T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

ETHIOPIA'S CONTESTED NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1941-2012

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

IDRIS YEBA BUTA

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ANKARA, 2023

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ANKARA, 2023

APPROVAL PAGE

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all the data utilized in this study is collected with adherence to academic ethical considerations and all the sources consulted in producing this dissertation are duly acknowledged. I also declare that all published and unpublished works of which are not original to this work are cited and referenced in accordance with the standard of the university.

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Signature……

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First, I would like to acknowledge three institutions that provided me with the environment within which I pursued my studies. The first is my home institution, Jimma University, College of Law and Governance, Department of Governance and Development Studies, which gave me time and support throughout my studies. Second, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı (YTB) for the opportunity it gave me to be in this beautiful country and among friendly people and to learn from the best. Third, I would like to extend thanks to the Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, particularly the Department of International Relations, for providing me with a learning and research environment that was both challenging and supportive. The dedication and support of faculty and staff to the development of its students have been a source of inspiration.

Then, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my Ph.D. dissertation supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA for his unwavering support, guidance, and encouragement throughout my journey. Particularly during the troublesome times of the Covid-19 Pandemic and wars in my country, his patience, helpful nature, friendly demeanor, and constructive criticism were the sources of my strength that helped me going. I am fortunate and honored to have him as my supervisor and mentor. Hocam, Çok Teşekkür Ederim!

I would also like to sincerely thank my first TİK committee members, Prof. Dr. Birol AKGÜN and Asst. Prof. Dr. Güliz DİNÇ for their invaluable contributions and insights throughout the research process. Then I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Gürol BABA, Asst. Prof. Dr. Christian LEKON and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mürsel BAYRAM for their insightful comments and suggestions that helped me refocus my energy on more fruitful analytical perspectives. I am deeply grateful for my committee members' willingness to lend their time and expertise and for their invaluable contributions to my academic growth and success.

Several people helped me throughout my studies, to mention a few of them: Dr. Ibsa Ahmed, thank you for your friendship and data. Dr. Yihenew Wubu, thank you for your collegial discussions, and data. Dear friends, Ahmed Ibrahim Buta, Feysel Qadi Mohammed, Misbahudin Ayub, Fikadu Tolossa, Aminu Jibril, Eshetu Geda, Mohammed Abdela Chirfa, and Nawal Mohammed thank you.

Then, I would like to extend a warm and heartfelt thank you to my best friend and younger brother, Amin Yeba Buta. His unwavering support and encouragement have been a constant source of strength for me throughout my Ph.D. journey. He shouldered the responsibility of our family, allowing me the freedom to focus solely on my studies. His financial support has also been invaluable and made it possible for me to complete this degree. Amin, your selflessness, and dedication to my success have been truly inspiring, and I am forever grateful for your love and support. Thank you, Amin, for being the best brother anyone could ask for. I also would like to take a moment to express my deepest gratitude to my parents, Obbo Yabaa and Aadde Kadiijaa, who have been my biggest source of support and encouragement throughout my life. Their unconditional love and guidance have been instrumental in my success, and I am deeply grateful for their sacrifices and hard work to provide me with the best opportunities. I will always be thankful for their unwavering belief in me and their constant support. In addition, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to all my siblings, who have been there for me through thick and thin. Their love and support have been a constant source of comfort, and I am proud to have them as my family. I am deeply grateful for their role in my life and for always being there for me.

Finally, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my life partner, friend, and colleague, Dr. Rahel Assefa, for her unwavering support and love throughout my Ph.D. journey. Her understanding and encouragement have been a constant source of strength. Her contributions to my research as a colleague have been invaluable. I am truly grateful for your being my rock throughout this process.

ÖZET

ETİYOPYA'NIN TARTIŞMALI ULUSAL KİMLİKLERİ VE AFRİKA BOYNUZU'NA YÖNELİK GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI, 1941-2012

Eski ve sömürgeleşmemiş bir devlet tarihine rağmen, modern Etiyopya devleti, 1960'lardan bu yana tekrar eden şiddetli ulusal kimlik çekişmelerine sahne olmuştur. Eritre, Oromo, Somali, Tigray ve diğer dışlanmış kimlik gruplarını temsil ettiklerini iddia eden milliyetçi hareketler, dışlayıcı ulus-devlet projesine karşı dahil olma, özerklik veya bağımsızlık savaşları yürüttüler. Bu iç savaşlar, Somali irredantizmi ve milliyetçi hareketlere verilen diğer dış desteklerle daha da karmaşıklaştı. Mevcut literatür, sömürge öncesi söylemlerin ve mirasın çağdaş ulusal kimlik çekişmelerini nasıl oluşturduğunu ve Etiyopya'nın bölgesel güvenlik politikalarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini anlama konusunda eksik kalmıştır. Bu çalışma, Etiyopya'nın ulusal kimliğinin nasıl oluşturulduğunu, tartışıldığını ve yeniden oluşturulduğunu ve bu çekişmelerin Haile Selassie'nin hükümdarlığı, Darg ve EPRDF rejimleri dönemlerinde bölgesel güvenlik politikalarını nasıl etkilediğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, iki aşamalı nitel araştırma tasarımı kullanılarak analitik olarak ayrı ancak işlevsel olarak bağlantılı olan ulusal kimlik çekişmeleri olgusu ile bölgesel güvenlik politikaları arasında köprü kurmak için bir analiz çerçevesi geliştirilmiştir. İlk olarak, birincil ve ikincil kaynaklardan toplanan veriler analiz edilmiş ve çok uluslu bir toplumdan bir ulus devlet inşa etmenin baskın söylemlerini ve karşı söylemleri oluşturmak için yorumlanmıştır. İkincisi, Haile Selassie, Darg ve EPRDF rejimleri dönemlerinde ulus devlet projelerine karşı yerel direniş ile bölgesel güvenlik politikaları arasındaki bağlantıları anlamak için uzun vadeli beş ayrıikili vaka seçilmiş ve analiz edilmiştir.

Bu vakaların deneysel analizleri üç ana bulgu ortaya çıkarmıştır. Birincisi, ulusal kimlik çekişmeleri esas olarak dışlayıcı menşe mitinin ve tahakküm, sömürü ve marjinalleşme tarihinin kümülatif ürününe dayanan dışlayıcı ulus oluşturma politikalarının bir sonucudur. İkincisi, Etiyopya'nın sınırları paylaştığı devletlere yönelik güvenlik politikaları, öncelikle bu devletlerin milliyetçi hareketlerin dış desteğe erişmesine destek verme veya izin verme istekliliği ve kapasitesi ile şekillenmiştir. Üçüncüsü, Etiyopya'nın dış ilişkileri silah temin etmek için ittifaklara; ayrılıkçılığa ve irredantizme karşı toprak bütünlüğünün korunmasına diplomatik destek sağlamak için uluslararası örgütlere aktif katılım göstermeye yönelmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etiyopya, Dışlayıcı Ulus İnşası, Dışlanmış Kimlik Grupları, Bölgesel Güvenlik Politikası, Dış Destek

ABSTRACT

ETHIOPIA'S CONTESTED NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1941-2012

Despite the ancient and non-colonial history of statehood, the modern Ethiopian state has been in recurring episodes of violent national identity contestations since the 1960s. Nationalist movements claimed to represent Eritrea, Oromo, Somali, Tigray, and other noncore identity groups waged wars of inclusion, autonomy, or independence against the exclusionary nation-state project. These internecine wars were further compounded by Somali irredentism and other external support for nationalist movements. Existing literature has gaps in understanding how precolonial discourses and legacy constituted contemporary national identity contestations and how they shape Ethiopia's regional security policies. This study aims to understand how Ethiopia's national identity has been constituted, contested, and reconstituted and how these contestations affected its regional security policies throughout the reign of the Haile Selassie, Darg, and EPRDF regimes.

A framework of analysis is developed to bridge the analytically separate but functionally linked phenomena of national identity contestations and regional security policy using a two-stage qualitative research design. First, data collected from primary and secondary sources were analyzed and interpreted to establish the dominant discourses of constructing a nation-state out of a multiethnic society and counter-discourses. Second, five longitudinal dyadic cases were selected and analyzed to understand links between domestic resistance against nation-state projects and regional security policies across periods of the Haile Selassie, Darg, and EPRDF regimes.

Empirical analyses of these cases revealed three main findings. First, national identity contestations were principally the function of exclusionary nation-building policies grounded in the cumulative product of the exclusionary myth of origin and the history of domination, exploitation, and marginalization. Second, Ethiopia's security policies toward states with which it shared boundaries were primarily shaped by the willingness and capacity of these states to support or allow nationalist movements to access external support. Third, Ethiopia's external relations were geared towards alliances to acquire arms and active involvement in international organizations to secure diplomatic cover for its territorial integrity against secessionism and irredentism.

Keywords: Ethiopia, Exclusionary Nation-Building, Noncore Identity Groups, Regional Security Policy, External Support

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAPO	All Amhara Peoples Organization
AETU	All-Ethiopia Trade Union
AIAI	Al Ittihad Al Islamiya
ALF	Afar Liberation Front
AMISOM	African Union Mission for Somalia
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
AU	African Union
BPLM	Benishangul People Liberation Movement
CFA	Cooperative Framework Agreement
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)
CSA	Central Statistical Authority
CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
EDP	Ethiopian Democratic Party
EDU	Ethiopian Democratic Union
EEBC	Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Forces
EOTC	Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPPF	Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
ESM	Ethiopian Student Movement
ETA	Ethiopian Teachers' Association
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GDP	Gross domestic product
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GNP	Gross national product
GPLM	Gambella People's Liberation Movement
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MEISONE	All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
NCIG	Noncore Identity Group
NEBE	National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NIF	National Islamic Front (Sudan)

OAU	Organization of African Unity
OETA	Occupied Enemy Territory Administration
OFDM	Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONC	Oromo National Congress
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice (Eritrea)
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council
POMOA	Political Office for Mass Organization Affairs
SALF	Somali Abo Liberation Front
SEPDC	Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition
SLM	Sidama Liberation Movement
SNNPRS	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Regional State
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front
TSZ	Temporary Security Zone
UDJ	Unity for Democracy and Justice
UEDF	United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UEDP	United Ethiopian Democratic Party
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts (Somalia)
UN	United Nations
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
USC-SNA	United Somali Congress-Somali National Alliance
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

GLOSSARY

Abun	"bishop', the highest ecclesiastical title of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church until the appointment of a patriarch in 1959; Abuna when used with a proper noun."
Balabbat	lowest political officer of local origin
Balambaras	Lowest military title (literally 'mountaintop com mander')
Chelot	Court
Dejazmach	Third in command
Emir	Arabic for a prince; also used as a title by Muslims in Ethiopia
Enderase	Personal representative
Fitawrari	title of commander of advance soldiers
Gadaa	System of organizing society according to age sets
Gebbar	Tribute payer (tax in labor or kind, and later in cash)
Grazmach	Commander of left-wing; also a title
Gibir	Tax; formal military banquet
Gult	Land instead of administrative salary
Kawo	King of Wolayta
Kebra Nagast	Glory of Kings, title of a book
Kegnazmach	Commander of the right-wing; also a title
Ketema	Garrison town
Lij	Junior prince; uncrowned 'king of kings' in Lij Iyasu's case
Mer'ed azmach	Rear-guard commander; historically, a title for the ruler of Shewa
Naftagna	Gunmen
Negus	King
Neguse Negest	'King of kings'
Ras	Title below the king, literally 'head'
Rist	An inalienable right to ancestral lands
Rista-gult	Land allocated both for raising state revenue and for the personal maintenance of the person administering it
Shifta	Rebel
Tabot	According to Chewa beliefs, the actual ark of the covenant is in Aksum; also replicas of this

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CHAPTER I

1. INTRODUCTION


Over the last two centuries, states with fixed and recognized territories have emerged as the primary and legitimate governance units of the international system. After decolonization, most African states joined the international system, with colonially inherited boundaries as sacrosanct. However, these boundaries created an acute form of incongruence between the state and the nation, as most of these states were multicultural entities attempting to build a nation, while some cultural groups within and across these states were nations in search of a state. Both quests for a nation by the state and the search for a state by the nations resulted in national identity contestations. National identity contestation, in this study, is a concerted political struggle against an exclusionary and homogenizing nation-state project pursued by the ruling class. The region that has been the epicenter of violent national identity contestations and incomplete state formations in Africa is the Horn of Africa.

The boundaries of the Horn of Africa region were drawn by European powers that colonized the region after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. They colonized mainly the coastal regions of the Horn of Africa, which is the southern gateway to the Red Sea that connects the Far East, Middle East, Africa, and Europe. However, part of the region's hinterland remained independent because Ethiopia successfully resisted the European colonial onslaught. At the Battle of Adwa, the forces of Emperor Minelik II of Ethiopia decisively defeated the Italian colonial forces on 1 March 1896.[1] Following the victory, Ethiopia signed six treaties[2] with neighboring colonial powers, which defined its boundaries and recognized its membership in the emerging international system.

[1] Raymond Anthony Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa : African Victory in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2015).

[2] Negussay Ayele, "The Politics of the Somalia - Ethiopia Boundary Problem: 1960-1967" (University of California, Los Angeles, 1969).

Figure 1: Ethiopia and Its Neighboring States in the 1960s



Source: Mapsland[3]

[3] large-detailed-political-and-administrative-map-of-ethiopia-with-other-roads-railroads-and-cities-1969.jpg (2880×3550) (mapsland.com)

Following the independence of the surrounding postcolonial states in the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia's sovereignty began to be challenged both internally and externally. Internally, the nation-state project of the Haile Selassie regime to homogenize multicultural society was resisted by cultural groups that wanted to separate from Ethiopia and establish or join nation-states of their choice. Following the crushing of peaceful demands for independence of the members of the Eritrean Muslim League,[4] Harari Kulub Watani[5], and the Somali Youth League[6], violent national identity contestations were started by the Eritrean Liberation Front in 1961.[7] Over a dozen liberation movements emerged in the next two decades, including the Western Somali Liberation Front, Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front, and Tigray People's Liberation Front, and they raised arms against the Ethiopian state. These movements that aimed to build a state for their "imagined nation", Eritrea, Greater Somalia, Oromia, Tigray, and others, pursued violent national identity contestations against what they differently articulated as Ethiopian, Abyssinian or Amhara "colonization" or "national oppression".

Externally, the Republic of Somalia, created from the union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland at their independence in 1960, made it a national priority to unite all Somali-speaking people under one flag. Uniting Somalis was enshrined in the first constitution[8] of the Republic of Somalia and prioritized as the *raison d'eter of* the Somali nation, Greater Somalia. The Greater Somalia was an irredentist national project aimed at annexing Ogaden, a fifth of Ethiopian territory, the Northern Frontier District, a fifth of Kenyan territory, and Djibouti.[9] The Republic of Somalia contested the national belonging of Ethiopian Somalis labeling Ethiopia as a "black colonial power," which needed to respect

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[4] Fouad Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991" (State University of New York at Binghamton, 2006); Joseph L. Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61" (Ohio University, 2011).

[5] See Wehib M. Ahmed, *History of Harar and the Hararis* (Harar: Harari People Regional State Culture, Heritage and Tourism Bureau, 2015); Tim Carmichael, "Approaching Ethiopian History: Addis Abäba and Local Governance in Harär, c. 1900 to 1950" (Michigan State University, 2001).

[6] See Cedric Barnes, "The Somali Youth League, Ethiopian Somalis and the Greater Somalia Idea, c. 1946–48," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 1, no. 2 (July 2007): 277–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531050701452564; J Ali, "Somali Resistance against Ethiopian State Nationalism: A Discursive Inquiry" (2022), https://doi.org/10.34737/vy038.

[7] Tekeste Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1997), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429337086.

[8] GoS, "The Constitution of the Somali Republic," Pub. L. No. No.1 (1960), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/2176/Constitution1960.pdf.

[9] Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009).

the right of Somalis to secede from Ethiopia and join their kin in Somalia.[10]

In general, nationalist movements claiming to represent "colonized" or "oppressed" national groups waged resistance wars against Ethiopia's policy of building a nation-state from a multicultural society. The ensuing wars produced changes in regimes, redefinition of national identities, and redrawing of territories, both internally and externally. The Haile Selassie regime (1941-1974), the Darg regime (1974-1991), and the EPRDF regime (1991-2018) tried to impose their versions of national identity until they were removed by force. Eritrea gained independence in 1993, making Ethiopia the most populous landlocked country in the world, while the TPLF-led EPRDF redrawn the internal borders based mainly on linguistic criteria.

Simultaneously, Somali irredentism led to interstate wars between Somalia and Ethiopia, concluding with a definitive victory for Ethiopia in 1978. Subsequent proxy wars between the two expedited the Republic of Somalia's collapse and Somaliland's de facto independence. Furthermore, support for the secessionist groups of each other and proxy wars between Sudan and Ethiopia have ultimately contributed to the breakup of both and producing Eritrea and South Sudan.

After its independence, Eritrea invaded Ethiopia, resulting in the bloodiest interstate war in Africa, with over 100,000 combatant fatalities between 1998-2000. The subsequent enmity between the two made Eritrea the hub of Ethiopia's nationalist movements, including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). At the same time, Eritrea and Ethiopia turned Somalia into a theatre of their proxy wars until the collapse of the TPLF in 2018. The post-TPLF prime minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed, won the Nobel Prize in 2019 for making peace with Eritrea. A year after winning the Nobel Peace Prize, the incumbent's regime engaged in brutal wars of belonging against the TPLF, which retreated to its base region of Tigray. At the time of writing, this war, supported by the Eritrean armed forces and the Amhara militia, has produced hundreds of thousands of casualties.[11] There are also ongoing wars of belonging in the Oromia regional state between

[10] GoS, "The Portion of Somali Territory under Ethiopian Colonization" (Mogadishu: Government Printing Office, 1974).

[11] David Pilling and Andres Schipani, "War in Tigray May Have Killed 600,000 People, Peace Mediator Says," *Financial Times*, January 14, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/2f385e95-0899-403a-9e3b-ed8c24adf4e7; BBC World Service - Africa Today, "Obasanjo: War in Tigray Has Killed 600,000,"

the state security forces and the Oromo Liberation Army. These are cyclical violent wars of belonging that have been reproduced episodically and claimed the lives of millions and tremendous material destructions over the last six decades.[12] At the regional level, it has increased the number of states by three: Eritrea, South Sudan *de jure*, and Somaliland *de facto* (see maps in **Figure 1** and **Figure 2**.)

To understand these complex wars of national belonging and their interplay with Ethiopia's regional security policies, this study answers the following two questions: Why and how have domestic and regional actors contested the national identity of modern Ethiopia?; and, how had contestations of national identity constituted changes and continuities in Ethiopia's regional security policy throughout the Haile Selassie, Darg and EPRDF regimes?

January 16, 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0dwrw4c; Teklehaymanot G. Weldemichel, "Inventing Hell: How the Ethiopian and Eritrean Regimes Produced Famine in Tigray," *Human Geography* 15, no. 3 (November 18, 2022): 290–94, https://doi.org/10.1177/19427786211061431.

[12] Richard Reid, "Atrocity in Ethiopian History," *Journal of Genocide Research* 24, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 97–108, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2021.1992924; Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*; Mohammed Hassen, "Genocidal Conquest, Plunder of Resources and Dehumanization of the Oromo in Ethiopia," *Journal of Genocide Research* 24, no. 1 (2022): 109–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2021.1992925; Leenco Lata, *The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea*, 2006, https://www.fafo.no/media/com_netsukii/20014.pdf; Fantahun Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991* (Northwestern University Press, 2014), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv47wbhr.

Figure 2: Ethiopia, Its Federal Regions, and Neighboring States, 2011



Source: World Atlas[13]

[13] https://www.worldatlas.com/upload/33/cf/45/shutterstock-150587417.jpg

1.1 Literature Review and Research Gaps

There are two broad bodies of literature relevant to the research questions. The first body of work on internal contestations of national identity is vast, contentious, and still tremendously growing. The second body of works that deals with how violent national identity contestations affect the foreign policy of Ethiopia is scarce and tangential. The following few pages present reviews of both kinds of literature to establish the research gaps.

The vast literature on the internal contestations of the national identity of Ethiopia can be subdivided into three major categories depending on how they interpreted national identity contestations in Ethiopia. These are Grand Narrative, Colonial Thesis, and Alternative Approaches. The first category, the Grand Narrative[14] camp, is known by different names, including the "Great tradition", "Nation building perspective", "Pan-Ethiopian nationalism", "Grand tradition," "Ethiopianist tradition," "Ethio-nationalism," "Church and State tradition," "Greater Ethiopia approach," or "Pan-Ethiopian ideology". It is a broad perspective that includes a diverse range of literature.[15] The point of convergence of discourse of the literature in this category is that Ethiopia was a "nation" with a stable and unique national identity formed by mutual cultural assimilation over thousands of years. The ancient Christian tradition, Aksum civilization, with one of the oldest writing systems and tradition of biblical knowledge production in native languages, and rich history of statehood with monumental material evidence were presented as some of the key symbols and identification markers of Ethiopian national identity.[16] Moreover, Ethiopia's coherent

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[14] Sara Marzagora, "Alterity, Coloniality and Modernity in Ethiopian Political Thought: The First Three Generations of 20th Century Amharic-Language Intellectuals," *PQDT - UK & Ireland* (University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies (United Kingdom), 2016), http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23681.

[15] Christopher Clapham, "Rewriting Ethiopian History," in *Annales d'Éthiopie*, vol. 18, 2002, 37–54; Sara Marzagora, "History in Twentieth-Century Ethiopia: The 'great Tradition' and the Counter-Histories of National Failure," *Journal of African History* 58, no. 3 (2017): 425–44, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021853717000342; Pietro Toggia, "African Identities History Writing as a State Ideological Project in Ethiopia," *African Identities* 6, no. 4 (November 2008): 319–43, https://doi.org/10.1080/14725840802417869; Semir Yusuf, "The Politics of Historying: A Postmodern Commentary on Bahru Zewde's History of Modern Ethiopia," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 3, no. 9 (2009): 380–85; Donald Crummey, "Ethiopian Historiography in the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century: A North American Perspective," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 34, no. 1 (January 24, 2001): 7–24; Donald Crummey et al., *Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and After*, *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, vol. 74 (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.2307/3557016.

[16] Marzagora, "History in Twentieth-Century Ethiopia: The 'great Tradition' and the Counter-Histories of National Failure"; Toggia, "African Identities History Writing as a State Ideological Project in Ethiopia"; Messay Kebede, *Survival and Modernization : Ethiopia's Enigmatic Present : A*

national identity was claimed to have been built by heroic sacrifices made by generations after generations for hundreds of years against foreign invaders. More importantly, the fact that Emperor Menilek II of Ethiopia could mobilize over a hundred thousand warriors from across the Ethiopian territories to register victory at the Battle of Adwa in 1896 was interpreted as sociological evidence that proved the existence of a coherent national identity and state capacity that ensured the survival of the Ethiopian "nation".[17]

The Grand Narrative approach to Ethiopian national identity has its epistemic home in Ethiopian Studies, established in the 1950s with the first higher education in Ethiopia, the University College of Addis Ababa (later Haile Selassie I University). In line with the Haile Selassie regime's national integration project, the writers in the Grand Narrative category worked towards creating binary social groups for the modernization agenda.[18] Accordingly, there were two categories of cultural groups of people in Ethiopia. One was the core group with civilization, indigenous writing script, and historical records of hundreds of years, which was supposed to "shoulder the civilizing mission". This group was claimed to be the embodiment of the Ethiopian "nation". The second group was the rest of the cultural groups of Ethiopia that did not have a script and historical records, which lacked "history". The second group had to assimilate into the culture, history, and civilization of the core, Amhara (Tigray to some extent) because the latter was superior in culture, writing script, and history.[19]

Philosophical Discourse (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1999); Sven Rubenson, *Survival of Ethiopian Independence B.Pdf* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1973); Donald Crummey, "Society, State and Nationality in the Recent Historiography of Ethiopia," *Source: The Journal of African History*, vol. 31, 1990.

[17] Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia, *The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory against European Colonialism* (Algora Publishing, 2005); Kebede, *Survival and Modernization : Ethiopia's Enigmatic Present : A Philosophical Discourse*; Tsehai Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941* (New York, NY: James Currey, 2018); Teshale Tibebu, "Modernity, Eurocentrism, and Radical Politics in Ethiopia, 1961–1991," *African Identities* 6, no. 4 (November 2008): 345–71, https://doi.org/10.1080/14725840802417885.

[18] Marzagora, "Alterity, Coloniality and Modernity in Ethiopian Political Thought: The First Three Generations of 20th Century Amharic-Language Intellectuals"; Elizabeth W Giorgis, *Modernist Art in Ethiopia*, 2019; Elleni Centime Zeleke, *Ethiopia in Theory: Revolution and Knowledge Production, 1964–2016*, *Review of African Political Economy* (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2019); Asafa Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics : Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020); Toggia, "African Identities History Writing as a State Ideological Project in Ethiopia"; Clapham, "Rewriting Ethiopian History"; Teshale Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896-1974* (Lawrence, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, 1995).

[19] Richard Pankhurst, "Tedla Hailé, and the Problem of Multi-Ethnicity in Ethiopia," *Northeast African Studies*, vol. 5, 1998; Bahru Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991* (London, Athens: James Curray, Ohio University Press, 2001).

Accordingly, to be Ethiopian and to integrate into the "civilized nation" of Ethiopia, other cultural groups were required to pass through the process of Amharization. In other words, the Grand Narrative overall discourse revolved around using the modern Ethiopian state to realize the unity of the Ethiopian "nation" by expanding the core values of Greater Ethiopia to "backward" peripheral ethnic groups and tribes that have not integrated. Temporally, there are two kinds of Grand Narrative literature: pre-1991 and post-1991. The pre-1991 works, particularly those published before 1974, were mainly geared towards augmenting and legitimizing the nation-state project of the Haile Selassie regime.[20] After 1991, the role of the Grand Narrative works was mainly to criticize "ethnic" federalism as antithetical to the unity of the Ethiopian "nation".[21] In other words, the TPLF/EPRDF undermined the project of national integration and activated "tribal" politics that was responsible for targeting the Amhara and other ethnic conflicts.

The persistent violent conflicts between the Ethiopian state and liberation movements were not wars of national belonging for literature in the Grand Narrative category. Instead, they were wars between ruling elites that were alienated from Ethiopian values and instead imported "alien" European modernity. The "disgruntled" elites, who imported other foreign designs, are responsible for the country's present predicament.[22] It was contended that the centralization and monopolization of power in the hands of Haile Selassie using the modern state apparatus produced two new social forces, students, and the military, which were meant to facilitate national integration and modernization. However, these social forces were dejected by the gap between the ancient, proud, noncolonial, and "unique" image of

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[20] Pankhurst, "Tedla Hailé, and the Problem of Multi-Ethnicity in Ethiopia."

[21] Assefa Mehretu, "Ethnic Federalism and Its Potential to Dismember the Ethiopian State," *Progress in Development Studies* 12, no. 2–3 (April 2012): 113–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/146499341101200303; Yohannes Gedamu, *The Politics of Contemporary Ethiopia : Ethnic Federalism and Authoritarian Survival* (London: Routledge, 2021); Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha, "The Original Sin of Ethiopian Federalism," *Ethnopolitics* 16, no. 3 (May 27, 2017): 232–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2016.1254410; Messay Kebede, "From Marxism-Leninism to Ethnicity: The Sideslips of Ethiopian Elitism," *Northeast African Studies* 10, no. 2 (October 23, 2008): 163–86, https://doi.org/10.1353/nas.0.0000; Getachew Assefa, "The Constitutional Right to Self-Determination as a Response to the 'Question of Nationalities' in Ethiopia," *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 25, no. 1 (March 2018): 1–50, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-02501002; Assefa Mehretu, "Delegitimization of the Collective Identity of Ethiopianism," *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 11, no. 1 & 2 (October 31, 2017): 45–70, https://doi.org/10.2307/26586249; Tezera Tazebew, "Amhara Nationalism: The Empire Strikes Back," *African Affairs* 120, no. 479 (April 22, 2021): 297–313, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adaa029.

[22] Messay Kebede, *Ideology and Elite Conflicts: Autopsy of the Ethiopian Revolution* (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2011).

Ethiopia, on the one hand, the reality of utter lack of development and democratization even compared to newly independent African post-colonial states, on the other hand. The alienated but ambitious elites turned on the system that produced them. The military abolished the seven hundred years old monarchy in 1974. In attempts to supplant the monarchy, the Darg further pushed the Ethiopian state into destructive civil wars. The former students turned "ethnic entrepreneurs" overthrew the military regime in 1991 and effected the dismemberment of Ethiopia by allowing Eritrea to secede and dividing the country into exclusive "ethnic homelands" that unleashed violent "tribal" conflicts. Many in the Grand Narrative emphatically argue that the generation of the 1960s that was infatuated with "alien" Marxism-Leninism and rejected their cultural traditions were responsible for the perpetual crises and conflicts.[23]

Regarding the external dimension of national identity contestations, works within the Grand Narrative category are mostly silent. When the external dimension was addressed, the tendency was to target the "historic enemies". For instance, the emergence of nationalist movements in Eritrea, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray was partly interpreted[24] as outcomes of colonial machinations by Italy and later Britain. During the five years, 1936 to 1941, partial occupation, fascist Italy restructured Ethiopia into six language-based regions that germinated the seed of "Greater Somalia", "Greater Tigray," and "Greater Oromia," which culminated in secessionist movements afterward.[25] The Bevin plan and subsequent American-British demarche of 1959 that agreed to the unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland at independence were external designs pursued to punish Ethiopia for its victory over the European colonial onslaught. At other times, the liberation movements were interpreted as the "fifth columnist" of the Arab/Muslim world that "always" wanted to "Islamize/Arabize" the "Christian" Ethiopia.[26] The immediate region of the Horn of Africa

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[23] Messay Kebede, "Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia, 1960-1974," *Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora*, 2008, 235; Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes, *Native Colonialism : Education and the Economy of Violence against Traditions in Ethiopia*, 2017; Tekeste Negash, *Education in {E}thiopia: From Crisis to the Brink of Collapse*, *Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Discussion Paper*, vol. 33, 2006.

[24] Birhanu Bitew Geremew, "The Tragedy of Colonialism in a Non-Colonised Society: Italy's Historical Narratives and the Amhara Genocide in Ethiopia," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, January 4, 2023, 002190962211470, https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096221147002; Belete Belachew Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991" (Addis Ababa University, 2012).

[25] Kebede, *Survival and Modernization : Ethiopia's Enigmatic Present : A Philosophical Discourse*.

[26] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991"; Tewodros Hailemariam Gedlu, "A History of Nationalism in Ethiopia: 1941 To 2012" (Addis Ababa University, 2013).

was not the focus of the works of the Grand Narrative.[27]

The literature in the Grand Narrative suffers from several weaknesses. The first and probably the worst weakness is its exaggerated, ideological, and ahistorical view of the Ethiopian state. By order of Emperor Haile Selassie[28], historiography and all public documents, including the constitution of 1955,[29] repeat the myth of "three thousand years". By the 1960s, the myth even moved to the African summit. For instance, the then Ethiopian Prime Minister Aklilu Habtewold argued at the first Organization of African Unity summit, in response to the irredentist claim of the President of Somalia:

> Ethiopia has always existed in history for centuries as an independent state and as a nation, for more than 3000 years. That is a fact. Second fact, the historical frontiers of Ethiopia stretched from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, including all the territory between them. The third fact, there is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali nation.[30]

This official historiography was produced, distributed, and redistributed through arrays of state and state-affiliated outlets. Even after the monarchy was overthrown, the "three thousand" years "nation" discourse continued to this date. Moreover, this dominant and ahistorical claim of the Grand Narrative is divisive and exclusively reserves the Ethiopian state for the core people that share the Solomonic myth behind the "three-thousand" years claim. The Grand Narrative silences the Ethiopian state's historical growth, decline, and re-emergence. Instead, it chose to sanitize its internal violent domination and equally violent interactions with autonomous polities in the Horn of Africa for centuries. Furthermore, modern territorial Ethiopia is substantially different from old Ethiopia spatially, and by the diversity of cultural groups, it houses.[31]

The hegemony of the Grand Narrative, backed by the full force of the state, was successfully challenged for the first time from an unexpected corner by an article by an undergraduate student at Haile Selassie I University (now Addis Ababa University). This

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[27] FDRE, *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy* (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information, 2002), https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/national-security-policy-and-strategy.pdf.
[28] Marzagora, "History in Twentieth-Century Ethiopia: The 'great Tradition' and the Counter-Histories of National Failure."
[29] See article of the Constitution
[30] quoted in Ayele, "The Politics of the Somalia - Ethiopia Boundary Problem: 1960-1967," 562–63.
[31] John Sorenson, *Imagining Ethiopia : Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa* (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1993); Bonnie K Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa, *The Invention of Ethiopia* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Pr., 1990).

article, entitled "On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia"[32], was published by Wallelign Mekonnen in 1969. This brief five pages article was the most influential piece that unveiled the voices of the silenced cultural groups and shocked the ruling class and the mainstream and hegemonic epistemic networks sustained by the state.[33] This article, written after Wallelign's imprisonment with Eritrean and Oromo nationalists[34], unequivocally declared that Ethiopia was not a nation. Instead, it was a "prison of nations and nationalities".[35]

The second category of literature about internal national identity contestations is the Colonial Thesis, which became prominent after Wallelign's article. The Colonial Thesis category[36], which is also known by alternative names like "Multinationalism Approach", "Multicultural Federalism", "Ethnonationalism", is even more diverse than the Grand Narrative camp, including Eritrean Studies, Oromo Studies, Somali Studies, and others. Works in this category share the assumption that Ethiopia is a "colonial empire" or, more popularly, a "prison house of nationalities". The Ethiopian empire was not in a position to "colonize" the polities in the east, south, and west of Abyssinia. Instead, European colonial powers enabled it after the second half of the 19th century for religious affinity and rivalries between European colonial powers over the control of the region. According to Asafa Jalata, one of the leading proponents of this thesis, European powers were arming and enabling Abyssinian kings to engage in a "civilizing mission" into an independent country of the Oromo, as well as other independent non-Abyssinian polities and peoples.[37]

Works within the Colonial Thesis category link the "colonial" expansion of the Ethiopian empire as part of the European scramble for Africa. After the Berlin Conference for Scramble for Africa of 1884-1885, Britain encouraged Italy to colonize parts of the Horn of Africa as a buffer to thwart the French plan of building an empire from Djibouti in east Africa to Dakar in west Africa. France, on its part, armed Menilek II to expand the Ethiopia

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[32] Walleligne Mekonnen, "On National the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia," *Stuggle* 5, no. 2 (1969), https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ethiopia/nationalities.pdf.
[33] Bahru Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974* (London: James Curray, 2014), 198–99.
[34] Zewde, 199.
[35] Gebrehiwot Berhe Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building* (London: Hurst & Co., 2020).
[36] Sorenson, *Imagining Ethiopia : Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa*; Asafa Jalata, "The Question of Oromia: Euro-Ethiopian Colonialism, Global Hegemonism and Nationalism, 1870s-1980s" (State University of New York at Binghamton, 1990); Holcomb and Ibssa, *The Invention of Ethiopia*.
[37] Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics : Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia*.

empire and thwart the British plan of building its empire from Cairo in north Africa to Cape Town in south Africa. Menilek used massive arms imports enabled by rivalries among European colonial powers to "colonize" adjacent peoples and increased the size of the Ethiopian empire three times its area and population. The Ethiopian empire followed European colonial policies, with the help of European expatriates and missionaries,[38] to establish violent settler colonies, Christianization, and the imposition of Abyssinian court culture and Amharic over native people outside Abyssinia.[39]

According to works[40] in the Colonial Thesis category, the cyclical violent wars of national belonging within Ethiopia and throughout the larger Horn of Africa were mainly the result of unfinished decolonization from "black on black colonialism" by the Ethiopian empire. Accordingly, until the "colonized" peoples, including the Somali, Oromo and other non-Amhara "nations" liberate, the armed struggle for independence would persist.[41] The Ethiopian "colonialism" and the violent relations can only be resolved after the relationship of colonialism is changed through the self-determination of nations, nationalities, and peoples. These works consider the emergence of "liberation movements" as the logical outcome of a nation "regaining" their states interrupted by Menilek's colonial interventions. Furthermore, the external supports to the nationalist movements were legitimate solidarity in line with the UN Charter for the people under Ethiopian "colonialism".[42]

The works in the Colonial Thesis category also suffer from the same problem as the Grand Narrative category. First, there is the problem of reverse reification of nations in

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[38] Holcomb and Ibssa, *The Invention of Ethiopia*; Asafa Jalata, *Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian Discourse : The Search for Freedom and Democracy* (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1998).

[39] Hassen, "Genocidal Conquest, Plunder of Resources and Dehumanization of the Oromo in Ethiopia"; Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics : Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia*; Abbas H. Gnamo, *Conquest and Resistance in the Ethiopian Empire, 1880-1974 : The Case of the Arsi Oromo* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014); Holcomb and Ibssa, *The Invention of Ethiopia*; John Sorenson, *Imagining Ethiopia, John Sorensen.Pdf* (New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 1993).

[40] Asebe Regassa, "Self- - Determination, Multinational Federalism and an Emerging Threat in Ethiopia : A Decolonial Approach" 21, no. 2 (2022): 57–82; Jalata, *Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian Discourse : The Search for Freedom and Democracy*; Holcomb and Ibssa, *The Invention of Ethiopia*; Etana H Dinka, "The Quest for Self-Determination and the State in Ethiopia : Perspective The Quest for Self- - Determination and the State in Ethiopia : The Oromo Popular Uprising of 2014 – - 2017 in Historical Perspective" 21, no. 2 (2022): 117–49; Sorenson, *Imagining Ethiopia : Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa*.

[41] Dinka, "The Quest for Self-Determination and the State in Ethiopia : Perspective The Quest for Self- - Determination and the State in Ethiopia : The Oromo Popular Uprising of 2014 – - 2017 in Historical Perspective"; Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics : Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia*.

[42] GoS, "The Portion of Somali Territory under Ethiopian Colonization."

search of a state. Instead of basing their argument on historic and dynamic development, Somali, Oromo, Eritrea, and other contemporary social construction were imagined into the past as independent "nations" whose "organic" development was interrupted by Ethiopian "colonialism".[43] Of course, there were Oromo, Somali, and other groups existing as cultural groups and with various levels of political organization, but not in the national form now claimed. Like the Grand Narrative, these works also create a myth of origins to draw identity borders and spatial claims that aimed at creating a "nation-state" in place of the Ethiopian "colonial" empire.

The third category of literature, Alternative Approaches, explained wars of national belonging using structural and institutional factors and the role of elites. For instance, one of the veteran experts of the region, Christopher Clapham, argued that conflictual relations between different groups in the Horn of Africa are principally a function of geography.[44] Different topographies created different social structures with different histories and pedigrees. Ethiopia's fertile and densely populated highlands created a hierarchical society that invented its civilization and state. On the other hand, the lowland and sparsely populated lands created egalitarian pastoral communities like the Somalis. These societies were at loggerheads for centuries over control of resources and precedence.[45] Like Clapham, John Markakis also synthesized and abstracted from his earlier works and produced a seminal work, *Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers*, wherein he divided the Ethiopian socio-economic structures into three: the core (Abyssinia), highland periphery (non-Abyssinian highland) and lowland periphery (predominantly pastoral and borderland communities). In this work, Markakis persuasively argued the two frontiers that the Ethiopian state could not effectively include and integrate, irrespective of the struggles of the peoples from these two frontiers for over half a century, the highland periphery, and the low land periphery. This three-level center-periphery approach is a widely praised model for undermining the dichotomous ideological perspectives of Grand Narrative and Colonial Thesis.

Other scholars also argued that state institutions' exclusivist and authoritarian nature and, later on, party institutions were responsible for the violent relationship between the state

[43] Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics : Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia*.
[44] Christopher Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 7.
[45] Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay*.

and society. Semir Yusuf[46] argued that exclusivist and authoritarian political institutions are responsible for the prevalent contending "ethnic" nationalisms and resulting identity-based conflicts. John Abbink[47] also stressed the institutional factors arguing that the current federal-state design is one of the main culprits for the ongoing conflicts in addition to the authoritarian character of the state, which was the legacy of the past regimes. Several scholars[48] within the Alternative Approaches point out that linking the cultural with the territorial is the main problem behind contemporary identity-based conflicts.

Other scholars focusing on the elites' role in the current predicament combine ideological and structural factors in their elite-focused analysis. The leading scholar in this category was Merera Gudina. Merera contended that the Ethiopian elites failed to use the windows of opportunity even if presented with multiple critical junctures in Ethiopia's political history. The failure of political elites to capitalize on the windows of opportunities to pursue inclusive and democratic politics has led to violent competing "ethnic" nationalisms. In general, the Alternative Approaches provided several structural and institutional factors that led to political domination, social exclusion, and economic exploitation of the peripheral groups by the core group, which are, in turn, presented as the causes of persistent violent opposition to the Ethiopian state.

The second type of literature is the body of works focusing on Ethiopia's regional policies and relations. Even though Ethiopia is the nucleus of the Horn of Africa physically and functionally, with unparalleled diplomatic history in Africa, except for Egypt, the literature on Ethiopia's regional relations is disappointingly scarce. Among considerable published works about conflicts in the Horn of Africa, no publicly available work is produced directly addressing how external support of nationalist organizations by

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[46] Semir Yusuf Teshale and Semir Yusuf, "Drivers of Ethnic Conflict in Contemporary Ethiopia," *Institute for Security Studies Monographs* 2019, no. 202 (2019): v–4; Semir Yusuf, "Managing Ethiopia's Ethnic Divisions through Constitutional Design Key Findings," *East Africa Report*, vol. 37, 2021, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ear37.pdf.

[47] Jon Abbink, "Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia: Some Problems and Prospects of Ethno-Regional Federalism," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 24, no. 3 (September 2006): 389, https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000600976729.

[48] Asnake Kefale, "Ethnic Decentralization and the Challenges of Inclusive Governance in Multiethnic Cities: The Case of Dire Dawa, Ethiopia," *Regional and Federal Studies* 24, no. 5 (October 20, 2014): 589–605, https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2014.971772; Getachew Assefa, "The Constitutional Right to Self-Determination as a Response to the 'Question of Nationalities' in Ethiopia," *International Journal on Minority and Group Rights* 25, no. 1 (March 28, 2018): 1–50, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1163/15718115-02501002.

neighboring state affect the regional security policy of Ethiopia.

However, there are a few works whose research objectives were different, but their data and insights are important for this study. One relevant work is Yihun's "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991". His focus on Ethiopia's policy towards Somalia and Sudan and his subsequent[49] works are also important to understand to Ethiopia's relations with Sudan and Somalia during the periods of the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes. Yonas's "A Rising Regional Power : Making Sense of Ethiopia's Influence in the Horn of Africa Region"[50] also presents an interesting account of Ethiopia's growing power in the Horn of Africa by employing two different theories: Neo-Classical Realism and Historical Institutionalism. He used material capabilities and ideational factors like elements of Ethiopian national identity that emanate from its outstanding historical achievements like the victory of Adwa. Yonas's work is relevant for this study in terms of comparing Ethiopia's historical "rarity" and material capabilities vis-à-vis countries of the Horn of Africa.

Furthermore, since the 1970s, there are works[51] that have addressed objectives and determinants of Ethiopia's foreign policy and relations. Even though the focus of these works is not specifically about Ethiopia's policies towards the Horn of Africa, they have two relevant insights for this study. The first insight is that Ethiopia's foreign policies were mainly determined by the quest to access foreign arms and diplomatic backing to ensure Ethiopia's territorial integrity and regime survival. Second, Ethiopia's active participation

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[49] Belete Belachew Yihun, "Ethiopia's Role in South Sudan's March to Independence, 1955-1991," *African Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 1–2 (2013): 35–54, http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/files/Yihun-2013.pdf; Belete Belachew Yihun, "Ethiopian Foreign Policy and the Ogaden War: The Shift from 'Containment' to 'Destabilization,' 1977–1991," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 677–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.947469; Belete Belachew Yihun, "Ethiopia's Troubled Relations with the Sudan, 1956-1983," 2016.

[50] Yonas K Mulat, "A Rising Regional Power : Making Sense of Ethiopia's Influence in the Horn of Africa Region" (Florida International University, 2020).

[51] Amare Tekle, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 27, no. 3 (1989): 479–502, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00020395; Edmond J. Keller, "The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 489, no. 1 (January 1, 1987): 76–87, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716287489001007; Negussay Ayele, "The 1952-1959 Ethio-Italian Boundary Negotiations: An Exercise in Diplomatic Futility," *Source: Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, vol. 9, 1971; Krishnamurthy Venkataram, "Foreign Policy of Theodore II of Ethiopia: An Interpretation," *Transafrican Journal of History* 3, no. 1/2 (1973): 129–45; Abota Arka, "Ethiopia ' S Foreign Policy Under Emperor Haile Selassie I : An Appraisal," 2002; Yihenew Wubu Endalew, "Ethiopia's Defensive Modernization: The Interaction between Domestic and International Settings (1896-1974)" (Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, 2021).

in international organizations, including its membership in the League of Nations, its participation in the establishment of the United Nations (UN) as a founding member, its leading role in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and its participation in the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) were to secure diplomatic support for its territorial integrity against European colonial powers and Somali irredentism.

In the last decade, some works have also been published that stressed Ethiopia's growing regional role though they lack depth and are tangentially relevant to this study. These works, generally, represent Ethiopia as a regional "net security provider",[52] with different phrases like "African style regional hegemon",[53] the "imperfect hegemon",[54] and "anchor state"[55]. These works are informed mainly by Ethiopia's close relationship with counterterrorism, peace-making, and peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa. The works of Mesfin and Abdeta[56] , and Taddese[57] also highlight Ethiopia's role as a regional security provider in the context of the Global War on Terrorism in the environment of the failed state and state sponsor of terrorism. These works also stress the material resources and diplomatic power, Ethiopia under the EPRDF, has been acquiring in return for its role in regional peace-making and peacekeeping.[58] And finally, two works, Berouk[59]and Le Gouriellec,[60] re-introduced the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) of Buzan and Waever[61] to explain the regional dimensions of security relations among states of the Horn of Africa.

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[52] Harry Verhoeven, "Africa's Next Hegemon," *Foreign Affairs*, April 12, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ethiopia/2015-04-12/africas-next-hegemon.

[53] Dustin Dehez, "Ethiopia – A Hegemon in the Horn of Africa Region," *BISA Annual Conference, Exeter* 0049, no. December (2008): 1–16.

[54] Sonia Le Gouriellec, "Regional Power and Contested Hierarchy: Ethiopia, an 'Imperfect Hegemon' in the Horn of Africa," *International Affairs* 94, no. 5 (September 1, 2018): 1059–75, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy117.

[55] Harry Verhoeven and Michael Woldemariam, "Who Lost Ethiopia? The Unmaking of an African Anchor State and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Contemporary Security Policy*, June 24, 2022, 1–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580.

[56] Seyoum Mesfin and Abdeta Dribssa Beyene, "The Practicalities of Living with Failed States," *Daedalus* 147, no. 1 (2018): 128–40, https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00479.

[57] Medhane Tadesse, "Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence," in *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia : Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, 2015.

[58] Michael Woldemariam, "Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia," in *African Foreign Policies in International Institutions*, ed. Jason Warner and Timothy M Shaw (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2018), 371–88, https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57574-6_23.

[59] Sharamo Roba et al., "Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa," *Institute for Security Studies Monographs* 2011, no. 178 (April 1, 2011): 436, https://doi.org/10.10520/EJC48723.

[60] Sonia Le Gouriellec and Sonia Le Gouriellec, "Establishment of a New Regional Order in the Horn of Africa," in *Diplomacy and Borderlands*, ed. Katharina P. Coleman, Markus Kornprobst, and Annette Seegers (New York: Routledge, 2019), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429296147.

[61] Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

These works are important for this study as its analysis is embedded in the regional level.

To conclude, the key gap in the first category of literature on the internal contestations of national identity in Ethiopia is that these works did not examine the interplays of the dominant discourse and counter-discourses starting from the myth of origin and their interactive developments over time. Understanding the myth of origin and the development of discourses around it helps us understand what identification markers that were core, and which were not compatible with the core values, the limit of identity and territorial borders, who belonged and who did not, who was the friend, and who was the enemy. These factors, in turn, are critical to know how the state "thinks" as a collective entity, how it justifies its existence, and its actions, in the words of Alexander Wendt.[62] In other words, how the dominant discourse conceives the national identity constitutes the state's laws, policies, and institutions. On the other hand, counter-discourses also constitute how the dominant discourse was perceived, and counter-responses to the state's institutions, laws, and policies were produced. In addition to critical shortages of relevant literature on Ethiopia's regional policy and relations, even the available ones lack a mechanism that connects how contestations of national identity constitute its regional security policy.

1.2 Objectives, Scope, and Argument of the Study

This study aims to understand and explain how Ethiopia's contested national identity constitutes its regional security policy with two specific objectives. The first objective is to understand and explain how contemporary Ethiopia's national identity has been constituted, contested, and reconstituted throughout the Haile Selassie, Darg, and EPRDF regimes in the context of the politics of the Horn of Africa. The second objective is to examine and explain the relationship between the contestation and redefinition of Ethiopia's national identity and the evolution of its regional security policy throughout the three regimes.

To achieve these objectives, the study presents a two-pronged argument. First, by combining insights from the literature on contestations of the national identity of Ethiopia and examining the evolution of the Ethiopian state over time, this study claims that violent

[62] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, *Review of International Studies*, vol. 67, Cambridge Studies in International Relations ; 67 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 274, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500001236.

national identity contestations are the result of assimilationist nation-building policies grounded in exclusionary myth of origin and cumulative legacies of domination, exploitation, and marginalization. In other words, the Haile Selassie regime's hegemonic and exclusionary state based on the national imagination of Kebra Nagast combined with the European nation-state model that required congruence of the nation and the state[63] resulted in exclusionary nation-building projects that reproduced political domination, economic exploitation, cultural marginalization of the noncore identity groups (NCIGs). Assimilationist and exclusionary nation-building policies instigated politically significant cultural groups to resist the imposed national identity of Ethiopia and seek autonomy or independence.

Even though detailed discussions of relevant concepts are presented in Chapter 2, we define non-core identity group (NCIG) here. I came up with this uninviting concept of "noncore identity group (NCIG)", inspired by Mylonas's noncore group,[64] but with a specific meaning. This study uses NCIG to avoid unending debates and polemics around concepts like ethnic group, minority group, religious group, tribal group, and clan groups in Ethiopia. For instance, the concept 'ethnic group' is used mainly to imply descent-based linguistic groups that demand recognition of cultural rights within the discourse of Grand Narrative, in line with a distinction made by Neumann.[65] On the other hand, "ethnic group" is a nation struggling for independence within the discourse of Colonial Thesis.

In addition, reifying and using one category as a given also undermines the prevalent diversity within and between different movements and the historical dynamics and developments. For example, in the 1960s, the Eritrean Liberation Front was primarily an insurgent organization that imagined Eritrea as an Arab and Muslim nation fighting against Ethiopia's tyranny. However, by the 1970s, it was supplanted by Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front as a nationalist movement that fought for Eritrea as an African nation comprising different ethnic and religious groups. The Islamic Front for the Liberation of

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[63] Mahmood Mamdani, *Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2020); John Markakis, *The Nation State : A Wrong Model for the Horn of Africa* ([Berlin] : Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 2021).

[64] Based on Mylonas Harris Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building, The Politics of Nation-Building* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139104005.idea of noncore group , p. 27

[65] Iver B. Neumann, "Security, Ethnicity, Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 24, no. 2 (April 1, 2018): 353, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12330.

Oromia and the Ogaden National Liberation Front were Muslim-dominated insurgent groups fighting against Ethiopia's assimilationist and exclusionist regimes dominated by Christian and Amharic-speaking elites. The Oromo Liberation Front, on the other hand, is a nationalist organization that claimed to fight for the independence of the multireligious republic of Oromia from the Ethiopian empire.

To overcome these challenges, in this dissertation, NCIG represents a political category on whose behalf a national movement fights against the ruling class's imposition of specific national identity discourse. As long as a nationalist movement defines its goal as seeking a state against the imposition of specific national identity discourse, the collective group for which it seeks a state is called NCIG in this study. NCIG does not mean a demographic minority. For example, Oromo NCIG was the largest national group in Ethiopia, with about 34.5 % whose language and other identification markers were proscribed by the Haile Selassie regime and consistently excluded from the sovereign power of the Ethiopian state as a collective group. On the other hand, the core group, Amhara, constituted about 27% of the total population of Ethiopia.[66] Therefore, the core is not necessarily the demographic majority; the NCIG does not necessarily mean a demographic minority.

Furthermore, as shown in **Appendix 1**, there are over dozen liberation movements. Even though they represented NCIGs, only some were politically relevant. Based on the works of Wucherpfennig et al.,[67] this study limits the politically significant NCIGs to collective national groups with over 5% of the total population and to the liberation movement that mainly recruited combatants from and in the name of the national group. Accordingly, Oromo (1973, ongoing), Somali (1960, ongoing), Eritrea (1961-1991), and Tigray (1975-1991; 2020, ongoing) are the nations in search of or maintaining their states within or outside the Ethiopian state, which are relevant for regional security policy. Many more NCIGs, including Afar, Sidama, Benishangul, and Gambella, have had liberation movements for an extended period since they lack internal capacity (population and capital) and significant kinstate. Reform pan-Ethiopian organizations like EPRP, EDU, and Ginbot

[66] FDRE, *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size by Age and Sex* (Addis Ababa, 2007).

[67] Julian Wucherpfennig et al., "Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups across Space and Time: Introducing the GeoEPR Dataset," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 5 (November 2011): 423–37, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894210393217.

7 were also left out because their goals did not include a redefinition of national identity from the already dominant one.

Furthermore, many more NCIGs could not violently contest since peaceful contestations were almost impossible. These include NCIGs like Walayta and Kaffa, some of the most oppressed, enslaved, exploited, and denigrated cultural groups between the 1890s and 1974. There are also small cultural groups at the periphery of the periphery, like Me'enit, Surma, Dasanech, Komo, and Barta, whose only tool of resistance against tyranny and exploitation of the ruling class was withdrawal and avoiding the state as much as possible. Even though these demographically small groups reside in strategically important transnational spaces, they also fall outside the scope of this study, as they could not seek their state.

The resistance by the organization of politically significant NCIGs and demands for autonomy or independence is a contestation of national identity. National identity contestation integrates the contending powers of the ruling class and the resisting class (elites of the NCIGs). In line with Enze Han, inn this study, national identity contestation is defined as a concerted political mobilization, violent or nonviolent, waged by political elites on behalf of noncore identity groups (NCIGs) to challenge a particular discourse of national identity construction pursued by the ruling class.[68]

Since we have defined the scope to only four NCIGs (Eritrea, Oromo, Somali, and Tigray), let us now recap the first part of the argument. Contestations of national identity against the exclusionist and assimilationist policies of the Ethiopian ruling class were waged by Eritrean, Oromo, Somali, and Tigrayan NCIGs. Even after the Amharization policies of the Haile Selassie regime were redefined following the 1974 popular revolution, the Ethiopian state developed further hegemonic and monopolistic tendencies that favored the maintenance of the status quo and exclusion of NCIGs. Due to path dependence, these NCIGs' organizations struggled until the Darg regime was deposed in 1991, and Ethiopia's national identity was redefined. Furthermore, even after Eritrea's independence and the Ethiopian state's internal restructuring based on linguistic criteria, the Oromo and Somali NCIGs continued violent national identity contestations as inclusion by law and state

[68] Enze Han, *Contestation and Adaptation : The Politics of National Identity in China* (Oxford: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013), 4–5.

restructuring could not reflect the expected representation and collective national identification markers demanded.

To come to the main argument of this study, I contend that a mechanism that bridges internal national identity contestations and the regional security policy of Ethiopia is external support to NCIGs. External support is the key factor that significantly affects the successful mobilization of NCIGs, and, therefore, the primary focus of security policy states located in conflict-ridden regions like the Horn of Africa. This is based on two key assumptions of IR in post-Second World War international politics. First, the probability of direct and indefinite conquest by an offshore power has been minimal owing to norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity guaranteed by global powers through the UN system.[69] Instead, the major threats to the state, particularly the postcolonial states of the developing world, are secessionist groups, irredentist neighbors, intervention on behalf of NCIGs and transnational ethnic and ideological groups, and states that intervene against these transnational groups. Whether it is the threat from within or from outside, they are all related to a segment of NCIGs residing within poorly controlled territorial borders. Second, however weak the state might be relative to the contesting NCIGs, the state has legitimate access to domestic and foreign resources that are not readily available to the NCIGs. Therefore, by definition, an NCIG has to have other sources of resources to effectively challenge the state, particularly if the only means to achieve its goal of state capture, autonomy, or independence is through the use of force. Generally, three major and two minor external actors could support NCIGs: great powers, neighboring states, diaspora, and other transnational actors.

The most important actor among these sources of external actors is the neighboring states that serve the interface through which most external supports are channeled to the concerned NCIGs. Great powers mostly do not directly engage with NCIG in distant parts of the world like Africa. Instead, they depend on the neighboring states of the target state. Arms and ammunition, finance, and diplomatic support like providing passports for leaders of the NCIGs are provided through the neighboring states. On their part, the neighboring states may provide support by training leaders and troops of the NCIGs to the provision of a military base and direct engagement with the target state, depending on the willingness and capacity of the neighboring state. Diaspora and other transnational actors also deliver

[69] Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

support through the neighboring states.

More importantly, cross-border identity groups are at the heart of Ethiopia's national identity contestations, both in the form of secession and irredentism. First, the NCIG can be an ethnic group, and it could be a multiethnic province, region, or ideological movement (both secular and religious), which seeks secession. Elites of politically significant NCIGs establish organizations in a distant area from the capital city from a constituency with a shared history and a combination of different identifications that finally produces a capable insurgent organization and external support that can successfully mobilize the entire region against an exclusivist state as can be attested from the successful secession of Eritrea and South Sudan. Second, because of a politically significant kin group or strategic resources across the borders, the neighboring state may follow revisionist policies immediately after independence or during a crisis of the target state, as can be attested from the cases of Somalia and Eritrea. A Survey of both state irredentism and NCIGs is summarised in **Appendix 1**.

The Horn of Africa region is conventionally viewed minimally or maximally depending on the number of states included. Minimally, it included only the Ethiopian hinterland and Eritrean, Djiboutian, and Somalian coastal lowlands. However, these remove essential dynamics like Somali-Kenyan disputes over the boundary and Somalian irredentism regarding the North-Eastern Frontier District of Kenya, mainly inhabited by the Somali-speaking population. Moreover, Sudan is irreversibly connected to Ethiopia and Eritrea both by transboundary peoples and resources. Furthermore, Uganda is closely connected to South Sudan and Kenya, so it cannot be considered outside the Horn of Africa region. Consequently, the maximalists argue for the Greater Horn of Africa, which includes Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. The Maximalist position is becoming mainstream mainly due to its institutionalization into the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Some even include Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Yemen from across the Red Sea.

Since this dissertation is about Ethiopia, it adapts IGAD member states minus Uganda as constituting an Ethio-centric regional security complex. Accordingly, the neighboring states that share boundaries with Ethiopia, i.e., Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, are included in this regional security complex (see **Table 1** below). The exclusion of Uganda from this regional security complex is because it does not

share transboundary identity groups and resources that may affect the security interactions between the two countries.

