, taxation, education, justice, and change all occur. This created resentment among rural residents who had been left out of these developments. Following the international community's intervention in Afghanistan in 2002 and the establishment of a new government, a flood of immigrants from rural inundated the country, flooding major cities including Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, and Balkh. The country has been ravaged by wars and continuing conflicts over the past four decades. Because the bulk of Afghanistan's urban regions are under central government control, they are considered safer against insurgent attacks than rural locations. For this reason, big cities like Kabul, Herat, and Balkh attract huge numbers of IDPs. While the Taliban and other anti-government groups (AGEs) have a stronghold in rural areas, where the majority of the population resides, government control is much more scattered than in the major cities. In metropolitan areas, high-profile assaults, targeted assassinations, and kidnappings are the main security concerns, but security in rural areas is more difficult. The Taliban, like other AGE groups, has a stronghold in rural areas where people are killed or maimed as a consequence of shelling, air and mine operations, or explosive device explosions self-made (Ahmadi, 2019, pp. 8–9).

They have also been targeted by Afghan local police (ALP) and pro-government militias (PGM). As a result, the security situation, which is dangerous and unstable migration, is one of the major driving reasons for Afghanistan's rural and urban regions. People are fleeing to cities to avoid violence and bloodshed in the countryside, where communities have remained largely peaceful despite four decades of conflict. According to a report conducted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Afghan government controlled or affected just 56% of the country's territory in January 2018, with rural areas accounting for the majority of the areas under insurgent control or influence. The fear of renewed or intensified warfare has driven many families to seek

refuge in a safer - generally metropolitan - area with better access to services. In 2017, conflict forced 93% of Afghans to flee their homes. The fear of renewed or intensified conflict in war-torn regions has driven many families to seek refuge in a safer - generally metropolitan - enclave where access to services may be guaranteed. The pattern of relocation across different areas of Afghanistan is altering as the country's geographical instability shifts. In 2012 and 2013, the southwest accounted for about a third of all tourism dollars spent (IDPs). In 2014 and 2015, the number of displaced people from the Northern, Northeastern, and Eastern regions rose. In comparison, this was when the state's northern area was peaceful following security threats in 2014, and conflict broke out in the state's northeastern and northern regions with the rise of Taliban and Islamic State forces. In 2015, the security situation deteriorated as the ANSF was obliged to operate alone due to a lack of foreign help. Direct armed attacks and warfare have grown in the southern provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Faryab, Helmand, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Uruzgan (Ahmadi, 2019, p. 11).

2.3. Plural Modes of Planning, Formal, Informal and Exceptional Urban Planning

2.3.1. Formal Planning

Biopolitics is directly expressed in the ideal-type of urban development. Infrastructure is created and maintained with an emphasis on listening to and responding to the needs of the whole population. Especially the most powerless, while economic development is aimed at promoting economic growth. The common good and plans are being undertaken to ensure long-term biological existence via the application of sustainability principles. This ideal-type is a decent representation, if not the only one, of what planners perceive to be the objective. All of the techniques of the urban planning profession however, it ignores the need of using sovereign politics in planning. Even though when there is strong social cohesiveness and low unemployment, there are more powerful groups inside a city government and there is more internal political struggle. Meanwhile, in Israel's far more split culture, Oren Yiftachel began investigating how formal urban design approaches may be used to hurt a community on a large scale. This was first referred to as the evil side of preparation by Yiftachel (Calogero, 2011, p. 68).

Government-run internment camps and prisons are the apex of planned environments in which the political ruler is concerned about the population's biological health. In the Nazi concentration camp, Giorgio Agamben focused on the relationship between biopower and sovereign power. Inmates' political personhood was progressively ripped away in a well-planned manner under the current political system. Only the "bare life" (Zoe), remains to be experimented with or deleted, regardless of trend. This has political consequences for the current administration. Spaces like Guantanamo are viewed as lawful democratic politics because they serve a critical military role. As a result, Kabul is directly affected by this severe manner of spatial construction and denial of rights, which includes the Pul-e Charkhi Jail in eastern Kabul and the American prison complex at Bagram Air Base (Calogero, 2011, pp. 68–69).

2.3.2. Illegal planning

The ways in which urban informality presents itself are as diverse as the places in which it occurs, but there are a few common threads running across Kabul. After 1830, the "Industrializing Empire" conquered several regions of Asia and Africa, according to Calogero. European nations experimented with new urban government systems on a regular basis throughout the nineteenth century. They first created colonies, then returned to the metropole with effective tactics. As Nezar points out, Alsayyad claims that urban modernism was used as a powerful instrument in forms of control. The intellectual rationale for colonization is the construction of new contemporary cities near existing cities. As a result of the massive alteration of political economy as a result of colonization, existing cities were also transformed through rapid in-migration and urbanization (Calogero, 2011, p. 69).

The capacity of the non-European quarters to develop farther than the "native" quarters was restricted. These neighborhoods frequently deteriorated into overcrowded hovels. Governments regularly established development limitations in order to self-modernize. What was codified became informalized, as Alsayyad argues in Urban Informality. In recent years, traditional urbanization processes have been criticized as archaic and primitive, opposition to urban modernization's steady progression. Despite the fact that the

British never monitored urban modernization in Kabul, the political necessity for it was loudly stated during King Amanullah's reign, which lasted from 1919 to 1928. In the year 1923, Amanullah began construction on a modern capital 10 kilometers southwest of Kabul, which he founded in 1922. Instead of "new Kabul," this new metropolis was named "modern Kabul" (Kabul-e Naw). Kabul-e Jadid (Kabul-e Jadid) is a city in Afghanistan. The "worn, dog-eared city" (Shahr-e Qadimi) was named the "old city" (Shahr-e Qadimi), whereas the "new city" (Shahr-e Qadimi) was labeled the "old city" (Shahr-e Qadimi) (Shahr-e Kona). After then, not all urban growth was supposed to be regular, orthogonal urban space, it was believed to be backward once the execution of comprehensive master plans began. In 1962, unplanned settlements were labeled as "outside the plan" unauthorized use (ghair-e Plan). The town refused to recognize right of tenure, failed to grade roads for paving and drainage, and failed to install street lights or piped water. The sovereign power of the urban rule was used in political philosophy to bind the provinces biopolitical care has its limits (Calogero, 2011, p. 70).

2.3.3. Exceptionalism Planning

Exceptionalism type of urbanization is being identified as planned more and more. Because these processes are unlawful, a third one, exceptionalism, has been lumped in with urban indifference. Exceptionalism plan when examined through a bifocal political lens that divides sovereign politics from biopolitics, however, urbanism seems to be quite different. Poorer families are more or less forced to "quietly infringe" on legal space in order to secure their urban lifestyles, whereas politically strong households and groups are free to openly break the law since they are more powerful than the urban system itself. Sovereign power and biopower are connected in an unusual way in this type of urban construction. Urban elites engage in overt activities that undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of local authorities, weakening their sovereignty, in order to take care of themselves. Repeated, systematic breaches by urban elites create zones of impunity in both the physical and political realms. Zoning regulations are broken in upper-class projects and property records are distorted. Oren Yiftachel has been recognizing political regimes' production of urban gray spaces since 2005, and now separates gray spacing from above from gray spacing from below. If Assef Bayat's quiet invasion of the ordinary describes urban informality

politics, it falls short of capturing the blatant impunity with which urban elites operate (Calogero, 2011, pp. 71–72).

On the other hand, the areas of exception in Kabul are sites where local sovereignty is weakening as a result of the activities of forces outside its control. The connection between the urban regime and the national capital is a difficulty for every national capital. The federal government and local governments are both involved. The legitimacy of the Karzai rule was acknowledged by foreign military and the world community, as well as international humanitarian organizations ranging from tiny non-governmental organizations to big multinational companies and United Nations programs. Group in today's world, geopolitics is a chaotic and invasive element, Kabul's urban space governance and reconstruction on the other hand, the spaces of exception in Kabul are locations where local sovereignty begins to fracture as a result of acts by authorities beyond its authority. The interplay of the urban regime with the national capital is an issue for any national capital when the municipal authority and the federal government are in conflict. However, in Kabul, this is not the case as evidenced by the presence of at least three more agents unidentified commanders. The legitimacy of the Karzai rule was acknowledged by foreign military and the world community, as well as international humanitarian organizations ranging from tiny non-governmental organizations to big multinational companies. To the Group of United Nations Programs in today's world, geopolitics is a chaotic and invasive element (Calogero, 2011, p. 72).

2.4. The Pluralization of Planning in Kabul

It's also crucial to understand the city's slow and (relatively) steady formalization from 1930 to 1990, as well as the tremendous development that followed. Since around 1990, there has been an increase of both informal and exceptionalism urban space. The old Chindawol neighborhood in the Ancient City's southwest quadrant resembles many of the city's informal places, although it is properly recorded and recognized as a historic area. Several villages have been affected. For example, Deh Bibi Mahro has been absorbed into the expanding city their current predicament is murky. They are not reflected in the Master Plan and, as a consequence, will not be demolished as a result of modernization. On the

other hand, some city planners have been charged with the responsibility. Certain portions were platted with astonishing regularity, despite the fact that they were created in defiance of the Master Plan, and were classified as historic places throughout the Master Plan's implementation with the intention of reconstructing. Kabul has been obviously developing since 1919. The terrible civil war of 1992-1996 was misunderstood as a "regression" or "de-modernization," despite the fact that it was the result of very current geopolitics. Despite the fact that the fall of the Najibullah administration in 1992 was part of a larger power transfer, this was not only the location, but also the era of the Cold War's penultimate proxy war between Western and Eastern Bloc states. In regimes all across the world, governmentality is shifting away from welfare states and toward lean government. The Kabul Master Plan was approved in 1964, and the municipal administration began to improve the entire city instead of developing new parts piecemeal as it had done since 1935. Only ten percent of the city was informal in 1976, according to a survey map of city locations that included both formal and informal communities. The third master plan for Kabul continued to manage the city's modernization until 1990, when President Najibullah allowed internally displaced refugees to dwell on public property designated for planned renovation, which he had to do since the people were in war (Calogero, 2011, pp. 74-75–76).

2.5. Modernity and Legitimacy

The effort of Amanullah to construct a Kabul Jadid or contemporary Kabul in the 1920s, which relied on urban change, will be detailed. Amanullah's most important approach was urban modernization, and he also pushed Afghans to adopt European-style clothing to modernize them. Years later, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry turned his head in condescension, and believed that real knowledge could only be generated by people clothed entirely in European garb. Condescension toward previous attempts at modernization is intrinsically tied to the nature of modernity. For example, American planners tremble at the idea of being associated with Robert Moses' top-down imperialism. On the other hand, disregarding the reality that Afghans have been actively engaging in modernization initiatives since 1920, tells a lot about those with the capacity to ignore history. Nine years after assisting in the conquest of Kabul, American soldiers have failed to grasp even the

most fundamental facts about the city they now control and affect. King Amanullah had the great relationship with Turkey especially with Atatürk who was the ex-first president of Turkey in 1923 as Atatürk established the Republic of Turkey in 29/10/1923. During that era diplomatic relation got strengthened with Turkey and king Amanullah send a group of medical girl students to Turkey. After graduation students return to Afghanistan to serve their people and the relation got stronger and stronger by the time (Calogero, 2011, p. 84).

The relationship of both brother and friend countries goes back to centuries. This year Afghanistan and Turkey celebrated the 100 years of diplomatic relationship at the embassy of Kabul in Turkey and about two weeks later of celebration there was the Newroz program at the embassy of Kabul in Ankara Afghan ambassador Mr. Amir Mohammad Ramin's speech he pointed out the relationship of both countries and wish to make it stronger. However, Afghans and Turks have many in common and these contribution and cooperation will continue forever of course Turkish government did good efforts in differ aspects for a peaceful Afghanistan. TIKA is one of the soft power foundations of Turkey which have activities in Asia, Africa and in Europe for instance, TIKA has some projects in Afghanistan and inaugurated some of its projects in the state, of course in these projects many Afghans have been working like TIKA. Many other NGOs and organizations are active in Afghanistan. As Turkey is the member of NATO and did many efforts and assistance in reconstruction processes of Afghanistan. By the year of 2014 NATO, many doners and NGOs have been withdrawn from Afghanistan, but still continues their assistance to the country from far and take part in the developing process of the state still some NGOs and doners are existing in the country (Embassy of Afghanistan in Turkey, 2021).

2.6. King Amanullah Khan's Modern Plan for Afghanistan (1990-1928)

We must go back to Amanullah Khan's ambitious modernization initiative in the 1920s to comprehend the long history of present urban planning in Kabul. In 1920, Amanullah planned to construct a whole new capital in the Chahr Dehi basin, seven kilometers southwest of Kabul. To oversee the construction of the new capital, he formed the Kabul Jadid agency in 1923. Jadid means "modern," as opposed to naw, the Indo-European

counterpart that meaning "new." According to Brinkley Messick19, the Ottoman rulers coined the term nizam jadid to describe their late-nineteenth-century modernizing initiatives. Though it might be interpreted as new order, modernizing order is a better translation. Amanullah was a close observer of Turkey's recent history through his father-in-law, Mahmood Tarzi. Tarzi was born in Ottoman exile in Damascus and educated in Cairo under Sayed Jamaluddin al-Afghani. The Tarzi family had been pardoned by Amanullah's father, Habibullah, and Mahmood had returned to Afghanistan in 1902. Tarzi had worked as a translator for King Habibullah and was fluent in Turkish, Arabic and French. When Amanullah married Tarzi daughter Soraya, he cemented his position in the royal court. She, like her father, was a firm believer in progress. They made it the major aim of Amanullah's regime. Dar ul-Aman Palace was built to highlight the administration's importance and to serve as a focal point for Kabul Jadid's district one. Albert Harten, a German architect, was hired by Amanullah to assist him in implementing his modernization plan. Kabul Jadid's design was influenced by Daniel Burnham's Beaux-Arts style, which was popularized at the 1893 Chicago World's Fair. The Kasr-e Dar ul-Aman, the government's main residence, was designed in the style of Berlin's Reichstag. Radial highways physically and aesthetically connected the Forty Pillar (Chehel Sotun) palace and park to the east, a second palace to the south (Tapa-e Taj Beg), and a circular plaza at Deh Mazang to the north. The government facilities of a rising bureaucracy were to be included in the First District. The Second District was designed to be commercial, whereas the following numbered districts were designed to be residential, complete with contemporary infrastructure such as broad, paved streets, drainage, and electricity (Calogero, 2011, pp. 85-86–87).

Figure 1: Darul Aman Palace During the War



Source: ArminWenger, (2006)

Figure 2: Darul Aman Palace After the War



Source: Afghan Multimedia Agency, (2020)

2.7. Ordinary Modernization Under the Musahibans (1930-1963)

In the fall and winter of 1928-1929, Amanullah's administration fell apart. The monarch and his wife embarked on a seven-month tour of Europe in 1928, which was ostensibly a diplomatic triumph on the international stage but a tragedy at home. Many Afghans were angry by Amanullah's symbolic modernization since it was not accompanied by a quick improvement in the vast majority of the population's material living conditions. When Amanullah was forced to abdicate, Nader Khan Musahiban, Amanullah's former Army Chief, came from semi-exile in France to organize an army to restore order in southeast Afghanistan. A tribal leader from the hilly area north of Kabul was rejected as king by the Pashtun nobility. Nader Shah was declared king of Kabul after capturing the city in October

1929. Despite the fact that many of Amanullah's symbolic acts of modernization were annulled, Nader Shah went on to implement a slew of institutional reforms that Gregorian describes as modernizing. In 1932, Nader Shah reopened all of Amanullah's high schools (lysa) and created a Faculty of Medicine, which paved the way for Kabul University and founded (Calogero, 2011, p. 87).

2.8. Soviet and Their Urban Plan for Afghanistan

From 1961 until 1992, Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, began to solidify power. Khrushchev's ideas for urban development would define the nature of Soviet technical support to Kabul's urban planning and they continue to have an impact to this day. From the outset of his tenure as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev saw planned urban development as a critical strategy for the Soviet Union. Stalin had focused on fast industrialization while largely ignoring the urbanization that accompanied it. Many Soviet cities saw urbanization that was similar to today's informal settlements in the global South: irregular, congested, and devoid of urban amenities. With the Sixth Five-Year Plan for the National Economy of the USSR, 1956-1960, Khrushchev attempted to address this by launching large urban development projects. Khrushchev resurrected the 1920s theorizations for a "City of Socialist Man" in the USSR's Sixth Five-Year Plan for the National Economy, 1956-1960, and began incorporating these concepts into major urban housing schemes to construct an urban strategy. The notion that cities are unavoidable appears to have been handed down to Afghan planners as well. Despite having significantly divergent opinions on other topics, planners with far differing views on other subjects expressed a similar expectation that new urban districts (shahraks) should be planned to accommodate a specific number of people, generally 5,000 (Calogero, 2011, p. 87).

In response, the Soviets agreed to Howard's drive for urban green space and Afghans followed suit. Howard regarded urban green space as an important component of his goal to combine the best of city and country to promote people's health. As previously said, controlling the health of the whole metropolitan population was one of the primary motives for participation in urban planning in the United Kingdom. The biopolitical reasoning that

is peculiar to the contemporary period manifests itself in this political ambition. The Soviets embraced the Garden City concept, creating massive urban parks and green areas throughout the USSR. Green-space design became more related to urban environmentalism in late Soviet planning. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1980 to 1989, this movement had the most direct impact on Afghan planning. Most of these verdant areas would be barren clay, salt-pan, or rocky bedrock if not for extensive irrigation. A request for assistance from Kabul Municipality to the Dutch government in 2008 revealed the beginnings of this demand for green space. These green areas, according to Kabul's mayor, are the city's lungs, helping to decrease pollution and dust in the air. The expression "lungs of the city" was popularized by the Garden Cities movement. Despite the fact that substantial parks throughout much of Kabul looks to be unfeasible owing to a shortage of water and a pressing demand for housing, the concept of green spaces as urban lungs appears to have been taken from Soviet planning concepts given through technical support from 1960 to 1989 (Calogero, 2011, p. 98).

