T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

EXAMINING THE ROHINGYA REFUGEE CRISIS IN BANGLADESH AND INDIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

MASTER THESIS

Kaisayr Husein

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Ankara, 2022

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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Plagiarism Page

Kaisayr Husein hereby declare that this MA Thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement. This research is my original work and has not been presented or published for any award or degree/diplomas in any other colleges and universities.

This is the result of my research thesis and effort where due references are made in the text. I declare that I have truly followed the procedures and the ethical principles that are specified in the document on the research thesis guidelines issued by the ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY. I also declare that I have fully cited and referenced all the materials that I have used in this thesis.

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ÖZET

Bangladeş ve Hindistan'daki Rohingya Mülteci Krizinin İncelenmesi: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Çalışma

Bu tez, Bangladeş ve Hindistan'daki Rohingya mültecilerinin ev sahibi devletlerin zorluklarını karşılaştırmalı biçimde incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Çalışma, her iki ülkedeki mülteci kamplarındaki koşulları sosyal, siyasi, ekonomik etkiler bağlamında, cinsiyete dayalı şiddet, güvenlik endişeleri, çevresel durum, sağlık koşulları, uyuşturucu ve silah ticareti, dini ve kültürel etkiler alt başlıklarına yer vererek, üç temel faktör açısından karşılaştırmaktadır. Tez, ilk aşamada Rohingya çatışmasının ve bölgedeki mülteci kamplarının tarihsel arka planını sunmaktadır. Ardından, Myanmar'daki etnik krizi etkileyen iç politikaları, Rohingya mültecilerinin hayatlarını doğrudan etkileyen iki ev sahibi ülke Hindistan ve Bangladeş'teki politikaları ve kararları değerlendirmekte, son olarak mülteci krizinin, bu iki ülkenin mülteci kamplarındaki durumu karşılaştırarak incelemektedir.

Bu inceleme, Rohingya mültecilerinin yoğun olarak bulunduğu Hindistan'daki ve Bangladeş'teki güncel durumunun sosyal, politik ve ekonomik faktörlerin merceğinde karşılaştırmalı bir analizini sunması açısından önemlidir. Karşılaştırmalı bir incelemeyle, Bangladeş ve Hindistan kamplarındaki Rohingya Müslümanlarının durumunu farklı deneyimlerden yola çıkarak ele almaktadır. Sonuç olarak, mültecilerin kendilerini güvensizliğe, kötü sağlık koşullarına maruz bırakan çeşitli düzeylerde sosyal, politik ve ekonomik sorunlara maruz kaldıkları görülmektedir.

Bulgular, her iki ülkedeki mülteci kamplarının koşullarının oldukça farklı olduğunu göstermektedir. Bangladeş'te göçmenler, dini bağları nedeniyle ülkelerine dönmeleri istenmeden önce memnuniyetle karşılanmıştır. Küresel topluluklar, insanların yüklerini hafifletmek için çeşitli ortaklıklar geliştirmiş olsalar da, Bangladeş'teki mülteci kampları, nüfusun daha büyük olduğu ve kayıt dışı küçük kampların yeterli gözetim ve kurallara sahip olmadığı kötü sağlık koşulları, güvenlik ikilemleri, şiddet ve kötü çevre koşullarıyla mücadele etmektedir. Diğer taraftan Hindistan'daki mülteci kamplarında mülteciler arasında suç, cinsiyete dayalı şiddet ve uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı gibi konuların henüz kritik seviyelere ulaşmadığını ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bangladeş, Hindistan, Mülteciler, Kamp, Rohingya

ABSTRACT

Examining the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh and India; A comparative Study.

This thesis aims to explore the challenges of both Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and India, and the host states. While breaking down the situation of refugees, the study compares the conditions in the refugee camps in both countries through certain patterns: social impact, political impact, economic impact through gender-related violence, security concerns, environmental condition, health conditions, drug and arms trafficking, and religious and cultural effects. This thesis assesses the domestic policies in Myanmar that affected the crisis, policies and the decisions in the host states that directly affect the lives of these refugees despite the presence of international bodies like United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

This thesis is important in the sense that it provides a rare comparative analysis of Rohingya refugees' conditions in both India and Bangladesh, through the lens of social, political and economic factors. With the help of a comparative examination, this thesis addresses the plight of Rohingya Muslims in Bangladeshi and Indian camps from multiple angles, and considers diverse experiences. This study finds out that refugees are subjected to various levels of social, political and economic problems which expose them to insecurity, bad health conditions.

The findings demonstrate that the conditions of refugee camps in both countries are quite different. In Bangladesh, the migrants were welcomed before being urged to return to their home country due to religious ties. Although global communities have partnered in a variety of ways to alleviate people's burdens, Bangladeshi refugee camps are struggling with bad health conditions, security dilemmas, violence, and bad environmental circumstances, where the population is larger and unregistered smaller encampments lack sufficient oversight and rules. On the other hand, the thesis reveals that issues such as criminality, gender related violence and drug trafficking have not yet reached critical levels in Indian refugee camps among the refugees.

Keywords: Bangladesh, India, Refugees, Camp, Rohingya.

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Figure 1 The location of Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar District (CBD), Bangladesh. Source: Fieldwork and ISCG (2019).

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Table 1. Source (Amin, 2018)

Chapter 1

1. INTRODUCTION

The Rohingyas have gone through several years of crime against humanity, and systematic turned into a recognized genocide. For the kind of persecution faced by them has pushed the vulnerable population to countries like Bangladesh and India. These violent attacks started in 1978 and run through, 1991-1992, and 2016. Their movement to Bangladesh is the most noticeable migration. It occurred in August 2017. Later, when states like Malaysia and Thailand refused to accept them into their countries they turned to India where some of them have managed to live in refugee camps. More than 745,000 Rohingyas have seek refuge in Cox's Bazar. This includes hundred thousand of children. A plan was made in early 2019 to meet the necessities, demanding $920.5 million USD so aid 1.2 million individuals. This includes refugees who absconded from the ethnic cleaning tyranny of Myanmar to Bangladesh and other camps that host them. The appeal is 17 percent funded as of 17th April (Bangladesh Genocide Archive).

Bangladesh is presently straining to cope with the pressure of housing around 1 million stateless Rohingya refugees. The stateless Rohingya refugees are desperate and only work as part-time volunteers in Bangladesh because they are not authorized to work. In the Rohingya camps, there are around 200 assistance organizations (Ishrat, 2019). Some NGOs ostensibly serving the Rohingya in refugee camps are accused of corruption and nepotism, while residents in Cox's Bazar who applied for jobs with these organizations were turned down. In southern Thailand, 65 shipwrecked Rohingya survivors of human trafficking were discovered stranded. In this light, this thesis will pursue the path of examining the conditions, situations, politics, and the arising matters in these refugee camps on the soils of Bangladesh and India separately and the two together comparatively (Mumtahin, 2019). These include knowing and assessing the already struggling statuses of the refugees, the domestic policies of Myanmar that directly and indirectly affect the people, the repatriation of some of these refugees and the lives of the local people around the host camps. The roles of the two host nations in the international community vis-à-vis their status as non-signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which establishes refugee rights must be studied. Moreover, the United Nation's failure concerning the Rohingya refugee status and the increasing vulnerability of the refugees must also be looked at.

This work shall fill an important gap in the studies of refugee crisis in political science and international relations since it is not only going to look at the Rohingya refugee crisis in India alone but goes deeper to compare the situations in the two host nations; Bangladesh and India, in the lens

of political science and international relations. Already, very few works have made attempt to separately study the two but none has made any effort to compare and contrast the two host nations.

1.1 Methodology

A descriptive case study tells the account of a real-life issue that people or organizations faced and how they dealt with it. It encompasses a brief but comprehensive account of the realities of the matter, as well as appraisal done, to make the reader fully comprehend the cause of the issue, the forces driving the remedy, the consequences of implementation, lessons learned, and links to theoretical approaches, concepts, policies, and techniques. Descriptive examples are intended to be used as teaching aids rather than research papers. They necessitate study, but the research provides the case study with concepts and meaning.

Bartlett and Vavrus (2016) have reviewed and discussed three categories of comparative case study. The Comparative Case Study Approach offers a multi-sited survey paradigm that investigates issues across multiple locations and dimensions. It emphasizes paying attention to 3 planes of comparison at the same time and in different ways. Horizontal: analyzes how comparable policies or occurrences evolve in socially linked and created areas. Vertical trails phenomena at different scales. Transversal, which follows events and cases through time (Bartlett and Vavrus, 2016). In this section, the following sub-titles will be addressed: problem statement, study purpose, research question, hypotheses, data, analytical method, contributions, and limitations.

This is a descriptive approach through comparative literature. This is going to be done using derived or compiled data to ascertain the differences regarding the situations of the refugees in their Bangladeshi and Indian camps. The study is based on secondary data gathered from a variety of sources, including books, journals, newspapers, and the web. The collected data was evaluated in order to derive conclusions from the research and to make the research more useful to the target reader. The Rohingya refugee camps' existing conditions will be demonstrated using the Bartlett and Vavrus' (2016) explained horizontal approach.

These include the camps (both the registered and unregistered), the social impact, gender-related situations such as violence, political impact of the influx of the refugees, economic and security impacts among others. The differences and the commonalities in these refugee situations and their impact shall be manifest in social impact, gender-related violence, political impact, economic impact, security concerns, environmental impact, health conditions, drug and arms trafficking, and religious and cultural effects.

1.1.2 Problem Statement

The main problem in this research is that the Rohingya refugee crisis has not been understudied, but a study of available body of literature reveals that many of such studies were done in different disciplines and scoped. For instance, Bakali and Wasty (2020), Taufiq (2019), Ty (2019), and, Sida and Schenkenberg (2019) are all examples of studies on the Myanmar but in the lens of security and religion. Moreover, the works have not captured any main or sub topic discussions with the subject matter relevance. This closest is "The Rohingya refugee issue: Differences in media framing in Bangladesh and India a Master thesis in Journalism and Mass Communication by Awny Mumtahin (2019) authored by Awny Mumtahin albeit done in the lens of Journalism and Mass Communication. Additionally, the existing literature has not given any attention to comparing the refugee cases in Bangladesh and India. Separate works have look into these issues separately without any effort to compare the two. Those that attempted to look into the Indian case have also done that lightly in reports, monographs and short articles. Despite the pressing nature of the Rohingya refugee crisis, many works have left several gaps this work shall be making effort to fill.

The comparison is going to bring to bear the difference situations of the refugees, the environmental realities of the refugee camps and other settlements that are considered illegal, and the works that go into the refugees' realities which have not been compared by works mentioned above either because they find it comparatively impossible or pointless. The need to compare their situation is given space in this work in order to reveal differences and similarities. For instance, the Bangladeshi camps in Ukhiya, Kutupalong and Teknaf Upazilas etc… and the Indian camps, in Jammu, Hyderabad, Nuh and New Delhi and many other camps areas.

1.1.3 Aim of the Study

This thesis aims at explaining the refugee crisis in Bangladesh and India. It will do so by looking into the challenges of the host states regarding their containment of the refugees, comparing the situations and trends in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and India, assessing the domestic policies in Myanmar that have effects in those refugee camps and tracing the history of the Rohingya conflict and the formations of refugee camps.

1.1.4 Contribution

This study will give a much-needed examination of how the Rohingya crisis, and the resulting refugee identity and citizenship issues, have sparked debates in political science and international affairs. It will stand out from past studies on the subject because the refugee crisis in hosting countries such as Bangladesh and India beg for in-depth research like this one. Unless a similar master thesis

is being written concurrently, a simple search of Turkey's research database reveals that nothing similar to this topic has been done. This implies that when completed, this thesis will be a valuable resource for students and academics interested in the subject.

1.1.5 Research Question

This thesis examines the conditions of the Rohingya refugee camps and their problems in Bangladesh and India comparatively. To do so, the main research question is formulated as: "What are the main similarities and differences between the conditions of Bangladeshi camps and Indian camps?" To reach out a specific conclusion about the comparison between these camps, multiple sub-questions are formulated as follows:

i. What are the similarities and difference between the Bangladeshi camps and Indian camps in terms of social impact, gender related violence, political impact, economic impact, security concerns, environmental conditions, health conditions, drug and arms trafficking, and religious and cultural effect?

This thesis argues that there are differences between the conditions of Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh and India due to social impacts, gender- related violence, political impact, economic impact, security concerns, environmental conditions, health conditions, drug and arms trafficking and religious and cultural effect. Analytically breaking down the situation would encourage the governments for a betterment of the refugee experiences as a matter of human rights. Look into the situations as they are being compared will pave way for governments and NGOs to reformulate policies that will go a long way to address the challenges in these camps whose spillover effect could reach the natives as well. For instance, the issues of drug trafficking and diseases.

Conceptual Framework

1.2. Refugee and the Refuge

People are not always willing to move. The refugee population is formed when people move involuntarily (Ahmed, 2009). According to UNHCR, the global refugee crisis is a disturbing trend that is increasing the number of displaced people, with 70.8 million forcibly displaced persons globally at the moment. There are 25.9 million refugees among them. Someone who travels or flees his or her home country owing to political, religious, or ethnic oppression is referred to as a refugee (Ahmed, 2009). Azad et al mentions Kofi Annan's comment which says that it is not easy for anyone that has not been through the experience of being taken away from their place of origin to fully grasp the concept of refugee. Primary rights like education, healthcare, work, and the freedom of mobility

are difficult to access for refugees in the host country (UNHCR). Refugees are frequently caught in a bind, since they are victims in both their home and host nations, and they have lost hope that the situation would improve (Azad et al, 2013). “One in which refugees find themselves in a long-term and intractable state of limbo,” as described by the UN. Although their lives are not in danger, their basic rights and basic economic, social, and psychological needs have not been met after years of exile.

1.2.1 Host Community

A host community is a sovereign nation that admits asylum seekers and allows them to stay in their country for a short or long period of time (Dev, 2002). The host community and refugees share the same land and natural resources, which can have negative consequences for the local economy, social life, and security in some cases. The United Nations also sees a host state or place as settlement given out or donated by a sympathizing country through the administration social and economic systems where refugees find shelter and form a new temporary life. It is important to add that these refugees continue to seek refuge in their newly found with or without the consent of the host state. In the case of refugee camps, the host community may embrace the camp or simply surround it, but it interacts with or is influenced by the refugees who live there.” (United Nations, 2011).

1.2.2 Difference between a Refugee and a Migrant

The refugee and migrant terminologies are used conversely many times, meanwhile the fact contain different meaning. The primary distinction between refugees and migrants is that one can choose to be a refugee or a migrant. A migrant is someone who chooses to relocate to another country for a variety of reasons, whereas a refugee is forced to go. People migrate for a variety of reasons, including better education, environmental protection, political and economic opportunities, and simply to live a better life (Parkins, 2011). “The UNHCR sees a refugee as a person forced to abscond from their place of living because they are being persecuted, fought, or harassed. These persons therefore become afraid of losing their life because of persecution due to their ethnic relations, religious affiliation, national orientation, political bias, and their involvement with particular social class. These people after having moved to seek refuge are most likely not willing to go back to their original settlement.” (2018b).

1.2.3 International Laws and Principles on Refugees

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) reiterates that every person is free to look for and benefit from the settlement of another nation if they are persecuted in their original settlement (Assembly, 1948). Because the issue of refugee forced migration necessitates the application of specific laws and principles, in 1951, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was set up as an International Refugee Organization (IRO) to facilitate the protection and solutions to the refugee problem internationally (Basu, 2009). This branch of the UN has the objective of leading and organizing international exploit for refugee protection and the resolution of their matters. The Geneva Conventions of 1951 and 1967 define the basic definition and legal framework for refugee protection in the host society, as well as the duties of the country together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Jastram & Achrion, 2001). The Article 33 of the 1951 reiterates that the non-refoulment principle protects refugees' rights by preventing them from returning to a place that their persecution is still going on. It is also important to add that a hosting state by no means or authority send refugees back to their places of origin where they do not feel safe and free to mingle and live like any other person in a way that their racial, religious, nationality, affiliation to a certain social class or political view is adversely affected. Because both Bangladesh and India are associates of the UN, they have the duty to adhere to the international community's norms and laws. It is believed by United Nations that the concept of non-refoulement is included in the international law of customary. As a result, it binds all countries, which includes those that are to yet to ratify the 1951 Convention as well as its 1967 Protocols. In the cases of North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ accepted the probability that a treaty establishment may be the grounds of a rule. When it is joined with the opinion juris, it may cause the formation of a binding tradition ruling all states of a mainly norm-creating character.

1.2.4 Citizenship, Citizens' Rights, Refugees Rights & Human Rights

Several arguments regarding citizenship characteristics have been found in the literature. The idea of citizenship, according to Kymlicka and Norman, comprises three dimensions at the person stage which are legal, identity, and civic conduct. Citizenship is a legal term that refers to a person's status as a part of a state. The identification element examines several identities as well as their membership standing. Last but not least, the attributes that a person should possess in order to be a good citizen are highlighted (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 30). Hammar, rather believes that citizenship may be

thought of in four main ways which are legal, political, social and cultural, and psychological. Citizenship refers to an individual's official membership in a state in a legal sense. Citizenship is acknowledged as the cornerstone for the country or "a much more significant constituent in international political system today" according to him, therefore it is a key political status (Hammar, 1989: 85). Citizenship has also cultural and social components, since it denotes "national membership." Hammar (1989:85) Finally, because citizenship is sometimes considered as "an expression of individual identification," it involves a psychological component (Hammar, 1989: 85). Furthermore, some scholars, like Turner (1993), address rights as an aspect of citizenship, while others, like Nuhoglu Soysal (1994), will not consider nationality in their definitions of citizenship. Citizenship has three primary elements, according to Baubock; rights, membership, and deeds. Baubock (1999: 6) evaluates and classify views using a slender spectrum approach, concentrating on the amount of focus placed on aspects of rights, membership, and practices as slimmer or thicker. For instance, citizenship denotes "'nationality' as it is understood in international law" at one end (the narrowest end) of the scale (Baubock, 1999: 7). Therefore, nationality is a legal position or connection between individuals and governments, rather than being a part of a country or a cultural and political group. Legal positivism, according to Baubock, is the narrowest administration of rights, memberships, and practices. Citizenship in a legal positivist sense refers to an empty relationship between persons and governments, devoid of any exact ethical meaning. When it comes to other elements of citizenship, such as rights and practices, he claims that the legal positivist theory of citizenship incorporates both rights and practices without conceptually presupposing either of them. Just sovereign governments are able to effectively "exercise political power not only over a region, but also over a populace that is the addressers of their laws" (Baubock, 1999a: 7).

Citizenship is now acknowledged as "participation in a circumscribed political group, that was either a country, a multinational-state, or a federated state," as per Benhabib (Benhabib, 2002: 454). Citizens, according to her, are those who are part of a state, have the right to dwell on its territory, are under its jurisdiction, and are, ideally, members of a "democratic sovereign in whose name laws are made and government is conducted" (Benhabib, 2002: 454). She divides citizenship into elements such as "collective identity, political participation rights, and social rights and rewards" in accordance with her description (Benhabib, 2002: 454).

Refugee rights on the other hand are embedded in two main points; rights to seek asylum and the right to enjoy asylum. The right to seek and enjoy shelter from repression in other nations' may be dated down to historical Greece, ancient Rome, and early Christian society's right of sanctuary. States recognized its contemporary equivalent in the shape of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Early drafting ideas that included a correlative requirement to provide

asylum were not approved, for example. 'The authority to grant refuge stays a right of the State,' according to fundamental foundations of state sovereignty. State sovereignty, as the final right of States to monitor their frontiers and refuse asylum seekers at their borders, is acquiring renewed momentum in today's atmosphere of heightened security worries (Harvey, 1998). The 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, the result of several unsuccessful efforts to reach an agreement on a legally enforceable pact, reconfirms that decision to grant asylum is a "practice of a state sovereignty," but it also confirms that States' caution in this respect is limited by the incorporation of Article 3. (1) (UN doc. A/CONF.78/12). 'No individual [obligated to invoke Article 14 of the UDHR] will be exposed to such initiatives as refusal at the border or, if he [or she] has indeed managed to enter the land in which he [or she] wants asylum, ejection or forced return to any State where he [or she] may be exposed to oppression,' according to this clause 'States maintain, and carefully preserve, the authority to allow or reject outsiders from their territory,' but 'the conceptions [of] admission and residence are not the "very core" of national sovereignty.' (Declaration on Territorial Asylum 1967; Andrysek, 1997) In reality, when it comes to the issue of sovereignty and the enterprise of asylum, the last one has been more frequently examined from the perspective that accepting refugees ought not be viewed as an infringement on the sovereignty of the refugee-producing state, rather than an infringement on the host nation's capacity to accept non-nationals. In this view, providing refuge is a "lawful use of sovereign territory, not to be considered as an unfavorable act by any State." (Goodwin-Gill, 1997:2). Despite these long-standing and resurfacing disputes over state sovereignty, other people contend that, while there is no de jure right to asylum, there could be an implicit right to asylum de facto or, at the very minimum, a right to aspire for that too (Einarsen, 1990:361; Goodwin-Gill, 1997). They claim that states' authority is limited by treaties and other regulations. '... states do not even have a fully free say in determining who to allow in terms of refugees,' according to Joly (Joly, 1996:1). The right to seeking and enjoying refuge has been further clarified with the entrance into effect of the 1951 Refugee convention. Whereas the UDHR is a non-binding document in and of itself, Article 14 is undoubtedly implied in the 1951 Refugee convention and its 1967 Protocol and is "an essential emergent standard of common global law," as mentioned above (Chowdhury, 1995:104). The 'right to sanctuary was inherent in the Convention, even though it was not formally declared therein, for the mere life of refugees relied on it,' as the French representative decided during the preparatory works (Goodwin-Gill, 1997). Conclusion No. 82 "reaffirms that the concept of asylum... comes immediately from Article 14(1)'s right to seeking and enjoying asylum."