Table 1: Basic Data of the Horn of Africa

State	Population (in millions 2021)	Area (in kilometers squared	Shared Boundary with Ethiopia (in kilometers)	Boundary Status (demarcation)	Political Significant Cross Border NCIG (>5% of the population) N.B. the first percentage is in Ethiopia, and the second is in the neighboring state	Strategic Cross-Border Resources
Djibouti	1.1	23,200	342	Demarcated	Somali %/60% Afar 35%	Water, railways, ports
Eritrea	3.6	117,600	1033	Delimited/Contested	Tigrigna 55% Tigre 30%	Ports
Ethiopia	120.2	1,104,300	5925	Both demarcated and un-demarcated/contested	Oromo 34.5% Somali 6.2% Tigray 6.1%	Water, railways, highways,
Kenya	53.0	580,367	867	Demarcated	Somali 3%	Water, port, highways
Somalia	17.1	637,657	1640	Undelimited and contested	Somali 99%	Water, oil, port
South Sudan	10.7	619,745	1299	undemarcated	Nuer 15.6% (insignificant in Ethiopia)	Forest/Water
Sudan	45.6	1,886,068	744	Undemarcated /Contested	Gumuz Berta (insignificant in both cases)	Water

Source: World Bank[70], CSA[71], compiled by the author

The major argument of this study is that Ethiopia's security policies and relations with the countries with which it shares borders are mainly constituted by the willingness (analyzed from compatibility of dominant discourses of national identity in line with regional patterns of amity and enmity) and capacity (analyzed from an understanding of the shared regional balance of power, including relative material resources and external support through alliances) of external support that nationalist movements accessed through the neighboring states. If the neighboring state is willing and capable of supporting the national

[70] World Bank Population, total - Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia | Data (worldbank.org)

[71] FDRE, *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size by Age and Sex*.

identity contestations against Ethiopia, the neighboring state is defined as an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures to prohibit it. If the neighboring state is willing but lacks the capacity to support the national identity contestation against Ethiopia, the neighboring state is partially securitized. If the neighboring state is capable of supporting the nationalist movements but not willing to allow the nationalist movements to use its resources, Ethiopia follows amicable policies. If the neighboring state is unwilling to help the nationalist movement but lacks the capacity to stop the nationalist movement using its resources, Ethiopia supports the target state.

This analytical framework was applied using longitudinal dyadic cases, which were selected and analyzed for each regime to understand the links between domestic resistance to nation-state projects and regional security policies. Ethiopia's regional security policies during the Haile Selassie period (1941-1974) were studied using three dyads, Ethio-Sudan, Ethio-Somalia, and Ethio-Kenya. During the Darg period (1974-1991), the Ethio-Djibouti dyad was added as the fourth case, while Eritrea was added as the fifth case during the EPRDF period (1991-2012). The changes and continuities of Ethiopia's policies towards its neighboring states were traced based on their willingness and capacity to support nationalist movements over time. As this study focuses mainly on Ethiopia and neighboring states' shared boundaries, transboundary peoples, and resources, the agency of neighboring colonial powers like France in Djibouti until 1977 was not the focus of this study.

1.3 Research Methods

Methodologically, this study employs a qualitative and interpretive research approach to explore how the construction of Ethiopia's national identity, its contestations, and evolution over time due to internal and external developments and how these changes in national identity constituted continuities and changes in regional security policy and vice versa. To understand the construction processes of national identity, discourses constituting and myth-creating documents like Kebra Nagast[72], archival sources, chronicles, constitutions, proclamations, diplomatic letters, and secondary sources were analyzed and

[72] Kebra Nagast Amharic/Ge'ez book of legends which means "Glory of the Kings"), is a foundational text of Ethiopia's Grand Narrative. It contains meta-stories that connects the national identity of Ethiopia to a legend of the birth of Menelik I, associated Ethiopia with the Judeo-Christian tradition, and provided a basis for Ethiopian national unity through the Solomonic dynasty, Semitic culture, and the Amharic language.

interpreted within their specific temporal contexts to understand the evolution of the core discourse in the processes of constructing a nation-state out of multiethnic society as well as counter-discourses by NCIGs.

Second, longitudinal dyadic cases were selected and analyzed for each regime to understand the links between domestic resistance against nation-state projects and regional security policies. Ethiopia's regional security policies during the Haile Selassie period (1941-1974) were studied using three dyads, Ethio-Sudan, Ethio-Somalia, and Ethio-Kenya. During the Darg period (1974-1991), the Ethio-Djibouti dyad was added as the fourth case, while Eritrea was added as the fifth case during the EPRDF period (1991-2012). The changes and continuities of Ethiopia's policies towards its neighboring states were traced based on their willingness and capacity to support nationalist movements over time.

1.4 Structure of the Study

This study is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter provides the introduction and research questions, a review of the literature and the gap to be studied, the research objectives, scope and argument, and the structure of the study. The second chapter provides a tailored framework of analysis that answers how to study relationships between contestations of national identity and security policy in the context of Hobbesian conflict formations in the Horn of Africa.

The third chapter provides key developments that constitute the repertoire of foundational myths of both the dominant and noncore identity groups that later elites draw on to pursue nation-building policies or national identity contestations. The chapter presents the development of the Ethiopian core identification markers grounded in the myth of Kebra Nagast that led to the development of a unique Ethiopian state in the Horn of Africa. It also presents how the myth was transformed into the Solomonic dynasty, its major achievements, and its critical crises due to its engagements with the Adal Sultanate and the Oromo regionally and Ottoman and Portuguese empires externally. Then, the chapter discusses the problematic establishment of a hybrid empire by excluding part of the core in highland Eritrea and including a majority of noncore identity groups. After establishing Haile Selassie's move to make the core group the permanent source of sovereign political authority, imposing the Abyssinian identity as national identity and excluding NCIG as subjects, the chapter ends with excluded groups partially welcoming the fascist Italian

occupation of 1935-1941.

The fourth chapter covers the period between 1941-1974. It presents post-war nation-building policy taking Eritrea as a case study and the reactions of Eritrean NCIGs to the imposition of Ethiopian national identity and their progressive resistance over time. This chapter also presents how external support to Eritrean NCIGs from and through Sudan shaped the foreign policy of the Haile Selassie regime towards Sudan. After discussing national identity contestations in southeastern Ethiopia through support from the Republic of Somalia and Somali irredentism, the chapter presents Ethiopia's securitization of the Greater Somalia project and its relations with the Republic of Somalia. It also discusses the absence of support for nationalist movements and the ensuing amicable relationships between Ethiopia and Kenya. It also establishes how the shared threats from Greater Somalia led to the alliance between Ethiopia and Kenya. Finally, this chapter explicates how the Haile Selassie regime used its alliance with the West and its membership in the OAU to defend against Somali irredentism and Eritrean secessionism.

The fifth chapter starts with the path-breaking Popular Revolution of 1974 and answers how Ethiopian national identity was redefined during the Darg regime, how domestic and regional threats were defined, and how these developments affected regional security policies between 1974-1991. The chapter argues that even if the class operation was ended, equality of languages and identities was legally provided, nationalist movements exploded demanding independence. It presents national identity contestations by organizations of southeast NCIGs and Somali irredentism and how successful counteroffensive and counterinsurgency security policies resulted in the collapse of the Republic of Somalia and the defeat of southeastern insurgent groups. Then, it presents organizations of Eritrea and Tigray NCIGs that were using Sudan to access external resources and the Darg regime's policies towards Sudan. It also shows how the absence of support from Kenya and Djibouti to nationalist groups made the relationship between Ethiopia and the two countries amicable. Finally, we investigate how the end of external support with the end of the Cold War led to the collapse of the Darg and the triumph of northern national movements, the redefinition of the national identity of Ethiopia, as well as the redefinition of regional boundaries in 1991.

The sixth chapter presents the redefinition of national identity under the EPRDF leadership by allowing the independence of Eritrea and restructuring Ethiopia based on

settlement patterns of linguistic identity groups and how these major groups redefined their identities. It also presents the contestations of the EPRDF nation-building projects by southeastern liberation movements, OLF and ONLF, and Somalia-based Islamist movements, mainly AIAI and its variants. The third section deals with counterinsurgency against ONLF and OLF and the securitization of the failed state of Somalia as a haven for terrorist groups. This chapter also presents the securitization of the Islamist NIF regime of Sudan and then turning Khartoum into a strategic partner. It also deals with the conception of the competitive national identity of Shaebia and TPLF, the Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000, and the emergence of Ethiopia as a regional power. It also presents the strengthening of the peaceful relations of Ethiopia with Djibouti and Kenya in the context of the post-Cold War and GWOT. In addition, this chapter also presents how the EPRDF capitalized on GWOT to capture resources and isolate adversaries and how it used international organizations to legitimize its regional security policy. Finally, there is a concluding chapter that threads these ideas together.

CHAPTER II

2. NATIONAL IDENTITY CONTESTATIONS AND REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY

This chapter aims to answer how to theoretically study the relationships between national identity contestations and regional security policy. A framework of analysis is developed in five interrelated stages for analytical purposes, even though the phenomena under study could be mutually constituting and simultaneously occurring. The first section briefly discusses key concepts. Then, the second one presents why and how the ruling class attempts to construct a cohesive national identity out of a diverse population through nation-building policies, particularly in postcolonial Africa. The third section elucidates why and how nation-building policies are contested by noncore identity groups (NCIGs). The fourth section explicates how the contestations by NCIGs are partly contingent upon external supporters: neighboring states, the diaspora, and external powers with strategic interests in the region. The fifth section advances the argument about how imagined or real interactions between NCIGs, and external actors constitute the security policy of the host state through two factors: willingness to support and capacity to support. Finally, the framework of analysis is concluded with four ideal scenarios that explain how combinations of the willingness to support and the capacity to support produce different regional security policy options.

2.1 Definition of Key Concepts

There are a few basic concepts that are pertinent to this framework of analysis. While concepts of national identity and security are the main ones, the concept of state is even more important, as both former concepts are closely related to and, in a way, a derivative of the latter. Therefore, starting with the concept of 'state' is more appropriate and fruitful. The concept of "state" is contested like any other concept in the social sciences. This study adopts the widely shared definition of Max Weber. Weber defined the state as a political organization of "a human community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of the

legitimate use of physical force within a given territory".[73] There are four building blocks of the state in this definition: a people, a territory, monopolized violence, and legitimate use of that violence.[74] These four state elements are the cornerstones of contemporary international relations.[75] The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States date, which is accepted as one of the customary international laws, endorses a permanent population, a defined territory, and a government as essential constituting elements of the state. The Convention, however, moved the concept of legitimacy from the domestic domain to the international arena by adding the phrase "a capacity to enter into relations with other states".[76] Aside from debates about measurements about the size of population and territory as well as the type of government that constitutes the state, these elements are accepted as given. It is the element of exclusive and legitimate authority over the means of violence that is the salient feature of the state that makes it unique from all other social organizations. This unique feature, legitimate authority over means of violence, has two dimensions: legitimacy as the right to rule and the capacity to enforce its laws and policies in the face of opposition.[77]

State capacity is the instrumental dimension of state-society relations. According to Migdal,[78] state capacity is the ability of the ruling class to "use the agencies of the state to get people in the society to do what they want them to do". Skocpol[79] defines state capacity as whether the state has the ability "to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances". State capacity is the presence of state agencies and employees throughout the state's territory to "achieve the kinds of change in society that their leaders sought

[73] Hans Gerth and C Wright Mills, *From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge, 2014), 78.
[74] Kevin C Dunn and Pierre Englebert, *Inside African Politics*, Second (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2019).
[75] Dunn and Englebert.
[76] Montevideo, "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States," December 26, 1933, https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml?msclkid=52f6e049afd511ec9a85509bde9f69b7.
[77] Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (1982): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010277.
[78] Joel S Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4.
[79] Peter B Evans, Dietrich. Rueschemeyer, and Theda. Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5.

through state planning, policies, and actions".[80]Tilly[81] defines it as "the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions".

The second dimension of the legitimate use of violence is the state's exclusive authority to make laws and policies binding on the members of a political community.[82] This dimension of the Weberian element of the state has been contentious both in academic circles and the policy arena. Legitimacy is contentious because it depends on the acceptance of and compliance by the people to the authority of the state. Acceptance and compliance presuppose the governed's consent to the state's binding laws and policies. Consent of the people depends on two factors: that the government itself is the embodiment of the collective political will of the population as to how and by whom they should be ruled and the provision of collective public goods like security and subsistence.[83] Since both levels of representation of the population's collective will and capacity to deliver public good are variable both spatially and temporally within and between states, legitimacy is "in the eyes of the beholder".[84] This variability of the perception of the government's legitimacy to rule brings us to another important concept that connects and binds the state as a politico-legal entity with the people as a socio-cultural entity, which is a nation.

The concept of "nation", along with its twin phenomenon nationalism, is so contested that an entire field of study called nation and nationalism has been established, divided into camps of primordialism, ethno-symbolism, and modernism, debating at least since the end of the First World War as theory and from Immanuel Kant as the history of ideas.[85] Debates about the phenomena of nation and nationalism are not merely academic debates; rather, their assumptions about the origin and contents of the concept of "nation" have real policy consequences. For instance, primordialists contend that nations are given, and membership in a nation is an inherent attribute of the human condition. Umut Ozkirimli posits that in a

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[80] Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, 5.
[81] Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 116, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511804922.
[82] Anna Stilz, *Territorial Sovereignty a Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
[83] Stilz, 90.
[84] Dunn and Englebert, *Inside African Politics*.
[85] Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Second Edi (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 12.

primordialist view, human beings can overcome their limits and realize their potential if they are part of a nation.[86] Membership in a nation overrides all other forms of loyalty and belonging to subnational or international social entities.[87] This assumption implies that the state and the nation should be congruent since the nation is the "depository of sovereignty" and "the only source of political power and legitimacy".[88] This assumption further alludes to the belief that the nation is an ahistorical and mystical entity whose survival is more important than the survival of its individuals and other collective groups. Therefore, the nation's security demands the ultimate sacrifice from political community members, as no one can survive without it. Based on these assumptions, millions have sacrificed to either preserve or create their homeland, fatherland, motherland_the nation.

The second group of scholars of nation and nationalism is modernists, who criticized the primordialist notion of the nature of the nation. Unlike primordialist who claim that nation is inherent and natural to the human condition, modernists claim that the phenomenon of a nation is the result of recent developments and processes in human history like capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, secularism, and the emergence of the modern bureaucratic state. From modernist definitions of "nation", the most popular one, from Google Scholar citation counts, is that of Benedict Anderson. Anderson defines a nation as "an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".[89] He further elaborates that the nation is imagined: "because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion".[90] It is limited in that no "nation imagines itself as coterminous with all humankind".[91] It is sovereign in that it recognizes the existence of other nations and therefore claims exclusive authority over the domestic domain and equality and noninterference from the external arena. Furthermore, Anderson argues that irrespective of the empirical reality of domination, inequality, and exploitation, the nation is always imagined as a community of equality and fraternity.[92] In

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[86] Umut. Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 2017).
[87] Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*.
[88] Özkirimli, 53.
[89] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 6.
[90] Anderson, 6.
[91] Anderson, 7.
[92] Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.

general, Anderson, like other key thinkers like Gellner[93], Hobsbawm[94], Brubaker[95], Breuilly[96], and Wimmer[97] in the modernist camp, decidedly placed the emergence of the nation with post-Enlightenment and Reformation ideals and industrial revolution and consequent spread of literacy and universal education, urbanization, print media, imperialist wars and revolution in military technologies. Furthermore, the policy implications of modernist assumptions are that nations are not only temporally recent but also socially constructed and, therefore, can be improved and perfected through nation-building policies.

The third group of scholars, called ethnosymbolists, takes the middle ground concerning the nature and origin of phenomena of the nation. Unlike primordialists, they posit that nations are socially constructed; unlike modernists, they trace the origin of the nation to premodern times. Anthony D. Smith, one of the key thinkers in the field and 'father of ethno-symbolism', defined a nation as "a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members".[98] After criticisms regarding the origin of the nation, Smith came up with another definition of the nation: "a named community that has a historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs".[99] Smith removed the phrases "a mass" and 'common economy', and replaced the phrase 'common legal rights and duties for all members with 'common laws and customs. He modified the definition to fit it with his position about the origin of a nation that he traces to ethnic roots[100] in contrast to the modernist understanding of the origin of the nation.

In this dissertation, a definition given by Guibernau is adopted: "a nation is a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a

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[93] Ernest. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing, 2010).
[94] E J (Eric J.) Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[95] Rogers. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed : National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External Homelands in the New Europe* (Budapest: Collegium Budapest/Inst. for Advanced Study, 1995).
[96] John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982).
[97] Andreas Wimmer, *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
[98] Anthony D Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14.
[99] Anthony D. Smith, "When Is a Nation?," *Geopolitics* 7, no. 2 (2002): 15, https://doi.org/10.1080/714000928.
[100] Montserrat Guibernau, "Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment," *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no. 1–2 (January 1, 2004): 132, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.2004.00159.x.

demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself".[101] A claim to self-rule or self-determination by a group of people involves a belief in establishing and maintaining a shared political agency whereby the right to rule, that is, claims to legitimate authority, is derived from the whole or at least the majority of people constituting the nation.[102] Furthermore, Maltachanova argues that if a group of people believes that they constitute a nation, it follows that their nation is the "primary political community: There is no larger or smaller political community to which they relate that can represent their agency".[103]

This notion of the nation as the primary political community and its role as the source of legitimacy for the state authority leads to a related concept of the "nation-state". A nation-state is a modern political entity claiming the monopoly of the "legitimate use of physical force within a well-defined territory" and "sharing a common culture, traditions, history, values and norms". Malesevic[104] defined a nation-state as a "secularised social organizations with fixed and stable territory and a centralized political authority underpinned by intensive ideological particularism and the promotion of moral egalitarianism, social solidarity and cultural homogeneity among its populace".

The concept of nation-state entails congruence between the state and the nation that successfully claims internal sovereignty over the domestic domain and external sovereignty from undue interventions from external spheres. According to Wimmer,[105] a modern nation-state can be delineated from earlier forms of states by two criteria. First, the nation-state has a written constitution that defines the nation as sovereign, equality of all members before the law, and institutionalization of popular representation. Second, the nation-state conducts its foreign relations independently. With the diffusion of the norm of self-determination, the expectation and aspiration have been that most aspire to be a nation-state with the congruence of the nation and state domestically and sovereignty from external interference.

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[101] Guibernau, 132.
[102] Ruth Wodak, *Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
[103] Anna Moltchanova, *National Self-Determination and Justice in Multinational States*, vol. 5, Studies in Global Justice (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009), 80–81, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2691-0.
[104] Sinisa Malesevic, *Nation-States and Nationalisms: Organization, Ideology and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 66.
[105] Andreas Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*, *Waves of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 256, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139198318.

However, in reality, there are a number of nations without a state and many states with multiple nations.[106]

Nations without a state are groups of people who are conscious of their nationhood without requisite statehood. The feature that distinguishes a nation without a state from a nation-state is a lack of its own internationally recognized state and inability to establish a collective agency for self-determination, at least internationally (where they are granted domestic self-determination except for foreign affairs, defense matters, international trade, and constitution-making) or at most both domestically and internationally. While there are over 163 stateless nations fighting for self-determination between 1945 and 2000,[107] mostly in the developing world, Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Basque Country, and Flanders are some of the well-known cases in the developed world. As can be inferred from this evidence, there are many more nations than states in the world that do not necessarily share the dominant cultural identification markers of their state, which leads us to another key concept, which is national identity.

National identity is defined as "a sense of belonging to a particular political community and sharing a common history, territory, culture, tradition, and values".[108] This definition fits well with the notion of the nation-state, where the boundaries of the state and the nation are congruent. This condition, congruence of the nation and the state, sets a foundation for a coherent national identity. A coherent national identity is a bond that binds the population together and fosters a sense of loyalty and nationalism. A united and loyal people with a fervent sense of belonging to a nation is "the most powerful political force," in the words of Stephen M. Walt.[109] Because a political community with a coherent sense of national identity can be mobilized for collective action to such a level that no other form of political organization has ever achieved.[110] For instance, to protect and defend the national

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[106] René Grotenhuis, "Nation and State," in *Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), 25–44, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1gr7d8r.5; Mylonas, *Polit. Nation-Building*; Andreas Wimmer, *Nation Building : Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400888894.

[107] Ahsan I Butt, *Secession and Security* (London: Cornell University Press, 2017), 25.

[108] Smith, *National Identity*, 13.

[109] Stephen M. Walt, "You Can't Defeat Nationalism, So Stop Trying," Foreign Policy, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/06/04/you-cant-defeat-nationalism-so-stop-trying/?msclkid=bbaa05a4b0cf11eca17f4dea36e601c9.

[110] John J Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion : Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018).

identity and values of their nation-state, millions have sacrificed and sacrificing, including their lives. However, only some states were able to achieve congruence between the state and nation, and, therefore, coherent national identity. In other words, some nations have yet to win independence, or conversely, some states have yet to construct a collective national identity.

States that have yet to construct an overarching and cohesive national identity have always attempted a nation-building policy to homogenize their populations.[111] On the reverse, nations without the state, ethnic groups, religious groups, and in general, what I call noncore identity groups (NCIGs) resist nation-building policies of their host state as it imposes on them the preferred identity of the dominant group as the national identity. I came up with a noncore identity group (NCIG) instead of an ethnic group, national movement, insurgent group, or clan group because, in the context of the Horn of Africa, using one category undermines the prevalent diversity between different kinds of movements and historical evolution of one group to another form of identity. For example, Eritrean Liberation Front was mainly an insurgent group that fought for Muslim Eritreans in the 1960s but was supplanted by Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front as a nationalist insurgent group that fought for Eritrea as a nation comprising different ethnic and religious groups. Somali National Movement was, on the other hand, a clan-based organization trying to separate from a homogenous nation of Somalia in every marker of identification other than colonial experiences and marginalization by the Southern clan networks. Sudan People's Liberation Movement had been multi-ethnic insurgent group fighting against assimilationist and exclusionist regimes of Sudan dominated by the Muslim and Arabic-speaking elites from the north, While the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia and Ogaden National Liberation Front were Muslim-dominated insurgent groups fighting against assimilationist and exclusionist regimes of Ethiopia dominated by Christian and Amharic speaking elites from the north.

On the other hand, Oromo Liberation Front is an insurgent group that fights for the independence of multireligious Oromia from the nationalizing Ethiopian empire. Whether the movement is ethnic, national, religious, ideological, multinational, or anti-colonial, what binds them together is their opposition to the imposition of exclusionist and assimilationist

[111] René Grotenhuis, *Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States*, *Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States*, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048532124.

nation-building policies by the ruling regimes and their centrality in foreign and security policies of the countries of the Horn of Africa. Therefore, to categorize all those political organizations opposed to the imposition of specific national identity by the ruling regimes, in this study, the label of NCIG as an analytical category.

This resistance by NCIGs and demands for autonomy or independence is a contestation of national identity. National identity contestation is a key concept for this study, as it integrates both the contending powers: the ruling class, and the resisting class (elites of the NCIGs). Here, national identity contestation is defined, in line with Enze Han,[112] as a concerted political mobilization, violent or nonviolent, waged by political elites on behalf of noncore identity groups to challenge a particular discourse of national identity construction pursued by the ruling class.

In contemporary competitive international politics, contesting national identity by NCIGs is a threat to the legitimate monopoly of the means of physical violence of the state. Furthermore, as contestations by NCIGs are often ignited or sustained by external supports (from rival states, kin groups across the borders, and the diaspora in other parts of the world)[113], the threats to the state also take an external dimension. As a result, the ruling class securitizes national identity contestation by the NCIGs as a threat to national security that commands extraordinary measures.[114] On the other hand, the NCIGs also securitize the ruling elite, its nation-building policies, and suppression of their demands as an existential threat to their identities and culture that commands extraordinary measures, including through insurgency and external support to achieve autonomy or independence.[115] The concept deals with the identification of threats to a valued referent, national identity in the case of state and noncore identity in the case of NCIGs, and measures to be taken to protect and defend its security.[116] Regional security policy is strategies of survival employed by the ruling elites of the state towards threats emanating from the proximate states and external actors.

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[112] Han, *Contestation and Adaptation : The Politics of National Identity in China*.
[113] Butt, *Secession and Security*.
[114] Butt; Han, *Contestation and Adaptation : The Politics of National Identity in China*.
[115] Butt, *Secession and Security*.
[116] Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*; Barry. Buzan, Ole Waver, and Jaap de. Wilde, *Security : A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

2.2 The Post-colonial States in Africa and Nation-Building Policies

Today, the entire populated world is divided into sovereign states that claim legitimate control over a defined territory and its residents. Out of 193 UN member states, 54 of them are African states. These African states are postcolonial states. They are postcolonial, not because there were no states in Africa before European colonialism. There were states like Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and the like that claim to trace their statehood hundreds, even thousands of years back into the earliest human civilizations and even claim to be the cradle of humankind. Instead, these states are colonial because they have inherited boundaries that were drawn through treaties signed by and among imperial powers.[117] Irrespective of patterns of pre-colonial state formations, all African states are colonially demarcated entities that result from European colonial legacies, not endogenous social developments. These inherited boundaries were drawn mostly arbitrarily without considering cultural differences and settlement patterns. Diverse nations were lumped together in the same state, and the same nation was divided into two or more states. This is the critical juncture in the history of African states with two profound implications for the nature of African states: irredentism and secessionism.

As Wimmer argued,[118] during the formation of modern states, in the case of Africa following independence, rebellion is most likely as the control of new states redefines in whose image the state is going to be designed and whose identification markers it bears from among cultural groups that happen to be within the recognized territorial boundaries. In Africa, diverse groups demanded autonomy or independence, like the cases of Biafra from Nigeria, Eritrea from Ethiopia, South Sudan from Sudan, Katanga from DRC, and Casamance from Senegal. The flipside of secession was irredentism in the early years of independence. For instance, Ethiopia tried and succeeded in federating and then uniting Eritrea. Somalia made it part of its national interest to unite the Somali-speaking people in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, as Morocco claimed and conquered the Saharawi Arab Republic, Egypt, and Sudan dispute over the Halayeb Triangle, Nigeria and Cameroun

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[117] Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*; Dunn and Englebert, *Inside African Politics*; Ieuan Ll. Griffiths, *The African Inheritance*, *The African Inheritance* (Routledge, 2005), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203975923; Mfaniseni Fana Sihlongonyane, "Africa and the New Globalization," *Development in Practice* 19, no. 2 (April 2009): 272–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520802689675.

[118] Wimmer, *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*.

disputed over the Bakassi Peninsula and in general about 29 distinct territorial disputes between African states.[119] Others also tried to revise the colonial boundaries through two mechanisms. The first mechanism to solve irredentism was through voluntary unions like the one between Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland in 1960, Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964, and the short-lived Union states of Africa between Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, and the confederation of Senegal and Gambia, Senegambia. Parallel to these minor efforts to overcome the problems of secessionism and irredentism, two mechanisms have been employed by the first-generation African leaders that this study assumes to establish path dependence for the subsequent developments concerning state-society relations and international relations of Africa. The twin mechanisms were localizing the norms of territorial integrity and noninterference through *Utti Posidettis* continentally and nation-building policies domestically.

The first-generation postcolonial African leaders,[120] after discussing different mechanisms through regional groupings like the Casablanca and Monrovia group led by Pan Africanists like Kwame Nkrumah, finally decided to establish a continental organization that they finally realized on 25 May 1963 by signing a Charter of establishing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at Addis Ababa. Probably, the most important outcome of that conference was the agreement on the acceptance of colonial boundaries as the law that governs the international relations of Africa. As a result, the newly independent African states localized the Westphalian norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonintervention in other states' internal affairs through the OAU Charter.[121] Furthermore, they even signed another treaty called the OAU Cairo Resolution in 1964.[122] At the regional level, the decisions of African leaders to respect colonial boundaries have successfully muted the often-expected type of interstate wars between and among neighboring countries for the most part and resulted in creating a noninterference regime.[123]

These bring us to the second mechanism that all African states used with different

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[119] Hein E. Goemans et al., "The Politics of Territorial Claims: A Geospatial Approach Applied to Africa," *International Organization* 71, no. 1 (2017): 31–64, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000254.
[120] Daniel. Don Nanjira, "African Foreign Policy and Diplomacy : From Antiquity to the 21st Century" (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010).
[121] OAU, "OAU Charter" (Addis Ababa: The African Union, June 25, 1963), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf.
[122] OAU, "Cairo Declaration" (African Union, 1964), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9514-1964_ahg_res_1-24_i_e.pdf.
[123] Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*.

policies and differing results: nation-building policies. Like any other leader of third-world countries in the 1960s and 1970s, first-generation African rulers adopted nation-building as the antidote to the contradictions of the postcolonial African state, irredentism, and secessionism.[124] The core argument of this discourse, as the modernist view of the nation holds, is that the newly independent African states had to follow policies that would transform traditional and backward African ethnic and tribal groups into individual citizens. This nation-building project, in general, makes three interrelated claims that would collectively make a nationalist discourse distinct from other kinds of discourse and social practices: identity, temporal, and spatial claims.[125]

First, through identity claim, the ruling class attempts to define the national identity of their state as either civic or ethnic, or sometimes both, in a dual system state, where urban areas are administered by common laws and rural areas are governed by customary laws.[126] In the case of civic-based national identity definition, the main criterion of inclusion is being resident and assuming consent to abide by the constitution, common laws, civic responsibilities, and related collective values promoted and propagated as the foundations of national identity. State institutions and policies are consciously directed toward cultivating an overarching national identity that cuts across identification markers peculiar to NCIGs. Besides, one or more languages of the nation are selected as official languages for integration and collective identity construction, and other languages and identification markers of all groups are provided with resources and legal recognition to develop their peculiar cultures, histories, and values. However, all identity groups are required to be primarily loyal to the nation and obedient to its general laws. A few African states like Botswana and Tanzania adopted the civic-based national identity and gradually built their overarching national identity in an inclusive manner at all three levels: collective national narrative, inclusive political networks, and widespread reach of the state apparatus. Attempts at redefining national identity through descent were mildly repressed.[127]

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[124] Jochen Hippler, *Nation-building : a key concept for peaceful conflict transformation?* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 4., p.4

[125] Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction*.

[126] Mahmood Mamdani, "African States, Citizenship and War: A Case-Study," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 78, no. 3 (April 20, 2002): 493–506, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00263.

[127] Ronald Aminzade, "Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania," *Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Postcolonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania*, 2011, 1–424, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107360259.

The ethnic descent-based nationalist discourse aims to construct a national identity based on the identification markers of the core identity group, including physical characteristics and cultural stereotypes. In this conception of national identity, the "authentic" members of the nation who inherited or adopted the values and identification attributes of the core group have a higher status within the nation.[128] To make NCIGs loyal to the nation, all state institutions, and policies, including education, culture, demography, economy, and politics, target NCIGs to adopt the core group culture and ways of life. Particularly, the elites of the NCIGs are either co-opted or coerced to assimilate. Besides, the cultures and values of NCIGs that are perceived to be noncomplimentary to the culture of the core group are persistently ignored and exiled to the private domain. Only the prescribed identifications markers and symbols of the core group, including language, manners of clothing, religious and cultural symbols, and arts, music, and the like, are encouraged and seen as the standard in the public arena.[129] Of all the markers of national identity, the choice of the lingua franca is most important as the bridge that connects diverse linguistic and dialect groups across the country and as an exclusion tool for other groups from power, status, and resources. Promoting a language as a national language as the bearer of national identity, high culture, and intellectual tradition while demoting and keeping all other languages as folkloric, unworthy, or incapable of development has critical implications for the overall outcome of the nation-building project and the nature of national identity to be constructed. Henceforth, particularly in countries where one of the local languages is promoted through the state lever as the national language, the implications are enormous whether in success or failure of the nation-building project. In general, the type of membership criteria into the nation, civic or descent, along with assimilation policies like language policy, may even extend to practices of physical removal of NCIGs through population mass relocation, villagization, internal displacement, segregation, and even mass killings and genocide.[130] Protests against exclusions by the noncore identity groups might be responded to with heavy-handed repression, including through indiscriminate killings and imprisonments.

The second element of national identity construction by the ruling elite is the selective

[128] Mylonas, *Polit. Nation-Building*.
[129] Grotenhuis, "Nation and State."
[130] Mylonas, *Polit. Nation-Building*.

utilization of memories to legitimize the nation-building project.[131] The nationalist discourse traces its continuity back from the past and justifies the need for its continuing existence into the future by selectively drawing from historical moments and events. The ruling elites selectively mobilize key historical events like past losses, defeats, and humiliations, or achieved major victories and glories; the mental trauma or pride of these events may become part of their identity and a binding force for them. For example, modern historical consciousness in China has been powerfully influenced by the 'century of humiliation' from the First Opium War (1839–1842) through the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945.[132] Many Chinese perceive this period as a time when their nation was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists. Future generations of Chinese are undoubtedly becoming connected to this national trauma through its retelling in the news, family stories, films, and history education classes. Such historical memories are used not only to mobilize collective action and reconstruct national cohesion but also to define who the "us" and who the "other" is.[133]

Consequently, nation-building policies are directed toward teaching and popularizing historical memories to sediment national cohesion and drive collective action through different mechanisms, including retelling history through museums, movies, and ceremonies, inculcating next generations through history education textbooks, as well as through "eventalization"[134] and naturalization of history and national identity through everyday lived experiences and practices. To create a higher degree of historical consciousness, nationalist discourse hugely invests in creating public spaces, monuments, sculptures, statues, museums, shrines, and public sites, as well as by transmitting through other mediums like films, literature, theatre, news, and mass events like sports, commemorations, celebrations, and holidays that create a sense of belonging.[135] Through historical memories imparted through these mediums, the nation tells its national story and imparts what the nation collectively says and recalls about its history. Through

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[131] Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction*.
[132] Zheng Wang, *Memory Politics, Identity and Conflict : Historical Memory as a Variable* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 17.
[133] Wang, *Memory Politics, Identity and Conflict : Historical Memory as a Variable*; Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction*.
[134] Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction*, 210.
[135] Richard Ned Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316710982; Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction*; Wang, *Memory Politics, Identity and Conflict : Historical Memory as a Variable*; Wodak, *Discursive Construction of National Identity*.

commemorating historical events and national heroes, the nationalist discourse creates a sense of unified national identity that serves current and future generations to mobilize for collective actions to preserve the achievements of the past generations and imprint their markings for future generations to learn from and inspired by to register even more significant achievements.[136]

The second and even more critical mechanism of imparting historical memories of a nation is history education. History education is crucial in developing national identity as it socializes the new generation into what the nation is, how it has come to be, what its non-negotiable values are, and at what costs they should be preserved. As a result, history education can indicate a shared collective memory and the official national story or narrative that the ruling class aims to pass down to generations.[137] History textbooks represent the selected aspects of history that the nationalist discourse promotes for national cohesion and their legitimization and the aspects of historical amnesia that it denies sharing with future generations. For instance, history textbooks selectively present historical events and times representing collective national identity while simultaneously silencing or denying historical events like violent conquests, slavery, expropriations, mass killings, and genocide that may undermine their project of creating a unified national identity.[138] In a way, history textbooks present a selected historical narrative that legitimizes and delegitimizes specific groups within the nation by suppressing or redefining events and historical interpretations that could potentially help develop or maintain alternative ethnic, political, religious, or regional identities.[139]

The third element of nationalist discourse is territory. The defined and recognized territory is the ultimate claim that defines and reifies other nationalist claims. It is *prima facie* evidence that the claimant political community exists as a unique and sovereign body politic among the community of nation-states. Recognized territory as a national home bestows on the ruling class of the state as the member of the international community to enter into relations with other nations that give them both validation and resources exclusive to the nation-states and not open for other international organizations, however powerful

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[136] Lebow, *National Identities and International Relations*.
[137] Wang, *Memory Politics, Identity and Conflict : Historical Memory as a Variable*.
[138] Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction*.
[139] Karina V. Korostelina, *History Education in the Formation of Social Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137374769.

they may be. To seal with the identification that makes it unique to the nation, states go a long distance to transform the physical territory and related social practices, including through wars, genocides, ethnic cleansing (Europe), forced settlements (China and Israel), border controls, and other countless peaceful and nonpeaceful strategies and tactics. Like in identity and temporal claims, and recursively along with them, spatial or territorial claims in nationalist discourse could be used inclusively or exclusively. It may also include a longing for, and imagination of lands demarcated to and recognized as part of a neighboring state or states.[140]

This is the main culprit in irredentist claims by nationalizing the state and conversely secessionist claims by an NCIG that imagines itself as a member of a political community across the borders.[141] Besides, a nation-building policy project could be simultaneous and recursive by two or more neighboring states with perennial claims to real or imagined land lost to the neighboring state or states.

To sum up, to overcome irredentist and secessionist tendencies in postcolonial states in particular and to build a cohesive national identity in general, states engage in nation-building policies that promote a particular identity, temporal and territorial claims. A particular coalition of ruling elite at a specific time presents all these claims as if they are "natural", "immutable" and "irreducible" essence of the nation. The definition of the nation's identity as sourced from Jus Soli or Jus Sanguine, the selected and endorsed myth of the nation's origin, and its history and management of borders and border-related social practices are sanctioned and propagated by the lever of the state institutions. While hiding alternative discourses of identity, history, and territory, the claims of the ruling elites are attempted to be translated to the definition of state and social relations, patterns of power configuration, relations of production, legitimacy of the nation-building policies and cross-border interactions of social groups and states. The ultimate aim of any nationalist discourse is to create a cohesive national identity by eliminating or minimizing diversity and establishing itself as the hegemonic discourse that prescribes and proscribes social behaviors and actions. Nevertheless, the particular nationalist discourse of the ruling elite and its effects may be accepted by a different section of society and more so in a relatively large, diverse, and poor

[140] Ozkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism a Critical Introduction*.
[141] Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed : National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External Homelands in the New Europe*.

postcolonial state. The responses of noncore identity groups (NCIGs) to the nationalist discourse and nation-building policies of the ruling class will be discussed briefly in the next section.

2.3 National Identity Contestation

Noncore identity groups respond differently to homogenizing national identity imposition by the ruling elite. The responses of the NCIGs, depending on the implications of the imposed identity for their ontological security and access to state resources, are either national identity adaptation or national identity contestation. Enze Han, who came up with these categories, defines national identity adaptation as "the process by which an ethnic group starts to accept the newly imposed national identity, and thus it involves substantial effort on the part of the group toward acculturation or even assimilation into the ethnic majority".[142] Elites of the NCIGs adapt the imposed national identity due to either expectation of relatively easier mobility to the identity category of the ruling elite along with an expectation of economic rewards from joining a resource-rich nation or infeasibility of rejecting the imposed national identity due to the size of the NCIGs and its dispersed settlements in that specific time and context. For this dissertation, the adaptation response of the NCIGs is not the concern, and instead, national identity contestation is the focus.

National identity contestation, on the other hand, is defined as " concerted political efforts, violent or nonviolent, waged by an ethnic group to question and dispute the meaning of a particular national identity imposed on group members".[143] The contestation by the NCIGs against the imposed national identity could be triggered by grievance, relative deprivation, exclusionary nation-building policies that reproduce political domination, economic exploitation and cultural marginalization and enabling factors like relative capacity of the NCIG vis-à-vis the state and presence of external supports.[144]

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[142] Han, *Contestation and Adaptation : The Politics of National Identity in China*, 5.
[143] Han, *Contestation and Adaptation : The Politics of National Identity in China*.
[144] Lars-Erik Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis," *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (2010): 87–119, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109990219; James D Fearon, "Why Ethnic Politics and 'Pork' Tend to Go Together," 1999, https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Pork.pdf; James D Fearon and David D Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (April 20, 2003): 75–90; Wimmer, *Nation Building : Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart*.

Exclusionary nation-building policies of the ruling class lead to the mobilization of NCIGs to contest the imposed national identity by intensifying grievance-producing factors and mobilization-enabling factors. Grievance-producing factors include political domination, social exclusion, and economic exploitation. First, the political domination of NCIGs may even start with their exclusion from the formative national story or myth that defines the in-group and the outgroup, the 'us' and 'them'. The formative story that the ruling elite promotes defines and legitimizes who, by what means, is authorized to make, interpret, and execute laws on behalf of the state. In other words, those who define the national story define who holds the state power and who does not. For example, in *Der Judenstaat*, the foundational document of Zionism, Theodor Herzl defined the identity of the would-be Israeli state as a Jewish state temporally extended back hundreds of years and with a spatial claim to Palestine. That national story anchored the laws, policies, and institutions of the state. If the national myth is defined to reflect the preferred identity of the ruling class exclusively, the exclusion of the NCIGs from both the collective national identity and state power is the logical conclusion. To repeat the example given above, once the Israeli state's national identity is defined as the Jewish identity excluding other NCIGs such as Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, and Christians, the Israeli national identity, by definition, reflects the Jewish identity based on descent and reserves the state powers for Jews.[145] The consequence of the exclusion of one's identity from collective national identity is ontological insecurity, while marginalization or lack of meaningful representation in state power is political domination.

Ontological insecurity refers to the inability of the NCIGs to maintain their identities in the face of homogenizing nation-building policies, i.e., NCIGs do not want to lose their ethnic, religious, or other identities.[146] to homogenizing attempts by the ruling class. In other words, the NCIGs oppose the promotion of the identity of another ethnic group as a national identity by the ruling elite, for it reduces their group's relative worth vis-à-vis the dominant group.[147] To overcome the problem of this ontological insecurity, NCIGs mobilize and organize, claiming different identities, temporality, and spatiality vis-a-vis the imposed national discourse. This is because, according to Horowitz, NCIGs follow their leaders

[145] Mamdani, *Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities*, 267.
[146] Filip Ejdus, "Critical Situations, Fundamental Questions and Ontological Insecurity in World Politics," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 21, no. 4 (2018): 883–908, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268-017-0083-3.
[147] Mylonas, *Polit. Nation-Building*, 19.

against the advantaged group to "retrieve their self-esteem".[148] In other words, NCIGs denied self-determination would come up with a version of nationalist discourse that demands inclusion, autonomy, or independence.[149] The logical response of the NCIGs to exclusion from state power and, therefore, political domination is resistance.

Second, the nation-building policies also result in social and cultural exclusion and marginalization of the NCIGs by dethroning and exiling their languages, values, rituals, and ceremonies to the private domain and structurally removing them from the public domain.[150] Mostly socio-cultural marginalization is practiced through boundary-making using the language, name of the individual, religious and cultural symbols, and other cultural artefacts. For instance, only somebody that speaks the language favored by the ruling elite gets promoted to the position of influence. Social permeability favors those who drop the identity markers of their group and adopt identification markers favored by the ruling class. These kinds of social boundaries influence the ability of individuals to be included in and accepted by new groups as equals; it also affects the potential for the formation of shared identities.[151] NCIGs that see their cultural values and social identities unrecognized by the state, with attendant exclusion from accessing political and economic opportunities, are left with no option but to organize, resist, and contest the imposed national identity.[152]

Third, due to the exploitation of their resources and inequitable distribution of national resources, the NCIGs tend to contest nation-building policies. This is because, in a poor, large, and multicultural postcolonial state, the ruling class tends to increase the share of the national pie for themselves and their kin or client groups and individuals by extracting more resources from NCIGs while simultaneously limiting their share of state resources. For example, ruling elites increase taxes levied and resources appropriated from NCIG areas while simultaneously minimizing investments in infrastructures such as roads, health facilities, schools and so on in NCIG areas. According to Fearon 1999, ascriptive identification markers are more convenient devices both to exploit and to exclude a group

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[148] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: Berkeley : University of California Press, 1985).
[149] Mylonas, *Polit. Nation-Building*.
[150] Mylonas.
[151] Fredrik Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries : The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1998); Fearon, "Why Ethnic Politics and 'Pork' Tend to Go Together"; Korostelina, *History Education in the Formation of Social Identity*.
[152] Han, *Contestation and Adaptation : The Politics of National Identity in China*.

of people from limited resources because they are easier to create the in-group and the outgroup.[153]

On the other hand, if access to resources and, therefore, one's economic advancement and social mobility are conditional upon inclusion in a particular identity group, outgroups are forced to mobilize and organize to protect themselves against exploitation and to demand their share of the national pie or bake their pie. Robert Bates,[154] one of the leading scholars on African politics, for instance, argues that ethnicity provides an attractive basis for coalition formation in conflict over the distribution of states' resources. If a hierarchical division of labor is institutionalized based on ascriptive criteria, the chances of identity-based group contestations and antagonism increase.[155]

Furthermore, attempts of the ruling elite to create a modern economy, as part of their nation-building project also create or heighten the grievance of the NCIGs. The modern economy, according to Gellner, promotes discrimination against NCIGs because it needs literate workers that can manipulate modern techniques and technologies of production. The literate workers, on the other hand, are mainly from the dominant identity that has had access to education. On the contrary, NCIG individuals are deliberately excluded from education by limiting their access to school or indirectly barring them through the medium of instruction, which would be through the imposed language of the ruling elite and including cultural contents that prohibit NCIGs from attending the schools. For example, by including religious content that contradicts the values of Muslims, like starting classes through Christian songs, many families are forced not to send their children to schools in Ethiopia before the Revolution of 1974.

In general, the exclusionary, exploitative, and marginalizing political, economic, and social relations promoted by the ruling class push elites of the NCIGs to mobilize and organize their groups for antagonism and contestations. By capitalizing on a common language and culture along with grievance against domination, exploitation, and exclusion, they can relatively easily present a collective coalition against the ruling class. Nevertheless,

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[153] Fearon, "Why Ethnic Politics and 'Pork' Tend to Go Together."

[154] Robert H Bates, *Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

[155] Lars-Erik Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison," *The American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (April 20, 2011): 478–95, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000207.

even though political domination, sociocultural exclusion and economic exploitation are underlying necessary conditions, these are not sufficient for an NCIG or NCIGs or group of them to mobilize and contest the imposed national identity. Contestation of the imposed national identity and resistance against the ruling elite requires resources and enabling environment, i.e., mobilization enabling factors.

Mobilization enabling factors are endogenous resources and external supports that can mobilize the NCIGs for contestation against the imposed national identity and its effects on the political, cultural, and economic well-being of the group. History of pre-colonial or separate colonial political experiences like in Eritrea and British Somaliland, political influence like Tigray, relative population size and settlement patterns, the cohesiveness of the elite, the repressive capacity of the state, and external supports are mobilizations enabling factors. History is an essential element for the mobilization of the NCIG as it is for the ruling elites. NCIG elites can tap into current grievances (political, economic and status discussed above) by selectively mounting and exaggerating a past' golden age' and 'glorious past', or even a separate political existence as a colonial entity, such as Eritrea, can sustainably mobilize their constituency to reclaim their lost 'self' and build an even better future for their imagined political community. An NCIG with a history of premodern statehood, or another form of a political organization or political influence, or both, within the current or beyond current state borders, is most likely to mobilize to either capture the state power of the current state or fight for autonomy or independence. However, history is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mobilization. The second enabling factor is the demographic and spatial dimensions, i.e., size and settlement patterns. An NCIG that can effectively challenge the imposed national identity of the ruling class needs to be politically relevant. At least the NCIG should have a relatively significant population; some argue a 'population of at least one million' and a compact settlement that covers a surface area of at least 50,000 square kilometers,[156] which serves both group cohesion and collective actions against state power or even mobilize to demand a place in central power. On the other hand, an NCIG that is small and or scattered throughout the territory is unlikely to fight for autonomy or independence. In general, an NCIG with a history of autonomy and political relevance can mobilize to challenge the imposed national identity, exclusionary,

[156] Wucherpfennig et al., "Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups across Space and Time: Introducing the GeoEPR Dataset."

exploitative, and marginalizing policies. However, historical, and spatial factors are just enabling or constraining but not determining factors on their own. Human agency is the only factor that can realign these enabling factors and mobilize them for contestation. That is the presence of the elite of the NCIGs to capitalize on the temporal and spatial enabling factors. Like the ruling elite, the NCIG should have an identity category conscious and cohesive elite that claims the uniqueness of the NCIG from the national identity being promoted by the ruling elite and define the salient identification markers that make their group unique and therefore deserves fighting for its ontological security. To successfully mobilize their respective NCIGs, elites on their part need to consider two more necessary conditions. These two more conditions are the repressive capacity of the state and the presence of external supports.

The repressive capacity of the state here refers to the Weberian understanding of the monopoly over means of violence. To operationalize it, a monopoly over means of violence entails the extent of the distribution of security apparatus, including the military, the police, and the intelligence throughout the territory of the state. Here, the dominant assumption about the state is that a well-developed security apparatus of the state can detect, neutralize, or eliminate any attempts by NCIG elites to mobilize and organize their respective constituencies to challenge the national identity promoted by the ruling class.[157] However, in a large, poor, multicultural state like Ethiopia, this assumption does not hold. In this context, the security apparatuses are unevenly distributed and do not exercise effective control over the entire territory of the state. The security apparatus is rather overwhelmingly concentrated around the capital city, industrial installations, mining areas and a few strategic locations only while completely missing from other parts of the state, even where they are desperately needed.[158] In states like current Somalia, effective security control could be limited to the capital city or even to the palace. Here, the apparent empirical conclusion is that if an NCIG is excluded from central political power, (therefore politically dominated, economically excluded, and culturally marginalized) along with the history of autonomy and politically relevant status, the elite of the NCIGs have a chance of mobilizing and organizing their constituents to overthrow the ruling class or claim autonomy or independence. If these conditions are fulfilled, the NCIGs can successfully contest the imposed national identity

[157] Wimmer, *Nation Building : Why Some Countries Come Together While Others Fall Apart*.
[158] Dunn and Englebert, *Inside African Politics*.

and change it by capturing the state, bargaining for autonomy or secession with one additional necessary factor, external support.

External support is the key factor that significantly affects the successful mobilization of NCIGs and, therefore, the primary focus of security policy states located in conflict-ridden regions like the Horn of Africa. This is based on two key assumptions of IR in post-Second World War international politics. First, the probability of direct and indefinite conquest by an offshore power has been nonexistent owing to norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity guaranteed by global powers through the UN system. Instead, the significant threats to the state, particularly the postcolonial states of the developing world, are secessionist groups, irredentist neighbors, intervention on behalf of NCIGs and transnational ethnic and ideological groups, and states that intervene against these transnational groups. Whether it is the threat from within or from outside, they are all related to a segment of NCIGs residing within poorly controlled territorial borders. Second, however weak the state might be relative to the contesting NCIGs, the state has legitimate access to both domestic and foreign resources that are not readily available to the NCIGs. Therefore, by definition, an NCIG has to have other sources of resources to effectively challenge the state, particularly if the only means to achieve its goal of state capture, autonomy, or independence is through the use of force. Generally, there are three major and two minor external actors that could support NCIGs: great powers, neighboring states, and the diaspora, as well as other ideological and ethnic movements.

Great powers like the US and former USSR have consistently been intervening in the domestic affairs of other states supporting NCIGs that have been fighting for regime change, autonomy, or secession. When they choose to intervene on the part of the NCIGs, the great powers change the balance of power significantly. By providing much-needed weapons, training, and diplomatic backing, these powers can inevitably tilt the winning chance for, at least committed and capable, NCIGs to realize their goal. The case of the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) is one such example. The US supports for Kurdish contestation against Iraq, Tibet against China, UNITA against Angola, and the like were also instrumental in sustaining these movements as long as they did exist. Chinese support for the Communist Party of Myanmar; Russia's support of South Ossetia also attests to the role of great powers in interfering and changing the dynamics of conflicts between the ruling

class and NCIGs.[159]

The neighboring states also play even more important roles in the onset and continuation of national identity contestation by NCIGs against the ruling class of the target state, which is the state where the NCIG is located. This is because neighboring states are the interface through which most of the external supports are channeled to the concerned NCIGs. Great powers mostly do not directly engage with NCIG in distant parts of the world like Africa. Rather they depend on neighboring states of the target state. Arms and ammunition, finance, and diplomatic support like providing passports for leaders of the NCIGs are provided through the neighboring states. On their part, the neighboring states may provide support from training leaders and troops of the NCIGs to the provision of a military base and direct engagement with the target state, depending on the willingness and capacity of the neighboring state, which will be presented in detail in the next two sections. First, the three remaining external sources of support for NCIGs that should also be related to the neighboring states in one way, or another are discussed as follows.

The Diaspora of NCIGs across the border and in other parts of the world also plays a significant role in mobilizing resources and lobbying for diplomatic support. In particular, diasporas forced to leave their homeland due to political repression tend to be more politically organized and more nationalistic or extreme. For many stateless diasporas, the main goal is to politicize their cause to achieve more autonomy, or even independence, for their 'lost' homeland. The exiled Tibetan community under the leadership of the Dalai Lama is one such case. Diaspora communities that reside in wealthy countries in the West can use economic resources to their advantage.[160] For example, money accumulated by the Eritrean diaspora in North America and Europe has been channeled to support military campaigns against the Ethiopian regimes throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the democratic nature of Western governments also means diaspora communities can influence these countries' foreign policies toward their homelands. Jewish, Armenian, and Turkish are some of the prominent cases. Globalization and the information technology revolution further increase the power of these diaspora groups and their transitional networks to publicize and promote their political agendas.

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[159] Kevork Oskanian, *Fear, Weakness and Power in the Post-Soviet South Caucasus : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis* (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
[160] Han, *Contestation and Adaptation : The Politics of National Identity in China*.

Other transnational ethnic and ideological movements could also be a source of minor, yet sometimes critical, support for the NCIGs. In porous borderlands, NCIGS across the border engage in quid pro quo. One of the best examples is the support that was exchanged between the EPLF of Eritrea and the TPLF of Tigray in Northern Ethiopia. In the early 1970s, EPLF provided its neighboring TPLF with some guns, ammunition, and training. Years later, when EPLF was surrounded by the Ethiopian Defense Forces, it was TPLF that saved the EPLF. Nevertheless, more common cases, particularly when the transnational NCIGs do not compete for the same constituency, is an exchange of information, weapons, and networks of resource transfer across borders. Recently, transnational ideological supports have become more common among jihadi groups around the world. In the Horn of Africa region, Al Qaeda has an open relationship with Al Shabaab that targets countries of the region, including Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. In summary, even if not, important transnational ethnic and ideological groups could be sources of support for NCIGs. However, those who support one way, or another need to pass through the neighboring countries to the target state. Whether external supports pass to NCIGs depends on the Willingness and Capacity of the neighboring state to support the NCIG/s. By implication, the nature of willingness and capacity to support NCIG by neighboring states defines the security policy of the target.

2.4 Willingness to support NCIGs and Security Policy of the Target State

Regional states' willingness to support an NCIG/s to achieve its goal of state capture, autonomy or secession depends on two interrelated factors: regional culture of anarchy and compatibility of nationalist discourses of the supporting state and NCIG or the target state. The culture of anarchy or patterns of amity and enmity shapes the predisposition of states towards neighboring states and other actors like NCIGs. There are three cultures of anarchy, according to Alexander Wendt,[161] Hobbesian (enmity), Lockean (rivalry), and Kantian (amity) cultures of anarchy. These cultures of anarchy affect both the willingness to support and the nature of the security policy of the target state. In a Kantian regional culture of anarchy, which is often called 'security community', states and other actors constituting the region display "a high degree of trust, a shared identity and future, low or no probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters, and differentiation of those within from those

[161] Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

outside the security community".[162] The nationalist discourses of the ruling elites and the NCIGs, as well as those of neighboring states, are inclusive and recognize each other and agree to resolve differences amicably. Intra-state and interstate identity contestations are institutionalized to such an extent that the use of force to impose the identity of the ruling class is considered remote. In general, in regions that are characterized by a Kantian culture of anarchy, such as the EU, both national and regional contestations and conflicts could be optimally resolved by peaceful and normal political procedures without resorting to extraordinary measures of security. For instance, the chance of a target state, say the United Kingdom securitizing Germany for supporting the secession of Scotland is remote because Scottish contestations against the imposition of English identity on Britain can be resolved through a referendum without sending an army to London or Edinburgh or soliciting external supports from Berlin or Paris. Therefore, in a security community characterized by a Kantian culture of anarchy, it is improbable that neighboring states securitize each other and consider a threat or use of force over external support for national identity contestations. However, if the regional culture of anarchy is downgraded to a security regime, there is a remote but possible chance of securitization.

In a Lockean regional culture of anarchy that is often called 'security regime', is the kind of security relationship that could be captured by Krasner's definition of regime applied to security as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge…".[163] In a region characterized by a security regime, there are explicit rules and mechanisms for minimizing or eliminating supporting each other's armed groups and intervening in the internal affairs of each other's affairs. Nationalist discourses of the ruling class, the NCIGs and neighboring states refrain from antagonistic identity, temporal and spatial claims. There are institutional mechanisms like general and issue-specific intergovernmental organizations wherein member states actively cooperate and solve collective problems. Member states may use the regional organization, annual summits, and other permanent multilateral organizations and ad hoc mechanisms to solve their domestic and transnational problems related to NCIG movements without resorting to threats or the use of political violence. As a result, NCIGs are unlikely

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[162] Oskanian, *Fear, Weakness and Power in the Post-Soviet South Caucasus : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis*, 26.

[163] Stephen D Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (May 22, 1982): 186, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300018920.

to get support for overthrowing a government or seceding with the support of neighboring states. There is always a chance that the security regime could be downgraded, or is already the case, to Hobbesian culture of anarchy wherein neighboring states intervene in support of NCIGs to protect or back up their excluded and dominated kin group in the target state or as a policy instrument to weaken the target state to achieve other policy objectives.

In the Hobbesian culture of anarchy that Buzan et al. called 'conflict formations', the dominant mode of understanding regional security interaction is through power relations where the use of force is considered legitimate.[164] In this type of region, which is the case for much of conflict-ridden regions like the Middle East, Post-Soviet South Caucasus, and the Horn of Africa, states and other NCIGs, both at domestic and regional levels, dominantly conceive a solution to their value contradictions and interests incompatibilities through some form of political violence. Because states within this kind of region mostly suffer from a legitimacy deficit across the board due to both arbitrary boundaries and a history of exclusionary nation-building policies. In this type of culture of anarchy, clashing temporal claims, exclusionary and antagonistic identity claims, and irredentist spatial claims are the defining characteristics of the region. A regional security complex with Hobbesian culture of anarchy can be divided into two: revisionist and status quo.

In a status-quo type of Hobbesian culture of anarchy, regional relations are based on a security dilemma. The goal of states that fall into this category is to be content with their boundaries and not to aspire to reclaim NCIGs across the border. Their sources of threats are irredentist neighboring states and secessionist domestic NCIGs, and those neighboring states and other external actors that support them. Depending on the history of the relationship between irredentist or secessionist NCIG or both, the status quo state may produce a nationalist discourse that prioritizes territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs as the cardinal principle in its regional relations. Its regional roles and affiliations are defined by these principles. Their engagements in international organizations and their alliance with extra-regional powers are defined by nonintervention in its internal affairs, specifically nonrecognition of a secessionist group within its territorial borders, and noncooperation with external actors that support the secessionist NCIG or irredentist state. While, in principle, it does not endorse secessionism and irredentism, due to security

[164] Oskanian, *Fear, Weakness and Power in the Post-Soviet South Caucasus : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis*.

dilemmas, it may support NCIGs in the neighboring state under two conditions. First, if a neighboring state is irredentist and supports its NCIGs to secede and merge with it or even makes a claim to peoples and territories across the borders. The second condition is when a status-quo neighboring state supports NCIGs in the target state for leverage. Under these two conditions, a status quo state could engage in a proxy tit-for-tat supports for NCIGs. Accordingly, when an irredentist state or rival state stops supporting the NCIGs, the target state also stops supporting the NCIGs. Therefore, support from a status-quo neighboring state depends on the balance of threats to its territorial integrity and regional balance of power, which will be discussed in the next section. When support goes to an NCIG from a status quo state, it is mostly conditional and episodic. As a result, the security policy of the target state towards a status-quo neighboring state is expected to be a mirror image of the status-quo state policy, and other things remain the same.

Nevertheless, the presence of politically significant groups across borders can also be a source of cooperation between the target state and a neighboring state/s under two conditions. First, if the politically significant NCIG is secessionist in both states to curb territory out of both states and tries to create an independent entity or to merge with a third state where kin-group are the ruling class, the two target states may work together to foil the goal of the NCIG while still competing against each other in other security issues. Second, if a third state claims to curve out a politically significant NCIG from two or more states simultaneously, the targeted neighboring states might agree to a mutual alliance against the irredentist state.