Microregions were meant as self-contained metropolitan communities with mass-produced homes, stores, schools, parks, and common infrastructure like steam heat. Open space was to be shared and enjoyed by all people in an open framework, as per communist principles. Kabul's Microregion-1 was built in 1964. In Microregions 1 through 4, the integrated infrastructure is far more important than the structures themselves. Due to Kabul's height of 1900 meters, subzero temperatures are common throughout the winter. As stated in the introduction, due to the inability of the poorest households to purchase fuel, several children in Kabul freeze to death in their homes each winter. Destitute individuals, according to AREU and UN-HABITAT personnel, burn plastic bags and other rubbish in poorly ventilated dwellings all winter, causing significant respiratory issues. In the fall of 2007, Angero's next-door neighbors—a family living in a hut behind a UN guesthouse—began burning plastics for heat. He shudders to think of the breathing conditions inside their house, given the severity of the smoke that filled the yard between Angero houses. Steam, on the other hand, is used to heat microregions. The district heating system plans for Microregions two through four are shown to us by a member of the House-Building Unit's personnel. Afghanistan's ongoing conflict began the day the Soviet Union invaded

the country. It will be explained that since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan from the north in 1978, the Soviet Union has been responsible for all of Afghanistan's injustice, death, conflict and difficulties, it wasn't only the Soviet Union. However, Afghanistan's neighbors have also had a negative influence in the country's continuous hostilities. As previously noted, the Soviets began building highways, electric dams, microregions, and tunnels in Afghanistan in 1950, including the Salang tunnel. However, the USSR operated efficiently and successfully until the Afghan government and people began to employ what the Soviets had constructed. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in order to capture numerous South Asian states, and it was the Soviet Union that opened the way for terrorism in Afghanistan. Afghans, on the other hand, fought alongside them and drove the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. While the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the United States backed the Mujahidin in order to push the Soviets out. Following years of conflict with the Soviet Union, America supported Mujahidin with financial and logistical support, as well as weapons. During the battle with the Soviet Union, about two hundred thousand Afghans were killed. The Soviet Union and Afghan President Najibullah struck a deal, and the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. The connection between Afghanistan and America will be addressed in the third chapter (Calogero, 2011, pp. 100–101).

2.9. Concept and Urban Planning

Urban planning was seen by the Soviets as a material-spatial component of their revolutionary social transformation goal. In many respects, this parallels contemporary projects such as Mitchell's orthogonal new towns in Egypt and Holston's flowing open areas in Brasilia, as well as King Amanullah's Kabul-Jadid project, which use outward spatial modifications to induce community psychological adjustments. This parallel helps to explain Amanullah's good relations with the early Soviets. Despite his position as King, the Soviets called him the "Red Prince" because his efforts to change Afghan society were seen as a critical step toward proletarian communism. And Khrushchev put Soviet urban planning into action, launching a five- or six-year plan in 1956. He developed a prototype microregion in southern Moscow in 1957 and pioneered the scaling-up of systemized usage of this concept across the union. After the initial prototype in Moscow, the first microregion

was created in Kabul by the Soviet planner force Afghans planers in 1961 (Calogero, 2011, p. 102).

A group of American planners noticed in 1976 that Soviet planners were unable to control, let alone limit, the rate of growth of the USSR's main cities. According to Underhill, one area where the Soviets had little success was in regulating city expansion. Industry and local governments frequently flout the law, leaving professional city planners with little choice but to comply. Over the course of thirty years of technical assistance, many of these traditions, as well as their underlying beliefs, were passed down to Afghans. From the 1950s through the 1970s, Afghans were ardent participants in this transfer, which drew on Afghans' own modernization efforts from 1919 onwards (Calogero, 2011, p. 103).

2.10. Kabul Master Plan

Microregions One and Two, Microregion Three, and Microregion Four were finished in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, respectively. Microregion Four began to expand in the late 1980s, but when the Najibullah regime was deposed in 1992, it came to an abrupt end. According to the 1964 Master Plan, the majority of the Old City (A) should be converted to public use. All of the Arg (B), Shahr-e Naw (C), Kabul University (D), and Dar ul-Aman Palace (E) buildings are still intact. According to the House Construction Unit, future expansion will be divided into four zones: north (Wazir Abad), east (Rahman Mena/Kart-e Naw), southeastern (Rahman Mena/Kart-e Naw), and southwest (Rahman Mena/Kart-e Naw) (Chahr-Dehi). The undeveloped mountainous parts and the strip along the Kabul river looked to be green spaces in the model, and they are clearly portrayed as such in the next two illustrations (Calogero, 2011, p. 106).

The Second Master Plan was intended to oversee Kabul's growth from 500,000 to 800,000 people. Large metropolitan areas were set aside specifically for both green space and industry, similar to Soviet master plans of the time. Unlike the First Master Plan, which claimed that all new residential development should be considered microregions, this plan incorporated single-family housing districts, as Afghan planners had done between 1930 and 1961. In the 1970s, single-family house neighborhoods Khair Khana (A) and Khushhal

Khan Mena (B) in Kabul's far northwest and west were developed using this concept. From 1978 to 2003, the Third Master Plan aimed to steer Kabul's expansion to a population of two million people during a twenty-five-year period. The design involved top engineers from Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and India. The bulk of the planners Calogero talked with, on the other hand, only indicated Soviet involvement in the creation of the plan. This strategy includes three key new features. For starters, it encourages far higher residential densities as a means of doubling the city's population without expanding gross developed land area. After 2002, mid-rise densification occurred in a few parts of Kabul, although only as shahraks, or private apartment districts. Second, undeveloped aquifer recharge zones have been established along the Logar Riverway and a portion of the Kabul Riverway. The aquifer recharge sites specified in the 1978 plan are still the city's major sources of urban water supply today. In Kabul, potable water is a rare commodity: many youngsters suffer from chronic dehydration, which can lead to kidney stones, as one public health student reminded us. Aquifers in several sections of the city are endangered by depletion, salt intrusion, and sewage pollution, according to the ministry in 2003. The 1978 plan's emphasis on water quality protection codified this ecological concern (Calogero, 2011, p. 106).

In order to complete the 1978 Master Plan, most of Kabul's informal housing would have to be demolished and replaced with mid-rise residential complexes, parks, and Soviet-era Modernist city roads. According to Janbaz, the city planned to rehouse informal inhabitants in freshly constructed housing after relocating them to temporary accommodation outside of Kabul, cleaning and repairing informal neighborhoods in accordance with the Master Plan. Ministry workers and foreign specialists were concerned that a "temporary" move would become very long-term, if not permanent, based on previous experience. Several million Afghans had spent the previous two decades in Pakistan's "temporary" refugee camps, which were established in 1980. Local politics also hampered the Plan's execution, despite the execution staff's evident willingness to improve Kabul. It's possible that Kabul's mayor, four deputy mayors, and well-connected land developers did not intend to carry out the whole Plan. For personal gain, they may have tried to influence the timing and sequencing of its execution. The Plan Implementation Office distinguished between

compliant and noncompliant urban development that was both legal and unlawful. The urban regime, on the other hand, remained a mystery. So far, it shown how Kabul changed from 1919 to 1992 as a consequence of a series of well-planned modernization initiatives. Amanullah gained total authority over Afghanistan and began modernizing Kabul during the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. Although Soviet forces left Afghanistan in 1989, the Najibullah government remained in power for another three years. Despite officially acknowledging Islam's place in Afghan culture, Najibullah's administration remained "developmentalist," continuing to build microregions in Kabul as part of a wider effort at both urban and national social and economic development (Calogero, 2011, p. 110).

Kabul's remaining traditional urban fabric has decreased substantially as a result of the civil war in 1992-1996, which destroyed half of the Old City. Any new structure that does not conform to the Master Plans' orthogonal highway and lot layouts, or that does not use modern building materials, is deemed illegal or obsolete, and fails to be contemporary in some way. In 2003, residents who were using clay bricks informed Calogero that they wanted to use burnt brick and concrete instead, but they couldn't afford it. Their preferences were not 'backward,' but rather the result of their inability to get concrete and burnt brick. Poverty isn't just a result of the circumstances. Concrete in Kabul is currently expensive due to the destruction of concrete production units in the region, either as a result of the mujahid civil war in 1992-1996 or the Coalition bombing of industrial sites in the autumn of 2001. Concrete would have been more inexpensive and individuals would have been in a better position to purchase permanent building materials if a continuous development regime had persisted after 1992 (Calogero, 2011, pp. 156–157).

The fall of the Najibullah administration in 1992, four months after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, signified a fundamental shift in Kabul's political calculus. The Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was portrayed as a political contract at both the geopolitical and urban levels. Both superpowers supported political autonomy as a method of gaining national self-determination in theory. Both superpowers' political legitimacy was predicated on their politico-economic systems' ability to enhance citizens' material living conditions or biological well-being. According to post-colonial thinkers, the age of progress shared many similarities with the preceding era of industrial

empire, which lasted roughly from 1870 to 1945. Colonial powers had invested in infrastructure and sometimes created entire cities in order to exploit natural resources from conquered countries. Unbalanced commercial arrangements arose as a result of decolonization, with "independent" former colonies exporting low-cost raw resources and labor to their former conquerors. The move into Cold War rivalry, on the other hand, meant that the USSR and the US battled for the loyalty of Afghan governments by improving their respective talents in systematic biological care of Afghans. The Salang Tunnel, which connects Eastern and Southern Afghanistan to the plain on the Hindu Kush's north slope, was built by the Soviets. Americans developed the Kajaki Dam and the Helmand River Project to aid the country's dry southern area. In the 1960s, the United States and West Germany helped to build a section of the Kabul University campus. The Polytechnic Institute was established in strong opposition to the Soviet Union (Calogero, 2011, p. 120).

2.11. Corruption and no Monitoring System

Despite the fact that most countries have serious data collecting challenges, the difficulty of evaluating, distributing, and utilizing urban data and information is particularly acute in Afghanistan. Even though the most recent census was conducted in 1979, it was never finished. There is no single central repository or formalized data sharing techniques, and data is scattered across a range of parties who keep various types of data. Datasets are usually incomplete (project-based), fail to discriminate between rural and urban conditions, and are not commonly utilized for policymaking, planning, or decision-making. Afghanistan's post-conflict reconstruction has been aided by urbanization, which has boosted economic growth, job creation, and the expansion of small and medium businesses (SMEs). Despite the billions of dollars invested, nothing about the country's urban dynamics is understood. Many people believe that the speed with which projects were completed is to blame for the country's present data scarcity and inadequate national monitoring systems. Lack of coordination among government agencies, funders, implementation organizations and other stakeholders; significant distrust and insecurity among stakeholders, including rivalry (perceived and/or actual) for using data for resource mobilization, and fear of exposing flaws in technology; significant distrust and insecurity among stakeholders. Including rivalry perceived and/or actual for utilizing data for

resource mobilization; significant distrust and insecurity among stakeholders (Rogers, 2020, p. 8).

2.12. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan (PRTs)

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have played an important role in stability and rebuilding since their inception. But what type of role? Joint Regional Teams were the initial name for the PRTs. President Karzai requested that they be referred to as PRTs. Regions are ruled by warlords and provinces are ruled by governors he explained. President Karzai also wants to stress the significance of rebuilding for these teams. Because PRTs were created in a changing context, it's not unexpected that their goal and structure have evolved over time. Flexibility was an important part of the PRTs' efficacy, although it appeared like flexibility was a term for uncertainty at times. The mission was described vaguely in a November 2002 presentation from the Coalition headquarters planning cell: (1) “Monitor” (2) "Aid coordinating bodies" (3) “Assist in the facilitation of cooperation. The impression was that the PRTs were supposed to be all things to all people, watching and enabling everything, but just not actually achieving anything critical to the political or military goals. The first PRT organizational map emphasized the military structure, with a dotted line linking the Afghan Government, governmental agencies (e.g., USAID), State Department, NGOs, and UN” at the page's far end. Later charts advocated bringing together State and USAID, as well as the US Departments of Justice, Education, Agriculture and other departments. Various PRT organizational charts circulated through Washington, US Central Command and Coalition headquarters for months (Hamid, 2006, p. 36).

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) struggled to be important to the wider political and military objectives in their early months, owing to inadequate resources and civil-military conflicts. PRT military troops used funding from the Department of Defense's Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program to construct schools, dig wells, and restore clinics, among other things. However, OHDACA's applicability was confined to basic humanitarian initiatives similar to those carried out by NGOs. The PRTs were not given the liberty to carry out projects like as fixing significant infrastructure, establishing

police stations or prisons, or training or equipping security personnel by the OHDACA authorities. There were no other project resources available to the teams. Their operational resources were woefully inadequate. The PRTs' communications were poor, and their few vehicles resembled a hodgepodge of dirty, duct-taped SUVs from a post-apocalyptic Mad Max movie. Individuals who relied on military vehicles and police escorts were limited in their ability to pursue their own aims due to the strong demand for automobiles, communications, and dedicated military men. At the PRTs, there were substantial civil-military conflicts, notably over mission priorities, due to a hazy objective, ambiguous responsibilities and limited resources. Despite the fact that most of the state department officials and other people on the group had military expertise, civil-military tensions remained high (Hamid, 2006, pp. 36–37).

The PRT mission started to focus on three main goals: improving security, bolstering the Afghan central government's reach, and enabling rebuilding. Despite not being able to simply establish security as some observers had hoped, they were able to calm factional violence, support Afghan National Army and police deployments, conduct patrols, and improve security operations during militia disarming. They extended the reach of the central government by appointing Afghan government officials to the PRTs and providing surveillance, registration and security assistance for events such as the constitutional convention (the "Loya Jirga") and elections. They assisted reconstruction by funding initiatives like as school renovations and more crucially, by aiding state department, USAID and department of agriculture officials at the PRTs in implementing civilian-funded programs. The author was told by PRT personnel that the most common indicator of success was the number of happy Afghan children. Anecdotal evidence of PRTs' positive impact on local Afghan attitudes abounds, with people switching from throwing rocks at PRT caravans to smiling and laughing as they realized the benefits of having PRTs in their midst. Local assistance in discovering weapon caches was stressed by coalition soldiers commanded by Lieutenant General Barno as another indicator of success in Taliban-controlled areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. The PRTs, on the other hand, had an obvious need for a more systematic approach to evaluating their effectiveness. The amount of OHDACA funds spent and the number of assistance projects completed (such as schools

and clinics) were easy to quantify, but they were a poor indicator. These measures were only effective to the extent that they gave the PRTs more power over local events. Despite the fact that measuring influence is extremely difficult, it must be done. The PRTs have attempted to develop significant public opinion polls but have been unsuccessful thus far (Hamid, 2006, p. 37,39).

Governance, especially provincial administrator training and civil society development, is one area of capacity-building that has great promise but has received little attention from the PRTs or any other source. For the US to genuinely declare victory in Afghanistan, effective security forces must work in the setting of decent government. At the national government level, the UN, the US, and other donors are conducting some training and mentorship programs, but at the province and district levels, there are only instructor training programs and very little more. Finally, local officials and governance councils extend the central government's influence more than the Afghan National Army or even the police. Local authorities would gain better skills and professionalism as a result of rudimentary, short-term training and organizational assistance, as well as a stronger relationship to the central government (Hamid, 2006, p. 41).

2.13. Informal Settlements on The Hill

The unaccounted-for sensitivity to natural disasters is provided by the unauthorized colonies that have sprouted up on the province's hillsides. The slopes' geological risks must be assessed scientifically, and the local government must determine if a risk scenario exists. As a catastrophe prevention approach, residents in risky areas must be transferred first to new urban expansions, and risk assessment must be included as a major axis in municipality growth plans. When it comes to urban expansion, the city is constructed on a high seismic location, which is sometimes neglected by policymakers. The Hindu Kush Mountain range has a huge epicenter, and hundreds of earthquakes, some with considerable depth and magnitudes exceeding 8.0, have been registered there in the twentieth century. The province of Kabul has been designated as a high seismic hazard zone, a classification shared by cities such as Lisbon, Istanbul, Lima, Tokyo, and a host of others recognized for their seismic risk and disasters. The majority of the city was not built to any type of

vibration-resistant standard, and the informal settlements built on the steep slopes of the hills are particularly vulnerable. Around 12% of the Kabuli population is thought to live in these densely packed settlements (Barbé, 2014, p. 9).

Some policy suggestions minimize the issue, claiming that the settlements are little and that they provide a much-needed supply of low-cost housing in Kabul, as well as being conveniently placed near the city center and main employment centers. In contrast, in La Paz, Bolivia, where the hillside suffered an uncontrolled process of informal growth since it was the only accessible site for the absorption of rapid immigration and high birth rates, the hillside underwent an unregulated process of informal development. Today's cities are getting denser, increasing the risk of erosion and collapse, yet local actors have yet to prioritize this threat. Because of poverty and the paucity of materials used in the construction of homes on unstable terrain, this risk is underlined in both cities. In truth, few studies have been carried out in Kabul to identify the precise geological characteristics of the mountains around the city, keeping the disaster risk unclear and preventing large figures from frightening the government (Barbé, 2014, pp. 9–10).