Furthermore, when read together, Articles 1 and 33 impose a responsibility on Contracting States to provide, at a least, accessibility to asylum procedure for the sake of assessing refugee status. Access

to asylum proceedings is also questionably an inferred right under the 1951 Convention (despite the fact that such processes are not required to provide refugee status), and it is widely recognized in state practice. It has been claimed that even without proper asylum processes, non-refoulement duties, particularly denial at the border, might be violated (Edwards, 2003:197). The right to seeking refuge is supported by Article 13(2) of the UDHR, which states that "everybody has the right to leave any nation, including his own...", as reaffirmed in Article 12(2) of the ICCPR. Despite the fact that Article 13(2) of the UDHR does not acknowledge a right "to access any country," it would be a mockery of the 1951 Convention if this was not intended, at least for the purposes of determining refugee status, especially where an individual has arrived on a sovereign border, including its territorial waters or a standby zone in an airport terminal (Henkin, 1994:117). Moreover, save in cases of national security or public order, Article 32 of the 1951 Refugee convention prohibits the removal of a recognized refugee.

In the case of refugees, the freedom to leave any nation and the right to pursue asylum are two synonymous terms. Removal of aliens is likewise addressed under Article 13 of the ICCPR, however it "modulates only the method, not the fundamental reasons for removal." (Human Rights Commission, 1989). It gives immigrants a full chance to seek redress against their removal, that may only be halted for "convincing national security considerations." (Gorlick, 1999: 51). Aside from providing a definition of "refugee" in Article 1, the 1951 Convention lists a number of rights assigned to refugees in Articles 3 to 34. 'Clarify the minimal criteria implied in the implementation of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration...' says the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol (Goldman and Martin, 1983: 312). By way of an affirmative refugee status finding under Article 1A (2), Governments are required to provide refugees with the basic levels of treatment outlined in the 1951 Convention, in accordance with its purpose and purpose. As a result, a context for the handling of asylum seekers and refugees in host nations has emerged, and the right to enjoy refuge has been converted from a nebulous idea of limited entry or stay to one that requires host governments to follow specific procedures (Clark, 1992: 190). The provision's tone and implications were modified when a right to "be granted" asylum was replaced with a right "to enjoy" asylum. In contrast to the right to seek refuge, the right to enjoy asylum implies a right to 'benefit from' asylum at the very least. While a State is not compelled to give asylum, once accepted to the territory, an individual has the right to 'enjoy' it. As per a UN report, "asylum" entails admitting a person to a State's territory, allowing them to remain there, refusing to deport, refusing to deport, and refusing to charge, punish, or conversely limit the person's freedom (Mubanga-Chipoya, 1988:103). By way of Articles 3 to 34 of the 1951 Convention, and recent developments in IHRL, the writer contends that it goes beyond.

As a result, "the right to seeking and enjoying refuge is not a meaningless concept." (Plender and Mole, 1999: 82).

While the 1951 Convention is without a doubt the basis of the global system of refugee protection and has remained valid for more than fifty years, it is not the only storehouse of rights pertaining to asylum seekers and refugees. The 1951 Refugee convention enumerates only a limited set of rights for asylum seekers and refugees, and they do not cover the full range of rights granted to them under the International human rights instruments. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 1951 Convention precedes the 1960s human rights agreements and included a number of rights that have since been improved by advancements in human rights legislation. A range of civil and political rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights, are covered under the 1951 Refugee convention. It covers religious freedom, property, creative rights, and commercial property, as well as rights to association, accessibility to courts, income work, self-employment, official certificate acknowledgment, and welfare, social security, and training (Article 3 to 24). However, the IRL is framed in such a way that the blends of treatment permitted by the Convention are based on concepts like legitimately residing or simply being present in the territory, and a sliding scale of treatment standards ranging from nationals65 to foreign citizens or foreigners (UNHCR, 2001). The 1951 Convention reciprocity attitude can also function as an impediment to equal rights with nationals. The scope of a refugee's rights can be evaluated in four ways, according to Goodwin-Gill: "simple presence," "lawful presence," "lawful residency," and "habitual residence." Only a handful of the 1951 Convention's rights explicitly apply to refugees and migrants. Non-penalization (Article 31) and non-refoulement (Article 33) are two such rights (Goodwin-Gill, 1997: UHCR).

The two fundamental considerations for asylum seekers and refugees in assessing relevant treatment standards are: Do human rights norms apply to them? In the case of a fight, whose right wins? One of the UN's main goals is to promote and support "respect for fundamental rights and freedoms for all people without regard to race, gender, language, or religion." (Article, 3). The UN Charter's human rights principles are immediately enforceable on all UN Member States. Likewise, the UDHR states that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" (Article 1) and that "everyone is entitled to all of the rights and freedoms set out in this Declaration, without difference of any sort (Article, 2)." Even though the UDHR is not legally binding, it did pave the way for future human rights obligations that do not make a distinction between citizens and non-citizens. These provisions were eventually moved to the ICCPR's Article 2(1) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights' ('ICESCR' Article) 2(2). As a result, the values of non-

discrimination and fairness are at the heart of the IHRL. Non-discrimination, along with equal treatment under the law and equal treatment under the law without discrimination, forms a basic and universal concept linked to the human rights protection, according to basic human rights standards (HRC, 1981).

IHRL's non-discriminatory foundation backs up the idea that such rights apply to "all people inside [a State's] jurisdiction and subject to its jurisdiction." In this respect, the IHRL is territorial rather than nationality-based, unless otherwise stated in specific clauses (Edwards, 2005:305). The fact that IHRL does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens except in a few particular situations suggests that foreigners are incorporated in all other provisions, according to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 'As a result, the basic assumption is that each of the [ICCPR and ICESCR] rights must be granted without distinction between foreigners and locals (Edwards, 2005). While 'nationality' is not directly mentioned in either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' non-discrimination articles, national origin or other statuses would plainly protect refugees and asylum seekers from discrimination. In any case, the ICCPR and ICESCR's Articles 2(1) and 2(2), respectively, are non-exhaustive and forbid "bias of any type." As a "standalone assurance of non-discrimination in regard to all rights," Article 26 of the ICCPR has been used to secure the protection of a variety of rights, including economic ones (Joseph, et al., 2000: 524). Asylum has always been "little defined or placed in context, and frequently unattainable," but IHRL is an instrument that may already provide it with more meaning (Goodwin-Gill, 1999: 225). After all, refugees are human beings as well (Kennedy, 2002).

Rohingya refugees from Myanmar are referred to as "Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals" (FDMN) in Bangladesh, where they are housed in camps. In terms of humanitarian aid, the Bangladesh government is meeting basic necessities in accordance with international refugee legislation. However, there is a distinction to be made between citizen and refugee rights. Under the Immigrants Act of 1946, refugees are deemed illegal foreigners and can be arrested for illegal immigration. If refugees attempt to exercise their right to freedom of movement by leaving the camp, they risk being arrested (Azad, 2018). In the social, political, and economic areas, they do not have the same rights as citizens (Al Imran & Mian, 2014).

1.3 Refugee camps

1.3.1 Social, Political and Economic Impacts

Over the past few years, there has been a rising studies on the implications of dislocated persons on host societies. Nevertheless, an examination of the data indicates a number of inadequacies in the

field of research. For starters, there is now a significant conceptual emphasis on the environmental and economic implications of hosting refugees, whereas the social dimension is frequently overlooked. This seems to be true particularly for the Global South in general, as opposed to Europe and North America, where the societal repercussions of immigration – even if not explicitly of refugees – have been researched more thoroughly (for instance Gesthuizen, van der Meer, & Scheepers, 2009; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010). In this thesis as shall be seen in consequent pages the comparison to be employed is similar to the Monte Carlo simulation technique on that microdata from refugee and host-country will not be used, instead the survey data gathered from aforementioned sources, in order to determine the effects of refugee camps on host-country economies, and to a broader extent health, political, environmental, gender and security and compare the effects of cash vs in-kind refugee help. There is a paucity of trustworthy scientific research on how refugees effect host nations' economics. According to several research, refugees have no substantial influence. Others believe that negative shocks have a heterogeneous impact, with negative shocks disproportionately affecting impoverished host-country populations (Landau, 2014). It is in this light that this work will use this comparative approach used in the mentioned research to compare and contrast the classified headings in the states in question.

1.3.1.1 Social Impact

i. Gender Related Violence

Gender-based violence is defined as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private life" by the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (UNDEVW, Article, 1). Gender-based violence has recently become a big worry and a severe problem all across the world. Gender-based violence is a violation of human rights, according to international human rights agreements (Heise and Gottmoller, 2002).

There is no universally accepted definition of gender-based violence; conceptions vary by state, society, and legal environment. Gender-based violence is a word that is frequently used interchangeably with violent acts against women. Nonetheless, the word does not specify if the violence stems from uneven power dynamics between men and women in society. As a result, the word "gender-based" is frequently used to emphasize the role that females' lower place in society plays in raising the chance of being harmed by violent acts. Therefore, the term's goal is to emphasize

that violence against women is a phenomenon that is linked to the gender of both the victim and the offender. It is in this light that this study shall concentrate on the gender issues as they are recorded in the Bangladeshi and Indian camps.

ii. Religious and Cultural Effect

Discrimination against refugees is on the rise in many host nations (Mestheneos and Ioannidi, 2002). While marginalization or otherization lessens over time as a result of harmonization measures, it may rise as a result of certain economic, cultural, and social reasons. Nevertheless, the process of adaptation and acceptance can be facilitated by some components such as religion and faith, which provide purpose to life (Yang and Fry, 2018). The purpose and meaning of life, as revealed by the individual's trust in God and spirituality, can have an influence on the individual's interactions with others (Captari et al., 2018).

Cultural differences, poor knowledge between the two populations, and probable prejudices might make it tough to get acquainted and engage refugees in nations where they are present (Colic-Peisker, 2005). (Hangartner et al., 2019). When faced with differences, spirituality and diversity, as basic ideals, may help to foster unity. With this knowledge, it will be simpler for refugees and host communities to overcome preconceptions and coexist by expanding their interaction in the same location (Cowling et al., 2019; Knappert et al. 2021). It is in this light that this thesis shall compare the effects of religion in coping with refugees in the states under study.

iii. Health Conditions

Many factors, such as geographical location and refugee camp situations, might have an impact on refugee wellness. Refugees may suffer from a wide range of acute and chronic health conditions. Communicable diseases like TB or intestinal parasites are examples, as are chronic illnesses like diabetes or hypertension, and mental health challenges like post-traumatic stress disorders like depression. Some disorders are difficult to diagnose and cure. Refugee and migrant health issues are comparable to those of the general population, while some groups may have a greater frequency. Accidental accidents, hypothermia, burns, gastrointestinal disorders, cardiovascular events, pregnancy- and delivery-related difficulties, diabetes, and hypertension are the most common health concerns among recently arriving migrants. Female refugees have unique problems, notably in maternity, infant, and child health, as well as reproductive and sexual health (UNHCR).

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), health is "a full condition of physical, mental, and social well-being, rather than only the absence of sickness or disability" (WHO, 1948). The conditions of being a refugee – the harms suffered before to flight, the conditions of the travel to a host nation, and the following conditions in refugee camps – can all have a negative impact on each of these aspects of well-being. Individual and population-level health concerns are significant in refugee camps. Over the last two decades, the field of humanitarian response has experienced remarkable expansion and professionalization as a result of challenges in fulfilling basic health standards in refugee contexts and lessons gained from humanitarian practice in catastrophic calamities. Despite worldwide urbanization of refugee environments (Spiegel et al., 2010), the health requirements of refugees in controlled or planned camps, frequently in settings with extremely limited resources, continue to be a key concern for the humanitarian community. It is in this light that this study visits the health situations in the Rohingya camps and it compares the Indian and Bangladeshi encampments.

1.3.1.2 Political Impact

i. Security concerns

In the late 1990s, a number of UN Security Council resolutions reflected government's growing concern about the security implications of refugee migrations. States acknowledged in these resolutions that large population relocation might pose a danger to international and regional peace and security, and could even be a planned war plan. More specifically, in Haitian, Iraqi, Kosovan, Liberian, Rwandan, and Somalian states, the Security Council connected population displacement to risks to international peace and security and considered such concerns grounds for international intervention (Goodwin-Gill, 1999).

Another aspect of the relationship between refugee flows and governments is domestic security and stability. This is due to the increased availability of small guns in war zones, as well as the possibility for resource disputes caused by the influx of large populations of refugees. Rapid and huge refugee flows can exacerbate instability in governments dealing with economic difficulties, political uncertainty, and ethnic or social conflicts. Conflicts between refugees and their host populations may arise as a consequence of actual or perceived rivalry for resources, or as a result of resentment when refugees are thought to be privileged in comparison to their impoverished hosts. This has happened in Kenya, for example (Adelman, 2003). Both camps in the states in question shall also be investigated in terms of the security concerns.

ii. Drug and Arm Trafficking

According to Mogire (2004), the term "small arms and light weapons" is frequently used to refer to three key categories of weaponry: small arms, light weapons, ammunition, and explosives. The role of refugees in the proliferation of small guns and light weapons has never been evident, even to prior writers who have written in the same field. According to research's performed by Mkutu, (2003) and Mogire, (2003), it is impossible to establish with confidence the involvement of refugees in the spread of Little Arms and Light Weapons since relatively small proportion of the refugee respondents could talk about the problem openly.

Migrant smuggling facilitators have grown in popularity amid global perceptions of migration as a problem. They are frequently portrayed as predators and violent men who defraud, abduct, attack, or leave innocent and desperate migrants throughout the world. Their trade is frequently described in global reports as one of the most profitable illicit activities in the world, second only to drug trafficking and the sex trade (Europol-Interpol 2016; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] 2017). Smuggling organizations are defined as complex, growing networks with multinational reach, in addition to supposedly generating substantial profits for their operators (Carrera and Guild, 2016). Both arms and drug trafficking have taken over so many camps refugee camps in the world and this study goes into these menaces in around the refugee encampments.

iii Environmental Impact

Environmental issues happen all over the globe, but many of them reach heightened proportions, bringing enormous numbers of people together in the name of survival. Deforestation, soil erosion, and the depletion and contamination of water supplies are among the most serious issues in refugee-affected regions. Other factors to examine are change in social and economic well-being of local communities due to the arrival of refugees or during their extended stay. These, too, may have an effect on the environment, changing the rate and scope of local services provided to people now and the future. On a worldwide scale, the environmental effect of migrants is negligible. During the height of Tanzania's refugee crisis in 1994-1996, 570 square kilometers of forest were damaged, with 167 square kilometers badly deforested. An environmental impact study conducted in Zimbabwe in 1994, after Mozambican refugees repatriated to their homelands, revealed a 58% drop in forest cover near camps. Nonetheless, nations such as Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo endure elevated amounts of habitat loss each year due to unchecked logging and land clearance for agriculture - 2,900 and 1,800 square kilometers of forest every year, accordingly (UNHCR, 2001).

The UNHCR is aware of the possible environmental effect of refugees, according to the organization.

The immediate problem is competing for environmental assets such as fuelwood, construction materials, fresh water, and wild edibles. If not tackled, environmental damage or disputes between refugees and native populations may hinder the efficacy of UNHCR's programs and, more importantly, impact future government decisions to give sanctuary to refugees. Refugees, on the other hand, cannot be supposed to prioritize environmental concerns over their own safety and well-being. This is where UNHCR and other organizations come in, aiding host nations with rehabilitation and clean-up activities while limiting the effect of refugees as much as possible (UNHCR, 2001). There is evidence of environmental degradation in the refugees' settlement in the states in question and this study shall identify and compare them accordingly.

1.3.1.3 Economic Impact

An inflow of refugees can also boost the gross domestic product of a host nation. Accepting a high number of migrants might be expensive at initially. Taxpayers' money spent on social services, job training programs, and integrating initiatives, on the other hand, might be considered as an investment. According to research, it leads to a net benefit for the economy (Burke, 2020).

A research of the impact on the economy of migrants in Europe between 1985 and 2015 found that after only 2 years of higher refugee inflows, the economies of the 15 nations surveyed improved and joblessness fell. Refugees increased demand for commodities, created jobs, and contributed to the economy. As a result, they were able to offset the expense of the government assistance they need upon arriving. Likewise, a Tent Foundation analysis from 2016 concluded that in the European Union, every euro funded refugee help programs yielded two euros in economic gains (Burke, 2020). When a government is spending in accepting refugees, it does not just do it the ethically by assisting the world's most disadvantaged persons in their period of dire need of help, but it also fosters economic growth and builds a more optimistic future for all of its citizens. To obtain these economic benefits, governments must first ensure that refugees are received, embraced, and assimilated. Many social groups have recognized this and rallied to make it a reality. It is against this background that the economic impact of the Rohingya is looked at in both India and Bangladesh.

1.4 Contribution of this study to the literature Research Design

A literature review, according to J Rowley & F Slack (2004:32), distils the current literature in a topic field; the goal of the literature review is to describe the advancements in that study area. As a

result, it recognizes and organizes the research's themes based on prior knowledge of the topic area. In reality, conducting a literature study aids the researcher in the study as a facilitator by allowing the researcher to learn more about refugees and the potential influence they have on host communities, as well as tying the findings to the theories chosen. It also aids in constructing the analysis section in accordance with the theories. The process of identifying a subject, supporting a technique, providing background, or changing research direction, as per Bryman (2012), is known as literature review. As a result, the review assists the researchers in determining the direction of their job. While the body of literature on refugee livelihood is growing, the scope and breadth of such studies remains minimal and un-synthesized when related to other topics in refugee studies. Particularly, there is a deficit of comparative empirical assessment of refugees' livelihood in respect to their host societies and exile places, such as camps and cities (Bryman, 2012).

Migration researchers use a broad range of comparative research designs depending on their study topic. The most prevalent variety, cross-location, has a spatial foundation. Cross-country, cross-region, and cross-province/city/town are examples of this type. A comparison of labor market integration policy results in Canada and Sweden might be an example of cross-location comparison (Yalaz & Zapata-Barrero, 2018: 9-31). A related problem may be investigated by comparing the labor-market incorporation of three newly arriving refugee groups in Australia, such as ex-Yugoslavs, black Africans, and those from the Middle East. Thanks to the current local shift in migration research, cross-city comparisons have risen substantially. The third category is the cross-meso level, which concentrates on comparison across institutions and organizations, such as studying the conceptualizations or policy implications of various migrant's activist groups in a given migrant host nation (Tyler et al., 2014: 3-21). The fourth category is cross-time comparisons, such as contrasting Turkey's response to major migrations of Bulgarian Turks in 1989 to Syrians since 2011 (Carpi, 2015). The last form combines comparing concepts, such as cross-country and cross-city comparisons. Such pairings hold promise because they may reveal "to what degree local decision-making process is influenced by the unique legislative framework, and what types of parallels and differences may be observed ceteris paribus." Scholars choose comparisons that are substantially relevant to their study subject. Each sort of comparison approach can be used to study each topic, but the research problem determines which one to use. A cross-group study strategy, for instance, will concentrate on issues relating to groups, their hosting settings, and their interaction in order to explain disparities in results. Cross-time comparisons are particularly important for identifying consistencies and inconsistencies in policy-making activities.

All of these correlations contribute to the empirical component of migration literature, allowing for more well-founded assessments. They aim to give "detailed, multi-layered, and varied assessments of the manner in which many parts of the routine immigrant experiences change and unfold," since these are qualitative comparisons (Morawsha, 2018: 114). Furthermore, they make us to experience "point of view from inside" and "the intensity and quality of details required to offer a true view of specific process of migration, causes, and interactions," even when confronting difficult issues like people trafficking or refugee militarization, which are frequently discussed in the general populace sphere (Van Liempt & V. Bilger, 2018: 270).

These researches are especially critical since migration challenges require more rigorous objective data for scientific progress, and feasible policy pathways to lead policy and social reform. As Scholten points out, migration academics have become a major voice in public debates on topics like as the migrant influx and extremism, and a wide range of agencies have emerged to add to evidence-based policies. Several methodological surveys on migration conclude that comparative research is necessary to better guide evidence-based policies and scientific growth.

About 15% of the 627 publications published in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies and Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies that employed qualitative migration studies in Europe between 2000 and 2016 used comparative research design, according to Yalaz and Zapata-Barrero's extensive study (Yalaz & Zapata-Barrero, 2018). While they used a variety of comparison methods, cross-location comparison accounted for more than half of all comparisons, outnumbering cross-location, cross-time, cross-meso level, and cross-group comparisons. In the 2015–2016 timeframe, Yalaz and Zapata-Barrero discovered that comparative studies in migration research increased to 25% (Yalaz & Zapata-Barrero, 2018: 13-14). McNally and Rahim evaluated the Journal of Refugee Studies by evaluating where the writers who wrote in these publications were based in order to address the issue of whether the Refugee Research field is international or not in a contemporary research. They discovered that writers from the United Kingdom predominate the journal, with more papers published than writers from any other nationality. Furthermore, despite the fact that the preponderance of refugee’s dwell in the Global South, all of the top ten nations where writers are located in the Global North (McNally and Rahim, 2020). Although author-by-country analysis offers information about the regions where knowledge is produced, it does not provide information about the geographic distribution of field periodicals.