Revisionist states within the Hobbesian culture of anarchy, on the other hand, are mostly characterized by disputing the borders of the target state, the identity of people that live across the border and the history of how the target state is 'illegitimately' in control of the contested lands that should have belonged to the irredentist state. The nationalist discourses of the irredentist states categorically clash with the nationalist identity of the target state because the same territory is simultaneously claimed by two sovereign entities. Contestations over the territory ultimately extend to the identity of the people over those lands and the legitimacy of the historical processes through which those lands were dispensed. As a result, in a Hobbesian culture of anarchy, a revisionist state, nationalist discourses of neighboring states and NCIGs are at odds, and spatial claims are overlapping. Some or all of the states in the region, particularly during the early years of independence

or after systemic changes like the end of the Cold War, or when there is differential development like the discovery of oil, follow irredentist policies and support secessionism across the borders. For instance, these kinds of parallel and antagonistic nation-building policies have been adopted simultaneously and interactively in the Middle East from the 1950s to 1970s, the Horn of Africa from the 1960s to 1990s, South Asia from the 1950s to 1970s and Southern Caucuses from the 1990s to present. Some of the states may even refuse to recognize a part or all of the existence of another state or NCIG. In this kind of regional culture, NCIGs can successfully secure external support from a kinstate across the border provided that the NCIG is not a minority in the kinstate. Willingness to support an NCIG by a neighboring state is based on a combination of non-demarcated and contested borders or the presence of cross-border and politically significant NCIGs with a contested temporality with regard to the inclusion of the group in the target state. However, willingness to support is not enough, and the supporting state also needs to have the capacity to defend itself lest the target state chooses to attack it or respond in kind by supporting its NCIG.

2.5 Capacity to support NCIGs and the Target State Security Policy

As discussed above, the regional culture of anarchy helps us only to distinguish the willingness of regional states to support the goals of NCIGs in their struggles against the target state. A shared understanding of the regional balance of power is another necessary condition that affects whether a neighboring state supports an NCIG or not. Like Russia did in annexing Crimea from Ukraine or unilateral recognition and guarantee of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia against Georgia, a powerful neighbor can successfully annex or help NCIGs achieve its goal with impunity.[165] On the other hand, however, coerced Palestinians by the Israeli State or Uyghurs and Tibetans by the Chinese state, they could not be rescued by neighboring states. To directly cut to the heart of the matter, a shared understanding of regional power relations constitutes the type of support that the NCIGs could get and depends on the intensity of securitization by the target state vis-à-vis both the NCIGs and supporting the state.

Every region has different regional power configurations, different levels of state capacity, and varying degrees of great power penetrations interest. Mapping out all those scenarios is beyond the objective of this dissertation, and henceforth, here, the focus is on regional power configuration relevant to the Horn of Africa regional security complex. The Horn of Africa is a multipolar regional system because Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia before 1991 have closer relative capacity in every imaginable state capacity measurement (see the following basic data). Theoretically, even the Somalia of today and South Sudan, under normal circumstances, can compete against any one of the states in the region. The relative capacity of the states can be analyzed using a number of indicators or using already developed measurement tools. For instance, the Horn of African countries can be evaluated in the following manner using current GDP, land area, population, and total arms imports (detailed comparative capacity measurement over time will be presented in the empirical sections).

[165] Oskanian.

Figure 3: Ethiopia and Its Neighboring States: GDP Shares 2021




Figure 4: Ethiopia and Its Neighboring States: Area Shares




Figure 5: Ethiopia and its Neighboring States: Share of Population 2021





Figure 6: Ethiopia and Its Neighboring States: Arms Import 1960-2020



Sources: for all the figures World Bank[166]

[166] World Bank, Population, total - Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya,

Furthermore, the capacity to support NCIG is not limited to the relative capacity of each regional state. Other external supports can effectively change the regional balance of power, albeit temporarily. For instance, the US can guarantee the security of Djibouti and incentivize it to transit supports to ONLF so that it curves out of the Somali inhabited area of Ethiopia and establish an independent state or join Djibouti or Somalia. On the reverse side, Ethiopia's territorial integrity could be backed up with the support of Russia so that the supports of the two great external powers balance each other, as happened in 1977/8 between Somalia and Ethiopia. Furthermore, status quo states may also establish and use a regional organization/s to further legitimize their border against secessionist NCIGs and irredentist states by isolating them from regional diplomacy.

Once the state's willingness to support foreign NCIGs is defined by a regional culture of anarchy, which is Hobbesian in the case of the Horn of Africa, and power relations are established by a shared understanding of regional power relations, then it is possible to come up with ideal scenarios with regard to the regional security policy of the target state. Accordingly, by combining a willingness to support and capacity to support, we have four alternative positions for the regional states: weak status quo, strong status quo, weak revisionist, and strong revisionist scenarios.

The regional security policy of the target state depends on the four scenarios outlined in **Table 2** above. Accordingly, Scenario A of a weak-status quo state is relatively much weaker than the target state and does not have a nationalist discourse that makes a claim to peoples and lands across the demarcated boundary. Since it fully recognizes the territorial integrity of the target state and it may be difficult to develop an irredentist policy under normal circumstances, the target state does not consider it a threat on its own. However, two conditions can make it potentially a threat. First, even if it is unwilling to help across border NCIG, an NCIG could use its porous borders and remote borderlands without its permission. As a result, the target state may establish a buffer zone across the porous borders or establish a joint border security mechanism to deny the operating base for its NCIG/s. Second, if the weak state is located at an internationally significant location that attracts foreign powers

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Somalia | Data (worldbank.org); GDP (current US$) - Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan | Data (worldbank.org); Arms imports (SIPRI trend indicator values) - Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan | Data (worldbank.org);

that could destabilize the target state through it, the target state might be forced into a strategic alliance with those external powers or establish another alliance mechanism to balance against a threat that emanates from weak status quo. Most importantly, the ruling class of the target ensures its security by monitoring and backing up a friendly ruling class in a weak-status quo state. With regard to change, under favorable circumstances, the relationship between the two states may develop into a close alliance within a regional security regime or may degenerate into weak-revisionist status under other circumstances that will be discussed under Scenario C.

Table 2: Level of Securitization, WTS & CTS

Willingness to Support (WTS)	**Capacity to Support (CTS)**		
		Low	**High**
	High	**Scenario C: Weak-Revisionist** Policy options: Partial securitization, including buffer-zone and regime change	**Scenario D: Strong-Revisionist** Policy option: full range of securitization including use of force, omnibalancing
	Low	**Scenario A: Weak-Status quo** Policy options: minimal securitization, including border controls and supporting a friendly regime	**Scenario B: Strong-Status quo** Policy option: Cooperation on regional security issues and institutionalization of border management to a defense pact

Source: Author

Scenario B's strongest state of status quo represents the best security scenario for the target state because this type of neighboring state does not make claims that clash with its identity and territorial integrity and controls its borders effectively so that NCIGs could not

use it to transit support across borders. In this scenario, both the ruling classes may collaborate to manage their borderlands and fight common enemies together. The two states may even support each other in managing other regional security externalities, including secessionist and irredentist attempts by NCIGs and other neighboring states. Cross-border conflicts over pasture and water, as well as other transboundary resources, can be managed by local communities and joint institutions without resorting to security measures. With regard to change, the relationship between the two may upgrade the region itself to a security regime under favorable international circumstances, or the relationship between the two states may degenerate into a strong revisionist state which will be discussed under Scenario D.

Scenario C of the weak revisionist state is the second-worst scenario or may even become the main security issue if the possibility of the strong revisionist state is inapplicable to the region in that specific period. This scenario is a scenario whereby a relatively weaker state vis-a-vis the target state follows nationalist discourses that clash against the nationalist discourse of the target state, i.e., there is conflict over the history of state formation and boundary-making on the identity of the NCIG across the border that happens to be in the target state and the territories inhabited. This case becomes even worse when the target state securitizes the NCIG as the fifth column and puts it under routinized surveillance and repression. Under this condition, the target state follows the following strategies. First, establish a unilateral security buffer zone across the border into the territories of the weak-irredentist state using its own personnel and third-party collaborators on the other side of the border. Second, undermine nationalist regimes and groups within the weak-irredentist state and back up groups that are favorable to its position. Third, attempting to win hearts- minds through the co-optation of some leaders of NCIG and the provision of some public services. The fourth strategy is lobbying external powers not to arm the weaker state significantly so that it could not realize its irredentist intentions. Conditions of change include giving up irredentist claims and developing collaborative relationships where NCIGs and people on the other side freely move and work across the border and the region upgraded into a security regime or a condition that bolsters that capacity of the weak-irredentist state or weakens the target state that transforms the security situation to worst-case scenario_Scenario D.

Scenario D of the strong-irredentist state is the security policy nightmare of the target state. I will flash out in detail why this scenario is the worst for the target state, both from

NCIGs and from an irredentist neighboring state. First of all, unlike other scenarios where territorial integrity is respected as legitimate or de facto accepted as such because of the overwhelming force of the target state, in Scenario D, that does not work. This is because a strong NCIG supported by a strong neighbor presents threats to all three dimensions of national security: the physical base of the state (population and territory), the governing regime and the national identity of the target state.[167] At the base level, if an NCIG could be able to secede, it inevitably weakens the state by changing population size, the economy, strategic territory, the military and overall physical dimensions of power.[168] Loss of a significant population due to secession means losing the source from which the target state builds a bigger army, employs more labor force with a wider tax base, and houses wider consumer markets that further attract foreign direct investments. This threatens the target state at multiple levels. For example, secession negatively affects the economy of the host state by reducing its access to natural resources and other industries and economic infrastructure within the NCIG area. If the NCIGs are home to critical resources like oil, water, or ports through which the host access the sea, like in the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan, the economic effects of secession could be even worse. On the other hand, the would-be seceded state, or the state it will merge to get access to these resources, increases the relative power vis-à-vis the target state. Furthermore, the seceding state can further bolster its capacity through access to international resources through a number of mechanisms, including control of foreign trade, access to trade and aid, and membership in international organizations.

The possibility of secession or merger of NCIG/s with the kin neighboring state not only threatens the physical security of the state, i.e., territorial integrity. It also threatens the security of the regime in power. This is because the regime loses whatever legitimacy it had before the secession, and this weakness opens up avenues for other excluded NCIG/s to capture the state power. That was what happened in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1991. Even worse, the new group that will capture the state would inevitably redefine the identity of the state, making the old dominant a minority or even totally excluding from new power redistribution, redefinition of history, culture, and the like. The previously excluded NCIG and would be an independent state after secession or merger is more likely to come back

[167] Oskanian, *Fear, Weakness and Power in the Post-Soviet South Caucasus : A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis*, 19.
[168] Butt, *Secession and Security*.

with more resources to fight the ram state with irredentism. That has been what happened between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000, and Sudan and South Sudan are still contesting boundaries.

According to Butt,[169] this fear of future war with the secessionist group is the factor that makes the host state fight bloody counterinsurgency wars for years. Furthermore, fear of total dismemberments, loss of status, and vulnerability to other NCIGs and other regional rivals, i.e., enemies from within and across borders makes this scenario- the worst-case scenario of third-world politics that forces the target state to resort to "omnibalancing" in the words of Steven David.[170] Consequently, because of threats from the NCIGs and irredentist neighbors, the target state is forced to develop an alliance with external powers and other lesser threatening neighbors, including weak-irredentist states and engage in security competitions with the strong-revisionist from inter wars like Ethio-Somalia of 1977/78, proxy wars like Ethio-Eritrea 2000-2018.

However, these kinds of intense security competitions are not constant. There are possibilities that can bring a change in both domestic and regional systems that will change both the national identity of the target state and, by extension, its regional security policy. The conditions under which change could be realized are three: change of leadership, change of international normative environment, and change of external leverage. Change of leadership is the easiest way to change both nationalist discourse and regional security policy. However, how it will come and how deeply it will hard reset both national identity and foreign policy are contingent on relevant historical dynamics. For instance, a change of leadership through revolution or rebel takeover of the state power will result in a forceful and fundamental reset, as in the case of post-1974 Ethiopia or post-1979 Iran. On the other hand, a change of leadership by death or resignation may bring about less dramatic change. Second, when a supporting normative international environment like the bipolar order of the Cold War ends, regimes that depended on the old support mechanism inevitably crumble, such as Apartheid South Africa, Mobutu's Zaire, Barre's Somalia, and Mengistu's Ethiopia. Finally, a powerful external actor may overthrow the ruling regime or force it to change both its domestic and regional security policy, like Iraq in 2003, Sudan in 2005 and Libya in

[169] Butt, 32.
[170] Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (April 20, 1991): 236, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.2307/2010472.

2011.

2.6 Conclusion

This analytical framework is developed with the sole purpose of explaining the regional security policy of a relatively weak postcolonial state that could not be effectively conducted using mainstream theories of security. This is because the security environment is significantly different from the security environment for which the mainstream theories were built. Mainstream theories of security studies suppose the state as the given in whose name national security is invoked. They are considered black boxes that need to ensure their survival in the self-help condition of the international system through the balance of power and alliance systems in realist understanding or through international institutions in liberalist understanding. This framework provides context-specific assumptions tailored to the security environment of relatively weak postcolonial states with contested national identities.

In post-Second World War international relations, multinational states like Ethiopia that had adopted exclusionary nation-building policies do not base their security assumption on defending against a great offshore power that may invade and colonize their territories. Rather, their security concerns emanate from demands of excluded NCIGs and regional actors and factors that enable the excluded NCIGs to capture state power and redefine national identity, secede, or merge with neighboring kinstate. In this security environment, the factors that constitute the security policy of the target state are the willingness and capacity of neighboring state/s to support the NCIG/s. Willingness to support the NCIG/s is based on the compatibility of nationalist discourses of the neighboring state on the one hand and those of the target state and the NCIG/s. If identity, temporal, and spatial claims of the target state and neighboring state are contradictory on the one hand and that of the neighboring state and NCIG are analogous, then the neighboring state is defined as willing to support. The support could take either helping the NCIGs to secede and then merge or directly intervening to annex it. However, a neighboring state's nationalist discourse could be analogous to the target in that it can follow status quo policy with respect to the NCIG, and henceforth, or it could be a status quo that would not support the NCIG unless provoked. Accordingly, if the neighboring state supports the NCIG, the target state will reflect back with securitized policy measures and vice versa. The level of securitization, however,

depends on the capacity of the neighboring state and the level of support it provides for the NCIG/s. Depending on the willingness and capacity to support, there are four ideal scenarios: weak-status quo, strong-status quo, weak-revisionist, and strong-revisionist with policy options partial securitization, desecuritization, partial securitization and full securitization. However, the scenarios and corresponding policy options are not fixed. They could change from one form to another or even transform into a security regime owing to a change in domestic nationalist discourse or the global normative environment.

In line with this analytical framework, the remaining four chapters present analyses of how discourses of the Ethiopian nation-state have been evolving along with the responses of contestations by both domestic NCIGS and regional actors and subsequent definitions of threats and policies followed by the three regimes consecutively. Depending on their willingness and capacity to support Ethiopia's NCIGs, the neighboring states of Ethiopia will be analyzed against the four ideal types and corresponding security policy options. Before directly delving into analytical chapters, the next chapter provides a historical background to the processes, actors, and factors that converged in the establishment of the modern Ethiopian state.

CHAPTER III

3. EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND MAKING OF THE MODERN ETHIOPIAN STATE

To this date,[171] there are ongoing national identity contestations in Ethiopia and resultant political violence that participates in regional states, and this chapter establishes the origins of these contestations and regional security relations. The need to trace the sources of national identity and, subsequently, the establishment of the modern Ethiopian state is because both the dominant ruling class and the elites of the NCIGs draw on historical memories to mobilize collective actions and reconstruct their conception of national identity and define who the 'us' and the 'other' was. The role and relations of regional colonial powers and other external actors were defined in terms of networks of support that traversed the boundaries, significantly affecting the balance of power between the core and the NCIGS. In the process of tracing and benchmarking the evolution of Ethiopian national identity and state-making, the main target of this chapter is both to identify the core identity group and major NCIGs and to establish the ideas, institutions, factors, and key actors that influenced the observed changes and continuities in their specific spatial and temporal contexts and that have been relevant in subsequent developments. To accomplish this, this chapter is divided into seven sections.

The first section presents the foundational myth of the Ethiopian "nation" and how its identity, spatial, and temporal dimensions were defined. The second section presents how the myth was transformed into the Solomonic dynasty, its major achievements as well as its critical crises due to its engagements with the Adal Sultanate and the Oromo regionally and Ottoman and Portuguese empires externally. The third section deals with the revival of the Solomonic dynasty and the making of the modern Ethiopian state by Emperor Tewodros

[171] At the time of writing there is an ongoing war between Tigray region that demanded for respect of regional autonomy and the ruling class and the Eritrean regime that have been vying to destroy the Tigrayan elite who were dominant between 1991 and 2018 and undo the federalist legacy established by the TPLF. TPLF itself came to power by overthrowing Darg regime. The Darg came to power through revolution that overthrow Haile Selassie. Haile Selassie came to power by palace coup against Lij Iyasu… all of them did not only overthrow the preceding regime but also redefined the national identity after they came to power.

between 1855 and 1868 with the mission of cleansing the Northern Oromos and Muslims from the Empire in the context of Egyptian and British external threats. The fourth section presents a revolution in war-making, consolidating the making of modern Ethiopia under Emperor Yohannes IV by cleansing it of Muslims of Wollo within the regional context of Egyptian, Italian, and Mahdiyya threats. The fifth section discusses the conclusion of the establishment of the modern Ethiopian state under Emperor Menilek after the victory of Adwa. The current territorial boundaries of Ethiopia were signed with neighboring colonial powers by leaving Eritrea, which had been part of Christian Ethiopia, as an Italian colony and by including a large and diverse population of different histories, pedigrees, identities, attitudes, and inclinations, including the Oromo of South and the Somali. In this section, it is established that the exclusion of Eritrea and the inclusion of non-Abyssinian populations have been key developments that have profoundly affected the national identity of Ethiopia and its regional security policy. Section six begins a discussion about national identity contestations and regional security policy following the palace coup against *Lij* Iyasu by combined forces of the Christian ruling class and neighboring colonial powers for his attempts to integrate Muslim populations and diversify foreign relations. Finally, this chapter is concluded by providing a solid empirical foundation for subsequent chapters by establishing implications of exclusionary policies for the security of the Ethiopian state as manifested by the defense against the Italian occupation, 1936-1941.

3.1 Kebra Nagast and Foundational Myth of Ethiopian National Identity

The dominant founding myth of the Ethiopian nation is provided by an authoritative book called *Kebra Nagast* (in Ge'ez: ክብረ ነገሥት, which means the Glory of the Kings). This book, which has been described as the "national epic",[172] "Ethiopian national saga",[173] and other similar expressions by different scholars,[174] finally transformed into constitutional provisions by the first written Constitution of Imperial Ethiopia in 1931 and was further affirmed by the 1955 revised Constitution. This composite book that served as the source of

[172] Donald N. Levine, *Greater Ethiopia; the Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*, book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 100.

[173] Edward Ullendorff and Abraham Demoz, "Two Letters from the Emperor Yohannes of Ethiopia to Queen Victoria and Lord Granville," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 32, no. 1 (1969): 135, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00093745.

[174] Edward Ullendorff, *The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); Kebede, *Survival and Modernization : Ethiopia's Enigmatic Present : A Philosophical Discourse*.

legitimacy for over seven hundred years (1270-1974) for the Solomonic dynasty, supposed to have been authored by monks of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church between the 6th and 14th centuries, has provided national identity claims with genealogical, confessional, temporal, and spatial dimensions.[175]

Genealogically, the Ethiopian Solomonid dynasty claimed Providence in line with the biblical tradition. Accordingly, the divine anointment of David (1 Samuel 16:12–13) and the promise of the establishment of his throne over the kingdom of Israel forever (Chronicles 22:10) was claimed to have been transferred to the new Israel, Ethiopia. The divinity of Ethiopian kings as descendants of the Biblical David and the status of Ethiopian people as the "chosen people" were claimed to have been accomplished through a myth elaborated in the Kebra Nagast (K.N.). According to this legend, the biblical King Solomon sought various building materials to construct the (First)Temple. One of the merchants who traveled to Jerusalem to provide the materials was Tamrin. Tamrin, who was a merchant from the country of the legendary Queen of Sheba, upon his return, told the Queen about Solomon's wisdom and generosity.[176] In search of his wisdom, the Queen visited Solomon in Jerusalem. She returned to Ethiopia pregnant with Solomon's offspring, and the alleged birth of their son, Menilek I (also David II), which was claimed to mark the foundational myth of the birth of the Ethiopian nation.[177]

Kebra Nagast (K.N.) elaborates in detail how God transfers the promise of an "eternal throne for the House of David" to the Solomonid Dynasty, the title of the "chosen people" to Ethiopia, respectively. The K.N. claims that after a sexual encounter with the Ethiopian Queen, "that same night Solomon saw a dream in which the sun came down from heaven and shone brilliantly over Israel, and then departed to Ethiopia to shine there forever".[178] Then the book painstakingly narrates mechanisms through which these two defining features of the Ethiopian polity under the Solomonic dynasty and still the dominant foundational

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[175] Terje Østebø, *Islam, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Bale Insurgency, 1963-1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108884839.,p.309,

[176] Sir E a Wallis Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)* (Cambridge, Ontario: In parentheses Publications Ethiopian Series, 2000), 16–19.

[177] Levine, *Greater Ethiopia; the Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*; Donald Crummey, "Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia (Légitimité Impériale et Création d'une Idéologie Néo-Salomonienne En Éthiopie Au XIXe Siècle)," *Cahiers d'Études Africaines* 28, no. 109 (1988): 13–43; John Markakis and Asmelash Beyene, "Representative Institutions in Ethiopia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 5, 1967; Ullendorff, *The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People*.

[178] Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)*, xxi.

discourse of the Greater Ethiopia ideology.[179] To cut directly to the core of the matter, Menilek, the son of King Solomon and Queen of Sheba, visited his father in Jerusalem in his adolescence. He was named David II and anointed king.[180] He preferred Ethiopia to Israel and returned. More importantly, he returned with the Ark of the Covenant.[181] Since Ark was a symbol of the "chosen people" of the people of Israel, now its transfer to Ethiopia, as seen in the dream of Solomon, represented the transfer of the promises, favors, and glories of God to the land, people, and kings of Ethiopia. Finally, it reserves the divine authority to exercise sovereignty to the Solomonic line: "no one except the male seed of David, the son of Solomon, the king, shall ever reign over Ethiopia".[182] This was exclusively reserving sovereign authority to male claimants of the Solomonic line was codified into the constitutions of the Empire of Ethiopia, so much so that the Ethiopian state could not resolve the inclusion of other social groups without a violent revolution that ended the dynasty.

Confessionally, the K.N. also defined the national identity of Ethiopia as Orthodox Christianity with a claim to be "the sole authentic bearers of Christianity".[183] The K.N. justifies God's love for Ethiopia instead of the Jews for the Jews crucified Christ, and while Ethiopian people "…without knowing about His Law, they destroyed their idols".[184] Regarding other denominations of Christianity, K.N. presents Ethiopia's Orthodox Christianity as superior, claiming that "they [people of Rome] corrupted the Faith of Christ, and they introduced heresy in the Church of God by the mouth of Nestorius".[185] After placing Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity as authentic and superior to any other faith, K.N. promises that "Ethiopia continued to abide in its faith until the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ".[186] Because of this, when the Solomonic ideology was dominant, those who subscribed to that ideology could not accept it and often displayed xenophobic attitudes toward followers of other faiths.

Spatially, K.N. claims half of the then-known world (to the authors of K.N.): "from the middle of Jerusalem from the north thereof to the south and western India is the portion

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[179] Levine, *Greater Ethiopia; the Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*.
[180] Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)*, xxv.
[181] Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)*.
[182] Budge, 125.
[183] Levine, *Greater Ethiopia; the Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*, 107.
[184] Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)*, 144.
[185] Budge, 140.
[186] Budge, 140.

of the Emperor of Ethiopia".[187] Furthermore, in his dominion, claims K.N., the emperor of Ethiopia enjoys absolute control and a guarantee of victory against his enemies by Providence. Then the book continues to present how Menilek I waged wars north-south, east-west of his capital, defeating all his enemies and forcing kingdoms from Egypt to India to pay tribute to him. The book created two additional necessary conditions for would-be monarchs of the Christian Kingdom. First, Ethiopia's monarch needed to be a warrior king.[188] Second, he needed to conquer and demand tribute from other dominions as the chosen one with a divine mandate.[189] By defining these conditions, the K.N., which Reid called a "violent book",[190] not only provided a license to conquer all surrounding peoples, but it also established the baseline for unaccountable, violent, and predatory polity[191] with just one accountability mechanism reserved for the Orthodox Church, that was ex-communication for heresy. In the coming few pages, this discourse of Judaeo-Christian Solomonic discourse will be discussed in tandem with its historical evolution.

3.2 Solomonic Ideology, Development of the Christian Kingdom, and Other Key Historical Developments between 1270 and 1853

The harbinger of the contemporary national identity of Ethiopia and its identity-based regional engagements had been set with the establishment of the Solomonic dynasty in 1270 and continued until its demise in 1974 with ebbs and flows across its existence due to internal dynamics and external influences. This section presents four key developments that are still affecting the Ethiopian state. First, the establishment of Ethiopian polity based on Solomonic ideology, *Tabot* Christianity and Ge'ez civilization[192] in the northern part of current Ethiopia

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[187] Budge, 15.

[188] Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*; Yonas Admassu, "Narrating Ethiopia: A Panorama of the National Imaginary" (University of California, Los Angeles, 1995).

[189] Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)*, 141.

[190] Richard J Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27.

[191] Gnamo, *Conquest and Resistance in the Ethiopian Empire, 1880-1974 : The Case of the Arsi Oromo*, 163.

[192] The Ge'ez Civilization is the cultural core of the Ethiopian state that is based on Ge'ez script, a high culture built around Tabot Christianity, and political system constructed with the myth of Solomonic descent. Writing of myths, religious and cultural rituals and biographies of the emperors and educating and socializing the next generations with these values are the preserve of the Orthodox Church. They had written in Ge'ez script and made the core culture the proud nation of history. The rest of the societies that were later incorporated considered inferior and need to be assimilated to the Ge'ez civilization that has a proud culture of script and, therefore, history Teshale Tibebu., *The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896-1974* (Lawrence, Kan.: The Red Sea, 1995). PP.13-14.

and expansion to southern areas by displacing, converting, subjugating, or exterminating existing communities between the 13th and 16th centuries. Second, a warrior Imam Ahmed Ibrahim al-Ghazi of the Adal Sultanate, with Ottoman guns, reversed the direction, conquered most of the Christian Kingdom, destroyed its institutions, and converted some of its population, which subsequently produced what Erlich called "Ahmed Gragn syndrome".[193] The kingdom was finally liberated from al-Ghazi's domination with the help of Portuguese soldiers. The third development was the Catholic Portuguese, capitalizing on their support for the Christian Kingdom to defeat the Sultanate of Adal, pressured the monarchy to convert to Catholicism, creating a wage between the Orthodox Church and the monarch. Even if the Jesuits were expelled, the Portuguese factor created dogmatic fragmentations within the Orthodox Church. The fourth related development was the emergence of Oromo, a non-Christian, and non-Muslim, as the third regional power bloc to profoundly affect the politics of the Horn of Africa in general and that of the Christian Kingdom in particular. First, it expanded to the dominions of both the Christian Kingdom and Muslim Sultanates from the early 16th century and permanently changed the region's demography and settlement patterns. Then some parts of Oromo kept its *Gadaa* system as governing framework and remained independent from both Christian and Muslim powers, while some Oromos, the Northern Oromo in particular, integrated into the Christian Kingdom's social organization and ended up as the power brokers in the capital of Christian Kingdom, Gonder,[194] until the mid-19th century. The dominance of Northern Oromo finally led to the crisis of the Solomonic dynasty and ushered in an era of renewal that created the modern Ethiopian state. As these four developments were the major constituting factors of the identity of the Ethiopian state and its relations with the peoples of the region, let us briefly look at each factor in detail.

Regarding the first development, the Solomonic dynasty was started in 1270 AD by a political entrepreneur Yikuno Amlak (r. 1270-1285), which replaced the Agaw's Zagwe

[193] "Ahmed Gragn syndrome", defines Hagai Erlich, is "the vivid, ever-recycled memory of the sixteenth-century destruction of the Christian kingdom (1529–1543) by an Islamic holy warrior, Ahmad Gragn, from the town of Harar, who united many of the Muslims of the Horn of Africa, and was inspired and helped by Arab scholars and Ottoman commanders in Arabia", "fear of an eventual all-Islamic militant unification that would lead to Ethiopia's destruction", Haggai Erlich, *Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010),4, 45

[194] Gonder was the capital of the Ethiopian Empire between 1636 and 1872

dynasty as "usurper".[195] In his usurpation against what he called 'usurpers', Yikuno Amlak relied on the support and legitimacy of leading Orthodox Church clerics such as *Abuna* Tekle Haymanot. In addition to the agency of these local leaders, there had also been significant external influences in the emergence of the Solomonic dynasty. The first and direct influence came from the Coptic Church of Alexandria. As the foundation of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was influenced by and, henceforth, attached to the School of Alexandria, the Metropolitan bishops that had been appointed as head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church between the 10th century and 1951 influenced the attitude of Ethiopian monarchs toward possible invasion by Muslim powers. In addition, this view of the bishops emanated from the dominance of the Muslim powers in Egypt and the conversion of the majority population to Islam and the need of the remaining Coptic Christians who sought protection from the kingdom of Ethiopia.[196] As the responses of the Zagwe Kings, except for Lalibela, who threatened to cut off the Nile River, were not impactful, they came up with the idea contained in the Kebra Nagast, which was later elaborated by Yishaq, the Neburaid (governor) of Aksum.[197] Furthermore, the European Crusaders that were defeated by Islamic powers also created a myth of Prester John concerning a Christian King that would help them clear the Muslims from the Holy Lands.[198]

Yikuno Amlak and the Orthodox Church clerics had devised institutional configurations that would last for centuries. The Solomonic dynasty formed social organization based on hierarchical institutions of monarchy, Church, Ge'ez civilization, war and land management that constituted the Christian Kingdom. Even if these institutions had been evolving since the Aksumite period, it is sufficient to briefly present a redacted and simplistic description of the functions of these institutions and their relationships. To begin with the nucleus, the monarchy sacralized by Solomonic descent and divine anointment had

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[195] Getahun Dilebo, "Emperor Menilek's Ethiopia, 1865-1916: National Unification or Amhara Communal Domination," *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses* (Howard University, 1974), 75, https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/emperor-meneliks-ethiopia-1865-1916-national/docview/302681395/se-2?accountid=142289., p. 9; Marzagora, "Alterity, Coloniality and Modernity in Ethiopian Political Thought: The First Three Generations of 20th Century Amharic-Language Intellectuals."

[196] Tekalign Nega Angore, "Reconstructing Ethiopia's Collective Memory by Rewriting Its History: The Politics of Islam," *Tilburg University Research Portal Citation* ([s.n.], 2017), https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/20054442/Angore_Reconstructing_04_12_2017_emb_tot_04_12_2018.pdf.

[197] Stuart C Munro-Hay, *The Quest for the Ark of the Covenant : The True History of the Tablets of Moses* (London: Tauris, 2006), 99.

[198] Matteo Salvadore, *The African Prester John and the Birth of Ethiopian-European Relations, 1402-1555* (New York: Routledge, 2016), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315612294.

the primary mission of advancing the divine Christian mission.[199] As the "elect of God", the land belonged to the divine monarch and the people were obliged to obey.[200] The Highland Christian Kingdom was organized into three interrelated social groups based on these principles: laypeople, aristocracy, and clergy. Based on these social groupings, the monarch distributed the land in siso (a third): a third for peasants, a third for the Church, and a third for the aristocracy. The Christian peasants have rist (hereditary) rights to own land and pay taxes immediately after the harvest. Non-Christians, including Muslims, Jews, and pagans, could not claim rist rights.[201] The monarch also expected to distribute a third of the gult, which was lands awarded as payment, instead of salary, to the warrior class for military and administrative services.[202] From *negus* (king), *ras* (army commander, immediately below the emperor), *Dejazmach* (commander of the rear guard), *kegnazmach* (commander of the right-wing) and *grazmach* (commander of the left-wing) to *balambaras* (the commander of a hilltop, lowest unit commander) that had to be served by the peasants.[203] The clergy had a rista-gult right to the land provided by the emperor, royal family, or other members of the aristocracy.[204] Once given to a church or monastery, the gulta-rist could not be revoked.[205] The clergy also extracted peasant labor, except for some monasteries where the clergy produced what they consumed.[206]

These configurations of institutions, monarchy, Church, land, and war had produced a specific kind of war-prone polity. As all powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) rested with the emperor and then delegated to the negus, ras, dejazmach, kegnazmach, grazmach and balambaras and *balabbat* (civilian title) in newly conquered areas. In this system, one's power, wealth, and often social prestige flow from one's position in the hierarchy. Furthermore, one could achieve and maintain a position or get promoted to the next position mainly through martial skills and political marriage to the royal family that usually followed proven martial skills.[207] Under these configurations, the best way to

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[199] Donald N Levine, "Ethiopia's Nationhood Reconsidered," *Análise Social* 46, no. 199 (April 21, 2011): 313.
[200] Paulos Tzadua., Peter L Strauss, and al-Safi Abu al-Fadail Majid Ibn al-`Assal, *The Fetha Nagast = The Law of the Kings* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2009).
[201] Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896-1974*.
[202] Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*, 79.
[203] Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*.
[204] Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896-1974*.
[205] Tibebu, 79.
[206] Tamrat Taddesse, "Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527" (University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies (United Kingdom), 1968).
[207] Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*, 182.

simultaneously achieve political influence, amass wealth, and social prestige was to wage wars against adjacent non-Christian polities, occupy their lands, and bring in loot.[208] Accordingly, the emperor or his deputies, including negus, ras, or dejazmach, deploy the Ethiopian army and their retinue.

The emperor or his deputy, who claimed every land as "lost territories",[209] sends a *mal'iktegna* (messenger) to offer a peaceful submission, in line with the rules of Feteha Nagast, to adjacent people in the regular wartime season, between October and June. The polity towards which the *mal'iktegna* was sent had two options. One option was to accept the offer for peaceful submission and welcome the emperor and his retinue and provide 'gibir', food to be consumed by the entire retinue and with more agreement to pay annual tribute and feed his soldiers whenever they would pass through that territory for further campaigns and raids.[210] The second option was to face the invasion of the Ethiopian king.

If the *mal'iktegna* comes back with a rejection of the offer by the target people, the next step is sending warari (invaders) young men that are selected for their exceptional martial skills and bravery under the command of *fitawrari* (advance guard commander). The fitawrari attack position would be assigned to the highest-ranking and most trusted ras or dejazmach. In intense battles, the fitawrari would be flanked by other rases and dejazmaches, acting as his right and left commanders. If the fitawrari died or went missing, he would be replaced automatically by the highest officer in the army. The fitawrari and his warari, who were armed mainly with swords, spears, and shields, initiated attacks by burning houses or property of the target people.[211] After this initial invasion and advance positioning, the main army led by the emperor or his deputy would arrive, transported mainly by horses, mules, and donkeys, for final subjugation. In this final engagement, the clergy would be part of the retinue along with their *Tabot*, a replica of the Ark of Covenant, as it was supposed to ensure a victory.

Through this model of deployment, monarchs of the Solomonic dynasty defeated and controlled territories of Muslim Sultanates and followers of indigenous religious beliefs.

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[208] Berhane-Selassie, 16; Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896-1974*.
[209] Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*.
[210] Berhane-Selassie; Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896-1974*; John Dunn, "'For God, Emperor, and Country!' The Evolution of Ethiopia's Nineteenth-Century Army," *War in History* 1, no. 3 (November 17, 1994): 278–99, https://doi.org/10.1177/096834459400100303.
[211] Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*, 183.

Accordingly, for instance, during the reign of Amda-Tseyon (r. 1314–1344), grandson of Yikuno Amlak, the Christian kingdom expanded to adjacent polities, including the east Sultanates of Ifat, Adal, Bale, the south to the Sultanates and Kingdoms of Gurage, Kembatta, Hadya, Fatigar, Sidamo, Dawaro; and the west Damot, Gafat, Enerea.[212]

This Emperor, Amda-Tseyon, who further gave a historical turn on mythically irredentist claims of Kebra Nagast, boasted as follows:[213]

> God gave me all the people of Damot into my hands; its king, its princes, its rulers, and its people, men and women without number, whom I exiled into another area. And after that God gave me all the people of Hadya, men and women without number, whom I exiled into another area. And after that God gave me the king of Gojjam into my hands, with all his troops, his princes, and his rulers, and all men and women without number. And after that God gave me into my hands the ruler of Ǝntärta [Ǝndärta] with all his army, his people, his relatives, and all his country as far as the cathedral of Aksum. And I, King Amdä- Siyon went to the sea of Eritrea. When I reached there I mounted on an elephant and entered the sea. And I took up my arrow and spears and killed my enemy, and I saved my people.

These words of Amda-Tseyon were recorded in his chronicles which a chronicler of the Orthodox Church recorded. As alluded to earlier, the Church served as the ideological arm of the Solomonic dynasty in terms of creating and propagating the Solomonic myth, controlling the legitimation of the dynasty, as keeper of chronicles and memories, socializing young generation through Church education and making and keeping social boundaries within the dominion of the Highland Christian Kingdom. As guardians of the *Tabot* Christianity, Solomonic emperors since Yikuno Amlak, on their part, had worked hard to secure and expand the Church. They built the Ethiopian Orthodox Church on firm grounds through the construction of many monasteries and church schools, producing young clerics indoctrinated with the Solomonic ideology, translating, and copying religious texts and preaching the divinity of the Ethiopian Kings.[214] Furthermore, in line with the agreement between Yikuno Amlak and Tekle Haymanot, the Solomonic Kings agreed to reserve a third of state land and property for the Church as rista-gult.[215]

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[212] Taddesse, "Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527."
[213] Tamrat Taddesse, "The Abbots of Däbrä-Hayq 1248-1535," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 8, no. 1 (May 2, 1970): 96.
[214] Angore, "Reconstructing Ethiopia's Collective Memory by Rewriting Its History: The Politics of Islam"; Taddesse, "Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527."
[215] Taddesse, "Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527."

However, these conquests and expansions did not target all regions for conversion to *Tabot* Christianity and settlement of Abyssinians. Different regions were targeted with three different strategies depending on the distance from the center and the suitability of the conquered lands for agriculture and defense. First, areas that were in the perimeter of the kingdom were targeted for total assimilation, through which areas of the medieval Sultanates of Shawa and Ifat had been cleansed of their Muslim population through extermination, conversion, and displacement. According to Tadesse Tamrat,[216] the leading authority on Medieval Ethiopian History:

> Amde Tsion appropriated all the peoples and their land, and reserved every right to dispose of them according to his wishes. He executed all resistance fighters who fell into his hands and reduced to slavery other captives of war. These acts of cruel repression were deliberately committed not only to replenish the ever-failing provisions of the huge army, but also to force the people to surrender and to give them a terrible example of the destructive force of the Christian army in case of further revolts.

Lands in these areas were given as a gult for monasteries, churches, the royal family and the Chewa, or warrior class. Moreover, heavy dues were imposed on the conquered people. Over time, the conquered people were religiously assimilated until the Muslim country of Ifat was unrecognizably Orthodox Christian.[217]

Second, areas that had their traditional ruling dynasties were reduced to tributary polities, with the ruling family kept as a vassal. This includes Muslim sultanates like Dawaro, Shirka, Bali and Hadya. As these polities refused to pay tributes or revolt, the Solomonic monarchs established a presence through roving cities and temporary garrisons called *Katema*. The last areas are pastoral regions in the eastern, southern and Red Sea areas. The strategy for control of this region was annual raiding and looting campaigns.

Different polities that were invaded by the Christian Kingdom responded differently. Some capitulated and adapted to the policies of the Christian Kingdom. Others oscillated between accepting suzerainty and revolting from time to time, depending on the relative balance of power. The raids were not unidirectional, even if most of them ended with the Christian Kingdom's upper hand. Muslim Sultanates also raided areas under the control of the kingdom from time to time. After over two hundred years of overall dominance by the

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[216] Taddesse, 189–90.
[217] Taddesse, "Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527."

Christian Kingdom, however, one challenge from a Muslim Sultanate broke this pattern of domination and southward expansions in the first half of the 16th century.[218]

The second significant development that shaped the Horn of Africa was the rise of Adal Sultanate's Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi, or as often called by the Ethiopianists Ahmed Gragn (Ahmed the left-handed). A military genius, Imam Ahmed organized Somali and Afar nomads and conducted Jihad against the Christian kingdoms with sweeping victory after victory. With the help of the new weapons and musketeers of the Ottoman governor of Yemen, Imam Ahmed changed the balance of power. He not only used extra-regional powers and new firearms, but he also changed the earlier notion of raids and then returned home.[219] Rather, he took his warrior wife, Bati Del Wambara,[220] and conquered the entire Horn of Africa region from Zeila to Massawa, from Aksum to Lake Tana, destroying some institutions of the Christian Kingdom and converting the majority of the people to Islam between 1529 and 1543.[221]

This dominance by Imam Ahmed sent shocks and crises into the heart of the Solomonic dynasty that sent desperate calls for help accusing the Imam and "Turks"[222] as joined hands to eliminate Christianity from Ethiopia. A force of some 400 Portuguese musketeers led by Christopher da Gama (son of Vasco da Gama, the famous traveler) arrived the following year. After losing half of the Portuguese soldiers, including its commander, da Gama, the Christian forces turned the tide and defeated Imam Ahmed's forces after the Imam was mortally wounded by a bullet fired by a Portuguese marksman at the Battle of Wayna Daga on 22 February 1543.[223] After the death of the Imam, his forces collapsed and were easily defeated. His wife organized the rest and returned to the City of Harar, the last strong defensive position of the Sultanate until its fall in 1887. However, to date, Imam Ahmed is

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[218] Taddesse.

[219] Samantha Kelly, *A Companion to Medieval Ethiopia and Eritrea*, ed. Samantha Kelly, *A Companion to Medieval Ethiopia and Eritrea* (Leiden ; Boston: BRILL, 2020), 460, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004419582.

[220] Ahmed, *History of Harar and the Hararis*, 300.

[221] Assefa, "The Constitutional Right to Self-Determination as a Response to the 'Question of Nationalities' in Ethiopia," March 2018.p.7

[222] The church chroniclers of the medieval period introduced this idea that the "Turks" was the one behind the successes of Imam Ahmed. Even if there are evidence that show that Sultan Suleiman I was not interested in conquering Ethiopia (see, pp. 462-463) and the weapons and Musketeers were from Yemen not directly from Istanbul. However, there were clear rivalries and wars between the Ottoman Empire and Portuguese at that time that influenced the regional politics of the Horn of Africa.

[223] Ahmed, *History of Harar and the Hararis*, 59.

the source of the worst ghost, called "Ahmed Gragn syndrome",[224] to be summoned by Christian rulers to justify the oppression and subjugation of Muslims, to justify their foreign policies towards Somalia and Sudan, as well as its relations across the Red Sea; that are still being tainted by that memory.[225] On the other hand, Imam Ahmed has also been the hero that Somali nationalists, including the idea of Greater Somalia and Afar and Muslims in the region, summon the memories of jihads of Imam Ahmed to draw an inspiring achievement from the past.

The third development was a religious schism introduced by the Jesuit missionaries. Following Portuguese musketeers' critical support in defending the Christian kingdom against Imam Ahmed's domination, Jesuit missionaries started proselytizing Catholicism. The Jesuit priests, over time, succeeded in converting Emperor Susenyos in 1630 in direct contradiction to the requirement of following Tabot-Christianity by Kebra Nagast. The pressure to officially make the Ethiopian Catholic Kingdom and force the people to convert was met with fierce resistance and bloody civil war. After the bloody civil war, Emperor Susenyos agreed to abandon the idea of making Catholicism a state religion and abdicated his power in favor of his son, Fasilides.[226] Emperor Fasilides expelled the Jesuit missionaries and got the remaining followers of the Catholic faith exterminated.[227] He legally proscribed Catholicism. Furthermore, to close the Catholic influence, he established closer ties with the old enemy, the Ottoman empire, so that Europeans would be kept away for two hundred years, from 1632 to 1840s. Besides, he allowed Muslims to live in his city, Gonder, where they dominated trade.[228]

The fourth development that profoundly changed the politics of the Horn of Africa was the growing dominance of the Oromo in areas where the Emperors of the Christian Kingdom settled, Gonder, and where Adal Sultanate settled, Harar, from the 16th century to the late 19th century. Due to both its Gadaa system of social organization and the relative weakness of the two opponents, the Oromo rapidly expanded up to Tigray in the north and

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[224] Haggai Erlich, *Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 4.
[225] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 30.
[226] Paul B Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2000), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-11786-1.
[227] Henze.
[228] Mohammed Dejen Assen, "Contested Secularism in Ethiopia: The Contention Between Muslims and the Government" (Addis Ababa University, 2016), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2831300.

Harar in the east. The Oromo expansion over vast lands resulted in two developments that still affect the Oromo and peoples of the Horn of Africa region. First, part of Oromo in the central and southern part of today's Ethiopia kept its Gadaa system by maintaiaining its core culture intact until the intervention of the modern Ethiopian state.

Second, the Oromos that expanded far from the core gradually dropped the Oromo governance institutions and adopted the social organization of the societies that they encountered. For instance, Oromos of the North, what is now Wollo, and Tigray adopted Islam and Christianity and partially integrated into the Christian Kingdom. Oromos of the West, like those of the Gibe states of Jimma, Limmu, Gomma, Guma and Gera, as well as Leqa Qellam and Leqa Naqamte in Wollega, established monarchies whose official language was Oromo and religion either Islam or Christianity. Oromos of the East also integrated into the Islamic culture of the Sultanates of the East. These relatively easier integrations of the Oromo into different social environments served as a buffer zone between different societies, including the Christian Kingdom and Adal Sultanate. On the downside, it fragmented the single largest ethnic identity group over time. One of the fragments that profoundly affected the medieval politics and formation of modern Ethiopia was the Northern Oromo of Wollo.[229]

The Northern Oromo warrior class started to take part in the internal powers struggles of the Christian Kingdom, supporting would-be monarchs to claim the throne of the Solomonic dynasty. They became a reliable force to shore Solomonic monarchs up against the Amhara nobility. For instance, while emperors like Susenyos and Bakaffa employed the Oromo warrior class to take the throne, Reid[230] further argues that "in the second half of the seventeenth century, for example, Fasilides had forged alliances with the Oromo elite at Gondar during a theological controversy within the Orthodox Church which had isolated the monarchy from many Amhara noblemen". According to Mohammed Hasan,[231] by the 1720s Yejju (Christened) and Warra Himano (Muslim) Oromo dynasties were well-founded and powerful leaders in the Christian Kingdom. From then on, the Solomonic emperors of the Gonderine period were increasingly relying on the Oromo warrior class so much that they

[229] Mohammed Hassen, *The Oromo and the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia, 1300-1700* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2017).
[230] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 35.
[231] Hassen, *The Oromo and the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia, 1300-1700*.

became kingmakers, and the Oromo language became the palace language.[232] However, they refrained from claiming the Solomonic genealogy and emperorship even if they had blood relationships through marriages with Christian emperors that took power through the mythical Solomonic line.[233]

To balance against this growing influence of the Oromo elites, Queen Mintewwab, the mother of Young Emperor Iyoas, called a Tigrayan warlord Ras Mikael Sehul. When Ras Mikael arrived with an army of thirty thousand men, the Amharized Oromos in Gonder and the non-Amharized Oromos of Wollo were fighting each other. He used the opportunity and got both groups eliminated. After killing forty-four key leaders of the Oromo from both sides, he then killed the young Emperor Iyoas, the one he called to protect. By killing Iyoas and naming the monarch of his choice, Ras Mikael Sehul started what is known as the era of Princess in Ethiopian history that lasted from 1769 to 1855.[234] After two years, Ras Michael was defeated and sent back to Tigray; the Warra Himano dynasty continued practicing Islam and Imamate governance system, while the Yejju dynasty continued as regent to the throne, making kings and protecting the throne until Emperor Tewodros II defeated them in 1853 and ushered the end of Zemene Mesafint and the beginning of state-making in Ethiopia. Meanwhile, these two divergent developments of Oromo expansion, the one that continued practicing the Gadaa system and those that integrated into the political system of the Christian Kingdom and other monarchies, fragmented the Oromo ethnic group with consequences that will be observed in the upcoming pages.

3.3 Making of Modern Ethiopia, Part I, 1855-1896: Uniting and Cleansing the Core

Whether one subscribes to the 'unification of Modern Ethiopia' or the colonization of non-Abyssinian by Abyssinian monarchs, there is general agreement on when the 'unification' process was officially restarted, or the colonization process started. On 11 February 1855, a shifta (bandit) called Kassa Hailu was coronated as Tewodros II, King of Kings of Ethiopia. His coronation, including his regnal name, signified an ending of an old era, the Era of Princes, and a beginning of a new era, the Era of 'Solomonic' Emperors. He

[232] Hassen, 344.
[233] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*.
[234] Hassen, *The Oromo and the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia, 1300-1700*, 345.

tried to remake the Abyssinian polity in the image of Kebra Nagast's utopian Ethiopia by redefining its identity (confessional, genealogical, ethnic, and linguistic), temporality and spatiality.

After church education, Kassa served *Dejazmach* Kinfu, the regional landlord of the frontier region called Qwara, which borders Sudan. Kassa was aiming to inherit this area as a landlord since it used to be administered by his grandfather and father. On learning that the authorities passed him after the death of *Dejazmach* Kinfu and gave the land to another person, he joined shiftanet (banditry) in the lowlands of Qwara to retrieve his inheritance by force.[235] Shiftanet was the school of leadership and martial skills for ambitious young men in those days.[236] According to Bahru Zewde, one of the leading scholars of Ethiopian history, this shiftanet time of Kassa brought him into direct conflict with Egyptian forces in Sudan that solidified his lifelong image of the 'enemy' and the policies he followed afterward.[237]

Kassa experienced his only major battle defeat at the Battle of Dabarki in 1848 to Egyptian forces. Well-organized and well-armed Egyptian troops mown down troops of Kassa with utter efficiency that he had never seen. He escaped with wounds both to his body and worldview. As opposed to the obtained wisdom that Ethiopians are "chosen people" and that conquer but never get conquered, standard indoctrination of the Kebra Nagast, Kassa's experience was a humiliating defeat for a young warrior whose dreams were to liberate his "fathers'' Holy Lands. He learned his lesson, the need for modern firearms and military discipline, but kept his vision of removing enemies from the lands of his fathers, from Qwara to Jerusalem.[238]

Qwara was granted to him with the title of *Dejazmach* by Ras Ali II, following his growing fame and increasing followers for defending the borders. In addition, Ras Ali, the real power holder as the kingmaker, also gave him his daughter Tewabech to tame and socialize him by the then main tool of social mobility, political marriage. In a while, however, following Kassa's sickness, the Yejju Lords at the Palace of Gonder sent him and his wife a portion of meat that is meant as a symbolic insult for a warrior of his status.[239] He

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[235] Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*, 49–50.
[236] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 51.
[237] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 28.
[238] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*; Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*.
[239] Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood : Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*, 50.

was furious, and his wife reportedly stirred him into action against her parents by saying: "'Tateq! Ager yelehim!', meaning: 'Arm yourself! [Have you] no country [to retire to]? Let's go!' Tateq became his 'horse-name'".[240] He returned to Qwara but returned to defeat them.

Kassa first defeated his ex-patron *Dejazmach* Goshu of Gojjam in 1852. After defeating four more vassals of Ras Ali, his father-in-law, he defeated Ali himself at the battle of Ayshal in 1853 and brought an end to the Yejju dynasty. After crushing the army of Ras Wube, who was planning to be crowned emperor by claiming Solomonic descent, Kassa got himself crowned by force at the Church of Ras Wube and with the Abun that Ras Wube brought from Alexandria for his coronation. Even if Kassa did not have a strong claim to the Solomonic line, his victory over other contenders was proved enough to be crowned as King of Kings Tewodros II of Ethiopia on 11 February 1855. He took "Tewodros" as a royal name because there was a popular legend that claimed that he was a "messianic king and saviour of Ethiopia who would unite the country and destroy Islam on his way to redeem Jerusalem".[241]

His expressed vision was to get his empire cleansed of the Oromos and remove the "Turks" from his "fathers' holy lands".[242] He subjugated Wollo and Shawa the same year and brought the core, Abyssinia, under his control. To realize his vision of removing the "Turks" from Jerusalem, he started communicating with European powers. The usual trend was referring to what 16th Imam Ahmed did to Christian Ethiopia, or how the "Turks" oppressed Christian Ethiopia by blocking it from the Christian world. Here is a typical letter that set the tone for Ethiopian rulers' demands[243] afterward:

> ... the Englishman, Bell, used to tell me that there is a great Christian Queen who loves all Christians. When they told me that they are able to introduce me to her and to establish friendship between us, then that made me very unhappy, ... I was prevented by the Turks who occupy the sea coast from sending to you an embassy during my difficult times ... Be hold how Moslems oppress the Christians

The second type of demand is based on the action to be taken and the resources they

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[240] Berhane-Selassie, 50.
[241] Haggai Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Middle East* (Boulder (Colo.); London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 49.
[242] Erlich, 49.
[243] quoted in Seifuddin Adem Hussien, "Islam, Christianity and Ethiopia's Foreign Policy," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 17, no. 1 (April 1997): 130, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602009708716363.

need to accomplish it. The target, as usual, is the 'Turk' that encircled Ethiopia. Emperor Tewodros wrote[244] to Queen Victoria of England and Emperor Napoleon III of France in 1862, saying,

> Since the kings of Ethiopia, my father, in times past had forgotten their Creator, he withdrew his Spirit from them and deprived them of their kingdoms, which he gave to the [Oromo] and the Turks. At my birth, God picked me up from the dust, gave me strength, raised me up, and by divine power I have chased away the [Oromo]. The Turks, however, resist the will of God, and since they refuse to surrender the land of my fathers, I am going out to fight them.

He sent letters demanding the support of Christian powers, particularly with arms with which he would defeat his enemies. However, the European powers refused to come to his aid. Rather, they refused to recognize him as equal, let alone as the 'divine' one who would liberate the Holy Lands. Queen Victoria ignored his requests. The reply from Napoleon was sent without "the royal seal or signature, advising him to grant toleration to Roman Catholic missionaries in his country while ignoring his appeals".[245] Emperor Tewodros, who felt he was ignored and his request unfulfilled by European powers, took European missionaries and consuls as hostages as a precondition to force them to fulfill his demands.

Furthermore, he ordered his European prisoners to produce weapons, including cannons and a naval ship. In the meantime, he was also introducing and enforcing a number of state-building and nation-building projects that would help him combine the empire. He made Amharic *Afa-Negus*, the official language of his empire. He also introduced a kind of modern organization and hierarchy to his army that includes ranks *yasr alaqa* (commander of ten), *yamsa alaqa* (commander of fifty), and *ya shi alaqa* (commander of a thousand) that are still in use.[246] He also tried to introduce some remuneration mechanism to relieve the army from predation and living off the peasants, except for Muslim Oromo areas, where he allowed looting and raiding for slavery. He also tried to restrict the number of the clerical class, mainly priests and deacons, so that more land would be freed for peasants. However, his policies and actions led him to the opposition, rebellions from northern Oromos, nobilities that lost their powers and resources to him, the Orthodox Church, and finally,

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[244] Sven Rubenson, *Tewodros and His Contemporaries 1855-1868* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1994), 203.
[245] Venkataram, "Foreign Policy of Theodore II of Ethiopia: An Interpretation," 139.
[246] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 33.

European powers that were insulted by an African despot.

His responses to opposition and rebellions were further desperation and violence. He imprisoned the *Abun*, the Head of the Orthodox Church, who excommunicated him and died in prison. He started "destroying churches, burning people alive or starving them to death, massacring prisoners of war, destroying wholesale the herds of cattle which were the livelihoods of communities".[247] Consequently, he had undone his achievements, and all the provinces he subdued rebelled against him, and his troops deserted him. And worse of all, when he was weak, desperate, and lonely, the only power he trusted and expected much from, Britain sent a military expedition that would punish him and release the European hostages in 1868.

In one of the most expensive overseas military operations, 9 million pounds approved by the British Parliament, the British Government appointed General Napier to lead a force of 42,000 men from the Gulf of Zula on the Eritrean coast up into the highlands, to confront Tewodros and free the captives. Napier's expeditionary force reached the fortress seat of Tewodros in Maqdala smoothly because local nobilities helped throughout the journey. First, Kassa Mircha of Tigray, later Emperor Yohannes IV, was angry because of the way Tewodros treated him when he was at Tewodros's court and, more importantly, the way Tewodros treated the *Abun* and the clergy made his personal and religious justification to support the British forces easier. Second, the Queens of Wollo, Workitu and Mastewat, whose sons and followers were killed by Tewodros, supported the Napier forces. Finally, when they reached the seat of Tewodros after mowing down, the demoralized army of Tewodros, the British reached Magdala, where Tewodros, who was besieged and outgunned, allegedly committed suicide.

When it came to achieving the goal of uniting Ethiopia and cleansing internal and external enemies, Emperor Tewodros was a failure. However, his policies were inherited and successfully put into practice by succeeding monarchs. His policy of removing Muslims, Jews and Oromos by excluding them from possessing the land for cultivation, assuming imperial positions, public social functions and taking part in the military was fully taken over by his successors. Amharic language, organization, and formation of the army, and, more importantly, the attempts to build a centralized Ethiopian empire were more

[247] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 55.

successfully achieved by his successors. Finally, because it was claimed that he committed suicide rather than capitulate to the foreign army, he became an icon of the Greater Ethiopia tradition and a hero to be summoned for justification of the use of force to resolve socio-political problems.

3.4 Napier Expedition and Making of Modern Ethiopia During Emperor Yohannes

The brief Napier expedition unleashed both internal and external forces that envisioned filling the vacuum created by the removal of Emperor Tewodros in April 1868. Internally, three contenders, Wagshum Gobeze of Lasta, Kassa of Mircha of Tigray and Menilek of Shawa, claimed the throne to consolidate Tewodros' vision of Christian Ethiopia further. Their differences were ethnic, doctrinal, descent and regional. First, Gobeze of Lasta, from the Agaw ethnic group, Tawehedo doctrine, Zagwe dynastic line and North-West part of the Abyssinian polity, took state power with the regnal name of Emperor Tekle-Giorgis II (1868-71). He was challenged and defeated by Kassa Mircha of Tigray from a venerated region of Aksum, Tigray ethnic group and Tewahedo doctrine and neo-Solomonic descent line. Kassa easily defeated Emperor Tekle Giyorgis at the Battle of Assam in July 1871 because of revolutionary changes both in his armaments and the formation of his troops.[248]

Kassa was provided with military aid worth approximately £500,000, including artillery, muskets, rifles, and munitions by the departing Napier expedition [249] Even though the 3000 rifles he got were dated for the British forces; it had revolutionized the warfare in Ethiopia. Because until then, Ethiopian warriors were limited to medieval gun powders at best, while most were armed with the locally made gorede, spears, and arrows. Furthermore, Kassa's forces also learned something new from the departing British expedition, trenching tactics and form in fighting. He used the new arms and tactics on Emperor Tekle Giyorgis and easily defeated a force of 60,000 men with 12,000 men.[250] After unprecedented preparations, Kassa was crowned Emperor Yohannes IV in January 1872. He took the regnal

[248] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 43.
[249] Harold G. Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia, A History of Ethiopia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 43, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315762722-8.
[250] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 43.

name ‘Yohannes’ after John the Baptist to signal his intention to baptize the peoples of Ethiopia,[251] which was a precursor of the state-building and nation-building policies he would follow.

Emperor Yohannes’s state and nation-building policies were claims of the Kebra Nagast[252] , with a few innovations to bolster them. In addition to the title of “Negusa Nagast of Ethiopia”, he specifically added “King of Zion”, implying that he is specifically for what Teshale Tibebu called “Tabot Christianity”.[253] This claim is based on the legend of Kebre Nagast that the Tabernacle of Mosses was present at the Saint Mary’s Church of Aksum, the new Jerusalem.[254] And henceforth, everyone who lives in his kingdom must profess the doctrine of Orthodox Tewahedo. He followed two strategies to achieve the policy of homogenizing people in confession. First, he resolved the doctrinal differences by outlawing all other doctrines and declaring the Tewahedo as the only doctrine of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church at the Council of Boru Meda in Wollo in 1878. Second, and simultaneously he passed an edict for all subjects in his empire to convert to Orthodox Christianity. Accordingly, “Christians, Muslims, and pagans were given two, three and five years, respectively, to conform. Muslim officials were given three months to renounce either their positions or their religion; pagan officials were to accept Christianity immediately”.[255]

To avenge what the Muslim leader of the 16th century did, Emperor Yohannes and his regional vassals rounded up and slaughtered Muslims of Wollo in thousands following the Boru Meda Council.[256] They followed through with this policy, as a result of which thousands of Oromos in Wollo and Shawa were converted in mass. Besides, the two leading

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[251] Crummey, “Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia (Légitimité Impériale et Création d’une Idéologie Néo-Salomonienne En Éthiopie Au XIXe Siècle),” 31.