2.14. Migration and Urbanization in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been through many migrations, due to natural disasters, a number of Hazara families fled to Iran in the 1850s, where they established as Shia Muslims. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, millions of Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, with hundreds of thousands more internally displaced as a result of the conflict between Afghans and Soviet Union forces. Due to religious, cultural, and linguistic similarities, Pakistan and Iran were natural choices for Afghans fleeing their homeland. Millions of Afghans have fled to Pakistan and Iran, yet Afghans in Iran are denied access to education and health services. Even millions of Afghan migrants in Iran were Shia Muslims until recently. Iran and Pakistan are both concerned about Afghans; they do not see Afghans as human beings, especially Iran. Pakistan, on the other hand, was better than Iran in that it allowed Afghans to get education and, in some cases, health treatment. Another group of Afghan refugees migrated into Pakistan between 1980 and 1985. Pashtuns and residents have settled in Peshawar on both sides of the Durand line. As

Afghans no longer regard the Durand line as an official boundary between the two nations, Hazara, Tajik, and other ethnic groups fled to Peshawar and Iran. The battle with Pakistan on the Durand line has lasted till now, and both nations are fighting for land. In addition, neighbors have a right to aid one other in difficult situations (IOM, 2019, pp. 16–17).

Following the fall of the Taliban regime, millions of Afghans returned to their homeland and resumed their lives there. Internally displaced people have also returned to their homes. As previously stated, international communities, donors, NGOs, the United States, Turkey, NATO, and other countries assisted and participated in the state's reconstruction. The mujahedeen victory in 1992, when Kabul fell, prompted the country's second major migrant influx. Many Afghans, notably the urban and educated middle class, fled to Pakistan and Iran at this time (IOM, 2019, p. 18).

2.15. Private Sector Activities in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a basic industrial sector, with the majority of industries concentrated in Kabul and a few large towns like Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. Traditional operations like as carpet weaving, dried fruit production, and other small-scale industries make up a major portion of contemporary industry. Traditional private sector service operations such as transportation and construction are two of the most important. Private enterprise has lately entered a number of non-traditional sectors that either did not exist in Afghanistan before mobile phones or were previously designated for the state sector (airlines and banks). Women weavers weave the majority of Afghanistan's carpets in villages. Through a network of domestic marketplaces and dealers, these products make their way to export markets. Many carpet weavers and businessmen fled to Pakistan during the fighting, primarily to Peshawar. As a result, the Afghan carpet sector in Afghanistan or displaced in Pakistan accounts for a substantial share of carpet exports in Pakistan's trade statistics. Raisins, long Afghanistan's most profitable export, have been limited with destruction to plantations and processing factories, however a recent preferential trade deal with India saw Afghan dried fruit exports return to fourth place in that market in 2003, a significant improvement (Bank, 2000, p. 72).

Traditional practices, like carpets or dried fruits, would need to be revived if they are to contribute considerably to broad-based growth. It will also be necessary to guarantee that smaller participants, particularly producers, profit more of these activities. According to recent studies of the carpet and raisin industries, producers receive just a small portion of the final price paid by the ultimate customers, such as 8–15 percent in the case of carpet weavers. Revival does not always imply reverting to previous techniques of manufacturing, processing and marketing. For certain industries, such as agricultural, quality assurance is placed far greater than it was 20 years ago. In Afghanistan, construction is growing and is projected to continue to be a main driver of private sector activity. The majority of road building, as well as new schools and clinics, is carried out by private companies (many of which are registered as NGOs), with foreign contractors handling the majority of road construction. Larger Afghan contractors located in Peshawar and Quetta may be encouraged to return since they have adequate expertise, trained employees, and equipment to undertake larger projects (Bank, 2000, p. 72).

On the other hand, many Afghan firms have completed successfully main road contracts and are progressively becoming eligible for secondary road contracts as subcontractors to multinational corporations. The Afghan construction sector is fast expanding, there are around 20–30 medium-sized firms with revenues of $1 million or more, and another 30–40 with revenues of $200,000 to $1 million. Using rules such as local content criteria, some funders are seeking to boost Afghan industry participation. Due to the construction boom, construction materials such as cement blocks, cement, steel, wood, steel products, bricks, aggregate, sand, plumbing and sanitary fittings, and glass are in great demand. Because Afghanistan's manufacturing capacity is limited. Imports (primarily from Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and to a lesser extent, the United Arab Emirates and China) meet the bulk of demand (Bank, 2000, p. 73).

There are three different types of trading patterns. First, major contractors import products for their own use; second, import/export firms buy from producers and sell to wholesalers, and third, who then sell to shops, large clients, and wholesalers which is rare. At the bottom end of the commodities chain, there are certain entrance obstacles. Small and medium-sized enterprises find it difficult to expand due to a lack of finance and vertical integration

at the high end of the firm. Bribes to towns, police, and judicial services appear to be widespread, and they operate as a deterrent to market participation. Currently, there are no quality controls in place to safeguard consumers from low-grade materials that often enter the market, and sub-standard building is prevalent. Telecommunications has seen the most private infrastructure investment. The public sector provides only extremely basic fixed-line communication services. Roshan, owned by a group led by the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Growth (fifty one percent), Monaco Telecom International (thirty five percent), MCT Corporation (nine percent), and Alcatel-Lucent (nine percent), was awarded a second mobile license in January 2003 after an international competitive tender process in 2002. The two mobile networks have received approximately $180 million in total investment, accounting for the majority of direct foreign investment in the nation. As a consequence, prices are in line with worldwide standards. Currently, the private sector plays a minor role in the primary energy generating, transmission, and distribution systems. Thousands of privately provided and maintained generators, on the other hand, are in use. These range in size from tiny residential generators to large diesel-powered generators used by workshops and small enterprises (Bank, 2000, p. 75).

A commercial water and sanitation sector has arisen in Afghanistan since the conclusion of the main battle. International organizations often use private contractors or a combination of private contractors and their own implementation efforts to dig wells, manufacture hand pumps, and install systems. A number of Afghan hand-pump producers are operating, illustrating how public service demand, such as from foreign aid agencies, may help Afghan private sector thrive. A shortage of serviced land, as well as unclear land titles, is a major impediment to investment in Afghanistan. Property titling is complicated, and it's not uncommon to find many paperwork for the same piece of land. The issue is being exacerbated by the return of migrants, who are causing regular confrontations. The possibility for resolving problems through the court system is limited due to a lack of court and judicial capacity, a lack of needed legal experience and insufficient guidance provided by legislation. There is no official business law as a result, property rights are ambiguous and uncertain. Land cannot be used to generate financial resources or to launch small businesses since it is difficult to collateralize. To overcome land and other constraints, the

Ministry of Commerce (MoC) is building an industrial park west of Kabul. (Bank, 2000, p. 76).

2.16. Recent Economic, Political Developments and Covid-19 in Afghanistan

In 2020, the COVID19 crisis put a strain on the economy, state budgets, and private-sector investment. While excellent weather conditions aided ongoing agricultural output and improved rural lives, lockdown measures and trade disruptions wreaked havoc on the urban services and industries sectors. Urban unemployment and suffering grew, but falling income hampered the government's ability to respond. With many businesses shuttered and jobs lost, recovery from the crisis now hinges on reinvestment and a boost in confidence. However, difficult political and security situations, as well as uncertainty about future foreign help, have hindered the restoration of trust. The government and the Taliban are making modest headway in their peace negotiations, but the number of Taliban strikes has increased. The scope and length of foreign security assistance, including the participation of international soldiers, is yet unknown. The international community pledged to maintain civilian grant funding during the Geneva Conference on Afghanistan in November 2020. However, overall commitments fell far below prior levels, and a considerable portion of pledged assistance was made conditional on the government making progress on peace talks, human rights protection, and corruption combat (Group, 2015, p. 1).

Growth projections are susceptible to a significant degree of uncertainty in the absence of fresh official national accounts data. Based on proxy indicators and preliminary National Statistics and Information Authority (NSIA) statistics, real GDP is estimated to have fallen by 1.9 percent in 2020. The agriculture industry is expected to increase by 5.3 percent in 2020, owing to excellent weather conditions and the rural economy's low impact from COVID-19 interruptions. The industry and services sectors, on the other hand, are expected to shrink by 4.2 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively, as a result of the lockdown measures and border restrictions. According to the results of a new Integrated Expenditure and Labor Force Survey, poverty dropped to 47.1 percent in 2019-20 from 54.5 percent in 2016-17. Due to increasing agricultural productivity during the 2018 drought, rural poverty dropped from 59% in 2016-17 to 47.6% in 2019-20. However, urban poverty rose to 47.6% in 2019-

20, up from 41.6% in 2016-17. Urban poverty may have worsened since then, with numerous private sector research indicating that the COVID-19 crisis resulted in greater unemployment and income loss for urban residents. Through 2020, the COVID-19 situation continued to put strain on Afghanistan's already-fragile health-care system, worsening the country's socio-economic problems. A total of 55,492 cases and 2,400 deaths has been officially documented as of February 15, 2021. With weak testing capacity, actual cases and fatalities may be far higher. COVID-19 tests had been done 276,878 times as of mid-February 2021, with a positive test rate of about 20%. This compares to India's 5.3% and Pakistan's 6.9%. Despite a modest increase in instances in mid-October, lockdown measures have been avoided since May 2020 (Group, 2015, p. 2,5).

Direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government began on September 12, 2020, following the Doha agreement struck between the US and the Taliban in February 2020. Under the terms of the US-Taliban agreement, US soldiers have withdrawn from offensive operations, large numbers of Taliban captives have been freed, and Taliban mass civilian fatality bombings and assaults on foreign forces have ceased. Despite this, Taliban attacks on Afghan security forces have increased, with over twenty civil society activists and other prominent citizens killed in a targeted murder operation. In response to sluggish progress with intra-Afghan discussions and sustained high levels of violence, the new US government launched a review of the Doha deal, including its pledge to withdraw all US forces by August 2021. A total of 865,793 Iranian and Pakistani refugees returned to Afghanistan for the first time in 2020. This was largely a campaign of forceful deportation of Afghans from Iran, set against the backdrop of terrible economic conditions brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic and international sanctions. Internal displacement remained a problem in 2020, with 397,138 people displaced as a result of violence (slightly down from 399,087 in 2019). In 2019-20, however, urban poverty has increased to 45.5 percent (up from 41.6 percent in 2016-17 and 24.6 percent in 2011-12). Due to challenges in the service and industrial industries, as well as the negative impacts of COVID-19 lockdowns and disruptions. Urban poverty peaked at 55.2 percent during the early phases of the pandemic, demonstrating the negative consequences of lockdown measures on work opportunities in the face of growing expenses. The trade imbalance decreased by approximately three

percentage points to 27.6 percent of GDP in 2020, compared to 30.4 percent in 2019. This was due to a considerably quicker reduction in imports relative to exports (Group, 2015, p. 5,9).

In the second quarter of 2020, the COVID-19 outbreak prompted severe travel restrictions and occasional border closures, affecting regional commerce and supply networks. By the end of June 2020, goods trade had decreased by 23.6 percent. The downturn was widespread, impacting many types of commodities. Border closures and trade restrictions were relaxed in the second part of the year, allowing commerce to increase. The trade imbalance decreased by approximately three percentage points to 27.6 percent of GDP in 2020, compared to 30.4 percent in 2019. This was due to a considerably quicker reduction in imports relative to exports. Exports decreased 10% due to COVID-19-induced border restrictions and sluggish demand in major trade partners, while imports fell 4.5 percent year on year (USD 278 million) due to weak domestic demand (a USD 87 million drop). Before the commencement of the COVID-19, exports increased by 11% in the first quarter of 2020. In the second quarter, however, exports plummeted due to border closures, transportation bottlenecks (both land and air), and lower demand in major export markets. Despite the elimination of border restrictions, exports fell 6% year over year in the third quarter before increasing 4% in the fourth. Due to border restrictions, exports to Iran and Pakistan decreased by 46.7 percent and 29 percent, respectively, in 2020 compared to 2019. Meanwhile, thanks to the recently established air corridor, shipments to India remained steady while exports to China rose by 78.5 percent. India and Pakistan, Afghanistan's top two export destinations, accounting for 80% of total exports (Group, 2015, pp. 13–14).

2.17. What Should Afghan Government do to Connect Urban/Rural Areas?

It is mentioned above that the connection of rural and urban areas in Afghanistan is very weak. Most rural population of the state move to urban areas for employment, job opportunities, good education system, great health care services and having basic services. Even at the capital Kabul people do not have relation to basic services. For instance, there is no canalization system in most large areas of the city, septic problems in the city with six million population, lack of electricity not having good health care system and there is

also not great education method. The government has to provide good and basic services to public. Afghan government has to invest in rural areas must improve infrastructure, construct roads for fast transportation, also to construct new hospitals for a good health care. Education methods must be improved especially in rural areas of Afghanistan for a bright future. To produce its own electricity to every corner of the state. The country currently imports over 670 MW of electricity from neighboring countries, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Tajikistan.

Till today there is a huge lack of electricity even in the capital urban places doesn't have 24 hours electricity it has some reasons, lack of electricity, militants destroy electric lines. The government must provide basic services in rural areas there is not a great management in administration of Afghanistan. Afghanistan state is compere to let the business men and foreign inverters to invest in urban-rural areas if there is an amusement park in the village people of the rural areas will go to near places for picnic and if there is shopping mall in rural or urban areas people will not go to big cities for shopping and spending their time there because it will also save their times and the profits even though crowed would be decreased. The Park process near the livelihood in the state, there must be green areas next to each house also a big park which would be shared by inhabitants and construct next to living areas that people to go and spend good quality time with family and friends. It will let the areas clean and the environment would be fresh and clean, people would be healthy too. The lack of public septic tanks there are no public septic tanks; instead, residents in certain small sections of the city utilize private septic tanks. According to a report, Afghanistan has the worst toilet infrastructure in the world, and some city residents drink water from a well near a septic, which might contaminate the water and cause issues for the residents. Many of them become ill as a result of their lack of access to clean, filtered water (Rahimi, 2011, pp. 1–2).

As a consequence of particular rubbish generated by industry, hospitals, and destruction/construction debris, the volume of waste has increased significantly; this buildup of mixed trash is dangerous to one's health. An integrated system for collecting and disposing of clinic waste and organic garbage separately is urgently needed. Over

2,400 bakeries in the city utilize wood burners, and dust fog frequently billows into the air around such enterprises (Rahimi, 2011, pp. 4–5).

CHAPTER THREE

GLOBALIZATION IN AFGHANISTAN

3.1. Globalization In Afghanistan

The silk routes that once crisscrossed Central Asia may never be conquered in Afghanistan. Under the pretext of development, the United States would retain permanent bases in the middle of it, a slingshot's distance from Central Asian oil wells and on the Iranian border. Borderless globalism's stakeholders, namely America and its allies worldwide, establish a "neo-imperial system" under their control. Battalions of organized relief workers trained in all but name as army troops have arrived with missionary zeal to realize global commercial projects while carrying firearms instead of food or medicine for their uplift. According to Zafar, Afghanistan Development and Reconstruction Institute (AFDARI), Australia's overseas assistance agency created and (UNAMA), as trying to alter Afghanistan's economic and cultural sectors while also undermining the nation-authority. The world capitalist economy is reinforced by investment obtained from pouring finance in unlikely isolated regions through coordinating ethnos cape and financial cape set by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), employees who run economic projects and do small international aid actions in backward areas Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Kabul (-Mustafa et al., 2019, p. 3).

The International Security Armed Forces (ISAF) personnel administer delegated for the aim of the global military order. While technoscapes, such as workplaces with modern transportation technology, satellite phones, the internet, and other related technologies, aid in the automation of global economic organization. (AFDARI) and (UNAMA) questioned the autonomy of the Afghan nation-state after the Taliban regime was ousted. Globalizers see Afghanistan as a chessboard where large, small, and local players engage in three-dimensional political and strategic games for their desired economic ventures at various levels. Afghanistan is a land of buried facts, many of which can be traced back to the American chess game in Central and South Asia (-Mustafa et al., 2019, p. 3).

3.2. Globalization and Afghanistan

Afghanistan was like an open field, a face that was simple to fill by powers after thirty years of vital fighting drove migration split the nation and a failing state. Foreign forces entered the state in a rush, not just with military force but also with economic might and cultural ideals. Globalization-related international institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, (UN) agencies, government funders (NGOs), the World Bank and private corporations from the north and other globalization factors have influenced the state in various ways over the years. The impact has mostly been cultural, political, and educational rather than economic. Only a limited number of multinational corporations have deemed it beneficial to invest in Afghanistan. The infrastructure is still poor and also education system is weak too. Agriculture is still the mainstay of the country's economy, despite being heavily influenced by global patterns the improvement plans. Especially in the cities globalization is visible culturally and technologically. From Kabul's perspective, after thirty years of isolation suddenly the changes appeared mostly from the look of rural areas not much has changed. With the support of (NGOs) and (UN) agencies till today, many things have changed in rural areas too after 2001, but not as much changes as much in urban. These agencies are trying to take out the rural from isolation with the support of the Afghan government. Globalization movements might be more evident in knowledge with the changes involving Islamic education influencing people all over the state. The reconstruction process of Afghanistan before and now are depending on international organizations and assistance communities. Through international assistance, world models have been forced on Afghanistan (-Mustafa et al., 2019, p. 4).

3.3. Political Overview on Globalization in Afghanistan

On 2001 7th October, America invaded Afghanistan with the main aim to arrest Usama Bin Ladin, who was claimed for the attacks on the Washington Towers. Six years later Usama Bin Ladin couldn’t catch by the American forces and the attacks continued. After many years of investigations, Bin Ladin was later arrested in Pakistan by American forces near a military camp. However, it's still a doubtable issue to many people that Bin Ladin's death is not clear. Even America shared some evidence, but it was not enough for the world.