Kunz (1973) proposed two primary conceptions for migrant movement, dubbed the Kinetic Model,

wherein refugees are divided into two types: anticipatory flow groups and acute flow groupings. Anticipatory flow, according to Kunz (1973), is defined as refugees escaping worsening situations in small numbers or separately, whereas acute flow is defined as refugees leaving due to impending danger in large groups and seeking protection in adjacent nations. According to Kunz (1973), the Rohingya belong to both the anticipatory and acute flow categories. The response to refugee support has evolved dramatically over the years, per the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-Standing Committee (UNHCR-SC) (1997). The UNHCR-SC (1997) originally referred to the global society's reaction to migrants as refugee relief and development in the 1980s. This method first centered help on growth, with the overall objective of the support being self-sufficiency and long-term remedies via local incorporation. One of the most significant problems to this method, according to the UNHCR-SC (1997), is the social and economic burden on the host nation; as a result, this approach necessitates the need to pay host nations. The UNHCR-SC (1997) stated that the response to refugees had evolved into refugee development and relief programs by 1984. Nevertheless, by 1991, this strategy was widely seen as a failure owing to a lack of financial and assistance agency backing. The UNHCR-SC (1997) also discovered that, by the 1990s, migrant flows leaned toward return and complicated situations, so they altered their reaction to help refugees reintegrate into fragile tension zones and redress the harm done to hosting nations during the deportation processes. In addition, the UNHCR-SC (1997) stated that, as the number of complex situations has increased, relief organizations have placed a greater focus on readiness.

So many works and theses have looked into the crisis of Rohingya Muslims as well as the refugee crisis that came with it in several neighboring states. In his masters' degree thesis *Impact of the Rohingya Refugees on host Country Bangladesh: A Focus on Cox's bazar* (2020), Mashrurah Bintay Zaker, all through his investigation, the researcher sought to learn as much as he could about the effects of refugees on host communities. The researcher has been somewhat helpful in generating a picture of the consequences of migrants on host communities after reflecting on the study topic and answering it. He believes the data and analyses may be used as a starting point for more study on the subject. His study is centered on the 2017 Rohingya refugee surge and its ongoing effects, with an emphasis on the implications at both the early and deeper levels. Previously, the Rohingyas were thought to be transitory Bangladeshi residents. The failure of repeated attempts to repatriate them has created a sense of uneasiness among GOB and the residents that their presence will be indefinite. Furthermore, Bangladesh is reliant on foreign donors, and it would be unable to deal with the refugee issue without their assistance. Even with all of the help, it is still trying to handle the residents and migrants. Despite the attempt made the researcher to bring the precarious situation of the refugees

and the effects it has on the host communities; this work has done nothing in comparing the situation in Bangladesh and India like is done in this thesis.

In his "*The impacts and challenges to host country Bangladesh due to sheltering the Rohingya refugees"* (2020), Kudrat-E-Khuda in the lens of sociology, the writer believes that the Rohingya situation should be handled seriously and effectively from economic and social angles with the goal of recognizing the repercussions and problems produced by the enormous migration of Rohingya refugees into Bangladeshi state. The Bangladeshi people's socio-economic stability has been severely harmed by the large departure of Rohingya refugees. As a result of the pressure exerted by Rohingya refugees, many Bangladeshis have been forced to flee their homes. The host country's labor market, Bangladesh, has seen a significant shift in pay patterns as a result of the Rohingya refugees. The Rohingya refugees provide low-cost labor because they must support themselves. The pay trend in the job market has been thrown off by this. Bangladesh's native laborers are in a precarious condition as a result of the scenario. If the situation (caused by the Rohingya refugees) is not addressed quickly, it would weaken Bangladesh's current socioeconomic system and threaten the state's core. Again, just like the previous study talked above, this study only looked at shelter which falls under economic problems although with some touch in politics and health.

On India, Khriezo Yhome's 2018 article, "Examining India's stance on the Rohingya Crisis", While examining the political discussion and rhetoric produced by the inflow of Rohingya refugees, the author contends that India's response to the Rohingya issue violates its conventional stance on refugees. He feels that as the Rohingya situation evolves, India may still contribute a lot to aid in the development of long-term remedies. He believes that India, as a growing state with global ambitions and a long history of dealing with migrants, has a responsibility to do so. Finally, India may be in a stronger position to form global and regional discussions on rising global governance concerns, such as refugees. In his MPhil thesis, Rohingya Refugees in India: Issues and Concerns (2018), Farhan Khan investigates the significance of organizations in engaging with the Rohingyas with the goal of better comprehending the Rohingya community's origins and past, as well as the state's stance on the Rohingyas. While investigating the plight of the Rohingyas in India, the researcher recommends that the humanitarian issues of the Rohingyas be investigated, and that the state come through with a plan to address this humanitarian crisis within India, as well as tougher stance on the Myanmar authorities to appropriately call them back, protect their rights, and incorporate them as citizens, as they have been residing in Myanmar for generations. His key finding was that political parties misuse their position by supporting the refugees based on their ideologies owing to a lack of a sufficient legal

framework.

Even UN organizations do not perform well when there is constant push from the state governments, as the UNHCR has only acknowledged 16,500 Rohingya refugees out of the 40,000. For instance, in their "*Sovereign Debt, Migration Pressure, and Government Survival"* Benhard and Leblang (2016) support the argument that performance is hindered by constant pressure. Like the ones before it, this work also concentrated on India only and has done nothing to compare the situations in India and Bangladesh; a gap this thesis aims to fill. These works have also failed to look into the realities of the camps in either country. Also, Socio-Political Impacts of Rohingya Refugees on Bangladesh by Ehteshamul Haque, Rohingyas In Bangladesh: Owning Rohingya Identity in Disowning Spaces, a PhD dissertation by Ishrat Zakia Sultana, The Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Social, Economic and Environmental Implications for the Local Community in Bangladesh, a Master thesis by Lily Myat, and The Rohingya refugee issue: Differences in media framing in Bangladesh and India a Master thesis in Journalism and Mass Communication by Awny Mumtahin (2019) are all recent works that have looked into the subject matter. The closest work to this thesis topic is the one authored by Awny Mumtahin but it is done in the lens of Journalism and Mass Communication. This study will make a deliberate effort to fill the literature gap.

1.5 Data Analysis

Data collection is the act of acquiring and evaluating information on variables of interest in a systematic manner that allows researchers to answer research questions, test hypotheses, and assess results. It is in this light that this work shall make use of secondary sources such as books, journals, papers, and reports from Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University's library and internet libraries to gather data, as well as other libraries in Turkey. It shall also make use of sources like internet, literature from scientific databases such as JSTOR, Google scholar, as well as sources from search engines and other related materials from video and audio sources relevant to the subject matter. In collecting the data for this study, related secondary data relevant to answering research questions shall be traced and located, the data is then retrieved, and finally evaluated. This evaluation is to make sure their sources are authentic and in any cases traceable to the authors.

1.6 Limitations

One of the limitations of this thesis is the inability of the researcher to have a direct access to refugees in both Bangladesh and India Rohingya camps for interview. Also, the researcher's identity as Rohingya citizen will guide the selection of relevant data for this research whilst conscious effort

will be put in to discard all biases and extraneous variables that could reduce the objectivity of the work.

CHAPTER 2

2 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS RESPONSES

This chapter covers the human rights violations and the refugee crisis responses by giving an overview of Rakhine State first, then giving place to the discussions on the conflicts. Thirdly, the chapter elaborates postcolonial experience, WWII and Myanmar Independence as a historical basis to figure out the human rights violations in Myanmar. While doing so, the section emphasizes the experiences of Rohingya refugees, who had to flee and settle down in refugee camps, facing various experiences both negative and positive, based on the host country's identity and citizenship policies.

2.1 Global Human Rights Movements

The United Nations in December 1948 established Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the cornerstone of evolving and contemporary global human rights obligations and policies for all and sundry (UN, 2017). Regardless of nationality, gender, ethnicity, language, race, or religion, the UNHCR recognizes all people's inherent rights to basic freedoms and equality. Several agreements, regional pacts, domestic laws and covenants have been developed across the globe since the proclamation of this foundation for defending human rights, ensuring persons' equal opportunity, fairness, and freedom from being persecuted within the legal framework of their corresponding governments. The right to labor, right to literacy, religious and movement freedom are all examples of human rights. In recent times, several have been identified as crucial have emerged in recent years among the UDHR's main principles. For example, international law is increasingly focused on the working on several measures and policies that facilitate the panacea to remedy the cruel fate of the less privileged populations that are facing discrimination due to fights, displacement and persecution (UNHCR, 2007).

Many countries, which include Myanmar, are now joined pacts of human rights and vowed in order to implement and comply with their duties under the accord (UNHCR, 2017). Being a new member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it made approval and has also accepted to its requirements for human rights protection since 2009. They are one of the provincial organizations of states to adopt an agreement on primary human rights (Arendshorst 2009). The record of human right of the Myanmar since entering the pact, and in the past had been repressive and rejection of

marginalized. It is equally endangering the safety and fortune of the neighbors' regional member. Regarding human rights in Myanmar, the United Nations (2005, 9) contains that rape, meditated killing, as well as any other form of sexual harassment insistently perpetrated by military individuals and also violence, incarceration, compulsory labor, and other ways of mistreatment are frequently sanctioned on marginal clusters across the nation, especially the Rohingya people.

The United Nations and Amnesty International have both agreed that the Rohingyas are part of the world's most victimized marginal crowd and face numerous obstacles in Myanmar. Their movement is restricted by the state, they have restricted contact to basic necessities and rights. They are equally denied citizenship. As a result, they have been classified as a stateless community in Myanmar, with no rights to land, work, or education (European Commission 2018).

In Myanmar, human rights violations and persecution of Rohingya Muslims occur on a regular basis. Despite joining international accords to defend individual rights within its authority, the oppressor state has successfully refused to secure the Rohingyas, despite years of pressure from the UN, UNHCR, and aid groups to meet its humanitarian duties (UNHCR 2017; Zawacki 2012: 21). Prior to Myanmar's independence, Myanmar asserts that Rohingyas unlawfully came to the region of Arakan from India's south, notably Bangladesh (Azad & Jasmin, 2013: 26). As a result, the government refuses to grant Rohingyas citizenship (Taylor, 2009 :156-157). They have had to migrate to neighboring nations to avoid the violence (Farzana, 2011: 217).

The following section provides an overview of the Rakhine region. The discussion of the issues encountered by the Rohingyas precedes it, with a particular attention on the role of the viciousness that erupted in August 2017. The chapter then moves on to a review of the legal context which can be applied to refugees in Bangladesh, followed by a consideration of the stakeholders' reactions to the Rohingyas.

2.2 Overview of Rakhine State

The state of Rakhine is located between Magway Bago and Ayeyarwady areas to the east, Chin State to the north, and the Bengal Bay to the west. Arakan is former name of Rakhine State (Min, 2016). Bangladesh's Chittagong division is located in Rakhine's northwest portion. Rakhine State's capital is Sittway. According to the 2014 census, Rakhine's total population is enumerated 2,098,807 and 1,090,000 non-enumerated (Department of Population, 2015). Mohammad relates that before the 2016-2017 crisis, it was estimated that more than a million of Rohingyas lived in Myanmar, although these approximations are tough to verify due to Rohingyas' deliberate exclusion in census figures by

the Myanmar (2017). Violence erupted between the forces government and the tribes of Rohingya in Rakhine. It also happened between the Muslims and Buddhists of Rohingya (Mirco, et al. 2017).

2.3 The Conflict

The Rohingya are a Muslim minority community who live in Myanmar's Rakhine area (Arashpour & Roustaei, 2016:384). They are the state's second-largest ethnic community, with Rakhine Buddhists accounting for the majority (Parnini et al, 2013:135). For about 200 years the Rohingyas have been present in Rakhine state (Southwick, 2015:139). Since before the country's independence in 1948, they have been the victim of discrimination and violence. This is owing to rivalry between ethnic groups vying for control of the territory. After independence, the Rohingyas were considered citizens, but after the 1962 military takeover, they were described to as illegal Bengali immigrants and a national security threat. This was the beginning of the Rohingya's civic, political, and economic rights being taken away (Lee, 2014:327).

Many Rohingyas people lost their formal documents in 1978, leaving them stateless and vulnerable to assault (Arashpour & Roustaei, 2016:385). The Rohingya were stripped of their citizenship in 1982 after a new law failed to acknowledge them as a national ethnic group (ibid.). According to Human Rights Watch, the measure "was purposefully targeted at the Rohingyas" (HRW, 1996).

The history of the Rohingya is divided into three periods, according to Milton et al. (2017, 942). There are three periods: precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial. From 788 to 819 AD, it has been identified by Milton et al. that Muslim mariners from Arab states as the first people to land on Rohingya lands. Hein (2018:366) went over the Rohingya settlement history in Arakan in greater detail. It is stated by Hein that Arakan is founded by Indian immigrants and afterwards overrun in the 11th century by Burmans, who then founded again Arakan in 1238. Meanwhile, there exist opposing viewpoints about the Rohingya's settlement in Myanmar. One faction claims that the Rohingya have lived in Myanmar since the ninth century, while others maintain that the Rohingyas are migrants from Bengal the region of Chittagong (Ullah 2016: 286).

Since the seventh century, indigenes have lived in the north of Rakhine. The Rohingya ethnic group's origins have been a blend of eastern region people of India, formerly known as Bengal, and ethnicity of Tibeto-Burman, who lived in the north of Burma. Dussich's paper (2018, 7-8) is arguably the thoroughly most historical chronological papers of significant occasions in Rakhine. Between 3rd century CE and 1406 AD, Dussich discovered colonies from different locations that settled among the locals in the coastal region of Arakan. Sanskrit was the indigenous language, and people lived according to their local religion and beliefs. Between the fourth and eleventh centuries, the

Inscription of Anand Chandra in the script of Nagari comparable to the Bengal dialect, as well as other north-eastern Indian languages, shows the presence of culture of the Buddhist, Muslims and the Hindu. In mid-1044 to 1077, monarch Anwardhta of Arakan was overthrown by the pagans of Burma and made it a province of Burma. According to Dussich (2018:8) Both Muslims and Hindus of Rohingya from Arakan, fled to Chittagong at this time.

The Kingdom of Arakan was established in 1238 again by Indian immigrants, according to Hein (2018:366), although Dussich (2018:8) said the victors were north-central Asia Mongols. The region was governed by Tibeto-Burman from the eleventh century to 1430, with two different groups, Rohingya Muslim and Rakhine Mogh. King Noromi Kla created the last Arakan kingdom in 1431, with the backing of the Bengali Sultan at that time. Mrauk U was the capital of the kingdom King Noromi Kla (Dussich 2018:8). Marauk U, according to Hein (2018, 366), was an irreligious and free capital that highly tolerated the religious rights and practices of Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic. The mosque of Sandhi Khan was constructed in 1433 at Marauk U by Sandhi Khan who was Muslim General. He assisted King Noromi Kla in regaining his throne later when was deposed. In ancient Arakan, the Mosque was seen as a sign of Muslim presence and integration, but it was destroyed by the Burmese army in 1996.

When they first surrendered the northern region to the Sultan of Dacca, Arakan's kingdom began to surrender its freedom to an outsider. Burma conquered the southern section of Arakan, forcing many people to flee to Chittagong in 1785. After that, the Burmans attacked the rebels of Arakan and began to war with the people of Britian. The British Arakan was colonized by in 1825 and remained under colonial control until 1948. (Hein, 2018:367; Dussich, 2018:9).

Even after Myanmar's independence, historic events have an important role in growing violence and tension. During British India, the event began with a huge number of internal migrations. Internal migration was encouraged in British India. However, internal migration was not the sole source of movement; China also attracted migrants, changing the demographics of Burma throughout time. Many settlers who were Muslim workers from Bengal worked in rice production in Arakan, resulting in an instant growth in the Muslim population (Hein, 2018:367). The Muslim population in Arakan grew at an unprecedented rate, tripling between 1871 and 1911.

Hein (2018, 368) uses two historical occurrences to explain why the Rohingya people in Myanmar are so tense and violent. The first is the human movement that altered Arakan's demographic character during British colonial administration. The British colonial concept of religion and race was the second event. Howe (2018:249) makes the same line of argument, claiming that faith has made an important impact in communal differences in Myanmar since the occupation of British. During their colonial control, the British jumbled together race and nationality, classifying people

based on religion and ethnicity, according to Hein (2018:368-369). This was obvious in the British census process in Arakan. The Muslims in the Arakan region were either classified as Burmese or Indian by the British. As a result, there are no Rohingya people recorded in British census records.

2.4 The Rohingyas in Burma in the Advent of World War II

During World War II, the schism between the larger Burmese as well as the lesser Rohingya Muslims got to a pinnacle. The Arakanese in the war openly backed the invasion of Japanese and added to its forces. The Rohingyas remained loyal to Britian (Ferguson 2018:478; Howe 2018:250). As Burmese people sought independence from British colonial control, the bulk of Burmese nationalists allied with the Japanese Army. The Japanese pledged freedom to Burmese nationals, and by 1942, the Japanese Army had seized the majority of Burma (Ferguson 2018, 478).

During the early years of WWII, violent warfare erupted between British supporters of Rohingya Muslims and Japanese supporters of Buddhist nationalists (Dussich 2018, 9). Both the Burma Independent Army and Buddhist Rakhine targeted the Rohingya population, killing about 100,000 Rohingyas and forcing another 50,000 to flee to Eastern part of Bengal state (Milton et al. 2017:942). Even after the country's independence, the two faction's violent experiences served as a constant source of animosity between Muslims of Rohingya and Buddhists of Rakhine (Dussich 2018, 9).

2.5 Independence of Myanmar

The Burmese Union was established in 1947 at the Conference of Panglong. The establishing document captures that the natives of the Frontier Areas will have the right and privileges considered as essential in states that practice democracy. Asserted minorities of ethnic groups will also have equal rights and behavior as the Burmese, and given an absolute self-sufficiency in inner management, and also ensure the right self-rule in their peculiar independent national conditions to all Burmese and non-Burmese nationalities. To resolve the long-standing internal conflict, Burma passed the Union Citizenship Act shortly after they had independence in 1948 from the Britain (Kipgen 2014:234-247). This act defined which ethnicities could gain citizenship. The act recognized all persons born on Burmese soil or with a Burmese parent as natives, but it did not include the population of Rohingya (Ullah, 2016).

Clearly, the past experience of religious and ethnic conflict caused intense lack of trust and influenced making of decisions from the country's inception in 1948. Myanmar had a brief period of parliamentary democracy before the takeover of the military in 1962. (Howe 2018:249-250).

According to Ullah and Chattoraj (2018:543), the ethnic identity of the Rohingya were originally recognized in the 1950s by the state. The first president of independent Myanmar was Sao Shwe Thaike, who originated from the Shan ethnicity. He proclaimed that Arakan Muslims were Burmese. The Rohingyas had citizenship and the right to exercise their franchise. Also, they were permitted to labor in civil service avenues, and one of the approved radio broadcasting services. It broadcasted Rohingya related programs three times in a week. Until late 1970s, the term "Rohingya" was used in textbooks and other journals (Ullah & Chattoraj 2018:543).

In 1962, when the military seized power, institutions of democracy began crumbling, and the military administration began using religious and ethnic conflict to necessitate their presence. Since 1962, succeeding military administrations have been fighting in the name of the state against various ethnic militia groups as well as general citizens (Howe, 2018:249-250).

The term Rohingya since 1960s has gradually been replaced by the term Bengali as the referred to them by the political administration. Prior to 1962, in Myanmar's democratic parliament system, the government at the time under Prime Minister U Nu listed an aggregate of 144 ethnic collections. The military government led by General Ne Win meanwhile retained a little more than 100 groups that the constitution of the Burma Socialist Program Party formally accepted. The government of Ne Win decisively excluded 'Rohingya' from the officially acknowledged groups of national ethnicity. The government claimed that citizenship law of Myanmar only recognizes groups that existed and settled down in the country prior to the country's freedom (Ullah 2016: 286).

In 2012. radical Buddhism followers and Rohingya Muslims clashed in Rakhine (OHCHR, 2018:7). Muslim minority were portrayed as dangerous in hate speech (Southwick, 2015:139). Myanmar has witnessed rise in anti-Muslim rhetoric and Buddhist nationalism since the 2011 changes (OHCHR, 2018). By damaging property, hurting, torturing, and killing Rohingya, the Tatmadaw was implicated in the violence (OHCHR, 2018:7, 26). Anti-Muslim riots resumed throughout 2013 to add to the mayhem (Lee, 2014:330-331). The international community expected Aung San Suu Kyi and the new government to bring positive change to Myanmar, but the country's conflicts worsened. Coercion, indiscriminate arrest, coercive labor, abuse, and forceful sex are recorded in reports from various sources (OHCHR, 2018:6).