[252] It is reported that Yohannes had written to Lord Granville in the following words: “Again there is a book called Kivera Negust (i.e. Kebra Nagast), which contains the Law of the whole of Ethiopia, and the names of the Shums (i.e. Chiefs), Churches, and Provinces are in this book. I pray you will find out who has got this book, and send it to me, *for in my Country my people will not obey my orders without it*.” The words in Italics were added by translators.

[253] Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896-1974*.

[254] Munro-Hay, *The Quest for the Ark of the Covenant : The True History of the Tablets of Moses*; Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)*.

[255] Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*. P. 150

[256] Crummey, “Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia (Légitimité Impériale et Création d’une Idéologie Néo-Salomonienne En Éthiopie Au XIXe Siècle),” 31; Mekuria Bulcha, “Genocidal Violence in the Making of Nation and State in Ethiopia,” *African Sociological Review / Revue Africaine de Sociologie* 9, no. 2 (2006): 15, https://doi.org/10.4314/asr.v9i2.23257.; Bulcha, “Genocidal Violence in the Making of Nation and State in Ethiopia.”

leaders of Wollo, Imam Mohammed Ali and Imam Amade Liban, were baptized as Ras Mikael and Dejazmach Haile Mariam, respectively; and retained their positions.[257] The majority of Muslim nobilities and followers of traditional faiths converted with the fear of being replaced by those who were willing and kept their powers, positions, and benefits. Most Muslim clerics and the general Muslim community responded with three different approaches. Those who were capable revolted and declared Jihad and fought bitterly for years until they were eliminated by combined forces of the Abyssinian Emperor and nobility.[258] The other groups fled to Hijaz, Yemen, Sudan, and the Muslim Sultanates of what is now present Ethiopia, including Gurage and Harar. Those who could not or would not join Jihad or fled followed "a nominal conversion, where Muslims became Christians in daylight and practised Islam at night based on the Islamic concept of taqiyya (dissimulation)".[259]

This holy war of Emperor Yohannes was, in part, the consequence of the external dimension of the Napier expedition of 1868. This expedition gave false hope for Khedive Ismail of Egypt (r. 1863 to 1879), who would inaugurate the opening of the Suez Canal in the following year. Ismail wanted to capitalize on the internal rivalries among Ethiopian nobilities and lessons learned from the ease with which the Napier forces entered and left Ethiopia. He sent a few thousand mercenary forces to control the highlands of Abyssinia. However, his forces were easily defeated at the battle of Gundet in 1875. Humiliated Khedive Ismael sent a much larger force in 1876 to Abyssinia to be further humiliated again at the Battle of Gura by forces of Emperor Yohannes, who mobilized and led them as holy warriors.[260] The double defeats of Khedive Ismail's forces in Ethiopia, on the other hand, gave a moral boost to the rise of the Mahdist movement in Sudan to open a war on Egyptian forces in Sudan that finally sealed the fate of Emperor Yohannes.[261]

The British colonized Egypt in 1882 and assumed responsibility for her possessions, including Sudan. Just before the British takeover, the Mahdists started a revolt in June 1881 and encircled the Egyptian army in Kassala. To release the sandwiched Egyptian troops,

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[257] Tesfaye Wolde-Medhin, "Highland Farmers and the 'Modernizing' State in Ethiopia: Conjunctures and Disjunctures" (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1983), 54.
[258] Assen, "Contested Secularism in Ethiopia: The Contention Between Muslims and the Government."
[259] Angore, "Reconstructing Ethiopia's Collective Memory by Rewriting Its History: The Politics of Islam."
[260] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991,* 45.
[261] Leenco Lata, *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland : The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization* (Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2004).

Britain negotiated an agreement with Emperor Yohannes in June 1884 to help the evacuation of the besieged troops. Yohannes, who had been trying to re-establish an alliance with Christian powers, eagerly signed the agreement in return for free import of goods, and ammunition, Egyptian facilitation of the appointment of bishops, and the restoration of Bogos to Ethiopia.[262] However, the Christian power he trusted, Britain, rather gave him two enemies that would end his life and divide his people into two, i.e., Mahdiyya and Italy.

First, Britain gave Italy the green light to control areas that were evacuated by Egypt, including Massawa on 15 October 1884,[263] to check French pinch movements from Djibouti to Dakar to dominate Africa. After controlling Massawa, Italians persuaded the Sultan of Zanzibar to give them the Coast of Benadir and the Juba River valley (what is now southern Somalia) and determined to connect it with Massawa. When they failed to convince both Emperor Yohannes and his Red Sea coast governor, Ras Alula, to give them territories, the Italians started to control the territories of Ethiopia by force. However, Yohannes' force, led by Ras Alula, defeated the Italians at the Battle of Dogali on 27 January 1887.[264] The defeated Italians rather increased their communications with and support to King Menilek of Shawa, who archrival of Yohannes for the throne of the Ethiopian Empire has been. Menilek, on his part, increased his territorial expansion to the south and east and controlled the strategic emirate of Harar in 1887, thereby opening an outlet to the Red Sea while substantially increasing his financial muscle and firepower. He also had constantly been working to raise an internal rebellion against Emperor Yohannes from Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam in addition to his usual secret machination with Italy and correspondence with Mahdiyya to attack the emperor.[265]

When Emperor Yohannes moved to put down the rebellion of Tekle Haymanot and Menilek, the Mahdists attacked the western frontier region of Ethiopia and sacked Gonder, burned churches and enslaved women and children, including the daughter of King Teklehaimanot of Gojjam.[266] After punishing Gojjam for ravaging it to the ground, the

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[262] Rubenson, *Survival of Ethiopian Independence B.Pdf*, 356.
[263] Lata, *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland : The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization*.
[264] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 96.
[265] Getahun Dilebo, "Historical Origins and Development of the Eritrean Problem 1889–1962," *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs* 7, no. 3 (March 1, 1974): 221–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/001132557400700302.
[266] Dilebo, 228.

emperor turned his face to Mahdiyya before punishing Menilek. When the emperor was killed at the Battle of Galabat in March 1889, passing his throne to his son Ras Mengesha,[267] Menilek informed the death of the Emperor to Italy and urged them to control parts of Tigray and signed the (in)famous treaty of Wichale to secure the throne he has been vying for decades.

3.5 Emperor Menilek II and Consolidation of the Ethiopian Empire

Following the killing of Emperor Yohannes at the Battle of Galabat, Negus Menilek of Shawa wasted no time in claiming the Imperial throne that he had been contesting. His regnal name and suffixes are obvious and accustomed to by practices of preceding monarchs. First, Menilek II, his regnal name, is meant as second only to the legendary Menilek I, the son of Biblical King Solomon and legendary Queen Sheba of the Kebra Nagast. Second, he added, "Mo'a Anbasa Ze'emnagada Yehuda," which means "The lion of the tribe of Judah has prevailed".[268] Third, he also introduced another dimension. He moved legitimation by Nebura'id of Aksum to the Nebura'id position he created at Adisalem in Shawa, his region. Through his coronation-related representations and performativity, Emperor Menilek II redefined Ethiopia in the image of Amhara, thereby excluding Tigray. By policies he followed since he was King of Shawa, Menilek redefined the Ethiopian state in identity, descent, and spatial dimensions while keeping the confessional dimension propagated by his predecessors. Menilek II founded contemporary Ethiopia with its current boundaries through two profound actions. First, he aggressively expanded the Abyssinian boundaries to non-Abyssinian polities in all directions except the north. Second, he colluded with Italians so that a part of Tigray, along with lowland Muslim communities, was colonized as Eritrea.[269] Let us see both points in detail, as they are critical for an understanding of contemporary national identity contestations and Ethiopia's regional security policy.

Menilek, who was a son of Negus Hayla-Malakot of Shawa, was taken to Emperor Tewodros's prison in Maqdala in 1855 following Shawa's defeat. For ten years, he was educated under Tewodros's supervision until he escaped in 1865. Even if he claimed the

[267] Dilebo, 230.
[268] Crummey, "Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia (Légitimité Impériale et Création d'une Idéologie Néo-Salomonienne En Éthiopie Au XIXe Siècle)," 35.
[269] Dilebo, "Historical Origins and Development of the Eritrean Problem 1889–1962."

imperial throne after his escape, he could not take it because Tekle Giyorgis and Yohannes were more powerful than him in terms of firepower at the time. To realize his obsession with the imperial throne, he started amassing firearms using his developing relations with European merchants and travelers that started to frequent his court. To buy more weapons, he had to get more resources through taxes, loot, and tributes. His options were further complicated by the control of long-distance trade that started from southern Ethiopia by the regional vassal of Gojjam, Negus Adal.[270] To control this lucrative long-distance trade, Menilek sent an army led by Ras Gobena, an Oromo general, against the army of Negus Tekla-Haymanot, whose army was led by Ras Daraso, another Oromo general. The Menilek side won the Battle of Embabo in 1882.[271] The Battle of Embabo was a turning point in Menilek's rise to power and the creation of current Ethiopia. Following this battle, the Western Oromo Kingdoms of Jimma, Leqa Naqamte and Leqa Qelam were convinced by Ras Gobena to pay a fixed annual tribute (*qurx gibir*) to Menilek that gave him a fortune.[272]

He used the newly acquired wealth to amass more and more weapons and started a war with another Oromo, the Arsi, which fiercely resisted his conquest for four years, 1882-1886. The Arsi cavalry defeated Menilek's forces in three battles, in one of which Menilek barely escaped with his life, leaving behind his wife and shoes.[273] However, the Arsi, who fought with traditional homemade spears, were mowed down with recently imported firearms. After over ten thousand Arsi warriors were killed in one day by the forces of Menilek at the Battle of Azule in 1886, the Arsi Oromo capitulated to Menilek. Menilek forces used all imaginable kinds of punishments, including mutilation, which is remembered as *Harkaa fi Harma Muraa Aanolee*, to castrating men who participated in the resistance, selling the young as slaves and taking away all the movable properties and burning down the rest.[274] Worse of all, Menilek instituted the *Gabbar-Naftagna* system on Arsi Oromo that was later applied to every region he occupied afterward.

However, the *Gabbar-Naftagna* system was not closed to Arsi Oromos or any other noncore identity group (NCIGs), provided that they could demonstrate and prove their loyalty to the Menileken Empire through the acquisition of specific cultural credentials. The

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[270] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 45.
[271] Zewde, 60.
[272] Zewde, 62.
[273] Gnamo, *Conquest and Resistance in the Ethiopian Empire, 1880-1974 : The Case of the Arsi Oromo*, 164.
[274] Gnamo, 157–61.

first and necessary cultural requirement was adherence to Orthodox Christianity, often followed by changing the Oromo or Muslim name to Amharic with Christian meaning.[275] Those who converted accordingly were provided with land rights, titles of public office, gult rights and other economic, political, and social benefits that were denied to non-Orthodox Christians. The second and related cultural credential for joining the empire's governance network was fluency in the Amharic language, which still is. Finally, the adoption of a set of norms of Abyssinian dressing codes and styles, marriage and food customs enhanced one's assimilation and social mobility. Here, even when Menilek was just a regional vassal, assimilation was not an option; it was essential to be part of the system.[276]

After reducing the Arsi Oromos to mere serfdom and slavery, the next even more important target of Menilek was the Emirate of Harar. Menilek's forces defeated the forces of Emir Abdullahi of Harar at the Battle of Chalenqo after bloody fights in January 1887.[277] When he entered Harar, a strategic city that connects the interior of the Horn of Africa with the Red Sea and a city that has been the center of Islamic learning for centuries, he announced that Harar was no more a Muslim city. In his letters to the British Resident Consul, Menilek justified his invasion of Harar on religious grounds. He wrote:[278]

> From Menilek, King of Shawa, and of all the [Oromos] good and bad! How are you? By the grace of God I am well! Amir Abdellahi would suffer no Christian in his country. He was another Grange. But by the help of God, I fought him, destroyed him and he escaped on horseback. I hoisted my flag in his capital and my troops occupied his city. Grange died. Abdellahi in our day was his successor. This is not a Muslim country, as everyone knows.

To prove that the city was no more a Muslim country, Ras Mekonnen got demolished the Sheikh Bazikh Mosque, which was the second main Mosque within the Jugal walls of Harar and in its place erected the Church of Medhane Alem.[279] Outside the Jugal, many churches were built on the ruins of mosques and *madrasas* demolished by Menilek soldiers.[280] Moreover, like in the case of Arsi Oromo, the lands were appropriated from local

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[275] Gnamo, 183.
[276] John Markakis, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 73–74.
[277] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 63.
[278] Dilebo, "Emperor Menilek's Ethiopia, 1865-1916: National Unification or Amhara Communal Domination," 90–91.
[279] Ahmed, *History of Harar and the Hararis*, 113.
[280] Assen, "Contested Secularism in Ethiopia: The Contention Between Muslims and the Government," 100.

peoples and placed under the *Gabbar-Naftagna* system and the Church.

The Second strategy that Menilek used to take the Solomonic throne was diplomacy and foreign relations. His kingdom of Shawa was at the heart of long-distance trades that connected the hinterland of the Horn of Africa region with the coastal one; his court had been frequented by foreigners. He used these connections and contacts fruitfully to communicate with foreign powers that might help him defeat Emperor Yohannes. First, he communicated with Egypt to be neutral in their wars against Emperor Yohannes with the expectation that the Khedive's forces would destroy Yohannes for him. When his "fond hopes went up in smoke",[281] Menilek begged for forgiveness from Emperor Yohannes, carrying a rock of submission on his shoulder just to bid time.

Second, he started secret agreements with Italians. In 1883 he signed a secret commercial treaty with Italy, and then signed another secret agreement of neutrality with Italy on 25 October 1887, in return getting from Italy 5,000 Remington rifles on sale.[282] Even worse, he agreed to the infamous Treaty of Wichale in 1889 while the emperor was fighting both Italians and Mahdists. Two weeks before Emperor Yohannes was killed at the Battle of Galabat by Mahdists, Menilek agreed to territorial concessions to Italy. On learning that the emperor was killed passing the throne to his son, Ras Mengesha, Menilek wrote the following to the Italian King:[283]

> I would beg your Majesty to give orders to all the generals in Massawa not to listen to the words of the rebels who are to be found in some parts of Tigre and forbid the passage of arms… I would like the soldiers of your Majesty to occupy Asmara and make sure that this route is well guarded and defended. I allow myself to say these things to your Majesty, because I see that God, in his justice, gives me the throne that for so many years I had the right to have and which will give rest and peace to all Ethiopia.

Accordingly, Italy controlled the territory of Emperor Yohannes with the agreement of Menilek, thereby dividing Tigrigna-speaking people into two. The northern part of Mereb Melesh areas, inhabited by mainly Orthodox Christian Tigrigna speakers, was curbed into what is now called Eritrea along with Muslim populations of the lowland as an Italian colony. However, the Wichale Treaty that Menilek signed to secure the throne and sold

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[281] Harold G Marcus, *The Life and Times of Menelik II : Ethiopia 1844-1913* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 42.
[282] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 75.
[283] Dilebo, "Historical Origins and Development of the Eritrean Problem 1889–1962," 232.

Eritrea for turned out to be thorny for him as well.

The Wichale treaty was signed in two languages, Amharic and Italian, and Article XVII has a major difference in the two language versions. While the Amharic version states that Ethiopia could optionally conduct its foreign affairs through Italy, the Italian version indicates that Menilek's foreign contacts must be through the agency of Italy. As a result, based on the Italian version of Article XVII, Italy announced that all foreign powers had to deal with Ethiopia only through Italy.[284] Accordingly, when Menilek announced his accession to the throne, he received unexpected responses. Queen Victoria expressed her happiness at learning of Menilek's accession but advised him to send all subsequent messages to London through the king of Italy. Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm's response was reportedly insulting.[285] Even if Menilek requested rectification of the problem, Italy refused, and the only option left to resolve it was war. Declaring war automatically, however, was not an option because of a great famine called *Kefu Qen* which lasted from 1888 to 1892.[286]

The Great Famine was caused by a prolonged drought, and an epidemic of rinderpest, carried by infected cattle from India, entered the highlands and devastated the livelihood of the core areas of Abyssinia from Tigray through Wollo, Begemider, Gojjam to Shawa. The Livestock of these areas was exterminated with extraordinary speed.[287] On top of the famine, virulent cholera killed significant people. Menilek and his aristocracy opened their granaries to relieve the suffering"[288] from the Abyssinian core. The survivors of the Great Famine followed Menilek to the resource-rich adjacent polities that made his territorial expansion speedier. Accordingly, Menilek's army occupied Dawuro- Konta and Kambata in 1889 and 1890, respectively. From the early 1890s to 1894, Menilek's army-controlled Bale, Sidama, Gamo Gofa and Wolayta. In the campaign for Wolayta, the Wolaytas resisted fiercely under the leadership of their Kawo (King) Tona. After defeating the Walayta, the forces of Menilek punished them by mass extermination and mass enslavement and their King Tona was taken prisoner to Addis Ababa, where he died.[289] Then Gedeo, Borana and Konso were easily occupied by the imperial forces. In most of these newly acquired areas, with the exception

[284] Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa : African Victory in the Age of Empire*; Sven Rubenson, "The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichale Treaty," *The Journal of African History* 5, no. 2 (1964): 243–83.
[285] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 92.
[286] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 71.
[287] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 96.
[288] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 95.
[289] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 65.

of nomadic areas like Borana, the *Gabbar-Naftagna* system was instituted.

After recovery from the Kefu Qen, Menilek publicly abrogated the Wichale Treaty in February 1893. Then the son of Emperor Yohannes and heir to the throne, Ras Mengesha, his brother and other Tigrayan nobilities that rebelled against both Menilek and Italians came to Addis Ababa and begged Menilek for forgiveness carrying a rock of submission on their shoulders on 2 June 1894. They were forgiven and appointed to administer the region. Following this, Emperor Menilek was ready for a showdown against Italian colonial forces and declared a general mobilization in September 1895.[290]

According to Richard Reid, Menilek harnessed "the restless militarism which had built up across the Ethiopian region since the 1860s, and indeed throughout the nineteenth century. From this perspective, the great clash between the Italians and the Ethiopians represented, among other things, a critical release of pressure for Menilek".[291] Menilek led a military confederation of upwards of 100,000 men well-armed, skilled in the use of both terrain and reinforcements, against the comparatively tiny force of 14,500 men.[292] At the Battle of Adwa, his forces easily and decisively defeated the Italian colonial army by killing 4000 Italians and 2000 Eritreans, with a loss of between 4000 and 7000 Ethiopians.[293] When the news of Italy's defeat by a black African king reached Europe, the victory of Adwa was celebrated as an extraordinary victory, the beacon of hope for the enslaved, colonized and dehumanized black race.[294] In Rome, Prime Minister Crispi was deposed, and Italy sued for peace, offering the abrogation of the Treaty of Wichale and unconditional recognition of Ethiopian sovereignty.[295]

Following the victory of Adwa, Menilek made two remarkable decisions that decided the fate of the peoples of the Horn of Africa region. First, even if the Wichale Treaty was abrogated, he allowed Italy to keep Eritrea as its colony. Scholars came up with various explanations for why Menilek made such a dangerous decision to leave Italy in Eritrea. One explanation is that "Menelik was nowhere near strong enough"[296] to clear Italy from Eritrea.

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[290] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 94.
[291] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*.
[292] Reid, 98.
[293] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 99.; Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa : African Victory in the Age of Empire*.
[294] Jonas, *The Battle of Adwa : African Victory in the Age of Empire*.
[295] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 99.
[296] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 98.

Another reason was that Menilek left Italy so that the Tigrayans could not be able to mount a challenge to reclaim the throne. Another explanation was that he preferred to control the resource-rich regions of the south in competition with colonial powers rather than wasting his resources on unfertile Eritrean lands. Irrespective of the reason or combination of reasons that compelled Menilek to sign a boundary agreement with regard to Eritrea, the very act of accepting territorial delimitation has fundamentally and irreversibly changed the discourse of Solomonic Ethiopia as conceived in Kebra Nagast. Territorially, the claim of the domain of Ethiopia as extending from the middle of Jerusalem to India as well as a claim based on the historic Ethiopia that once controlled part of the southern Red Sea, including Yemen across the Red Sea, was gone.[297] In terms of identity claim, the Tigrigna-speaking and confessionally Orthodox Christian population of Eritrea had not only been part of Solomonic and historic Ethiopia, but they had also been part of the people that founded the myth of Solomonic Ethiopia. Therefore, the presence of those people across the border would inevitably be tantalizing agony for both polities across the border and national identity contestations.

Second, while leaving the core of Abyssinia divided in the north, Menilek was rather aggressive in competing with European colonial powers in the scramble for Africa in the south. Most of the key warriors of Menilek were running at a neck-breaking speed to place the Ethiopian flag in every direction, except north, as an effective control for Menilek's boundary negotiations with neighboring colonial powers. Accordingly, Menilek signed boundary agreements[298] with France on 20 March 1897 with regard to French-Somaliland (present-day Djibouti), with Britain on 26 June 1897 with regard to Somaliland, with Anglo-Egyptian Sudan on 15 May 1902 with regard to Sudan, with Italy on 10 July 1900 with regard to Eritrea, again, with Britain with regard British East Africa (Kenya) in 1907; and finally with Italy with regard to Italian-Somaliland in 1908. Those treaties included peoples of totally different pedigrees like Oromo, Somali, Afar and other non-Habesha peoples who did not share the territorial, identity and temporal claims of the Empire of Ethiopia as represented by Solomonic legends.

Third, and the corollary by-product of the two core decisions, is the security

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[297] Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)*.
[298] David Napier Hamilton, "Ethiopia's Frontiers: The Boundary Agreements and Their Demarcation, 1896-1956." (University of Oxford, 1974).

implications of allowing a defeated power to control the sea outlets both from north and south and the implication of colonial administrations for the future of peoples of similar pedigrees across the border. On the other hand, by allowing Italy to keep Eritrea, Menilek did not only make Ethiopia the most populous landlocked empire in the world but also made it vulnerable to the revenge that would come after four decades through Eritrea. Furthermore, he set a precondition for the development of three competing nationalisms,[299] Eritrean, Tigrayan and Ethiopian (or Amharan), that are still affecting the relationship between these identity groups. It did not take long before the ramifications of those decisions manifested. The full sovereignty, which was earned following the battle of Adwa, as evidenced by the aforementioned treaties, was short-lived. Italy, which was the first colonial power to recognize the Empire of Ethiopia as sovereign, was also the first to restart colonial machinations.

3.6 Succession Problem, Colonial Threats, and National Identity Contestations, 1906-1916

Following the victory of Adwa, Emperor Menilek had been in effective control of his newly recognized Empire both in domestic aspect and diplomacy, which was personal diplomacy based on his kin understanding of international politics of the time and his shroud negotiating skills. However, Initially, according to one of the key authorities on Eritrea, Tekeste Nagash, Italy was not sure what to do with Eritrea. They had even contemplated passing it to a third party, probably to the King of Belgium.[300] The new Italian PM Rudini was contemplating the idea of total withdrawal from Africa and reduced the colonial budget by more than half.[301] However, that was just a momentary urge created by unexpected defeat at the hands of unexpected force. By May 1903, three years after signing the boundary agreement with Menilek, Italy has already started planning how to divide up Ethiopia with Britain and connect its Eritrean and Somaliland colonies.[302] By the time Menilek suffered his first major stroke in 1906, of a disease that progressively incapacitated him, the neighboring colonial powers, Britain, Italy, and France, entered into a Tripartite Treaty of

[299] Merera Gudina, "The State, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and Democratisation in Ethiopia The State, Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and Démocratisation in Ethiopia," *Afr. j. Polit, Sci*, vol. 9, 2004.
[300] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*, 15.
[301] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991,* 150.
[302] Harold G Marcus, "A Preliminary History of the Tripartite Treaty of December 13, 1906," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 2, no. 2 (May 21, 1964): 23.

1906. In this Treaty, the three powers agreed to divide Ethiopia into their respective spheres of influence: Blue Nile Basin for Britain, areas along the Ethio-Djibouti railway for France, and the middle "hinterland" that connects Eritrea and Somalia for Italy.[303] More importantly, the three powers also agreed to protect Ethiopia's territorial integrity and not to intervene in its internal affairs lest they all agree. Menilek, who was not consulted but was shown a copy of the treaty, to which he reportedly thanked the three powers for agreeing to protect the independence of Ethiopia. Furthermore, Menilek agreed to a semi-colonial treaty with France, known Klobukowski Treaty, concerning the railway line built between Ethiopia and the French colony of Djibouti in 1908. For our purposes, the most relevant provision of the Klobukowski Treaty is Article 7, which reads:[304]

> Until such time that the Ethiopian legal system is Europeanised, criminal or civil disputes involving French citizens or its protégés will remain under French consular jurisdiction. However, 'mixed cases' (civil or criminal) involving French and Ethiopian subjects will be tried by an Ethiopian judge working in consultation with the French consul or his agent. Should the defendant be an Ethiopian subject, Ethiopian law applies. Should a defendant be a French subject, French law applies. If a decision cannot be agreed, the court of the Ethiopian emperor shall be approached for final ruling. The French consul shall harbor arrested or convicted French subjects when the underlying matter involved only French subjects.

Following the stroke and machinations by colonial powers, Menilek started introducing some institutional mechanisms and assigning an heir to the throne. Accordingly, Menilek established the Council of Ministers in 1907, which was led by Fitawrari. Habte-Giorgis was also the minister of war and the country's most prominent general. Menilek also instituted a Crown Council comprising leading noblemen, ranking church officials, and government ministers. This organization became important in February 1908 when the emperor suffered a stroke that severely incapacitated him. The government fell to the Crown Council, and, as its chairperson, Empress Taytu, the wife of the emperor, concentrated so much power into her hands that she became the de facto head of state. When she tried to replace Menilek's governance networks with her own and increased attempts at engaging, the strong Shawan nobility colluded with the Church and removed her and all her networks

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[303] UK Government, "Tripartite Treaty," 1906, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p1/d460; Marcus, "A Preliminary History of the Tripartite Treaty of December 13, 1906."

[304] Hailegabriel Gedecho Feyissa, "European Extraterritoriality in Semicolonial Ethiopia," *SSRN Electronic Journal* 17 (July 30, 2017): 7–8, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2819885.

from power.[305] In the meantime, Menilek's grandson *Lij* Iyasu was made heir-designate with the designate Ras Tesemma Nadaw, an empire loyalist, as regent in August 1909.[306]

Lij Iyasu, the heir-designate, started exercising sovereign power autonomously after the death of his regent in 1911 and even more independently after the death of his grandfather, Emperor Menilek, in 1913. Even if he was a teenager, Iyasu introduced some policies that aimed to empower and integrate the cultural groups that had been designated as threats to the Solomonic throne and the Christian Kingdom unless christened and Amharized, like the Oromo (non-Amharized), Somali, Afar, and other non-Orthodox Christian majority regions of the empire. Iyasu married daughters of Muslim notables from these areas and even helped with the building of a Mosque in the Jigjiga, Somali region.[307] He also removed some of the Shawan predatory nobilities from their positions and replaced them with his favorites. Externally, he established closer relationships with Germany and the Ottoman Empire to fond off British, Italian, and French colonial machinations. Furthermore, to eject these European colonial powers from the region, he allied with Somali anti-colonial leader Sayyed Abdile Hasan, whom the colonial power called the Mad Mullah. Iyasu's attempt at inclusive nation-building and friendly relations with Muslim leaders in neighboring colonies bought him a combined enemy of the Shawan aristocracy, the Church, and the tripartite colonial powers.[308]

The Shawan aristocracy, particularly *Dejazmach* Tafari and his associates, started spreading rumors that accused Iyasu of apostasy, the crime that, in Solomonic ideology, leads to the deposition of a monarch. European diplomats, who had been sponsors of Tafari, wanted to remove Iyasu as soon as possible following the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. Even if members of the Council of Ministers and Shawan aristocracy had decided to remove Iyasu, the *Abun* of the Orthodox Church demanded credible material evidence showing the apostasy of *Lij* Iyasu. The three legations of Britain, Italy, and France, to evoke the "Ahmed Gragn Syndrome", alleged that *Lij* Iyasu had converted to Islam and that he was planning to create a Muslim empire extending from Sudan to the Somali coast with the help of the Germans and Turks. As "material evidence" to show Iyasu's apostasy, the legations presented "secret documents," and a doctored photo of the Ethiopian flag with

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[305] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 118.
[306] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 105.
[307] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 132–33.
[308] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 113–16.

Arabic text that says, "There is no god but Allah and Mohammad is the messenger of Allah" printed on that was claimed that Iyasu had sent to Ahmet Mazhar Bey, the Turkish Consul resident in Addis Ababa.[309]

To give a sense of urgency and to force the Council of Ministers to depose Iyasu, the three legations presented a jointly authored note of protest on 12 September 1916. The note warned the ministers that the Allies would intervene militarily and impose a total arms embargo against Ethiopia unless the young emperor was stopped from helping their enemies, Germans and Turks.[310] The Amhara ruling class, which was looking for an opportunity, used the note to convince Archbishop Mattewos and conducted a palace coup against *Lij* Iyasu on 27 September 1916, a date chosen for its ideological significance, as it is the Orthodox Christian holiday marking the mythical finding of the True Cross. Some of the charges and changes presented during the ex-communication and replacement made are read as follows:[311]

> In order to exterminate us by mutual fighting he has converted to Islam and, therefore, we shall henceforth not submit to him; we shall not place a Muslim king on the throne of a Christian king; we have ample proof of his conversion to Islam…Therefore, having deposed him (Lij Iyyasu), we have placed on throne Woizero Zawditu, Emperor Menilek's daughter. We have appointed Dajjach Tafari, the son H.H. Ras Makonnen, Crown Prince, with rank of ras, and Regent of the Empire.

When the Shawan aristocracy deposed him and contradicted the prescribed rules of the Kebra Nagast, which prohibited women's enthronement,[312] Iyasu was not even in Addis Ababa to try to enforce the rules. He was in the east among the people he was trying to integrate as equals into the Ethiopian Empire, the Somalis of Ogaden. His Father, Negus Mikael of Wollo, aka Imam Mohammed Ali, had tried to communicate with the Shawan ruling class. He did not grasp that Amharized and baptized Wollo Oromo's position of influence in the Empire was coming to an end. When he opted for the last option of using force, which was the only option that worked in the history of Ethiopia, he was too late. Another ablest Amharized Oromo warrior from Shawa, Fitawrari Habte-Giorgis Dinagde,

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[309] Wolde-Medhin, "Highland Farmers and the 'Modernizing' State in Ethiopia: Conjunctures and Disjunctures," 260.
[310] Angelo Del Boca, Antony Shugaar, and Richard Pankhurst, *The Negus : The Life and Death of the Last King of Kings* (Addis Ababa: Arada Books, 2012), 65.
[311] Del Boca, Shugaar, and Pankhurst, 66.
[312] Budge, *The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelek (Këbra Nagast)*, 39.

outmaneuvered, outgunned, outnumbered, defeated, and captured Negus Mikael at the Battle of Sagele, 40 kilometers from the capital, on 26 October 1916. *Lij* Iyasu, who was also approaching the capital from the East with 6000 troops, changed direction upon receiving the news of the defeat of his father and escaped to Afar, another Muslim region that he tried to integrate into the empire. With that, not only Iyasu but baptized and Amharized Muslims were removed from the sovereign decision-making network until the end of the Solomonic dynasty itself. His ex-communication was an apparent proclamation of the exclusion of the Muslims, in particular, and followers of non-*Tabot* Christianity from ever claiming the Ethiopian throne and their progressively increasing exclusion from realms of power, wealth and social prestige. Furthermore, the overthrow of Iyasu in collusion with neighboring colonial powers has become the key foreign policy tool that Ethiopian rulers presented and represented Ethiopia as a "Christian ally of the West in a predominantly Muslim and increasingly hostile part of the world".[313] By helping Britain and Italy persecute Sayyed Abdile Hasan in the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian rulers also set a precedent for defining and targeting non-Christian freedom fighters from the neighboring region as a threat to Ethiopia.

3.7 Defensive Modernization, Exclusionary Nation-Building and Italian Occupation 1916-1941

Ras Tafari, who replaced Iyasu with the help of European powers, had been an astute student of international politics and well-informed of ideas and developments in Europe and around the Horn of Africa region. He knew the vulnerabilities of being encircled by colonial powers without a sea outlet and a total dependence on foreign markets for weapons. In addition to threats that emanated from colonial powers, Tafari was also in a precarious power position owing to the formidable power of the regional aristocracy and *Lij* Iyasu, who was roaming in the Muslim lowlands.[314] To address these challenges, Tafari started patient, arduous and painstaking processes of defensive modernization, nation-building and centralization and personalization of power.

Even more than preceding monarchs, Tewodros, Yohannes, and Menilek, Tafari had

[313] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 65.
[314] Del Boca, Shugaar, and Pankhurst, *The Negus : The Life and Death of the Last King of Kings*.

been obsessed with foreign relations from childhood under Catholic priests until his overthrow in 1974, which of course, served him well. He relentlessly requested European powers to allow Ethiopia to declare war against the Alliance from 1917 so that Ethiopia would share the spoils of war, which European powers declined.[315] Rather, the tripartite powers were not happy with the lack of progress on the part of Tafari in making Ethiopia ready for foreign capital penetration. The idea of these European powers emanates from wrong assumptions about Ethiopia.[316] First, there was this erroneous assumption that Ethiopia was mineral-rich and that it had to be open for capital. Second, Italian colonies in both Eritrea and Somaliland were mostly unfertile lands that could not feed the native peoples, let alone serve colonial extractions.[317] Without some conceptions of resources from the hinterland within Ethiopia's territories, these colonies were not viable. So was Djibouti. Britain, on the other hand, was concerned with the control of the Nile, which is mainly sourced from Ethiopian highlands, on which its colonies of Egypt and Sudan rely, so it was concerned with making sure that no other power controlled the Nile Basin. Third, the European colonial powers were concerned with the transfer of weapons from Ethiopia to their colonies that might undermine their control. Finally, with available information to Italy about defense capability and national cohesion, Rome could contemplate colonizing Ethiopia and renewing its shredded name at the Battle of Adwa.

When his attempt to amass weapons by joining the Entente side failed, Tafari started another strategy of securing Ethiopia from vulnerabilities to encirclement by colonial powers. He believed membership in the League of Nations was the solution. To use the Wilsonian idea of an association of nations to guarantee political independence and territorial integrity as well as to secure sovereign access to the sea, he worked hard to make Ethiopia a member of the League of Nations. His attempts were significantly challenged by die-hard conservatives at home and Britain and Italy that were bent on denying membership of Ethiopia as it was not "civilized" enough.[318] However, Tafari's relentless efforts and friendly French diplomats' support led to the admission of Ethiopia into the League of

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[315] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 119.

[316] Del Boca, Shugaar, and Pankhurst, *The Negus : The Life and Death of the Last King of Kings*; Richard Reid, "The Challenge of the Past : The Quest for Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea," *History of Africa* 28 (2001): 239–72; Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*

[317] Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary Dispute," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 2, no. 2 (July 11, 1964): 189–219, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00003992.

[318] Del Boca, Shugaar, and Pankhurst, *The Negus : The Life and Death of the Last King of Kings*, 83., .83

Nations in 1923 with two conditions: abolition of slavery and non-transfer of weapons to other African peoples.

Tafari legally banned the slave trade immediately in 1923, which was impossible as the Gabbar-Naftagna system he ruled was dependent on slavery and serfdom. Even the slave trade persisted as he had no mechanism of enforcing it where the Shewan and other nobilities in the provinces were the main beneficiaries of the slave trade. After fulfilling the two conditions in principle, abolishing the slave trade by decree, and confirming *de facto* Ethiopian position of not transferring weapons, Ras Tafari decided to travel to Europe to learn lessons as to how to modernize Ethiopia[319] and to convince the neighboring European powers to grant Ethiopia sovereign access to the sea. Accordingly, on 16 April 1924, Tafari and a large retinue left Addis Ababa for Europe.

The journey that took over four and half months was eye-opening for the Ethiopian aristocracy that believed in the centrality of Ethiopia in their conception of the universe.[320] It was shocking for them to learn that PM Ramsay McDonald of Great Britain did not care to know where Ethiopia was, let alone to discuss specifics of outlet to the sea. The condescending response of the French PM to the delegation's demand for sovereign access to the sea was another surprise for Francophile Tafari, who spoke French eloquently and made French a medium of instruction in his modern schools in Ethiopia at the time. Italian PM Benito Mussolini was so angry at their demands that he demanded the readiness of colonial troops in Eritrea and Somaliland to occupy Ethiopia outright.[321] Tafari returned with a determination to apply his new knowledge even if he failed to secure sovereign access to the sea.

Conversely, Rome and London disregarded the sovereignty of the Empire of Ethiopia and, irrespective of Ethiopia's membership in the League of Nations, started negotiating and

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[319]One of the leading scholars on Ethiopian history Harold Marcus (2002, p.122) describe the Ethiopia that Ras Tafari was trying to modernize in the following words: "In 1924, Ethiopia was, by any standard, a backward country. Its economy was based on a traditional agriculture that yielded grain, coffee, and pulses, and hides and skins were important export items. There were virtually no roads then, and trade was drawn to Addis Abeba to take advantage of the railway to the sea. Hidden in a forest of eucalyptus, Ethiopia's capital had a population of as many as one hundred thousand, who were all served by two modern hotels, two cinemas, two hospitals, and numerous drinking houses". More importantly, first modern elementary school was opened in 1908 and when Italy occupied Ethiopia in 1936 there were 13 of them for 4 million people (Markakis, 2011: 110).

[320] Del Boca, Shugaar, and Pankhurst, *The Negus : The Life and Death of the Last King of Kings*, 84.
[321] Del Boca, Shugaar, and Pankhurst, *The Negus : The Life and Death of the Last King of Kings*.

exchanging letters with regard to their projects in Ethiopia without consulting the Ethiopian government. In 1925, Italy agreed to a British project of building a dam on Lake Tana of Ethiopia, deep inside Ethiopian territory, while Britain agreed to an Italian railway project that connects Eritrea and Somaliland across Ethiopia.[322] France, which did not want these powers to dominate the Ethiopian economy, informed Tafari that the exchange of letters between the two colonial powers was an affront to Ethiopia's sovereignty. Tafari started a propaganda campaign through his newly established Berhanena Selam press and took the matter to the League of Nations. Rome and London dropped their projects and recognized Ethiopia's independence. From this experience, Tafari proved his belief in the power of collective security against external threats and returned to his domestic bureaucratization and modernization projects.[323]

Following the death of Fitawrari Habte-Giyorgis in 1926, who was the chair of the Council of Ministers, Minister of War, hero of Adwa and leader of the Shawan Aristocracy, Tafari was finally free to embark on his bureaucratization project. He deliberately recruited and appointed educated but non-aristocrat individuals as directors of departments of government that he was set as part of institutionalizing state apparatus. He placed trusted individuals in positions of postmasters and telegraph-telephone operators to gather intelligence on regional nobilities. He also placed his supporters in all the finance-related institutions, from the Empire's treasury to tax tolls both in the capital and provincial centers. After monopolizing the information flow and financial flows, Tafari started to remove and replace independent regional nobilities one after another.[324] Those who opposed faced the full force of the imperial army and total confiscation of their property. The final victim of Tafari's bureaucratization move was Ras Gugsa Wole, who was the husband of Empress Zawditu, the reigning monarch.[325] Empress Zawditu also died two days after her husband was killed in the battle. By eliminating some of his challengers and painstakingly waiting for fourteen years for some to die, finally, Tafari was ready to redefine the Ethiopian Empire in his image while purging out all the power centers he inherited.

With a pompous coronation ceremony attended by European royal families, Tafari was crowned as "By the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, His Imperial Majesty Haile

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[322] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 124.
[323] Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*.
[324] Marcus, *A Hist. Ethiop.*, 119.
[325] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 134.

Selassie I,[326]King of Kings of Ethiopia, and Elect of God". Tafari finally changed the legend of Kebra Nagast into legal provision through the first written Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia in 1931. What has so far been claimed about the identity of the Ethiopian state was transformed into legal and political identity. Now by law, all powers, legislative, interpretive, and executive powers, rest in the hands of the emperor (article 6).[327] Haile Selassie did not only place the sovereignty of the Ethiopian empire in his hands, but he also removed, by one stroke, the powers of regional nobilities and any claim to the imperial throne by other Solomonic claimants. Essentially, he removed succession to the Ethiopian throne from the realm of politics to the realm of law and thereby closed aspiration through martial skills like Emperors Tewodros, Yohannes, and Menilek did. After the promulgation of the Constitution, he immediately moved to centralize the remaining powers centers like Tigray, Gojjam and Jimma. From Jimma, the only Muslim autonomous polity, its Sultan was removed, and executive powers were transferred to the Christian Amhara nobility. With that, the absolutist state was formed with power trickling down as Haile Selassie favor, the favor that overwhelmingly was given to the Shawan Amhara, where they ruled peoples of different identities by imposing their identification markers, including *T*abot Christianity, Amharic language, Amhara culture, and worst of all *Gabbar-Naftagna* system.[328] However, these exclusionary state and nation-building attempts were abruptly paused with the conquest of Fascist Italy in 1936.

Mussolini of Italy, who had been preparing to colonize Ethiopia for revenge, externalize the economic crisis in Italy, and consolidate his power, invaded the Empire of Ethiopia from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland simultaneously.[329] Unlike the times of Adwa when Menilek's force was at par with arms and superior in number and morale, this time, the arms were those of the Adwa time, and the army was fragmented by the exclusionary policies of Haile Selassie. For instance, while the Tigrayan aristocracy fought with Menilek at Adwa, now one of the Tigrayan key figures Ras Haile Selassie Gugsa, welcomed and helped the Italian colonial forces to occupy the regional capital city without a shot. His other brother Ras Seyoum, grandson of Emperor Yohannes, fought for some time, was captured, and then turned into a collaborator. Even Amhara nobilities Like Ras Kassa Hailu of Gojjam,

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[326] Haile Selassie means power of Trinity,
[327] Imperial Government of Ethiopia, "The Constitution of the Empire of Ethiopia, 1931." (1931), https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ethiopian-constitution-of-1931.pdf.
[328] Gérard et al., *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia* (London: Hurst, 2015).
[329] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 153–54.

that was marginalized by the Shawan Amhara, openly welcomed the Fascist occupation. For areas that were subjugated by the Gabbar-Naftagna system, like Arsi, Kaffa, Walayta and most of the southern and eastern regions, the conquest of Italy was liberation. Probably, the best example of an exclusionary policy of Haile Selassie was the case of the Sultan of Jimma. Abba Jobir, Sultan of Jimma, who was denigrated by Haile Selassie, had already established links with Italians before the fall of the Imperial government. Following the control of Addis Ababa in 1936, the sultan sent a letter to the League of Nations through the British government, asking for protection from the unruly Amhara soldiers stationed in his kingdom. He even offered 30 Maria Theresa thalers for each Amhara head in his region to make sure that the Amhara would never rule Jimma again.[330]

Some people also fought against Fascist Italy's occupation until liberation, irrespective of Haile Selassie's policies. The most famous was *Arbagnoch*, who adopted guerrilla tactics and made the Italian conquest unstable and limited to towns. These were of two kinds, the armed a*rbagnoch* who fought by roving from place to place like the old shifta and *yewust arbagnoch,* those who gathered information and supported from within the Italian colonial apparatus and fed the armed *arbagnoch*. Emperor Haile Selassie, on the other hand, fled the country after losing at the Battle of Maychew on 31 March 1936.

After exiling to Britain, Haile Selassie delivered one of the most famous and foreboding speeches on 30 June 1936 at the League of Nations in Geneva with his trademark dignity and power and concluded with the following words: [331]

> I ask the fifty-two nations, who have given the Ethiopian people a promise to help them in their resistance to the aggressor, what are they willing to do for Ethiopia? And the great Powers who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask what measures do you intend to take? Representatives of the World I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of the duties of the head of a State. What reply shall I have to take back to my people?

This powerful speech did not bear any immediate results in the form of stopping

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[330] Ezekiel Gebissa, "The Italian Invasion, the Ethiopian Empire, and Oromo Nationalism: The Significance of the Western Oromo Confederation of 1936," *Northeast African Studies* 9, no. 3 (May 30, 2002): 75–96. 78

[331] Haile Selassie and Haile Selassie, *Selected Speeches of His Imperial Majesty, Haile Selassie First, 1918-1967*. (Addis Ababa: Imperial Ethiopian Ministry of Information, Publications & Foreign Languages Press Dept., 1967), 316.

Fascist Italy from occupying Ethiopia. However, it created a public outcry and extraordinary sympathy from the black community across the world. Even if the powers of the time, like Britain and France, recognized Ethiopia as an Italian colony, in one of the ironies of history, Mussolini defected to the Hitler side and joined World War II in June 1940, which included driving Britain out of its colonies in East Africa. Haile Selassie's prophetic speech then became his lifeline to his throne. To expel Italy from East Africa, London took Haile Selassie to Khartoum so that he would help Ethiopian *arbagnoch* and British forces to expel Italy from Ethiopia. On 5 May 1941, Haile Selassie returned triumphantly to his capital Addis Ababa. For the next thirty-three years, he made policies and decisions that would profoundly affect the future of Ethiopia, countries of the region and even Africa, which is the subject of the next chapter.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with the evolution of the national identity of Ethiopia from the foundational myth established in the Kebra Nagast through interplays of internal, regional, and extra-regional actors, factors, and processes until the Italian occupation of 1936. The myth developed as a rallying point to guard *Tabot* Christianity against the surging Islamic power across the Red Sea by making the confessional dimension of identity the primary securitization object to be defended at any cost. The fusion of the monarchy and the Church, as well as limiting the throne to the successful claimant through proven martial skills and Solomonic descent to be endorsed by the Church in tandem, made the Solomonic dynasty war-prone, which inevitably had to make raids and subjugation of neighboring communities for proselytizing, as a source of tributes and as a controlled buffer zone against extra-regional intervention legitimate practices.

The first major crisis hit the Christian Kingdom with the Jihads of Imam Ahmed, who, unlike other sultans, was interested in domination rather than simple raids for loot. As a result of which, he dominated the politics of the entire region with the exception of a few pockets. In the eleventh hour, the kingdom was saved by the help of Portuguese musketeers establishing, albeit for the time being, communication with co-religionists from Europe. To avoid vulnerabilities that emanate from surrounding Muslim powers and out of "Ahmed Gragn Syndrome", the recovering monarchs of the Christian Kingdom produced edicts that proscribed integration of Muslim and Christian peoples through the prohibition of sharing

meat with Muslims, greeting with left hands, segregation to specific quarters, and further proscribing from owning land or serving in public office. Infiltrating Muslim polities through networks of intelligence and proactively denying the rising of or removing independent-minded leadership of Muslim polities and replacing them with puppets from the family of the deposed that were amenable to the interests of the kingdom.

Even if the Muslim sultanates were effectively neutralized, another crisis emerged from an unsuspected corner, the Jesuit missionary. Even if the Portuguese saved the kingdom from Imam Ahmed's complete conquest, their quest to rebaptize *Tabot* Christians to Catholicism was as threatening, if not more, than Muslim power. After a bloody civil war, the Catholics were cleansed from the dominion of the Ethiopian Christian Kingdom, and relations were, rather, established with Ottoman Empire so that Europeans would be kept away for two hundred years, from 1632 to 1840s.

The rapprochement with Muslim power and gradual penetration of the Northern Oromo warrior class, by invitation and then by promotion, into the heart of the newly founded capital of the Christian Kingdom, Gonder, on the other hand, created another crisis. Attempt to remove the Oromos through an alliance with a Tigrayan warlord led to the Era of Princess, where the Solomonic monarchs became puppets of the Oromos and Muslims who did not, culturally, belong to the kingdom. To cleanse the Oromo and Muslims of the Christian kingdom, Emperor Tewodros revived the Solomonic dynasty and started the process of making the modern Ethiopian state. His successor, Emperor Yohannes, who contributed to his deposition by collaborating with British expeditionary force, continued the policy of state consolidation by cleansing it of Muslim Wollo and by fighting the imperialist power of Egypt and Italy, as well as a revenge of the Mahdiyya.

The process of state-making of modern Ethiopia was concluded by Emperor Menilek II through two critical policies. First, Menilek expanded the Christian Kingdom beyond its core of Abyssinia and included peoples of diverse history, pedigree, tribes, ethnicity, language, religion and other identification markers that are a majority in terms of population and land size as compared to that of the core Abyssinia. At the same time, he allowed the core Abyssinian people of Kebessa, in what was renamed Eritrea, to be a colony of Italy, making the Empire both landlocked and encircled by colonial powers. These two decisions, the inclusion of peoples of different histories and identities and leaving the core people beyond defined territorial borders, have become the bones of contentions with regard to

nation-building and national identity contestations that have rocked both the Ethiopian state and its relations with other states with Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan.

His successor, *Lij* Iyasu, tried to integrate the diverse identity groups while trying to remove colonial powers from the amputated Eritrea by making an alliance with freedom fighters and opposing the security bloc. The reaction of the Solomonic establishment combined with threatened colonial powers was not only the deposition of Iyasu through ex-communication but also a commitment not to allow leaders of Muslim backgrounds and other confessional and ethnic groups to take part in the sovereignty of the Ethiopian state. Ras Tafari, who was ruling since the coup against Iyasu, started the reverse process of nation-building that excluded even those that were allowed by Menilek to join the governance networks from the periphery. Through defensive modernization, he bureaucratized the power, made himself and his family the only legitimate sovereigns of Ethiopia through his constitution of 1931 and while simultaneously removing regional aristocracy as a center of power. Tabot Christianity, Amharic, Amhara culture, and dominance by elites of Shawan Amhara in the Gabbar-Naftagna system became markers of Ethiopian national identity and power. The excluded non-core identity groups played a part in allowing the Fascist forces to easily defeat Haile Selassie's divided and outdated army in 1936 and thereby setting the stage for post-1941 further national identity contestations and regional security policy that will be discussed in the next chapters.

CHAPTER IV

4. EXCLUSIONARY NATION-BUILDING POLICIES, NATIONAL IDENTITY CONTESTATIONS, AND REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1941-1974

Upon return to his throne in 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie marked Eritrea and Somaliland as the gates of threats to his empire. Controlling these territories and Ethiopianizing or at least neutralizing the 'unfriendly' Muslim and pro-Arab peoples in these regions became the top priority throughout his second reign. He imposed his conception of national identity on these noncore identity groups (NCIGs), which they contested and resisted. As peaceful national identity contestations were impossible, NCIGs, with a likelihood of external support, began armed struggles to protect their identities and overcome domination, exclusion, and marginalization. The struggles of NCIGs were enabled by support from and through Sudan in Eritrea and Somalia in the southeast. The Haile Selassie regime securitized these external supports as national security threats, which, in turn, defined its regional foreign and security policies and strategies. By closely examining the interplays of exclusionary nation-building policies and regional security policies, this chapter answers the two basic questions of this dissertation during the Haile Selassie period: understanding and explaining how contemporary Ethiopia's national identity has been constituted and contested; and how these contestations defined its regional security policy.

To answer these questions, the chapter is structured into seven sections. The first section presents the post-occupation nation-building policies of the Haile Selassie regime, taking Eritrea as a case study. The second section presents the reactions of Eritrean NCIGs to the imposition of Ethiopian national identity and their progressive resistance over time. The next section will present the first dyadic case study that links the role of external support from and through Sudan to the policy of the Haile Selassie regime toward Sudan. The fourth section presents national identity contestations in southeastern Ethiopia and the discourse of Greater Somalia. The fifth section presents the case of Ethiopia's securitization of the Greater Somalia project and its relations with the Republic of Somalia. The next section

presents how mutual threats from Greater Somalia, as well as the absence of conflicting national identity claims, produced the development of a friendly relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya as the third case study. The seventh section presents how the Haile Selassie regime used its alliance with the West and its membership in the OAU to defend against Somali irredentism and Eritrean secessionism. Finally, there is a conclusion that threads these ideas together.

4.1 Post-WWII Exclusionary Nation-Building Policies: The Case of Eritrea

Mussolini's switch to Hitler's side in June 1940 changed the configuration of power in the Horn of Africa, and Emperor Haile Selassie had the chance to his second lease to the throne. After British Imperial forces, along with Ethiopian patriots, expelled the Italians from Addis Ababa, the emperor triumphantly entered his palace after five years in exile. Upon resuming his throne in 1941, he started nation-building policies that were aimed at establishing his rule on firmer ground and denying vulnerabilities that could come from a collaboration of elites of the NCIGs with enemies and neutralizing an opportunity that coastal regions from the Eritrean coast in the north to Somali coasts in the south could be used to invade Ethiopia again. Locally, he restarted rebuilding the control, extraction, and distribution structures based on the core values of the dominant group he represented.

The core values, as we have established in Chapter 3, are the hegemony of the Abyssinian court culture based on the monarch as the embodiment of sovereignty and source of all authority and power (divine and secular), the centrality of Tabot Christianity, and the imposition of Amharic as the sole medium of public communication. A combination of these three values has been imposed as the core national values to unite the peoples of Ethiopia. These three core values were further elaborated on in the revised constitution of 1955. Diverse peoples that happened to be within the Ethiopian borders could not claim autonomy or self-determination in any form because the constitution proclaimed that the Empire of Ethiopia's: "... sovereignty and territories are indivisible. Its territories and sovereign rights are inalienable" (Article 1). Unity was the ultimate goal on which the nation-building

policies of the Haile Selassie regime were set. To achieve unity, diverse peoples[332] with different identification markers had to give up their 'traditional' identities and had to embrace the 'modernizing' core values. In other words, noncore identity groups (NCIGs) had to drop their "tribal" and "backward" identities and assimilate into the historical and core 'Ethiopian' national identity: Abyssinian court culture, Tabot Christianity, and Amharic. The exclusionist discourse of Kebra Nagast was combined with the European nation-state model to produce nation-building policies that were, at the same time, assimilationist and exclusionary.

Like in European colonial modernity, the core values were propagated through the state and ideological state apparatuses, while at the same time, identification markers of NCIGs were progressively removed from public use or display. Schools, courts, local governments, the army, history writing, cultural productions (including in cinema, radio, newspapers, TV, museums, festivals, and holidays), and all tentacles of the state and social ideological apparatuses were directed to regenerating core values. Simultaneously, madrasas and Protestant churches were proscribed from using the languages of NCIGs, and all other cultural practices and identity regeneration institutions of NCIGs were proscribed. The only means to access state power and resources and to be included in the networks of the ruling class was assimilation into one nation, one religion, and one flag core values.

To execute his nation-building policies, the first move of Emperor Haile Selassie was to undo any ethnic, regional, and religious consciousness that the Italian occupation might have awakened. He immediately obliterated the Italian colonial structures and replaced them with governance networks loyal to him. To that end, he promulgated Decree No. 1 of 1942, which annulled the Italian territorial organization that was based on linguistic and religious criteria. Instead, he created 12 *Teklay Ghizats,*[333] provinces, designed to undermine regional loyalties. These structures remained stable throughout the Haile Selassie period, except for the splitting of Hararghe into Bale and Hararghe due to Somali irredentism in 1960 and the annexing of Eritrea in 1962. All governors at all levels were appointed by the emperor.[334]

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[332] which were numeric majority constituting between a two-third and three-quarters depending on if Tigray was to be considered a core or NCIG.

[333] Tewodros Hailemariam Gedlu, "A History of Nationalism In Ethiopia: 1941 to 2012 A History Of Nationalism In Ethiopia: 1941 To 2012" (2013), 125. The 12 provinces were Arsi, Begemder, Gamu-Gofa, Gojjam, Harargh, Illubabor, Kaffa, Shewa (Shoa), Sidamo, Tigray, Welega, and Wollo.

[334] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*.

The return of the emperor to the throne, his exclusionary nation-building policies, and his progressively centralizing expansion of the state apparatus into the peripheral areas of NCIGs invited contestations and resistance from all politically significant NCIGs, the patriots, military, and students. The 1943 First *Weyane* rebellion in Tigray,[335] the 1943-1969 Somali movement, the 1963-170 Bale Oromo uprising,[336] the 1963-1967 *Maccaa-Tuulamaa* Oromo movements,[337] the 1943-1948 Harari *Kulub-Watani*[338] movement, and the Eritrean liberation movement since 1961 were some of the nascent national identity contestations. Patriots like Belay Zeleke and Negash Bezabeh fiercely opposed the return of the emperor to the throne.[339] Furthermore, the military staged an attempted coup that set revolutionary questions in motion. The students[340] who took up the mission of the failed coup further expanded and articulated the problems into 'land to the tiller', 'gender equality', and 'education for all. Furthermore, radical students who had been organized underground finally took up the 'nationalities question' in 1969 and joined forces with NCIG organizations to produce two revolutionary redefinitions of the Ethiopian state in 1974 and 1991. Of the political organizations of NCIGs, the one that established a precedent and fundamentally transformed national identity contestations in Ethiopia and led to multiple redefinitions is the Eritrean question.

To understand how the Haile Selassie regime imposed an exclusionary national

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[335] For details see Aregawi Berhe, "A Political History of the Tigray People ' s Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt , Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia Aregawi Berhe" (2008); Gebru Tareke, *Ethiopia : Power & Protest : Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); John Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia : The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[336] An outstanding work has been produced by Østebø, *Islam, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Bale Insurgency, 1963-1970*. see also Tareke, *Ethiopia : Power & Protest : Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century*; Kefyalew Tessema, "Society and State in the Balé Lowlands: Interplay of Divergent Interests in Center- Periphery Interrelations in Southeastern Ethiopia, 1891-1991" (Addis Ababa University, 2020), http://etd.aau.edu.et/handle/123456789/22464; Ketema Meskela, "BALE" (2001), http://www.helpa-prometheus.gr/διαγνωστικές-εξετάσεις-για-τον-καρκί/.

[337] For details see Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics : Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia*; Biratu Kenei Aga, "Brigadier General Taddasa Birru: A Militry-Political Biography (1922-1975)" (Addis Ababa University, 2019).

[338] For details see Ahmed, *History of Harar and the Hararis*; Carmichael, "Approaching Ethiopian History: Addis Abäba and Local Governance in Harär, c. 1900 to 1950."

[339] Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*, 53.

[340] Ethiopian Students' Movement (ESM) role in Ethiopian politics has been one of the most debated subjects in contemporary Ethiopia. A number of works have been written both to appreciate and vilify the students' role in the revolutionary changes that were introduced in Ethiopia since 1974. Some of the key texts written by Ethiopian scholars who were part of the students' movement include: Bahru Zewde, *Documenting the Ethiopian Student Movement : An Exercise in Oral History* (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2010); Kebede, "Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia, 1960-1974"; Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*; Zeleke, *Ethiopia in Theory: Revolution and Knowledge Production, 1964–2016*.

identity based on the core values and how it has been contested by an NCIG, I will present the case of Eritrea. Eritrea was selected for several advantages. First, Eritrea's multiple identification markers and their constituencies were well researched and documented, including by the Four-Power Commission of Inquiry in 1948 and then by the UN Commission for Eritrea between 1948 and 1950. Second, the values imposed by the monarchy were clear and well-documented by the Eritrean NCIGs in their subsequent contestations and struggles for independence. Third, unlike in the case of other NCIGs, where they were excluded from state institutions and public spaces by design, in the case of Eritrea NCIGs, the regime obliterated and destroyed already existing Eritrean formal institutions and replaced them with Ethiopian institutions and core values. Fourth, the Eritrean NCIGs had publicly elected leaders who were persecuted and eliminated by the absolutist regime and the Eritrean Assembly that represented popular sovereignty, which was also closed. Furthermore, the phased exclusion of Eritrean NCIGs, which was first based on religion and then language, was a unique alienation process that reproduced the Eritrean collective national identity in opposition to the imposed Ethiopian national identity. This dimension of exclusion and the redefinition of identity boundaries of Eritrea's NCIGs represents the dynamism of the concept of 'NCIG' as an analytical category. The history of the contestation of Ethiopian national identity by the Eritrean NCIGs had also established a precedent and popularized the 'national question' among the elites of other NCIGs, and defined the structure of the Ethiopian state under subsequent regimes. For these reasons and, more importantly, for the critical role it played in defining Ethiopia's regional security policy, the case of Eritrea is presented to show the processes of exclusionary nation-building policies of the Haile Selassie regime, how these policies led to contestations of national identity, and subsequent definitions of Ethiopia's regional security policy.