Anyhow, the good thing is that Ladin is not in the world anymore and people do not hear from him. In 2001 December, UN-mediated a conference in Bonn with some foreign countries' representatives and about two hundred Afghans elected by the UN to represent the Afghan people. The conference decision added a temporary state, accepting of International Security Armed Forces (ISAF) and disarmament of all war lords in Afghanistan. New constitution, election, human rights commission, the promise of international assistance, and incentives for refugees were other measures. Anyhow, a reconciliation of commission near the model used in South Africa was not on the agenda; many Afghans expected it like this commission. It was very necessary after twenty-five years of wars in Afghanistan (Karlsson & Mansory, 2007, p. 186).

A few days later the Bonn conference president Karzai was in the palace. A liberal form of democracy was made for Afghanistan. But cultural structures were included too. Loya Jirgas were also asked twice in 2000 to legitimize the president and approve the new constitution. So, the constitution raised some concerns for instance, some did not like that Afghanistan was declared as an Islamic state and there was another big concern too that some thought the state could not protect women's rights. In 2004 the elections were fully under the control of Afghan forces, warlords and their militia. The presidential election attracted about 70-80% of voters, just fifty percent voted for National Assembly. The president was elected for six years more and 350 members since there were not the party system members were elected for four years and twenty five percent of women are members of the parliament. The relation between political influence and financial assistance is strong; about fifty percent of the financial aid from international organizations has been implemented. Before the peace deal between America and the Taliban and the withdrawal of international organizations leaving Afghanistan by 11 September 2021, and International (NGOs) profit-driven companies also have a strong effect and have role in policy issues as international organizations UN and World Bank (Karlsson & Mansory, 2007, pp. 186–187).

Civil society is a globalized term now described even in Afghanistan, also it worth nothing that the phenomena existed many before it was labeled. Social functions are still performed by civic, social, and volunteer institutions and organizations; most have an Islamic form.

It implements developmental projects in different areas of the state about twenty five percent of (NGOs) community improvement in Councils set in every involved village. The program aims at improving skills in joining consensus building, monitoring, procurement, accounting, and contract management national solidarity program in 2007. More than 22,000 projects, education, transport, water supplies, and electricity have been implemented in 16,000 communities. By 2021, it has increased to more projects, and more projects are under the work (Karlsson & Mansory, 2007, p. 188).

3.4. Economy

As mentioned above about economic view here will be described a little more the Afghan state has mentioned that the state wanted to build a liberal market economy and to do this there would be an enabling environment for the private sector. For instance, great direct foreign investment, sale of public land, for Afghans, it was embarking on new roads. In old times road construction mines and industrial companies were public affairs. The country played an essential role in improving plans details before the wars regarding economic improvement, especially in big waterpower and industrial projects. Moreover, there were no state farms, market business was privatized, and the state had never had a planned economy like which is now. As it is known Afghanistan is in the tough condition right now with the withdrawal of America and international organization. The state is facing some security and financial problems it will be considered if America and international organizations withdraw what the country should do and must have a policy and strategic plans for the next decades which Afghanistan doesn't have. It's because of corruption, conflicts, and disunity of the people. The current state is committed to privatization agenda according to national development strategy; the budget issued from 2005 and onwards to give imaginable funds to the development of the private sector in industrial activities was looking to be a hard thing to do. According to the ministry of finance, in 2006, the economic growth was going to be ten percent per year, and it was close to increase, but due to conflicts now, even the economic growth decreased back. Buildings have been constructed, and infrastructure have been developed mostly by and for private interests, for instance, show off is, the newly built houses are almost built of glass the difference is immense to the surroundings, lack of sanitation and water, no trash collection, random electricity

supplies, no sewage system, etc. Total country budget has three aspects; the developing budget; the operational budget; external budget which is funded by (USAID), (EU), and (JICA), Japan International Cooperation Agency. In a country like Afghanistan, the poor state cannot mediate between the national/local and global. The 2006 budget shows an example of marginalization and dependency of the state as Afghanistan. Afghanistan is considered as it produces the world's 90% opium. Also, much of the profits arising from the opium trade, it will be discussed (Karlsson & Mansory, 2007, pp. 188-189–190).

3.5. Technology

After the 1970s, to today corruption in the state have been increased. Most state employees were never fired technically or officially. They remained in power, also continued their jobs by power and backed up from their political leader, that's why there is huge corruption in the state today. For decades governmental institutions and organizations had been dysfunctional and large sections of the administration are acting ministers. Just some powerful people had the authority everywhere also they had nothing to do, just taking their salaries and travel to the world they were not care about Afghan people. At the beginning of 2001, in public offices in cities where electricity was available many people did not know how to use computers, software, servers, printers, and scanners. They couldn't control the new facilities at offices. Still, the young men are enthusiastic learning computers and are familied with technology. Today young generation knows better and is familiar with technology, and computer skills have become a desired commodity on the market. Telephone and access to the internet was for a few people. These days internet access and telephones have a good market in Afghanistan the isolation of rural areas also made it possible that every family has access to internet and phones. People in rural areas now have access to televisions and through these telecommunications, technologies people have access to news information and more (Karlsson & Mansory, 2007, pp. 190–191).

3.6. Culture

Taliban banned TV, music, cinemas, and the world was responded to it as the Taliban regime collapsed. At the beginning of 2007, there were just seven national TV channels. There are more than two hundred international and local TV channels there are now more than many radio channels, many magazines, and newspapers, music, CD, DVD, films to buy. Hollywood and Bollywood flooded the market, but local films don't have bazaar. After 2001 India came with many Bollywood films to Afghanistan and spread their soft power in the state. Commercial hug a great deal of time in radio and TV. Young women and men with skills of computer and English were hired in differ projects by international agencies to have jobs with them. International NGOs represent values like secularism and individualism rationality and that also attracts young Afghans; there are some Christian companies, but these companies do not attract many people. Women's isolation in Afghanistan is a sensitive and complicated issue; women seclusion by Afghan men is understood as protection, women also have the right to work as men do in Islam. In Islamic view education is compulsory by both men and women. There is a need in society for both men and women one is incomplete then other. Of course, there are limits for women and men in society according to Islam and science, but in Afghan society, women face many problems. There are no equal rights between men and women in many aspects in Afghanistan. In the Taliban regime, women were not allowed to go to high schools and get educated, but the girl children were allowed to go to Islamic Madrasas. In 2001 after the democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was established, girls were allowed to go to schools and universities. There are hundreds of thousands of schools and universities for both boys and girls (Karlsson & Mansory, 2007, pp. 191–192).

3.7. Globalization and Education

Globalization is a process, which has affected many areas of human life, one of those being education. In the twentieth century, many developing countries have experienced growth in the educational facilities available due to the entry of institutions from the West. Some believe that this process is an invaluable opportunity for the people of the developing countries to raise their skills and education standards. Others fear that it is merely a modern

version of cultural imperialism that will create a universal, ultimately Western society. One aspect of the globalization of education has been the creation of twinning projects between one Western and one non-Western University. Education has become more globalized as a result of globalization. The goal of transferring Western nations to developing countries is to increase the people's skills and capacities. Under the influence of globalization, education is continually shifting. The impacts of globalization on education are foreseeing changes within educational systems around the world as ideas, values, and knowledge, transforming the roles of students and instructors, and causing a transition in society from industrialization to an information-based society. It represents the cultural impact and ushers in a new era of cultural imperialism. It provides quick technological and communication advancements, foreseeing changes in school systems throughout the world as concepts, values, and knowledge (Mcgreal & Chambers, 2006, p. 67).

The ability of countries to compete in a global market where industrial-based economies are giving way to knowledge-based industry sectors, realizing the importance of knowledge skills. The intellectual capacity to meet the challenges of increased change and uncertainty is often what determines their future. In Afghanistan, people have also experienced huge changes in technology and education, especially after the collapse of the Taliban regime. Western education took place at the universities of Afghanistan; as mentioned above, some people think Western education is cultural imperialism is true because it will impact the new generation, and many people will be affected by culture. In Afghanistan, as mentioned above there are Islamic Madrasas which people learn there also, there is nothing out of culture or Islam that the Taliban have fear of. It’s seen that a good thing the new generation is improving technologically, socially, and educationally for a great future. People should work hard, and smarter the world is changing once it is more modern and developed. After the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, many hundreds of thousands of schools and universities have been established in recent two decades, including foreign universities, for instance, American university thousands of students get education, but one wild and savage thing is that the Taliban till today attack on universities and schools. Lasts year, on 2th November 2020 Taliban attacked Kabul University. More than thirty people have died, and more than fifty were wounded, universities, schools are

the places to learn in centers must not be involved in the war. Such improvements in education paint that there has been a shift from industrialization to an information-based society. During the Covid19 pandemic, technology played a big role as the world is still facing the invisible enemy everywhere were closed all the world were in quarantine and lockdown. Most people, organizations, institutions, and governments continued jobs from their homes. Everything was depending on the internet (Mcgreal & Chambers, 2006, p. 68).

3.8. Poverty and Economic Globalization in Afghanistan

According to the United Nations, the previous four decades of military conflict have worsened poverty and hampered attempts to reduce it. Armed warfare is one of the numerous reasons of one-third of Afghans live in abject poverty with another 36% living on the verge of starvation. Afghanistan is one of the world's low-income countries in the twenty-first century, and it has been devastated by war. Infrastructure, agriculture, industry, financial markets, commerce, education, governmental system and organizations, labor market, and the country's health care system are all affected. Unemployment is a lack of basic health and education facilities, poverty, corruption, the opium economy, weak governance, and national security forces, a lack of access to safe water, an unstable and non-professional extraction system, which accounts for nearly 10% of GDP in 2010, and a trade deficit of nearly 40% in 2010 were among the top challenges (Tabesh, 2012, p. 3).

In emerging nations like Afghanistan, globalization and its influence on poverty will be significant. The history of globalization is a relatively young phenomenon, began shortly after a new government was created and the Taliban administration was deposed. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Bonn international conference, Afghanistan's issues became globalized. All international organizations focused on eradicating terrorism's roots in Afghanistan, which had become a haven for terrorists. Following the fall of the Taliban rule, many internally or externally displaced Afghans returned to their homes, and most youngsters began attending school. Afghan people formed our government via elections. Afghan administration is attempting to restore and rebuild some of the areas that have been damaged. Despite this, Afghanistan remains one of the world's

poorest countries regarding GDP and per capita income. Insecurity, instability, corruption, weak governance, and a lack of law are the most difficult challenges for Afghanistan to overcome in terms of poverty reduction. A substantial portion of the population is afflicted by poor food intake, a lack of social services, and a scarcity of resources. Afghanistan's economy has also been harmed by four decades of political and social war. Furthermore, great governance policy reforms and effective currency reforms have helped most impacted sectors recover in the last ten years, particularly in the financial and business sectors. Afghanistan's economy has strengthened and has been empowered to combat the difficulties (Tabesh, 2012, p. 5).

After the Taliban era, Afghanistan has achieved prosperity as a worldwide country. Afghanistan has been globalized and the state has political, cultural, social, and economical relations with other countries of the world. Having relationships with other countries means that it can inspire foreign direct investment and improve productivity and exports to maintain a positive trade balance. Afghanistan has encouraged and supported both domestic and foreign businesses to invest in the economy since 2001. Finally, it can readily be perceived that globalization directly impacts employees and the purchasing power of labor force in a country. It can be confidently declared that the idea that international trade inevitably makes the rich wealthier and the poor weak. It must be adopted the policies that successful emerging nations have taken to increase their integration with the global economy and thrive, in some cases spectacularly (Tabesh, 2012, p. 6).

3.9. Narcotics Trafficking in Afghanistan

No other aspect of Afghanistan's economy shows the fingerprints of globalization as plainly as drugs, which help the state's financial survival while also posing a danger to its statehood. The illegal economy in which drugs was a major component and the only mature element of Afghanistan's economy to survive decades of conflict. While Afghanistan's opium production was already fully integrated with the global economy by 2001, international anti-opium policies and world market forces have cemented the country's position as an opium producer since then. Opium cultivation is now two and a half to three times larger in hectares than from 1994 to 2002, and output has been continuously

increasing since 2002. Afghanistan produces over 90% of the world's opium, and almost all of the opium and morphine basis for heroin found in Eurasia comes from Afghanistan. Opium has been a benefit to local businesses as well. Farmers can invest in the agriculture sector and acquire household items by growing opium. This income, on the other hand, had a negative inflationary effect on areas markets ("The Bright and Dark Sides of Altruism," 2018, p. 48).

The political economy of drugs in Afghanistan is an essential element. Opium is grown particularly in regions where it is large areas. Local tribal institutions and the insurgency have aided the establishment of manufacturing and trafficking networks across the nation, particularly in regions along major trade routes. Opium is transited through the northern network from Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan to Tajikistan. It is disseminated or exchanged by big Central Asian and Russian mafias spanning Eurasia and Eastern Europe. The Taliban, who has a greater hold on the region, controls trafficking considerably more strictly and brutally along the Southern route. Helmand, in the south, is the world's single greatest opium production. Opium from Farah, Herat, and Badghis is frequently smuggled to Iran, where a vast consumer market of millions of drug addicts exists. It may also readily go to Turkey and Europe via Iran ("The Bright and Dark Sides of Altruism," 2018, p. 49).

3.10. The Future of Afghanistan and The Political Parties in Pakistan

Three scenarios will be described the Future of Afghanistan and political parties in Pakistan. Fizza Batool asked the political leaders of the Pakistani parties to predict their involvement in three possible future scenarios during interviews. First, the Taliban agreeing to share power as a political actor in exchange for minor changes to the current republic system; second, a stalemate in which the Taliban reverts to the use of force for political control while the government maintains the current republic system; and third, the outbreak of a civil war reminiscent of the 1990s. First Scenario: continuation of the ongoing republic system with Taliban as a political actor (Joas, 2012, p. 6).

All respondents said that this situation was highly unlikely, as the peace dialogue would take years and would necessitate significant changes in Afghanistan's present political

structure. They all agreed, however, to assist in the improvement of diplomatic relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Especially Pakistan often promised Afghanistan that Pakistan would not support terrorists and Taliban and would work for a peaceful Afghanistan and region. Still, Pakistan did not keep its promises and, till now supporting the Taliban. While Pashtun elders agreed to help mediate talks between the two countries on the thorny Af-Pak border issue, Islamist political figures. Both strands of politics advocated changing the Durand Line to a soft border and eliminating the border barrier, which was seen as detrimental to national and public interests. Importantly, Pakistani Islamist groups were not enthusiastic about the republic's continued existence in Afghanistan. Second one: delay in the peace process with the continuation of violence. When questioned about the intra-Afghan dialogue's future, many respondents from Islamic and Pashtun political groups expected something along the lines of second scenario. Amid a deadlock, Pashtun political figures have stated that they would continue to support and encourage the Ghani government by backing its position as the legitimate government in Kabul. Pashtun parties might function as a political counterweight to Taliban-led operations in Pakistan and the Pakistani government's use of the Taliban as a stooge. The Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) plays an essential role in this respect since it has been aggressively mobilizing against the Pakistan government's backing for the Taliban. On the other hand, Islamist political groups, thought that maintaining links between both the Taliban and the Pakistani state was vital to Pakistan's national interests and should keep pressing both Taliban and Afghan government negotiators to restart the peace dialogue process in the event of a stoppage or impasse. That’s the Pakistani state should take a similar stance while without openly intervening in Afghanistan's domestic affairs (Joas, 2012, pp. 6–7).

Third Scenario: civil war. The majority believed that the spillover effect on Pakistan would shift the focus of Pakistani political parties inward due to the stakes regional and global forces had in Afghanistan, given the likely influx of refugees and possible disruption in the security situation in their political strongholds in (KPK) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. Civil conflict in Afghanistan, according to certain Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) officials, might

encourage Pashtun separatist groups. Most people assumed that Pakistani Pashtuns would not support a separatist movement since they have urbanized and had business interests in non-Pashtun areas like Karachi. Since many years of conflict between parties in Pakistan and not giving the same rights to all ethnic groups, Baluch and Pashtuns in Pakistan want to be independent to have their constitution, land, languages, and control their land. Pakistan's government creates many problems for other ethnic groups, and that's why Pashtun and Baluch secessionists want to separate from Pakistan (Joas, 2012, p. 7).

3.11. Afghanistan and India Relations

Kabul and New Delhi's relations will be described in three different stages. The first stage started with the independence of India in 1947 with the end of the cold war. Afghanistan-Pakistan territorial disputed, specifically involving Durand line and Pashtunistan, brought Kabul and New Delhi nearby. At this period, India enjoyed great relations with Afghanistan. The second stage started in 2011 with the end of the Cold War and lasted until the Taliban administration was overthrown in 2001. During this period of civil conflict, Islamic extremism, and jihadist terrorism, India's relations with Afghanistan were strained. India's influence fluctuated, falling after the overthrow of the Najibullah administration and briefly rebounding under the tenure of Burhanuddin Rabbani in 1992-96. New Delhi's influence in Afghanistan was eclipsed by Islamabad after the Taliban regime which Pakistan supported came to power in 1996 (Silk & Strategy, 2017, pp. 29–30).