The escalating violence in 2017 began on August 25th. Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) members attacked several security installations to draw international attention to the situation. Tatmadaw attacked the Rohingya in reprisal, with the support of border police and other locals. According to reports, the violence was methodical, organized, and ruthless (OHCHR, 2018). Hundreds of people were killed or injured in the attack. Villages were also set on fire, resulting in many Rohingyas dying in their homes and preventing them from returning (OHCHR, 2018:12-13).

Authorities in Myanmar allege that the burning was carried out by Rohingyas themselves, however there is no evidence to support this assertion (Amnesty, 2017b:27). The authorities presented it as "clearing operations," according to the UN fact-finding mission, while Médecins Sans Frontières reported that over 10,000 people were killed (OHCHR, 2018:8). Men were shot and killed right away, while women were sexually assaulted before being hurt or killed. After that, bodies were buried in mass graves (ibid.). In just three weeks, more over 370,000 Rohingyas crossed the border, according to Amnesty International (Amnesty, 2017a). The unrest in 2017 was "predicted and prepared," according to the United Nations (OHCHR, 2018:9).

2.6 Violation of Human Rights in Myanmar

Treating people equally in terms of their dignity and right is an important primary tenet of human rights is that all people should (Ullah 2011:149). The Rohingyas have the right to live in freedom and dignity as human beings. Human Rights Watch (HRW) observes that (2016), Myanmar government has wrongfully excluded the Rohingyas from citizenship and has restricted their freedom of travel, education, work, and basic requirements of life. Rohingyas are frequently viewed as part of the world's most susceptible and mistreated subgroups, who are denied elementary rights and lawful citizenship as nationals of Myanmar (Hofman, 2016; Tonkin, 2015). In 1978, 1991-1992, 2012, 2015, and 2016-2017, the Rohingyas were subjected to recorded military oppression and cruelty. As a result, the United Nations and Human Rights Watch labelled the oppression of Rohingyas as generally ethnic cleansing (Lone & Naing, 2017).

The Rohingya problem, as observed Wolf (2017:3), is the result of myriads causes including ancient disputes, faith related strife, financial reasons, and governmental factors. The United Nations labelled Myanmar's earlier security activities as "crimes against humanity." According to observers of the conflict, the military's most recent persecution was driven by a determination to violently eliminate the Rohingya people from Myanmar permanently (Safi, 2017). Kipgen (2014:235-238) for instance claims military and Rakhine Buddhist organizations' violent, planned, and organized persecution of Rohingyas has been more brutal since October 2012, purposeful, and prepared than earlier attacks to hurt them. The assaults done in villages, residences, and many mosques are well planned and catastrophic, with the obvious goal of driving away the Rohingyas (Human Rights Watch, 2013:4). Yanghee Lee, a United Nations distinctive investigation on Myanmar, supports the claim that the government wants to permanently deport Rohingyas outside Myanmar (The Independent, 2017). This idea was backed up by a lot of evidence from the last few years. In 2014, for example, resident Myanmar and Buddhist police services collaborated in brutal onslaught on Rohingya people, forcing

thousands to flee to Bangladesh and India (Brooten, 2015:137).

The bloodiest brutality has happened since late 2017, when the ARSA people attacked numerous Myanmar security checkpoints inside Rakhine after they killed (at least) a dozen police personnel in retaliation (Freeman, 2017). The violence has worsened since August 25, and the crackdown by the military caused the death of over 688, 000 Rohingyas refugees that fled to Bangladesh. Though Myanmar asserts that it is fighting terrorism, humanitarian organizations have labelled Myanmar's rights violations against children and women. This included systematic rape and killing, as ethnic cleansing (Safi, 2018; Siddiqui, 2017). Furthermore, Nyan Wan claims that the Rohingyas are not an ethnic group. He asserts they are rather unlawful settlers who should not even claim citizenship in the state of Myanmar (Freeman, 2017).

As a result, Myanmar seems unconcerned with welfare of Rohingyas or their protection, neither is it about international disapproval of the ongoing violations of human rights. Whole villages have been burned to the ruins in recent months, with Rohingyas having to see female ethnic Rohingya defiled. Many male and children alike ruthlessly murdered or vanished cannot be traced (BBC, 2017). When challenged with proof of the killings, which included cable photographs of over 1000 burned households, government authorities claim that the Rohingya set fire to their own homes, which a United Nations Human Rights Chief had already categorically denied and warned the military to halt the pretense. Security personnel killed several men, shoot them, butchering infants, raped women, destroying and plundering homes and then forced the vulnerable people to enter into Bangladesh after crossing a river, according to John McKissick, the head of UNHCR in Bangladesh (BBC, 2016, 24 November).

The Myanmar government also restricts access to health and medical services, which can be classified as human rights abuse. An international humanitarian medical organization known as Medicine Sans Frontiers (MSF) helps individuals afflicted by conflict, disasters, and poor health care. The political administration expelled non-profit outfit from Rakhine in February 2014, citing allegations doctors and medical officers of the MSF were involved in activities to make the government unpopular in crisis of Rohingya. As a result, the government's actions deprived over a million Rohingyas of the solitary source of medical assistance the vulnerable people had. Armed civilians attacked the UN and various NGOs in Sittway, Rakhine's capital, in March of 2014, displacing 300 international relief workers and preventing them from delivering help and health treatment to the deprived settlers (Brooten, 2015:135). The non-governmental organization were once again blamed for advocating for the Rohingyas and giving them supports regarding the crisis, causing outrage and animosity among the local Buddhist community. Military troops who would not have had the gut to plainly target a global NGO, it is claimed, galvanized and coordinated the fury

within the Buddhist community (Brooten, et. al. 2015).

The military took after that took it upon itself to be heavily available in Rakhine area, as they conduct massive a so called anti-terrorist operations to expedite the eradication the menace of the group they brand separatist. This is in collaboration with indigenous Buddhist mobs. This people would set village building ablaze and openly make attacks, murder and injure the Rohingyas with the help of armed personnel (BBC, 2017). The Myanmar government barred press organizations, foreign political observers, and non-governmental organizations from getting access to certain zones to make reports on the violence. As a result, an inaudible massacre is taking place while the rest of the nation look on, incapable or unable to end the catastrophe (The Independent, 2017).

Besides being exposed to intimidation and excessive violence, the Rohingyas are unable to work or earn a living due to government constraints on movement, which prevent them from getting the food they require. This is a flagrant breach of human rights. Foreign relief and food supplies to Rohingya in northern Rakhine have been virtually shut off by the military. As a result, many refugees are hungry or starving, according to humanitarian employees and medics that help to treat refugees that have lately entered Bangladeshi encampments (Klug, 2018). Amnesty International's 2018 report, released in February, revealed more proof and corroboration of the military's tactic of starving the Rohingya and expelling them from Myanmar by using food as a weapon. Due to long and ongoing nature of the Rohingyas' atrocities and abuses over many years, Amnesty International's 2017/18-year article noted, that the conditions of rights of the Rohingyas severely worsened.

Since the third half of 2017, oppression of Rohingya Muslims Arakan has risen drastically (Amnesty International, 2018), it drove a lot of Rohingya refugees outside their original settings to Bangladesh (and India as would be discussed is details in consequent chapter), where they confront massive challenges satisfying their basic necessities as refugees (Karim, 2017). The violation of Human rights and the ethnic violence from within in Myanmar are not new, but have been a part of the country's 'business as usual' for decades, probably prior to their independence (as earlier discussed). The increased ferocity in contemporary times indicates a shift in the severity of atrocities against Rohingya as well as the intention of government to expel the vulnerable from the nation (European Commission, 2018:1).

2.7 Legal and Administrative Framework for Rohingya Refugees

The Refugee Convention of 1951 and the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 1992) remain the most comprehensive measures used to protect refugees' basic rights and validate their status in asylum-seeking countries. These regulations are necessary for the international management of refugee

safety and the provision of basic humanitarian aid to refugees. It has also made it possible to put UNHCR protection and monitoring into practice. Bangladesh is neither a member to the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol, however the country is a signatory of the 1948 UDHR, compelling the state to satisfy its obligations to Rohingya refugees. The third quarter of 2017 crisis of the refugees were just the recent in a long line of incidents involving security forces in Myanmar persecuting Rohingya Muslims. Bangladesh has accepted thousands of refugees as a result of military actions in Myanmar since 1978, from a humanitarian standpoint (Mohammad et al. 2017:184). Under UNHCR watch over the years, many of such refugees were repatriated to Myanmar, but the majority of people that have escaped from Myanmar during the clampdowns of 1990s remain in Bangladesh. Near the two countries' border, the government runs refugee camps (Azad & Jasmin 2013 :1). Apart from Bangladesh, the Rohingya attempted to migrate to Thailand but were turned away. The Rohingyas travelled to Malaysia in the hopes of finding refuge in a Muslim-majority country. Malaysia, on the other hand, followed Thailand's lead. When all other options had been exhausted, they headed to India in the hopes of finding safety. In addition, the terrible conditions in Bangladesh and other nations pushed Rohingyas to migrate to India (Dutta, 2021).

In the second part, state policy’s primary principles, in article twenty-five, promoting international security, solidarity, and peace of the Bangladesh Constitution, there exist particular reference to sympathize for oppressed peoples around the world who are struggling due to colonialism and racism. Article thirty-five guarantees the same security to every native and any person temporarily residing in the state. As a result, the state is dedicated to working on behalf of victims or asylum seekers while adhering to global laws.

Both Bangladesh and India cannot compel any refugees of Rohingya to relocate to Myanmar provided their safety is endangered (Mohammad, 2011: 405-410). Approximately 40,000 Rohingya refugees live in India. Around 16,000 of them have filed with the UN Refugee Agency. While the UN has urged India to give the Rohingya with the safety they require, India argues that they are a threat to its national security and have ties to foreign terror organizations. So far, India has refrained from exerting any pressure on Myanmar. The term "Rohingya" is never used in official remarks or publications in India. The Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 2019 clarified the government's position by stating that: The Act amends the Citizenship Act of 1955 to offer citizenship to Buddhist, Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Parsi, and Christian illegal migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

State legislation or legal charter in Bangladesh to legalize the refugee management problems or to protect the rights refugees (Mohammad, 2011: 418). A repatriation procedure for 200,000 Rohingyas were started in 2005 via ambassadorial interaction with the government of Myanmar and partnership

with the United Nation. However, the procedure was halted due to political instability in Myanmar and the Myanmar government's lack of response and enthusiasm (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014: 1).

In 2014, Bangladesh published an article which looks at the strategy of talking about Myanmar refugees and unrecorded nationals of Myanmar in Bangladesh. The highlights of this article include the reasons for the well-structured and deliberate persecution and marginalization of the minority of Muslim in Rakhine, as well as the international community's arrangement with Myanmar to aid the recovery and deportation of Myanmar nationals (Abrar, 2015). The article underlines the importance of improving border security capability from a national safety standpoint in order to prevent unlawful entry and argues for a procedure of documenting the unregistered Rohingya people. The article further suggests primary humanitarian support and references a "safety discussion" alongside the Myanmar as well as provincial cooperation (Abrar, 2015).

Philanthropic organizations place requirements on deliberate deportation, making it a protracted process (HRW, 2017). If the realities of the refugee origin nation are favorable, UNHCR advocated a standard repatriation process based on voluntary return standards (Abrar, 1996). Bangladesh is loath to broaden its services and security to refugees of Rohingya because it thinks that it will lure more migrants to the settlements, which are already overcrowded and a significant cost on the host nation.

Bangladesh is a signatory another Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations regarding the deportation of Rohingya refugees (The Daily Star, 2018). According to Bangladesh's Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner, UNHCR would oversee the repatriation process, which involves obtaining refugee approval for voluntary return, managing interim camps, logistics, and transportation. Until the Rohingya return to Myanmar, the UNHCR will provide vital safety, aid, and finances (The Daily Star, 2018). The current scenario in Myanmar, on the other hand, is not favorable for a safe and long-term return of Rohingya refugees. Despite the fact that asylum in Bangladesh has significant restrictions, it is now the only realistic choice for Rohingya refugees.

In October 2018, India returned a few Rohingya refugees to Myanmar by handing them over to Myanmar authorities. The Supreme Court also declined to intervene in this matter. In recent times, it stayed away from elections at the UNHCR regarding a motion endorsed by Bangladesh denouncing Myanmar's handling of the Rohingya issue. According to the Indian political frond, India has not broken any global law because it is not a signatory to the 1951 convention, hence is not obligated by the non-refoulement rules. According to the United Nation, the principle of non-refoulement is a necessary and inalienable part of international refugee protection. International custom is widespread practice acknowledged as legal. This is according to ICJ’s article 38, and one of the sources used by

it for considering disagreements under global law.

2.8 International Laws and Conventions on the Refugee Status

A person's freedom to seek refuge in other state is generally recognized. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as was previously reiterated was written to protect people's right to nationality and citizenship. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the freedom to seek refuge in other state to escape persecution (Yasmin, 2017:71). Seeking refuge contains two basic characteristics: one, every nation maintains the right to grant refuge to refugees. Two, under article fourteen of the UDHR, every person has the right to seek refuge in other nation to avoid oppression in his own country based on religion, politics, ethnicity, or other factors. Under the global quest for human rights, international law recognizes the right in a more positive light (Mohammad, 2011:403).

As a signatory to the UDHR Myanmar is promised to comply with the provisions of the international body's basic human rights. Irrespective of the deal, Myanmar is unsuccessful in maintaining basic human rights such as freedom, citizenship, and safety to the Rohingyas (UNHCR, 2007:20). According to Razzaq & Haque (1995), article 29 of the UNDRIP explicitly specifies indigenous peoples' land rights, however the Rohingyas have been stripped of their rights to own land and compelled to seek refuge in other nation (Razzaq & Haque, 1995:40). As a result, it is safe to assert that Myanmar deliberately breached article 15 of the UDHR by failing to recognize Rohingyas as a group in the Act of Citizenship of 1982 through their unsuccessful endeavor to identify them as such. This explains does not only prove that the Myanmar authority have reached an international principle but also explains the legitimacy of the movement of the Rohingyas to seek refuge in any country they find pleasing.

2.9 The perspective of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Refugees of Rohingya

As previously reiterated every person maintains the right to pursue and to enjoy asylum in another nation to defend them from oppression/torment, as stated in Article fourteen of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The Convention of 1951 serves as a law that defends and assists immigrants seeking refuge. The convention provides some defense to its members (Suwardi, 2004: 35). States parties to the convention shall not be classified as refugees because of legitimate

political discrimination based on race, religion, country of origin, or skin color, and they should be allowed to practice their faith freely (UNHCR Convention, Article 3 and 4). Second, the refugees' personal status is determined by the laws of the country in which they reside. If they do not have their own personal status, they are questionable to the state's laws in which they are situated (place of residence). The Protocol's signatories and signatories should also recognize marriage-related rights (UNHCR Convention, Article 12).

Third, a refugee has the same property rights as others, including the ability to move or not move and save as much as others, as well as the ability to transfer their assets to the state where they will live (UNHCR Convention, Article thirteen, fourteen and thirty). Fourthly, participants in the signing should respect the freedom of refuge seekers to participate in the Assembly's establishment, which includes a variety of commerce along with the Assembly's non-profit and non-political nature (UNHCR Convention, Article 15). The right to assemble is one of the provisions. Fifth, a refugee would have had the right to file a lawsuit in front of the court (UNHCR Convention, Article 16). Sixth, maintains the right to gain occupation, create a trading company as well as take part in other voluntary labor, that is if the voluntary job conforms with the recognized provision, such as ratification of certificate. The point is to gain expertise in order to be placed on a suitable job (UNHCR Convention, Article 17, 18 and 19). Seventh, each refugee will be treated equally to nationals of the other country in terms of the entitlement to basic school education (UNHCR Convention, Article 22). Eighth, each refugee shall have the right to social welfare, including the right to work, housing, and receiving wages from job they do (UNHCR Convention, Article 20 and 22).

This is a right to social assistance. Nineth, save for reasons of security or public interest, each refugee is entitled to letters and an identity travel document that allows him to go outside of the country where he was placed. The signatories will respect travel documents issued under international agreements (UNHCR Convention, Article 27 and 28).

Many organizations and workplaces have been established when the United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 to monitor human rights issues across the globe. Additionally, the Security Council and the General Assembly have presumed responsibilities for creating economic and social assembly proposals, and growth and human rights resolutions (Deppermann 2013:297). The United Nations has the responsibility to find lasting answers to the crises faced by refugees, coordinating international refugee safety, managing the actions of Non-Government Organization and government charitable interventions, and assisting refuge seekers in voluntary return or relocation (Imran & Mian, 2014:228). Responding to the rising gauge of the refugee crisis, the UNHCR lately introduced a distinct program which is aiming to positively affecting the lives of refugee and

reiterating the necessity for robust remedies and advanced living standards for the growing number of long-term refugees of the world. (Kiragu, Rosi, and Morris, 2011:1). Despite the commitment to human rights by the United Nations, the ICJ will probe any gaps in the human rights system identified by an adjudicatory authority (Deppermann 2013:298). The Statute of Rome, that forms part of the UN human rights system in 1998, founded the International Criminal Court (ICC). The International Criminal Court (ICC) has authority over major abuses of human rights like as criminalities against human race, war criminalities, and killing. The ICJ plays a significant duty in the growth of international human rights legislation and in considering cases of infringement. The Security Council of the UN has given the authority and obligation to International Court of Justice (ICJ) to make and pronounce the ICC's judgements (Deppermann, 2013:299-301).

Obviously, the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice can help to avoid or halt human rights breaches against refuge seekers and people who are persecuted, like the Rohingya, and they can help to alleviate the condition of refugees (Deppermann, 2013:315). Exerting legal pressure on states in conversations about resolving refugee crises, such as in the case of attempts to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding for the safe and distinguished expulsion of Rohingya refugees under United Nation supervision can also be done by the UNHCR. (The Daily Star, 2018). And following the military takeover, there appears to be a growing worry among the Rohingyas that they would be tortured even more, as some of them have stated. "Even if they try to repatriate us, we will not accept to go back under the current situation," one of them, Nurul Amin, is said to have said (Deppermann, 2013). If the military leadership advised moving forward on repatriation as a way of improving its image, an International Crisis Group representative says it is unlikely that Rohingya would be willing to go back in a climate where military brutality is on the rise, not down (NPR, 2021).

States usually ensure that citizens' basic human rights and personal security are protected. When people turn refugees, however, this safety net vanishes. They will be extremely susceptible to abuse and other sorts of mistreatment, and incarceration or deportation, if they did not have some type of legal status in their refuge nation. Authorities are in charge of safeguarding refugees on their territory, and they frequently work with local non-governmental groups to do so (NGOs). In several states, meanwhile, UNHCR personnel collaborate with NGOs and other partners in a range of settings, from major cities to isolated encampments and border regions. They work to foster or offer legal as well as physical safety, and to reduce the fear of violence – which include sexual abuse – that many refugees face, even in asylum-seeking nations. UNHCR is working with nations to clarify, explain, and improve on the current corpus of international law established by the 1951 Refugee Convention. It has initiated a number of measures in recent times that attempt to strengthen the Convention while

also encouraging the search for lasting and secure answers for the world's dislocated peoples. The most significant international refugee forum in half a century, held in 2001, adopted a historic declaration confirming member governments' adherence to the 1951 Refugee Convention. UNHCR developed the "Agenda for Protection" via a sequence of global consultation, and it remains to serve as a guide for authorities and humanitarian groups in their attempts to increase global refugee protection (UNHCR, 2020).

Regarding various categories of individuals that are negatively affected: Throughout time, the UN agency in charge of monitoring the condition of stateless persons has taken on duties for a number of additional groups who are comparable to refugees in some respects but were not expressly woven into its mission at the time of its formation (in 1974). It was recently named a key partner in the UN's new "cluster strategy" to enhance the delivery of protection and aid to internally displaced persons, who, unlike refugees, have never had a single agency committed only to their well-being. For at least two decades, UNHCR has worked with IDPs in some capacity, although on a more ad hoc basis. In summary, UNHCR now occupies a more leading spot in the states where displacement occurs, either as a result of its significant involvement in assisting returning refugees to reintegrate into their native states, or as a result of its expanded tasks on behalf of internally displaced persons in states such as Columbian, Sudanese, Sri Lankan, and Ugandan states (UNHCR, 2020).

UNHCR's experience has led to it being assigned even more responsibilities on occasions. In Bosnia - Herzegovina in the 1990s, for instance, UNHCR launched the world's longest-ever airlift as part of its effort to aid besieged and displaced communities. UNHCR started substantial efforts following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, despite not generally being engaged in natural disaster aid, since housing and camp administration, UNHCR's two support specialties, were in short supply in both situations. The UNHCR began assisting victims of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in May 2008. Later same month, the refugee agency delivered tens of thousands of tents to earthquake victims in China's Sichuan region. Having 6,500 people operating out of 267 centers in 116 countries, the UNHCR is now one of the world's most important humanitarian organizations. The institution has helped over 50 million people throughout its more than half-century of existence, garnering two Nobel Peace Prizes in 1954 and 1981 (UNHCR, 2020).