To begin with, key processes of contestations of national identity are constituted by the imposition of core values and policies of the politically dominant elites, on the one hand, and the struggles of the elites of the NCIGs against the imposition, on the other. In the case of Eritrea, which was under the British Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) between 1941 and 1952 after Italy was expelled as a colonial master, the idea of the federation itself was a compromise of opposing tendencies of the two main constituencies. The first and more powerful constituency, in terms of population size and ideological coherence, was the unionist bloc represented by the Unionist Party that sought complete union with "motherland" Ethiopia. This bloc claimed about half of the mainly Christian

highlanders who were organized by the networks of churches of the Eritrean Orthodox Church and the Haile Selassie regime. Besides, this bloc also had support from some Muslim conditional unionist elites who saw an opportunity for a reunion with their kin, the Afar in Ethiopia, along with a promise for recognition of their culture.[341]

The second constituency was the independence bloc, represented mainly by the Muslim League. This bloc also claimed another half of the Eritrean population and over seventy-five percent of the territory.[342] Unlike the Unionist Party, which had relative internal cohesion, the Muslim League was ethnically and linguistically diverse, ideologically incoherent, and organizationally weak. However, it was organized to save their Muslim identity and Islamic culture against the Tabot Christianity-based national identity that had been aggressively promoted by the Haile Selassie regime and elites of the Unionist Party.[343] To overcome their fragmentation, they adopted the Arabic language as a unifying thread and promoted Tigrigna as another Eritrean national language in their quest for independent Eritrea. There were also politically insignificant pro-independence Christians and pro-Italian groups that did not want union with Ethiopia and preferred cooperation with the Muslim League in the pursuit of independence.[344]

These two positions, a union with Ethiopia and independence, were well documented by both the Four Power Commission of Investigation for Former Italian Colonies (from now on addressed as Four Power Commission) and the United Nations Commissions of Eritrea in their investigations conducted to know the wishes of Eritrean peoples. The Four Power Commission, which was established following a peace treaty with Italy in 1947, asked some representatives of the different groups of Eritrean societies about their future between November 1947 and January 1948 and produced a report. The report revealed that different sections of Eritrean communities were promoting their interests that could be simplified into two irreconcilable positions: independence and union with Ethiopia. Due to conflicting interests and positions, officials from the Four Powers could not agree on one decision regarding the future of Eritrea. As a result, the decision about the "disposal of Eritrea" was

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[341] Joseph L. Venosa, "The First Line Against Second Class Citizenship: The Eritrean Muslim League, Islamic Institutional Autonomy, and Representation on the Eve of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Federation, 1950-52," *Source: The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 46, 2013.
[342] Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991," 210.
[343] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61."
[344] Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991."

referred to the UN General Assembly in September 1948. The General Assembly established the United Nations Commission of Enquiry comprising Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan, and South Africa by resolution 289 (IVA) in November 1949. In June 1950, the UN Commission presented conflicting proposals. Pakistan and Guatemala proposed the independence of Eritrea; Myanmar and South Africa proposed a federation with Ethiopia, and Norway proposed Eritrea's union with Ethiopia. The UN General Assembly voted and adopted a federation as a middle-of-the-way solution, which was also being pushed by the United States. This was because the US had been running a strategic communications facility[345] in Asmara and a naval unit in Massawa since 1942 and, therefore, wanted Eritrea to be controlled by the friendly Imperial Government of Ethiopia.[346]

Accordingly, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution No. 390A (V) with a majority vote on December 2, 1950, recommending that Eritrea be constituted "as an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown".[347] At the time of the transfer of authority to Ethiopia in 1952, Eritrea had a democratic constitution written by UN experts, an elected Assembly by the Eritrean people, a government established on the principle of checks and balances, political parties, independent media, and a political atmosphere where civil and political rights began to be respected. On the diametrically opposite side, the Ethiopian government was based on absolute monarchy, which in turn, was based on a divine mandate whereby the emperor was the source of all powers, and everyone else exercised a delegated authority from him.[348]

From the onset, Emperor Haile Selassie never accepted the idea of federation, but his American advisor John Spencer advised him to ease into it. He accepted the federation temporarily. Then he gradually dismantled it between 1952 and 1962 because the idea of popular sovereignty and related institutional manifestations in autonomous assembly,

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[345] In return for US assistance, the emperor allowed the US to build a communications base at Asmara in 1953, which by the early 1970s had 4,000 US personnel and served as the main communications base to control the Polaris submarine movements in the Indian Ocean; and to relay US diplomatic radio from the Middle East back to Washington.

[346] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*, 72.

[347] Anze E. Matienzo, "Final report of the United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea" (New York: UN, PP - New York :, 1952), http://digitallibrary.un.org/record/624014/files/A_2188-EN.pdf.

[348] IGE, "Revised Constitution of Ethiopia 1955" (1955), https://www.abyssinialaw.com/laws/constitutions/the-1955-ethiopian-constitution-english-version/download; Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*; Fouad Makki, "Empire and Modernity: Dynastic Centralization and Official Nationalism in Late Imperial Ethiopia," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24, no. 2 (June 2011): 265–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2011.558056.

executive, and judiciary was antithetical to his absolutist rule. In September 1954, he openly claimed that there was no internal and external to his sovereign power in his objection to Eritrea's autonomy. He further declared that his "day of great happiness" would be "the day when the population of *the Mareb Melash* (Eritrea)… would opt for a complete union with Ethiopia rather than a simple federal link".[349] Therefore, the dismantling of the Eritrean federation was not an option because it was in direct contradiction to his anachronistic claim to divine authority but also to his mandate to maintain, sustain, and expand Ethiopia as a Christian nation. As a result, he unleashed the project of obliterating Eritrean institutions and imposing the Ethiopian national identity. In the following pages, I will present how the Ethiopian national identity was imposed by destroying and replacing the key identity-reproducing institutions of Eritrea and finally by officially annexing Eritrea and reducing it to a mere province.

One of the first institutions targeted in the process of imposing Ethiopian national identity was the media. In Eritrea, about fourteen newspapers were circulating in the 1940s and early 1950s, which were instrumental in raising the consciousness of Eritreans and instilling the idea of popular sovereignty, resisting colonialism, and carrying the collective concerns of Eritreans.[350] To put out the nascent Eritrean nationalism that has been propagated by the pro-independence camp, the offices of newspapers were closed, and their license was revoked in 1953, less than a year after the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. The pretext was a circulation of an Arabic text entitled "Petition from the people to the United Nations Tribunal in Asmara"[351] on 14 March 1953, carrying complaints against Ethiopia. The measures began by closing the *Sawt al-Rabita al-Islamiyya* office, the voice of the Muslim League, arresting its editors for "subversive political activity" and revoking its license.[352] Subsequently, the remaining news outlets were silenced. As a result, Eritrean NCIG elites were effectively barred from communicating with their constituencies through the media.

The second tactic of overtake of Eritrea by the absolutist monarchy was through imperial law-making to expropriate the land by default. When the attempts of unionist

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[349] Gérard Prunier and Éloi Ficquet, *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy, Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi* (London: Hurst, 2015).
[350] Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991," 220=21.
[351] Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991."
[352] Makki, 305.

lawmakers to change land tenure in Eritrea were successfully resisted by Muslim League members, the Haile Selassie regime bypassed the Eritrean Assembly through the Revised Constitution of 1955. Article 130 of the Constitution, by default, appropriated grazing lands and territorial waters as government lands. In other words, the entire land that was under Eritrean NCIGs was made the property of the state, which could be appropriated at will.[353] In addition, young Christian men from Eritrea and Ethiopian highlands were encouraged to take up permanent residence in the traditional lands of Muslims to change settlement patterns.[354] Furthermore, ports, railways, factories, and customs were expropriated and placed under the agents of Haile Selassie and the Unionist elites.[355] In general, Eritrean NCIG employees were progressively expelled and replaced by those of the dominant groups.

The third and, overall, more important strategy of imposing a monarchical nation-building policy was monopolizing the executive wing of the Eritrean government using radical pro-unity elites. Even the radical pro-unity Chief Executive Tedla Bairu, who had been trying to dismantle the federation, was forced to resign because he was not pushing enough. He was replaced by the notorious personal delegate of the emperor, Asfaha Woldemikael, who made sure that the remaining Eritrean institutions were obliterated one after another. Asfaha has also supported another radical and notorious police commissioner, Tedla Ogbit,[356] who ordered raids on the houses and properties of elites of NCIGs, detained leaders, and punished anyone and everyone who stood between the goal of assimilating Eritreans into Ethiopia.[357] Along with other radical representatives of the emperor, like the Vice-President of the Assembly, many of the district officials were prominent members of the Unionist Party who were determined to end Eritrean autonomy.[358]

After dominating positions of power with radical unionists, the next tactic of the Haile Selassie regime to end Eritrean autonomy was to obstruct key leaders of NCIGs from running for the Eritrean Assembly or denying them an opportunity to join the Assembly if by any chance they happened to run for office. These tactics were used to avoid unnecessary

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[353] IGE, Revised Constitution of Ethiopia 1955.
[354] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61."
[355] Venosa, 280; Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*, 216.
[356] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*, 116.
[357] Negash, 136.
[358] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*; Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61."

diplomatic rows at the UN by removing politicians who fought for Eritrea's autonomy and could not be bought out. Accordingly, the Secretary-General of the Muslim League, Ibrahim Sultan, and other leaders were jailed while votes for Muhammed Omar Akito, another top leader of the Muslim League,[359] were voided. To further manipulate election results, NCIG candidates and their family members were harassed routinely.[360] As a result, by manipulating the Eritrean Assembly elections of 1956, the Haile Selassie regime assured the elimination of the Eritrean federation. A British diplomat who visited Eritrea with the emperor in 1957 reported to London that "Advocates of union fill most key positions; and it is generally conceded that the Eritrean Assembly, as now constituted, could be made to vote for incorporation at any time".[361]

After the Eritrean Assembly was dominated by pro-Unionists, the regime started to officially remove markers of the identity of Eritrean autonomy, including Arabic and Tigrigna as official languages, and Eritrean symbols, including its flag and names of public spaces and places. The most profound, however, was the official removal of Arabic and Tigrigna as official Eritrean languages and their replacement by Amharic as the sole official national language in 1958.[362] This act of imposing Amharic on Eritrea had fundamental repercussions regarding the immediate political, economic, and cultural relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as other developments in national identity thereafter. This policy of imposing Amharic was the public declaration of the idea that the Haile Selassie regime's nation-building policy had dropped Tigrigna speakers as core members. They were relegated to an NCIG that needed to speak fluent Amharic to be Ethiopian. Even before it was officially imposed on Eritrea, it had already been the case in Ethiopia. For instance, at a graduation ceremony of military cadets of 1955 from Haile Selassie I Military Academy, Holata, the emperor said, "it is embarrassing for anyone claiming to be an Ethiopian and to say, 'I do not know Amharic' and this is parallel to mean that 'I do not have a country and I neither know my mother nor my father'".[363] The Revised Constitution of 1955 that

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[359] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61."
[360] Venosa, 301–12.
[361] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*, 224.
[362] Michela Wrong, *I Didn't Do It for You : How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), https://doi.org/10.2307/20031765.
[363] Wudu Tafete Kassu, "The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian State and the Alexandrian See: Indigenizing the Episcopacy and Forging National Identity, 1926–1991," *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses* (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006), 242,

promulgated Amharic as the only national language was just a constitutional reaffirmation of that rule as well. Finally, it also came to Eritrea with full force.

Implications of this include the removal of Arabic and Tigrigna from schools and the state bureaucracy. The Arabic language teachers and other employees whose jobs were based on Arabic and Tigrigna were expelled from their jobs and replaced by Shewan elites and other Amharic speakers.[364] Muslim teachers in rural Muslim-majority lowlands were defunded. Likewise, Muslim students were subjected to Christian rituals in schools and compulsory celebration of Christian holidays, while Muslim *eids* (holidays) were removed from public holidays and public spaces. Generally, they were denied belonging as they were relegated to the status of second subjects who were referred to as "Muslims in Ethiopia," not Ethiopian Muslims.[365]

Additionally, public spaces and public institutions were renamed to show the core identification markers. The streets and public institutions were named to the name of the emperor and similar core identity expressive nomenclatures and symbols. For instance, the main road of Asmara, which is now called *Harnet* (Independence) Avenue, was renamed Emperor Haile Selassie I Avenue[366] , as was the *Hirgigo* Charity School, which was renamed Haile Selassie I Secondary School.[367] Besides, to show that Eritrea was not autonomous, the nomenclature was changed from 'Eritrean Government' to 'Eritrean Administration'. In addition, Eritrean laws, including the penal code, were replaced by Ethiopian ones. After all the significant institutions, including the labor and trade unions, were eliminated one after another, the last act was to shut down the Assembly and officially annex Eritrea. Finally, Eritrea became the 14th province[368] of the Empire of Ethiopia on 14 November 1962.[369]

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https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/ethiopian-orthodox-church-state-alexandrian-see/docview/305328816/se-2?accountid=142289.

[364] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 296.

[365] Patrick Desplat and Terje Østebø, "Muslims in Ethiopia: The Christian Legacy, Identity Politics, and Islamic Reformism," in *Muslim Ethiopia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013), 1–21.

[366] Sjaak Kroon, "Language Policy in Public Space: A Historical Perspective on Asmara's Linguistic Landscape," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 15, no. 2 (2021): 274–96, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2021.1904703.

[367] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 358.

[368] The Province of Hararghe was also divided into two provinces of Hararghe and Bale, thereby making Bale the 13th Province.

[369] Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*.

In summary, the absolutist monarchy accomplished what it sought for a decade, removing the idea of popular representation, and replacing it with the inverse, sending representatives of the emperor to Eritrea. Finally, the executive, legislative, and judiciary are not only perverted but also followed by displacement. The Eritrean Unionist elites, who led the process of moving Eritrea from the realm of popular sovereignty to that of the divine mandate, were themselves removed and replaced by the Shewan Amhara. The process that had begun with the removal of Muslim Eritrean elites was concluded by demoting Christian Eritreans as well from a position of influence. As we will discuss later, leaders of the pro-independence camp, like Ibrahim Sultan, Secretary-General of the Muslim League, and Idris Mohammed Adam, President of the Eritrean Assembly, left Eritrea and started the armed struggle. The latter became the chairperson of the Eritrean Liberation Front (*Jebha*). Even the leader of the Unionists, Tedla Bairu, was disenchanted and later joined Jebha. The Office of the Governor-General, the current title of the Eritrean province, was transferred to the Haile Selassie men. First, his son-in-law, General Abiy Abebe, and later Ras Asrate Kassa, a member of the Royal court, administrated Eritrea. Other key positions were transferred to the emperor's family and loyalists. With full control of the tentacles of the Eritrean state, the imposition of core values seemed successful. The unionist Eritreans who chose to join Ethiopia with ethnoreligious calculations were demoted to an NCIG like their Muslim co-nationals by ethnolinguistic logic.[370] The circle was complete, with Eritrea reduced to another satellite province of Shewan domination. Now, let us discuss the response of Eritreans to this decade-long process of imposing Ethiopian national identity.

4.2 Eritrean National Identity Contestations

As discussed in the first section, the wishes of the Eritrean people regarding a union with Ethiopia were acutely contested. Most Christian Eritreans preferred to return to their "motherland". This position was extensively propagated by the Eritrean Orthodox Church and spearheaded by the Haile Selassie regime.[371] The Muslim Eritreans, on the other hand, rejected the idea of a union with Ethiopia because of negative memories and fear of suppression. The Christian kingdom of Ethiopia had a history of raiding, looting, and

[370] Makki, "Empire and Modernity: Dynastic Centralization and Official Nationalism in Late Imperial Ethiopia."

[371] Mesfin Araya, "The Eritrean Question: An Alternative Explanation," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28, no. 1 (March 11, 1990): 79–100, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00054239.

dominating Muslims of the lowlands.[372] Furthermore, The Eritrea Muslims did not have a shared will with the Abyssinian national identity, whose ideology was based on exclusionary Solomonic myth and Tabot Christianity. That was the *raison d'être* of the federation: to protect the cultural autonomy of Muslim Eritreans and non-Muslim Eritreans who did not want the union. On the other hand, the nation-building aim of the Haile Selassie regime was to destroy Eritrean autonomy and convert the Eritreans into loyal Ethiopian subjects.[373]

Initially, the responses of the Eritrean people were divided along the religious line. Christian elites who were propagating the unionist agenda considered themselves part of the dominant ruling class and welcomed the imposition ephemerally, while Muslim elites who refused to be relegated as non-core elites contested the imposition of the national identity of Ethiopia vigorously. Although the peaceful resistance of the elites of Eritrean NCIGs, Muslims initially, had ultimately failed and turned into armed struggle, Unionist elites had also started to turn away from a warm welcome to disenchantment progressively and then to violent resistance when the imposition of the national identity of Ethiopia started to take a linguistic turn. Haile Selassie regime started to exclude and marginalize Tigrigna-speaking Christian Eritreans and replaced them with Shewan Amhara.[374] In the following paragraphs. I will discuss how the initial nation-building policies of the regime were resisted by the elites of the Muslim NCIGs and then joined by their Christian co-nationals in the second phase and how they started to join hands in armed struggles against Ethiopian domination when institutions of peaceful contestations were obliterated.

In the first three years of the federation, the elites of the Muslim NCIGs had tried to save their autonomy through peaceful and public contestations in the Eritrean Assembly.[375] They managed, albeit temporarily, to block policy proposals and legal bills that were presented by the Unionist elites who were working to achieve their initial goal of complete union with Ethiopia.[376] From the first sessions, they presented law bills to end popular

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[372] Michael Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies" (Princeton University, 2011); Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*.
[373] Makki, "Empire and Modernity: Dynastic Centralization and Official Nationalism in Late Imperial Ethiopia."
[374] Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991"; Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*; Araya, "The Eritrean Question: An Alternative Explanation."
[375] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61."
[376] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*.

sovereignty and replace it with Haile Selassie's sovereignty, including by making the Chief Executive an appointee instead of an elected representative of the Eritrean people. The pro-independence members of the Eritrean Assembly successfully rejected such bills, including attempts to remove Arabic and Tigrigna and replace them with Amharic.[377] However, they could not stop the actions of the unionist elites who controlled the executive branch from staffing the education office with Christians and expelling Arabic-speaking teachers from the schools, blocking Muslim expatriates like those from *Al Azhar* University.[378]

Furthermore, as they realized that they were losing to well-funded, well-placed, and dominant Christian elites, the Eritrean NCIG elites next focused on saving their autonomy by requesting UN intervention. According to the UN Federal Act, Eritrea's autonomy could not be abolished even if members of the Eritrea Assembly agreed to unite with Ethiopia unanimously. Article 91 (1) of the Eritrean Constitution provided that "The Assembly may not, utilizing an amendment, introduce into the Constitution any provision which would not conform with the Federal Act". Moreover, the fate of the federation can only be decided by the UN General Assembly.[379] The Eritrean elites of the NCIGs thought that the Federal Act of the UN was the guarantee and had sent memorandum after memorandum to the UN headquarters.[380] There was no response.

In addition, members of the Eritrean Assembly, influential members of the Eritrean *ulema*, and the youth association wrote complaint after complaint to the emperor to get their autonomy respected. Here is a sample of complaints, with references to earlier complaints, that were submitted by the Muslim League before the 1956 elections asking the emperor to safeguard Eritrea's autonomy:[381]

> The Moslem League considers its first duty to see that the Federation and the autonomy of Eritrea under the Sovereignty of Your Imperial Crown are safeguarded… Your Majesty undoubtedly remembers the letter which has been submitted to You at the end of January 1953 and the Memorandum submitted by the people in February 1954 in this regard. The Moslem Conference which was held on first and second December 1955 had also

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[377] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61."
[378] Venosa, 291.
[379] Okbazghi Yohannes, "The Eritrean Question: A Colonial Case?," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 25, no. 4 (December 11, 1987): 643–68, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00010132.
[380] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*; Wrong, *I Didn't Do It for You : How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation*.
[381] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*, 212.

> submitted to H.E. The Chief Executive, to H.E. The President of the Eritrean Assembly and to the members of the Assembly similar requests aimed at the improvement of the domestic machinery of administration and the problem of restoring to Eritrea its right in the Federation… effecting equality among the citizens of the country without allowing a certain group to have domination upon the other. Therefore, the Moslem League begs that observance of such equality among the citizens be had in the various governmental and public services...

This memorandum was based on an important conference conducted by the Muslim League in December 1955 to overcome the crises created by increasing political domination, economic and cultural marginalization, and ontological insecurity being produced by the moves on the part of the Haile Selassie regime to annex Eritrea. At this conference, attended by all key elites of the Muslim NCIGs, decisions were made to reengage the Muslim community as a whole and protect the Arabic language, culture, and education. To prohibit defections and fragmentation of the Muslim community, the Muslim League produced the idea of taking an oath. In the move meant to drive collective actions, members were obliged to take a solemn oath of allegiance before other branch representatives:

> I swear by God, the Almighty, the great that I will follow the Eritrean Islamic [Muslim] League principles and I will sincerely make every effort to realize it and to follow directions of the League authorities and to be a good, gracious member and to avoid anything or any act that contradicts or harms the League's principles. May God be my witness.[382]

Even if it was being dismantled by the regime, the Muslim League was able to return to its constituency, albeit informally, and started creating new offshoots like the Federalist Youth Union of Eritrea. This was possible because it successfully used grievances created by exclusionary nation-building policies and capitalized on religious identity to remobilize and organize the Eritrean NCIGs. Even conditional unionists of the coastal region, like Mohammed Omar Khadi, returned to the fold of resistance. Their attempts to reengage other pro-Independence elites started to produce results owing to the atmosphere of resentment developing throughout Eritrea by 1956. The atmosphere of resentment was mainly the result of exclusionary policies and the deflating Eritrean economy due to the departure of the Italians and other foreigners, the predatory taxing system of the regime, and drought.[383] Consequently, disenchanted Christians have also started to join hands to oppose the regime.

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[382] quoted in Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 307.

[383] Venosa, 298; Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*.

Throughout 1957 and 1958, high school students and labor unions started protests.[384] The response of the regime to complaints from the Muslim League and protests from students and workers was mainly a threat and the use of force to silence any opposition to its policies.

Symbolically, one of the key events that showed the extent of silencing used by the regime was the trial of Mohammed Omar Khadi. Khadi was accused of sedition for presenting a complaint against the Ethiopian government to the UN General Assembly.[385] In October 1957, Khadi presented a 72-page complaint to the UN General Assembly accusing the regime of violating the provisions of the Federal Act and imposing Ethiopian national identity over Eritrea and progressive marginalization of Eritrean NCIGs from governance and economy.[386] On his return from New York, Khadi was arrested for complaints, which was considered a trial of Muslims, as NCIG, for demanding their rights to be respected. The leadership of the Muslim League, the newly formed Federalist Youth Association of Eritrea, and members of the ulema sent complaints to stop the unjust detention and trial of Khadi.[387] Regardless of the complaints and requests for justice, Khadi was sentenced to 10 years for bringing the Ethiopian government into disrepute.[388] Those who complained against the Khadi trial were hunted and detained.

Furthermore, by officially removing Arabic and Tigrigna and replacing them with Amharic, the regime took the final step of de facto annexation of Eritrea. Following mass arrests and the crackdown by the Haile Selassie regime in 1957 and 1958, the peaceful contestations by Eritrean NCIGs in the Assembly and through sending complaints and memorandum were over. In other words, when the imposition of Ethiopian national identity could no more be contested through institutions in Eritrea, the peaceful contestations went into the diaspora in Arab countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, as well as the kin groups across the borders in Sudan. The first diaspora to respond through an organizational mechanism was the one in Sudan, by establishing the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) or Harakat in 1958 in Port Sudan under the leadership of Muhammad Seid Nawad, who had

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[384] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 313; Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*, 130.
[385] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 321.
[386] Wrong, *I Didn't Do It for You : How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation*.
[387] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*.
[388] Negash, 131.

briefly been a member of the Sudanese Communist Party.[389] Nawad and his colleagues in Port Sudan were able to organize thousands of Eritrean youth in major cities such as Gerba, Gederef, Medeni, Khartoum, Toker, and Kassala.[390] In addition, the Harakat also organized clandestine opposition in Eritrean towns through a secret network organized into a seven-member cell, famously known as Mahber Shewate. Even if Harakat was successful in terms of mobilizing and organizing the Eritreans for complete independence from Ethiopia, ensuring the unity of Eritrean peoples across religious, ethnic, regional, and other diversities, and building a popular democratic political system, it was short-lived.[391]

The feeling of resentment produced by the exclusionary nation-building policies of the absolutist monarchy, along with the progressively deteriorating economic conditions and progressive destitution of Eritrean peoples,[392] could not be addressed by the gradual and peaceful mobilization and organization of the Harakat. The former President of the Eritrean Assembly, Idris Mohammed Adam, was one of the leaders who talked to Nawad in 1959 in Sudan on his way to escape from Eritrea to Egypt. Adam could not agree with the peaceful method of the Harakat struggle for the liberation of Eritrea and henceforth decided to establish another organization that would liberate Eritrea through armed struggles.[393]

To start armed struggles, there were favorable mobilizing factors: conscious elites, terrain, demography and settlement patterns, the limited capacity of the Haile Selassie regime to police sparsely populated and inaccessible lowlands, as well as external support in addition to political domination, economic and cultural marginalization as grievance producing factors, and overall ontological insecurity that have been discussed so far. With regard to conscious elites of NCIGs, three leaders took the initiative.[394] Adam, former President of the Eritrean Assembly, along with Idris Glawedos and Osman Saleh Sabbe, established the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), popularly known as Jebha in Arabic acronyms, in 1960 with the determination that the only way to respond to Ethiopia's

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[389] Negash, 148; Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies."
[390] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 333.
[391] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*; Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61."
[392] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 362.
[393] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61."
[394] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 98.

disregard for the Eritrean autonomy was armed struggles. The three leaders represented three Muslim Eritrean NCIGs, Tigre (Beni Amir), Bilen, and Saho, respectively, claiming the Muslim League constituency. Adem was the chairperson; Sabbe was an ideologue and chief interlocutor in Arab/Muslim capitals; and Glawedos was a military strategist.[395] Sabbe capitalized on his links and networks in popularizing Jebha. Furthermore, there were also other supporting leaders like Woldeab Woldemariam, that had been broadcasting from Cairo Radio since 1957 to build the consciousness of the Eritrean people to overthrow the yolk of Shewan domination.[396]

There were several suitable mountainous terrains for the Eritrean NCIGs to start and maintain the armed struggle. Muslim-dominated mountainous regions like the Sahel, which comprises inaccessible hideouts like the mythical Nakfa, were good for defensive purposes because of their inaccessibility to the conventional army, their proximity to kin and friendly forces in Sudan, and knowledge of the terrain by Muslim bandits who fled away to these regions to avoid authority.[397] Furthermore, the settlement patterns in these western Eritrean regions were also conducive. First of all, the Tigre people, who account for about thirty percent of the Eritrean population, were the prime target of exclusionary policies of the Haile Selassie regime and home to key figures like Idris Mohammed Adam, Ibrahim Sultan, and Idris Hamid Awate. There were also kin groups across the border in Sudan from Port Sudan to Kassala. Furthermore, the five-thousand-man Second Army Division in Eritrea could not patrol and control hundreds of kilometers of porous borders.[398] Irrespective of combinations of grievance-producing and mobilization factors and actors, elites of Eritrean NCIGs could mount a successful armed resistance if and only they could secure external support because it was impossible to extract surplus from the thoroughly impoverished population of NCIGs in Eritrea.

Therefore, to secure external support, the Jebha leaders defined their struggles as Muslim and Arab struggles against the colonialism of the Judeo-Christian and theocratic

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[395] Woldemariam, 96.
[396] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 343.
[397] Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*; Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991"; Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies."
[398] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 332.

empire of Ethiopia. By using both Arab and Islam as strategic identity resources in the context of the early 1960s Arab nationalism, Jebha's leadership was able to garner support from Arab/Muslim countries like UAR, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Sudan. Adam and Sabbe visited Somalia upon its independence in 1960, where they were warmly received. Somalia helped Jebha with the opening of the Eritrean-Somali Friendship Association and agreed to provide Jebha officials with diplomatic passports and Muslim students with Somali passports so that they could be able to access scholarship opportunities denied to them.[399] While the support from Somalia was insignificant and symbolic, Sabbe also used his connections[400] with Syrian officials helped to secure training opportunities at the Aleppo military academy and the acquisition of large armaments. His Syrian[401] connections also extended to other Arab countries like Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Kuwait. While Egypt and Saudi were important sources of support from Red Sea littoral countries, the most important one for Jebha was Sudan, as any neighboring state is for any armed insurgency, as it can provide secure bases of training and operations. Sudan allowed and supported Jebha to establish its Supreme Council in Khartoum, and its Revolutionary Command, which was the military command headquarters in Kassala, and just across the border from Eritrea.[402] Furthermore, Jebha freely recruited Eritrean refugees and migrants throughout Sudan.

Jebha started the thirty-year armed struggle with the proverbial shot started by Idris Hamid Awate, a renowned former brigand, leading thirteen rebels against an Ethiopian army patrol at Mount Adal on 1 September 1961.[403] Until 1964 Jebha insurgents avoided direct engagements with the military and focused on attacking police outposts and stations. For instance, in a surprise attack on a police station, they were able to escape with thirty-two guns and twelve hand grenades,[404] which became a strategy with which later insurgent groups were able to build mechanized units, as we will discuss in Chapter 5. In addition to several successful raids for arms and ammunition, Jebha was further strengthened by enlisting two battle-experienced groups: a contingent of Eritreans who had served in the Sudanese army during British rule and defected Muslim Eritrean police officers. The Later

[399] Venosa, 355.
[400] Sabbe's wife was the cousin of a Syrian Prime Minister, and he was a close personal friend of the Syrian army chief of staff.
[401] Syrian Ba'athist party claimed as constituting part of the Arab nation
[402] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 163.
[403] Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991," 328.
[404] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 98.

group joined Jebha not only with the determination to fight the war of independence but also with "an intimate understanding of the enemy and its strategy".[405] On the other hand, Jebha gave an ultimatum to Harakat to join Jebha or get eliminated. Harakat refused to accept the conditions and dispatched a small contingent of armed forces to Eritrea. Jebha eliminated fighters and degraded Harakat as a fighting force in May 1965 and temporarily emerged as the sole liberation movement to represent Eritrean national identity contestation.[406]

Besides, the fortune of Jebha started to turn around when large armaments were air-transported from Syria to Sudan and reached the rebels through land and sea. Following the influx of both men and arms, the Jebha Supreme Council and platoon commanders decided in June 1965 to reorganize their forces, about two thousand men, along with the Algerian model.[407] The Algerian model, which was successfully used during the Algerian War of Independence, divided the country into six *wilayas*, zones of operation. Using this model, Jebha also divided Eritrea into four zones of operation. Soon afterward, they added a fifth zone of operation in the highland region to accommodate the progressively increasing recruits from the Christian-dominated region.[408] Each wilaya was placed under a commander who was to be coordinated from a Revolutionary Command in Kassala, Sudan.[409] With the support of the diaspora in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, as well as recruiting, training, and hiding bases in Sudan, Jebha began to challenge Ethiopia. Enabled by these supports, Jebha conducted several operations that significantly affected both the domestic and regional security policy of Ethiopia, particularly relations of the Haile Selassie regime with Sudan. In the next section, I will discuss how the support from and through Sudan to Jebha affected the policy of Ethiopia's regime toward the governments in Khartoum.

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[405] Woldemariam, 100.

[406] Michael Weldeghiorghis, "The Eritrean Liberation Front: Social and Political Factors Shaping Its Emergence, Development and Demise, 1960-1981" (Leiden University, 2014), 76, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/32998/ASC-075287668-3671-01.pdf?sequence=1.

[407] Robert G Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, Soviet and East European Studies: 71 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies."

[408] John Markakis, "The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 26, no. 1 (March 16, 1988): 51–70.

[409] Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991," 330.

4.3 External Supports to Eritrea's National Identity Contestations and Ethiopia's Policies toward Sudan, 1956-1974

The policies of the Haile Selassie regime toward Sudan were primarily constituted by the fear of external support to Eritrean NCIG organizations, mainly Jebha early on, and related issues of border control and refugee management. External assistance to Eritrean NCIGs from kin groups in Sudan, Eritrean diaspora, regional states like Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, Kuwait, and Libya, as well as peer movements like Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), reached Harakat and Jebha mainly through Sudan.[410] These supports could not have reached them without the willingness of the Sudanese state to allow transits of external support through its territories; henceforth, the Eritrean NCIGs could not have developed the capacity to challenge the regime through armed struggles.

The willingness and capacity of the ruling class of Sudan to support as well as host elites of Eritrean NCIGs and to allow them to use its territories as an interface to access other external supports were the function of local, transnational, and regional ideological affinity and strategic calculations. At the local level, Eritrean Muslim NCIGs that were subjected to oppression had kin groups across the border from Port Sudan on the Red Sea to Kassala in eastern Sudan.[411] The least Khartoum could do was allow locals to host, protect, and support their kin from Eritrea. There were also Islamic brotherhoods, such as the Khatimiyya, that stood by Eritrean NCIGs and put pressure on Sudanese politicians to support Eritrea's struggle for independence.[412] The pressures through ideological affinities like pan-Islamic ideals and Arab nationalism from Arab capitals and the Office of the Arab League to support Muslim and "Arab" Eritreans against the oppression of the Christian and pro-Israeli theocratic regime had positive retorts in Khartoum.[413] Furthermore, Egypt's strategic interests of controlling the Nile waters and the Red Sea with the assistance of Sudan and in competition against Ethiopia had also been positively affecting support through and from

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[410] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991"; Andargachew. Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*; Negash, *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*.

[411] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 146.

[412] Belete Belachew Yihun, "Belete.Pdf" (Addis Ababa University, 2012), 21–23.

[413] Shumet Sishagne, "Discord and Fragmentation in Eritrean Politics, 1941-1981" (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1992), 267–74.

Sudan to Eritrean movements.[414]

Due to the permissive conditions, both willingness and capacity, created by the factors described above, Sudan served as the conduit of external aid that helped develop Jebha's human capacity and the provision of arms and goods for fighting. First, Sudan was an irreplaceable source of support due to its location in recruiting, training, escaping, hiding, transiting, getting medical treatment, and serving as the military command headquarters. Eritrean militants and key political figures like Woldeab, Ibrahim Sultan, Ibrahim Afa, Adam, Sabbe, Afewerki, and Ramadan escaped through friendly networks in Sudan and were able to organize themselves to fight back.[415] Furthermore, Eritrean commanders who got trained in Syria, Egypt, Algeria, China, and Cuba transited through, based at, and operated from Sudan with Sudanese or Somalian passports.[416] Besides, thousands of liberation fighters were freely recruited from Eritrean refugee camps in Sudan and from Eritrean soldiers who served in the Sudanese army during British rule. Furthermore, wounded fighters of Jebha were provided with medical treatments at government hospitals in Sudan. After the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, recognition of Jebha leadership in Khartoum reached the level of conducting demonstrations "in the presence of higher officials and brandishing flags and placards which called for 'armed struggle to liberate Eritrea'".[417]

It is difficult to categorize Sudan into either strong-status quo or strong-revisionist. It exhibited both approaches throughout the Haile Selassie period. There were times when Sudan did not actively support Eritrean NCIGs organizations. Furthermore, there are moments when Jebha officers were even invited to the national security council. As a result, there are two qualifications for support for Eritrea's NCIGs from and through Sudan. First, even though Sudan was the most important actor in terms of support, it was not the main source of firepower or technical support. Much of the arms and munitions, other materials, and technical as well as financial assistance were sourced from other countries. The main

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[414] Gebrekal Mesfin, "The Horn of Africa: The Changing Nature of Security in the Aftermath of the Cold War" (University of London, 2001), 71, https://ethos.bl.uk/Logon.do;jsessionid=B3BE8D4E771BDDFEB32710D0A837DCF9?ordering=1.

[415] Roy. Pateman, *Eritrea : Even the Stones Are Burning* (Lawrenceville, NJ [u.a.]: Red Sea Press, 1998); Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61"; Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991."

[416] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 355.

[417] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."

sources were Syria and Iraq, which shipped tons of weapons and ammunition to Jebha through Sudan from as early as 1964.[418] Furthermore, Jebha's eagerness to use Arab nationalism as a strategic identity resource helped in sourcing resources both from progressive and conservative Arab governments. These supports reached organizations of Eritrean NCIGs, mainly through Sudan. The use of Sudan's territory and territorial waters to transit external support to Eritrea was the most important support that Sudan rarely denied Eritrean NCIGs.[419]

Second, the policies of the Sudanese ruling class toward the organizations of Eritrean NCIGs were not constant throughout the Haile Selassie regime. It was phased. At times, it mirrored Addis Ababa's orientation and, at times, the priority of the current Sudanese administration, which will be outlined in interaction with the Haile Selassie regime's policies towards Sudan between 1956 and 1974. Haile Selassie regime policy responses to external support from and through Sudan to the Eritrean NCIGs were also mainly adapted to the magnitude and publicity of the support by the Sudanese government as well as considerations to avoid pushing Sudan to hard align with Egypt and Somalia.[420] Based on these factors, four phases of security relations between Ethiopia and Sudan can be discerned.

The first phase, which ran from 1956 and 1964, was the period when the Haile Selassie regime made the utmost efforts to win the friendship of Sudan and consequently, support to the Eritrean NCIGs were limited to allowing Harakat and Jebha to organize and operate in and transit through Sudan without official endorsement. Although security officials in Addis Ababa were aware of the movements of Eritrean NCIG elites to appeal to Arab countries and the United Nations through Sudan and knew the establishment of both Harakat and Jebha in Sudan and Egypt,[421] the appeasement policy toward Sudan was followed for two main reasons. First, to avoid further pushing Khartoum towards revisionist Nasserite nationalism that targeted Ethiopia as an obstacle to Cairo's hegemonic aspirations in the

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[418] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 100, 148; Semir Yusuf Teshale, "Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-Led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014," *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses* (University of Toronto (Canada), 2018), 202, https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/insurgency-ethnically-divided-authoritarian-led/docview/2150830373/se-2?accountid=142289.

[419] Pateman, *Eritrea : Even the Stones Are Burning*.

[420] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."

[421] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 329–30.

Nile Valley and the Red Sea.[422] Second, and even more pressing, was Somali nationalism which publicly claimed part of Ethiopian territory and defined Ethiopia as an imperialist power, which will be discussed in the next section. Owing to Sudan's status quo colonial boundaries, the positive personal disposition of the emperor[423] toward Sudan for his positive experience during his exile, and the presence of a bargaining chip in the form of rebellious NCIGs in Sudan's southern regions, Addis Ababa went extra miles to be friendly with Sudan.

For instance, Ethiopia was engaged in helping Sudan crash revolts in its southern region by providing its airlifting Sudanese troops to target locations.[424] Addis Ababa also permitted hot pursuit operations by Sudanese troops deep inside the Ethiopian territory and tolerated the resulting indiscriminate killings and damage of properties. Furthermore, with the expectation of reciprocity and not to tarnish good relations with Sudan, the Haile Selassie regime also rejected the offer of assistance by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in June 1963 regarding South Sudan refugees in its territory.[425] To show reciprocity through Addis Ababa's requests for the extradition of wanted rebels, the Abboud government extradited about a dozen Eritrean militants in October 1963.[426] The absolutist regime hanged the extradited fighters. On the other hand, an Ethiopian army officer and governor of a province bordering southern Sudan had helped fight the Anya Anya guerrilla movement in early 1964.[427] However, both extradition agreements and helping each other in suppressing the NCIGs ended with the overthrow of the Abboud government in 1964, and the second phase of Ethio-Sudan turbulent security relations started.

The short-lived government of Sir Al-Khatim al-Khalifa (30 October 19674 to 2 June 1965) started the second episode in progressively turbulent Ethio-Sudanese relations by publicly supporting Haraket and Jebha. Khalifa's government not only accepted the legitimacy of the struggles of Eritrean insurgent groups against Ethiopian subjugation, unlike Abboud's government, it also released all Eritrean prisoners in Sudan and allowed members of the Eritrean NCIGs to freely move within Sudan, raise financial and material

[422] Erlich, *Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan*, 102.
[423] He stayed in Sudan on return in 1940-41 and resumed his position with the support of Sudanese soldiers.
[424] Yihun, "Ethiopia's Role in South Sudan's March to Independence, 1955-1991," 36.
[425] Yihun, 27.
[426] Erlich, *Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan*, 105.
[427] Yihun, "Ethiopia's Role in South Sudan's March to Independence, 1955-1991," 36–37.

support, and recruit members for the insurgency.[428] Furthermore, it also facilitated the transit of financial, material, and arms support from other Arab states and the Eritrean diaspora from the Middle East. It was the support that Jebha received that transformed it into a fighting force.

Following the change of the Khalifa government, the Mahgoub administration took the initiative to rekindle the friendship with Ethiopia. As a result, the two states signed an Addis Ababa Memorandum of Understanding in July 1965.[429] The contents of the agreement were rather an acknowledgment of securitization of each other due to reciprocal support for each other's insurgent groups. According to this memorandum, they agreed to close the offices of insurgent groups and expel members of insurgent groups from their respective territories, deny the transfer of arms and other supports through their territories, and refrain from hostile propaganda against each other.[430]

However, contrary to the agreement, both Addis Ababa and Khartoum were progressively working to help each other's dissident groups. Due to the support, Jebha managed to engage the Ethiopian army directly. As discussed above, Jebha was organized into five Wilayas and started attacking targets in Eritrea. To deal with the Jebha attack and eliminate it once and for all, the Ethiopian government, on the other hand, established a closer relationship with Israel to train its troops in counterinsurgency.[431] With the Israeli counterinsurgency experts and with American technical support for airstrikes, the Haile Selassie regime started widespread crusades and a "scorched earth" counterinsurgency policy in February 1967 against Muslim-dominated areas that were suspected of hosting Jebha rebels.[432] The "scorched earth" counter-insurgency operations were spearheaded by Israeli-trained, exclusively Christian commandos. The commandos were backed by the Second Division in Asmara and the air force. Over three hundred villages were burned to the ground; hundreds of civilians were massacred, dozens burned alive, tens of thousands of farm animals slaughtered, and consequently, tens of thousands of Eritreans flocked to

[428] Yihun, 37.
[429] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[430] Yihun.
[431] Lovise Aalen, "Ethiopian State Support to Insurgency in Southern Sudan from 1962 to 1983: Local, Regional and Global Connections," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 626–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.949403.
[432] Andebrhan Welde Giorgis, *Eritrea at a Crossroads : A Narrative of Triumph, Betrayal and Hope* (Houston: Strategic Book Publishing and Rights Co., 2014), 363.

Sudan.[433] Even though the atrocious and destructive counter-insurgency operations were meant to nip the Jebha in the bud, they rather had several blowbacks with far-reaching consequences for the future of Jebha, Eritrea, the Haile Selassie regime, Ethiopia, and Ethio-Sudanese relations.

First, Sudan broke the mutual policy of not internationalizing the refugee problem and announced it to the UNHCR. Regardless of Ethiopia's protests, both against the Sudan government and the United Nations, Sudan received funding support for hosting three hundred thousand Eritrean refugees, henceforth internationalizing the problem.[434] Jebha, on the other hand, had an unending source of recruits for its war of independence. The sacrifices Jebha paid against the ruthless regime resulted in progressively increasing recruits, including from the Christian areas. Christian students from well-to-do families, like Isaias Afewerki, started to drop out of Haile Selassie I University and join Jebha in Sudan.[435]

Furthermore, Sudan allowed Jebha to receive increasing aid from Arab countries, particularly following the 1967 Arab-Israeli debacle. Egypt also allowed Jebha to reopen its offices and resume radio propaganda. As a result, the period after 1967 was a huge incubation period for Jebha. Moreover, the first pro-Ethiopian Unionist Chief Executive of Eritrea, Tedla Bairu himself, joined Jebha, which was a symbolically important development in terms of the conception of the national identity of Eritrea as cross-sectional.[436] In these contexts, Sabbe was able to send dozens of recruits to China and Cuba for training through Sudan. More fighters were also sent to other countries, including Algeria and Syria, for training.[437]

Second, Jebha's contestation of the national identity of Ethiopia and the determination of the absolutist regime to eradicate the militants began to permeate the student body at Haile Selassie I University. Students from Eritrea whose classmates joined Jebha, Oromo students whose relatives were being executed for asking for self-help organizations to develop their culture, and students from other NCIGs started to organize in the underground, read and

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[433] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies"; Wrong, *I Didn't Do It for You : How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation*.
[434] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[435] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*.
[436] Welde Giorgis, *Eritrea at a Crossroads : A Narrative of Triumph, Betrayal and Hope*, 119.
[437] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 162.

discuss Marxist texts.[438] The Stalinist conception of the 'national question'[439] and the definition of the nation in the context of ongoing decolonization in Africa helped the students question the nature of Ethiopia versus the Eritrean question.[440] Finally, Jebha's specific question about the national identity of Eritrea in opposition to the imposed national identity of Ethiopia took center stage in discussions of the Ethiopian Students' Movement (ESM) in an article by Wallelign Mekonnen in the November 1969 issue of Struggle, a journal published by the student union at Haile-Selassie I University (HSIU) in Addis Ababa.[441] Here, I will detour a little to introduce this article because it will be critical for subsequent developments and the Eritrean question and Ethiopian revolution that we will discuss in the next Chapter.

With his ideology-setting article entitled 'On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia', Wallelign legitimized the Eritrean national identity contestation and made it thinkable for other NCIGs to imagine the place of their identity in the Ethiopian empire. He argued, in this brief, but wildly consequential article, that Ethiopian national identity was essentially Amhara supremacy:[442]

> To be a "genuine Ethiopian" one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity and to wear the Amhara-Tigre Shamma in international conferences. In some cases, to be an "Ethiopian", you will even have to change your name. In short to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an Amhara mask (to use Fanon's expression). Start asserting your national identity and you are automatically a tribalist, that is if you are not blessed to be born an Amhara. According to the constitution you will need Amharic to go to school, to get a job, to read books (however few) and even to listen to the news on Radio "Ethiopia" unless you are a Somali or an Eritrean in Asmara for obvious reasons.

By proposing armed struggles and socialist revolution as the only genuine methods of freeing Ethiopian peoples from the tyranny of the Haile Selassie regime, Wallelign

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[438] Zeleke, *Ethiopia in Theory: Revolution and Knowledge Production, 1964–2016*, 119–20; Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*, 196.

[439] The Stalinist theory further developed from Lenin's idea of the right of oppressed ethnic groups to struggle against all forms of oppression, see Prunier, 418. Members of the Ethiopian Students' Movement pushed the belief that oppressed nationalities of Ethiopia have a potential capacity to be a nation in line with Stalin's definition of the concept nation as a "historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and a community of culture", see Zeleke, *Ethiopia in Theory: Revolution and Knowledge Production, 1964–2016*, 126.

[440] Zeleke, 120.

[441] Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*, 198–99.

[442] Mekonnen, "On National the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia."

supported Jebha's method but criticized its conception of exclusionary Eritrean national identity which did not make it better than the regime it was fighting against.[443] Wallelign's ideas became the obsession of the ESM until the 1974 revolution; and subsequently became the 'canonical manifesto'[444] of liberation movements, as we will see in Chapters 5 and 6. While his article has been the most consequential in terms of a redefinition of the national identity of Ethiopia afterward, Wallelign and other young students who tried to Ethiopianize the "nationalities question" were decimated by the Haile Selassie regime.[445]

While the "nationalities question" was emerging as the main agenda for annual students' conferences in Europe and North America, Jebha also started another tactic that made it more prominent. The tactic that the students copied from Jebha was to hijack Ethiopian Airlines planes (EAL). On 11 March 1969, the Jebha unit damaged the EAL planed, which was Frankfurt Airport, Germany. On 18 June 1969, also Jebha group bombed and damaged an empty plane on the ground at Karachi airport in Pakistan.[446] On 13 September 1969, they hijacked and forced a passenger plane to land in Aden, Yemen. Other unsuccessful attempts were also conducted in Rome and Madrid.[447] While these attacks put Jebha on the map at the chagrin of the Haile Selassie regime, radical members of the Ethiopian Students' Movement (ESM)[448] also joined Jebha by hijacking the plane.[449] On 11 August 1969, key student leaders hijacked a domestic flight plane from Ethiopia and forced it to land in Khartoum. The radical students stayed in Sudan for six months and later moved to Algiers. [450]

The publicity of the acts of Jebha and students, as well as the decision of the Sudan government to publicize hundreds of thousands of Eritreans who fled to Sudan from oppression and suppression of the Haile Selassie regime, forced Addis Ababa to counterbalance Sudan more aggressively. The regime simultaneously targeted both Jebha and Nimeiry's regime as the main national security threat. With regard to Jebha, particularly following Jebha's killing of Brigadier General Teshome Irgetu, commander of the Second

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[443] Mekonnen.
[444] Woldeyes, *Native Colonialism : Education and the Economy of Violence against Traditions in Ethiopia*, 134.
[445] Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*, 166.
[446] Zewde, 165–66.
[447] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 109.
[448] ESM …THE NATIONAL QUESTION…
[449] Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*, 166.
[450] Zeleke, *Ethiopia in Theory: Revolution and Knowledge Production, 1964–2016*, 124.

Division, to avenge his role in "scorched earth" counter-insurgency operations since 1967, the absolutist regime placed Eritrea under military rule.[451] The military went on a killing spree that included the horrifying massacres that led to a further refugee influx, from which Jebha recruited and increased its force to thirteen thousand. Furthermore, the atrocious wars against both Muslims and Christians together further cemented the view that Eritreans were being suppressed as Eritreans and created the tenacity toward the commitment to armed struggle as the solution to the Eritrean problem.

With regard to Sudan, Ethiopia also declared the presence of thousands of Sudanese refugees, established refugee camps, and allowed the UN to inspect the cases in reciprocity to the internationalization of the Eritrean refugees in Sudan. By going above the internationalization of the refugees, Addis Ababa also facilitated the recruitment of rebel groups and their training both in Israel and Ethiopia.[452] In terms of supporting the Sudanese NCIGs as a security tool, this increased when Ethiopia allowed different rebel groups in southern Sudan to use Ethiopian territory to attack targets in Sudan.[453]

Furthermore, the coup in Sudan in May 1969 that brought General Jaafar Nimeiry to power further escalated and started the third phase. For Haile Selassie regime under stress from radical leftist students, the Jebha that was creating havoc both in Eritrea and internationally, socialist Nimeiry was the worst news. In a few months, Barre in Somalia and Ghaddafi in Libya were added to Nimeiry in Sudan and Nasser in Egypt, who turned against Ethiopia after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.[454] The siege mentality of the elites of the Haile Selassie regime turned into overdrive, and they decided to remove Nimeiry from office.

To remove Nimeiry from power, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, which were concerned about the growing influence of socialist regimes (Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, and Libya from outside the region) in the Red Sea region, with a green light from the US, aligned to remove him in 1970. Accordingly, it was planned that a friendly Ansar group would execute an

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[451] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 63; Makki, "Eritrea between Empires: Nationalism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination, 1890–1991," 332.
[452] Yihun, "Ethiopia's Role in South Sudan's March to Independence, 1955-1991."
[453] R Bayissa, "The Derg-SPLM/A Cooperation: An Aspect of Ethio-Sudan Proxy Wars," *Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities* 5, no. 2 (February 16, 2011), https://doi.org/10.4314/ejossah.v5i2.63648.
[454] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."

operation to overthrow Nimeiry using weapons purchased from Israel, funded by Saudi Arabia, and transferred by Ethiopia.[455] However, Sudan discovered the plot and foiled the Ansar operation by bombing Aba Island in March 1970. However, other unrelated developments forced Nimeiry to change his policy of supporting Eritrean NCIGs. The Sudanese Communist Party conducted a temporarily successful coup against Nimeiry in July 1971. After four days, the coup was reversed, and the leading putschists were executed. Nimeiry blamed the coup on Moscow.[456] As a result, he switched Cold War patron to the US and thereby started the relatively peaceful fourth phase of Ethio-Sudan relations.

In the fourth phase, Nimeiry negotiated and signed the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 to redefine the Sudanese national identity that would be inclusive of the southern Sudan NCIG. Part of the agreement was stopping the help to Eritrea's NCIGs movements. Ethiopia's main interest was to stop external support to the Jebha through Sudan and the use of territory by the Jebha to attack Ethiopia. After the Addis Ababa agreement, the Nimeiry regime temporarily blocked the Jebha movements and closed the offices of Eritrean NCIGS organizations.[457] However, in two years, the Haile Selassie regime was overthrown by the revolution of 1974, and Khartoum resumed support to Eritrean insurgent organizations, including the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, Shaebia in Arabic acronym, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

4.4 National Identity Contestations in Eastern Ethiopia and the Greater Somalia Discourse

The objectives and strategies to impose the Ethiopian national identity on the people of eastern Ethiopia were the same as those sought and employed in Eritrea discussed above: the imposition of Abyssinian court culture, Tabot Christianity, and Amharic. However, there were two significant differences in terms of the targeted population. First, unlike the people of Eritrea, where about half of the population initially sought complete union with Ethiopia due to cultural and religious compatibility, in eastern Ethiopia, the conception of the national identity of the Haile Selassie regime had no collective constituency among the majority Muslim Oromos, Somalis and Hararis. Second, there was a kin state, Somalia, across the

[455] Yihun, "Ethiopia's Troubled Relations with the Sudan, 1956-1983," 76.
[456] Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, 114.
[457] Pateman, *Eritrea : Even the Stones Are Burning*, 100.

border whose conception of national identity completely included the Somalis and partially included the other two.

As a result, the national identity contestations in the southeast were different from the ones in Eritrea, both in terms of the nature of external connections and the nature of social mobilizations and organizations. In the case of Eritrea, resistance against the imposition of Ethiopian national identity was led by Eritrean elites whose unambiguous goal was Eritrean independence from Ethiopian 'colonialism', using Eritrea's colonial history as the criterion. However, the national identity contestations of NCIGs of the Southeast movements were more aspirational than articulated as postcolonial self-determination. Although oppositions against the Haile Selassie regime were always present in most parts of NCIG areas, the idea of contesting the national identity in the southeast started to be mainly hatched during the British control over the entire Somali-speaking peoples, 1941 to 1948, including the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. This default Greater Somalia administration under British control enabled the diffusion of the nascent Somali nationalism, which was institutionalized through the Somali Youth Club (SYC) in 1943 in Mogadishu. By establishing networks that linked young merchants and the educated working class like government clerks and other salaried employees, as well as members of the Somalia Gendarmerie, the SYC spread throughout Somali-speaking territories.[458] When the influence of the Club reached parts of Ethiopia, the emperor invited the Club's president, Abdulqadir Saqawa Din, to Addis Ababa in 1946. Upon his return from Addis Ababa with a promise of support from the emperor against European colonialism, the Mogadishu branch of SYC started to entertain the idea of union with Ethiopia against British domination.[459] The news of the idea of union with Ethiopia was received with dread at the Jigjiga branch of SYC, in Ethiopia.

A member of SYC at Jigjiga reported to have warned that "the Ethiopians are colonizers, they are stronger than us, they are barbarous and arrogant, they will consume you, they want to cheat you, to take the land _never allow them".[460] By the time SYC was upgraded from a self-help club to the nationalist organization called Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1947,[461] pro-Ethiopia Somali nationalists like Makhtal Daahir, president of the Harar branch of SYC, turned against Ethiopia with a rising tide of Soomaaliweyn, a Somali

[458] Barnes, "The Somali Youth League, Ethiopian Somalis and the Greater Somalia Idea, c. 1946–48," 280.
[459] Barnes, 281–281.
[460] Barnes, 282.
[461] Barnes, 279–181.

phrase for Greater Somalia. The young elites of the Ogaadeen clan[462] of Ethiopia used memories of the humiliation of Muslims, as well as a history of violence and looting under the authority of the father of Haile Selassie, Ras Mekonnen,[463] who was the first Ethiopian governor of the region, subsequently by his son and families of Haile Selassie who considered Harar fiefdom of the royal family. Henceforth, Harar represented the iconic victory of the Ethiopian Christian monarchy, where a mosque was demolished and replaced by a church to show supremacy.[464] On the other hand, for NCIGs of the southeast, Harar was their iconic economic, cultural, and center of Islamic civilization that was built by Muslim emirs.

The SYL claimed Ogaden, including Harar, which made it diametrically opposite nationalist claims against the official nationalism of the absolutist monarchy. The claims of the SYL nationalists were based on a nascent Somali nationalism that aimed to create Soomaaliweyn.[465] The Greater Somalia project aims to unite the Somali-speaking territories of Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, the Ogaden of Ethiopia, French Somaliland (Djibouti), and the Northern Frontier District (NFD of Kenya). The first SYL President Haji Mohammed Hussein advocated the discourse in the following words:[466]

> We wish our country to be amalgamated with the other Somalilands and to form one political, administrative, and economic unit with them. We Somalis are one in every way. We are of the same racial and geographical origin, we have the same culture, we have the same language, and the same religion. There is no future for us except as part of a Greater Somalia.

The discourse of Greater Somalia had been diffusing rapidly throughout the territories of Somali-speaking peoples of the Horn of Africa and non-Somali regions of Muslim Oromos and Hararis in eastern and south-eastern Ethiopia that were subjugated, exploited, marginalized, and excluded by the Haile Selassie regime both before and after Italian occupation.[467] The Greater Somalia discourse that made Islam one pillar of its national

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[462] Ogaadeen, is used for the clan and Ogaden is used for the territorial spaces inhabited mostly by Somali speaking people of eastern Ethiopia.
[463] Reid, "Atrocity in Ethiopian History," 104.
[464] Ahmed, *History of Harar and the Hararis*, 113.
[465] Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, *The Suicidal State in Somalia_ The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991 (2016, UPA)* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2016), 38.
[466] Quoted in Giulia Liberatore, *Somali, Muslim, British : Striving in Securitized Britain.* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 43.
[467] By the end of 1947 there were about 300, 000 SYL members throughout the region, Carmichael, 2001, 199

identity construction happened to be a solution to the ontological insecurity caused by the core values of the Haile Selassie regime. Due to push factors from the Ethiopian side and the relatively inclusive political network of the SYL that strictly prohibited clan and other subnational identifications, it opened more than one hundred and seventy offices in the Oromo provinces of Hararghe, Arsi, and Bale in the eastern Ethiopian territories. As a result, there were significant activities of mobilization in Eastern Ethiopia[468] to resist Ethiopian rule and seek autonomy or independence and a subsequent merger with Somalia. The Somalis of Ethiopia registered a higher watermark of contesting their belonging to the Empire of Ethiopia when a group of traditional representatives of the Somalis and Hararis of Ethiopia signed a petition to the Four-Power Commission of Investigation for the Former Italian Colonies (Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union) in 1948 demanding merger with Somalia along the line the SYL aspiration of the Greater Somalia.[469]

In the petition, five reasons were provided for contesting against being under the Empire of Ethiopia and justifying amalgamation with other Somalilands.[470] First, Ethiopia conquered the region by force half a century ago and "can exercise authority only by the use of considerable armed forces". Second, Somali Muslims were disliked and treated as foreigners. Third, Ethiopia could not develop. Fourth, Somalis did not have any voice in the hostile government of Ethiopia, and they "have no confidence in their administration of justice".[471] Finally, the Ethiopian government could not claim the region as it had never effectively occupied it. In other words, the elites of the Somali and Harari NCIGs effectively demonstrated exclusion from the "Christian nation" of the Haile Selassie regime, as well as a lack of provision of public services that connected the ruler and the ruled.[472]

However, the Four-Powers Commission, which declined the petition, could not agree on a specific plan for the future of the former Italian Somaliland. The British Foreign Affairs Minister presented a pro-Greater Somalia proposal, called the Bevin Plan, which aimed at a unification of all Somali territories, including the Ogaden, under British trusteeship.[473] This

[468] Natasha Issa Shivji, "Secessionism on the Nation's Frontier: The Predicament of Land, Labor and Dependency in Mombasa and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (1850–1963)" (New York University, 2019), 230.
[469] GoS, "The Portion of Somali Territory under Ethiopian Colonization."
[470] GoS, 61.
[471] GoS, 61.
[472] GoS, 61.
[473] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."

proposal was rejected by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four powers as a British machination for further imperialist expansions.[474] When its plan was rejected, Britain returned Ogaden to Ethiopia despite fierce opposition from the SYL. The fate of the former Italian Somaliland was referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The General Assembly decided to place the former Italian Somaliland under Italian trusteeship for a decade.[475] With the decision of Britain to return the Haud and Reserved Areas to Ethiopia and keep the NFD as part of Kenya, the SYL's aspiration of uniting all the Somali territories was effectively aborted, and territorial divisions were returned to pre-Second World War colonial treaties.