The third stage started with the overthrow of the Taliban administration in 2001. India has been strengthening bilateral ties and recovering influence in Afghanistan throughout this time. India has risen to prominence as the most powerful regional force, investing in the development of Afghan institutions. New Delhi has given Kabul $2 billion in economic help since 2001 and has promised another $1 billion in the coming years. Because India's security depends on Afghanistan's stability, New Delhi has backed the expansion of democratic institutions, which has been ravaged by decades of violence and turmoil. Kabul took the brave step of altering its current rules and conducting business with Pakistan after Ashraf Ghani became Afghan president in 2014. Ghani's policy looked to give tremendous

promise for fostering peace between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which was a welcome change from the past. By time, Ghani's capacity to affect the transformation in Pakistan's stance toward Afghanistan that so many had hoped for became severely limited. Despite his diplomatic effort to Pakistan, the two countries relations deteriorated. Ghani has subsequently expressed his dissatisfaction with Pakistan's failure to persuade the Afghan Taliban to enter discussions, accusing them of disrupting regional peace and security (Silk & Strategy, 2017, pp. 30–31).

In the late 1990s, New Delhi was kept out of Kabul due to Pakistan's close ties with both Taliban and India's staunch opposition to such ties. Following the Taliban's fall, India handed up control of the insurgency to the US and limited its involvement to "soft power" measures. Given Pakistan's sensitivity to India's direct participation in Afghanistan, India made it clear that it had no plans to send soldiers to the country. India was correct in its assessment that Indians in Afghanistan were becoming sitting ducks for the battle-hardened and Pakistan-backed Taliban. Pakistan's ideological preoccupation with anti-Indianism and its operational requirement of acquiring strategic depth in Afghanistan have always put a bad light on India's participation in the war-torn country's rebuilding and growth. During Ghani's meetings with Indian officials, they discussed collaboration and aid in various areas, including healthcare, education, agriculture, disaster relief, electricity generation, and election management. Furthermore, both parties "stated commitment to work together with the international community to confront and eradicate the scourge of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations according to the statement. In December 2015, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi conducted an unexpected visit to Kabul. After becoming Prime Minister, he made his first trip to Afghanistan. Manmohan Singh, the former Prime Minister of India, visited Kabul in 2005 and 2011. Modi revealed two of India's most significant projects in Afghanistan during his visit: the opening of the Afghanistan parliament building and the handover of four Mi-25 assault helicopters. In June 2016, Modi visited Herat in western Afghanistan, where he and Ghani jointly inaugurated the Afghan-India Friendship Dam, formerly known as the Salma Dam. This was his second trip to Afghanistan in six months. The importance of Indo-Afghan ties was underscored by

Afghanistan's decision to bestow the Amir Amanullah Khan Award on Modi, the country's highest civilian honor (Silk & Strategy, 2017, p. 34).

In post-Taliban Afghanistan, India has developed numerous rebuilding and development programs as part of a soft power strategy. To mention only two high-profile development projects financed by New Delhi, India constructed the Afghan Parliament building and funded the Afghan-India Friendship Dam. Rebuilding air links, power plants and investing in the health and education sectors are part of India's support for Afghanistan. India assists Afghanistan in the training of government officials, diplomats, and police officers. India has been open to the Afghan people, allowing collaboration in various sectors based on deep historical ties. Every year, thousands of Afghans travel to India for tourism, medical care, and education. India has agreed to let the Afghan government to use Indian satellites for communication. Although New Delhi claims that its aid to Kabul is for infrastructure development and capacity building, it is primarily motivated by India's geopolitical objectives. In Afghanistan, India has two key strategic goals that it hopes to achieve through aid. For starters, India does not want the Taliban's hardline political Islam to resurface and impose itself. Second, India does not want Pakistan to acquire strategic depth in Afghanistan and use its advantage to jeopardize India's security. In the fight against Islamists and terrorists, both countries have fostered strategic and military collaboration (Silk & Strategy, 2017, p. 36).

Strengthened economic and business ties are also a result of increased civilian collaboration. Afghanistan is a landlocked state that relies on Pakistan's Karachi port for maritime access. This advantage has given Islamabad significant clout in Kabul, which it has used to exert pressure on Afghan administrations on several occasions. The situation altered, much to Pakistan's chagrin, when India sponsored the building of a 135-mile road connecting Afghanistan's Nimroz region with the Iranian port of Chabahar. This initiative "built a new transportation channel that breaks Pakistan's monopoly on seaborne transit commerce to Afghanistan. The Zaranj Delaram Highway runs from Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar to Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhshan region, connecting sixteen of Afghanistan's thirty provinces. The highway connects the Indian subcontinent with

landlocked Central Asia by creating north-south transportation channels (Silk & Strategy, 2017, p. 36).

As a result, India's involvement has served as an example of its "soft power." Since 2001, New Delhi has committed more than $3 billion to Afghanistan's development. India has also promised to “provide further support to the Afghan national defense and security forces in the fight against terrorism, organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering. Both India and the US have concluded that no progress can be sustained without substantial foreign military assistance for the Kabul administration, it appears plausible to claim that India's relationship with Afghanistan will include a major security component. In addition, the Modi government has decided to implement up to 116 high-impact community development projects in thirty-one Afghan provinces, as agreed in a meeting between India's External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani in New Delhi on September 11th, 2017. Education, healthcare, irrigation, agriculture, water supplies, renewable energy, flood management, micro-hydropower, sports, and administrative infrastructure would all benefit from these expenditures. India's goal is to improve the capability of the Afghan government and security forces, allowing them to combat the Afghan Taliban and ISIS more effectively (Silk & Strategy, 2017, p. 37).

The war in Afghanistan, which started in 2001, has proven to be the longest American participation in an overseas conflict. The US has spent over $800 billion, and almost 2,400 American troops have died as a result. There were several new components and emphases in US President Donald Trump's new Afghanistan strategy. Pakistan's strategy of harboring and nurturing the Afghan Taliban, notably its most dangerous arm, the Haqqani network, has been noted by Trump. US government has been giving Pakistan billions of dollars while they've been harboring the exact terrorists, we're fighting president added that will have to alter and that is going to change right away. Trump's appeal to India to enhance its participation in Afghanistan was one aspect of Trump's speech that shook Pakistan. It’s appreciated that India's major contributions to Afghanistan's stability, but India trades with the US for billions of dollars, and America want India to help more with Afghanistan, particularly in the area of economic support and development president Trump added. In

response to Trump's call for India to do more, it was pointed out that India was already assisting Afghanistan because of their long-standing friendship. India have been steadfast in extending reconstruction and development assistance to Afghanistan in keeping with our long-standing friendship with its people. India will continue to work on these issues, including in collaboration with other countries. Afghan government officials praised Trump's approach to the war in Afghanistan for raising service levels, eliminating rigid timetables, and increasing pressure on Pakistan. This is the first time the US administration is coming with a very clear-cut warning to Pakistan either to stop what you're doing or suffer the bad results. (Silk & Strategy, 2017, pp. 37–38).

3.12. The Water Dispute Between Afghanistan and Iran

Unlike Afghanistan and Pakistan or Pakistan and India, Iran and Afghanistan have no serious territorial issues. However, as each side suffers from droughts, climate change, and a lack of adequate water management, a simmering conflict over the allotment of water from the Helmand River jeopardizes their partnership. Both nations have continued to construct dams and drill wells without conducting environmental impact assessments, altered water flows, and planted crops unsuited to the changing climate. There are likely to be rising crises without greater management and international assistance. It's also critical to improve and explain current agreements. Water conflicts between Iran and Afghanistan stretch back to the 1870s when Afghanistan was ruled by the British. The Iran-Afghan boundary was drawn along the Helmand River's main branch by a British officer. Reza Shah Pahlavi's Iranian government and Mohammad Zahir Shah's Afghan government signed a contract in 1939 to share the river's water, however, the Afghans failed to approve it. In 1948, a new attempt to resolve the conflict was launched in Washington. Iran and Afghanistan chose a three-person panel to study the matter and recommend based on an American idea. The Helmand River Delta Commission submitted their findings on February 28, 1951, proposing that Iran's share of Helmand waters be twenty-two cubic meters per second. Iran, on the other hand, rejected the findings and demanded a greater share. After then, there was a protracted period of renegotiation. In 1969, the shah’s minister of justice, Asadullah Alam, wrote in his journals that Afghanistan had promised additional water in exchange for greater access to the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar

Abbas and development aid. During 1973, Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida and Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Musa Shafiq signed an agreement accepting a flow of twenty-two cubic meters per second into Iran, with the possibility of Iran acquiring an extra four cubic meters per second in normal water years. In exchange, Iran pledged to open its Chabahar and Bandar Abbas ports to Afghanistan without any restrictions. Due to political developments in both countries, including a 1973 coup in Afghanistan, the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that same year, and eventually the establishment of the Taliban in 1995, this agreement was never approved or fully executed (Aman & Fatemah, 2016, pp. 1–2).

3.13. Irrigation Dams and Canals

In the Helmand valley, successive Afghan administrations have attempted to improve agriculture by building irrigation dams and canals. In the 1930s, Germany and Japan both tried to rebuild historic canals for Afghanistan, but their efforts stopped following their loss in World War II. In 1946, the Afghan government hired Morrison-Knudsen, a US corporation to construct irrigation systems and roads in the southern Helmand-Arghandab valleys. US assistance was used to fund this project. Halfway through repairing ancient canals, Morrison-Knudsen proposed that a storage dam and reservoir be erected to make the greatest use of the restored water. The construction was completed without previously performing surveys to keep costs low which proved to be the project's fatal flaw. The Arghandab Dam, 18 miles northeast of Kandahar and stands at 44.2 meters (145 feet), was built in 1952 and had 388,000 acre-feet of water storage capacity. The Kajaki Dam, seventy-two miles upstream from Lashkar Gah, was completed a few months later, in April 1953. The dam developed to supply energy, agricultural water, and flood control, and it produced Afghanistan's most significant water reservoir. Appropriate soil and topographical studies were not conducted, despite a 1950 UN study casting doubt on the project's financial viability and predicting significant environmental impacts in the lower valley, including waterlogging and salinization downstream from the dam. Rain and melting glaciers provide Afghanistan's water source. Three out of every five important rivers in the nation drain into neighboring countries. One of two rivers that flow into Iran is the Helmand; the other is the Hari. Surface water makes up two-thirds of Afghanistan's

water capacity of 75 billion cubic meters, and the nation can only use 25 to 30% of its river water flow. The Helmand River is Afghanistan's longest river accounting for approximately 40% of the country's surface water. Helmand is a vital source of income for Afghanistan's southern and southwestern regions, accounting for 95 percent of the country's total. As a result, Helmand has become a national issue that any Afghan administration appears to find more impossible to handle. Helmand water is increasingly becoming a national concern in Iran. In reality, all of Iran's governments since 1979 have had the same fundamental stance on the water issue with Afghanistan (Aman & Fatemah, 2016, pp. 2–3).

3.14. The Hamouns

The Hamouns are three lakes on the Iran-Afghan border: Hamoun-e Helmand, which is fully within Iran; Hamoun-e Sabari, which lies on the border; and Hamoun-e Puzak, which is almost entirely within Afghanistan. The Helmand River supplies water to the three lakes, which are connected and nourished by it. According to historical data ancient civilizations have lived on the banks of the Hamoun lakes for more than 5,000 years. These lakes and marshes historically supported a significant deal of plant and animal variety in the Sistan Basin. Drought and irrigation diversions, such as dykes along the Iran-Afghan border and four reservoirs built by Tehran in the region of Sistan-Baluchistan, have diverted water away from the Hamouns. The Iranian Fisheries Company introduced an unknown type of fish into the lake in 1983, which had a significant impact, the fish consumed almost all of the reeds in the wetlands. Dams and canals for irrigation programs in Afghanistan's Helmand, Nimrooz, and Kandahar provinces also decreased lake water levels. As a result, the Hamoun lakes are virtually extinct, as there are the birds and fish that the local inhabitants formerly relied on for survival. The issue was made worse when the Taliban regime in Afghanistan stopped the Kajaki Dam and cut off water to Iran from 1998 to 2001, during which time the region experienced one of its worst droughts. Iran has accused Afghanistan of using the Helmand River as a political instrument. Some in Afghanistan believe that Iran is using Afghan refugees in Iran as a countermeasure to exert pressure on Afghanistan. In turn, Afghanistan might use water as leverage to compel Iran to improve its treatment of Afghan refugees. There may be a public reaction against Afghans in Iran

if there is a sense that Kabul is blackmailing Tehran, says Mohsen Milani, executive director of the University of South Florida's Center for Strategic and Diplomatic Studies (Aman & Fatemah, 2016, pp. 3–4).

3.15. The Recent Performance of Afghan Economy

The starting point was dire for recent developments in Afghanistan late 2001 when the Taliban fell. With cereal grain production down by half, livestock herds decimated, orchards and vineyards destroyed by war and drought, over five million people displaced as refugees in neighboring states, and remaining economic activities steered in an informal or illicit direction by insecurity and a lack of support services; the Afghan economy was reeling. Although the infrastructure and many employees remained, the Afghan state has practically ceased operating in policymaking and service delivery (Bank, 2000, p. xvi).

Low food intake, asset loss, a lack of social services, impairments such as from land-mine accidents disempowerment, and insecurity afflicted and continue to afflict a large number of people. The Taliban's effective prohibition on opium poppy growing, enacted in 2000, had little impact on opium commerce presumably due to accumulated stocks, and was devastating to the livelihoods of several impoverished farmers and rural wage workers, especially through opium-related debts. The collapse of the state effectively cut off the poor from access to services. The poor were disproportionately affected by insecurity which had various negative consequences, one of which was the huge number of female-headed families. Even while the fabric of family’s kinship groupings and other traditional clusters has stayed together rather successfully. As seen by the high number of inward remittances the local infiltration of the warlord and commander culture has had negative consequences. Afghanistan has been largely excluded from global growth during the previous forty five years (Bank, 2000, p. xvii).

The government's sound macroeconomic policies—a highly successful currency reform in late 2002, a prudent "no overdraft" set of policies prohibiting domestic financing of the budget deficit, conservative monetary policy that has kept inflation at around 10% per year, and good exchange rate management—have all contributed to the country's recent strong

growth performance. Domestic revenue mobilization has also improved, rising from nil in 2001 to over 4% of GDP in 2003; trade reform—import duties have been rationalized, and customs administration reforms are in the works; and financial sector reform, with the Central Bank becoming legally autonomous and several foreign banks setting up shop in Kabul. From agricultural production and processing to mining, building, trade, and other services, Afghanistan has a lot of room for expansion. Exploiting Afghanistan's geographic location as a land bridge between South and Central Asia may potentially be a source of growth through commerce, transportation, resource sharing, and collaborative development. Women's participation in the economy should be expanded to promote broad-based growth. The informal economy, which encompasses a wide variety of activities in terms of legality and market orientation and accounts for roughly 80–90 percent of the total economy including drugs has served as a coping mechanism for Afghans' survival during conflict has demonstrated considerable dynamism. Its response to shocks and short-term possibilities is adaptable. On the other hand, the informal sector is the result of conflict-related instability, limited time horizons, degradation of the rule of law, and a lack of public services. All of which have impacted businesses decisions to stay informal, tiny avoid longer-term investments. The informal economy's dominance is a self-reinforcing equilibrium that maintains most economic activity informal and makes tax mobilization, state construction, security, ultimately competitiveness and growth difficult (Bank, 2000, p. xvii).

3.16. Towards a Sustained Growth and Reduce Poverty

Afghanistan faces significant challenges in maintaining its recent rapid economic progress, which will require the leadership of a strong, competitive private sector. Insecurity and a lack of the rule of law fueled by the drug industry, which has a vested interest in maintaining an atmosphere of insecurity and lawlessness regulatory burden and corruption despite the government's pro-private sector policy orientation and pursuit of trade and tax reforms, there is still excessive red tape in obtaining permits, land allocations, and the lack of key support services. There is a lack of a framework and infrastructure for standards, quality assurance, weights and measures, and testing, which are important for export growth. Afghanistan's growth strategy must be multi-faceted in order to alleviate these

constraints and enable the Afghan private sector to generate broad-based economic activity and robust growth on a competitive basis including export competitiveness, which will be necessary for the long run to replace the eventual decline in external assistance. Breaking out of the informal equilibrium and moving toward a formal equilibrium, in which many successful and growing entrepreneurs become part of the formal economy over time, investing, registering themselves, paying taxes, and benefiting from the rule of law and availability of services will be associated with sustained economic growth. This does not imply that the entire economy would be structured, much less rapidly, but rather that a large, active formal sector would emerge. Importing resources, such as aid and technical assistance, military and police assistance, imports of goods and services, foreign investment, and ideas, capital, and abilities from Afghans living abroad can support rapid economic growth and jump-start the process of "formalization" in the short term. External aid through budget channels should be increased, contracts provided through transparent, competitive bidding, and sound fiduciary procedures maintained to help support the formal equilibrium. Domestic capacity-building must be a key component of this strategy (Bank, 2000, p. xvii,xviii).

Economic growth will allow people to create assets by allowing them to invest and repay loans from their earnings and accumulate physical capital such as cattle. Increasing possibilities for impoverished people will also necessitate the development of human capital, community asset-building initiatives, and asset financing through microcredit, among other things. Women's economic empowerment will contribute to both broad-based growth and poverty reduction. Finally, advances in security should help the poor a poverty reduction plan would thus contain, in addition to growth, the following key elements: Poor people's asset creation, aided by a variety of well-targeted, cost-effective initiatives, some of which, such as microfinance and agricultural development, would assist both growth and poverty reduction. Public works employment programs and other sources of income can assist the disadvantaged in preserving and building physical assets over time. While the official sector is easy to distinguish, the informal sector encompasses many economic activities. The act of registering or paying taxes is typically seen as a formality. The government's documented operations, which account for 3% of GDP and about 350,000

employees, are, by definition, primarily formal. Businesses that are registered and included in the official private sector, even if they may also engage in informal activities. The formal sector also includes registered operations but is exempt from law taxation, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Starting from a relatively low foundation, official (non-opium), GDP increased by 29% in 2002 and 16 percent in 2003. Agriculture accounted for two-thirds of the increase, owing to improved precipitation and seed and fertilizer supplies. Cereal production has increased significantly, but opium production has also increased. Services are expanding, especially in large cities, construction, and government, connected to the restoration effort. 2.4 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan, and 600,000 internally displaced persons have returned to their homes, indicating increased trust (Bank, 2000, pp. 2-3–4).