The UNHCR has sent more supplies to Bangladesh to help refugees and host communities brace for the monsoon rains, which occur between May and September and increase the danger of flooding and landslides. Hundreds and thousands of Rohingya refugees have taken up residence in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh's wettest region. During the monsoon season, humanitarian partners anticipate that up to 200,000 Rohingya refugees may be at danger. Many people live on steep, undulating terrain that is susceptible to landslides and flood, and they need to be relocated immediately. 41,000 of them

live in locations considered to be at significant risk of landslides. UNHCR has transferred more over 24,000 of them to safer regions by mid-August 2018. UNHCR has also provided updated tent kits to over 80,000 refugee families, which contain bamboo sticks, lines, shelter-grade tarps, sandbags, and equipment. With the help of UNHCR and its collaborators, the Bangladesh government has built 32 kilometers of brick roads and sidewalks, 91 kilometers of drainage pipes, and 45 kilometers of steps throughout the colony. There have been 63 kilometers of retaining walls and facilities installed. Ninety-four kilometers of drainage and 2,324 meters of bridges have been constructed or restored (UNHCR, 2020). In Bangladeshi host communities, UNHCR has also tactically installed116 storage units with emergency supplies and refurbished 20 community structures and amenities. With the goal of "leaving no one behind," UNHCR has been operating in India since 1982, promoting refugee protection and integration into current national services like health as well as education. In India, however, Rohingyas lack the necessary identification credentials and certifications to access national services. They also suffer from poverty, health problems, and a lack of jobs. As previously stated, India lacks a legal framework and a national mechanism for determining refugee status. As a result, the UNHCR has been working to claim refugee status for India's formerly "illegal immigrants." By the end of December 2019, UNHCR India has registered 27,700 refugees (UNHCR, 2020).

2.10 The Stakeholders Responses in Dealing with the Rohingya Crisis

Many stakeholders showed interest in or are worried about the humanitarian situation occurring in Bangladesh and Myanmar, particularly those that are capable of influencing or can be affected by issues of refugees in both countries (Brooten, Ashraf & Akinro 2015:725). The Rohingya crisis, for instance, has received extensive coverage in global news outlets and episodic updates dedicated to keeping the world informed about the violence. Their coverage of the challenge confronting human communities and non-governmental organizations are regular and prevalent throughout social media platforms (Brooten, Ashraf & Akinro, 2015: 730). As a result, the international media played an important role as participants in the subject, broadening the knowledge and participation of many other organizations and individuals who are now concerned about the Rohingya.

Furthermore, an amount of significant non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play critical roles as stakeholders in the crisis resolution process. The UN and UNHCR, for example, have made a number of other humanitarian organizations give assistance to the Bangladeshi Rohingyas, including encouraging independence outreaches, building accommodations and toilets in refugee campsites,

and providing training with state funding (Kigaru, et. al. 2011:9).

Though the United Nations, European Union, and governments of other countries with a stake in the crisis are prohibited from interfering with Myanmar's state sovereignty, many countries have made attempts to officially interfere in the conflict, which include the Malaysia, United States, Bangladesh, and Indonesia, (Kinacioglu, 2012:16).

Local organizations, like as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and neighboring nations have equally added their voices alarm concerning the continuing violence, recognizing that it poses a bigger risk to their safety and has the potential to exacerbate the effects of more refugee displacement in an already volatile environment (Thuzar & Rieffel, 2018; Zawacki, 2012:18). Others are afraid that a local guerrilla conflict between Muslims and Buddhists will have a major impact on Southeast Asia's political and economic stability. In addition, the conflict in Myanmar's inter-religious dimension has the potential to attract a large number of other parties from the international Islamic organization. For instance, delegates in May 2018 conference of the 53 OIC member countries consisting of foreign ministers and diplomats advocated for global action, which includes punishing Myanmar in response to the crisis of the Rohingya Muslim (AFP, 2018).

As a result, as the fight has increased and expanded nationwide borders with refugees fleeing prosecution, interest of stakeholder in the Rohingya problem has broadened and expanded. Like recently put by a Malaysian Foreign Minister put, "this issue seizes to be an interior concern, but a global issue" (Al Jazeera, 2016). The Rohingya problem is not merely a humanitarian crisis, rather it is posing threats to security, the environment, and Bangladesh's general condition, as well as influencing regional collaboration and international ties. The next chapter look into the various camps and conditions in the Bangladesh and India refugee hubs as well as the negative effects on the indigenous population.

CHAPTER 3

3 ROHINGYA REFUGEE INFLUX IN BANGLADESH AND INDIA

3.1 Bangladesh and the Rohingya Refugees

Bangladesh is well-versed in dealing with the refugee crisis, not only as a sending but also receiving nation. During the war for independence between Bangladesh (East Pakistan) and Pakistan in 1971, roughly ten million people escaped to India as refugees from Bangladesh. According to the Indian government, approximately 9 million refugees sought asylum in more than 800 encampments. It should be noted that nearly two million Rohingyas were internally scattered in the state (MacLean, 2018). Immediately following the climax of the war for independence, all Bangladeshi citizens who

had been living in the Indian state as refugees returned to the Bangladeshi state consensually. Following their liberation, approximately three hundred thousand Bihari people, dubbed "Deserted Pakistani People," had been stranded in Bangladesh. Regrettably, these Bihari folks were not granted Refugee status due to their inability to meet the conditions outlined in the first article of the convention of 1951. They were unable to trespass the border and hence unable to abscond the place of their abode (Naser & Afroz, 2007). In Abed Khaan and Others vs. the Bangladeshi Authorities, the respected Bangladeshi High Court issued a remarkable judgment that permitted 10 Biharis to vote and decreed that they remained citizens of the state in Bangladesh (Waliur, 2003).

The Rohingya refugee predicament has recently captured the interest of the global society. The first large influx of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh occurred in 1978, when approximately 250,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh (Kiragu et al. 2011). The government was eager to admit the Rohingya exodus as a humanitarian crisis at the time (Milton et al., 2017:2). The humanitarian approach of the government has offered refugees with emergency housing as well as some forms of assistance, which include food and medical care. Due to repression, scores of people fled by boat from neighboring Myanmar State into the south coast of Bangladesh, notably the islands of Shahpori, St Martins, Teknaf and Cox Bazar areas, via the Naf River, which serves as a popular coastal area between Bangladesh and Myanmar (Milton et al., 2017). Following the terminal confrontations between the Muslims and Buddhists, Rakhine declared a state of emergency in June 2012. Following the murder and sexual harassment done to a Buddhist lady in the mid-2012, fighting began, preceded by a strike on a bus transporting Muslims. Societal upheaval persisted for days straight as Muslim and Buddhist groups participated in assaults and retaliation, killing several and compelled large numbers to run for their lives on both sides. The government of Myanmar stated that, more than 200 people lost their lives in Rakhine from mid-2012. However, Rohingya people campaigners believe the figure is closer to one thousand. More than 145,000 locally scattered people, with Muslims constituting 94% of the population. (Kiragu et al. 2011).

The Rohingya crisis, on the other hand, happens to be an old experience in the Bangladeshi state. The Rohingya initial movement in 1784 managed to flee Arakan to Cox's Bazar, when King Bodawpya of Burma conquered and occupied the stretch of settlements around Arakan. Aside the influx of foreign of refugee folks, two main waves of immigration of Rohingyas occurred in the Bangladeshi state in 1970s and in the feuding time in 1990s to run from the Myanmar government-supported deliberate atrocity and ethnic cleansing program (Milton et al., 2017). For over 30 years, about half a million recorded and unrecorded Rohingyas have been staying in Bandarban, Cox's Bazaar, and surrounding zones thanks to the kindness of Bangladesh. Most remarkably, over 270,000 Rohingya people immigrated from Burma into Bangladesh in 1991 and 1992. Bangladesh originally

welcomed them as fellow Muslims as an oppressed cluster of Myanmar refugees with a roughly comparable of identity of Islam. Meanwhile in the Bangladeshi state, local law that oversee refugee management or to protect refugee rights did not exist (Al-Imran & Miann, 2014).

The legal position of the UNHCR in the state was premised on a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1993 and initially planned to be legitimate within 12 months, with a second year's renewal only when needed (UNHCR, 2020). At first, authorities of Bangladesh accepted the Red Cross, UNHCR, as well as many global organizations to support asylum seekers. Additionally, the government of Bangladesh had recorded approximately 258,000 Rohingyas and given asylum via an executive order, but with no whatever appropriate legal approval. Furthermore, scores of Rohingya refugees had already landed in the Bangladeshi state and had been permitted to mingle liberally with the native populace over the decades (Al-Imran & Miann, 2014).

3.1.2 The Attitude of Bangladeshi Government Towards Rohingya Refugees

In June 2012, the government of Burma issued a proclamation in the West of Rakhine following confrontations between Buddhist grand Rohingyas that left 50 people dead. More than 90,000 Rohingyas escaped Myanmar to the borders of Bangladesh ten days later, just to be barred from entering. Ironically June 20th happens to be World Refugee Day. Dipu Moni, Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, voiced alarm in June 2012 that a surge of new of Rohingyas would pose a serious problem for the nation, due to the fact that there were already a large number of them there. On August 17, 2012, the Foreign Affairs Minister stated unequivocally that Rohingya people were going to be returned home immediately, emphasizing that they had completed the necessary procedure through discussions with Burmese government but were unable to execute their plans because of riots that was happening there at that period of time. They had prompted the authority of Burmese regarding the coming back journey of Rohingya people so they could arrive in the country willfully. In a statement read out in Parliament, the Minister urged those organizations and allied nations to rather urge Myanmar's authorities to settle its ongoing tension without spilling over into its serene neighbors. She further suggested that donor organizations to assist Rohingya refugees in Myanmar rather than Bangladesh (Al-Imran & Miann, 2014).

Various reasons could justify the shift in stance of the government toward these refugees. However, the principal motivation, per the available literature, is the protracted refugee state (Loescher & Milner, 2009:9-10) of the Rohingya Crisis. The asylum seekers would not be in Bangladesh for a short period of time, instead till the story of government inspired persecution came to an end.

The spark of a military crackdown in 2017 prompted Bangladesh to admit a substantial number of Rohingya refugees. In contrast to its past negative reaction, the Bangladeshi government has accepted approximately 725,703 Rohingya refugees since the military crackdown on August 25, 2017; up to 871,924 refugees are expected to be in Cox's Bazar district in January, 2021. (UNHCR, 2020). Moreover, there was not a particular incident of involuntary expulsion while the UNHCR had complete access to refugee camps and new immigrants (Human Rights Watch, 2018a: 41). In brief, since the 2017 military assault, the Bangladeshi authorities has assumed the position of hosting Rohingya refugees and protecting them from re-foulement.

3.1.3 The Bangladeshi Government Perspective

The Bangladesh authorities a position is unequivocal. Bangladesh, contrary to Myanmar, had not have to cope with those individuals inside. As a result, Bangladeshi administration sees the problem as being caused by the Myanmar government (Kiragu et al. 2011). As a result, it is not Bangladesh's utmost duty to care for the individuals. The individuals arrived from Burma and would have to go back there or elsewhere; they cannot live within Bangladeshi state indefinitely. Per the Bangladesh officials, the beginning of the issue can be traced back to three factors, the most significant of which is Myanmar's repressive regional policy in Arakan state. That is why the Rohingyas escaped their homeland, particularly in 1978 and 1990–1991.

The first reason that came up frequently in unstructured discussions with state authorities is that several of the people remain "financial refugee," which means the financial condition in Bangladeshi state is just marginally ahead of that in Arakan. However, the officials understand that the problem of Myanmar's poor economic situation does not apply to the entire country, the Rohingya people are financially disadvantaged an ethnic group According to Iftikhar Chowdhury, Bangladesh's former minister of foreign affairs, when Burma progresses and gains civil as well as socioeconomic growth, the possibilities are that the refugees will return voluntarily (Farzana, 2018).

The second issue stated is the proclivity of people in this region to travel overseas. The second concern mentioned is the inclination of individuals in this region to go outside of the region. As a result, it's probable that the Burmese immigrants intended to travel to Bangladeshi state in order to secure a home to live in another nation. A few other nations that had welcomed refugees exist, though the amount is limited. According to Chowdhory, that serves as an extra motivation for the Rohingya refugee to seek asylum in a third nation, whether in Europe, the Middle East, or Australia (Farzana, 2018).

There are still new refugee surges to Bangladesh as a result of these two factors. Whilst Bangladesh recognizes Rohingyas as having cultural, linguistic, as well as religious similarities with

Chittagonean Bengali Muslims, it would not recognize the refugees as being of Bangladesh descent (Farzana, 2018). The historical reality that Chittagong and Arakan area of Bangladeshi state had the same directorial entity (Charney, 1998) does not support a single ethnicity of the two regions' inhabitants. Furthermore, it thinks that hundreds of thousands of individuals crossed the border at a certain period in time, showing a quick and evident shift in their habitation. As a result, the Bangladesh government's official position is that it is hesitant to allow the refugees live on its land; they intend to treat the people as immigrants as well as deport them back to where they came from. As a result, the Bangladesh authority has chosen a diplomacy, requesting the Government of Myanmar to return its citizens as quickly as feasible. To that purpose, Bangladesh agreed to welcome arbitration from different agencies.

3.1.4 Repatriation and Bilateral Agreement

Because Bangladesh perceived the problem as external, it moved quickly to launch diplomatic concerted efforts to return the migrants. Just as the first large flight from Arakan occurred in 1977, Bangladesh, although being one of the poorest nations, expressed sympathy (Farzana, 2018). One explanation might be that it was also recuperating from its 1971 war, during which its citizens endured same experiences while seeking refuge in neighboring India. Furthermore, the displaced people had the same Muslim faith. As a result, like reiterated above, Bangladesh first viewed them as fellow brothers in distress. Thirteen tent camps were established along the River Naff's border, on both flanks of the Teknaf's expressway. Food and temporary shelters were provided to the displaced population. Nevertheless, Bangladeshi state said in a plain language from the start that it is an impermanent preparation, and that the Rohingyas would have to depart as soon as the condition in Arakan returned to normal. That got stressed extra in a news session in mid-1979, the time the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, "the Bangladeshi government's stance on the Rohingya refugee crisis was that they should be repatriated in the sake of fair communality and border tranquility" (Huq,1993:138).

Bangladesh began negotiating with Burma for the return of the Rohingyas, with initially favorable accommodation. Burma originally refused to accept the people, stating the migrants have always been Bengalis fleeing Myanmar. However, under international strain, it consented to negotiate, culminating in bilateral talks. Myanmar dispatched a team to Bangladesh, and the presidents of both nations met in Dhaka in 9th July, 1978, and inked a deal. Tabarak Hussain, Bangladesh's foreign secretary, represented the country, while its deputy minister for international affairs represented Burma (Huq, 1993). The accord is known as the agreed Minutes Signed Between the Governments of Burma and Bangladesh on Repatriation of Burmese Refugees, 1978. Despite the fact that this

document does not refer to the refugees as "Rohingyas," it does refer to them as "legal inhabitants of Burma." This expression does not describe the refugees' ethnic or linguistic characteristics. In either situation, the participants consented to deportation under the following terms: During the first wave, the socialist pledged to return legal inhabitants of Myanmar that can provide their Myanmar ID cards and collective family photographs. These conditions supported Myanmar's position that it was hesitant to admit all refugees. Many people may have been refused national cards owing to tight citizen regulations. As a result, the constraint reflected the Myanmar authorities' unwillingness to admit the Rohingyas' homecoming, which made it hard for them to cooperate in many situations.

Myanmar decided to accept those that were capable of presenting their papers dispensed in Myanmar containing evidence of stay in Myanmar, together with their household, that can equally furnish proof of their abode in Burma, including address or any other specific details in the second stage of deportation (Farzana, 2018). The deal also stipulated that deportation for those "Burmese inhabitants" would begin earlier 31 August 1978, as well as get finished in half a year.

It has been consented that following the deportation of "Burmese inhabitants," the two authorities would put in resources and efforts together to prevent unlawful border crossings by individuals from either end and start border regulations, as well as concur to begin receiving the deportation of the Rohingya inhabitants that trespass the border following the initial set time. It is vital to highlight that the deal was entirely two-sided. Bangladeshi government has succeeded in making plain that it would not accept any internal incorporation, and that the entire refugee has to go back home. And this shows the position of Bangladesh after initially accepting the refugees.

3.1.5 Voluntary Deportation

The Bangladesh administration believed that the refugees should be deported as quickly as possible to end the crisis. However, in the treaty signed, as soon as the deportation procedure began, it was discovered that there was a scarcity of individuals willing to return. At the end of September, for example, just over 190 immigrants had been returned, compared to a projected overall of six thousand (Rezvi, 1978). What caused the scarcity? Could it be because of the condition forced, the immigrants worried of their prospective security in their original settlement, given they had not received anything productive other than verbal assurances from the Burmese authority at this point? (Scully & Trager, 1979). Furthermore, there appears to have been some mishandling in the camps, which resulted in the loss of life of 8 Rohingyas in the late 1970s, in a conflict among the Rohingyas and camps administrators (Raid, 1994) What caused the problem, however, remained unknown in the period. Comparable incidents later revealed the encampment players that controlled aid items

have been engaged in death of the immigrants.

The occurrences in the camp reveal that there are some political disagreements among the camp residents. Internal disputes hampered the deportation procedure, that reunited the Bangladeshi state and Myanmar in October 1978 (Rezvi, 1978). At this period, they attempted to simplify the deportation arrangements via discussion by "scrapping previously-defined steps" (Reid, 1994:17). However, as of the end of October, sources indicated that there were just 448 repatriates. After, all of a sudden, in the month of November, the rate of deportation appeared to accelerate drastically. On November 26, it was announced that 12,405 refugees had gone. Around December, the figure had climbed up, at the tail of early 1979, as reported a radio, around 61,000 returned refugees have participated in the program around 1978 (Reid, 1994:18).

Around that point, it has been unclear what circumstances were contributing to the unexpected spike in deportation. According to the administration, what drew the Rohingya people back was the rumor of unoccupied land being granted in light of the deportation deal, as well as improvements in the security situation in Arakan (Rezvi, 1978). The following repatriation was subject to stringent conditions. There was no available information for the final stage of deportation. Due to close coordination between Burmese and Bangladeshi officials, the final evacuation was completed six weeks ahead of schedule. A total of 187,197 refugees have been returned by December 29, 1979 (Reid, 1994). The Bangladeshi authority described this as a "significant step" in the country's diplomatic policy and for the region's long-term peace. Given this "pleasing" conclusion, the global community wished to conclude its effort for the Rohingyas. At least two things were revealed by the successful deportation procedure. For one thing, the evacuees were Myanmar natives originally; otherwise, the authorities of Myanmar would not have permitted the people to comeback. Secondly, the Bangladeshi administration had been accurate in its assessment that the people were from the opposite side of the border and Myanmar citizens.

However, after Myanmar's 1990 elections, Bangladesh saw a far larger exodus entering the nation within a decade. In the beginning, the United Nations, along with other humanitarian organizations, began a relief operation in about twenty encampments by Teknaf-Bazar Cox’s route in February 1992. Following that, in April 1992, the two countries signed an MoU outlining the parameters of a deportation program with minimal involvement of UNHCR participation (Razzaq & Haque, 1995). The Bangladesh government (GoB) has, however, closed the camps to new Rohingya immigration. By September 1992, all refugees had been registered. The Rohingyas were returned by the GoB without the intervention of UNHCR near the end of 1992. Meanwhile, statements issued in this time period by international groups such as the UN, AI, and HR all condemned the policy, citing flaws in the return procedure. The name Rohingya shows in activism materials, providing credence to the

belief of the people they have a separate identity (Razzaq & Haque, 1995). Following that, the UNHCR inked distinct Memorandums of Understanding with the two governments; still, deportation that occurred during this period was denounced as involuntary according to several charitable report. Evidently, the Bangladeshi authorities were opposed to using even one pressure in the deportation. (UNHCR, 2007:20).

The Myanmar government kept their hard-line stance toward the refugees this time as well. The key issue to remember at this point is, per the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding, Burma approved the deportation plans however was reluctant to recognize that repatriated individuals were natives, rather as provisional inhabitants of Arakan." The logical thing to ask is: why the Bangladeshi authority accepted the terms as it was evident that the matter would not be resolved in the near future? Government perspectives backs the concept that the Bangladeshi state did that although the issue was not fully handled, it was going to be handled momentarily. When both sides cannot reach a deal, Myanmar may refuse to take back the Rohingyas.

3.2 The Attitude of Indian Government towards Rohingya Refugees

The influx of Rohingyas to India began in 2012. New Delhi has remained silent on the dispute since it began in 2017. Despite a UN commission's serious claims of genocide against Myanmar, India has avoided denouncing Myanmar in public remarks and venues. During his first bilateral visit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said nothing about the of the Rohingya problem. Intriguingly, the prime minister complimented the Myanmar government's efforts to promote peace and national reconciliation, as well as the ongoing peace process. Furthermore, throughout his speech, India's prime minister made no mention of the Rohingya, while offering condolences to the security troops slain by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (Bulbul et al., 2022).

UNHCR admits that practically all Rohingyas enter India via the Bangladesh-India border (UNHCR, 2017) Until April 2018, 17,705 Rohingyas in India were registered with the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2018). The Government of India reports that 40,000 Rohingyas live in India's northern and eastern states. This is a minor sum when compared to India's estimated 15 million Bangladeshis. In the absence of a national refugee statute, India considers Rohingya refugees to be "illegal immigrants" and, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs, has the authority to repatriate them. India's Border Security Force detained 478 Rohingyas attempting to make entry to India between 2015 and 2018, 26 at the India-Bangladesh borders (Sabha, 2019).