Despite these reversals, the SYL elites continued to work on their project of uniting all Somali territories at independence. After a decade of relentless attempts, within the relatively favorable environment of the Cold War rivalries, their Greater Somalia project moved one essential step forward by the Anglo-American demarche of January 1959.[476] Washington and London supported the union of the Italian Trusteeship of Somaliland and the British Protectorate of Somaliland mainly to curb the Nasserite Arab nationalism that had been breathing down the Red Sea and to contain the USSR presence in the Horn of Africa. Following this milestone development, the SYL elites continued pushing irredentism even further. At the Pan-Somaliland Conference of 30 August 1959 in Mogadishu, they claimed that the borders of Greater Somalia would extend as far as the highlands of Ethiopia.[477] As the first President of the Somali Republic, Aden Abdulla Hasan defined the Greater Somalia project as the raison d'être of the nascent Somali nationalism, saying, "Reunification of all Somalis is the very reason for the life of our nation".[478]

This claim of Greater Somalia, which was repeated on public occasions by Somali political elites, achieved a hegemonic status with its promulgation in the first constitution of the Republic of Somalia. Article 6 of the constitution authorized the government to reinstate Somali territories through legal and peaceful means.[479] And finally, the inauguration of

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[474] Barnes, "The Somali Youth League, Ethiopian Somalis and the Greater Somalia Idea, c. 1946–48," 281.
[475] Muuse Yuusuf, *The Genesis of the Civil War in Somalia: The Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on the Conflict* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2021), 17.
[476] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[477] Yihun.
[478] Ezekiel Gebissa, "Consumption, Contraband, and Commodification: A History of Khat in Harerge, Ethiopia, c.1930-1991." (Michigan State University, 1997).
[479] GoS, The Constitution of the Somali Republic.

independence of the Republic of Somalia through the union of former Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland on 1 July 1960 accomplished the essential first step towards the creation of Greater Somalia. Furthermore, the Greater Somalia aspiration was further engraved in the national flag through a five-star emblem that was intended to represent the five territories designated to make up Greater Somalia. The idea of engraving was meant to remind people that full independence of Somalia cannot be achieved if other territories remain under foreign control.[480] As a result, Somalia was consistently following weak-revisionist behaviors and a strong-revisionist approach in the last years of the Haile Selassie regime. In this chapter, we will see the weak-revisionist approach alone. The second one will be covered in the next chapter.

Somalia's revisionist claims were not limited to spatial claims. It also included temporal claims like rewriting history that promoted the archenemies of Christian Ethiopia, like Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, who subjugated and occupied Christian Ethiopia in the 16th century, and the Somali nationalist leader Sayyed Abdile Hasan. These leaders were celebrated as Somali national heroes, and their statues were erected in Mogadishu. This was a diametrically opposing claim of historical memory, national heroes, and territorial, and identity claims by the monarchical regime of Ethiopia. For Somali nationalists, Ethiopia needed to allow colonized people to exercise their right to self-determination. A Somali politician even proposed a solution in the form of a referendum, in which they would not ask the Ogaden if the people were given a chance and chose to stay with Ethiopia.[481] Contestation of the territories of Ethiopia by Somalia has been pursued through diplomacy, propaganda, war, and support of the insurgency.

The main strategy of Somali leaders throughout the Haile Selassie period was to demand respect for the right to self-determination of Somali-speaking people in Ethiopia in multilateral forums, including the UN General Assembly and the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Contestations 'on behalf' of Ethiopian Somalis were presented by arguing that Ethiopia participated in the Scramble for Africa in the late 19th century as a colonial power. For example, at the sixteenth session of the UN General Assembly 1961, the representative of the Republic of Somalia, Abdullahi Issa, attempted to portray Ethiopia

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[480] Ingiriis, *The Suicidal State in Somalia_ The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991 (2016, UPA)*, 38.

[481] Ayele, "The Politics of the Somalia - Ethiopia Boundary Problem: 1960-1967."

as an African 'colonial power', claiming that:[482]

> "We regret to say that a neighboring African State participated in this scramble…During the process of colonial expansion and the consequent dismemberment of our country, Ethiopia seized the opportunity to absorb a large portion of Somali territory. The Somalis who inhabit this territory have repeatedly voiced their desire to join their brothers in the Somali Republic".

The definition of Ethiopia by Somali elites as an 'imperialist power' was usually followed by reports of the current denial of freedom of movement and grazing rights to Somali pastoralist communities, their oppressions, and brutal massacres by Ethiopian armed forces. The Somali leaders could not even refrain from their contestations at continental summits hosted in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu,[483] which will be discussed in detail in Section 4.7.2.

The related and even relatively successful strategy used by the Somali nationalists in their irredentist claims against Ethiopia was propaganda. Through radio and print media, Ethiopia was portrayed as an enemy of Somalis and other NCIGs. Some of these NCIGs, whose voices were silenced by the absolutist regime, were provided with airtime on Radio Mogadishu.[484] For example, the Oromo were given the first opportunity to broadcast their message in their language in 1962.[485] Furthermore, because of the radio broadcast, Oromos leaders started to mobilize and organize in Mogadishu and other avenues, including the annual Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. They exchanged information about independence movements and decolonization with other African pilgrims and started looking for support. The key leaders of the Muslim Oromo of southeastern Ethiopia, such as Haj Aadam Saddo, Elemo Qilxu, and Shek Husen Sura, used Hajj and Umra to leave the country, connect with support networks in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen to support the Bale movement. As a result, the Haile Selassie regime tried to block pilgrims from Bale from going to Hajj.[486]

The official strategy followed by Somalia in its move towards realizing the greater

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[482] UN, "General Assembly, 16th session :1027th plenary meeting, Thursday, 5 October 1961, New York" (New York, 1962), 281–82, http://digitallibrary.un.org/record/742355/files/A_PV-102.
[483] Ayele, "The Politics of the Somalia - Ethiopia Boundary Problem: 1960-1967," 581.
[484] Sara Marzagora and Ayele Kebede, "Literary Networks in the Horn of Africa: Oromo and Amharic Intellectual Histories," in *Routledge Handbook of African Literature2*, ed. Moradewun Adejunmobi, Coetzee, Carli (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 436–37.
[485] Greg Gow, "Translocations of Affirmation: Mediascapes and Cultural Flows among the Stateless Oromo," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 7, no. 3 (September 1, 2004): 309, https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877904046304.
[486] Østebø, *Islam, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Bale Insurgency, 1963-1970*, 304.

Somalia was supporting the NCIGs of Ethiopia. In addition to making self-determination and unity of Somali-speaking people part of the constitutional provision, the government of Somalia made its official policy to support Somali insurgent groups by claiming that it was legal in line with the Charter of the UN to support decolonization. As aforementioned, whether it was British, French, or Ethiopian "colonialism", supporting decolonization was the official policy. What Mogadishu always denied was the participation of the Somali National Army (SNA). Accordingly, three organizations of Ethiopia's NCIGs were supported by Mogadishu in the 1960s. The organizations evolved into the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), which was fully supported and became a medium of Somali irredentism. Second, Somalia tried to support Eritrea's independence as it confirmed Ethiopia's imperialism even though its supports were mainly ceremonial, like diplomatic support, provision of Somali passports, and sponsoring offices in Mogadishu. Third, the Somali government also provided limited support to the Bale Oromo uprising by providing arms, transit, and a forward base to attack Ethiopian targets.[487]

Although not proven fruitful, the government of Somalia, particularly that of PM Shermarke, tried to realize Somali irredentism through violent tactics and strategies. Tens of incursions have been made into Ethiopian territories since the independence of Somalia in 1960. The largest offensive attempt was conducted in February 1964. The Somali National Army (SNA) crossed into Ethiopian territory at Tug Wajale, Ina Guuxa, Dabagoryale, Ferfer, Yat, and Dollo fronts[488] at the same time. These attempts, which were called the Tug Wajale wars because the Tug Wajale was a brief but intense battle, were easily repulsed by Ethiopian forces on all fronts. Another small cross-border skirmish was also tried in 1967, after which Somalia refrained from direct engagements. After the failure of these brief skirmishes, Somalia engaged in an unprecedented build-up of arms with external assistance in the context of the Cold War and Arab nationalism.

As the West's support for defensive purposes was not sufficient for Mogadishu's goal of Greater Somalia and Somalia did not have the financial means to buy war technology, it focused on using the rivalries of the Cold War and Arab-Israel competition to get support. The largest supporter was the former USSR. Between 1963 and 1969, Moscow trained and

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[487] Østebø, *Islam, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Bale Insurgency, 1963-1970*; Tareke, *Ethiopia : Power & Protest : Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century*.
[488] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*.

armed about 16,000 SNA forces, which was further increased to 50,000. Furthermore, hundreds of Somali military officers, including from the Ogaadeeni clan, were trained at Soviet military academies like Frunze, Kuznetsov, and St Petersburg.[489] One of these officers, General Siad Barre, took power through a coup in 1969. The other major source of support for Somalia was Egypt (UAR). Somalia's irredentism, its help to Ethiopia's NCIG organizations, and the growing Somali capacity with external support led to the securitization of Greater Somalia, which will be discussed in the next section.

4.5 Securitization of Greater Somalia Discourse

The Pan-Somali nationalism and its Greater Somalia aspiration was unarguably the most securitized security issue as an existential threat to Ethiopia during the Haile Selassie regime. To remove the irredentism of Somalia as an existential threat, as well as to weaken and contain Somalia, several institutional designs were introduced. For the first time in Ethiopia's security knowledge production history, a unique study unit was established by interdisciplinary experts from defense, intelligence, foreign affairs, and Haile Selassie I University to research and propose policy ideas on how to minimize and eliminate vulnerabilities that emanate from Greater Somalia. Moreover, a modern intelligence center outside the capital was also established in Harar to collect, organize, analyze, and report intelligence from the entire Somali-speaking and Muslim areas of the Horn of Africa from Djibouti to Kenya. Furthermore, regular, and special defense structures and clandestine army units were organized and dispatched. New administrative designs for territorial administration, border controls, and refugee management were also devised to protect Ethiopia's territorial integrity and national security. This was because the Somali claims against the Ogaden region contradicted Ethiopia's identity, spatial and temporal claims all at the same time. As a result, several strategies were developed to deal with NCIGs of southeastern Ethiopia (Hararis, Oromos, and Somalis), Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti at the same time.

With regard to the NCIGS, the main objective of the Haile Selassie regime was to delink them from the influence of Pan-Somali nationalism and immunize them to Somali

[489] Ingiriis, *The Suicidal State in Somalia_ The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991 (2016, UPA)*, 43.

propaganda. To this end, several strategies were devised which were common to all three and unique to each of the three NCIGS. First, the three NCIGs in these regions, i.e., Hararis, Oromos, and Somalis, were placed under regimented Shewan domination. Moreover, in areas outside major towns, administrative ketemas (garrison towns mainly settled by Christians from the highlands), army, and police posts were installed throughout these territories for effective control. In the fertile regions of Bale and Hararghe, highland settlers were resettled to fertile and strategic areas to change settlement patterns and break contiguous settlements of NCIGs.[490] To further control and manage the influence of Somali nationalism, the most extensive intelligence networks, with its headquarters at Harar, were built throughout these territories, linking all areas dominated by Muslims, including Djibouti and Somalia.[491]

With regard to unique control mechanisms for each NCIG, strategies were devised based on demography, terrain and identity, and ideological affinity of the NCIGs with Somalia. To begin with, controlling Hararis, whose entire population was in the tens of thousands, was rather easy. Instead of killing indiscriminately and burning down entire villages as in the cases of Muslim Eritreans, Somalis, and Oromos of Bale, the responses to Harari's national identity contestations were mainly about establishing a hegemonic presence and using regular domination measures, including imprisonments, tortures, property confiscations, forcing into exile, and co-opting.[492] For example, Hararis, who demanded a merger with Somalia through the Watani-Kulub alliance, were rounded up, and 81 of their ringleaders were sent to inaccessible prisons in western Ethiopia, such as Jimma and Gore, and their properties were confiscated.[493] Thirteen of their leaders who managed to escape to Cairo were forced to return using their families and other prisoners as hostages.[494] After months of imprisonment, the leaders of the Harari movement were released but banned from returning to Harar, and some of them were co-opted through appointment to symbolic but functionally vacated positions in Addis Ababa. More importantly, the presence of overwhelming security institutions like the elite and prestigious Haile Selassie I Military Academy, Harar, the regional headquarters of the Intelligence Unit,

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[490] Gnamo, *Conquest and Resistance in the Ethiopian Empire, 1880-1974 : The Case of the Arsi Oromo*, 237; Meskela, "BALE," 33.
[491] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[492] Carmichael, "Approaching Ethiopian History: Addis Abäba and Local Governance in Harär, c. 1900 to 1950."
[493] Ahmed, *History of Harar and the Hararis*, 163–65.
[494] Ahmed, 155–58.

and the headquarters of the Third Division of the Army was itself overwhelming for such a minuscule NCIG. As a result, the Hararis were successfully pacified and reduced to a voiceless subaltern.[495]

Contrary to the Hararis, the most vocal and restive NCIG has been the Muslim Oromo of Bale. They fought the absolutist regime under the leadership of General Wako Gutu for seven years, from 1963 to 1970. Several strategies were used to control the Muslim Oromos of Bale. The regime strengthened the policy of diluting through resettlements. The peasants from this region were displaced from fertile lands and replaced by settlers.[496] The settlers joined the counterinsurgency on the side of the government. The Fourth Division Army units, along with the Naftagna and with the air support, conducted "scorch earth" operations. In the districts of El Kere and Dello that border Somalia, entire villages were burned down to terrorize the population, not to rebel and support insurgent groups.[497] Besides, the administration of Bale was placed under the emergency administration of Naftagna appointees from Shewa or military generals. This region was also pacified for five years, 1970-1975, when the Somali arms deliveries were discontinued, and as a result, the militants were forced to give up armed struggles momentarily.

However, the Haile Selassie regime's determination to sniff out Oromo movements rather forced it to transform it into a national movement with the founding of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1973 as a vanguard organization for the self -determination of the Oromo, an NCIG that constituted between 35% and 40% of the Ethiopian population. The territorial claim of the OLF was approximately 600,000 square kilometers, about half of the country. Substantial territorial areas claimed by OLF, in Hararghe, Arsi and Bale, overlapped in part with those claimed by Somalia. As a result, the spatial contestations of the OLF for its Democratic Republic of Oromia[498] were not only against Ethiopia but also against Somalia's claims. As a result, the first contingent of the OLF fighters led by Jaarraa Abbaa Gadaa, who were trained in Aden, were imprisoned by the Barre regime until 1975.[499]

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[495] Hararis attempted final public contesting imposition of Christian identity was when about 5000 Hararis demanded public celebration of Mowlid, in 1957[495] when their protest was overwhelmed by HS forces and protesters were imprisoned.

[496] Østebø, *Islam, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Bale Insurgency, 1963-1970*, 139.

[497] Østebø, 150.

[498] Tesfaye Tolessa Bessa, "A History of Oromo Literature and Identity Issues-(c. 1840-1991)" (Addis Ababa University, 2019), 380, http://etd.aau.edu.et/handle/123456789/20411.

[499] John Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers* (New York: James Currey, 2011), 195.

The second contingent started the armed struggle with the proverbial shot started by Elemoo Qilxuu at mount Charchar in Hararghe in 1973.[500] The Oromo struggle for self-determination during the subsequent regimes will be discussed in chapters five and six.

With regard to the main target NCIG, the Somalis of Ethiopia, the Haile Selassie regime tried to use both an appeasement policy co-opting some of the Somali elites through the appointment of Somali individuals and extreme forms of punishment, including burning down entire villages to force submission. However, the policy did not work because the key leaders behind the Greater Somalia project themselves are the Ogaadeen clan, who reside across Ethio-Somalia borders as well as across Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya borders. In the early years, Ethiopian Somalis who were employed as police, security, and border control officers to deal with the Somali incursions, rather took their arms, crossed the borders to Somalia, and started to attack Ethiopia. As a result, the region was put under the control of the Third Division and administered by military rule.[501]

In addition to controlling its NCIGs, the main target of the Haile Selassie regime was to contain and weaken Somalia. To decapacitate the government of Somalia so that it could not achieve its declared policy of territorial aggrandizement, the Haile Selassie regime followed strategies of deterrence, divide and rule, organizing and sponsoring an insurgent group, obstructive border control, organizing and supporting opposition groups and leaders, and propaganda warfare.

Targeted strikes as deterrence were used as direct responses to the frequent Somali incursions, both by the SNA and militant groups based in Somalia as well as to respond to the invasion of 1964. Deterrence was institutionalized into two types of forces: the regular defensive army and offensive special commando units. The regular army of two divisions, the Third Division, and the Fourth Division, was placed in strategic posts bordering Somalia.[502] The Third Division, for instance, easily defeated the Somali National Army's invasion between February 6 to 8 of 1964 at the Tug Wajale (Togochale) battle.[503] Ethiopian Airforce also took part in this battle, hitting targets inside Somalia, including in the capital

[500] Aga, "Brigadier General Taddasa Birru: A Militry-Political Biography (1922-1975)," 417.
[501] Tareke, *Ethiopia : Power & Protest : Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century*; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[502] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[503] Tareke, *Ethiopia : Power & Protest : Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century*, 139–40.

of northern Somalia, Hargeisa. The easy defeat of all Somali units in 1964[504] forced Somalia to limit its violent tactics to irregular incursions by regular armed forces dressed as insurgents.

To deal with the irregular incursions by both the SNA and militants, Ethiopia organized two commando units, one based at Jigjiga; and the second based at Kebridehar, embedded in the regular army units. According to Yihun, these commando units were dispatched with clandestine incursions deep inside the Somali territories to destroy the sanctuaries and training camps of the militant groups. Furthermore, Somalia's critical infrastructures, like police stations, army installations, and other state structures, were attacked[505] by these units to force the Somali government to refrain from irredentism and to stop supporting organizations of Ethiopia's NCIGs.

In addition to defense and offense through regular and special commando units, the Haile Selassie regime also produced another strategy, proxy wars, to weaken and contain the Greater Somalia project. Particularly following PM Sharmarke's call for Somali people to raise against Ethiopia in August 1963, the Ethiopian government decided to do away with the Greater Somalia project by separating the two Somalis that had already united as an option of last resort. With the recommendation of the Study Unit and coordination by the Intelligence Unit, an insurgent group called the North Somalia Liberation Movement was organized to conduct proxy wars and pursue the goal of separating Somaliland from Somalia and defeating the Greater Somalia ideology at its root.[506] Even though this project was not pursued because of the efficiency of other strategies, it was successfully executed by the subsequent regime of Ethiopia, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The other painful geopolitical strategy of the Haile Selassie regime that was used to force Somalia to limit its irredentist moves was border controls. This device was used by capitalizing on the triangular Ethiopian territory that cut deep between northern Somalia (Hargeisa) and southern Somalia (Mogadishu). By placing the Ethiopian territory under emergency administration and by limiting both flights and land transport through the Ethiopian territories, it was able to limit movement between the two parts of Somalia. It was

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[504] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*.
[505] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[506] Yihun, "Ethiopian Foreign Policy and the Ogaden War: The Shift from 'Containment' to 'Destabilization,' 1977–1991"; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."

costly for movements between Mogadishu and Hargeisa under these conditions.[507] Furthermore, to further induce its divide-and-rule policy through border management, Ethiopia allowed pastoralists from northern Somalia to cross Ethiopian borders and use Ethiopian grazing lands and water wells while denying the same to pastoralists from southern Somalia.

Another more successful strategy of the Haile Selassie regime, which is still being used, was to capitalize on Somali clan politics. While the divide-and-rule strategies through clan politics were versatile and combined with all other strategies and tactics, the Haile Selassie regime employed them effectively through two mechanisms. The first was radio propaganda, which was meant to counter Somali government propaganda. Radio Mogadishu was the center of divisive propaganda against Ethiopia. It even gave airtime for broadcast in the Oromo language, the language banned from public use by the Haile Selassie regime. Somalis, Oromos and Eritreans, and other NCIGs of Ethiopia were agitated to raise arms against "colonialist" Ethiopia. In response to that, the Study Unit prepared radio propaganda warfare in the Somali language with the sole purpose of introducing rifts between and among Somali clans. According to Belete, the contents of these propaganda programs were so divisive that the government of the Republic of Somalia was forced to negotiate with Ethiopia to stop the radio propaganda reciprocally.

Second, the divide-and-rule strategy based on clan politics was a long-term investment in supporting liberal politicians that could potentially support the principle of Utti Posidettis. Even though several individuals were vying for Ethiopian support without a support base in Somalia, Ethiopian security officials rather decided to continue supporting[508] Ibrahim Egaal.[509] Both for his potential of accepting peaceful co-existence with Ethiopia as well as for the last resort option of supporting the separation of Somaliland from Somalia, Ibrahim Egaal was furnished with significant Ethiopian resources, including funds, intelligence, materials, and arms and ammunition. To conclude, these strategies that targeted the government of Somalia produced positive results when Ibrahim Egaal became Prime Minister in 1967 and tried to follow an amicable regional foreign policy approach. These

[507] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[508] Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egaal was the first PM of British Somaliland for 11 days before union of two Somalilands, PM of Republic of Somalia between 1967 and 1969 and President of the seceded Somaliland between 1993 and 2000
[509] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."

strategies were further bolstered by an alliance with Kenya and the use of external assistance and continental diplomacy, which are presented in the next two sections respectively.

4.6 Shared threats from Greater Somalia, Unwillingness to Support NCIGs, and Friendly Relations Between Ethiopia and Kenya

Since its independence in 1963, Kenya has been the friendliest of neighboring states sharing boundaries with Ethiopia. Several factors have contributed to the development of an amicable relationship between the two states. The first reason is the absence of historical baggage and non-contradictory nation-building policies between the two countries. Ethiopia's support for Kenya's struggle for independence is another factor. Third and most importantly, the shared insecurities from the irredentist policies of Somalia were further enhanced by shared status quo foreign policy orientations and ideological affinity. As a result, the theoretical perspective which fits Kenya's relations with Ethiopia is a strong status quo approach.

Unlike the cases with Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya did not have significant political relations before the independence of Kenya, and more importantly, they did not follow contradictory nationalist discourse in identity, temporal, and spatial claims. The Ethiopian Empire had no history of wars of control of long-distance trade or religious rivalries with peoples who inhabited what is now Kenya. As a result, neither Kenya nor Ethiopia has temporal or spatial claims based on historical engagement. They became neighbors because of late 19th-century colonial treaties between Britain and Ethiopia that initially defined the land boundary in 1907, redefined in 1947, demarcated in the 1950s, and finally approved in 1970 by now independent Kenya and Ethiopia.[510]

Across the 800 kilometers long boundaries that separate the two countries live four NCIGs: Somalis, Turkana, Dasanach, and Borana (Oromo pastoralists), in both countries.

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[510] UN, "Kenya and Ethiopia: Treaty Respecting the Boundary between the Two Countries (with Maps , Schedules and Protocol). Signed at Mobasa on 9 June 1970," Pub. L. No. No. 26507 (1989); Korwa Gombej Adar, "The Significance of the Legal Principle of 'Territorial Integrity' as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy towards Somalia, 1963-1983," ProQuest Dissertations and Theses (University of South Carolina, 1986), https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/significance-legal-principle-territorial/docview/303508783/se-2?accountid=142289; Cyprine Oduogo Onyango, "Kenya - Ethiopia Relations: A Study of the Significance of Economic and Political Factors Contributing to Co-Operation, 1963 - 1991," no. i (1995): 1–234.

During the Haile Selassie period from 1963 to 1974, two potentially significant NCIGs might have influenced the relationship between the two countries. The first is the Oromo. The Oromo account for more than a third of the Ethiopian population suffering under the imposed Amhara values that could use Kenyan support to contest the national identity of Ethiopia. However, the opposite happened regarding the Borana Oromos. First, when allowed to choose between Ethiopia and the British protectorate, Borana elders preferred Ethiopia to Britain in 1907. Second, since the pastoral economy of Borana was not suitable for appropriation and looting was not sanctioned against friendly people, Borana was left to its own tools without the presence of state tentacles and, henceforth, the absence of the imposition of Ethiopian national identity. Moreover, an utter absence of state tentacles in Borana not only produced an absence of national identity contestation but also denied the condition of nationalist elites' development in the Borana land during the monarchical period.

The second politically significant NCIG that Ethiopia and Kenya share is the Somalis. Rather than being the source of insecurity between the two states, Somalis became the primary agent that made Addis Ababa and Nairobi strategic allies. This is due to the combined secessionists of Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya and the irredentist policy of the Republic of Somalia. Somalis in both Ethiopia and Kenya have publicly demanded that self-determination be followed by a merger with Somalia. As discussed in detail earlier, Somalia also has a Pan-Somali public policy of uniting Somali-speaking peoples that account for a fifth of `the territory both in Ethiopia and Kenya.[511] More than anything else, this shared imperative to protect their territories against Somali irredentism has led to a friendly relationship between the two countries. As a result, Ethiopia and Kenya signed a treaty on defense and security cooperation on 13 July 1963 and ratified it on 27 December 1963, following the independence of Kenya.[512]

Although the urgency to sign the mutual defense treaty even before the independence of Kenya was due to the increasing shifta of rebellion in the majority Somali districts of the northern province following the refusal of the UK to endorse the results of a referendum for

[511] Onyango, "Kenya - Ethiopia Relations: A Study of the Significance of Economic and Political Factors Contributing to Co-Operation, 1963 - 1991"; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[512] Adar, "The Significance of the Legal Principle of 'Territorial Integrity' as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy towards Somalia, 1963-1983."

the self-determination of the Somali people of this region.[513] There were also simultaneous insurgencies and rebellions in the Ogaden and Bale regions of Ethiopia that were backed by Mogadishu, which further pushed Addis Ababa for the defense pact with Kenya. Following the ratification of the mutual defense treaty by Kenya, Ethiopia's defense minister General Mengesha argued that Somalia has been building a twenty-thousand-man-strong military with the help of external powers, particularly the Soviet Union and Arab states, with the intent of claiming the Northern Front District of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. He related the shift in rebellion and insurgencies in these regions to Somalia's projects.[514]

The convergence of interests of Ethiopia was not limited to containing Somalia's irredentist behaviors. The friendly relations between Emperor Haile Selassie and President Jomo Kenyatta are also reflected in the amicable resolution of boundary issues between the two countries. Unlike the cases of the boundaries between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Ethiopia and Sudan, the friendship between the two leaders reduced the boundary demarcation to a technical issue. Due to the political will of the leadership, Ethiopia and Kenya were able to exchange contentious borderlands. For instance, when people in Ethiopia complained about demarcating Qadaduma to Kenya, the two governments revised the boundaries to keep Qadaduma in Ethiopia, and instead, Godoma[515] was transferred to Kenya. As a result, the border management between the two states has been sustainably desecuritized, and pastoral conflicts are managed by the local administrations and by the pastoral communities themselves.

Furthermore, Ethiopia and Kenya also implemented their mutual defense agreement by sharing critical intelligence about Somali insurgents and the support that they received from Somalia. Security cooperation between security institutions of the two states reached joint operations and sharing of police radio frequencies in the areas of Somali insurgent groups across the borders.[516] The most fruitful joint initiative of the leadership of the two states has been a diplomatic attempt to socialize Somalia and other African countries into the norm of non-interference and territorial integrity through the continental organization.

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[513] Gunther Schlee, *Identities on the Move : Clanship and Pastoralism in Northern Kenya* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989).

[514] Keesing's Record of World Events, "Defence Pact," 1963, https://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/1425-1963-12-KS-a-IEM.pdf.

[515] UN, Kenya and Ethiopia: Treaty respecting the boundary between the two countries (with maps, schedules and protocol). Signed at Mombasa on 9 June 1970.

[516] MFA, "Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Frontier Security Issues" (Addis Ababa, 1974).

Ethiopia, in consultation with Kenya, used Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia in 1964 to push for an African treaty on the sanctity of colonial boundaries.[517] As we will discuss in the next section, Ethiopia and Kenya pushed for the adoption of the Cairo Resolution of 1964, which defined the continental non-intervention norm.

4.7 Using Alliances and International Organizations to Counter Irredentism and Secessionist NCIGs

4.7.1 Using Alliances to Acquire Assistance and Deny Support to Organizations of NCIGs

Ethiopia was made, expanded, and secured both from internal dissenters and external invaders by wars. These wars were conducted with imported weapons. As discussed in Chapter 3, Emperor Menilek defeated the Italian colonial forces using war technologies imported from Europe. At the Battle of Adwa, Ethiopia had comparable firearms to the Italians. However, Ethiopia could not keep up with revolutions in the technologies of war. It has not developed the economic capacity to import sufficient arms, nor has it developed a technological capacity to produce war machines. In the absence of both, securing an international power that was willing and capable of supporting Ethiopia with arms became more imperative than ever before. Emperor Haile Selassie had a proven talent for securing foreign assistance for gaining and maintaining both the throne and territory.

His aptitude to capitalize on foreign support began when he used European powers to overthrow his cousin, Lij Iyasu, and took state power through a palace coup in 1916.[518] With an acute understanding that Ethiopia was not in a position to defend itself, he deliberately worked to make Ethiopia a member of the League of Nations (LN) so that his empire would be safeguarded against impending imperialism. However, the LN did not save his empire from the occupation of Fascist Italy in 1936. Still, he turned the failure of the LN and international society into a moral arsenal to return to the throne in 1941.

After returning to power with the help of the British and controlling the empire, the emperor worked hard to get rid of the unsolicited British dominance in his empire and its

[517] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*, 26.
[518] Del Boca, Shugaar, and Pankhurst, *The Negus : The Life and Death of the Last King of Kings*, 66.

undue machinations to redesign Ethiopian territories. As a result, he sent Yilma Deressa in 1942 to Washington to seek US support.[519] That move served Ethiopia well, as the US, as the ascending power, positively registered the Ethiopian request for an alliance. This early mover advantage helped the emperor to meet President Roosevelt at the Suez Canal in 1945. The emperor presented six requests to the President: access to the sea through Eritrea, the Ogaden oil deal, Djibouti railway management, participation in the drafting of the UN Charter, participation in the post-war peace conference, and defense technologies assistance.[520]

In 1950, the US helped Ethiopia achieve access to the sea by pushing the Eritrean federation and included Ethiopia in the Point Four assistance framework in 1952. However, the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia came with its complications. The neighboring Arab countries argued for the independence of Eritrea.[521] The Israel factor and Ethiopia's misplacement as the only Christian state in the Red Sea region aroused hostility among Arab states.[522] Particularly following the ascending Arab nationalism following the Nasserite coup of 1952 forced the Haile Selassie regime to seek American protection actively.[523] The regime requested a mutual defense agreement for both deterrence and defense in the event of an "Arab/Muslim" attack.[524] However, Haile Selassie request to establish closer ties with the US was not welcomed to the degree he wanted. The Pentagon valued the Kagnew Station and base and flight rights in Ethiopia, but not much more.[525] To show a further commitment, the Haile Selassie regime even dispatched an Ethiopian unit of 1,158 troops called the Kagnew Battalion to Korea between 1951 and 1954 under the UN flag.[526]

As a result, Ethiopia was accorded a much more watered-down agreement in May 1953 was signed as the Ethiopia-American Mutual Defense Agreement, which was mainly materialized in the form of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)

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[519] Tekeda Alemu, "The Unmaking of Ethio-American Military Relations: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Ethiopian Revolution" (Claremont University, 1983).
[520] Getachew Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States History, Diplomacy, and Analysis* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), 39.
[521] Venosa, "Paths toward the Nation: Islamic Identity, the Eritrean Muslim League and Nationalist Mobilization, 1941-61," 181.
[522] Jeffrey Lefebvre, "Client Dependency and Donor Dependency: American Arms Transfers to the Horn of Africa, 1953-1986 (Ethiopia, Assistance, Somalia, Military)" (University of Connecticut, 1986), 268.
[523] Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*.
[524] Lefebvre, "Client Dependency and Donor Dependency: American Arms Transfers to the Horn of Africa, 1953-1986 (Ethiopia, Assistance, Somalia, Military)," 112–16.
[525] Lefebvre, 133.
[526] Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*, 45.

which targeted to train three divisions of 6000 men.[527] However, in the subsequent twenty-four years, the US-trained about 40,000 in Ethiopia and about 3000 officers in the United States.[528] Ethiopia's need for trained manpower and modern firepower was met by the US. As a result, Ethiopia absorbed over sixty percent of the US military aid to Africa.[529]

Furthermore, Ethiopia became not only the home and best-trained army in black Africa as well as a small but unparalleled Air Force in the Horn of Africa region, which was armed with American jets, including supersonic jets.[530] The Haile Selassie regime used these weapons effectively to defeat Somali irredentism, including victory at the Tug Wajale war of 1964.[531] Furthermore, the army, particularly the air force, with the help of American technicians, burned down hundreds of villages in Eritrea, Bale, and Ogaden to crush resistance from Muslim NCIGs in the North and Southeast.[532]

The American assistance to the Haile Selassie regime was not limited to the federation of Eritrea, training and arming the Ethiopian armed forces. It provided diplomatic cover to silence the Eritrean question and anchor other aid to Ethiopia. Another fruitful engagement with Washington was critical information for the security of Ethiopia. One such critical piece of information was the advanced information provided to the emperor about the upcoming rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and the US.[533] Using this information and his position as the leading African statesman, the emperor negotiated with Mao to recognize the PRC in return for stopping support to the Jebha.[534] Beijing instantly agreed and invited and received the emperor with fanfare on October 6, 1971. The reception by Chairman Mao was also targeted to gain influence in Africa for its plan to replace the Republic of China in the UN Security Council Permanent Veto position. As a result, Beijing

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[527] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*, 13.
[528] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 124.
[529] Zewde, *History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991*, 184–86.
[530] Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, 101.
[531] Wrong, *I Didn't Do It for You : How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation*; Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[532] Østebø, *Islam, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Ethiopia: The Bale Insurgency, 1963-1970*; Wrong, *I Didn't Do It for You : How the World Betrayed a Small African Nation*.
[533] Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*.
[534] Fantahun Ayele, "African Journal of History and Culture Revisiting History of Gafat: Was Emperor Tewodros's Military Reform an Attempt at 'Translative Adaptation' of Western Technology?" 8, no. 4 (2016): 30, https://doi.org/10.5897/AJHC2016.0331.

stopped supporting the Eritrean NCIGs organization until the late 1980s.[535]

A power that was the source of support for Ethiopia, which was related to the US but whose willingness to support Ethiopia was independent of the Cold War ideological bloc, was the state of Israel. While Ethiopia and Israel shared ideological convergence on claiming descent from the House of David, more importantly, Tel Aviv considered the control of Eritrea under Ethiopian control as part and parcel of Israel's national security interest. Furthermore, Israel was also a major source of arms, which was second only to the US support. It was also the primary partner in the training of a special counterinsurgency unit called Commando 101[536] , which was exclusively trained to eliminate threats from Muslim NCIGs in Eritrea. Besides, even after Kagnew Station had become redundant, the American government was influenced by the Jewish Lobby to continue arming Ethiopia to balance against Egypt's interest of turning the Red Sea into an 'Arab Lake'. Consequently, Israel, which considered maintaining Eritrea as part of Ethiopia in the best interest of its national security, became an all-weather partner of Ethiopia. With these external supports, the Haile Selassie regime was able to control the threat both from the east, Somalia, and north, Eritrea.

4.7.2 International Organizations as Tools of Defense against Secessionism and Irredentism

Emperor Haile Selassie understood the precarious situation of Ethiopia since his rise as a default ruler in 1916. As discussed in Chapter 3, he deliberately worked to make Ethiopia a member of the League of Nations (LN) so that his empire would be defended against impending imperialism. However, the LN did not save his empire from the occupation of Fascist Italy in 1936. Upon returning to his throne, he used the failure of the LN and international society as a moral arsenal to extract outstanding concessions like the federation of Eritrea and, henceforth, access to the sea. Moreover, Ethiopian diplomats used his stature and Ethiopia's closer relationship with the West to block the Eritrean plight and request to respect the Federal Act. Until the independence of Eritrea in 1993, the Eritrean question was buried as an internal matter. However, unlike in the case of Eritrea, both the United Nations and the Western powers were not willing to allow Haile Selassie to annex Somalia. In a diametrically reversed manner, his irredentist moves against Somalia and

[535] Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*.
[536] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 101.

Djibouti came to haunt his empire in the form of Greater Somalia.

The first initial step toward the realization of Greater Somalia came in the form of the British-American demarche of 1959, accepting the union of Somaliland and Somalia. The demarche was a watershed in Ethiopia's perception of its place in the international alliances of the time. In addition to the West, other powers like the USSR, UAR, and the Arab League supported the union forcing Ethiopia to recognize its isolation. The elites of the absolutist regime perceived this as a conspiracy analogous to silence that allowed Fascist Italy's invasion of 1935/36 from Eritrea and Somalia.[537] Cairo was also hosting Eritrean rebels and their organization, Jebha. Eritrean secessionism from above and Somali irredentism from below were considered Arab/Muslim encirclement and machinations to coerce 'Christian' Ethiopia. In the national identity conception of the monarchical regime, Ethiopia was the only ancient Christendom that survived "Islamization" and Arabization. To further protect that dimension through another method, the regime tapped into Ethiopia's image as the only African power that defeated a European colonial power and became the beacon of light for black people worldwide.[538]

To overcome this predicament of isolation and insecurity, the elites of the Haile Selassie regime produced an idea that differed from the usual tendency to look for solutions to the West. Diplomats like Ketema Yifru proposed to look for friends in Africa and collectively build a continental subsidiarity norm against policy impositions from external powers like the British-American demarche on Somalia and Arab domination.[539] After months of tiresome diplomatic maneuvers, the first and, arguably, the greatest diplomatic victory for Ethiopia was realized in the form of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on May 25, 1963. Six months before the establishment of OAU, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea, thereby exempting it from the principles it was going to introduce into the charter of the would-be continental organization. Henceforth, the OAU became the continental diplomatic shield to contain Somali irredentism and block Eritrean secessionism.

To that end, Ethiopian experts drafted the establishing Charter of the OAU enlists several provisions that determined the future state-building in Africa, among which the provisions about the sanctity of territorial inherited boundaries and non-intervention into

[537] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[538] Hussien, "Islam, Christianity and Ethiopia's Foreign Policy."
[539] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."

each other's internal affairs. After fierce arguments, Ethiopia's draft was tabled for discussion. After two days of deliberations, and personal diplomacy of the emperor with each representative, the charter was signed by the leaders of thirty independent African states at midnight on 25 May 1963.[540] Ethiopia's attempts were well-received by most of the leaders of Africa. However, not all African states endorsed this extraordinary diplomatic achievement, particularly the sanctity of colonial borders. Somalia challenged it.

The President of the Republic of Somalia questioned the principle and contested the national identity of Ethiopia. Somalia's President openly put his disagreement that he would not agree to the principle of Uti possidetis that other first-generation African leaders present at the summit were agreeing to. He argued that.

> It has been suggested by some that any attempt to adjust existing boundary arrangements would aggravate rather than ease the situation, for that reason matters should remain as they are we do not subscribe to that view for several reasons. It would amount to us condoning actions and policies which we know very well are wrong and unjust. It would, too, admit a defeatist attitude and imply a lack of courage to solve African problems. Finally, it would show that we are short-sighted to think that African unity can be achieved by sidetracking contentious issues that are the realities of the African scene.[541]

Finally, the President contended that "…Ethiopia has taken possession of a large portion of Somali territory without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants". He further argued that Somalia's contestation is not self-aggrandizement. Rather, it is a demand that the Somali people in Ethiopia were to be given the opportunity for self-determination. Ethiopia was spearheading to block of these kinds of claims from the beginning. Like the foreign minister of Ethiopia had done at the 1961 UN General Assembly, on this Africa's summit Ethiopia responded to the President's accusations.

Ethiopian PM Aklilu Habta-Wald responded by the very existence of Somalia before colonialism. PM Aklilu further argued that without colonial treaties, the Somalia that which President was representing would cease to exist. He further argued that the sanctity of colonial boundaries was the guarantee of the existence of African states and an antidote to unending bloodshed due to boundary conflicts. And henceforth repeated the policy lines of Ethiopia: non-interference in the internal affairs of the state, respect for the sovereignty and

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[540] Yihun.
[541] quoted in Ayele, "The Politics of the Somalia - Ethiopia Boundary Problem: 1960-1967," 558.

territorial integrity of every state, a peaceful settlement of all disputes, and cooperation and solidarity based on African brotherhood.[542]

Despite losing face among his peers for an irredentist claim against the host state, President Aden could not reign on the fervent militant Pan-Somali nationalism. Irrespective of OAU principles, Somalia invaded Ethiopia on 7 February 1964. Ethiopia did not waste a minute calling for an emergency meeting of the OAU on Somali aggression. As chairman of the OAU, the emperor used the Somali invasion as a pretext for urgency to localize the principle of Uti Possidetis. The Cairo Declaration of July 1964 legalized colonial boundaries by declaring: "…that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence".[543] Henceforth, by spearheading the formation of continental non-interference and territorial sovereignty regimes, Ethiopia successfully silenced Eritrea's quest for self-determination and Somalia's quest to annex the Somali-inhabited region of Ogaden.[544]

Furthermore, by generously supporting the independence of other African countries, leading the anti-Apartheid struggles, and engaging in extensive peacemaking efforts, the Haile Selassie regime successfully concealed internal problems of national identity contestations and other demands for reform. To begin with, the fight against Apartheid began in 1960. Ethiopia and Liberia charged the Apartheid Government of South Africa at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning South-West Africa (Namibia). The charges were a violation of the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations that transferred Southwest Africa from Germany in 1919, including failure to carry out the social progress of the indigenous population in the territory. The ICJ ruled that Ethiopia and Liberia could not be plaintiffs of Southwest Africa. Ethiopia took the case to the General Assembly. At the 21st Session of the General Assembly, the Ethiopian foreign minister made a passionate appeal that forced the Assembly to revoke South Africa's mandate over Southwest Africa and establishment of the "Namibian Council", which ultimately led to the independence of Namibia in 1989. In addition, Ethiopia spearheaded the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa by training fighters, including Nelson Mandela, providing offices and logistics to support their diplomatic efforts, and providing radio hours for their

[542] Ayele, "The Politics of the Somalia - Ethiopia Boundary Problem: 1960-1967."
[543] OAU, "Cairo Declaration."
[544] Woldemariam, "Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia."

propaganda and mobilization activities. However, the laudable fights against Apartheid in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe concealed the ugly socio-political stratification that treated sections of NCIGs as serfs and slaves in Ethiopia.

Furthermore, the emperor also engaged in high-profile mediation roles that were based on the principles of Uti possidetis He successfully served as the mediator of the Biafran War in Nigeria (1970), conflicts between Morocco and Algeria (1963) and between the government of Sudan and southern Sudan rebel groups (1972). Because of his peacemaking roles, the emperor placed himself as the preeminent statesman of the continent. Besides, by spearheading the support for African peoples' quest for independence against European colonization and white minority rules in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, and by sending a peacekeeping force to Congo in 1960, Ethiopia placed itself as the guardian of African causes.[545]

The outcomes of the Haile Selassie regime's diplomacy through OAU and, by extension, the UN were outstanding for Ethiopia. Some of the main benefits accrued include the suppression of the voices of Ethiopia's NCIG organizations, including those of Eritrea, Nasser's removal of help to Jebha, and other Eritrean NCIG organizations, the socialization of Somalia, and the reconciliation with Sudan. With regard to silencing opposition groups, the other default silencing device was the location itself. First, the emergence of the sanctity of colonial boundaries as the hegemonic norm of African continental norm entrepreneurship made raising the Eritrean question a taboo, even if Somalia and Sudan tried it sometimes. Second, the location deterrence[546] impeded the leadership of the Jebha, Oromo, and Somali movements from lobbying African countries at the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa. However, the leaders of the national liberation movements, such as those of the African National Congress (ANC), who were supported by Ethiopia, easily accessed diplomatic resources in Addis Ababa.

Third, because of the positive effect of engaging in continental diplomacy, the emperor was able to convince Nasser of Egypt to change his attitude towards Jebha. As a result,

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[545] Ruth Iyob, "Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 2 (June 11, 1993): 257–76, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00011927.

[546] Location deterrence is used to describe the default condition of inability of leaders of insurgent groups to present their case to the OAU and to seek continental diplomatic support for self-determination, as the OAU is headquartered at Addis Ababa.

Nasser was forced to expel Eritrean rebels from Egypt, shut down their offices, and stop radio Cairo propaganda. Consequently, Jebha was forced to relocate its headquarters from Cairo to Damascus and then to Khartoum. However, Addis Ababa made the mistake of siding with Israel following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, and Nasser resumed hosting and supporting the Jebha.

Fourth, Somalia was pressured to tone down, albeit temporarily, its irredentist claims. Following the coming to power of PM Egaal, he approached both Emperor Haile Selassie and President Kenyatta at the Kinshasa OAU meeting of 1967. They agreed to tone down hostilities and normalize relations. Even if he could not directly negotiate the Ogaden issue because the agenda was mainly pushed by the Ethiopian Ogaadeeni clan leaders, he was able to reach some agreements with Kenya through the Arusha Declaration. There were also relatively peaceful engagements with Ethiopia. However, that could not last long because his administration was accused of "betraying" the nation and overthrown. The Soviet military academy graduate Siad Barre, who came to power in October 1969, temporarily closed the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) movement and stopped support for movements of the Oromos of Bale and created some semblance of peace until he consolidated power. However, that did not last long. Somalia increased its propaganda and built its national army to surpass Ethiopia in arms.

Finally, through continental diplomacy, the emperor was able to force Sudan to stop helping Eritrean liberation movements following the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. To sum up, Haile Selassie regime successfully used the OAU and UN to secure strategic interests and personal fame. He successfully precluded Eritrean questions from being an agenda at both institutions. Even though it could not be silenced like that of Eritrea, the Ogaden question of Somalia was also dismissed as territorial aggrandizement, and Mogadishu was put on the defensive. Sudan was "convinced" to expel organizations of Eritrean NCIGs, albeit temporarily. However, diplomatic astuteness was not going to save the Haile Selassie regime from a boiling catastrophe at home that erupted as a popular revolution of 1974 and reversed the diplomatic gains as well, which is the subject of the next chapter.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed how external support for the resistance of movements of NCIGs against exclusionary nation-building policies constituted the regional security policy of the Haile Selassie regime. The project of building Ethiopian national unity as the antidote to vulnerabilities that might emanate from diversity paradoxically ended up producing threats. This was because exclusionary nation-building policies around the core values of the ruling class at the expense of NCIGs resulted in struggles against the imposition of the exclusionary national identity of Ethiopia. Since peaceful contestations were impossible, the only way to resist the imposition was through armed struggles. Armed struggles were resource-intensive undertakings that required considerable external support to start and maintain. NCIG organizations in Eritrea and southeast Ethiopia have been able to access external resources from and through Sudan and Somalia, respectively. The nature and extent of these external supports defined the regional security policy of the Haile Selassie regime.

The starting of Eritrean armed struggles against Ethiopia in 1961 was in opposition to the imposed core values of the Ethiopian ruling regime that necessarily excluded Muslims and abrogated the Federal Act. Soon enough, religion-based exclusion and domination also took a linguistic turn and alienated Tigrigna-speaking Eritrean Christians. As a result, the struggles of Eritrean NCIGs became an activated national liberation movement. In addition to the grievance-producing factors and enabling factors, the external dimension was critical in the onset and maintenance of the Eritrean armed struggles. Jebha and other Eritrean NCIG organizations accessed external support from the kin, diaspora, Arab countries, and other international actors, mainly through Sudan. These external supports, along with related issues of border controls and refugee management, were the main determinants of Ethiopia's security policies toward Sudan during the Haile Selassie period.

The nature and magnitude of support for Eritrean NCIGs from and through Sudan were neither constant nor determined solely by the ruling class of Sudan. Consequently, the case of Sudan is difficult to categorize as status quo or revisionist, as it exhibited both approaches at the same time. At times, the support reached Jebha was even dictated by Egypt's strategic interests and Arab-Israeli relations. Accordingly, Ethiopia's policies were also varied and episodic. In the first years, the Haile Selassie regime followed appeasement policies that included supporting Sudan to suppress NCIGs of southern Sudan. The change of government in Sudan in 1964 changed that policy, as the new government stood by

Eritrea, and Jebha started to acquire considerable support. As a consequence, Ethiopia started supporting and arming the Anya Anya movement as a counterbalance. The coup that brought Nimeiry to power further increased support for Jebha and led to the securitization of the Nimeiry regime as the top national security threat that needed to be removed by supporting the Ansar group along with progressively increasing assistance to the Anya Anya militants. When its power was threatened, the Nimeiry regime agreed to expel Jebha from Sudan as part of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which led to the resolution of the southern Sudan problem temporarily. As a result, the security policies of the Haile Selassie regime toward Sudan were mainly constituted by the nature and magnitude of external support to Eritrean NCIGs from and through Sudan.

Unlike Sudan, the willingness of Somalia to support the movements of the Ethiopian NCIG was official. Although Somalia lacked the material capacity to carry out the Greater Somalia project, its goal of uniting Somali-speaking territories was diametrically opposite to Ethiopia's status-quo position of territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of the state. Furthermore, the conjoining of internal (Ethiopian Somalis) and external (Somali ruling class) national identity contestations helped Haile Selassie regime to define the movement of NCIG in the southeastern part of the country as the 'fifth column' and addressed it as part of the irredentism of Somalia. Consequently, Ethiopia devised several strategies to foil Somali irredentism, including scorched earth counterinsurgency and emergency administration in provinces bordering Somalia; building a defense, offense, and intelligence institutions and capabilities targeting Mogadishu; capitalizing on Somali clan politics for its divide and rule strategy, including supporting liberal politicians like Ibrahim Egaal, border management and control, direct defensive wars, proxy wars, clandestine attacks deep inside Somali territories, and propaganda warfare propaganda. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s policies towards Kenya and Africa and its relations with external powers and international organizations were mainly geared to combat Greater Somalia, in addition to silencing the Eritrean question.

Ethiopia's relations with Kenya were the direct opposite of that of Somalia. There was no competing temporal, territorial, or identity claims, as they had no historical baggage or competing nation-building policies. Furthermore, Kenya's strong status quo approach was further lubricated by Ethiopia's support for Kenya's struggle for independence. More importantly, the shared insecurities of the irredentist policies of Somalia further pushed the

two states to develop a mutual defense alliance. The absence of supporting the NCIG organizations of each other and the personal friendship of the Emperor and President Kenyatta also sedimented the relationship and helped them demarcate their boundaries amicably. Furthermore, Ethiopia and Kenya also implemented their mutual defense agreement by sharing critical information about Somali insurgents and the support they received from Somalia. Security cooperation between the security institutions of the two states reached the level of interoperability of cross-border police. The most fruitful joint initiative of the leadership of the two states has been a diplomatic attempt to socialize Somalia and other African countries into the norm of non-interference and territorial integrity through the OAU.

The Haile Selassie regime used its close relationship with the US to develop defense and security capabilities and to secure further support from other actors using its ties to Washington as an anchor. In addition, friendly relations with the West helped Ethiopia block the Eritrean demands from reaching the UN, while the OAU was used to socialize Somalia according to the norms of territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of the state. Consequently, through multidimensional regional security policy and support networks, the Haile Selassie regime was able to control both Eritrean secessionism, southeastern movements, and Somali irredentism. However, exclusionary nation-building policies, socioeconomic contradictions, and the inability of the Haile Selassie institutional design to adapt to growing demands from the people caught up with the regime and led to the 1974 revolution. Consequently, both the Eritrean question and other NCIGs would return with a vengeance following the overthrow of the regime, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

5. THE REVOLUTION, REDEFINITION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY, NCIGS, AND REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1974-1991

This chapter addresses the interplay of redefinition and contestation of national identity in revolutionary Ethiopia and the regional security policy of the Darg regime, 1974-1991. To understand the interplays of multiple factors, actors that reconstituted national identity, renewed contestations, and their interactions with regional and internal actors and developments, this chapter is subdivided into seven sections. The first section briefly presents processes that led to the 1974 revolution and the redefinition of Ethiopian national identity. The second section deals with national identity contestations by organizations of south-east NCIGs and Somali irredentism. The third section presents successful counteroffensive and counterinsurgency security policies that resulted in the collapse of the Republic of Somalia and the defeat of southeastern insurgent groups. The fourth part presents the dual contestations between northern insurgent groups, on the one hand, and between the insurgent groups and the Darg regime on the other. The fifth section presents the role of Sudan in supporting northern insurgents and the policy of the Darg regime toward Sudan. The sixth section presents the lack of support for the organizations of NCIGs from Kenya and Djibouti and the peaceful relations of Ethiopia with the two countries. Finally, the seventh section presents the end of the Cold War and the triumph of northern insurgent groups, the redefinition of the national identity of Ethiopia, as well as the redefinition of regional boundaries in 1991.

5.1 The Revolution, Rise of Radical Military Junta, and Redefinition of National Identity

In February 1974, a popular revolution broke out that fundamentally redefined the national identity of Ethiopia. The revolution[547] had been a cumulative outcome of structural

[547] There is a huge number of body of literature on the Ethiopian revolution, its causes, its consequences, and

contradictions between exploitative development and exclusionary nation-building policies of the Haile Selassie regime, on the one hand, and an inclusive and distributive nation-state that the educated class expected, on the other hand. National identity contestations by elites of NCIGs and demands for reform by members of the dominant class intersected to expose the gross incompetence, grand corruption, and appalling greed of the elites of the ancient regime in the face of crisis and, henceforth, the revolution. In this section, I show how the seven centuries-old dynasty collapsed and opened an opportunity for a redefinition of national identity.

Although structural factors such as the exploitative land tenure system, exclusionary nation-building policies, shortages and unequal distribution of public services, unemployment, endemic corruption, and heavy-handed suppression of NCIG movements in Eritrea, Bale, and Ogaden, as well as students' movements, acted in the aggregate to a breaking point, two immediate and related factors sparked and precipitated the revolution. The first proximate factor was the broadcast of famine conditions in Wollo and Tigray. On 18 October 1973, ITV (a television channel based in London) aired gruesome pictures of the famine conditions in Ethiopia entitled "The Unknown Famine: A Report on Famine in Ethiopia". This graphic film of shocking images of starvation by journalist Jonathan Dimbleby was subsequently rebroadcasted.[548] The pictures elicited unprecedented sympathy for the victims of famine internationally and, subsequently, global movements to save them. When the news of the famine, months later[549], reached Ethiopia, the students and the educated urban class that had already been at the boiling point were ashamed and shocked. More shocking were the responses of the Haile Selassie regime that purged whatever legitimacy left off decades of cumulative structural problems and contradictions.

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comparisons with other revolutions. Some of them include: Zeleke, *Ethiopia in Theory: Revolution and Knowledge Production, 1964–2016*; Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*; Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*; Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution* (London: Verso, 1981); Edmond J. Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1988); Christopher Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); John Markakis and Nega Ayele, *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia* (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1986); Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*.This section is not about an analysis of the revolution itself, but about it affected the conception of national identity, the inclusion of NCIGs and its impacts on subsequent nation-building policies and regional security policies.

[548] Dawit W Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1989), 260.

[549] Markakis and Ayele, *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 81.

Instead of helping the victims, the regime was obsessed with covering up the famine to save the emperor's image. For instance, a senior official of the regime replied to UNICEF's request for disclosing the famine to get international assistance, saying, "we don't want that assistance. The embarrassment to the government isn't worth it. Is that perfectly clear?".[550] Moreover, Ethiopian embassies were instructed to deny the authenticity of Dimbleby's film.[551] Furthermore, the then Director of the United Nations Development Programme for Ethiopia reported that the emperor was well informed about the famine but considered it normal: "peasants always starve, and nothing can be done".[552] Earlier, famines in 1958 and 1965 perished tens of thousands of people without government intervention.[553] Regardless of the information that scholars of Haile Selassie I University provided to the regime, the regime was trying to downplay the famine and chase away the famine victims who reached the capital after much suffering. Even worse, the government was asking for customs fees on food aid; officials were stealing from the food aid meant for starving people and selling it at exorbitant prices. When accountability was demanded, the emperor instead conferred high distinctions on corrupt officials, who were blamed for the famine, to "prove that they were innocent and to curb the foreign gossip and slander".[554]

This attitude towards famine was politicized in conjunction with the sickening lifestyles of people close to the emperor, as can be sensed from the following quote, which led to an unrecoverable loss of legitimacy and served as fuel for subsequent revolutionary processes.[555]

> The scintillating halls of the Hilton Hotel in the city were the scene of one of the most extravagant wedding parties witnessed in the modern history of Ethiopia just on the eve of the February 1974 Revolution. … A wedding cake costing the fabulous sum of Eth $10,000 was flown in from London for the occasion. As the 5,000 guests assembled at the Hilton Hotel for the wedding party washed down their exotic cakes with champagne, the death toll from famine in Wello was reaching the 200,000 mark… In the midst of simulated

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[550] Paul H Brietzke and Paul Herman Brie take, "Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution," *PQDT - Global* (University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies (United Kingdom), 1979), https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/29562/1/10731718.pdf.
[551] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 260.
[552] Brietzke and Paul Herman Brie take, "Law, Development and the Ethiopian Revolution."
[553] Africa Watch Report, "Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia," 1991, 57, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Ethiopia919.pdf.
[554] Ryszard Kapuscinski, *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1983), 117–18.
[555] quoted in Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 14–15.

plenty, the people were being ravished by famine and pestilence.

The second and related precipitating factor of the revolution was the mutiny by the Fourth Division soldiers stationed at Nagelle to fight Somali irredentism and the Bale Oromo uprising. On January 12, they arrested their officers and demanded senior officials' attention to solve their horrible living conditions. When the ground forces commander was sent to investigate their demands, they also put him under arrest until the emperor sent the air force commander. The soldiers on the Dollo front near Somalia and Kenya borders went further; they made the ground forces commander "sit under the scorching sun for half a day and, when thirsty and hungry, was treated to dirty water and bread full of grit".[556] That was to show the commander the conditions of life of the soldiers and junior officers. The refusal of the Haile Selassie regime to meet the demands of the soldiers led to another mutiny that triggered a series of mutinies, strikes, and demonstrations in February 1974. The open revolts of the armed forces emancipated the civilian population from fear of being quashed.[557]

Civilians in Addis Ababa and provincial capitals took to the streets and started strikes on February 18 with a petition of two-digit questions that included land to the tiller, freedom of the press, release of political prisoners, free education for all, salary increase and prosecution of corrupt officials in addition to questions specific to their sector or office.[558] While strikes by the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Union (CELU), Ethiopian Teachers' Associations, and Taxi drivers paralyzed the government for days, people of provincial capitals like Arbaminch, Asela, Jimma, and Metu joined the mass protests demanding the removal of corrupt officials of the regime.[559] Symbolically, the most important event was the record-breaking protest of over a hundred thousand Muslim community members with solidarity protests by Christians in Addis Ababa on April 20, 1974.[560] The demand for equality of religion, with support from Christians, was a strike at the heart of the regime

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[556] Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*, 37–38.
[557] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 36.
[558] Markakis and Ayele, *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia*; Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia*; Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*; Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*; Halliday and Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution*.
[559] Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*, 47.
[560] Tiruneh, 49.

whose legitimacy was based on religious inequality.