In general, most employment in Afghanistan is in the informal sector, with most people in rural regions dependent on various jobs outside of agriculture to make ends meet. Informal activities improve access to commodities and services (such as food) (credit associated with opium cultivation). They also lend money to people, both in and out of the formal economy. The opium economy is a key source of durable goods, housing, and, less commonly, working capital investment. The informal economy's domination in Afghanistan results from a self-reinforcing equilibrium that includes a failing government, conflicting power bases, insecurity, a lack of the rule of law, and a very unfavorable investment climate for formal-sector operations. Because the government is unable to provide security throughout the country, local authorities warlords assume this responsibility, resulting in decreased government income and, as a result, even less capacity to provide security. Afghanistan's history aided the establishment of the "informal equilibrium. The Afghan economy before 1978 was dualistic, with a small but expanding urban economy in contrast to a vast rural sector that was informal yet export-linked to international markets. The government-funded its development budget mostly through overseas sources, avoiding the need for significant domestic taxation. The Soviet occupation emphasized distinguishing between a state with foreign backing and a formal economy in government-controlled areas and an informal economy in non-government-controlled areas (Bank, 2000, pp. 4–5).

Chapter four

America's Policy for Afghanistan

4.1. Afghanistan And USA Bilateral Agreement

On September 11, 2001, the Islamist terrorist group Al Qaeda carried out a series of coordinated terrorist strikes in the United States. Al Qaeda's leadership was located in Pakistan. But America thought that Bin Laden was based in Afghanistan, wherein the Taliban regime was in power. President George W Bush stated that people who house terrorists are also terrorists. A friendly administration in Kabul is required for US soldiers to look for Al Qaeda members there. In addition, the administration sought UN support for military action. The United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001, expressing the Council's readiness to take all necessary actions to react to the September 11 attacks. When the Taliban refused to extradite Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the Bush administration started military operations against them to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and undermine the Taliban regime's military capacity. With Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001, combat activities in Afghanistan began (OEF). Initial military operations largely consisted of US air attacks on Taliban and Al Qaeda troops, which were aided by a limited number of US special operations soldiers (about 1,000) and (CIA) operatives. These operations aimed to direct US air attacks against Taliban strongholds to aid Afghan troops fighting the Taliban (headed by an armed coalition known as the Northern Alliance). Around 1,300 Marines were deployed in October 2001 to put pressure on the Taliban in the southern province of Kandahar, although there were few intense confrontations between the US and the Taliban. Despite pledges that they would not enter Kabul, Northern Alliance soldiers did so on November 12, 2001, to great public support. The Taliban eventually lost control of the south and east to Pashtun leaders backed by the US, notably Hamid Karzai (Thomas, 2019, p. 4).

On December 9th, 2001, the Taliban government came to an end as Mullah Omar, and other Taliban commanders departed Kandahar. Between 2003 and mid-2006, the US and

international troops (as part of the United Nations-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) trained nascent Afghan forces. They fought relatively low levels of insurgent violence with focused combat operations primarily in the south and east of the country. By late 2005, US and partner forces believed the insurgency had been mostly crushed, and NATO took overall security responsibility for Afghanistan in 2005-2006. When violence intensified in mid-2006, their optimistic estimates were proven to be incorrect. In 2006-2008, NATO-led operations removed Taliban insurgents from certain regions, but they did not prevent Taliban re-infiltration, nor did preventive fighting and enhanced development activities bring long-term success. The United States and its allies opted to boost troop levels in response to the deterioration of the security situation. Throughout 2010 and 2011, operations by US, NATO, and Afghan troops significantly decreased regions under Taliban control, and the handover to Afghan security authority began on time in July 2011. On June 22, 2011, President Obama stated that US troop levels would reduce to 90,000 (from 100,000) by 2011. In line with the transition and claiming that the assassination of Osama bin Laden was a significant accomplishment of the primary US objective. By September 2012, the US military would be down to 68,000 troops. President Barack Obama declared in his State of the Union address in February 2013 that the US military force will be reduced to 34,000 by February 2014, which president did. Despite popular pressure in certain European nations to decrease or cease military engagement in Afghanistan more quickly, most partner countries reduced their forces at about the same rate and percentage as the US. The Netherlands, Canada, and France completed their combat operations in 2010-2012, although they continued to train the ANDSF until 2014 (Thomas, 2019, pp. 4-5–6).

4.2. Afghanistan And USA Bilateral Agreement

The Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between Afghanistan and the United States was signed on May 1, 2012, by President Barack Obama and then-President Hamid Karzai. The signing came after months of negotiations to address Afghan demands for authority over detention centers and a halt to or control over US midnight operations on militants. The agreement also committed the two nations to develop a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that would specify the parameters of US participation in Afghanistan

and identify Afghanistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. The BSA was adopted by a Loya jirga (consultative assembly) convened by then-President Karzai in November 2013. However, he declined to sign it at the time; President Ashraf Ghani finally signed it as one of his first acts after taking office in September 2014. The BSA was not presented to Congress for approval since it was deemed an executive agreement (Thomas, 2019, p. 7).

4.3. Improvements in Trump Administration

President Donald Trump declared a new approach for Afghanistan and South Asia in a national speech on August 21, 2017. Despite anticipation that he would discuss specific aspects of his new policy, including the possibility of more soldiers. President Trump stated that America would not speak about troop levels or USA intentions for future military actions. Some politicians criticized the approach as being weak on details and intended solely to perpetuate a hazardous status. Others applauded the decision, comparing it favorably to options such as a complete pullout of US soldiers, which President Trump mentioned that his initial inclination, or a significant dependence on contractors. Aside from more troops, the strategy gave US forces more freedom to operate independently of Afghan forces and attack the enemy across the breadth and depth of the battlespace, broadening the list of targets to include revenue streams support infrastructure training bases and infiltration lanes. This was demonstrated in a series of operations against Taliban drug laboratories that began in the fall of 2017. These activities often emphasized U.S. authorities attempted to weaken what is largely seen as one of the Taliban's most critical weapons. Cultivation, manufacturing, and trafficking of drugs as sources of revenue (Thomas, 2019, p. 9).

The peace agreement between the Taliban and America has signed on 29/2/2020 in Doha, Qatar. The Afghan government has not invited to peace dialogues between SUA and the Taliban in Doha. But according to a peace deal between the Taliban and America, the Afghan state was expected to come to intra- Afghan talks. Taliban and Afghan government recently came together many times, and peace negotiations improved somehow. In July 2021, the Taliban told the Afghan government that the Taliban would enter Kabul peacefully and not hurt anyone after the peace deal. But it was not like that, and the Taliban

wanted to kidnap and then kill president Ghani. On 15th/ 8/ 2021, the Taliban entered the presidential palace as the president expressed in his recent video that he went to the defense ministry to control the situation and give important orders to the ministry. Ghani's bodyguards took president immediately to a safe place to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to prevent a big incident of embarrassment. Also, that bloodshed and chaos are stopped in Kabul that's why the president was forced and taken to Emirates. The condition is not clear: Will the Taliban come to rule the country by force? Will the Taliban accept to come to the election? (Al Jazeera News, 2021).

4.4. Defense Security Forces (Afghan National ANDSF)

The main goal of NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan after 2015 is to train, advise and support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in their fight against the Taliban and other armed organizations. The (ANDSF) costs around $6 billion per year to run, with the US contributing about $4.5 billion in recent years. In July 2016, during the (NATO) summit in Warsaw, U.S. allies promised $1 billion per year for the ANDSF from 2017 to 2020. Despite economic constraints, US authorities believe Afghanistan provides its committed amounts of $500 million (calculated in Afghan currency). Afghanistan pledged to take full financial responsibility for the (ANDSF) by 2024 at the Chicago 2012 (NATO) summit. However, existing security dynamics and economic trends make this improbable. The Department of Defense (DOD) and others have criticized the (ANDSF), citing issues such as absenteeism, high fatalities, illiteracy, inconsistency in leadership, and a lack of logistical capabilities such as airlift medical evacuation, resupply, and other related duties (Thomas, 2019, p. 16).

4.5. Re-emergence of The Taliban and Globalization of Terrorism

The Taliban's techniques have improved noticeably. In the past, the Taliban's military capabilities were limited. The Taliban are increasingly working more closely with foreign fighters and other outside help, and they are capable of organizing and executing a variety of tactically complex operations. According to accounts, they have regrouped into cells of 10 to 25 militants, with each unit having either an Al Qaeda member or another Arab fighter

who teaches them Iraqi techniques. The usage of improvised explosive devices exemplifies their growing technological complexity (IEDs). The (IEDs) are very strong, capable of destroying even the most well-protected tanks, Humvees, and jeeps; they can also utilize complex triggering devices to activate their (IEDs) at any moment to attack a specific target. More importantly, the Taliban and foreign fighters have added a new weapon to their long-running war suicide bombing. This weapon was unknown in Afghanistan's lengthy history of combat before September 11. But it has quickly acquired a stronghold. Many Afghans believe that foreign fighters carry out suicide strikes since the behavior is foreign to their culture and brand of Islam. Before being apprehended by Pakistani officials, Taliban spokesman Mullah Latif Ullah Hakimi warned that the group had forty-five more suicide bombers ready to go. During October and November 2005 alone, there were eight assaults, one of which occurred in the heart of the capital in front of the army training facility, killing over nine people and wounding hundreds more (*Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics*, 2006, p. 2).

At this critical juncture, Afghanistan's long-term stability is dependent on the Afghan security system, which includes the National Army, Police, and Intelligence. Although the international community, led by the United States, has educated security professionals, it will take years for the Afghans to be ready to cope with the danger on their own. A major focus should be on increasing their capacity and improving their training. Afghanistan's stability is critical not just for the Afghan people but also for the region. It would be a pity if Afghanistan became a refuge for terrorists once again, so the international community must demonstrate its dedication and loyalty to this growing democracy (*Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics*, 2006, p. 3).

4.6. China’s Interests in Afghanistan

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Afghanistan's new government have built strong political relations. In January 2002, Hamid Karzai, the newly appointed Interim Prime Minister, paid a visit to Beijing and met with President Jiang Zemin. In 2006, he returned as President of Afghanistan and signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and collaboration, which Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan described as indicating that the

China-Afghanistan comprehensive and cooperative alliance has entered a new period of growth. Karzai's state visit to China in March 2010 strengthened the PRC-Afghanistan relationship, demonstrating Beijing's support for the Karzai government while also pushing Kabul to take more efforts to combat regional drugs trade and terrorism. The Chinese government has been suspicious of NATO's military effort in Afghanistan, that started in 2003 when NATO took leadership of the UN-mandated ISAF. The main Chinese concern was that the US was attempting to build a long-term military presence to China's west as part of a regional containment plan against Beijing. Another Chinese concern was that the US was attempting to entice China into participating in its arduous post-invasion stabilizing operations. Although Beijing attempted to portray its anti-Uyghur terrorist campaign as a parallel operation, most western governments rejected this description, and the US declined to hand over Uyghur militants caught in Afghanistan to China for execution. Chinese authorities continue to feel that the west has a double standard when it comes to Beijing's anti-terrorism efforts. Nonetheless, they have grown increasingly comfortable with NATO's military involvement in Afghanistan over time (Weitz, 2015, pp. 10–11).

Beijing's goals in Afghanistan are heavily influenced by geography. The most serious fear of the Chinese government is that events in Afghanistan may have an impact on China's domestic security, particularly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Beijing is concerned about the recent increase in terrorism in Xinjiang (and elsewhere). Policymakers of the People's Republic of China fear that event in Afghanistan, such as transnational terrorism and narcotrafficking, might exacerbate the region's socioeconomic problems. Second, authorities in the People's Republic of China are concerned about security in the west, particularly in Pakistan and Central Asia. While China wants to maintain political stability in Central Asia, a region that could serve as a transmission belt for terrorism and other instability into China, it could also serve as an economic bridge between the PRC and Europe, as well as a source of important natural resources, Pakistan is an important, if troublesome, ally for Beijing. China's commercial interests in Afghanistan, while presently minor, may grow in importance over time. Finally, the possibility that events in Afghanistan may have an impact on China's worldwide reputation and ties with Russia and the US remains a concern. Despite the fact that the Afghanistan issue has waned in

importance in China-US relations since the early years of the Obama administration, once Afghanistan was the new White House's top security concern. PRC policymakers would still like to avoid accusations that China is ignoring its international obligations in Afghanistan. Beijing and Moscow also consult on Afghanistan, though the two regional giants have yet to define, let alone implement, a coordinated policy in that nation (Weitz, 2015, pp. 12–13).

PRC businesses have become the biggest foreign investors in Afghanistan's natural resource industry by value thanks to several major transactions struck a few years ago. Due to security, logistical, legal, and other issues, these companies have yet to completely execute their ideas. Furthermore, China has been successful in locating cheaper and more dependable alternate sources for natural resources such as copper. However, if the security situation in Afghanistan improves in the future, or alternative sources become less reliable, China may be enticed to expand its strong position as the main foreign investor in many of Afghanistan's economic sectors. In theory, a natural economic relationship exists between a resource-rich Afghanistan and a capital- and technology-rich China. Afghanistan is considered to hold untapped or undeveloped oil, natural gas, iron, gold, copper, and other raw resources, all of which China buys in large quantities. By acquiring these goods from Afghanistan as well as other Central Asian states along the proposed new Economic Silk Road Belt, the PRC could diversify its import sources away from more distant and similarly volatile world regions, whose goods are transported to China via long ocean shipping routes vulnerable to pirates, foreign navies, and other disruptions. Some Chinese and other foreign investors have purchased natural resource contracts in Afghanistan in the hopes of improving local security and regional economic conditions, but corruption, the country's extremely poorly developed infrastructure, and, most importantly, the country's never-ending insurgency have scared off most other investors. Following the Afghan government's opening of its energy, mining, and raw materials sectors to foreign investment in 2007, many PRC firms made deals to spend billions of dollars in various projects. The Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), for example, recently bought a majority interest in the massive Aynak copper deposit. The conditional proposal of more than $3 billion in November 2007 was the single largest foreign direct investment in

Afghanistan at the time. The state-owned (MCC) provided a bundle of prospective benefits that its privately held Western counterparts couldn't match, including large local employment and the potential building of railways and other transportation infrastructure (Weitz, 2015, p. 19).

4.7. The Modern Silk Road

In recent years, the notion of resurrecting old land routes that connect Asia and Europe and reaping the benefits of increased commerce has piqued people's attention. A major motivator has been a shift in US foreign policy in Afghanistan, especially the Obama administration's economic-focused approach to long-standing security concerns and political deadlocks across the Eurasian continent. Enhancing land connectivity has been a major pillar of the administration's policy. Since 2010, various possibilities for a modern silk road have developed, depending on multiple strategic goals expressed by several nations and individuals. Suppose these actors want the Modern Silk Road to be more than a term. In that case, they must take urgent action, such as raising awareness of the benefits of rail freight connectivity for the area and identifying significant bottlenecks preventing its implementation. Producing a road map that specifies activities relevant parties, such as governments and the business sector, may take to progress the process. In (GMF's) on Wider Europe series, Iulian Chifu's previous study on transport corridors between Europe and China showed that corridor efforts are an incentive for all route nations and other important actors in the area, such as the United States. It will be focused on here in particular. First, it discusses the relevance of rail freight transit along the contemporary silk road in the context of global supply chains, concentrating on logistical problems connected to commerce between China and Europe and then on potential developmental advantages for nations in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The third section looks at several railway corridors options along the Modern Silk Road, focusing on lines that travel through the South Caucasus. Finally, it provides a road map that identifies key action areas. The second wave of globalization has been distinguished by information technology. Technological advancements enabled the production process to be organized into so-called supply chains, in which various phases of the manufacture of a single commodity are spread over many sites, for instance, Swedish cars may contain Japanese components and vice-versa.

Countries strive to attract different stages of production within the supply or chain in the age of global production. Interdependence and multinational corporations stretch out different stages of production to other countries to become more efficient (Ussal Sahbaz, 2014, pp. 1–2).

4.8. Afghanistan Silk Road and Central Asia

The original silk road into being in China's Han dynasty (206 BC) made trade connections. Today, the countries are China, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and India and Pakistan to the South. Those ways potentially extended over thousands of miles to Europe. Central Asia was one of the central places where the first globalization waved connecting Western and Eastern markets motivating hug wealth the intermixing traditional and cultural-religious. Expensive China's silk, spices, jade, and other important goods exported to West and China also import golds, other essential goods, and glass products (McBride, 2015, p. 1)**.**

The plan is to enlist the support of the country's Central Asian neighbors in a result that is good for everyone the situation that will boost trade, energy exports, investment, and peace. The administration of the former Soviet stan countries argues that they will be the drivers of the new Silk Road, enriching themselves while raising Afghanistan and maintaining regional security. The new Silk Road concept is based on several assumptions regarding Central Asian interests that are incorrect. First, that Afghanistan and Central Asia are a natural region with a shared ethnic, religious, and historical identity and that this identity will reinforce a strong regional relationship; second, that Central Asian states will not treat Afghanistan primarily as a security threat after the United States leaves and third, that they have common economic interests in cooperation in Afghanistan. In actuality, the Central Asian republics' foreign policies will be determined by regime survival border security and concrete economic incentives from China, not Afghanistan. Despite their Silk Road history and shared religion, the Central Asian and Afghan inhabitants have no common identity. Most Central Asian Muslims were influenced by Soviet modernization initiatives, which supported secular governance and distrust Islamic-leaning regimes like Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Central Asian states themselves have significantly less cooperation. Several

external initiatives at regional integration have failed or remained empty shells of international agreements since 1991. Mistrust between Central Asian leaders has been overcome since a decade ago. Afghanistan has opened its ways to Central Asia and Europe through the silk road and Chabahar port. In the Taliban regime, Afghanistan just had trade with Iran and Pakistan, and the state was more landlocked to the world. After the collapse of the Taliban, Afghanistan opened its economic ways to Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle east (Collins,2014,pp. 18-19).