The Rohingya problem has been debated in the Parliament of India, where the leadership has stated that the estimated 40,000 Rohingyas residing in India pose a security concern and deplete the nation's scarce resources, and that they would be recognized and repatriated as a result (Sabha, 2018). A

Ministry of Home Affairs decision requiring state authorities to recognize Rohingyas and begin the exit process has been brought before the Supreme Court by two Rohingyas. The petitioners allege that repatriation will violate basic rights guaranteed to non-citizens under the Indian Constitution, as well as the principles of international law of non-refoulement (Supreme Court, 2017). While the case is still being heard, the state has deported 12 Rohingyas to Myanmar, notwithstanding the Court's refusal to give temporary protection to suspend the repatriation of seven of them (Sabha, 2019).

Despite the fact that few Rohingyas have been deported to Myanmar, which has acknowledged them as citizens, the evacuations have had a detrimental impact on the Rohingya minority in India, which is already discriminated against. As a result, scores of Rohingya families migrated to Bangladesh from India in order to avoid deportation to Myanmar (Das, 209). In Jammu, India's northernmost state, where the majority of Rohingyas have moved, their existence has turned a local political issue, with extreme elements publishing front-page adverts in publications labelling Rohingyas as a peace threat (Newslaundry, 2018). These events are hardly surprising given that the government has labelled the Rohingyas as a security concern, alleging that some of them have ties to terrorist organizations headquartered in neighboring states (Supreme Court, 2017).

Though the authorities in Bangladesh today houses over a million Rohingyas, India appears to be extremely hostile to its comparatively tiny Rohingya community of 40,000 (Ministry of External Affairs, October 2015). This is in sharp contrast to how other refugee groups have been treated. India has a long history of hosting and integrating refugees, as well as upholding non-refoulement norms, which are part of the "Indian history and civilization." The Government of India has welcomed Afghan, Bengali, Tamil, and Tibetan refugees, providing them with basic necessities (Ministry of External Affairs, October 2015). Accordingly, estimated 1,600 Rakhine Buddhist and Christian migrants who escaped from settlements around Mizoram during the 2017 confrontations between Myanmar security forces and the Arakan Army were shielded in neighboring villages, with local administration and paramilitaries providing assistance (Bhattacharyya, 2018). Deporting Rohingyas from India has been criticized as a violation of the nation's humanitarian tradition, moral norms, and dharma (Pillay, 2018). This raises the issue of what variables are at play in the management of the Rohingya situation by India.

3.2.1 The Phases of India Response

The Indian government's approach to the Rohingya situation has developed quickly. There are three distinct stages. During the first phase, which began in 2012, via an outbreak of violent clashes within the Buddhists of Rakhine and Muslims of Rohingya in the state of Rakhine. India saw it as a "problem

from within" but supported Burma. Salman Khurshid, a former minister of state payed a courtesy call to the state of Rakhine where he offered $1000,000.00 humanitarian fund for Myanmar. (Beauchamp, 2013). Whether on purpose or not, the Indian state permitted Rohingyas to come into the state and abstained from making it political in their internal political or mutual ties with the Myanmar state. Not long after Khurshid visited Rakhine, and UNHCR Antonio Guterres went to India, expressing their profound gratitude to Delhi's ancient heritage of understanding and tolerance, that was evidenced in its government's practice of safeguarding and helping the immigrants as well as their "rigid compliance to the precept of non-refoulement and consensual deportations" (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012). At the time BJP-led NDA administration took office in May 2014, it implicitly supported the UPA government's position. The Rohingya problem took on a regional dimension in 2015, when Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, all dismissed crammed boats transporting Rohingyas seeking to dock on their beaches, leaving hundreds of people stranded at sea (The Guardian, 2015). There have been pleas for India to assist in rescuing the Rohingya people, however Delhi chose to ignore them. This occurred shortly in the aftermath of the tragic Nepal earthquake, for which Delhi has been fast to offer aid. (Yhome, 2015).

In the first phase, a set of circumstances appeared to have characterized India's strategy. India declared it support to Myanmar government because it has been worried that bringing it up openly could push the former Burmese state to the Chinese state in a period it is attempting to build partnerships with the then recently created democratic looking administration. Delhi has commercial interests as well, with businesses owning risks in the Gas field of Shwe around Rakhine State's shore. Together with the objectives of energy and proposals to construct inter-border transmission lines (The Telegraph, 2017). India has an integration interest in connecting its non-coastal north-eastern district with the Bengal Bay via the Rohingya dominated lands under a partnership deal with Myanmar which involves the building of Sittway port, an interior canal in the River Kaladan, as well as roadworks connecting it to India's Northeast. India was concerned that unrest in the state of Rakhine might harm their interests. Amid increasing intelligence collaboration between both nations, notably in combating inter-border cultural violence in the common regional boundaries, Delhi was wary of upsetting Myanmar's administration. Delhi's gift relief aid was as much a show of solidarity to the former Burmese administration as it was a response to benevolent issues in a neighboring nation. Hence, geopolitical, economic and security considerations, as well as humanitarian concerns, shaped Delhi's Rohingyas reaction throughout this time.

The following phase two of Delhi's Rohingyas plan started in the middle 2017, when the news of the administration's tactics to repatriate Rohingya people that had resided in various regions of Indian state. On August 9, 2017, Kiren Rijiju, Home Affairs State Minister made a statement in Parliament

saying that the Indian authorities planned to expel Rohingyas from India as they were "unlawful settlers" (India Today, 2017). Later, the minister stated the repatriation strategy had not yet been materialized (The Hindu, 2017). The media sources bring out that quoting the authorities' figures, the estimate of Rohingya people in Indian state was about 10,600 six years ago and more than quadrupled to forty thousand in the next 2 years. After a month of the repatriation plan was announced, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a Rohingya rebel organization created in the year 2013, launched an offensive on the security and military positions in Rakhine Northern regions and Modi paid a courtesy call to Myanmar (India Today, 2017). The statement they made in the trip "criticized fresh terror acts" at Rakhine, however has been deafeningly silent on the Rohingyas problem. When Bangladesh, the nation that bears the burden of the refugee exodus, sought Delhi's assistance, the Indian authorities' one-sided stance had to be softened. On September 14, 2017, India started "Operation Insaniyat" to give emergency aid to Bangladesh refugee centers. Delhi's decision to give assistance is consistent with its intention to disincentives Rohingya migrants from coming to India (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017). As India reassessed its strategy, the government of West Bengal took a stance in opposition to the central administration, proclaiming its sympathy towards the Rohingyas refugee (Hindustan Times, 2017). Although this West Bengal government's stance on the Rohingya problem did not affect the federal government's stance, it did send a memo to India concerning its need for considering the opinions of government of state on the subject. Sushma Swaraj, External Affairs Minister, paid a visit to Dhaka on October 9, 2017, and assured the Bangladeshi administration of Indian's assistance.

Besides politics, humanity considerations, as well as non-interference in domestic politics, two additional elements seemed to have pushed the Indian strategy in the second phase: increased security worries and the necessity for diplomatic juggling between Myanmar and Bangladesh. The evaluation of Delhi in the later part of the second phase enabled it to establish three principles that formed the foundation to propel its Rohingya strategy: one is the evaluation that regaining "sense of stability" could occur "only with the repatriation of the refugees to Rakhine state" (Indian Express, 2017). This stance meant the repatriation of Rohingya people to Myanmar outside the Bangladeshi state and abroad could imply the returning of Rohingya people from India. Formally, India refers to the Rohingyas in Bangladesh as exiled individuals, while the ones in the Indian state have been considered "unlawful migrants." The second claim concerns India's appraisal of the matter, which states that economic growth in the state Rakhine is the "sole lengthy remedy." As a result, the necessity for throwing their back behind and organizing development capitals on themselves, and appealing the global societies to aid Rakhine's progress determinations, was selected. The next claim pertains to India's position that it could well retain effective dialogue with both Bangladesh and

Myanmar, and also the global society must "manage the crisis with prudence, considering the wellbeing of the people." The first tepid reaction of the BJP administration to the Rohingyas immigrant issue in the Bangladeshi state appears to have been a hint on the lengthy matter of "unlawful migrants" in India. The BJP has long advocated for the deportation of Bangladeshi "unlawful migrants" in Northeast Indian country. The party committed in its 2014 policy pledge to ""address the matter of penetration and illegal mass migration in the North-east region on the grounds of priority" (BJP Election Manifesto, 2014).

The last phase of India's policy was likely inspired by the need to launch a responsibility for them in solving the condition through intensifying its covert diplomatic efforts. This phase begun quickly after the Chinese intervened in the Rohingya issue with its 3-step approach and the eventual ratification of the deportation arrangement between Myanmar and Bangladesh on November 23, 2017 (The Hindustan Times, 2017). India 's view was likely colored by the assumption that some procrastination in ramping up its involvement would permit some parties to exploit the crisis for geopolitics benefits at the expense of themselves. This means that the Indians are skeptical about the Chinese geopolitical influence if the Rohingyas are left at the mercy of China. In 2017, in the month of December, Jaishankhar, a state secretary went to visit Myanmar where they agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding concerning a development program the state of Rakhine development program with the Minister of social welfare of Myanmar at "growth of the economy and subsistence projects in the region of Rakhine" including "a program to construct produced accommodation in Rakhine to compliment the essential necessities of repatriated refugees." The Memorandum of Understanding calls for Delhi to provide $25 million to a 5-year growth initiative in the state of Rakhine. When the Myanmar Government requested, the Indian state accompanied a team of United Nations that visit Myanmar around mid-2018, together with different nation neighbors, which are the Chinese state, Laos state, and the Thai (Myanmar Times, 2018). On her visit to Myanmar on May 10-11, 2018, Minister Swaraj emphasized the necessity of "the secure, prompt, and lasting repatriation of dislocated individuals to Rakhine State." This represents an improvement above the prior approach, which necessitated "caution" in dealing with the crisis in Rakhine (The Ministry of External Affairs, 2017).

There exists a widespread belief that, because the Western world is preoccupied with its own problems, vacuum of global leadership becomes apparent. In these conditions, maybe India has designed a response to the Rohingya problem with less regard for the responses of Western power and authority, who nevertheless like to lecture to other nations from their self-appointed moral basis. The Chinese attempted to seal the authority void. Nonetheless, the 3-step methods of China have shown to be insignificant thus far.

3.2.2 Stance of India on Rohingya

In general, two lines of argument have described India's Rohingya policy. Despite their disagreements on most matters, the two believe that the absence of a state migrant regulatory framework has hindered India's management of the Rohingya situation. It is contended by the first line of argument that the present Rohingyas strategy entails few continuities since it is "compatible with Delhi's previous reluctance to instantly designate refuge seeking people as refugee". The school of thought holds that India has traditionally "built impediments" for refuge seeking people to "remain in Indian state lastingly," referencing the instance of refugee seeker from Bangladeshi state in the war of 1971. Delhi assisted the Bangladeshi state but refused to consider people running away from the Bangladeshi state to be refuge seekers, which "guaranteed their comeback" to Bangladesh after the conflict (Jaishankar & Saraf, 2017). This school of thought is not entirely inaccurate when it claims that India opposes prolonged refugee settlement and that the absence of a state policy for refugee hindered Delhi's response to the Rohingya issue. Nevertheless, there appears to be a significant contrast between the Rohingya policy by the BJP and past approaches to refugee management. In the instance of the Rohingyas, the authorities closed its doors to them, but in previous situations, Delhi had usually embraced refugees. Furthermore, no refugees in the previous times were viewed as constituting a "terrorism danger," but the administration's main reason in the instance of the Rohingyas was security. (Mehta, 2017).

The second interpretation sees the present strategy as a break from the past and analyses it in terms of prospective consequences for India. This line of thinking contends that defining the Rohingya situation via the security rationale is short-sighted since it may generate additional security issues for Delhi, such as "increased radicalization" of an oppressed minority with significant spill over repercussions on Delhi (Mehta, 2017; Kurian, 2018). As per this logic, the state's Rohingya strategy has endangered the existence of score of Indians overseas populations in destinations, that includes Myanmar (Gandhi, 2017). The authority's reticence, it claims, has "created room for some nations to lead the way" in the Rohingyas' issue. Furthermore, the strategy has harmed Delhi's ancient-standing reputation as a free and democracy hub state that has traditionally welcomed migrants (Haidar, 2017). Moreover, Sahoo (2017) mentions that a speculation exists that the Rohingya strategy was affected by a style against the Muslim group in the BJP party government, noting the planned 2016 amendment bill of citizenship, that recognizes refugees that are not Muslims in the Indian as "residents" of the state. This assumption managed to gain strength in late 2017, when Delhi allowed scores of refugees, largely Christian denominations and Buddhist faithful, escaping persecution in

Myanmar to gain entry through Mizoram, despite increased security within India's territories neighbouring Myanmar to block Rohingyas (Bhattacharyya, 2018). Others warned the Indian that it risks "losing the good name is as well as also potential to help reshape a large area riven by ethnic aggression, deprivations, and underdevelopment" (Joshi, 2017).

The preceding study of the two perspectives on India's Rohingya policy raises three concerns. Firstly, India's handling of the Rohingya situation has called into question its democratic foundations. Secondly, Delhi's reluctance to take the lead may have already adversely affected its global and regional leader ambitions. Thirdly, while the strategy may have achieved brief security objectives, the clustering of thousand many vulnerable individuals in the area may have created a perfect recruiting environment for radicalization. Taking a strong stand on the Rohingya refugees renders India a possible focus for extreme organizations.

3.3 The Refugee Camps

3.3.1. Camps for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh

Following lengthy discussions and agreements with the authorities of Bangladeshi, the UNHCR and international humanitarian organizations established twenty-one improvised campsites in Cox's Bazar to house refugees from Rohingya in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, there are now two government-run emergency encampments, since 19 of them were decommissioned (Ishrat, 2019:77). Many camps of Rohingya refugees are centered on the peninsular of Teknaf, a short piece 60 kilometers long stretch of land and between 5 to 10 kilometers broad that connects the Bengal Bay to the Naf River, that forms the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD) has designated an area of around 40 square kilometers (4000 hectares) to the north of the peninsula as forest reserve. In 2017, around September, more than 700 hectares of the forestry reserve were designated for the expansion of encampment of Kutupalong by the UNCHR encampment, which was established under the 1993 MoU between Bangladesh and the UNCHR. Kutupalong was abode to 13,900 refugees prior to the 2017 migration. 100,000 unregistered Rohingya people living in temporary communities around the city (Danish Immigration Service, 2011). Bulukhali, another temporary hamlet, was to its south, split by a stretch of forest. These communities were becoming interconnected by November 8, 2017, establishing the Kutupalong-Balukhali expansion site. This was the world's biggest refugee encampment, hosting nearly 600,000 people. Additional 100,000 refugees were sheltered in the Jamtoli, Hakimpara, and Potibonia communities to the south. Moving southern part, Leda nad Nayapara had merged to create a 3rd expansive cluster of over 80,000 refugees, which had extended into adjacent remote communities

(SEG, 2018), as well as a projected 57,000 refuge seekers had been integrated into encampments societies (Tani & Rahman, 2018).




Figure 1 The location of Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazar District (CBD), Bangladesh. Source: Fieldwork and ISCG (2019).

The arrival of more than 550,000 refuge seeking Rohingyas in the Bangladeshi state in 2017 was welcomed with a massive administrative apparatus. This was organized by Bangladesh's National Task Force (BNTF), which the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and included representatives from 22 ministries, which include the army, police, and intel organizations. A task force of the local district directed by the commissioner of the district oversaw and supervised on-the-ground operations. The relief sector assisted these measures via an Inter Sectoral Coordination Group (ISCG) which the International Organization for Migration convened and overseen by the Resident Co-coordinator of UNCHR. Around 2018 in March, the relief sector includes 130 organizations spanning from United Nations organizations, the Red Crescent and Red Cross, through civil organization, religious-based organizations, and governmental organizations (SEG, 2018). The refuge seeking centers were separated into sectors, each with its own Camp-in-Charge officer designated by the government. As site management partners, humanitarian organizations were assigned to zones. The refuge seekers were sorted into clusters of 200 family groups led by a Rohingyan leader chosen by the Bangladeshi soldiers. Immigrants did not have the liberty to vacate the encampments or the liberty to labour without them. A vast monitoring scheme was established, along with a web of interior and exterior

intel personnel who regulated who and what can and cannot access the encampments, reportedly to combat drug and trafficking humans and rebellious group recruiting (Karim, 2018). Not less than 27 security posts were set up to monitor travel inside and outside of the region (Safi, 2018).

The huge government-based and charitable instrument functioned like a capture device, organizing, consolidating, and compressing the multidirectional mobility of people, food, arms, medicines, drugs, aid, and so on into and outside the encampments, in the middle of encampments and neighboring settlements, and into and out of Bangladesh. That was a stratigraphic mechanism designed to confine the pressures and fluxes of stuff mobilized by the immigrant incursion to a controllable socio-political individual (Yusouff, 2017). Nevertheless, it mobilized extra people and movements in the process - the implementation of steadiness on a certain pedestal undermined formerly calm geological and geopolitical layers (Colebrook, 2017). It put a lot of strain on its geology and topography. The camps are situated in south-east Bangladesh, which contains terrain of precipitous, equivalent, north-southern oriented peaks and gorges produced when the tectonic of Indian plate crashed with the Plateau Shillong between two and half and sixty-six million years ago. There are disagreements concerning what prompted a limited handful of Rohingya refugees to be allowed provisional status and branded as registered, whereas a huge proportion stayed unregistered. According to Ishrat (2019), the words "registered" and "unregistered" are defined as follows.

In 1991, as mentioned earlier, the government gave refuge and support to Rohingyas as soon as they arrived in Bangladesh. The administration quickly understood that the Rohingyas would require long-term assistance. Caused by a lack of policy, the authorities registered names and families of Rohingyas' as well as their information, entered them into the official database, and provided them with housing and other assistance. These registered encampments are managed by the government. These Rohingya immigrants have been recognized as registered refugees ever since. Bangladeshi state has a democratic legislative structure that ensures that all citizens, including immigrants and refugees, have access to some basic human rights. In terms of the legal context, there is no internal legislation or distinct governmental policies in Bangladesh that governs migrant safety. There has been no noteworthy signal in this respect till recently. Part 3 of the Constitution ensures a number of basic human rights, in line with the global human rights debate. Article 27 of the Constitution, for instance, ensures that everyone be treated equally under the law. Articles 31 to 35, in particular, might be viewed as safeguarding the rights of immigrants. Article 31 stipulates that not only nationals, but also foreigners who are temporarily residing in the nation, have right to full support (Arif, 2020).

During the same period, a succession of compulsory deportation occurred, causing a huge number of Rohingyas to flee to Burma. However, due to the unrelenting brutality targeting them in Burma,

the majority of those deported returned to Bangladesh. Because the authorities have not formally recognized them, these Rohingyas turned and continue to be unregistered in the records of the Bangladeshi officials. These people established their personal encampment in Teknaf and Ukhia next to the government-run registered settlements. The state, the UNHCR, and other local and global organizations provide assistance to registered camps. With the exception of a handful interventions by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the areas of healthcare and cleanliness, the unregistered encampments get nothing and strive to subsist (2019:78).

3.3.1.1 Registered camps

Nayapara and Kutupalong recognized encampments, just like unregistered encampments, are identified by the names of the localities in this portion of Cox's Bazar province. The two encampments opened their doors in 1992. Assistance progressively enhanced and expanded at Nayapara and Kutupalong registered camps are 36 and 70 kilometers respectively apart from Cox's Bazar town. According to official records accessible on the website, the registered camp of Kutupalong houses 13,985 registered Rohingya immigrants in 2,620 households by July 2017. The campground is spread out across 75 acres of land. Ishrat laments that when she met the Kutupalong Camp-In-Charge she was not furnished with much data, and he refused to present her a camp brochure.

By March 2016, eleven basic schools have exist founded to serve from the first grade to one through five, and one high-school serving grades six and seven. Kids are not officially permitted to join in Bangladeshi schools out of the authorized encampment after completing grade 7. The population of boy and girl pupils in elementary schools in Kutupalong recognized encampment is 1426 and 1546, correspondingly, from a sum of 2972 schoolchildren. 267 boys and 216 girls among the 483 secondary pupils available. Tenants have access to public tube wells and restrooms (Ishrat, 2019). A large number of state institutions are engaged in giving assistance to the Rohingya people who have been registered. According to the official website of Bangladesh, the Nayapara registered encampment is located on 85 acres of land. Per the official records, it housed 19,557 enrolled Rohingya people in 3,709 households by July 2017. A library, public tech accessibility, a 26-bed health centre, 108 waste dumps, 955 toilet facilities, 415 bathtub sets, and 69 pipe network stations are among the services provided in Nayapara (Ishrat, 2019). Many households have personal tubewells and lavatories inside the confines of their homes.

In the both refugee two camp strategies, the authorities offer basic necessities such as food, housing, clothes, educational training, healthcare, drinkable water, cleanliness, and skills training in

conjunction with regional and global NGOs. Apart from primary essentials, the UNHCR, international agencies WFP, WHO, UNFPA, and a couple of regional Organizations provide a variety of assistance to the two camps. These organizations mostly give non-food goods and nutritional supplements, as well as providing health and education assistance and assistance with personality initiatives such as household horticulture, planting trees, sewing, and woodworking. Houses in the two registered encampments meet basic needs for occupants, based on the average state of houses in Bangladesh remote areas.