The first resignation[561] of PM Aklilu and a raise in the salary for armed forces could not sustainably return the soldiers to their barracks. After two cautious attempts to engage in politics, including arresting former government officials for corruption and accountability for the famine, the third attempt by military officers succeeded. With agitations from students and leftist underground organizations, one hundred and eight representatives of different army units were gathered at the headquarters of the Fourth Division in Addis Ababa on June 28, 1974. By 3 July, they pledged their loyalty to the emperor and legitimized to act to stabilize the state by arresting corrupt officials. On July 4, they introduced the motto "Ethiopia First".[562] For two months, they submitted their pledges of loyalty to the emperor while arresting old officials with his "blessing". They also controlled the media and discredited the monarchy simultaneously.

After controlling the media and neutralizing the emperor's forces, the Darg started propaganda against the *ancien* regime. The emperor's alleged possessions, including the city bus company, major breweries, and the country's goldmines, were disclosed along with rumors of his deposit of "billions of dollars" at a Swiss bank.[563] Discrediting was followed by the nationalization of his properties, palaces, and the abolition of the Crown Council, the Ministry of Imperial Court, the Emperor's Chilot (Court), and the Emperor's Special Chief of Staff.[564] On the eve of the Ethiopian new year, on September 11, the Darg broadcasted a film contrasting the perishing of famine victims from Dimbleby's film, including the deaths of children, while the emperor was feeding meat to dogs from a silver plate and other lavish lifestyles of the royal family.[565] The following day, they finally deposed the Emperor on the Ethiopian new year and pronounced the establishment of a Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), which continues to be called the Darg popularly.

The Darg members, who were unknown junior officers and ascending to power without any organized body that could challenge them, strategized to promote themselves

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[561] Attempts were made by President of Crown Council that it could not be said resignation because they did not have the power to resign….
[562] Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*, 66.
[563] Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, 170.
[564] Markakis and Ayele, *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 112.
[565] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 15.

behind a known face. For that purpose, they appointed General Aman Mikael Andom as the Head of State but not of the junta. Aman was selected for several reasons, of which the following two are outstanding. First, he was a famous military hero of the Tug Wajale war of 1964 against Somalia's aggression. He was revered among the Third Division of Harar and the entire army. Because of his popularity, the Haile Selassie regime removed him from his position and detained him in the Senate. His popularity among the army and his distance from the ancient regime made him Darg's choice. The second and equally important consideration was his role in resolving the Eritrean question. He was born and raised in Sudan by a family of Eritrean origin. He was also a fluent speaker of both Tigrigna and Arabic languages.[566]

One of the first urgent tasks of General Aman, henceforth, was to solve the Eritrean question and reinclude the Eritrean NCIGs into the fold of the new Ethiopia. As a senior and moderate officer, Aman envisioned a political solution to the Eritrean problem whereby Eritrean NCIGs would have autonomy and possibly the return of the federation. He went to Eritrea twice after the revolution. He spoke to the people in Arabic and Tigrigna languages and explained his aspirations for Ethiopia, which fully integrated the Eritrean people with the ongoing revolution. In his last visit, in October 1974 at a football stadium in Asmara, Aman told the Eritreans that the enemy was gone, the feudal system, thereby removing the need for an armed struggle. However, an ambitious, influential, and power-hungry junior officer wanted to crush the Eritrean question through political violence.

The first vice-chairman of the Darg, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam, rejected Aman's pacifist approach to the region of his descent and even accused him of "treason".[567] Darg ignored Aman's initiative and decided to crush Eritrean insurgent organizations militarily. Aman could not agree with militant junior officers like Mengistu, who were tending toward solving problems through violence. The disagreement between Aman and the junior officers was solved by executing Aman on November 23, 1974.[568] The bloodless revolution graduated to the bloody one when Mengistu and his cliques got summarily executed 52 more

[566] Aregawi Berhe, "A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991) : Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia" (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2008).
[567] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*.
[568] Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*, 77.

political prisoners,[569] including two former prime ministers and Darg members who opposed the arrest of Aman.[570] With that, the Darg also destroyed an opportunity for an inclusive nation-building project and gave the armed groups of NCIGs another opportunity for mobilization and organization.

To consolidate its precarious power and satisfy the insistent demands of the leftist groups, Darg proclaimed "Ethiopian Socialism" on 20 December 1974 as its fundamental political and economic program.[571] In the following days, secularism was introduced, and the hegemonic theological conception of Ethiopia as a Tabot Christian nation was dethroned. For the first time in modern Ethiopian history, Muslim holidays were made public holidays, and subsequently, their institution, the Ethiopian Supreme Islamic Council, was accorded legal recognition.

Furthermore, with a series of proclamations, the Darg recognized the linguistic, ethnic, gender, and other equality of the Ethiopian NCIGs. The languages that were banned by the Haile Selassie regime were not only recognized, but the ones widely spoken were provided with their airtimes on Radio Ethiopia. For instance, the Oromo language was provided with an hour of radio airtime, as was Tigrigna. Furthermore, a weekly newspaper published by Ethiopian Press Agency, *Bariisaa,* was published in the Oromo language.[572] In addition to Amharic, which was retained as the only working language and aggressively promoted as the medium of national communication, dozens of NCIG languages were selected to introduce literacy in the majority of Ethiopia with the Ge'ez script. "Know Your Country" clubs in schools and cultural campaigns that include collections of cultural arts, cultural performances, folklores, songs, poems, and dances of NCIGs were introduced and promoted in public spaces to develop an inclusive national culture.[573]

However, the most radical initiative that placed the final blow to the old system was the 4 March 1975 Proclamation 31[574] , which fundamentally changed production relations

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[569] twenty-nine of some of the highest civilian dignitaries and twenty-three senior military and police officers of the ancien regime

[570] Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*, 78.

[571] Tiruneh, 86.

[572] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 88.

[573] Gedlu, "A History of Nationalism In Ethiopia: 1941 to 2012," 234.

[574] Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution : 1974-1987 : A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*, 100.

that freed non-Abyssinian peasants and pastoralists and answered the "land to the tiller" question. [575] Furthermore, the nationalization of financial institutions and foreign enterprises followed this revolutionary proclamation. Finally, the members of the feudal regime were made powerless by a proclamation of July 26, 1975, that outlawed the ownership of more than one home and confiscated all extra houses.[576] With that, equality of all NCIGs before the law was recognized and the foundation of equal opportunity to access national resources was proclaimed, and henceforth, inclusive nation-building policies seemed to have begun.

One of the other extraordinary achievements after the revolution was literacy campaigns to prepare the peasants for land reforms by teaching them how to read and write. The campaigns involved most of the high school and university students, sixty thousand, for a year.[577] The campaigns were conducted in fifteen languages that covered all the major NCIGs' languages, over 90% of the population.[578] With all the problems of teaching materials in languages other than Amharic, it was one of the first nation-building moves that increased literacy and enhanced a sense of belonging because of the symbolic recognition of the equality of languages. As a result, the literacy rate increased from less than 10% to 40% in 10 years. In addition, a National Democratic Revolutionary Programme (NDRP), which was developed by leftist organizations, mainly the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISONE, in Amharic Acronym), toward defining national identity and comprehensive nation-building policies was adopted by the Darg.[579]

The attempts to redefine national identity also included revisions of history, heroes, flags, national anthem, and names of public spaces and institutions. The temporal claim of three thousand years was sanitized by sacrificing Emperor Haile Selassie as the scapegoat and appraising the role of other emperors in the survival of national independence and territorial integrity. Haile Selassie was presented as the aberration in the 'continues' and patriotic national life. History textbooks were reproduced by removing Emperor Haile Selassie and condemning feudalism while magnifying the roles of other emperors like Tewodros II, Yohannes IV, and Menilek II in independence and national unity.[580] Moreover,

[575] Tiruneh, 97.
[576] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 24.
[577] Giorgis, 27.
[578] Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, 220.
[579] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 27.
[580] Toggia, "African Identities History Writing as a State Ideological Project in Ethiopia."

attempts were made to move the history writing project from focusing on emperors' chronicles to including the common people's contribution.

As a result, public spaces bearing the names of these emperors were kept, while institutions that had the name of emperor Haile Selassie or the royal family and ruling circles were removed from all public places. For instance, the Haile Selassie I University was renamed Addis Ababa University, Haile Selassie I International Airport to Bole International Airport, Haile Selassie I Theatre was renamed National Theatre, and Prince Mekonnen Hospital named after his favorite son, was renamed Black Lion Hospital. After several attempts at the redefinition of national identity, Darg's final act at the redefinition took its final form in the 1987 Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The preamble of the constitution provided the background to the new Ethiopia as follows:

> "The working people of Ethiopia…experienced bitter class oppression and exploitation…the people were victimed in the clashes frequently waged among feudal lords, through various means robbed of the fruits of their labour and alternately subjected to hunger, disease and mass death….the feudal system was overthrown through the great sacrifices of the progressive sections of society. Thus, our popular revolution, which erupted in 1974 has paved the way for the current sovereignty of the people…we, the working people of Ethiopia, have by our referendum of 1 February 1987 approved this Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land and basis for establishing and administering the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia ".

Based on NDRP principles, which were later enshrined in the constitution of the PDRE, the claims of the national identity of the Haile Selassie regime based on one religion were dropped. However, Article 2.1 proclaimed Ethiopia as "a unitary state in which all nationalities live equally".[581] The national oppression was relegated to deeds of feudal lords that would be addressed through socialist nation-building. Darg also maintained the monarchical regime's temporal claims of statehood of "three thousand years" and the indivisibility and inviolability of the territories. The motto of "Revolutionary Motherland or Death" was endorsed in the constitution. While self-determination was redefined to "ensure, equality of nationalities, combat chauvinism and narrow nationalism, and strengthen the unity of working people of all nationalities" (Article 2.2).[582] While recognizing all languages

[581] PDRE, "The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia" (1987), https://www.abyssinialaw.com/laws/constitutions/the-1987-ethiopian-constitution-english-version/download.
[582] PDRE.

as equals (article 2.5), the constitution maintained the dominance of the Amharic language as the only working language (article 116).[583] Furthermore, secularism and equality of religions were proclaimed (Article 46.1 and 46), while exercising the freedom of religion was limited in the cases of its conflict with the interest of the state and the revolution, public morality, and freedom of other citizens (Article 46.2.).[584]

However, the revolutionary initiatives in the first two years and the subsequent inclusive redefinition of Ethiopia's national identity were not reached through inclusive processes, nor did they achieve a practical inclusion of NCIGs. Rather the redefinition of national identity and nation-building policies were animated by power and renewed national identity contestations. Intra-Darg power struggles, struggles between Darg and leftist organizations that were sources of radical initiatives, struggles between leftist organizations, the proliferation of 'liberation fronts' representing NCIGs, and Somali irredentism waged simultaneously created complex violent conflicts representing divergent visions of the future of the Ethiopian state. The first three conflicts were settled with the victory of Mengistu and his clique, and the last two led to the collapse of the Republic of Somalia, Eritrea's independence, and Darg's collapse.

With regard to the first three struggles, Mengistu emerged victorious, monopolizing all the powers as the emperor did before. First, he invited leftist organizations, including the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and MEISONE. Other small leftist parties were also invited. EPRP, established by former ESM members in North America and Ethiopia, refused to join Mengistu's call and demanded the Darg transfer power to a vanguard civilian party to be organized by workers and peasants. The most radical of leftist organizations, EPRP, defined the Darg enemy of the revolution and started what was termed white terror, which killed several members of the rival organization, MEISONE, as well as some Darg members. Mengistu himself barely escaped assassination.[585] The Darg and MEISONE together declared Red Terror on EPRP members and sympathizers. Mengistu distributed weapons to members of the Association of Urban Dwellers, Kebele, and gave them "freedom of action" to eradicate enemies of the revolution. The subsequent killing spree liquidated the educated section of Ethiopian society between 1977 and 1978. Mengistu

[583] PDRE.
[584] PDRE.
[585] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 27.

later liquidated the leaders of these two organizations, who escaped killing each other.[586]

While coordinating the elimination of leftist organizations and liquidating their leadership, Mengistu also eliminated all the possible competitions within the Darg. He got the capable officers executed. On 3 February 1977, he eliminated Teferi Banti, the successor of General Aman, in a palace shootout, and finally, Atnafu Abate, the Vice-chairperson of the Darg, was executed later. Furthermore, Mengistu also got killed the majority of the civilian leftist organizations' leaders, including the chairperson of MEISONE, Haile Fida, and the chairperson of EPRP, Berhane Meskel Reda.[587] By February 1977, the transfer of monopolized power from the absolutist monarch to the Marxist tyrant was complete. After emerging as the sole ruler, with more power than the emperor himself due to further state penetration into societies following revolutionary initiatives including land to the tiller, expansion of state apparatus through urban and rural Kebeles, Mengistu's Darg started to persecute the continued national identity contestations, through multiple organizations of NCIGs in the southeast and north. In the southeast, multiple secessionist organizations were securitized along with Somali irredentism, while in the north multiple organizations were targeted along with support from and through Sudan. In the following sections, these contestations, external support, and securitization of the external supports will be discussed briefly.

5.2 Capitalizing on Weakness Created by the Revolution: Movements of the South-eastern NCIGs and Invasion of Somalia, 1974-1978

By the time of the outbreak of the popular revolution in Ethiopia, several factors allured Siad Barre to revive Somalia's claim to the southeastern territories of Ethiopia. The first factor was the relative decline in Ethiopia's strategic importance due to the ascendance of satellite technology that made the Kagnew communication station irrelevant, while Egypt and Sudan's switch to the West in the Cold War orientation further taxed the importance of Ethiopia.[588] Furthermore, in the context of American politics of fresh memory of defeat in Vietnam and the Watergate scandals, the US officials did not have an appetite to commit to

[586] Giorgis, 31.
[587] Pietro Toggia, "The Revolutionary Endgame of Political Power: The Genealogy of 'red Terror' in Ethiopia," *African Identities* 10, no. 3 (2012): 273, https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2012.715455.
[588] Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*; Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, 108.

another third-world quagmire. As a result, Washington was unwilling to provide Ethiopia with weapons of the quantity and quality that Addis Ababa was relentlessly requesting. Second, Somali irredentism and NCIG movements in southeastern Ethiopia were relegated to secondary status by Ethiopia's elites, who were preoccupied with power struggles at the center. Third, organizations of Eritrean NCIGs, Jebha, and Shaebia, have controlled the entirety of Eritrea, other than big towns like Asmara, Barentu, and Massawa, due to which some of the army units were relocated from Somali borders to Eritrea, thus creating a security vacuum. Fourth, the number of Ethiopia's new "liberation fronts" that requested arms from Mogadishu to fight Ethiopia "confirmed" to the Barre regime the extent of fragmentations of the politics of the Ethiopian Empire. Finally, and even more importantly, Somalia's willingness to claim the Ogaden was, this time, based on its relatively better offensive capability vis-à-vis Ethiopia.

By 1976, Somalia had already outgunned and outmaneuvered Ethiopia by a large margin thanks to huge investments by the Soviet Union and some Arab states. For instance, Somalia had three times as many tanks with better quality in terms of bigger guns, better armor, and greater range. Additionally, Somalia had twice the number of Ethiopia's armored personnel carriers (APCs) and much more combat aircraft, artillery, and ground-to-air missile capability, which Ethiopia did not have.[589] Despite all the advantages that Somalia had over Ethiopia, Mogadishu did not rush to occupy Ogaden directly. Initially, Barre's regime focused on two preliminary tasks: contesting national identity through propaganda and supporting Ethiopia's insurgent groups to test Ethiopia's defensive capabilities and avoid a diplomatic row.[590]

Like in the case of the early 1960s, Barre's regime restarted the smear campaign, labeling Ethiopia as a 'black colonial' power. At the OAU annual summit of heads of states and governments, Somalia sponsored protests that asked Ethiopia to respect the right of self-determination of the peoples of Ogaden and Eritrea.[591] A publication entitled "The Portion of the Somali Territory under the rule of Ethiopian Colonization" in which the entire Horn of Africa was claimed as the territory of Somalia, was published and distributed by the Barre regime.[592] Radio propaganda was also intensified to mobilize Ethiopian Somalis, and

[589] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 183.
[590] Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, 200.
[591] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[592] GoS, "The Portion of Somali Territory under Ethiopian Colonization."

publications were distributed through official government media like *Halgan* in Somalia about the Ogaden region and its insurgent groups, particularly about the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF).[593]

While in principle, they proscribe clannism, the WSLF guerilla army was organized based on subclans. According to Gabru Tareke, six divisions of WSLF named Ahmed Gureh (named Imam Ahmed of the sixteenth century), El Tire ("Revenge"), Dufan ("Storm"), Denkebed ("Strangler"), Dersene ("Steadfast") and Horyal ("Vanguard") were organized corresponding to a subclan division in Ethiopia. These divisions were controlled from Hargeisa, Dusamareb, and Baidoa in the northern, central, and southern parts of Somalia, respectively. All divisions were trained, organized, armed, and controlled by the Republic of Somalia. While Barre's regime armed them with portable weapons like AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, machine guns, hand grenades, and rocket launchers, WSLF established networks of *Gode* that provided it with intelligence and provisions from the local population in Ethiopia.[594]

After WSLF operated in Ethiopia for about six months, some of the older leaders and fighters of the Bale Oromo militants from 1963 to 1970 were helped by the Barre regime to reorganize and fight the Ethiopian empire in 1976. However, he refused to help them if they were to organize as an Oromo organization. They accepted the ultimatum and established the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) for the Oromo-speaking Muslim population in southeastern Ethiopia. For the Barre regime, Muslim Oromos were "Oromo-speaking Somali". Unlike the older generation rebels who fought Christian Ethiopia to protect their Muslim identity (Islaamaa), the younger and educated generation of the OLF who were exposed to ideas of secular and revolutionary struggles for national independence considered SALF as an organization designed to serve as a tool for Somalia's territorial aggrandizement that undermines the Oromo quest for unity and self-determination.

The OLF was founded in 1973 as a vanguard organization for the self -determination of the Oromo, an NCIG that constituted between 35% and 40% of the Ethiopian population. The territorial claim of the OLF was about 600,000 square kilometers, about half of the country. Substantial territorial areas claimed by OLF in Hararghe, Arsi and Bale, overlapped

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[593] Ingiriis, *The Suicidal State in Somalia_ The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991 (2016, UPA)*, 141.
[594] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 186–87.

in part with those claimed by the Somalis. As a result, the spatial contestations of the OLF for its Democratic Republic of Oromia[595] were not only against Ethiopia but also against Somalia's claims. As a result, the first contingent of the OLF fighters led by Jaarraa Abbaa Gadaa, who were trained in Aden, was imprisoned by the Barre regime until 1975.[596] The second contingent started the armed struggle with the proverbial shot started by Elemoo Qilxuu at mount Charchar in Hararghe in 1973.[597]

OLF's secular identity claim, to draw on the Oromo democratic-republican Gadaa system[598], other cultural institutions did not sit well with SALF, which claimed the same constituency but had been fighting Christian Ethiopia to save their Muslim identity. Due to the overlap of territorial claims of the OLF and the Greater Somalia project, the Barre regime denied the OLF access to external resources through Somalia. Instead, it tried to silence Oromo nationalists by imprisonments and even killings at times. Even if it was allowed to open an office in 1979, it was also expelled it in 1982 when it was adamant about its territorial claims[599].

To realize the goal of separating Ogaden from Ethiopia and merging with Somalia, the WSLF organized its guerilla army based on subclans in Ethiopia. The WSLF fighters about 40,000 in total, entered Ethiopian territories from northern, central, and southern at the same time by mid-1976. According to Gebru Tareke, one of the leading military historians of Ethiopia, the Barre regime sent the guerilla organizations "to pressure Ethiopia into negotiations while wearing down its troops, who would then be attacked by Somali regulars at a suitable time should the talks fail"[600]. Initially, they quickly passed along the Somali-inhabited plains as they were familiar with the geography, and the population was welcoming. They destroyed police posts and other state apparatus that they encountered on their way. However, when they started to penetrate Oromo-inhabited highlands and plateaus, the reception by the population started to fade. The Oromos of Hararghe and Bale were just liberated from feudal control by the 1975 land reform, their religion and language

[595] Bessa, "A History of Oromo Literature and Identity Issues-(c. 1840-1991)," 380.
[596] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 195.
[597] Aga, "Brigadier General Taddasa Birru: A Militry-Political Biography (1922-1975)," 417.
[598] Gadaa system UNESCO inscribed Intangible Heritage which is a traditional democratic and republican system of governance of the Oromo people, see https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164
[599] Teshale, "Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-Led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014," 204.
[600] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 187.

recognized, and henceforth had less reason to rally behind guerilla fighters initially. Besides, the Ethiopian army evacuated the lowlands and concentrated on defending highland garrison towns and larger cities, Ethiopia's defense forces kept them at bay.[601] As a result, WSLF AND SALF insurgents were limited to hit-and-run tactics and failed to move beyond the largely abandoned lowlands.[602]

Meanwhile, the OAU and individual African countries provided good offices so that Addis Ababa and Mogadishu peacefully solved their territorial disputes. When African attempts failed, the Kremlin unsuccessfully tried to solve the disputes between socialist Somalia and socialist Ethiopia. Finally, one last time, Fidel Castro, in consultation with the USSR and Yemen, chaired a meeting between General Siad Barre of Somalia and Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia on March 16, 1977, at Aden.[603] When the talks could not resolve problems between the socialist states, Castro proposed a confederation of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti (destined to become independent in June 1977), and South Yemen.[604] Barre placed a condition that he would talk about confederation if Ogaden and Eritrea joined it as independent countries. When Mengistu declined his condition, Barre left the talks by remarking to Mengistu to "have a nice war".[605]

After four months, Barre forces crossed into Ethiopian territories in a Somali blitzkrieg invasion from four directions. By September 12, 1977, Somalia was in control of most Somali-speaking territories, including the Ogaden region's capital, Jigjiga, and a strategic hill of Karamara where the Ethiopian air force radar was installed. In two more months, the Somali forces penetrated 700 km in the east and 300 km in the south and seized about 350,000 square kilometers of Ethiopian territory.[606] Even if stalled before occupying the larger cities of Harar and Dire Dawa, General Siad Barre almost fulfilled the lofty aspiration of taking Ogaden. However, in less than six months, Ethiopia reversed the gains of Somalia and continued to contribute to the destruction of the previous union between the two Somalilands, as will be discussed in the next section.

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[601] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*.
[602] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*.
[603] Mesfin, "The Horn of Africa: The Changing Nature of Security in the Aftermath of the Cold War," 70.
[604] Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, 151.
[605] Yihun, "Ethiopian Foreign Policy and the Ogaden War: The Shift from 'Containment' to 'Destabilization,' 1977–1991."
[606] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 192.

5.3 From defense to destabilization: The End of Greater Somalia Discourse and Liquidation of South-eastern Insurgents 1978-1991

Since its independence in 1960, the raison d'être of the Somali nation was uniting Somali-speaking territories, as discussed in Chapter Four. However, it could not be achieved because the target countries were unwilling to leave, and Mogadishu could not take them due to significant differences in manpower and firepower. The Soviet Union changed that balance of power by investing in the training and arming of the Somali National Army. Due mainly to these newly acquired offensive capabilities and Ethiopia's inability to respond effectively to Somalia's incursions since the revolution, the Barre regime refused to negotiate and was determined to seize Ethiopia's territories by force.

Mengistu's responses to Somalia's impounding threats were based on a resourceful third-world strategy of omnibalancing [607], alignment with the main source of the threat to address the present and imminent danger. Since the main force behind Somalia's aggressive capabilities was the USSR, Mengistu expelled the US and switched alignment towards Moscow. On 23 April 1977, Mengistu notified the Carter administration of the closure of the US Information Agency (USIA), Military Advisory Group (MAAG), National Medical Research Center (NMRC), US Consulate in Asmara, and Kagnew Station. Hundreds of US military personnel and their families were ordered to leave the country in four days. Western news agencies like Reuter and AFP were also expelled. The US retaliation was holding $100 million worth of various kinds of military equipment, ammunition, and spare parts for communication equipment, which Ethiopia had already paid for.[608] The reward of switching to the East was, however, manifold.

Following a clear commitment by Mengistu and Barre's territorial claims against "socialist" Ethiopia, the USSR sided with Ethiopia. Moscow's total overtures toward Addis Ababa came immediately after the Barre regime announced the closure of Soviet facilities in Somalia and ordered the immediate departures of Soviet advisors and expatriates on 13 November 1977. In less than two months, Moscow shipped $1 billion worth of weapons, which was more than the entire American support to Ethiopia between 1953 and 1976 in

[607] David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," 246.
[608] Elizabeth Schmidt, *Foreign Intervention in Africa : From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 147.

monetary terms. The weapons included 80 fighter aircraft, 600 T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and other heavy and light weapons as well as ammunition. Besides, about 1500 Soviet military advisors to Somalia relocated to Ethiopia under the command of General Vasily Ivanovich Petrov, Deputy Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces. Cuban advisors who were expelled from Somalia, as well as fully armed 15,000 Cuban troops headed by General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez as well as two Yemeni armored battalions, 4000 troops, also joined the war on the side of Ethiopia.[609]

Before launching the campaigns to expel Somali forces from Ethiopian territories, Mengistu appealed to the emancipated peasants to defend their nation and their revolution against foreign aggression. Like during the Battle of Adwa, over a hundred thousand peasants from different parts of Ethiopia were either volunteered or forced to join the campaign to expel Somali forces from Ethiopia. Before dispatching them to battlefronts, over 140,000 peasants were trained for three to six months at the newly instituted massive training centers of Tatek. Three brigades of para-commando forces were also trained. These para-commandos and peasant militia helped save Harar and Dire Dawa from falling into the hands of the Somali forces.[610]

After preparation for a few months, campaigns to move the war from defense to counter-offense, the Ethiopian forces were organized under First Revolutionary Liberation Army (FRLA) in January 1978. The FRLA, later called the First Revolutionary Army (FRA), had several advantages that significantly tilted the balance of power toward Ethiopia. First, in addition to the massive addition of manpower and firepower, Soviet and Cuban military advisors that joined the Ethiopian side from the Somali side brought critical information about the weapons and organizations of the Somali National Army. Second, the Ogaden, Hararghe and Bale plains that had been controlled by insurgents of NCIGs and Somali forces are not conducive for defensive purposes. Third, the Barre regime's strategic blunder of counting on extreme internal divisions in Ethiopian politics. Fourth, the shortage of supplies was further exacerbated by elongated supply lines and a critical shortage of ammunition and spare parts after the USSR switched to the Ethiopian side. Fifth and more importantly, post-revolutionary mobilization to defend the revolution against foreign

[609] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*, 130.
[610] Ayele, 35.

aggression ignited fervent nationalism and produced a high spirit to defeat Somalia.[611]

On 5 March 1978, Jigjiga and Karamara were liberated, and in three more weeks, Ethiopia was in control of all its south-eastern territories. For the Republic of Somalia, however, it was the beginning of a downward spiral that Somalia never recovered from to date. The first effect was an attempted coup on 9 April 1978 by some of the commanders of the defeated SNA who were not happy with the leadership of Barre. The failed coup, on the other hand, was the end of official nationalism and the re-emergence of clan politics as a hegemonic governance framework in Somalia.[612]

After SNA was defeated, the next targets in south-eastern Ethiopia were the insurgent groups. To eradicate the armed groups that operated in the region, the FRS conducted a total strategy called Lash Operation in the mid-1980. The Lash Operation had two dimensions political and military. In terms of politics, the peoples in south-eastern Ethiopia, particularly those in Bale, Arsi, and Sidamo, were forced into a villagization scheme. With the promise of the provision of infrastructure, the entire population was uprooted and settled in villages.[613]

The military operation was led by General Demissie Bulto using regular forces of the FRA and supported by peasant militia and the Cuban mechanized brigades. Through these strategies, the ideologically weak SALF and militarily feeble Ethiopian Oppressed People's Struggle (ECHAT Amharic acronym) were put out of existence.[614] As Teshale cogently argued, WSLF and SALF were too dependent[615] on the Republic of Somalia for supplies and leadership, and the defeat of SNA was also translated into their defeats. In the absence of backing from Somalia, both WSLF and SALF were soundly defeated, with a loss of about ten thousand fighters. Afterward, SALF, which was criticized by its constituency and never fully accepted by Somalia, ceased to exist; its members joined either OLF or IFLO. The

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[611] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*; Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*; Mesfin, "The Horn of Africa: The Changing Nature of Security in the Aftermath of the Cold War."

[612] Ingiriis, *The Suicidal State in Somalia_ The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991 (2016, UPA).*

[613] Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia*, 277–79.

[614] Gebru Tareke, "From Lash to Red Star: The Pitfalls of Counter-Insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980-82," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 3 (March 22, 2002): 465–98, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X02003981.

[615] Teshale, "Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-Led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014," 224.

WSLF was obliterated and had to change its purpose and name to Ogaden National Liberation Front, with the clear redefinition of fighting for Ogaden as independent, not for independence and merger. OLF relocated its area of operation from south-eastern to western Ethiopia, near the Sudanese borders. IFLO was the only organization with a few hundred soldiers that continued banditry form of guerrilla presence without any strategic effect.

After defeating the Somali National Army and insurgent groups that contested Ethiopia's national identity and territorial integrity, the Darg regime was still committed to the policy of "last resort", ending the Greater Somalia ideology by separating former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, the first successful step. To achieve this goal, Somali politics was ideal at that time. The formation of the Isaaq clan-based Somali National Movement (SNM) in London in March 1981 had been especially significant for Ethiopia to institutionalize proxy wars against Somalia. With significant support from Ethiopia, the SNM was able to eject the WSLF from northern Somalia.[616] To replicate the success of SNM in southern Somalia, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was formed by officers led by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf (from Majeerteen Clan), who fled Somalia after the abortive coup of April 1978. The more critical movement was United Somali Congress (USC), formed by Mohammed Farah Aidid, who was specifically aided for representing the Hawiye super clan that dominates Mogadishu and its surrounding. The SSDF and USC, as well as other clan organizations supported by Ethiopia, started attacking targets inside southern Somalia with the technical support of the Ethiopian FRA.[617]

By 1988 the strategy worked[618], and Barre agreed to peaceful co-existence. The April 1988 peace agreement led President Siad Barre to accept the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and rather asked for delimitation of the boundary. Despite the agreement, Mengistu saw safety only in the disintegration of Somalia. Ethiopia provided arms and logistics for SNM, SSDF, USC other Somali insurgent groups that not only overthrew the Barre regime but also effected the collapse of the Somali state.[619] On the other hand, while the Somali insurgent

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[616] Teshale, 158.
[617] Mesfin, "The Horn of Africa: The Changing Nature of Security in the Aftermath of the Cold War."
[618] As Woodward (2003:128) wrote "in March of that year, the major EPLF victory at Afabat in Eritrea led to Mengistu needing to deploy troops from his eastern to his northern regions, and to ensure security in the east a deal should be struck with the old enemy Siad Barre. The two governments agreed to end assistance to insurgents on each other's territory, as well as exchanging prisoners of war from the 1977-78 conflict and facilitating the repatriation of refugees".
[619] Ingiriis, *The Suicidal State in Somalia_ The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991 (2016, UPA)*, 201.

groups were fighting the Barre regime, Mengistu had moved most of the Ethiopian forces to the north[620] to deal with the Eritrean and Tigrayan national movements, which will be discussed in the subsequent sections.

5.4 Dual Contestations: Northern Insurgents' Struggles Against the State and Rivalries Against Each Other

However, Darg's recognition of past injustices and claims of revolutionary and inclusive nation-building policies could not satisfy the unanimous position of organizations of Eritrea for unconditional independence as well as self-determination demands by OLF and WSLF, among others. It could not even fulfill the demands of the TPLF for autonomy and an end to national oppression. In the aftermath of the revolution, particularly after the killing of General Aman, the Eritrean armed groups, Jebha and Shaebia, were the strongest challenges to the Darg in the north. There were also several other insurgent groups in the north. These organizations were competing against each other as toughly as they fought. They eliminated each other than Darg eliminated them. The northern insurgents were numerous immediately after the revolution. Their national identity conceptions and their responses to the new nation-building policies of the Darg vary from organization to organization. Jebha and Shaebia were mainly organizations that had further developed their colonial thesis and organized themselves according to the Marxism-Leninism organizational framework and Maoist insurgency strategies. There were also counter-revolutionary groups like the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) led by Ras Mengesha Seyoum of Tigray and supported by Sudan, the US, and other conservative Arab monarchies like Saudi Arabia. There were also radical leftist organizations such as EPRP, TLF, TPLF, and OLF that wanted radical reorganization of the Ethiopian state. Of these organizations that created armed struggles in the north, Shaebia and TPLF defeated other rival organizations and then, ultimately, the Darg regime itself redefined both the national identity of Ethiopia and the national boundaries of the region. Shaebia led Eritrea to independence, and TPLF controlled the remaining Ethiopia. In the next two sections, I will discuss how these two organizations emerged with alternative national identity conceptions, defeated rival groups, and then finally the Darg itself.

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[620] quoted in Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*, 232.

5.4.1 Rivalries Between Jebha and Shaebia, and Triumph of Shaebia as the Front of Eritrean National Liberation Movement

As discussed in chapter 4, Jebha was the foundational organization that represented the struggles of Eritrean NCIGs for independence. It also had a foundational role in the emergence of multiple perspectives regarding the relationship between the national identity imposed by the ruling regime of Ethiopia and the values and identities of the NCIG. For Eritrea, Jebha defined the relationship as colonial and henceforth started the armed struggles in 1961, as discussed earlier in detail. The ensuing debates and contestations in the Ethiopian Students Movement (ESM) mutated into "nationality question" and "regionalism question", which in turn became persistent issues in the years between 1969 and 1975.[621] Finally, these debates and contestations settled into three major leftist positions following the revolution: the colonial perspective (Jebha, Shaebia, OLF, WSLF, SALF), the national oppression perspective (TPLF after 1978), and the class oppression perspective (like Darg, MEISONE, ECHAT, EPRP).[622]

Jebha maintained and committed to the colonial perspective and consequent position of unconditional independence of Eritrea. However, Jebha's early strategic move of capitalizing on Eritrea's identity as 'Arab' and Muslim, excluding or silencing Christian and African dimensions, created intra-Eritrean contestations since 1967. The inability of Jebha to resolve these internal contradictions and the insistence of the first-generation leadership to keep the Muslim and Arab identity as the dominant markers of Eritrean national identity as well as their factious and parochial politics, led to constant internal tensions, clashes, and factionalism along religious, ethnic and provincial lines until its demise as a fighting force in 1981.[623] These Jebha's internal contestations and contradictions were further "intensified by generational and ideological differences as well as by personal rivalries for control of the nationalist movement".[624] Particularly, the attempts of absentee leadership to define Eritrea as a "Muslim and Arab" nation, and to limit the participation of Christian Eritreans led it to splinters. Furthermore, the later attempts at a limited reform, *Eslah*, to include Christian and

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[621] Zeleke, *Ethiopia in Theory: Revolution and Knowledge Production, 1964–2016*.
[622] Lata, *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland : The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization*, 128.
[623] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies"; Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*.
[624] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 59.

young Marxist recruits, on an unequal term of counting votes of recruits as a third of the old members, were not acceptable to the recruits.[625]

Young Jebha regional leaders like Isaias Afwerki and Ramadan Muhammad Nur, who were trained in China together, founded a new organization called EPLF (popularly known as Shaebia) in 1972 by coalescing three splintering groups. Like it eliminated Harakat in 1965, Jebha avowed to eliminate Shaebia as well, arguing that.

> "The existence of more than one front …[is]…a politically unconscious adventurist attempt underlying the dangerous strategic mistake of dividing the social forces of the democratic national liberation and hence, weakening it, or a conspiracy hatched by the colonialists[626] to liquidate the revolution… In both cases those who stand behind such a political phenomenon betray the revolution… and acts of sabotage directed at the unity of such a front should be confronted with the most unwavering determination to secure/contain it".[627]

Accordingly, Jebha tried to liquidate Shaebia in intra-Eritrean liberation camp contestations for a redefinition of Eritrean national identity and monopolize the liberation movement. It succeeded in liquidating one splinter group, the Obel group. However, the civil war between the old Jebha and the new Shaebia between 1972 and 1974 was stopped by the intervention of the Nimeiri regime of Sudan.[628] Then, the Ethiopian revolution and demands from their followers for rapprochement forced the two organizations to entente momentarily between 1974 and 1978. During this period, their tactical-level collaborations helped the two organizations control entire Eritrea except for a few major towns.

While Jebha and Shaebia were trying to capture Asmara, the Darg moved to Eritrea from the victory over Barre's Somalia. With morale from victory east, Ethiopian troops expelled Jebha and Shaebia from the territories they controlled between 1974 and 1978. As a result, Jebha, which directly engaged the Ethiopian forces supported by Soviet, Cuban, and Yemeni contingents, and had lost a considerable fighting force, moved its remaining forces across borders to Sudan. Shaebia, unlike Jebha, retreated to Nakfa mountain[629] in what was nicknamed Shaebia's "Long-March". Nakfa is a chain of mountains and a natural

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[625] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 118.
[626] Isaias was reported to have CIA and Ethiopia
[627] quoted im Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 176–77.
[628] Woldemariam, 185–86.
[629] Woldemariam, 207.

fortress where Shaebia built deep underground command centers, depots, warehouses, radio stations, hospitals, clinics, cottage industry schools, training camps, and many more complex social, economic, and military structures.[630] Shaebia kept its manpower and firepower intact within Nakfa's caves, shelters, and tunnels.[631]

The Darg postponed clearing Shaebia from Nakfa, momentarily and mistakenly announcing "the end of the 17-year-old separatist dream". [632] Then it refocused its war efforts from Eritrean "secessionist bandits" to "fifth columnists" in the East through Operation Lash. Shaebia used that gap to liquidate Jebha, which was degraded in its engagements with Ethiopian troops under the Darg in 1978. Shaebia and TPLF conducted a joint operation that removed Jebha as a combatant force, leaving it as the vanguard that led the armed struggles for the independence of Eritrea. The TPLF joined the enmity of Jebha, on the side of Shaebia, because of critical disagreement. For instance, Jebha not only claimed territories like Badme that TPLF claimed to be Tigrayan, but also supported enemies of TPLF, like EDU, TLF, and EPRP. More importantly, Jebha's actions to obstruct the mobility of TPLF members and vehicles to and from Sudan through areas Jebha controlled made it an enemy of the TPLF. By supporting Shaebia to emerge as the sole organization of Eritrea, TPLF ensured its survival as well.

However, after the final victory through the Lash Operation in the east, the Darg planned to eliminate the 'bandits' of Eritrea once and for all through the much-publicized Red Star Multifaceted campaign. The organization of the Eritrean NCIG that remained to face the Darg was Shaebia. The Red Star, which was meant to be the "final blow" to eradicate Eritrean militants, involved 200,000 (with 84,000 directly engaging in fighting) Ethiopian troops of the Second Revolutionary Army (SRA) and 2,400 Soviet advisors against 22,000 fighters of Shaebia.[633] At least since the 1896 Battle of Adwa, the overwhelming of an enemy with the sheer weight of numbers had been one of the pillars of military culture, and the Ogaden proved that in 1978. The odd of ten well-armed revolutionary troops to one Eritrean militant seemed a sure thing. Preparation to capture the

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[630] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 71.
[631] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies"; Pateman, *Eritrea : Even the Stones Are Burning*; Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*.
[632] quoted Pateman, *Eritrea : Even the Stones Are Burning*, 82.
[633] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 109; Teshale, "Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-Led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014," 121.

last stronghold, Nakfa was much anticipated, and Mengistu represented and propagated the capture of Nakfa as the final victory that would deliver the "Revolutionary Motherland" to a future of prosperity.[634] The Vietnamese hero and master of people's war strategist, General Vo Nguyen Giap, was invited, was shown the geography and his expert opinions were sought.[635] After months of preparation, the Nakfa town was reduced to rubble through days of aerial bombardments and artillery barrages.[636] Thousands of Ethiopian troops paid the ultimate sacrifice in thousands and finally opened a cut to capture the strategic hideout of Nakfa, and then it would be over.

However, the Chief of Staff, General Haile Giorgis, ordered the troop to halt so that the Third Division (where Mengistu served before the establishment of the Darg) would take the honor of capturing Nakfa, the final blow. When the Third Division arrived at the open after a few hours of waiting, Shaebia had already reorganized and cut off the opened cut.[637] In the ensuing counterattacks, Shaebian fighters successfully expelled Ethiopian forces. The commander of the Third Division was killed in action.[638] The Darg never dislodged Shaebia from Nakfa from 1978 to 1991, irrespective of sacrifices in tens of thousands of human lives and billions of dollars of debt in aggregate. Shaebia, on the other hand, led successful national liberation struggles that led to the independence of Eritrea and the collapse of the largest armed forces in black Africa in 1991. The factors and battles that led to the success will briefly be discussed in Section 5.7. Here, I briefly present the national identity conception and claim of Shaebia as a vanguard organization of Eritrean NCIGs, how it acquired internal and external support manpower, firepower, and other resources, and its interactions with other organizations of NCIGs and Sudan.

After emerging as the hegemonic nationalist organization to represent the contestation of Eritrean national identity against Ethiopia, Shaebia reiterated Jebha's colonial thesis. Accordingly, temporal, and spatial claims were locked to terms of colonial treaties. It rejected both claims of historic Ethiopia and claims of 'Arab and Muslim' exclusionary identity claims by Jebha. It framed the national identity of Eritrea as a post-colonial and secular state where identification markers were respected, not promoted. Furthermore, to

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[634] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 108.
[635] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*, 235.
[636] Tareke, "From Lash to Red Star: The Pitfalls of Counter-Insurgency in Ethiopia, 1980-82."
[637] Giorgis, *Red Tears : War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 109.
[638] Pateman, *Eritrea : Even the Stones Are Burning*, 107.

avoid competition and complications by claims of other organizations of Ethiopia's NCIGs, Shaebia made it a prerequisite that they accept that Eritrea's question was a "colonial question". TPLF, TLF, EPRP, OLF, and other organizations of Ethiopia's NCIGs were provided training from Shaebia, using its territories with an understanding of Shaebia's claim.[639]

To overcome Jebha's weaknesses of persistent factious and parochial organizational culture, Shaebia Leninist-Maoist principle of democratic centralism. Through democratic centralism, Eritrea's national liberation was claimed to be achieved through a long-lasting people's war against Ethiopia's 'colonialism'. Several interlocking institutional mechanisms were introduced to practice democratic centralism[640] in Shaebia, among which: *gemgam* (criticism and self-criticism) and *Halewa Thawra* (defense of the revolution) are critical. *Gemgam* is a device used to prevent mistakes and develop trust and camaraderie between and among comrades through criticism and self-criticism.[641] Other than being a tool for correcting the behaviors of individuals, gemgam could also be used to purge or demote undesirables and incompetents. Members and leaders of Shaebia who passed the threshold of being corrected through gemgam were subjected to the violent device, the Halewa Thawra.

The Halewa Thawra was used to gauge, suppress, and eliminate dissidents and factious elements. For instance, one of the first and successfully crushing factious groups was the elimination of a group that Shaebia labeled Menkae. Menkae, a bat in Tigrigna, was a label coined to indicate secretive meetings at night using darkness as a cover. Individuals who were suspected to be leaders and supporters of Menkae were incarcerated in the Sahel and later executed. Elites who challenged Isaias Afwerki and fighters who were suspected of being extreme 'leftist', 'rights', or 'Ethiopian or CIA agents' were interned or executed in Halewa Thawra.[642] Commanders of Halewa Thawra who were accused of being extreme in treating prisoners themselves were interned and executed in Halewa Thawra. Through these mechanisms, Shabeia kept everyone in line.

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[639] Berhe, "A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991) : Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia."

[640] Jebha also introduced democratic centralism by 1971 and revamped itself as communist revolutionary vanguard organization even though it could not outrun its past

[641] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 66.

[642] Welde Giorgis, *Eritrea at a Crossroads : A Narrative of Triumph, Betrayal and Hope*, 247–48.

Within Shaebia itself, there was a secret vanguard party called the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP).[643] Eritrea's EPRP was led by Isaias between 1971 and 1987 and was relegated and silently shut down following the end of the Cold War, and Isaias took over the Secretary-General position of Shaebia from the nominal Ramadan in 1987.[644] Through this shadow organization, Shaebia developed a matrix of networks that connected youth, farmers, and women at multiple levels in Eritrea and at regional levels in Ethiopia, Sudan, as well as in North America and, Western Europe, and Arab countries. Eritrean networks provided Shaebia with fighters, food, shelter, intelligence, and other functions such as evacuating the dead and wounded and constructing roads and fortifications.[645] In return, Shaebia provided hope of independence and social services like public education, health, and adjudication of conflicts in areas it controlled. In areas it did not control, a dense matrix of networks was built across Eritrea, Sudan, and Ethiopia, critical in providing it with intelligence, including war plans, which sometimes reached Shaebia commanders before it reached government generals. The diaspora networks were sources of finance, armaments, medicine, food aid, scholarly networks, and diplomatic support.[646]

As a result of its doctrine of self-reliance and governance mechanisms and the brutality of the Darg regime, Shaebia progressively grew as a formidable force of 100000 well-trained, disciplined, battle-hardened people's army by 1990. Other than its economic activities in liberated areas, supports from Arab countries, and Western aid organizations in Sudan, particularly after the 1984/85 famine, the diaspora were transited to Shaebia through Sudan. Shaebia's tactical-level collaboration with the TPLF also helped both organizations to support one another at critical junctures[647] like Operation Red Star, Af Abet Battle, and Battle of Shire, which will be discussed later on.

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[643] Different from Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)

[644] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 218; Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 67.

[645] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 68–69.

[646] Tareke, 74; Teshale, "Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-Led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014," 203.

[647] Alemseged. Abbay, "Identity Jilted: The Eritrean and Tigrayan Divergent Nationalist Paths" (University of California, Berkeley, 1996), 192.

5.4.2 The Emergence of the TPLF as the Vanguard of the Tigray National Movement

The Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) was founded in 1975 by Tigrayan university students to liberate Tigray from domination by the Amhara ruling class. Tigrayan national identity conception by the TPLF heavily draws from both distant history and proximate conditions of life. In terms of long history, the elites of Tigray NCIG draw from the history of oppressive and exclusionary state-building and nation-building policies of the ruling elites since the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, as discussed in Chapter 3. TPLF elites argued that the national oppression of Tigray started when Emperor Menilek colluded with Italian colonialists and divided Tigray into Eritrea and Ethiopia to weaken Tigray and appropriated the throne and moved the center of power from Tigray to Shewa along with corresponding status and resources.

From the status-related grievance-producing factors, the subjective awareness of the relegation of Tigray as the core of Ethiopia's national identity played a crucial role. That was because Tigray represented the myth of the foundation of the Ethiopian empire, including the myth of Kebre Nagast, and the resulting Solomonic dynasty, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, Ge'ez script, and Aksum civilizations that defined the official Ethiopian nationalism during the Haile Selassie regime. Even though the elites of Tigray considered their regions the nucleus of historic Ethiopia, they were progressively excluded from its core by the Amhara ruling class by monopolizing power and using Amharic as a device of exclusion. As a result, one's powerful Tigray became powerless and destitute, and the elites of the Shewan Amhara conspiracy were claimed to be responsible for the loss of power and status.

From proximate conditions of life, Tigrayan students had concluded that their future was bleak in the system dominated by the Amhara ruling elite. This was because their future was closely linked to the state as a source of employment and personal and collective development. Where Tigray's economy was overwhelmingly subsistence agriculture with "no industrial base and valuable exports"[648], the hope of Tigrayan students was the state to access both employment and other resources. However, the state was designed in such a way that non-Amhara were excluded by default. By imposing Amharic as a national language,

[648] Young, *Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia : The Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991*, 16.

and henceforth making it "the language of government, the courts, church officialdom, and, crucially, the schools, institutions which were predominantly located in towns"[649], Tigrayan graduates felt that they were relegated to secondary status even in their province. The following quote from John Markakis, one of the leading scholars of the Horn of Africa, represents the conditions that pushed Tigrayan students to radicalization in the early 1970s, culminating in their determination to join the armed struggles:

> "Tigray students felt at a disadvantage compared with Amharigna-speakers in clearing school examination hurdles. Only 2% of those who qualified for entry to the University in 1963-8 came from that province, while 65% came from Shoa(including Addis Ababa). Those who reached the top of the education ladder were pessimistic about their future prospects in the service of a state where three-quarters of the senior officials were Shoa".[650]

Therefore, Tigrayan Haile Selassie I University students drew on the grievance-creating factors, ontological insecurity produced by a real and perceived loss of status and enabling environment of the revolutionary period to produce an alternative conception of Tigrayan national identity, as they defined a nation based on Leninist and Stalinist understanding of the concept of nation. For the elites of the TPLF, the Darg was a continuation of domination by the Amhara elite, and henceforth, it represented a continuation of national oppression. In line with the spirit of the time, the 1960s and 1970s, the solution to the condition of national oppression was, therefore, an armed struggle. However, the ultimate goal of the armed struggle was redefined along the way. In its first manifesto of 1976, the goal of the TPLF was to form a "People's Republic of Tigray".[651] This goal was changed to autonomous Tigray within democratic and socialist Ethiopia, where the equality of national groups would be guaranteed.

To achieve this goal, a few Tigrayan students of Haile Selassie I University returned to their province. They were divided into two groups and were directed to two different locations. One group went to the remote hills of the western Tigray, which is closer to Sudan, called Dedebit. At Dedebit, the students were accommodated, protected, trained, and socialized with local people by a popular Tigrayan nationalist, Ayele Gessesse, more popularly known as Sihule. According to Aragawi Berhe, one of the founders of TPLF and its senior Commander said Sihule, who had prior contacts with Jebha's Idris Awate and

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[649] Young, 75.
[650] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 188.
[651] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 202.

known brigand himself, “gave the TPLF the legitimacy and popularity that none of its other members could provide”. The second group headed to Eritrea. Shaebia, whose leadership was from the same ethnic group in Eritrea, was an inspiration for the elites of the TPLF. As a result, its members were sent to Shaebia training camps in the Sahel, where Shaebia officers trained them and returned with a few aged weapons and a Shaebia trainer to Dedebit to start the armed struggle. The TPLF started the proverbial first bullets on 18 February 1975 with Sihule[652] as its leader.

However, the TPLF's claim to the national liberation of Tigray was contested by several organizations that claim to represent Tigray's constituency, including EDU, EPRP, and TLF. The first counter-revolutionary force of EDU, which was trained and funded by the CIA, Sudan and Saudi Arabi, entered Tigray from Sudan with a well-armed 10,000 force to crush communist organizations in Ethiopia and return Ethiopia to monarchy.[653] Even if TPLF lost its leader and trainer from the Shaebia in the battles, the EDU was, in the end, defeated and cleared from Tigray by the TPLF, giving it battle experiences and more resolve.[654]

After emerging victorious from contestations against other organizations and internal factional power struggles through violence, the TPLF established itself among the peasants. Despite tactical collaboration with Shaebia, because of which TPLF helped defend against the Red Star operation in 1982, a competition over ideological 'purity' in 1984 led to the break-up of the relationship between Shaebia and TPLF. Shaebia expelled the TPLF trainees from its territories and closed Dimtsi Weyane, a TPLF radio station operating from Shaebia-controlled territory in the Sahel. Worse in time of need, the Shaebia closed the only route through which international aid organizations transit humanitarian aid to famine-stricken parts of Tigray that were under the TPLF in 1984/85.

Henceforth, the TPLF was forced to look for other ways to save its populations that were dying in thousands due to famine. It mobilized a hundred thousand peasants to build

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[652] Sihule was a nickname given to Gessesew in reference to 18th century Tigrayan kingmaker Ras Mikael Sihule that was discussed in Chapter three.

[653] Woldemariam, “Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies”; Berhe, “A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991) : Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia.”

[654] Berhe, “A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991) : Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia.”

an alternative route to Sudan and successfully made it through the terrain of Welkite to Gedaref in Sudan. Shaebia's decision to block TPLF at this time of need created a "lasting bitterness" between the two, in the words of Reid.[655] Even though the two fronts worked together after 1988 to overthrow the Darg,[656] they kept their acts of revenge that have been blooding Ethiopia and Eritrea to date, as will discuss in the Final Chapter.

Confident of its victory over the Darg, the TPLF started contemplating controlling Addis Ababa. However, it could not do it without the help of the two main national groups, the Oromo and Amhara. When its talks with OLF to cooperate failed, it formed a coalition with and formed EPRDF and controlled Addis Ababa on May 28, 1991, and ended the 17 years of rule of the Darg that consumed the lives of over two million people. With Shaebia's control of Asmara and OLF's entry into Ethiopia from Sudan, the national identity was redefined again in two decades. In the next section, I will discuss how the relationship of Sudan with these insurgent organizations constituted Darg's policy toward Sudan.

5.5 External Support from and through Sudan to Organizations of Northern NCIGs and The Darg Policy towards Sudan

Like during the Haile Selassie regime, the leading security issue that determined the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan during the Darg regime was the Eritrean question and related issues of border control and refugee management. The degree of securitization was further complicated by the opposing Cold War blocs, Arab-Israel politics, Libya-Sudan relations, and the domestic political dynamics of Sudan partly affected their foreign policy approaches. In this section, I will discuss how real and perceived support from and through Sudan to northern insurgent groups, which in turn constituted Darg's policies towards Sudan.

In the aftermath of the 1974 revolution of Ethiopia, a plethora of organizations with different agendas moved from Ethiopia to Sudan, in addition to Jebha and Shaebia, which were already operating from Sudan. There were several organizations, to mention the politically significant ones: EDU, OLF, TPLF, and EPRP. Later, Khartoum also sponsored

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[655] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 205.
[656] Mesfin, "The Horn of Africa: The Changing Nature of Security in the Aftermath of the Cold War," 82; Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*.

smaller organizations to fight a proxy war against SPLM in Ethiopia's territories, including Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM) and Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM).[657] The quality, quantity, and duration of assistance that these organizations received from and through Sudan varied depending on their goals, ideology, capacity, and networks with other external actors, including the diaspora, ideological and ethnic movements, and external powers.

The EDU was considered the better candidate to foil the revolution and bring Ethiopia back into the "conservative" camp in the first three years after the revolution. The objective of the EDU was to restore the monarchy, and the convergence of Sudanese, Saudi, and American security and strategic interests were the main factors in the choice. The monarchist man behind EDU was Ras Mengesha Seyoum, great-grandson of Emperor Yohannes IV and the last hereditary Governor of Tigray, who escaped the Darg with the help of Jebha to Sudan in 1974.[658] By organizing other officials of the Haile Selassie regime who fled the arrest of Darg in Sudan, Ras Mengesha established the EDU. With the interventions of people like Sultan Ali Mirah Hanfare of Afar, who had close ties with Riyadh, the EDU immediately attracted significant support from Saudi Arabia[659], which had the financial capacity and commitment to undermine growing Soviet influence in the Red Sea region, Khartoum, which was opposed to Kremlin since the foiled communist coup of 1971 and the US. As a result, with Saudi funds, CIA technical and material help, and Sudan as training and rear base, the EDU raised and dispatched a well-armed force of 10,000 fighters to remove the Darg from power and destroy other communist forces in Ethiopia.[660]

Nimeiry encouraged Washington's investment in the EDU by overplaying Darg's communist credentials and accusing it of the 1976 attempted coup against him while he was in the US. Nimeiry accused the Darg of training the Ansar forces of Sadiq al-Mahdi in collaboration with Gaddafi of Libya in Ethiopia.[661] In retaliation, Nimeiry engaged in

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[657] John Young, "Along Ethiopia's Western Frontier: Gambella and Benishangul in Transition," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 2 (1999): 321–46, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X9900302X.

[658] Berhe, "A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991) : Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia."

[659] Teshale, "Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-Led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014," 203.

[660] Markakis and Ayele, *Class and Revolution in Ethiopia*, 161; Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 234.

[661] Francis M Deng, "War of Visions : Conflict of Identities in the Sudan" (Washington, D.C.: Brookings

multidimensional counteractions against Ethiopia. Worst of all, he officially declared the legitimacy of Eritrean independence and allowed Jebha and Shaebia to use Sudanese territories as a conduit to acquire resources and fight for independence. He also allowed the coordination of support to train and dispatch the EDU to overthrow the Darg and concentrated the Sudanese National Army along the Ethiopian borders.[662] Extended propaganda against Ethiopia opened through radio Omdurman was also part of the retaliation. Furthermore, Nimeiry signed a 25-year joint defense pact with Egypt on 15 July 1976 to counter the threats of the Darg from the east and Ghaddafi from the west, Darfur.

Darg's responses to Nimeiry's accusations and intervention in the internal affairs of Ethiopia were conflicting and variable over time. Several factors were calculated in Darg's reactions and the policies developed towards Sudan. First, intra-Darg power struggles and influences from leftist organizations dissipated the focus. The Somali-backed WSLF and SALF were occupying the Ogaden plain at an alarming rate in the east. At the same time, Jebha and Shaebia controlled the Eritrean territories at an alarming rate in the north. The reluctance of both the USA and the USSR to commit resources in the needed magnitude made the choice of Cold War alliance difficult. Due to these factors and other complex factors in the context of the aftermath of the revolution, Darg's responses were conflicting and reactionary.[663]

First, attempts were made to appease Khartoum. The Darg requested the support of the Nimeiry regime and other Arab countries for the success of its May 1976 nine-point peace initiative on Eritrea.[664] Furthermore, the Darg was cleared of supporting the South Sudan rebels even though it had been in contact with some elements of them since April 1975. However, the declaration of mutual defense between Cairo and Khartoum and public pronouncement of support for the "independence of Eritrea" could not be bypassed by the nationalist military junta. This brought back the siege mentality that the "historic enemies of Ethiopia", the Arab countries, planned to control the Nile and the Red Sea by undermining

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Institution, 1995), 167–69; Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, 198.

[662] Yihun, "Ethiopia's Troubled Relations with the Sudan, 1956-1983," 78.

[663] Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*; Yihun, "Ethiopia's Troubled Relations with the Sudan, 1956-1983"; Alemu, "The Unmaking of Ethio-American Military Relations: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward the Ethiopian Revolution."

[664] Terrence Patrick Lyons, "Reaction to Revolution: United States-Ethiopian Relations, 1974-1977" (The Johns Hopkins University, 1994), 214–15.

Ethiopia's national independence and territorial integrity. Consequently, in January 1977, the Darg declared National Mobilization against Sudan, and a military contingent was sent to borders along the Sudanese borders.[665]

However, the Darg was momentarily forced to back down from its engagement with Sudan. When Somalia was fast approaching the strategic towns of Jigjiga, Harar, and Dire Dawa, the Darg decided to deal with Somalia militarily and with Sudan through shaming. As a result, Addis Ababa passed the case of Sudan over to the OAU to buy time. The OAU's African Heads of State and Government established an Ad Hoc Mediation Committee of selected member states in 1977. Like during the Haile Selassie regime, Ethiopia invoked the OAU's principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the member states. The use of OAU succeeded, and Ethiopia and Sudan signed a communique based on the OAU principles.[666] Although the agreement did not produce a substantive change in practice, it helped Addis Ababa to focus on the Ogaden War, which was concluded with a definitive victory.

By mid-1978, Ethiopia's victory in the east was repeated against organizations of NCIGs in the north. Of course, EDU and Jebha were put out of action, with a larger role played by TPLF and Shaebia. However, Nimeiry's regime refused to renounce the Eritrean question as an internal affair of the Ethiopian state. Whenever peacemaking attempts were made, Khartoum was committed to the inclusion of the Eritrean question into the agenda.[667] The victorious Darg was no more willing to appease Khartoum and refused to engage in peace initiatives that included the Eritrean agenda. However, one year later, Nimeiry's position was changed due to developments in the Middle East.[668] As a result, the Addis Ababa Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 18 January 1980.[669]The Joint Ministerial Commission was reactivated, and Mengistu visited Sudan for five days in May 1980, while Nimeiry reciprocated in six months.