Figure 3: The Silk Road Map



Source: https://www.amazing-iran.com/silk-road/

4.9. The Age of Global Production Freight Transport

Diversification of production first resulted in companies relocating their operations to areas with low-cost labor and low-cost marine transportation. As a result, Asia has emerged as the global industrial hub, headed by China's extraordinary economic growth. China's commerce expanded at a rate of 25% per year on average during the last decade, more than double the rate of global trade making China the world's largest trader in 2013. Chinese exports were mostly exported out of ports on the country's eastern coast which also happened where most of the country's industrial output took place. The eastern ports, on the other hand, have gotten increasingly crowded over time. According to World Bank research, China's need for container port services is nearly twice as high as available supply causing substantial shipping delays. Because of the overcrowding at Chinese ports, rail freight has emerged as a viable option. Many multinational corporations are already using railway links along the Modern Silk Road. For example, HP employs cargo trains to

transport its products from China to Europe. On June 20/ 2013, DHL stated that it had started a weekly express freight train service from Chengdu, China, to Poland through Kazakhstan. It is important to connect China's trade with Europe. Despite a sluggish recovery from the global financial crisis, Europe is the world's largest consumer market. In 2012, the EU accounted for seventeen percent of Chinese exports, making it its second-largest export market. In the case of Chinese exports to Europe, rail freight has a significant time advantage over marine. For example, shipping a container from China's industrial areas to Europe's industrial core can take thirty-five days. A freight train, on the other hand, could move the container is around fifteen days. Maritime freight costs, on the other hand, are less expensive than railroad freight. For example, whereas railway hauling a container cost between €3,500 and €5,500, exporting the container costs €1,500 (Ussal Sahbaz, 2014, p. 2).

Recent developments in China's northern Xinjiang province provide an excellent example of how a region's economic future is linked to railway growth. India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia share Xinjiang borders. The Baku–Tiflis–Kars (BTK) railway, completed in 2017, was built in collaboration with Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. With the intermodal crossing at the Caspian Sea, the (BTK) railway will complete the Middle Corridor of the Modern Silk Road once it is operational. The development of the Modern Silk Road necessitates novel ways, which frequently involve bilateral and multilateral platforms and the participation of all (sometimes opposing) stakeholders. The dialogue's focus should not be limited to route countries. However, China and the EU should be included on both ends of the corridors and other countries with significant economic interests, such as the United States. Transportation corridors are a complicated topic with technological, corporate, economic, and international implications. As a result, sovereign governments require a structure that incorporates diverse participants from these sectors, such as multilateral financial organizations and private sector representatives (Ussal Sahbaz, 2014, p. 5).

It was evident by November 2011 that confining the regional strategy to Pakistan was insufficient. Iran, Russia, India, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all have vested interests in stabilizing Afghanistan. A new concept had to be invented to broaden the Afghanistan-

Pakistan strategy and throw a wider net for involving a wider range of states. As a result, the notion that Afghanistan represented Asia's heart was born. Cooperation was supposed to reduce non-state actors' destructive behavior while also bringing positive externalities to neighboring countries, such as economic dividends when Afghanistan became a land bridge and a hub for trade and transit in the region. The US administration envisioned a new silk road (Tadjbakhsh, 2012, p. 6).

4.10. The Benefits of Afghanistan, Iran and India from Chabahar

Afghanistan is another significant participant in the project. Afghanistan wants to re-establish trade links with India and become less reliant on Pakistan. In May 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed an agreement with Iran that allows India to establish two Chabahar Port terminals and eleven other memorandums of understanding. The trilateral transit agreement struck by Afghanistan, India, and Iran, which permits Indian goods to reach Afghanistan via Iran, is one of the more significant agreements. These three nations are also major participants in the Chabahar project. Iran realized it needed a seaport away from the historically contested Arabian Gulf during its conflict with Iraq. Hence, it contracted Indian contractors to start construction on a port in the 1990s. After much thought, Indian contractors decided that Chabahar, Iran's southernmost coastal city, would be the best location for a seaport. However, the project was put on hold due to a lack of funds from the Iranian government. The Indian Prime Minister, Atul Vajpayee, signed a deal with Iran to revive the Chabahar Port project a few years later, in 2003 (Amirthan, 2017, p. 87).

The fundamental reason for India's formalization of the agreement was strategic. India was denied access to Afghanistan, including the ability to provide supplies to Kabul by Pakistan. India replied by building a road from Zaranj on the Afghan–Iran border to Delaram on the Khash river allowing it to reach Kabul from the southwest. But it still needed a port to convey supplies Chabahar was the answer. One of India's primary motivations for developing Chabahar is oil. Iran was India's second-largest oil supplier before the trade, and economic sanctions were imposed in 2006. After the sanctions were imposed, all transactions were halted, and India's trading relationship with Iran was

hampered. The sanctions, however, have been lifted. India and Iran have agreed to process delayed oil payments to Tehran, freeing about $6.4 billion in frozen assets. India and Pakistan are now competing for influence in Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan prevents India from freely trading with Afghanistan. India wants an Afghanistan that is economically and politically self-sufficient from Pakistan. India can trade with Afghanistan through the Chabahar Port. As previously stated, India has already constructed a 218-kilometer road between Delaram and Zaranj. Afghanistan has recently connected this road to Chabahar port and is using it to transport export commodities. This initiative benefits Afghanistan by renewing its trade ties with India and reducing its reliance on Pakistan. India benefits from its reestablished ties with Afghanistan in the short term since it can import Afghan mineral wealth at a lower cost (Amirthan, 2017, pp. 87,89-90).

4.11. Telecommunication and Internet in Afghanistan

Afghanistan had a barely functional post-war infrastructure and no telecom services just ten years ago. Since April 2002, when the first private telecom business, Afghan Wireless Communications Company (AWCC), was authorized to provide mobile (GSM) services, the telecom sector has re-emerged. The telecommunications industry has grown at a breakneck pace. Due to rapid developments in infrastructure, services, policy, and the legal and regulatory framework, Afghanistan's telecom sector has become one of the country's most profitable, generating an annual average revenue of $139.6 million, accounting for more than 12% of total government revenue. Despite several hurdles, including as the ever-changing security environment, the telecom sector was able to attract nearly $1.8 billion in total investments in 2012, up from $600 million in 2006. Simultaneously, unemployment is one of the top seven factors for popular pessimism about the country's development tendencies. Compared to 40,000 employments in 2006, the telecom sector has created over 110,000 direct and indirect job possibilities across the country. Afghanistan now has six operational telecom service providers and fifty-five licensed Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Afghan Telecom, a state-owned fixed-line operator; Wasel Telecom, a Local Fixed Service Provider (LFSP); and AWCC, Roshan, Etisalat, and MTN, four GSM operators. Since 2002, the sector has prioritized the development of a sufficient national communications infrastructure. The private sector,

specifically the four mobile providers AWCC, Roshan, Etisalat, and MTN – has been the main investor in this field. Followed by the Afghan government with aid from donor agencies such as the World Bank and USAID (Javid Hamdard, 2012, p. 8).

4.12. Information and Communication in Afghanistan's Agriculture

Forty years ago, Afghanistan used to produce a wide range of agricultural products, such as nuts, fresh and dried fruits, leather, cotton, and wool. Crop and animal agriculture helped the country become known for its carpet and embroidery industry. Exports were worth 600 million US dollars at the time. Afghanistan is in a different condition now, with over 40% of the people unemployed due to a long-running war and bloodshed. A comparable number of people are poor. Nonetheless, as Afghanistan rebuilds, agriculture has the greatest potential for achieving national and international socio-economic stability. Unfortunately, the extreme insecurity that rural households are experiencing has made illegal drug manufacture a tempting alternative to traditional Afghan products. These illegal crops aid the cycle of violent extremism. Fostering legal agriculture will boost economic growth and job creation while also reducing a key source of income for extremists. Fruits including grapes, pomegranates, melons, and nuts (like almonds and pistachios) (saffron and cumin), and animal products are some of the most potential agricultural export opportunities (such as leather and wool). Only about a third of farmers currently receive any kind of agricultural production information. Access to veterinary care is available to 15% of herders. Furthermore, the quality and delivery of these extension services are poor. Extension agents do not have sufficient access to knowledge, and even university-taught content may be more than fifteen years old. Afghan extension agents have voiced a strong desire for accurate, up-to-date extension data. When compared to the extensive support network that developed country extension agencies provide to farmers. This explanation elucidates the extremely desperate condition in which Afghan farmers find themselves when it comes to just feeding their families. Almost all of Afghanistan's thirty four provinces have rugged terrain and poor transportation facilities, as well as unstable energy. (Santibañez et al., 2014, p. 8)

4.13. Electricity Services

In 1893, Kabul got its first electricity plant, which had a capacity of 40 lights. The 20-kW thermal engine at ARG (presidential palace garden) in 1911, the 19-kW engine in Jalalabad province in 1915, and the 15-kW engine in Paghman district in 1916 were the next smaller power plants to be developed. The first hydropower station was erected in Jabal Seraj in 1920, and it began working in 1922 with a capacity of 1,500 kW, which was then transferred to Kabul. From 1935 to 1951, Afghanistan adopted a new policy to support the private sector and industrialization, as well as to equip them with the necessary tools to start a business in the country. As a result, various power plants have been created and developed to address the problem of electricity scarcity. In Afghanistan, hydropower is the most extensively used renewable energy source. Because of the abundance of water resources and their environmental impact, hydropower facilities have gotten a lot of attention. In Afghanistan, hydropower has shown to be the most promising form of electricity generation. Because of the size of the population, the presence of industrial areas, and housing amenities, a considerable portion of electricity generation was concentrated in central Afghanistan. The volume of water flowing through the nation varies, with a stronger flow in the spring season, which runs from April through August on average. After 1893, there was an increasing trend in the production and use of electric power. Throughout the country, a large number of powers producing factories were developed and used. The Naghlu hydroelectric power station is one of Afghanistan's most powerful. Construction on the dam began in January 1960 and was finished in 1968. With an installed capacity of 100 MW, this plant has four producing stations operating in Kabul, each measuring around 110 meters from foundation to crest and positioned below the confluence of the Kabul and Panjshir rivers (Mir Sayed Shah Danish et al., 2017, p. 492).

The oldest hydroelectric station is Jabal Seraj, which was built on the Salang River in 1916 at an elevation of 1,600 meters above sea level under the rule of Amir Habibullah Khan. According to MEW (Ministry of Energy and Water) data, the nation is home to 13 significant hydropower facilities. Following is a list of these power plants: Naghlu (237,486 MWh), Surobi with two turbines in Kabul (171,047 MWh), Mahipar with two running turbines (110,801 MWh) located 40 kilometers east of Kabul, Kajaki One and

Kajaki Three (in the south) have production of (193,446 MWh) and feeds around 50,000 families in Kandahar and Helmand provinces with 51 MW capacity. Darunta in Jalal Abad has three turbines (47,025 MWh), Pul-e-Khomri in Baghlan has two turbines (27,049 MWh), Grishk in Helmand has two turbines (8,598 MWh), Asadabad (1,975 MWh) in Kunar, Charikar (1,856 MWh), and Jabal-u-Saraj in Kabul has two turbines (8,598 The Kabul River and its tributaries supply 80.4 percent of the country's installed capacity, which is fed by eight hydroelectric units. The directorate of new energy projects began making and installing solar hot water systems for the first time in 1986, and they were installed in various government offices. According to estimates, solar radiation in Afghanistan averages 5.5-6.5 kWh per square meter per day, with 300 bright days per year. Years of violence and civil war have badly harmed Afghanistan's electrical system, and fewer than 30% of the population today has access to electricity. However, in electrified regions, demand exceeds supply, and power outages have always been a problem. However, without the creation of a stable electric power source, long-term socioeconomic progress will be impossible (Mir Sayed Shah Danish et al., 2017, pp. 492–493).

In 2001, Afghanistan's new government placed a strong emphasis on the development of the electrical industry, as well as other vital infrastructure sectors. Its main purpose was to offer a reliable, economical, and environmentally friendly source of energy for socioeconomic expansion and to raise living standards with an annual economic growth rate of 9%. This proportion has always fluctuated and is on the rise. The country's overall electricity production and consumption is 2,664.6 million kWh per year, but total power generation was 846.6 million kWh in 2011, and climbed to 885.8 million kWh in 2012, with electricity imports compensating the difference. The Inter-Ministerial Commission for Energy (ICE) was founded in 2006 to coordinate government energy strategy, utilize donor resources, and integrate sector planning. After then, Afghanistan became involved in globalization on the 3rd of August, 2008, when it joined SARSO (South Asian Regional Standards Organization). International treaties bring states together on an equal basis to reap the benefits of collaboration. Due to a heavy reliance on coal for electricity generation and oil for transportation, global greenhouse gas emissions increased by 70% between 1970 and 2004. Around 1.2 billion people still lack access to electricity, while around 2.8 billion

people, primarily in Afghanistan and other developing countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, rely on traditional unclean biomass for cooking and home heating. Afghanistan, like other developing countries, faces major energy obstacles such as low rates of access to modern energy services, insecurity of supply due to heavy reliance on imports, deforestation and health issues as a result of the excessive use of firewood as a primary energy source, and air pollution. Although Afghanistan is rich in renewable resources, efficient usage and consumption of these resources is still limited. Supplying communication tower stations, rural and isolated locations, where these needs are placed far away from power producing stations, is one of the most prevalent uses of PV systems (Mir Sayed Shah Danish et al., 2017, pp. 493-494–495).

Even though electricity is required for practically all means of communication, it remains an unaffordable luxury for most Afghans. While the Afghan Energy Information Center reports that 36% of Afghans have access to electricity 24 hours a day, this figure is pushed upward by urban areas, where the average is 70%. Based on a population of 35 million people. Electricity is only available to around 25% of rural households, which account for more than 75% of the overall population. Although Afghanistan's substantial solar, wind, gas, and thermal resources suggest that it might produce up to 23,000 tons of electricity mega wat (MW). However, today, Afghanistan can produce 310,000 megawatts (MW) thanks to the Salma and Kamal Khan electric dams. However, it still imports 73% of its power from neighboring Tajikistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Previously, Afghan power plants could only generate about 500 (MW). Afghan power plants are expected to produce 600 megawatts (MW), by 2021. Furthermore, the national power provider, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), says that only about half of this is produced due to resource limitations and inadequate facility upkeep. As a result, Afghanistan is significantly reliant on power imports from its neighbors and inefficient and expensive diesel generators. Even the most plausible reform initiatives take time and money. Shortly, this position is unlikely to alter (Santibañez et al., 2014, p. 11).

4.14. Mobile Services

According to a survey conducted on December 31, 2012, more than 88 percent of Afghans live in a mobile phone service region. Mobile phones are used by 63% of rural people and 94% of city dwellers, for 19.67 million mobile phone users in the country seventy-two percent. Generally, locations outside the fringes of provincial capitals are without cell phone service. Mobile phone users charge their gadgets with car engines, generators, and other energy sources, even though electricity is not common in rural areas. Because of pro-market policies and healthy competition among suppliers, the cost of ownership has dropped by nearly 97%. This cost reduction has facilitated the fast adoption of mobile phone technology. Mobile phones have a unique potential for disseminating information, particularly to literate individuals such as extension agents, due to their widespread availability. In 2012, 48% of Afghan women-owned a cellphone, while 32% had access to a phone belonging to a family member (USAID and Gharib 2013). These are significant improvements from 2002 when only 1% of Afghan women owned or had access to a mobile phone (Santibañez et al., 2014, pp. 11–12).

The Afghan government has issued licenses to 66 internet service providers (ISPs) so far. 1.5 million people use the Internet for news and information in Afghanistan, accounting for around 5.6% of the population. These figures are most likely the result of a combination of high illiteracy and high service expenses. Indeed, in 2021, a digital subscriber line (DSL) recently revealed that a 1MB Internet connection would cost only one dollar per month. Down from 97 USD in 2013, 300 USD in 2012, and 5000 USD in 2002. While these gains are significant, most Afghan households still lack access to the internet due to a monthly average per capita income of less than 40 USD. Nonetheless, the Internet, like other forms of communication, is rapidly evolving. The construction of a 4810-kilometer national fiber-optic backbone began in 2007 with World Bank and Afghan government support. The initiative is being developed in three phases with twenty-five provinces now connected to five international neighbors. Five provinces are partially connected, and Afghanistan is connected to Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (Santibañez et al., 2014, p. 15).

The sector's dynamism is mostly attributed to a small number of youthful entrepreneurs. The majority of them have recently graduated from university, have no prior work experience, are extremely creative, and produce cutting-edge software or applications. Micronics, a Herat-based (IT) firm, invented “Concours,” an application to help kids study for the university admission exam. These entrepreneurs are ambitious and driven to grow the industry. A growing need for (IT) services has also helped (IT) companies. Most medium to large businesses in Kabul already uses IT. They use bookkeeping and administration software and have a website for advertising. Although (IT) companies are concentrated in Kabul, the sector is beginning to emerge in provincial capitals. In Herat, an increasing number of local businesses are requesting (IT) assistance, and they gradually realize the value of new technology in terms of increased productivity and transparency (Consulting, 2014, p. 16).