3.3.1.2 Unregistered camps

In Bangladesh, there is no legally recognized "settlement" for unregistered Rohingya people. Indeed, the Bangladeshi administration did not forcibly expel this group of individuals from the nation and compel them to leap into the Naf River, neither did it embark on a campaign of pursuing, destroying, killing, and other types of oppression against the Rohingya people. The Rohingyas, with the exception of a tiny number of them, have been ignored and unregistered from the outset, increasing their vulnerability. This unregistered camp consists of a smattering of improvised dwellings on government-owned large and desolate terrain that was originally deserted and is next to the registered encampment, untamed and unsecured. A couple Bangladeshi NGOs have recently begun to provide assistance in the areas of sanitation and health. Only handful off foreign organizations have begun to provide humanitarian aid on an as-needed basis. However, the quantity of services available is insufficient in comparison to the demand of such a huge community. They are in a very tough condition due to an absence of assistance and their unrecognized position. In the same neighborhood, one segment gets state and UNHCR assistance while the other does not (Ishrat, 2019).

Leda and Kutupalong are two unregistered encampments respectively situated 36 and 68 kilometers from Cox's Bazar. This unregistered encampment in Ukhia is called Kutupalong. This camp is overcrowded—chaotic, sloppy, and expansive sprouted up with no plan. According to Batattiston (2018), the Rohingya city is "a new, unanticipated realm." There are several entrance ways to the camp, indicating how fragile and unsecured it is. Taal is the local name for the unregistered camp in Kutupalong. It has no well-defined shape, is disorganized, and is unsecure. The swampy paths within the encampment crisscross and slope up and through the hillsides where the Rohingyas live. Plastic sheets and bamboo poles have been used to construct the "houses"—shacks. At the further edge of the encampment, there is a narrow forest that leads to the Bay of Bengal's beach. "Kutupalong is not just the world's largest refugees' encampment, with a number of one million plus people, but it is currently the most heavily occupied" (Altman, 2018), Kakuma and Dadaab in Kenya only come after

it in terms of most populated camps. Leda, an unregistered camp in Teknaf that depicts the name of the place it is situated is highly structured and on level ground, but it is located in a nearly same natural environment woodland and ocean somewhere at camp's end.

Local non-governmental organizations manage 40 education centers at the unregistered camp of Kutupalong. Unregistered Rohingyan teens and young adults work in education centres as instructors. Local NGOs have installed tube wells and toilet facilities. Medecins Sans Frontières, 'Doctors Without Borders' (MSF) has set up a hospital for Rohingyas that are unregistered. Despite the fact that joblessness is high in this neighborhood, there are some outliers. Many unregistered Rohingya refugees, for instance, are recruited by local NGOs that work on infrastructure works within the encampment, such as installing sewers and bathrooms, waterproof sealants to prevent slides, and so on. Some are willing to labor as workers in farmland or in small enterprises and groceries run by Bangladeshis in adjacent areas. At Kutupalong undocumented camp, few tube wells in each block can be found, but people must queue to use the toilet facility or boreholes because there are no personal washrooms. The waiting time might be rather extensive sometimes. They have, however, educated themselves to reduce the number of moments they need to use the restroom because they are in open spaces and a 10-minute trek from their wooden huts. Because of the range and the absence of electricity, they try not to use the bathrooms when it is dark. They'd instead delay till morning to use the restroom (Ishrat, 2019).

Inhabitants of the Leda camp previously got accommodation assistance from regional NGOs. The houses are arranged in lines and the atmosphere is pretty tidy. The people were provided with latrines and trash stations by local NGOs.

Regrettably, this Leda camp does not have a school. Children exclusively attend madrasas established by the locals themselves. Madrasas are religious institutes whose curricula have nothing to do with regular school curricula since they are run only by Rohingyas.

The chronic water issue is the most challenging aspect of life in Leda camp. The land of the encampment is loaded with rough pebbles attributable to geological factors, making the installation of tube wells particularly difficult. This results in huge lines for water at the collecting station, where water is held by local NGOs and distributed just twice a day to locals. Inhabitants of Leda encampment, like those of Kutupalong encampment, grapple with a limited range of job opportunities, yet they, also, are fortunate in many cases to acquire work beyond the encampment. (MSF, 2018).

3.3.2 Camps for Rohingya refugees in India

If juxtaposed with Bangladesh, where the authorities opened its doors but presently claims that the large number is putting a burden on the country's community and environmental resources, the number population of Rohingyas in India is quite low (Amin, 2018). The Administration of India and NGOs hold accurate figures on Rohingya people residing in the country. Though earlier discussions made in this thesis put a rough figure of the refugees in India, a clear distinction between Bangladeshi and Indian refugee response can be observed through quantification. This also indicate that there is no proper documentation of these refugees in India owing to previous mentioning that the India government had always resisted the entrance of these refugees. Despite the fact that this thesis focuses not on the figures of refuge seeking Rohingyas in the Indian state, the controversy surrounding them serves to contextualize the government's response.

The Government of India indicated in its statement to the Highest Court that there are roughly 43,000 Rohingya immigrants in the nation, albiet could not cite any demographics facts or a basis for the figure. The UNHCR has 17,500 asylum seeking Rohingyas enrolled in India, which has done so via its partner NGOs in various Indian states. The UNHCR has handed identity cards to around 16,500 refugees, to enable them "avoid harassment, arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, and repatriation." Delhi has stated that it will not recognize the card and has dismissed the UN's position that extraditing the Rohingyas breaches the concept of refoulement - returning refugees to a dangerous location. "Everyone who enters the nation with no proper lawful authorization is deemed unlawful," said A. Bharat Bhushan Babu, a Ministry of Internal Affairs official in an interview with Reuters. "According to the law, everyone who is in the country illegally must be deported." They will be returned in accordance with the law." (Das, 2018).

The Rohingya immigrants have created organizations and associations to address the many difficulties that the group faces in India. The Rohingya Human Rights Initiative (ROHRIngya) is one such organization. According to the statistics they have, the number is between 18,000 and 20,000, according to one of the group's Co-founders (Amin, 2018). ROHRIngya blames resource scarcity and engagement for his community's inability to collect detailed and accurate differentiated statistics. 'Given the volatility of most refugee conditions, quantifying refugees is the finest approximate science,' according to the United State Department's World Refugee Report 1991. Considering the limited population of Rohingya refugees in the Indian state, the state must not hard time calculating the correct figures. The UNHCR and the ROHRIngya both report comparable estimates, but the government's figures are significantly higher. Several factors could be the reasons the government numbers are significantly high. Firstly, all refugees from Myanmar including several persons of other

ethnic minorities such as Chin and Karen that run away from the state because they were facing persecution in the tribal strife with the nation and are currently largely dead could be recorded as Rohingya people. Under the given conditions, the other and far more reasonable explanation might be a purposeful effort to depict this figure like a burden on indigenous properties and a "security risk."

Another key issue to investigate is where they live. According to statistics gathered with the assistance of ROHRIngya, Rohingya refugees are distributed throughout eight states, including Delhi. The majority of these encampments are headquartered around the war-torn state of Kashmir and Jammu, with Hyderabad coming as second. Additionally, the cities listed in the below figure, media sources state that Rohingya refugees may be present in Rajasthan. The choice of these locations is based more on luck than on choices. The first location is determined by the agency or, in certain situations, by family who have already arrived.

The Distribution of Rohingyans in India			
State	Location	Number of Families	Total Population
Delhi	Shaheen Bagh	95	387
	Kalindi Kunj	50	225
	Khajuri	51	192
	Uttam Nagar/Vikaspuri	40	200
	Faridabad	37	150
	Purana Goan	17	61
Uttar Pradesh	Mirzapur/Aligarh	110	430
Haryana	Punana	35	145
	Chandni-1	44	162
	Chandni-2	44	158
	Nangali-1	51	156
	Jagipur Ward-7	74	280
West Bengal	Kolkata	40	120
Tamil Nadu		21	95
Punjab		10	50
Telangana	Hyderabad 26 locations	1050	3705
Jammu	Jammu 22 locations	1350	5600
	Kashmir 22 location	18	85

Table 1. Source (Amin, 2018).

No precise timeframe exists for their entrance and residence in India, although the majority of them started arriving in this nation via Bangladesh amid Myanmar's 2012 outbreak of conflict (Dixit, 2018). That was the period encampments started to spring up in Delhi as well as other cities including as Jammu and Hyderabad. They have built up self-settled camps' in the majority of these sites; some reside in personal private leased lodgings, and in some spots, these are placed in roughly sketched encampments through assistance from certain NGOs.

'Accessibility to the state's security, support, and services is crucial to the healthcare of people,' as

relates Ager (2014), whether they are refugees or citizens in a state. The population of Rohingya in India, on the other hand, strives to obtain these essential amenities. The living situations in the encampments are deplorable, with no or little exposure to privisions such as electric power, clean drinking water and medical services, sanitation and housing offered in fabric shelters or silicosis shacks: this was revealed not only by this Amin (2018) during field trips to Jammu and Delhi, but also by the media. Even expectant mothers and newly born babies are refused the Pradhan Mantri Maternity Scheme (PMMS) maternity benefits (Dixit 2018). Furthermore, a few kids that are allowed to enroll in public schools have not been able to join in the noon feeding program. The majority of the adult males in these camps work casual workers. Their sources of subsistence are essentially determined by the places they reside. For example, in Delhi, the majority of the areas described in the above table are semi-urban, ghettoized slums where they cohabit alongside Nepalese encampments or interior immigrants from places such as Bihar. Others operate modest improvised stores; some have rented rickshaws; and yet others are trash collectors.

A more in-depth examination of their socioeconomic situations, notably in Jammu, is covered in a different category. The consequent sections are attempts to look at several issues under different heading, confronting and impacting the Rohingyas struggle in both India and Bangladesh. These include the conditions of the people in the camps, the effect of the immigrants on the indigenous people in Bangladesh and India.

3.4 The Condition of the refugees and impacts of the crisis on Bangladesh and India.

This section looks into how the Bangladeshi and Indian states are handling the Rohingya refugees in their home countries. It gives an insight into the realities of the refugees and the encampments in the states. The differences and the commonalities in these refugee situations and their impact shall be discussed under social impact, gender-related violence, political impact, economic impact, security concerns, environmental conditions, health conditions, drug and arm trafficking, and religious and cultural effects.

3.4.1 Social Impact

The social effect impact includes health difficulties, justice and law matter, and how the indigenous populace sees Rohingyas. Bangladesh has been dealing with the effects of a prior migrant inflow when extra strain was placed on the country's economic and social structures from middle 2017. Unanticipated presence of migrants might threaten inter-community cohesion and pose threats to

essential local ethical systems like culture, faith, as well as structure of the language (OCHA, 2018). According to Alam (2018), the population growth rate amongst Rohingyas is greater than that of Bangladeshis. International humanitarian analysts suggest that the women in encampments would bear children to an astonishing 48,000 infants in 2018, putting further strain on the native community. Previous findings like Committee for International Rescue (2014:25), the UNDP & UN Women (2017) reveal that, whereas the priority of support is on Rohingyas, there's really discontent within impoverished native Bangladeshis that are as well negatively impacted by the conflict but receive less help and support philanthropy organization. This social consequence is generating a break in relations as well as an increase in the magnitude of hatred toward immigrants. Furthermore, Uddin (2012:129) alleges that the Rohingya inflow has caused a slew of additional societal problems, including their engagement in weapons as well as drug smuggling, smuggling humans, crimes, and brothels in the region of Cox's Bazar. According to BBC News, Rohingya females are engaging in narcotics peddling and brothels as a quick way to get money, and these unlawful practices are harming the Bangladeshi state. In an analysis of econometrics. Datta (2015:136) illustrates how deprivation causes lack of security, and lack of security generates poverty among Rohingyas, who have to do anything they could to survive, even if it means engaging in crime.

The socio-cultural component is yet another societal issue that influences the lives of the indigenous people. Numerous Rohingya females, for instance, plan to marry native Bangladeshi males, however the High Court in Dhaka forbid marriage between Rohingyas and the Bangladeshis. Thus, marriages and fusion between the two group have been prohibited by law, and there have been occasions when police have been involved in arresting persons who have wedded surreptitiously and attempted to escape from detected (SBS News, 2017). The government's massive tactics to manage the condition in the refugee centers could fuel greater resentment, suspicion, and prejudice against the Rohingya. As a result, Shyamol (2017) asserts that the security situations and atmosphere in Cox's Bazar have worsened dramatically, a position supported by local management officials and law enforcing authorities.

Datta (2015:141) discovered that several Rohingya people are living out of refugees' encampments and mingling with locals by purporting to be natives of Bangladesh, allowing these people to acquire property in the district of Cox's Bazar, participate in politics, and travel overseas using illicit Bangladesh passports. These are concerning trends for officials, since sources indicate that about 50,000 Rohingya people have travelled to Saudi Arabia as migrant laborers using Bangladeshi passports (The Daily Star, 2017). Nevertheless, as disclosed by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS) in 2017, there are concerns that Rohingyas could be susceptible to enrolment of radical Islamists who previously see the condition in the state as an advantage for

terrorism jihadist action which could endanger regional stability.

i. Gender related violence

As previously stated, there is a widespread perception among local Bangladeshi populations of the Rohingya as ignorant, harsh, possibly unscrupulous, and aggressive (UNDP & UN Women 2017:2). Violence influenced by sex is one instance of ways this aggressiveness may be mirrored and amplified by prejudices and inequities in Rohingya culture. Sex related violence is defined by Benjamin and Fancy (1998: 14) as "abuse directed against people due to their sexuality that impacts them owing to their unique tasks or obligations in community." Taking this into consideration, Alam, (2018) reveals that younger women from Rohingya frequently encounter sexual misconduct, sometimes, assault from their own local residents inside refuge seeking centers. Furthermore, premature and coercive conjugal ties is a major worry for Myanmar female refugees. According to research (Akhter & Kusakabe, 2014), encampment for children and women are frequently subjected to sexual assault when visiting restrooms and fetching water, that could be located very distant from the refuge of their encampment homes. The researchers also discuss the way male Rohingya conflict, persecution, and dissatisfaction experiences can manifest as marital abuse towards their women or other household members. According to Akhter and Kusakabe (2014:238), Rohingya males are frequently barred from acquiring lucrative job owing to limitations on their mobility out from the encampments, as well as restricted options for unskilled labor. As a consequence of need, Rohingya females could turn the primary breadwinners in their homes, that could lead to unhealthy relationship and conflict in households with established gender stereotypical anticipations. Aside from personal abuse, the women experience dangers of abuse and oppression at their job places owing to their poor socioeconomic position.

In November 2017, BBC News featured an example of this dilemma when a Rohingya girl called Halima revealed her hardships after arriving in Bangladesh. She was compelled to participate in the activities of brothel for more than a month, according to the interview, before she was rescued by Police. Unfortunately, she returned to the brothel due to a lack of funds and assistance (BBC News, 2017). According to Lee (2005:77), many of the Rohingya's acts violate the ethics, morals, and faith beliefs of the native Bangladeshi population. Moreover, Lee argues the two, locals and Rohingyas compete for work opportunities, schools, benefits, as well as medical services, which might lead to violence involving them. The Inter-Agency Working Group on Reproductive Health in Crisis (IAWG) has asked the global society to ensure Rohingya women and girls' sexual and reproductive health. Mother and child mortality rate would rise unless urgent steps are taken to enhance maternity care and STDs. Many Rohingya women have been afflicted with illness and are malnourished as a result of the abuse and rape they were forced to undergo in Myanmar prior to fleeing to Bangladesh.

As a result, the development of STDs within the Rohingya in encampments and among locals is expected to pose issues for healthcare workers and aggravate the situation for everybody (IAWG, 2018).

ii. Religious and Cultural Effects

The BJP has made it obvious that it wants to marginalize Muslims since 2014. The BJP has lived true to its electoral platform, from establishing a Hindu shrine on the ruins of the Babri mosque to mess with Muslim marriage rules. Even while the globe faced COVID-19, the BJP has been preoccupied with spreading myths about the way Muslims were purposefully spreading the virus. To the Muslim migrants, the ongoing hostility has merely exacerbated their pre-existing problems of statelessness and uncertainty. This year, 2021, has seen an increase in anti-Muslim hostility. Close to 200 Rohingyas, which includes children and women, were detained in Kathua, India, early this year after the authorities claimed they were undocumented refugees. Couples were taken from their babies, who screamed in vacant shelters and went hungry. The immigrants are being held in custody. Every week in August, stories of crimes against Muslims circulated. Some Muslims were tortured, made to recite Jai Shri Ram (Hindu mantras), as well as watched right-wing Hindu parties screaming for their annihilation in leading Indian places ranging from Ajmar to Kanpurr, Indorre, and Delhi. Right-wing fanatics have trapped the Rohingyas, who are increasingly concerned not only about their life situations but also about being compelled to flee India. "We are asking that the Indians should not see us as Muslims or refugees." "Rather they should look at us as human beings in peril," Hussain remarked. "We are genocide survivors." (Aswani, 2021).

On the other hand, according to continuing study, numerous reasons influenced Bangladesh's political selection to accept the Rohingya, as well as the nation's religious and cultural identity, which revolves around ideals of society and helping those in need. Conversations with political officials, non-governmental organizations, and local participants indicated that the common Muslim faith and Islamic identity of several Bangladesh citizens and the great majority of Rohingyas mobilized humanitarian help in two ways. Firstly, the Muslim principles of "zakat," one of Islam's five principles, and "sadaqa," or consensual generosity, were critical in inspiring ordinary persons to provide emergency aid. Both of these ideas highlight the importance of giving to people that are needy. Religious authorities utilized these ideas to solicit contributions as well. Prime Minister Hasina used benevolence in Islam to defend her migration strategy in her 2019 presentation at the General Assembly. Secondly, the premise that the Rohingya Muslims, particularly, were being targeted due to their religion added to the sense of purpose among Muslims to help the Rohingyas.

Whereas the great majority of Rohingyas that escaped to Bangladeshi state were Muslims, a lesser proportion of Rohingya Hindus and Christians who came with the surge also got essential aid and housing. Nevertheless, not all of those questioned used faith to justify their behavior. "Why did we reply?" questioned a healthcare worker contacted for the study. Because that was the right thing to do, the humane thing to do, the righteous thing to do. Why should we not? The catastrophe has come at our doorstep. "How else could we possibly turn them down?" (Sajjad, 2020).

iii. Health Conditions

As the problem in Bangladesh has progressed, international health organizations have voiced growing worries about medical problems and communicable diseases in refugee encampments, which could be widespread among displaced people and the native populace caused by an inadequacy of connectivity to healthcare and sufficient hygiene (Alam, 2018). According to Masud et al. (2017:21), who researched the health issues, the majority of the Rohingyas who are ill are not documented and may be spreading infectious illnesses like such as hepatitis, TB, HIV, skin disorders, and malaria (BIPSS, 2017:3). Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies is worried that contagious illnesses diseases might ruin medical support in refugee centers, and the likelihood of spreading amongst natives owing to when Rohingya people moving from one location to another the other seeking employment jobs.

Several writers and organizations have touched on the medical challenge of environmental deterioration in encampment locations and unsanitary circumstances, which constitute a significant risk to the surrounding area (Haque 2016:865; Khatun 2017:28; Janny & Islam, 2015:97). They are exceedingly worried about the crude free toiletries that cause water pollution and surroundings, as diarrhea and other induced gastric disorders are a major source of disease and death, particularly among youngsters. Masud et al. (2017:23) and Datta (2015:139) have explored reproduction concerns in refugee encampments, including an insufficient information about modern contraceptives, that increases childbirth and child death rates, early and forced marriage as well as other health problems, and the issue of STDs. Moreover, Parnini (2012:236) emphasizes the significance of drug addiction and accompanying disorders diseases like Hepatitis and HIV, which have quickly developed as a result of Rohingya participation in smuggling drugs.

Meanwhile, health situation in Rohingya camps of India is terrible not promising. Everything has gotten terrible even worse as a result of the epidemicCOVID-19 pandemics. Nasrullah, a Rohingya from Madanpur Khadar encampment in New Delhi who also wanted to be identified simply by his

first name for his own security, in his interview with The Wire, said the whole community was remaining within the encampment to prevent being ill, limiting mobility and using pieces of cloths as protective masks. He added that they were not afraid of COVID-19, rather they were afraid of dying as a result of our inability to pay for hospital treatment. He's been taking care of the health of his family by having them drink an herbal mixture he's prepared himself. He understands the concoction has no medical validity, but that is the only cure he can It would have been preferable if we were devoured by COVID-19, Salma Bi said, a refugee in a shelter next to Nasrullah's, said.

Up till now, my life has been nothing but fleeing destinations. They run away from Arakan and then had to flee Bangladesh. She said they have a life now, but they are not truly living it. It's as though they're in a cage everywhere they go (Aswani, 2021).

In South Asia, India offers the most economical reasonable and available public healthcare system. It has extensive national programs on both contagious and noncontagious illnesses. Furthermore, India has facilities for counselling, diagnosis, and treatment, as well as some social protections, as well as measures to build community-based systems or initiatives. Myanmar and Bangladesh are geo-strategically significant for India's political and economic participation in Southeastern Asia, and the latter maintains strong ties with both. In the health sector, India has extensive bilateral health collaboration with both countries. On May 7, 2021, the Delhi branch of UNHCR's distributed a notification informing asylum seekers and refugees about how to get vaccinations on their own and promoting pandemic-appropriate conduct. It did not, meanwhile, mention any collaboration with the Indian government for the vaccination of immigrants. The virus's rising threat, together with increasing socioeconomic hardships, is driving Rohingyas even farther to the edges (Aswani, 2021) Any literature that demonstrates Indian government’s deliberate effort to take care of the medical needs of the Rohingyas.

Considering India's advanced medical infrastructure and the severe situation in the Cox's Bazar camp regions, the former may help Bangladesh even more by assisting in the administration of public health crisis in the encampment regions. The Indian government is now sponsoring the development of 36 health centers in five Bangladesh's northeast districts, namely Sunamgannj, Habigannj, Brahmannbaria, Jamalpurr, and Sherpurr, under its "Aid to Bangladesh" initiative. Each communal healthcare is expected to serve the populace of around 7,000 people and could offer health services, with a focus on maternity health. The creation of health centers, particularly in Habigannj (445.1 km) and Brahmannbaria (353.5 km) near Cox’s Bazar, would assist in relieving the load on Bangladesh. Infrastructure, technological and medical knowledge, and infrastructural facilities from India can facilitate coordination and operation of health programs in Cox's Bazar. Unfortunately, India's aggressive retaliation against the Rohingya people has produced a dangerous situation. Fear

of imprisonment and harassment has prompted numerous Rohingya people, who have lived in India for decades, to flee to Bangladesh. This scenario jeopardizes the balance of India–Bangladesh relations, since the latter is increasingly overwhelmed with accommodating Rohingya refugees. While India's "Operation Insaniyat" has been a success, the nation should explore providing more comprehensive health assistance (Banerjee, 2019).

3.4.2 Political Impact

In August 2017, Bangladesh has been a reluctant player in welcoming migrants and enabling migrant shelters to be established from the inception of the Rohingya crisis. In response to international criticism and pledges of assistance in the way of international assistance, the administration has demonstrated tremendous compassion and forbearance for refugees. Many diplomatic efforts have been undertaken to address the problem on its borders, yet minimal headway has been made. Contrarily, the issue has intensified in the last year, particularly after August 2017, leading many pundits to assume that no settlement is in sight. According to Alam (2018), Bangladeshi authorities is unable to build the foreign diplomatic help necessary to settle the situation. Meanwhile, in 2017, around November, the Bangladeshi state and the state of Myanmar struck a mutual deal to return the migrants, with Bangladeshi state seeking to finish the process in two years as previously discussed in the above pages. This strategy appears improbable to see the light of the day because protection for Rohingya in Myanmar has not been enhanced, talks of granting the people citizenship or civil rights have not been made, and consensual deportation is highly improbable to become a path that several asylum seekers might consider granted the consequences they would face if they returned (Alam, 2018).

Idris (2017:2) asserts that, in general, the majority supports the administration 's plan to provide shelter to Rohingya people, and this decision could have an influence on the upcoming general elections in the beginning of 2019, based on how the refugee situation develops. A landmark research by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (2017:6) indicates that local legislatures and officials frequently utilize Rohingya immigrants to advance their personal political objectives, which might be a major worry for Bangladesh. According to BIPSS (2017:7), the refugee issue has led Bangladesh to miss the economic and political backing of two of its close allies, China and India, since both have taken the sides with Myanmar and have substantial geopolitical and economic interests there. Consequently, a diplomatic realignment is happening in this region, which may have a severe influence for Bangladesh.

Meanwhile in India, India's ruling party since 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has repeatedly

addressed in its electoral rallies the subject of the negative impact of illegal immigration, as well as potential solutions. This political party accuses the opposing party Indian National Congress (IDC) of utilizing undocumented people as a political base. Having labelled the Rohingya migrants as illegal immigrants who constitute a security risk, the BJP sees no electoral benefit in harboring the Rohingya people in India. On the flipside, their prompt return would benefit the BJP's electoral objectives (Dutta, 2017).

i. Security Concerns

This refugee situation is no more only a humanitarian concern; it now creates a possible danger to Bangladesh's domestic stability and security, as well as a broader concern to multinational security in the South-east Asia area (BIPSS, 2017). The ARSA arm group has already demonstrated its capacity to employ and adopt Rohingya jihadi fighters from encampments of Refuge seekers for inter-border warfare and drug trafficking, endangering peace and stability, and threatening security (Haque, 2016:863). Also, Alam (2018) states that the extreme fundamentalist organization al-Qaeeda lately issued a plea online for Bangladesh Muslim families to help the Rohingyas by engaging in violent acts against Myanmar. According to Ullah (2011:156), there are accusations that Jamat-i-Islam and Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI) and have been engaged in sponsoring Rohingyas refuge seekers to engage in unlawful operations both inside Bangladesh and near the borderline. Because most of the national security threat caused by the Rohingyas and radical organizations is clandestine and highly improbable to be easily identified, it appears that there is probably to be far more activities than is heard of, implying that security problem has not to be completely realized or evaluated.

India on the other hand, regards the Rohingya refugees as a security threat, potentially causing a new criticism in the already messy social stratosphere of various Indian states, citing the Muslim minority collective affiliation with radical groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (Inkey, 2018). This trend explains why Narendra Modi, a Hindu nationalist with far-right beliefs, is hesitant to bring the Rohingya crisis into his own neighborhood. Since its start, the Modi government has been unpopular among Indian Muslims for purportedly encouraging extreme Hindutva in India; subsequent developments related Kashmir problems and anti-Pakistan sentiments support the same argument (Bal, 2019). As a result, even after the UNHCR's deepest dismay, occasional forceful repatriation of Rohingya people from India to Myanmar has occurred throughout the years (Nebehay, 2018). The anti-religious attacks in India already discussed above the subheading of religious and cultural effect. It is however touched on a little bit because of its links to security impact.

ii. Drug and Arms Trafficking

The Bangladeshi authorities believe that more 500,000 illegal Rohingyas live in Cox's Bazar and Chittagong districts. Many people are living in abject poverty and may resort to illegal activity in order to live (Datta, 2015:136). According to Shyamol (2017), Bangladeshi law enforcing officials are informed of Rohingyas illicit operations, including the smuggling of 'Yabba,' an addictive and dangerous blend of caffeine and methamphetamine largely made in Myanmar, medications, and wine trafficking in Cox's Bazar and Chittagong. According to Yasmin (2017: 405), Bangladesh's spot is ideal for illicit drug trafficking and global opium trade due to the geographical closeness of the Golden Triangle, the opiate making region where Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar borders meet, and the much more significant opiate making region of the Golden Crescent, which covers the Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan surrounding regions. As a result of their links to trafficking weapons, drug smuggling, and other illegal enterprises, the Refugees pose a domestic security danger to Bangladesh. Bangladesh's military security services and policemen are acutely aware of these activities and execute frequent missions to find and apprehend offenders; yet, the effort is arduous, complicated by a lack of border checks and rampant bribery (BIPSS, 2017:5).

iii. Environmental Conditions

According to Khatun (2017:23), Bangladesh has been dealing with environmental deterioration as a result of immigrant inflow for years, but the latest refugee flood has been significantly more impactful. Environmental catastrophes, a shortage of potable water, and adequate management of waste are among of the primary environmental implications of the Rohingya existence. Another research (Ahmed, 2018), mentions that an extra immigrant intake to the current native community creates an enormous strain on environmental assets, posing protracted issues for an environment which is sustainable. According to Bangladesh's department of forest, the existence of the Rohingya has resulted in the destruction of 4,000 acres of forest land. Furthermore, the researcher points to a WHO research that reveals the decline and contamination of water sources as a result of ecological destruction, particularly deforestation and the accompanying land degradation and dropping of the surface water from runoff rainfall. The Rohingyas fell trees for firewood and to build their huts, creating desolate land where formerly there really were forests as well as fruits farms.

Teknaf Wildlife Sanctuary (TWS) is a protected forestry reserve of about 29000 acres of land that is under threat owing to overharvesting of natural forests by locals and Rohingya refugees (Alam et al.,2014:233). Land clearing has a negative influence on the welfare of the local community since it

deprives them of environmental possessions and sufficient supply of water (UNDP & UN Women, 2017:9). According to Imran and Mian (2014:239), the refugee issue has turned a source of serious concern for Bangladeshi authorities owing to mounting environmental constraints that are impeding the preservation and conservation of nature regions' restricted bio-diversity.

Getting rid of the cover of the virgin forestry reserve caused by the overburdening of human inhabitants in such refuge seekers' encampment locations kickstarts a chain reaction of ecological repercussions that will culminate in the full deterioration of the entire eco-system required to maintain living. Consequently, the charity organization Doctors Without Borders said that a fourth of tube wells had dried up in Hakimpara encampment because deforestation had caused in rainwater drainage to the sea instead of refilling subterranean aquafers (Ahmed, 2018). Furthermore, the WHO cautions that improperly constructed lavatories near tube wells also contaminated groundwater and endangered the wellbeing of patients suffering from illnesses like cholera and diarrhoea (Ahmed, 2018). As could be observed, the refugee situation is having a major impact on Bangladesh's ecology, that is already facing several issues (BIPSS, 2017:6).

In India, in June, about 60 shacks were destroyed in the Madanpur Khadar encampment in Delhi because of an electrical malfunction —the settlement's second fire in three years. As their improvised lives burned to the ground, the evacuees gathered every credentials they could find. In Myanmar, they fled because they were afraid of the military, said a refugee, who spoke anonymously. And at these Indian encampments they were, rushing to keep their future from collapsing. On September 1, floods killed one person in the Sharan Vihar encampment in Delhi. Mohammed Jashim, an 18-year-old refugee, perished after walking into water that touched a power line in his camp, as his helpless family watched on. The parents cursed their destiny. They continued stating that the youngster wants to make a lot of money for them, stated Noorul Amin, a camp refugee. Mohammad Rofiq, a Rohingya residing in an encampment of Punhana, Haryana, India's northernmost state, also mentioned floods. Rofiq sleeps under multi-coloured tarpaulin sheeting fastened with nylon threads and supported with canes of bamboo, as do the majority of the camp's residents. Due to monsoons, he's mended the leaks in his shelter tent practically weekly since July. When it drizzled, the camp filled up, and their stuff float on water right in front of their eyes, according to Rofiq. Rain brings with it the risk of snakes, reptiles, and toxic bugs. Rofiq recounted a recent occurrence that occurred on September 17. In their camp, a snake bit a napping 3-year-old child. According to him, the youngster went blue and died quickly. This is the type of housing they have; this is their existence as refugees (Aswani, 2021).

3.4.3 Economic Impact

Financial market system is sustained by a constant balance of supply and demand - between employee and access to employment. The Rohingya issue may disrupt society's consistency, and new difficulties may arise when large numbers of jobless migrants seek work (BIPSS, 2017:4). It is reasonable that migrants may seek jobs outside of the encampments and may encounter conflict with the local population, causing social instability. According to Baldwin and Marshall (2018), the majority of refugee centers are located in isolated places where the bulk of residents are destitute and rely on every day income acquired via manual labor. The researchers noted, nevertheless, that Rohingya migrants are increasingly vying for scarce opportunities and will disadvantage local laborers. Native Bangladeshi labor prices at 500 takas which is US 6 dollars per day, whereas Rohingya laborers takes less than 400 takas, thus the owner hires the inexpensive Rohingya laborers. This causes a serious deterioration in living prospects for the disadvantaged locality, which survives daily life on little incomes. Because of the lack of job openings and a low salary, the local people are obliged to trade their minor properties and animal herds and take out mortgage so that they can maintain their family (UNDP & UN Women, 2017:7). According to Yasmin (2017:417), when individuals from the local dwellers end up losing their livelihood and relocate to some other place to look for better earnings, it contains a severe threat to Bangladeshis economic and social steadiness and the progress of the economy in the long-run. Cookson (2017) adds that Bangladeshi state is a tiny state that has a sensitive economy, scarce possessions, congestion, and limited farmland. Due to that, the great inflow of the Rohingyas, alongside the state's overcrowding and rising population, may substantially obstruct economic strides of the Bangladeshi state. Bangladesh's GDP per capita was $2029.60 in 2016, accounting for barely 8% of the global norm (Trading Economics).

The inflows of international help and increased global spending for the assistance of Rohingyas can boost Bangladesh's growth in the economy. For instance, Parnini (2013:288) says that the UNHCR, sponsor countries, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are giving assistance to support the refugee inflow, which has yielded some positive consequences, such as expanded work opportunities for local inhabitants. According to Khatun (2017:24), improvements in the local economic structure, such as developments in small corporate areas that have recently opened opportunity for local people are there. Several Bangladeshi labourers have sought profitable work with relief assistance organizations and development agencies.

However, according to Alam (2018), the entire expenses to the administration for asylum seeker encampment zones is a strain on the country's economy. According to Cookson (2017), Cox's Bazar is one of the most important tourism destinations in the Bangladesh state, but the flood of refugees

surge now has a negative effect on tourist revenue. According to Khan's 2017 research (25), the tourists who visited the region has reduced owing to the continuous violence. According to travel companies, they would lose more than 500,000 guests this season. Cross-border commerce with Myanmar and aquaculture in the River Naf have equally deteriorated due to administrative constraints, that had a negative economic effect on Bangladeshi state (UNDP & UN Women, 2017:9).

In some other encampment in Haryana, India, on the hand Hussain, a local leader that wanted just to be identified by his first initial to prevent police retaliation, complained of similar—and financial—issues. Hussain wanted to be a mathematician but ended up working as a day laborer pouring mortar on a building project. He is now struggling to sustain his household. Since moving to India, a decade ago, his earnings have been abysmal, he added. Because of lack of documents, Rohingyas in India may only seek for unofficial occupations such as day laborers, trash collectors, dressmakers, tobacco makers, or construction workers like Hussain. This implies there will be no set wage, contracts, or healthcare coverage. As a result, many migrant families are able to labor in low-wage occupations or rely on the UNHCR's little financial support. Economic uncertainty has disproportionately impacted women, according to Noor Marjan, an 18 years old refugee. Poverty, for example, has compelled many females to use fabric instead of female personal care items such as sanitary pads (Foreign Policy, 2021).

It can be deduced from the above that the Rohingyas in Indian and Bangladeshi camps are quite abysmal. However, their situation in Bangladesh is better than that of India as Refugees in Bangladesh have some sort of advantages in getting themselves some menial jobs to fend for themselves and their immediate families. Despite this little advantage, the activities of these refugees as mentioned above are straining on the already struggling economy of Bangladesh.

CHAPTER 4

4. Conclusion

This study focused on the differences and the commonalities in the Rohingya refugee situations and their impact as manifested in social impact, gender-related violence, political impact, economic impact, security concerns, environmental condition, health conditions, drug and arms trafficking, and religious and cultural effects. This study asks the question; what are the similarities and difference between the Bangladeshi camps and Indian camps in terms of social, political, economic, security, environmental, religious and cultural effects, health conditions of the refugee settlements

as well as gender-related violence drug and arms trafficking. It is argued that both Bangladesh and India have behaved differently towards the Rohingya refugees after a close comparison was made using related literature. This study compares the situations and factors surrounding the status quo of the refugees and their impacts in the Bangladeshi and Indian states suggests that the Indian situation is far different to the Bangladeshi state in that the number of refugees in India is quite minimal to that of Bangladeshi state. The Bangladeshi has state that it has been a long history of dealing with the Rohingya refugee situation whereas the Indian state's experience with the Rohingya refugees is quite recent. Despite the recent resistance, Bangladesh has demonstrated enough tolerance of the Rohingya refugees partly of religious proximity whilst India's religious intolerance also manifested in its poor handling of the Rohingya refugees.

In Myanmar, history could be replaying anew. For ages, the world society was split by the nation's intra governmental fight between both the military dictatorship and democracy proponents: The West and United States, accepted an exclusion and punitive measure plan against Myanmar, whereas the Myanmar's neighbors, such as India and ASEAN, sustained effective dialogue. When Myanmar's army leadership chose to pursue democratization and hold its first polls in twenty years, both the Western world and Myanmar's neighbors declared that their strategies had succeeded in ushering about reform in the nation. The intellectual argument about whether the isolationist or constructive policy was far more successful persists. However, the West, headed by the United States, has taken a tough stance towards Myanmar's administration about the Rohingya crisis, whereas Myanmar's neighbors, particularly India and ASEAN, have engaged in meaningful debate. The global society might be starting a new chapter of global division. If history is any guide, it'll at best result in accusations and counter-accusations about the technique was more successful. However, the worldwide barrier simply makes it harder for anybody to assist people in need. As of now, Modi's response to the Rohingyas issue has been seen as opposing the country's established stance on immigrants. As the Rohingya's situation evolves, Delhi could still contribute a great deal of aid in the search for long-lasting remedies. Such efforts will have a significant impact on Modi's global and regional stature.

Despite the fact that Bangladeshi has been sheltering nearly a million refuge seekers, the nation has consistently denied the prospect of the Rohingya people staying indefinitely. Bangladesh politicians' comments in the latter half of 2019 show that the nation views the Rohingya people as a security danger instead of an oppressed population. The global society, on the other hand, attacked the plan to relocate the Rohingya people to an Island susceptible to accident. Humanitarian aid and activism to put strain on Burma were maintained. Nevertheless, the attempts made to combat disease outbreaks in the encampments are equally worthy of praise. Despite this, teenage healthcare

continues to face a variety of socioeconomic, ethnic, and spiritual difficulties. Driven by fear, Rohingyas are confronting a massive problem in respect of essential necessities and many life-sustaining amenities in order to conquer problems. Whereas a variable-scale emergency intervention has been launched, the Rohingya people face restrictions, and cooperation is essential for successful execution of new possibilities and plans. Concerning a significant influx of migrants in different interactive and collaborative initiatives like resource regeneration, forested land recovery, and disaster prevention initiatives toward effective administration is a pressing requirement at the moment.

The research reveals how the Rohingya refugees' identification has been complicated by their absence of legal nationality in Myanmar. The People can create a valid identification founded on their presence in a society defined by politics after their entitlements (citizenship identity) are recognized and involvement within this society is given. Legitimate citizenship in Myanmar is critical for the people of Rohingya. Just legal participation can convert individuals to legitimate individuals, give them better necessary papers including passport, and integrate them into the political body in their original country, Myanmar. Even though a passport is regarded as valid identification of citizenship, it is basically an effort to limit person's freedom of travel. Creating Myanmar Muslim identity and the question surrounds it cannot be separated from the wider problem of the displaced persons' migration. Notwithstanding becoming world's biggest immigrant community, the Rohingya people have received little worldwide attention, owing to the fact that it is primarily a South Asian issue that poses no danger to the United States and Europe. As a result, systematic and earnest attempts to come up with a remedy to the Burmese dilemma are absent, and the situation has reached dilemma proportions.

The words of state officials, emergency relief organizations, healthcare specialists, ecological authorities, and local police departments all agree that the existence of Rohingya immigrants in Bangladeshi state is producing a wide-ranging detrimental impact on community, the state, and the area. The Rohingyas issue is a terrible situation and a difficult task for Bangladesh. In the context of the Rohingya, the concluding thesis is that uneven availability of resources and chances is the root cause of violence between locals and immigrants. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the crisis's impacts in Bangladeshi are more complicated and pervasive, extending further than the local areas where shelters are to the state, local, and even worldwide stages. As a result, an urgent comprehensive and coherent response to the Refugee situation must be developed in order to safeguard the indigenous community and Bangladeshi against harm.

India and Bangladesh are not the only states where Rohingya refugees can be found in tents, however other states like Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have some scores of these refugees that live in among

the people in their states. In this thesis, India and Bangladesh have taken the center stage in all discussions regarding the Rohingyas and their persecutions that the international communities have described as deliberate ethnic cleansing meted out by the Myanmar state government. When the brutalization got intensified this Muslim minority fled and carved their ways into Bangladesh and India among other nations.

This thesis answered the question, what are the refugee-related problems in Bangladesh and India camps of Rohingya comparatively, through a comparative study. In answering the questions, it has been suggested that the conditions in Bangladesh and India are only getting worse with India and Bangladesh making conscious effort to return these refugees to Myanmar amidst Myanmar's dragging feet in accepting them and the refugees' reluctance to go back citing issues of mistrust and possible repeated torture. This study brings to bear he conditions in both refugee hosting states as it argues that the states involved have treated the refugees differently. The refugees have been initially met with open arms before being asked to return to their place of origin probably because of faith proximity (Islam) in Bangladesh for instance. Camps in Bangladesh are both recognized and taken care of amidst their division into registered and unregistered camps. The global societies have collaborated in many ways to reduce the burden of the people. Meanwhile it is no surprise that deteriorated health situations, security dilemma, violence, poor environmental conditions marked these refugee camps especially in Bangladesh, largely because the population there is higher and the unregistered smaller encampments lack proper supervision and regulations. And compared to the Indian refugee camps, it is obvious that some situations like crime, prostitution, and drug trafficking have not yet escalated in the India (at least as far as the data I accessed is concerned). This could be because some of these refugees live in fear because of the hostilities supervised by the leading political parties and the popularly known Indian habit of intolerance towards Muslims. Also, some of these refugees have returned to Bangladesh and to farther places like Malaysia and Saudi Arabia to seek greener preachers.

Previous studies like have not given room for comparative studies on the subject matter. Little effort has been made in political science field to research this pressing refugee crisis comparatively as has been done in this one. The few works on the subject matter were rather done in fields not similar to political science. It is in this light that this research has come in to compare, relate and differentiate the political, social and economic impacts that have risen as a result of the interactions between the host states and the refugees.

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