Because of systematized procedures, information communication technology (ICT) helps enterprises enhance productivity. Companies can produce more in less time with the help of new technologies, and employees may be more productive. They are summed up, the Director of the Barada Hamidi Group, a Mazar-e-Sharif-based trading firm. However, it is difficult to quantify productivity improvements. All of the interviewees agreed that (ICT) positively impacts their company's or department's efficiency (Consulting, 2014, p. 17).

4.15. The Digitalization and Biometric Process of Afghanistan

A combination of the secret key and biometric technology can accurately verify a person's genuine identity when they visit a sensitive institution. Traditional human identification recognition techniques are used in private key identity verification systems. On the other hand, Biometrics is an automated method of identifying a person based on a biological or behavioral feature (Kalunga & Tembo, 2016, p. 99).

The features analyzed are the face, palms, DNA, body orientation in motion, fingerprints, hand geometry, handwriting, iris, retinal, vein, signature, and walk. The United States and the United Kingdom established biometrics technologies in 2010 to identify non-authorized personnel. The Afghan government established the Afghan Automated

Biometrics Identification System on June 6, 2010. (AABIS). Fingerprints, iris, and faces were scanned and recorded in this system's database. The system was created to improve national security and do multiple tasks in a short amount of time. This technology generated a smart card Identification Card (ID) to identify Afghan citizens, among other documents. The digitalization process has begun after the Taliban regime collapsed. Especially president when he came to power in 2014, he started the reformation of the state. The healthcare system of Afghanistan has been digitalized. The passports and identity cards are digitalized for security purposes, prevent fake identities, and provide great services. The customs of the fourth side of Afghanistan digitalized for good trade and to stop the huge bribe in the state. President Ghani started the country's reformation to improve and compete with the world (Kalunga & Tembo, 2016, p. 100).

4.16. The Digitalization of Library in Afghanistan

Given the physical and societal limits of the time, it is not unexpected that printing was not embraced in Afghanistan before 1871. The Arabic alphabet and the act of writing are valued in Islamic countries, and scribes and calligraphers are respected specialists. The purchase of a lithographic press by Amir Shir ‘Ali Khan in 1871 marked the beginning of printing in Afghanistan. The Amirs of the twentieth century spread printing beyond Kabul to Herat and Mazar-I Sharif, publishing governmental degrees, legislation, military manuals, instruction books. Historical, literary, and scientific works as well as historical, literary, and scientific works. Although some subsequent works incorporated passages in French and English, most of these publications were in Pashto or Dari Persian. In 2002, Robert D. McChesney, then-NYU Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and History in the Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, proposed creating the Afghanistan Digital Library to provide free, unrestricted access to texts printed in Afghanistan from 1871 to 1930. Professor McChesney compiled an extensive bibliography of materials published in Afghanistan, including monographs, serials, and documents to aid the research. Few of the publications in the bibliography are available in publicly accessible libraries or archives in the United States, Europe, or Russia. Copies of the publications inside Afghanistan are inaccessible due to decades of conflict and turmoil. The National Endowment for the Humanities gave funding to the (NYU) Division of Libraries (NYU

Libraries), with Professor McChesney as a project advisor. In 2005, the Afghanistan Digital Library was founded by the Reed Foundation, Spencer Foundation, and Gladys Brooks Foundation. In 2006, the initiative was expanded to include a collaboration between NYU Libraries and the Ministry of Information and Culture of Afghanistan to facilitate the digitization of Kabul publications. The National Endowment for the Humanities provided further financing to create conservation and digitization facilities at the National Archives in Kabul. Also, personnel training by NYU Libraries staff and consultants. The Afghanistan Digital Library was created using digital image files created in Kabul and sent to NYU Libraries (MCCANN et al., 2005, pp. 61–62).

The Afghanistan Digital Library website offers full access to 383 Afghani publications as of May 2010. By 2021 the Afghan digital library in New York University (NYU) has a digital collection of over 500 rare books, serials, pamphlets, and manuals. The Afghanistan Digital Library will be preserved and continued by NYU Libraries for the foreseeable future. The New York University library staff continue to work with private collectors and research libraries to digitize publications. They become available and perform digital preservation efforts to assure long-term accessibility and preservation (MCCANN et al., 2005, p. 62).

4.17. The TAPI Project

The 1600-kilometer Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI), gas pipeline was officially launched on December 13, 2015, by the governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. With a completion date of 2019, it is intended to be the greatest cross-country energy infrastructure project in South Asia. The (TAPI) pipeline, which will transport gas from Turkmenistan's Galkynysh gas field to South Asia at the cost of up to $10 billion, has a capacity of 90 million standard cubic meters per day. Turkmenistan is anticipated to export up to 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India via the pipeline. The project's significance in energy security and its potential as a confidence-building mechanism between Afghanistan and Pakistan and India and Pakistan. The multitude of complex roadblocks to its fulfillment further emphasizes the necessity for policy-relevant academic research. Academic

literature devoted solely to the (TAPI) is scarce, and the majority of available works examine energy concerns in South Asia holistically. Existing literature has strongly emphasized the security concerns to the (TAPI) posed by terrorist and insurgent groups and geopolitical disputes. Viewing energy through the lens of defense and security rather than cooperation is not unique to the (TAPI). Still, it is likely one of the most significant roadblocks to regional energy projects in South Asia. The interests of the member countries of (TAPI) in the pipeline's security are inextricably linked to the advantages derived from its use. Turkmenistan will benefit from hydrocarbon export income, India will benefit from the pipeline's diversification of energy sources, and Afghanistan and Pakistan will benefit from gas supplies and transit revenues. In general, most interviewees in India and Pakistan cited insurgent and terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan as key concerns to the pipeline. In contrast, others stressed the project's reciprocal benefits in energy security and regional collaboration (Huda & Ali, 2017, pp. 202,205-206).

The South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 to catalyze regional economic integration. On the other hand, South Asia is now known for its lack of integration with (SAARC) and has achieved relatively little commerce and connectivity. The participation of India and Pakistan in the (TAPI) project would help (SAARC) tremendously since it would function as a confidence-building tool between the two countries. Increased confidence (TAPI) could persuade New Delhi and Islamabad to actively work together on critical (SAARC) efforts that bi-lateral disagreements have hampered in the past. In an interview, Sridhar Khatri, a noted expert on (SAARC), claimed. It is a failure of strategy on the part of (SAARC) because it has not been able to develop stakes for each country in its procedures after thirty years. In this perspective, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an institution and South Asia as a region are invested in the (TAPI) initiative in terms of peace-building between India and Pakistan (Huda & Ali, 2017, p. 208).

The potentiality of (TAPI) is defined by two essential characteristics that are ingrained in the system. Domestic politics of the states hosting the pipeline's first segments, particularly Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, are two countries in Central Asia. In these contexts, (TAPI's) virtual raison reason shapes domestic discourses of progress linked to the project's

development. The project's significant infrastructural promise is ultimately linked to (TAPI) which appears to encode the dreams of individuals and societies living along the 1000-kilometer route that runs through Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. The pipeline corridor's insecurity, particularly in its Afghan leg (about 750 kilometers long), feeds into the project's virtual nature by obscuring its future development prospects. The peace and connection nexus' elusiveness are nearly intimately linked. (TAPI) enabled successful peace negotiations with Taliban rebel factions operating across Afghanistan, Pakistan's Baluchistan area, and recently along the Turkmen-Afghan border. Security issues rooted in the region's semi-chronic instability will remain an intractable barrier to project completion. More broadly, the integration of power infrastructure across the South/Central Asia split until this nexus materializes (Anceschi, 2017, pp. 3–4).

In Afghanistan, infrastructure is at the heart of major development themes in President Ashraf Ghani's administration. Afghanistan's ambitions of rebuilding and industrialization are represented in several large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the Lapis Lazuli train, the Ring Road, and, in the energy sector, the Lapis Lazuli railroad (TAPI). (TAPI) pervades government-sponsored rebuilding narratives in which three primary factors, peace, connection, and regional integration, are vital to Afghanistan's future prosperity. The Ghani administration stated that initiatives like (TAPI) would help Afghanistan break free from the economic shackles that have held it back for the last 40 years of strife. The pipeline encapsulates the Afghan people's hopes for progress, as seen by spontaneous public celebrations in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Helmand provinces. On the day of the inauguration and the subsequent multiplication of (TAPI)-focused projects. Such as establishing a (TAPI) Park in Logar province and the popularization of (TAPI)-related slogans among Afghan youth. Turkmenistan's Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources stated on August 6, 2015, that Türkmengaz would head the TAPI consortium adding more than fifty years of experience in the development, production, and transportation of natural gas to the project. While this declaration failed to undermine the project's basic virtuality in retrospect, it piqued policymakers' curiosity across Asia at the time. The Turkmen administration quickly presented TAPI as the most recent energy bridge. An extensive infrastructural network that had seemed to connect Turkmenistan and Afghanistan since

the Niyazov period. According to the Asian Development Bank, the project's major backer (ADB). The ratification of Türkmengaz leadership was a significant step forward in building a successful partnership. TAPI will be a project that brings enormous developmental advantages to the region (Anceschi, 2017, p. 5,8).

4.18. The TAPI Pipeline a Recipe for Peace or Instability

The (TAPI) has seen a convergence of interests, both by big powers and regional actors, in conflict-ridden Afghanistan, where limited short-term interests of key stakeholders continue to impede peace-building efforts. For example, the United States (US) promotes the initiative as a magic glue that will bring the warring groups and their regional proxies together in a mutually beneficial cooperative framework. The United States believes that TAPI would wean India off the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, which runs from Iran's South Pars gas complex in the Persian Gulf. The resulting dependency and benefits of collaboration may function as a spur for peace between India and Pakistan, in addition to further isolating Iran. Despite Turkmenistan's apparent resistance, Russia has expressed interest in the project as well. It has stayed out of post-9/11 Afghan affairs thus far. During President Hamid Karzai's visit to Moscow in January 2011, it reached an agreement with the Afghan government. Both nations indicated their willingness to collaborate on various energy projects, including the building of the TAPI pipeline, in a joint statement. While Russia strives to seize control of the energy-rich former Soviet Union nations, the new governments remain defiant in their attempts to break free. Turkmenistan has been working hard to build an alternative pipeline network and reduce its reliance on Russia for some gas shipments. Russia stated in October 2010 that Turkmenistan had agreed to enable the Russian gas giant Gazprom to join in the TAPI project, but Ashgabat rejected the allegation (D’Souza, 2011, pp. 2–3).

For obvious reasons, Afghanistan stands to benefit greatly from the initiative. The pipeline would create prospects for economic growth, income generation, and job creation, contributing to long-term stability. The administration in Kabul is expected to generate upwards of US$1.4 billion in transit fees per year. Furthermore, this initiative helps Afghanistan reduce its reliance on Iran, from whom it imports almost 2,400 tons of gasoline

per day by land. Such reliance has come at a cost in the recent past by giving the dominant supplier a tool to limit Afghanistan's capacity to use the acquired commodity. Iran placed a gasoline embargo on Afghanistan in early December 2010, claiming that the oil it supplies is utilized by US and NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. The administration of Karzai claims that gasoline was exclusively utilized for civilian reasons. Despite security concerns in most of the region through which the pipes traverse, President Hamid Karzai has vowed to 'speed up the project and provide soldiers to secure the pipeline. TAPI has sparked worries in Iran that it would be left behind in the emerging energy export economy and the region's fast-expanding network of natural gas and oil pipelines. Iran needs ever-increasing quantities of Turkmen natural gas for its winter heating and fuel demands, as well as for pumping gas to keep its aging oil fields viable. When TAPI has completed, Turkmenistan's reliance on Iranian export routes is greatly decreased. As a result, Iran would not compel Turkmenistan to accept oil accords on its conditions (D'Souza, 2011, p. 3).


India and Pakistan have been talking with Iran about building a new pipeline to transport Iranian gas to their nations. The pipeline would be similar in cost to the TAPI project, with an estimated capital cost of US$7.5 billion. Since a meeting of Indian and Pakistani petroleum ministers in Islamabad in April 2008 to resolve a pricing issue and clear the way for signing agreements, as well as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's visits to Islamabad and New Delhi, Iran and Pakistan have signed the initial agreement without India. Iran's Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, stated in February 2010 that China is interested in participating in the project. The pipeline's prospects appear to be bright at the moment, but there are some thorny concerns to be resolved. Despite the confluence of strategic, political, and financial interests, political instability, pricing difficulties, corruption, and security concerns will continue to impact the project's fate directly. The region has been plagued by political instability since establishing an independent Central Asia, as seen by several color revolutions. Similarly, the lack of an efficient police force in Afghanistan may transform this initiative into a profitable protection racket or cash cow for militants and local warlords. Defeating those threats would ultimately lead to a reliance on private security battalions and contractors, with little effort to strengthen Afghanistan's national security institutions (D'Souza, 2011, p. 4).

Figure 4: The TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) Pipeline Map



Source: Enerji Gunlugu, (2015)


Figure 5: Afghanistan: Urbanization from 2009 to 2019



Source: Statista 2021, Afghanistan: Urbanization from 2009 to 2019

From 2009 to 2019, this graph depicts the degree of urbanization in Afghanistan. The proportion of a country's population living in cities is referred to as urbanization. In 2019, urban regions and cities accounted for 25.75 percent of Afghanistan's overall population.

Figure 6: Afghanistan: Globalization index (0-100)



Source: The global economy, Afghanistan: Overall globalization.

Data for Afghanistan from 1970 to 2018 is required for this indicator. During that time, Afghanistan's average score was 26.69 points, with a low of 19.29 points in 1978 and a high of 39.79 points in 2015. The most recent number is 38.52 points from 2018. For contrast, the current world population in 2018 is 62.02 points, based on 194 nations.

Finally, this study shows that the urbanization and globalization processes in Afghanistan is increasing year after year in a tangible value according to global average. The most important thing to mention is that Afghanistan is at lowest rank of globalization in Asia, while the urbanization of Afghanistan is fastest growing in the world but recently after the Taliban took the power millions of Afghans were displaced and hundreds of thousands fled to foreign countries escaping the Taliban rule.

CONCLUSION

Today's Afghanistan is different than Afghanistan before 2001. Afghanistan is one of the fastest urban growing countries in the world. After the emerge of Afghan government in 2001, the country has been developing in every aspect. In Boon conference America and its alliances has agreed to reestablished the Afghan government with the invasion of America. The Taliban regime has collapsed in 2001, and Afghan government has established once again. Urbanization and globalization processes are the most essential issues in the country. Afghans have experienced both urban and global processes now Afghanistan became globalized the state is now connected to the world. Nowadays the world is globalizing and people believe in it and Afghanistan is also experiencing the globalization process. Now Afghanistan has open trade with the world and export and imports to Central Asia, South Asia, Europe and Middle East through air corridor and freight transport. Technology is also improving very fast since last decade and many ministries have digitalized their processes. Passports, identity cards (Tazkira) and many other biometrics are now digitalized even the custom of the country and transportation system is digitalized. Many projects have been inaugurated with many countries for instance, the (TAPI) project a gas pipeline between Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Silk road is also one of the important ways of trade and business for Afghanistan. Chabahar port and many more, all these are the new and recent developments in the country. In urbanization process most rural areas became urban and many inhabitants now live-in urban areas. Afghanistan has experienced different migration waves internally displaced people due to conflicts since Soviet Union invasion in 1979 to today, return of forced migrants and individually migrants. These waves of migration were and are for differ reasons for safety, good standard services of life, good education methods, better health care services and other various reasons. Nowadays many electric dams have constructed and millions of Afghans benefits of also the state manage the water now. Most areas became green and people invested in various businesses and trades in which not only government benefits of but also people benefit of. New apartments and buildings are standardly constructed most of new constructed apartments have green areas and place for sports that neighbors can play and walk in together. The canalization system is available in new most reconstructed apartments but its only available in some urban areas and in cities

not in rural areas. Still living in rural area is different than living in urban areas because urban area still has better opportunities and great services than rural areas for instance there is no electricity in rural area, but solar electricity that the public provide it by themselves, no good education system, no good schools and universities, there is no great health care and the most important one is no employment in rural areas. Especially in Afghanistan it's better to live in urban areas so at least people have good services than rural areas to live in good education system, great health care, good universities, employment and etc. Unfortunately, the country once again put back in bad situations after the Taliban took the state again on 15th 8/ 2021, hundreds of thousands Afghan fled to foreign countries from Taliban. All organizations and institutions have stopped their work and projects in the country for some time. Most politician, doctors, engineers, teachers and educated people fled the country for safety and they were not understanding each other politically and ideologically. Afghanistan needs all these people for developing, Taliban doesn't know how to manage and rule the country, it's easy to take a stat but it's difficult manage and rule it. All these progresses and developments in last two decades of republic of Afghanistan became zero in Taliban regime, hunger, unemployment and crucial will continue. If Taliban will not allow women in their cabinet and will not let all ethnic groups in cabinet then it's not far that the regime will collapse soon.

Finally, this study shows that the urbanization and globalization processes in Afghanistan is increasing year after year in a tangible value according to global average. The most important thing to mention is that Afghanistan is at lowest rank of globalization in Asia, while the urbanization of Afghanistan is fastest growing in the world but recently after the Taliban took the power millions of Afghans were displaced and hundreds of thousands fled to foreign countries escaping the Taliban rule.

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