Most importantly for Ethiopia, Sudan stopped supporting insurgents and agreed to

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[665] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."
[666] Yihun.
[667] Aalen, "Ethiopian State Support to Insurgency in Southern Sudan from 1962 to 1983: Local, Regional and Global Connections."
[668] The decision of the Arab League to expel Egypt following the developments after Camp David Agreement
[669] Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics: 1956-1991."

close their offices. Besides, Sudan even allowed Ethiopia to use its territories to conduct its counter-insurgency operations, including using tanks and air force in pursuit of the Eritrean militants across Ethio-Sudanese borders. However, these amicable relationships were short-lived.[670]

The failure of the Red Star Operation and the redefinition of the national identity of Sudan by the declaration of Sharia law in 1983 gradually returned the two states to the politics of proxy wars. Improvements in Cairo and Khartoum relations, along with the growing presence of Washington's relocation of some of its facilities to Sudan, made it the top recipient of American support in Africa, replacing Ethiopia. Although Khartoum's support for Shaebia and other Ethiopian NCIG organizations was limited to tolerating them for the use of Sudanese territories for their international relations and the acquisition of resources from their diaspora and other humanitarian agencies, Darg officials preferred to engage in a blame game accusing Sudan of breathing life into a 'bandit' already eliminated.

However, even though Darg preferred to deflect its inability to defeat the progressively developing capacity of Shaebia, Shaebia's survival was mainly a function of organizational coherence and robustness. Since 1980 Sudan did not provide it with aid other than allowing it to use its territory and transport facilities for medicines and relief supplies.[671] Rather, Shaebia used the territories of Sudan to run external support and its businesses. For instance, to ensure the provision of food and necessities for the population under its control and its fighters, Shaebia established the Eritrean Relief Association in the mid-1970s. The Association became the outlet that channels relief aid from humanitarian organizations of the West. Furthermore, Shaebia also engaged in lucrative illicit trades such as cigarettes and alcohol in Sudan, from which it made millions of dollars annually and bought favors and silence from the Sudanese authorities. According to Woldemariam, Shaebia used to make about 50 million USD from this trade, and some agricultural products were exported to Sudan in the 1980s. However, the bulk of its weapons came from the Darg itself. Therefore, the most crucial support that Shaebia acquired from Sudan was using its territories to import goods and sell products and services to the Sudanese markets. It also established covert banking networks throughout Ethiopian territories as well.[672] As aforementioned, Shaebia

[670] Yihun, "Ethiopia's Troubled Relations with the Sudan, 1956-1983."
[671] Pateman, *Eritrea : Even the Stones Are Burning*, 102.
[672] Woldemariam, "Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies," 215.

had a complex web of networks that infiltrated Ethiopian and Sudanese state apparatuses and had equal or more fighting forces than the Sudanese state.[673]

The other politically significant organization of Ethiopia's northern NCIG was the TPLF. The TPLF relations with Sudan were similar to those of Shaebia. All its headquarters were in Tigray. However, Sudan allowed it to open and run offices through the humanitarian wing, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), in several Sudanese cities, including Khartoum and Port Sudan, as contact points for its foreign relations with agents of foreign governments and humanitarian agencies.[674] In addition to several businesses that the TPLF operated in Sudan and refugee camps in Sudan, the TPLF also had 160,000 hectares of agricultural land under its control, from which it exported to Sudan.[675] Furthermore, in addition to its policy of self-reliance, the TPLF made its sole strategy to depend on weapons to be collected from enemy forces. It also used Mengistu's obsession with Shaebia to hide and develop its capacity until it could no longer hide its well-armed force of over 50,000 TPLF militants.

Instead, the Darg focused on Shaebia. Mengistu asked a rhetorical question "What would happen if Tigray becomes independent? What could Tigray do as long as we kept Eritrea?". [676] As a result, the TPLF was dealt with marginally until it was too late. The Darg focused on complaining about how Shaebia was a non-entity without petrodollars of 'historical enemies' and the US imperialism, and Sudan was depicted as the lifeline that connected the 'bandits' with external aid from imperialist powers and enemies of Ethiopia. If only Sudan stopped supporting them, Shaebia would fade away. Therefore, forcing the government of Sudan was taken as the main strategy to defeat Shaebia and other rebels who took sanctuary in Sudan. Taking the success of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement as historical evidence and precedent, the Darg regime started to arm a newly created Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). They helped different groups come together and establish a unified organization under Colonel John Garang in June 1983.[677] Ethiopia provided all the support, including weapons, rear base, headquarters, radio airtime, offices, diplomatic networks, and external assistance, including facilitating trainers from

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[673] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 67.
[674] Berhe, "A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991) : Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia."
[675] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 97.
[676] quoted Tareke, 88.
[677] John Ryle et al., *The Sudan Handbook* (London: The Rift Valley Institute, 2012), 215.

Israel.[678] Until the coup d'état of 1985 that overthrew Nimeiry, SPLM/A was Ethiopia's only leverage against Khartoum.

The SPLM/A was not only the fighting force against controlling strategic places. It also gave Ethiopia additional advantages by undermining the Egyptian project of Jonglei and the oil exploration in southern Sudan. It was also given the additional responsibility of fighting other militant groups in its areas of operation. As a result, it was to fight the OLF, GPLM, and BPLM. Furthermore, unlike Sudanese forces, Ethiopian forces gave even firing support to SPLA in its wars against Sudan. During negotiations, one of Ethiopia's demands was for Sudan to cancel the mutual defensive agreement with Egypt. The Darg's proxy wars in Sudan did not illicit the expected behaviors from Sudan for some time.

After the 1985 coup, however, the second leverage opened up. The second leverage was the party politics in Sudan. Whenever a military regime is removed from power, two historic political organizations emerge in Sudan: Ansar-backed Umma Party and Khatmiyya-affiliated DUP. The Darg regime used these parties to introduce peace initiatives that involved one of these political parties and the SPLM/A. The idea of the Darg was that if a negotiation based on the condition of Ethiopia were successful in Sudan, Eritrean organizations would also be forced to come to the table. In April 1988, it almost succeeded when Sadikalmahdi of the Umma party agreed to the conditions of Ethiopia and agreed to bring all Ethiopian armed forces in Sudan to negotiating table. He also promised to force Isais to come to the table.

However, Sudanese politics intervened. Sadikalmahdi was overthrown by Turabi-backed Hassan Omar Al-Basher. In the first days after coming to power, Basher promised to solve all the Ethio-Sudanese problems and bring back the best friendship between the two countries. Nevertheless, with the collapse of the Darg regime, the Al Bashir government took a cue from the US to coordinate organizations of Ethiopia's NCIGs for a post-Darg scenario. Particularly following the collapse of Somalia in January 1991, the US wanted a smooth transition in Ethiopia. As a result, Khartoum put pressure on Shaebia, TPLF, OLF, and other smaller organizations to produce a roadmap that the US made a precondition for

[678] Bayissa, "The Derg-SPLM/A Cooperation: An Aspect of Ethio-Sudan Proxy Wars"; Matthew. Arnold and Matthew Leriche, *South Sudan from Revolution to Independence* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2013); Aalen, "Ethiopian State Support to Insurgency in Southern Sudan from 1962 to 1983: Local, Regional and Global Connections."

future aid from the West for would-be governments to take power in Addis Ababa and independent Eritrea. To sum up, the strong nationalist movements of Eritrea and Tigray succeeded in overthrowing the Darg regime in May 1991, and their leadership controlled Addis Ababa and Asmara by flights arranged from Khartoum. As discussed in Chapter Six, TPLF-led EPRDF expelled SPLM/A from Ethiopian territories as payback for support from and through Sudan.

5.6 Regional Diplomacy and Peaceful Relations with Djibouti and Kenya

During the military rule, Ethiopia's relations with neighboring countries were not only conflictual, like in the case of Somalia. The two remaining neighboring states that shared borders with Ethiopia had peaceful relations: one because of shared threats and the other because of a lack of capacity. Similar to the Haile Selassie period, Ethio-Kenyan relations were further enhanced irrespective of ideological differences and because of Somali irredentism and lack of assistance for each other's NCIGs. In the case of Djibouti, which won its independence in 1977, the relationship started on the wrong foot because of Djibouti's support for WSLF and positive outlook toward Somali irredentism. However, the relationship was reversed and became sustainably amicable after Ethiopia's victory in the Ogaden War. The following two sub-sections will discuss Ethiopia's peaceful relations with Djibouti and Kenya.

5.6.1 Djibouti: From A Strategic Liability to A Reliable Partner

Djibouti is the fourth case study that illustrates the relationship between the willingness and capacity of the neighboring state to support national identity contestations and the resulting security policy of Ethiopia. As the smallest neighboring state that shares boundaries with Ethiopia and Djibouti is not expected to support Ethiopia's organizations of NCIGs. It has less than one percent of the Ethiopian population. It is also a microstate with an area of 23200 square kilometers. It had neither agricultural potential nor mineral deposits to rely on for economic well-being. However, it is located in one of the most strategic locations in the world. It is the gateway and exit to the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal, one of the busiest chokepoints of international trade. Due to its location, Djibouti depends on strategic rent and external support. Strategic rent is allowing foreign powers to use Djibouti territory in return for usage rents on the land and ports. As a result, over two-thirds income of Djibouti came from Ethiopia's port use. The rest came from external actors

like France, which used Djibouti as a military outpost in the the Red Sea region.

With its size and its overwhelming dependence on Ethiopia, Djibouti was expected to adopt a weak-status quo approach to Ethiopia. However, upon independence, Djibouti followed a weak-revisionist state foreign policy towards Ethiopia. When Djibouti won its independence in June 1977, Ethiopia was emerging from bloody revolutionary processes. As a result, Mogadishu significantly influenced the process of independence of Djibouti. That was because, in Djibouti, 65% of the population were Somali who shared identity and ideological affinity with Somalia. Besides, as Ethiopia had been decidedly pro-Afar, the other 30% of the population of Djibouti during the Haile Selassie regime, which claimed Djibouti as part and parcel of Ethiopia, the Somalis who dominated Djibouti politics at independence tilted towards Somalia. For instance, even if Ethiopia was the first to renounce territorial claims against Djibouti at the OAU in 1975 and publicly guaranteed to protect the independence of Djibouti.[679] Even asked to be clear of Greater Somalia, Djibouti politicians added the blue color of Somalia to the flag of the Djibouti Republic. Furthermore, even if Ethiopia generously supported the national independence ceremony of Djibouti, Djibouti politicians invited delegates from Ethiopia at half the number of those from Somalia.[680] The undue preferential treatment of Somalia was not acceptable to Ethiopia.

The worst happened when Djibouti gave 'neutral' approval to the Somali invasion of July 1977, less than a month after Djibouti's independence. Djibouti publicly declared its neutrality in the face of the invasion and denied Ethiopia's use of the Djibouti port to import arms. As Djibouti has always been the main port of Ethiopia for its defense and security provisions, the neutrality of Djibouti was equivalent to an outright enmity. Furthermore, Djibouti did not condemn the Somali invasion of Ethiopia in 1977. Furthermore, it hosted Sultan Ali Mirah of Afar, who fled Ethiopia after his men attacked the Darg's literacy and land reform campaign centers.[681] Furthermore, Djibouti also allowed the WSLF to use its territories to attack Ethiopia and kept silent when its citizens joined on the side of Somalia.

In addition to dependence on Djibouti for shipping arms, Ethiopia overwhelmingly

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[679] Walter S Clarke, "The 'Esayi Dream: A Footnote to The Ogaden War," *Northeast African Studies* 13, no. 1 (May 24, 1991): 19.

[680] Belete Belachew Yihun, *Djibouti (YeTigegninetachin Mesferia) ጅቡቲ (የጥገኝነታችን መሰረታዮ)* (Addis Ababa: Oland Printing Press, 2014).

[681] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 204–6.

(65-95% of total trade volume) depends on Djibouti for its international trade. Blocking Djibouti ports was never a manageable affair, as was attested by experiences when Ethiopia denied access to Djibouti ports in 1935 and 1977. As a result, prohibiting Djibouti's support for these forces or, even worse, Djibouti's capture by enemies of Ethiopia was top on the security agenda.[682]

However, these weak-revisionist approaches of Djibouti toward Ethiopia were sustainably reversed following the decisive victory at the Ogaden War in March 1978. The Hassan Aptidon government of Djibouti, which was sympathetic toward the Greater Somalia project, sought rapprochement with Ethiopia. The Darg also went long-distance at treating Djibouti favorably so that Ethiopia would not be in such a position where it would be forced to go long-distance to import weapons and transit supports through Mombasa, Kenya if Eritrea ports were made insecure by Shaebia and Jebha and Djibouti was closed in the name of neutrality. The Djibouti port was and is the national security nightmare for Ethiopia, and henceforth Ethiopia always, including during the Darg, to a reliable partnership with the Republic of Djibouti.

As a result, Ethiopia went a long way in reducing the vulnerability of Djibouti to external assistance. In addition to payments related to port services, Djibouti politicians were encouraged to own residence apartments and businesses in Ethiopia, even when other foreigners were banned from owning a business in Ethiopia.[683] However, neither appeasement nor diplomatic cover could separate Djibouti from Somalia. When the OAU's Good offices committee presented a report in June 1981 which opposed Somali irredentism, Djibouti refused to agree to the report and denied the threat of Somali expansionism. Contrary to the expectation of Ethiopia, Djibouti was not the priority of the Barre regime, as Ogaden was.[684]

Still, the Darg regime continued following appeasement policy toward Djibouti, except for training and arming and maintaining some Afar youth from Djibouti as a stick approach against the Somali-dominated government of Gouled Aptidon.[685] President

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[682] Yihun, *Djibouti (YeTigegninetachin Mesferia) ጅቡቲ (የጥገኝነታችን መስፈሪያ)*.
[683] Yihun, 11–114.
[684] Ingiriis, *The Suicidal State in Somalia_ The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991 (2016, UPA)*, 141.
[685] Yihun, *Djibouti (YeTigegninetachin Mesferia) ጅቡቲ (የጥገኝነታችን መስፈሪያ)*, 95.

Aptidon, on the other hand, focused on changing the regional role of Djibouti to maximize the survival of the Djibouti state. He started the peace mediation process at the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), now IGAD, which was formed in 1986 with headquarters at Djibouti.[686] After the failed meeting of Aden, Mengistu and Barre met in Djibouti at the IGADD summit hosted by the President of Djibouti. The brokering of Djibouti between the two bore fruits in April 1988 when Barre and Mengistu signed the agreement.

5.6.2 Kenya: All-Weather Strategic Partner of Ethiopia

As we have discussed in chapter four, the relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya continued to be influenced by the common threats from Somali irredentism, the absence of supporting each other's organizations of NCIGs, and a history of collaboration and peaceful conflict resolution. During the Darg period, the amicable relations between Kenya and Ethiopia were further enhanced irrespective of many factors that could have led to the relationship in other ways, including ideological differences, regime and leadership changes, and regional pressures for ideological consistency.

Even though the Darg deposed his close partner and switched Ethiopia's Cold War bloc from West to East, President Kenyatta did not change his policies towards Ethiopia. Instead, his intelligence units were furnishing the Ethiopian side with timely information about the Somali troop movements. Besides, Munyua Waiyaki, then Kenya's Minister of Foreign Affairs, reportedly said that Kenya would give "total support to Ethiopians in their struggles to protect their independence, integrity, and unity".[687] In addition to entitlement provided for by the defense pact, Kenya's intelligence, material, diplomatic and multidimensional backing to Ethiopia and opposition to Somalia emanated not from ideological affinity, but rather it was from a pragmatic conception of Kenya's national security and self-preservation. Even if it had the largest economy in the region at the time, it had never been a militaristic state. The increase of its armed forces from 9,000 in 1974 to 14,000 in l980 was extraordinary development for Kenya. At the same time, Somalia took

[686] Ingiriis, *The Suicidal State in Somalia_ The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime, 1969-1991 (2016, UPA)*, 200.

[687] quoted in S M Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn of Africa: Kenya's Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Dispute," *Australian Outlook* 37, no. 1 (April 1, 1983): 35, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718308444803.

the lead and started militarization of the region by doubling its armed forces from 20,00 to 54.000. Ethiopia, which had an edge and planned to have much more force than Somalia and Sudan combined, was bypassed. By switching sides to the East, Ethiopia increased its armed forces by over seven-fold, from 38000 in 1976 to over 250000 by 1980.[688] Given these disparities, Kenya saw her security in a victory for Ethiopia than engaging in an unsustainable arms race against Somalia. Furthermore, its turbulent relations with Tanzania and Uganda at the time also further sedimented its partnership with Ethiopia.[689]

Kenya's support to Ethiopia during Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia included the furnishing of Ethiopia with critical logistics, including the port. When Somalia destroyed the Ethio-Djibouti rail line in 1977, Kenya allowed Ethiopia its Mombasa port free of charge. What made this support extraordinary and further cemented the partnership of the two countries was that Kenya allowed transit of Soviet weapons and Cuban troops with obvious knowledge of the US. Kenya went against attempts by the Barre regime's friendly gestures and demand for ideological consistency against Soviet interventions. Even though Nairobi had been the strongest opponent of the Soviets of presence in the region, the Kenyan security establishment viewed Somalia as more threatening than even the Soviets because the Ogaden war was the second move towards realizing Greater Somalia that ultimately included the Somali-inhabited Kenya's North-eastern province, the NFD.

After the time-sensitive transit of logistics through Kenya, the other critical support of Kenya to Ethiopia during the Ethio-Somalia war of 1977 to 1978 was relentless diplomatic support. These included convincing the West not to support the Barre regime as arming Somalia beyond defensive need was undermining the security of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, as well as the peace of the entire region. Kenya carried out a series of diplomatic campaigns to the West and Arab world not to support Somalia in 1977 and 1978. For instance, President Moi discussed with President Carter and Prime Minister Callaghan not to arm Somalia as it was a threat to Kenya's national security and regional peace.[690] President Moi also visited Saudi Arabia to curb Saudi finance flow to Mogadishu, which

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[688] Adar, "The Significance of the Legal Principle of 'Territorial Integrity' as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy towards Somalia, 1963-1983," 214–16.
[689] Adar, 210–11.
[690] Samuel M Makinda, "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* 4, no. 1 (January 15, 1982): 36, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436598208419609.

was used to purchase weapons.[691] Furthermore, the OAU norms of uti possedetis and non-interference in internal affairs of other states that emperor Haile Selassie and President Kenyatta promoted in the 1960s helped Kenya and Ethiopia in their diplomatic wars against the Somali invasion of Ethiopia. As a result, Somalia was all alone in 1978 when Ethiopian forces expelled it from Ethiopian territories in March 1978. Furthermore, Ethiopia did not cross the international boundary in pursuit of Somali forces, thereby confirming its commitment to the principles of territorial integrity.

Because it supported Ethiopia, Kenya was attacked and threatened by Somalia and its supporters. The first threat came from Somalia. Somalia dispatched three thousand shifta that started attacking Kenyan targets, including police posts, in 1977.[692] The other blowback was a diplomatic row with Iran. As Shah's Iran was one of the main interfaces that were transferring the support of the West to Somalia, Kenya asked Tehran to refrain from intervening in African affairs. The subsequent diplomatic quarrels led to the closing of the Iranian embassy in Nairobi and the breakdown of relations between the two countries.[693] The other major action of Kenya with a consequence was its interception of an Egyptian cargo plane transporting arms to Somalia in 1978. Egypt retaliated by seizing Kenyan passenger planes until the release of its aircraft.[694] Irrespective of these threats, Kenya stood by Ethiopia until Somalia was defeated and the looming danger of Somali irredentism was removed by force.

Just before the total victory of Ethiopia over Somalia, Waiyaki visited Addis Ababa in 1978, where he uttered statements that further confirmed the symmetry of Ethiopia and Kenya's security conceptions in the following words" Kenyans are over-joyed by your victory and just as your struggle was our struggle. So, we now feel that your success is our success… Kenya is ready to jointly destroy anyone who wishes to annex territory".[695] At the end of his visit, Ethiopia and Kenya signed a joint communique. In the communique,

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[691] Adar, "The Significance of the Legal Principle of 'Territorial Integrity' as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy towards Somalia, 1963-1983," 212.

[692] Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn of Africa: Kenya's Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Dispute," 35.

[693] Levin Opiyo, "Somalia-Ethiopia War Forced Kenya and Iran to Sever Ties," *Nation*, 2020, https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/somalia-ethiopia-war-forced-kenya-and-iran-to-sever-ties-242142.

[694] Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn of Africa: Kenya's Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Dispute," 36.

[695] quoted in Onyango, "Kenya - Ethiopia Relations: A Study of the Significance of Economic and Political Factors Contributing to Co-Operation, 1963 - 1991," 166.

they outlined four minim conditions to be fulfilled by Somalia to ensure regional peace and security: to renounce its territorial claims unconditionally; to declare its acceptance of principles of UN and OAU, to respect international treaties and peaceful settlements of disputes and finally to pay reparation for the war damages inflicted on Ethiopia during the Ogaden War.[696]

Furthermore, after the death of President Kenyatta, his successor, President Daniel Arap Moi, visited Ethiopia in January 1979 and further strengthened the Ethio-Kenyan partnership by renewing the defense pact. At the dinner program prepared in his name, President reiterated the excellent relationship between the two nations and confirmed that the cooperation continues regardless of ideological differences. At the end of the visit, the two countries renewed the defense pact entitled "Ethiopia-Kenya Treaty of Cooperation".[697] During his visit to Kenya in 1980, Mengistu, on his part, reconfirmed the readiness of Ethiopia to standby Kenya and added that "our two countries will not hesitate from jointly confronting any and all attempts being made by the expansionist government in Mogadishu towards the realization of the futile dream of the so-called Greater Somalia".[698]

Somalia's response to the renewal of the defense pact and joint communique was further accusations and diplomatic pressures against Kenya. The Somali Supreme Revolutionary Council accused Kenya of "… fell prey into Abyssinian intrigues, and subsequently create in her country unwarranted instability and chaos and at the same time invite enmity from the Somali Government and people which hitherto had not existed".[699] When its attempts fell on deaf ears, the Barre regime solicited diplomatic backing from the Reagan administration to pressure Kenya to unfriend Ethiopia and befriend Somalia. However, even if Nairobi was forced by Washington to normalize relations with Mogadishu but never turned its back on Addis Ababa. Furthermore, even if Somalia publicly dropped its claim on the NFD and argued that the case of the Ogaden was "colonial", Kenya opposed Mogadishu's territorial claims against Ethiopia. Moreover, Kenya also refused to support

[696] quoted Onyango, 179.
[697] Onyango, "Kenya - Ethiopia Relations: A Study of the Significance of Economic and Political Factors Contributing to Co-Operation, 1963 - 1991."
[698] quoted in Onyango, 177.
[699] quoted in Adar, "The Significance of the Legal Principle of 'Territorial Integrity' as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya's Foreign Policy towards Somalia, 1963-1983," 196.

other organizations of NCIGs of Ethiopia, unlike Somalia and Sudan.

However, Kenya's all-weather support for Ethiopia's territorial integrity, political independence, and unity did not save it from the catastrophe looming from the north following the end of the Cold War and the victory of organizations of NCIGs. Even then, it allowed the ousted Mengistu to flee to Zimbabwe through Nairobi on May 21, 1991, accepted the incoming regime of EPRDF and resumed another amicable relationship and greater partnership, which will be discussed in the final chapter.

5.7 End of the Cold War, Collapse of the Darg and Triumph of Organizations of NCIGs

As we have discussed in the previous sections, between 1974-1982, the Darg had defeated or controlled intra-Darg contradictions; won wars against the leftist organizations (EPRP and MEISONE) and decimated urban opposition; defeated Somali aggression; and decapacitated the southeastern militant groups; and controlled the northern ones. Other than frustrations created by the inability to eliminate Shaebia from inaccessible Nakfa and Sahel mountainous caves and hideouts after the costly Red Star Operation, the Darg was in comfortable control and consolidation of power between 1982 and 1984. In this moment of relative stability, the Darg was able to start institutionalizing the revolution and its conception of national identity. In addition to further consolidation of state structures that penetrated to the extremes of peripheries, the Darg founded the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), which was inaugurated on the 10th anniversary of the 1974 revolution. Darg also commissioned the PDRE constitution in a bid to finalize the form of the 'socialist' political community it aspired to realize. However, building up resentments due to exhaustion and fatigue from the revolutionary processes and wars, unaddressed demands of NCIGs, continued monopoly of power and violent political culture, embedded and perpetuated dominance of the core group and progressive alienation of the elites of NCIGs were exacerbated by two more precipitating factors that ultimately led to the collapse of the Darg and victory of organizations of NCIGs. The two major developments were the famine of 1984/85 and the introduction of Perestroika and Glasnost.

The famine of 1984/85, which consumed the lives of one million people, forced the Darg to upscale revolutionary and emergency powers to introduce or reinvigorate policies

that led to the disenchantment of the people and the army. The most consequential policies that broke the relationship between the peasant and the Darg were villagization, resettlement, and national conscription. First, the villagization policy was introduced in Hararghe and Bale to separate the Oromo peasants from the OLF through the Lash Operation. After the famine, the Darg made villagization one of the prime policy tools to regiment the society both to manage food aid and control insurgent movements. Through this program, millions of peasants were forced to destroy their houses and relocated to locations decided by the Darg.[700] This unpopular policy that uprooted peasants and communities from their ancestral lands was employed despite vocal opposition.[701] On the contrary, it was enshrined the idea of villagization in the PDRE constitution of 1987. Article 10 (3) provided that "the state shall encourage the scattered rural population to aggregate".

The second and equally opposed policy was resettlement. The resettlement was mainly meant to relocate the population from drought-hit regions of Tigray and Wollo to rainfed and fertile regions in west and southwestern Ethiopia, mainly. More than 600,000 people were forced to resettle, which led to the dislocation of families and communities. Tens of thousands died from malaria and related tropical infections. Other tens of thousands fled their new settlements to neighboring countries, mainly Sudan. Tens of thousands more fled and joined rebel groups like TPLF, Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), and other militant groups. Despite vocal opposition and ineffectiveness, the Darg again included in the PDRE constitution Article 10(2), "the state shall ensure human settlement patterns correspond to the distribution of natural resources".

Third, and the worst policy of the Darg that led to the disenchantment and alienation of the population, particularly the peasant (who accounted for more than 90%), was national mandatory conscriptions (Beherawi). By capitalizing on the revolutionary zeal of 1977/78 that led to the victory against Somalia through massive peasant mobilization, the Darg made Beherawi institutionalized, through which young people from low-income families were forcefully recruited to serve the army.[702] Over half a million troops were recruited to fight against their peoples, insurgent groups in Eritrea and Tigray mainly. The Kebele from which

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[700] Mulatu. Wubneh Abate, Yohannis., Mulatu Wubneh, and Yohannis Abate, *Ethiopia : Transition and Development in the Horn of Africa* (Boulder, Colo.; London: Westview Press ; Avebury, 1988).
[701] Begna Fufa Dugassa, "Indigenous Knowledge, Colonialism and Epistemological Violence: The Experience of the Oromo People under Abyssinian Colonial Rule" (University of Toronto, 2008).
[702] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*, 40–41, 234–35.

they were recruited had also provided for expenses. Peasants' children who were recruited through Beherawi were mostly sent to the battlefronts without proper training and provisions.[703] On the other hand, the well-to-do section of society and well-connected families avoided sending their children to the war fronts by using legal loopholes and by sending their young children to study in North America and Europe. This corrupt practice was not lost on the peasant who expressed in the popular saying: "Children of the rich go to Bole (international airport); children of the poor go to Tole (Tolay militia training center).[704]

The alienation of the peasants was further compounded by exhaustion, fatigue, and war-weariness of the army, which was further exacerbated by Mengistu's micromanagement. Mengistu, who could not trust the armed forces and, like his predecessor Emperor Haile Selassie preferred loyalty to competence, introduced a triangular command in 1980 with the help of the KGB.[705] The triangular command was designed in such a way that three parallel chains of command report to Mengistu, the Commander-in-chief. This structure coordinated a military commander, political commissar, and security officer within each armed forces unit. While the stated goals of political commissar and security officers were preventing dissent within and infiltrations into the armed forces, they were mostly supposed to report on the military commanders. As a result of undue interventions initiated by political commissars and security officers, able and independent-minded military officers were not able to perform their tasks. Legitimate concerns were stifled as dissents, and critical initiatives were aborted as insubordinations. As time passed, resentments were built up; and divisions, discords, and infighting became common. Mengistu's ultimate solution was execution. The case of the execution of General Tariku Ayne in 1988 was presented as a classic example by experts of the Ethiopian military, and in a way, it was also one of the fatal decisions that contributed to the collapse of the Darg itself.[706]

General Tariku was the commander of the elite Nadaw Command that was based at the Af Abet, the nerve center of the Second Revolutionary Army (SRA). Tariku's mistake was transmitting the request of discontented troops under his command who had been in

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[703] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 128–30.
[704] quoted in Tareke, 130.
[705] Ayele, *The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991*, 88.
[706] Gebru Tareke and Gebru Tareke, "From Af Abet to Shire: The Defeat and Demise of Ethiopia's 'Red' Army 1988-89," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 42, 2004, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x04000114.

foxholes and trenches for six and more years without relief and a request for a political solution to the Eritrean problem.[707] The request he forwarded were legitimate demands that had already started taking a toll on his unit and other units. Horrible living conditions and combat fatigue, discords created by Mengistu's ears in the army, and Shaebia's propaganda have already created a few desertions and defections. Rather than addressing the root causes, Mengistu got General Tariku executed on February 15, 1988. Shaebia was thrilled and reported on its Radio the same night that the Darg "cut off its right hand with its left hand".[708]

On March 17, a month after Tariku's execution, Shaebia attacked Af Abet. In two days, it registered a historic victory with "15,000 soldiers were killed, wounded, captured or dispersed".[709] In this battle which was compared to the Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu, partially correctly, Shaebia captured 50 T55 tanks, heavy artillery, mortars, and rocket launchers, as well as thousands of light weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition.[710] The quantity and quality of arms captured at the Af Abet helped Shaebia transition its guerrilla force into a conventional army. Furthermore, Shaebia controlled half-Eritrea following the order of Mengistu to evacuate the army following the crushing defeat. Furthermore, Af Abet was the beginning of the end for Ethiopia's imposition of its policies over Eritrea.

Meanwhile, the second major development, the introduction of Perestroika and Glasnost, also started to undermine Darg's ideological position as well as certainty over the ending of the Soviet and its bloc countries' assistance. Even though the Darg members were well aware of the restructuring and liberalization of Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR since 1985, they seemed to tenaciously commit to building a "socialist" political order, as evidenced by the 1987 PDRE constitution. That was in the face of the total dependence of half-a-million soldiers. Cognizant of these facts and the success of Shaebia at Af Abet, Gorbachev warned Mengistu that the solution to the Eritrean problem was political and that the Soviet provision of weapons would end soon.[711] Gorbachev's warning and Af Abet debacle forced Mengistu and his regime to recalculate their options.

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[707] Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement*, 300.
[708] quoted Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 252.
[709] Africa Watch Report, "Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia," 235.
[710] Africa Watch Report, 187.
[711] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*, 315–16.

Given the ending Cold War and drying external support as well as conditionalities to open up the markets, the Darg decided to accept a rapprochement with the struggling Barre regime of Somalia and relocate the majority of troops and resources of the First Revolutionary Army to fight the northern insurgent groups. Accordingly, Mengistu finally agreed to Djibouti's quest for rapprochement. After repetitive discussions, Mengistu and Barre signed the "Mogadishu Agreement on Normalization of Relations" on 3 April 1988. That was an extraordinary achievement for Ethiopia because it was a death certificate for the Greater Somalia ideology, as Somalia recognized the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. From then on, the bone of contentions was support for insurgent groups, not territorial claims. Mengistu ordered Ethiopian troops to evacuate the two buffer camps built inside Somalian territories. However, the Darg increased material support, including weapons, vehicles, and other logistics to SNM and SDDF. He wanted the Barre factor removed. These Ethiopia-backed Somali forces defeated the Somali National Army. SNM controlled former British Somaliland and declared independence after two years of genocidal wars. The other two forces expelled Siad Barre in January 1991. However, they failed to establish effective controls, thereby leading to the collapse of the Republic of Somalia as a state. The Darg achieved its security goal in the east.

After the 1988 agreement with Barre, Mengistu moved much of the troops from the FRA and moved it to establish a Third Revolutionary Army (TRA) to eliminate TPLF from Tigray and reinvigorate the obliterated SRA in parts of Eritrea. However, much of the TRA forces were put out of service by the TPLF beginning at the Battle of Shire, which ended on February 6, 1989. For all the intense and purposes, the Darg was on the last gasps after the battle of Shire. The army officers who saw the impending catastrophe and collapse of the largest army in black Africa strategized to save it by removing Mengistu and making peace with Shaebia and TPLF. They conducted an attempted coup on 16 May 1989 while Mengistu was away for a request for arms supply from East Germany. His triangular command saved him, and most of the top generals were executed. After this, Shaebia and TPLF started preparing to take power in Asmara and Addis Ababa, respectively.

The TPLF changed its position from liberating Tigray to controlling Addis Ababa. As representing a constituency of about 6% of the total population, it needed to create a partnership with at least organizations of the two largest national groups, the Oromo and Amhara. With regard to the Amhara, the TPLF had already established a partnership with a

multinational group that was organized from war prisoners of the EPRP and established the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM). The TPLF and the EPDM (later renamed Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM)) as junior partners, established the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989. They tried to partner up with OLF, but its national identity conception was difficult to reconcile with the position that the TPLF aimed for itself. They ditched the OLF and minted their proxy organization called the Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO) from prisoners of war of the Ethiopian army.[712]

With the push from the Bush administration, the EPRDF, led by Meles Zenawi, and Shaebia, led by Isaias Afwerki, started negotiating the future of the Ethiopian state. Al Basher of Sudan was given the role of coordinating all insurgent groups of Ethiopia for the democratic transition of Ethiopia after the Darg. Days before the collapse of the Darg, the London Conference was organized in May 1991 by the invitation of the US Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen. The main protagonists present were Shaebia, TPLF, OLF, and some officials of the Darg attending. Other than American diplomats, senior officials of Sudan also took part in the talks. The result of the negotiations was that the TPLF-led EPRDF was given the green light to establish government while Isaias Afewerki of Shaebia also agreed to de facto independence of Eritrea to be followed by two years of peaceful exit process through a referendum and formal recognition.

In line with these agreements, the victorious forces of Shaebia controlled Asmara on 24 May 1991 and declared de facto independence after thirty years of wars of independence and formally recognized on May 24, 1993, after a referendum.[713] The TPLF-led EPRDF seized Addis Ababa on 28 May 1991 and declared a provisional administration to be followed by an inclusive transitional government in which all political forces except, Darg, would be represented, and elections for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution would be conducted. In two decades, Ethiopia's national identity was radically redefined with implications for its regional security policy, which will be discussed in the next Chapter.

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[712] Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution : War in the Horn of Africa*.
[713] Tareke, 307.

5.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have addressed how conjectural factors of famine mismanagement and poor living conditions of the soldiers and junior officers in the NCIGs areas sparked a revolution that led to the end of the seven-century dynasty and the redefinition of national identity. The national identity conception of the Darg as a 'socialist' political community, as envisioned by leftist students and their organizations, was inclusive in terms of identity claims and spatial and temporal claims. Accordingly, public spaces and policies were secularized, and the Solomonic ideology was replaced by Marxism-Leninism and Abyssinian court culture with democratic centralism that resulted in maintaining the culture of the monopoly of power in the hands of one person. National unity was the ultimate goal of nation-building policies, thereby further entrenching "secularized" core values and maintaining the privileged cultural status of the core group, which led to the multiplication of organizations of politically activated NCIGs in the revolutionary context. Almost all the major national movements adopted variants of Marxism-Leninism ideology but opposed the Marxist Darg's practice of maintaining national oppression in the name of defense of the revolution, national unity, and territorial integrity. Furthermore, even if the equality of identification markers was legally recognized, individuals and organizations that tried to exercise those rights autonomously were mercilessly crushed. The only avenue left to overcome continued national oppression and tyranny was to continue or start armed struggles. Armed struggles in the southeastern were conducted with the help of Somalia and in the north with the assistance of Sudan.

In the southeastern, WSLF, SAF, OLF, and three other smaller organizations restarted national identity contestations. The first group to seriously challenge the state with external support was the WSLF. With the close support and backing of Somalia, WSLF controlled over half of the Somali-speaking territories of Ethiopia when the Barre regime decided to commit to the Somali National Army and control Ogaden with the arms collected from the Soviets and Arab partners, mainly. The dominance of Somalia and Barre's move to monopolize the WSLF struggle from the organization of NCIG to the level of interstate conflict undermined the movements. Both Somalia and the NCIG organizations of southeastern Ethiopia were completely defeated in 1980. After defeating both through direct wars and counterinsurgency, the Darg regime graduated its security strategies and tactics to proxy wars using clan militants and buffer zoning to control Somalia. Even if agreeing to

rapprochement, the Darg chose to support Somali armed groups until the collapse of the Barre regime and, ultimately, Somalia itself. The last resort policy goal of dismembering Somalia that started in 1964 was finally achieved by the Darg in 1991.

Djibouti, which is the most important neighboring state for Ethiopia's national security, started its relationship as a weak-revisionist state in support of Greater Somalia. Its support for Somalia was based on "neutral" approval whereby Ethiopia was denied port access to import arms and other technologies of war to defend itself against the Somali invasion. Furthermore, in the first eight months of its independence, Djibouti also allowed the WSLF to attack Ethiopia from its territories and its citizens to participate in the war against Ethiopia. However, once the Somali army was decisively defeated, Djibouti changed its approach to weak-status quo, thereby refocusing its approach to developing economic integration with Ethiopia. Furthermore, Djibouti redefined its role as a regional peacemaking state, because of which it became the seat of the IGADD and helped to make peace between the Bare regime and the Darg in 1988.

Equally, Darg's policy towards Kenya was amicable and further enhanced irrespective of ideological differences. Furthermore, changes in the regime in Ethiopia and changes in the government in Kenya did not affect the relationship between the two countries. Although Darg deposed his close partner and switched Ethiopia's Cold War bloc from West to East, President Kenyatta did not change his policies toward Ethiopia. Rather, his intelligence units were furnishing the Ethiopian side with timely information about the Somali troop movements. Because of its national security interest, Kenya stood by Ethiopia and provided the necessary support, including free use of the port of Mombasa to transit arms and troops, including from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Yemen, which were in the opposite ideological position of the Kenyan government. In addition to furnishing Ethiopia with intelligence, Kenya also spearheaded diplomatic warfare against the Somali invasion. Nairobi warned the West not to support Somalia because it would be the next target if Somalia succeeded in Ogaden.

On the other hand, Sudan was second in line as the enemy. The main bargaining chip was SPLM. However, Darg made a mistake. The victorious northern insurgent groups, Shaebia and TPLF, were not fully dependent on Sudan. For over a decade, they had developed a self-sufficient and self-sustaining resource pool. They collaborated at the tactical level. Besides, Sudan was still critical as a conduit for goods and help they got. It

was an avenue where they discussed the national charter not to repeat the collapse of Somalia. Finally, leaders of the major organizations, Shaebia, TPLF, and OLF, and representatives of other organizations flew from Khartoum to Addis Ababa for the July 1991 conference that redefined the national identity of Ethiopia, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI

6. THE 1991 REGIME CHANGE, REDEFINITION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY, NCIGS, AND REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1991-2012

Upon controlling the seat of the government of Ethiopia in May 1991, the TPLF-dominated EPRDF regime introduced a new nation-building project that reorganized the Ethiopian state as a multinational federal state and redefined its national identity. In direct contradiction to the assimilationist policies of the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes, the EPRDF regime made two critical decisions regarding the 'nationalities question'. First, accepting the Eritrean question as a colonial question facilitated Eritrea's independence and international recognition through a referendum in 1993. Second, it declared that the "nationalities question" of the rest of NCIGs was a problem of "national oppression" that could be solved through internal self-determination. Consequently, the problem of social injustices and oppressions caused by the policies of assimilation and homogenization of past regimes could be addressed by recognizing and affirming the right of NCIGs to self-govern in their defined territorial entities through the combined federal principles of self-rule and shared rule. However, the nation-building policies of the EPRDF regime were contested and resisted by Ethio-nationalist and Amhara elites, the Oromo and Somali NCIG organizations, the Somali Islamist organizations, and later by Eritrea. These contestations shaped the foreign and security policies of the EPRDF regime between 1991 and 2012. As Chapters 4 and 5 did for previous regimes, this chapter also answers the two basic questions of this dissertation during the EPRDF regime under PM Meles Zenawi: understanding and explaining how contemporary Ethiopia's national identity has been constituted and contested; and how these contestations defined its regional security policy.

To answer these questions, the chapter is structured into seven sections. The first section presents the redefinition of national identity under the EPRDF leadership by allowing the independence of Eritrea and restructuring Ethiopia based on settlement patterns of linguistic identity groups and how these significant groups redefined their identities. The second section presents the contestations of the EPRDF nation-building projects by southeastern liberation movements, OLF and ONLF, and Somalia-based Islamist

movements, mainly the AIAI and its variants. The third section deals with counterinsurgency against ONLF and OLF and the securitization of the failed state of Somalia as a haven for terrorist groups. The fourth section presents the securitization of the Islamist NIF regime of Sudan and turning Khartoum into a strategic partner. The fifth section deals with the competitive national identity conception of Shaebia and TPLF, the Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000, and the emergence of Ethiopia as a regional power. The sixth section presents the strengthening of peaceful relations of Ethiopia with Djibouti and Kenya in the context of post-Cold War and GWOT. Section seven presents how the EPRDF capitalized on GWOT to capture resources and isolate adversaries and how it used international organizations to legitimize its regional security policy. Finally, there is a conclusion that threads these ideas together.

6.1 Triumph of NCIG Organizations and Redefinition of National Identity of Ethiopia

Unlike the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes that targeted NCIGs for assimilation and homogenization toward the goal of national unity, the main goal of EPRDF's nation-building policies was to build a new multinational, federal, and democratic Ethiopia in which identity groups use and promote their culture and language and determine their own affairs. In other words, the EPRDF diagnosed the solution of its predecessor, assimilationist nation-building policies, as the main culprit for socio-political ills in Ethiopia.[714] Instead, federalism and accommodation of diversity were considered both the solutions to the past problems of national identity contestations and guarantors of the Ethiopian state's continued existence. Consequently, to address past injustices of political domination, economic exploitations, and cultural marginalization of NCIGs, the EPRDF has taken two fundamental measures in line with the triparty agreement of EPRDF, Shaebia, and OLF at the London Conference of 27 May 1991[715]: recognizing the independence of Eritrea and restructuring the rest of Ethiopia in a way that cultural identities (diversities of NCIGs) were protected and promoted.

Regarding Eritrea, which has been fighting a war of independence since 1961, the EPRDF solution was simple: respecting Shaebia's quest for self-determination of Eritrea

[714] Tsegaye Regassa, "Federalism as a Tool of Conflict Management in Learning to Live with Conflicts Ethiopia -- An Overview," *Mizan Law Review* 4, no. 1 (2010).
[715] Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building*, 173.

and facilitating its formal independence from Ethiopia. Regardless of the outcries of Ethio-nationalists, who believe that Eritrea was part of historic Ethiopia and could not be allowed to secede along with Ethiopia's ports, the victorious organizations of NCIGs, Shaebia, and TPLF decided otherwise. The Shaebia-led Provisional Government of Eritrea and the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) led by TPLF / EPRDF agreed to eight principles that would govern the relationship of independent Eritrea and the new multinational Ethiopia, of which the following three were adopted: First, the right of the Eritrean people to determine their future through an internationally supervised referendum. Second, they agreed that the Provisional Government of Eritrea would wait two years before the referendum. Third, to sweeten the deal and facilitate future peaceful relations between the two countries, Eritrea agreed to make Assab a free port for Ethiopia.[716] Based on these agreements, a UN and OAU-supervised referendum was conducted; and Eritreans declared their independence with 99.8% of votes cast on May 24, 1993, exactly two years after Shaebia controlled Asmara.[717]

Second, to address the past unjust social relations and inequalities and begin inclusive nation-building in remaining Ethiopia, the EPRDF convened a Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference of Ethiopia between 1-5 July 1991 in Addis Ababa.[718] At this Conference, twenty-seven different political and social organizations participated, including armed groups, such as the EPRDF, OLF, Afar Liberation Front (ALF), Gambella People's Democratic Movement (GPDM), and Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) as well as three Ethio-national and nineteen ethnonational organizations, workers representatives, Addis Ababa University representatives in the presence of observers from the UN, OAU, Nigeria, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sudan. Ethiopianist organizations like Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISONE, in Amharic Acronym), as well as the Darg's WPE, were barred from taking part in the National Conference by the EPRDF, victor's settlement.[719] Accordingly, the invited and present representatives of organizations agreed to a Transitional Charter of July 1991.[720] The Charter, as the supreme law of the land for the transitional period, established

[716] Mulugeta, 176.
[717] Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay*, 115.
[718] Sarah Vaughan, "Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia" (University of Edinburgh, 2003).
[719] Medhane Tadesse, Alagaw Ababu Kifle, and Dade Desta, "Evolving State Building Conversations and Political Settlement in Ethiopia," *Conflict, Security & Development* 21, no. 4 (September 2021): 1–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2021.1974698.
[720] Vaughan, "Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia."

the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE).[721] Meles Zenawi of EPRDF became the President of the TGE. In addition to the presidency, the EPRDF led by TPLF took the office of the prime minister, as well as the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and interior.[722] As the only non-EPRDF major rebel group, the OLF was also invited to choose four cabinet positions from the remaining. The OLF, which claimed to represent the largest national group, the Oromo, but which was militarily weak compared to the EPRDF, settled for ministries of education, trade, information, and agriculture.[723] The TPLF appointed individuals from politically insignificant organizations to the remaining cabinet portfolios as well. Furthermore, participants of the Conference also became members of the Transitional Council of Representatives by adding a few representatives from five more organizations, including the ONLF.[724]

In redefining the national identity of Ethiopia, the victorious NCIGs organizations, the TPLF-dominated EPRDF and the OLF made the idea of self-determination of identity groups, including secession, which was proposed by the Ethiopian Students' Movement (ESM) in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the pillar of the Charter. The Preamble of the Charter promised to "…start a new chapter in which freedom, equal rights, and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing principles of political, economic and social life...".[725] Article Two of the Charter further elaborated the idea of self-determination to empower the NCIGs as follows:

> The right of nations, nationalities, and peoples to self-determination is affirmed. To this end, each nation, nationality, and people are guaranteed the right to:
>
> a.) Preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history, and use and develop its language;
>
> b.) Administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation;
>
> c.) Exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the concerned

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[721] TGE, "Transitional Period Charter Ethiopia," Pub. L. No. 1, Berhanena Selam Printing Press (1991), Article 18, https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/the-transitional-period-charter-of-ethiopia.pdf.
[722] Teshale, "Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-Led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014," 174.
[723] Teshale, 174.
[724] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 233.
[725] TGE, Transitional Period Charter Ethiopia.

nation/nationality or people is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged, or abrogated.

This idea of self-determination of identity groups, including independence, was, on the other hand, a response to contestations of NCIGs against the imposition of the core values of Amhara in the name of national unity, leading to the disintegration of the country. According to Mulugeta, one of the TPLF veterans, self-determination was assumed to be the foundation of unity of the political community.[726] In other words, once past social injustices and inequalities were addressed, future nation-building would be based on equality. In line with this promise of the Charter, the NCIGs ('nations, nationalities, and peoples' in EPRDF parlance) first establish their respective autonomous units and then come together and establish a collective shared rule at the center. In a way, it was holding together federalism, posing as coming together federalism.[727] Accordingly, the TGE, through its Proclamation No. 7/1992, established 14 autonomous regions[728] and other lower-level autonomous entities based on the population size and settlement patterns of 'nations, nationalities, and peoples'.

The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), which replaced the Transitional Charter, came into force in 1995 after four years of the constitution-making process. Despite opposition from Ethio-nationalists and Amhara elites, the principle of self-determination, including independence, became the foundational and constituting principle of the Constitution to transform Ethiopia from the "prison house of nationalities" to a multinational state of "nations, nationalities and peoples". The Preamble of the constitution, unlike any other constitution, starts with the phrase "We the Nations, Nationalities, and People of Ethiopia".[729] Article 8 further declared that "All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia".[730]

The more radical and the (in) famous part of the constitution, Article 39, was about self-determination, including secession, which was the legacy of the 1970s Ethiopian students' movement (ESM) debates. Article 39 (sub art 4) proclaims, without any

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[726] Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building*, 261.
[727] Mulugeta, 195.
[728] TGE, "Proclamation to Proclaim the Establishment of National Regional Self-Governments," Pub. L. No. Proclamation No. 7/1992 (1992), Article 3.
[729] FDRE, "Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia," Pub. L. No. Proclamation No. 1/1995 (1995), Preamble, https://www.fsc.gov.et/DesktopModules/EasyDNNNews/DocumentDownload.ashx?portalid=0&moduleid=1179&articleid=152&documentid=103.
[730] FDRE, Article 8, sub art 1.

precondition, the mechanism through which people as a collective identity or cultural group determine their right to self-determination as follows:

> 4. The right to self-determination, including secession, of every Nation, Nationality and People shall come into effect:
>
> a) When a demand for secession has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the legislative council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned;
>
> b) When the Federal Government has organized a referendum which must take place within three years from the time it received the concerned council's decision for secession;
>
> c) When the demand for secession is supported by a majority vote in the [regional] referendum;
>
> d) When the Federal Government will have transferred its powers to the Council of the Nation, Nationality or People who has voted to secede; and
>
> e) When the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law.
>
> 5. A ''Nation, Nationality or People'' for the purpose of this Constitution, is a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.

The EPRDF regime, which sponsored the writing of the Federal Constitution, vaguely defined who 'nation', 'nationality' or 'people' are. Article 39 (sub art 5) quoted above seems to have adapted the modernist understanding of identity, mainly the Marxist one. Based on this definition and empirical data collected by the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities of the Darg regime in the 1980s and elite bargaining, the Federal Constitution restructured the Ethiopian state into regional states. Article 46 of the FDRE Constitution, imitating coming together federalism declared that "The Federal Democratic Republic shall comprise of States" and "States shall be delimited based on the settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned".[731] Based on these criteria the Constitution established nine National Regional States and two city administrations (see

[731] FDRE, article 46.

Figure 7 below[732]) which were the State of Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somalia, Benshangul/Gumuz, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, Gambela Peoples, and Harari People.[733] The constitution further declared that other "Nations, Nationalities, Peoples within …[these] states have the right to establish, at any time, their own states".[734]

Figure 7: Map of FDRE National Regional States



Source: Ethiopian Info[735]

The fundamental difference between the EPRDF state structuring from assimilationist and homogenizing regimes of the past is that NCIGs at the regional state level were granted the right to protect and promote their specific national identity. For example, the titular regions Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Somali, Afar, and Harari national regional states institutionalized the national identity of the majority group as the national identity of the region. For instance, the Constitution of the State of Oromia, after repeating the right of self-determination, including secession in the Preamble, proclaims that the Oromo language is

[732] From etiopiaregions-01-1140x576.png (1140×576) (gisreportsonline.com)
[733] FDRE, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Article 47, sub art. 1.
[734] FDRE, Article 47 sub art 2.
[735] Source: Ethiopian Map - Ethiopian Info

the working language of the region and that it uses the Latin alphabet.[736] The use of the Oromo language in its Latin script, the Qubee, was popularized by the OLF in 1991 and 1992.[737] The decision to use the Oromo language as the sole working language of the largest, richest, and most populous region of Ethiopia was a reversal of the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes' assimilationist policies. Particularly, the decision to use the Latin alphabet instead of the Ge'ez alphabet of the core group was an extraordinary achievement for Oromo nationalists who imagined autonomous existence at the chagrin of Ethio-nationalists and Amhara elites who forcefully argued for the re-imposition of the Ge'ez script nationally. Other regional states like Somali, Afar, and smaller NCIGs like Sidama also adopted the Latin script.[738]

Furthermore, titular regions such as Oromia, Somalia, Afar, and Tigray also produced flags and anthems that reflected the identity, history, values, and aspirations of the majority group in their respective regional state.[739] Non-titular regions like Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, Gambella Peoples, and Benishangul/Gumuz also produced their own flags and anthems. For example, while the colors of the Ethiopian flag continued to be green, yellow, and red, that of Oromia was red, white, and black.[740] Furthermore, histories started to be rediscovered and re-interpreted. For instance, the history of Emperor Menilek, the empire builder who led Ethiopia to victory at the battle of Adwa, was not sanitized as it used to be. His atrocious and genocidal campaigns like Anole and Chalenqo, Kaffa, and Walayta were resurrected and remembered. History textbooks at all levels were revised in line with the new dispensation.[741]

In addition to the establishment of a regional state with defined territories by major

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[736] Mootummaa Naannoo Oromiuyaa, "Revised Consitution of Oromia National Regional State," Pub. L. No. Proclamation No. 46/2001 (2001), Article 5, https://caffeeoromiyaa.org/images/Oromia Constitution.pdf.

[737] Mekuria Bulcha, "The Politics of Linguistic Homogenization in Ethiopia and the Conflict over the Status of Afaan Oromoo," *African Affairs* 96, no. 384 (1997): 325–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a007852.

[738] John Young, "Bolshevism and National Federalism in Ethiopia," in *The Nation State: A Wrong Model for the Horn of Africa* (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 2021), 70, https://doi.org/10.34663/9783945561577-05.

[739] Christophe Van Der Beken, "Federalism, Local Government and Minority Protection in Ethiopia: Opportunities and Challenges," *Journal of African Law* 59, no. 1 (2015): 150–77, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021855314000205.

[740] Mootummaa Naannoo Oromiuyaa, Revised Consitution of Oromia National Regional State, Article 3.

[741] Jean-Nicolas Bach, "EPRDF's Nation-Building: Tinkering with Convictions and Pragmatism1," *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, no. 27 (2014), https://doi.org/10.4000/cea.1501.

NCIGs with their unique working language, flag, and other symbols, the regional states also had fully fledged state structures, including an elected regional council, the executive appointed by the regional council, regional judiciary, regional bureaucracy, and regional police. Other than powers like making national policies and laws, national defense, foreign affairs, and monetary and fiscal matters, the Federal Constitution authorized that "All powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone, or concurrently to the Federal Government and the States are reserved to the States".[742] The Regional National States were, among others, authorized to make laws, including the regional constitution and social and economic policies, administer natural resources, levy taxes, enact and execute laws with regard to regional civil services and establish and administer a regional police force.[743]

In line with the Federal Constitution, all regions have developed their derivative constitutions. However, there were a few variations, as discussed above. For instance, regarding language and other identification markers, the titular regions, i.e., the Tigray, Amhara, Afar, Oromia, Somali, and Harari regions, have declared the language and identification markers of the majority group as the national identity of the region. On the other hand, the nested small population groups were clustered together and formed non-titular regions were forced to adopt Amharic as the working language of the National Regional State. The worst of which was Southern Nation, Nationalities, and Peoples National Regional State (SNNPNRS), which was constituted by about 56 NCIGs which in aggregate, constitute about 20% of the Ethiopian population. The irony of the SNNPNRS, was a nested federation on its own where NCIGs like Sidama (4%), Gurage (2.5%), and Walayta (2.3%), while Harari whose titular group population was less than 20,000[744], which was only about 7% population of the region constituted its own National Regional State.[745]

While self-rule was proclaimed for the administration of autonomous regional states, the 'Nations, Nationalities and People' also constituted a shared rule at the federal level. The shared rule was given by Article 50 of the Federal Constitution, which further promulgated a parliamentary system of government with two chambers. The lower house, the House of

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[742] FDRE, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Article 52 sub art 1.
[743] FDRE, Article 52.
[744] FDRE, *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size by Age and Sex*, 16.
[745] Asnake Kefale Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions" (University of Leiden, 2009), 70.

Peoples' Representatives (HPR) has a maximum limit of 550 seats, with at least 20 seats reserved for minority Nationalities and Peoples, has "… the power of legislation in all matters assigned by this Constitution to Federal jurisdiction".[746] In the HPR, a political party or coalition of political parties with the greatest number of seats forms the government for five years.[747] From 1994 to 2012, during the study period, only the EPRDF was the only dominant ruling party.

The upper house, the House of the Federation (HoF), is a unique non-legislating parliament. The HoF is composed of representatives of 'Nations, Nationalities and People' with each 'Nation or Nationality' represented by one representative and "by one additional representative for each one million of its population".[748] The main duties of the HoF are to interpret the Constitution, decide on the issues of self-determination, including secession, decide on the formula for the division of revenues and subsidies to the regional states and resolve conflicts between and among regional states.[749] The HoF was uniquely designed as a forum where each cultural/linguistic identity group would seek and affirm its right to self-determination, including independence. However, in its functions under the study period, 1995 to 2012, the HoF has mainly been the rubber stamp of the TPLF elites, as was the HPR.

Despite a constitutional design that seems to serve both self-rule and shared rule, the EPRDF's project of building a multinational federation also faced opposition, contestations, and resistance from multiple fronts. Sources of contestation could be divided into four. The first and most vocal opposition to multinational federation came from the formerly privileged class of Amhara and mostly Amhara dominated by Ethio-nationalists. Ethio-nationalists mostly were urban-based, educated Amhara or Amharized elites that posed as defenders of the great tradition and support further propagation of the secularized core values of the Abyssinian core to replace the backward "tribal" cultures. They were, generally, remnants of the monarchy, Darg, EPRP, MEISONE, and other elites that were organized into the All-Amhara People Organization (AAPO) after 1991 and rejected TPLF's "ethnic federalism" or "tribal politics". For Ethio-nationalists, TPLF was the enemy of one Ethiopia, which allowed Eritrea to secede and made Ethiopia landlocked, and imposed "tribal politics" to balkanize Ethiopia like former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union by

[746] FDRE, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Article 55, sub art 1.
[747] FDRE, Article 56.
[748] FDRE, Article 61 sub art 1-2.
[749] FDRE, Article 62.

institutionalizing "ethnic politics".[750] Contestations by Ethio-nationalists were mostly non-armed struggles, and, therefore, with little implications for regional security relations. The only exception was, Ginbot 7 (G7), which was founded by Professor Berhanu Nega after failed electoral contestation in 2005. G7 was the only major armed group claiming to represent the core in the history of national identity contestations in Ethiopia. It was supported mainly by the diaspora in North America and Europe, Eritrea, and Egypt.

The second source of contestations against the EPRDF nation-building project came from politically significant NCIGs (see **Table 3** below) that were opposing the nation-building policies of the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes as well. These were organizations of Oromo, mainly OLF, and Somali, mainly ONLF and AIAI. The demands of these organizations were fundamentally different from those of Amhara and Ethio-nationalists. The way EPRDF curved up Oromia, including Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and Harar, the Oromo zone in the Amhara region, was a deliberate move to undermine the territorial claims of the OLF. Furthermore, the multinational federalism was both limited as it did not satisfy their territorial demands and was not genuine as the people of Oromo and Somali were not allowed to exercise self-determination through a referendum. For these groups, the TPLF was administering these regions, Oromia and Ogaden, through surrogates who were representing TPLF, not the people of the regions.[751]

Apart from the OLF, which claimed a vanguard status in Oromia, there were also other Oromo elites in different organizations, like the Oromo National Congress (ONC) that peacefully contested the status of the Oromo language at the federal level. They argued that the Oromo language needed to be made the second working language of the Federal government because it constituted the largest mother-tongue language in Ethiopia. In other words, retaining Amharic as the sole working language of the Federal government was contrary to the spirit of the Federal constitution that claimed to address past social injustices and inequalities. The decision to make Amharic the sole Federal working language

[750] Paul H Brietzke, "Ethiopia's 'Leap in the Dark': Federalism and Self-Determination in the New Constitution," *Source: Journal of African Law*, vol. 39, 1995; Vaughan, "Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia"; Alem Habtu, "Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution," *Publius* 35, no. 2 (March 2005): 313–36, https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pji016; Gedamu, *The Politics of Contemporary Ethiopia : Ethnic Federalism and Authoritarian Survival*.

[751] Berhanu Balcha, "Restructuring State and Society: Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia" (Aalborg University, 2006); Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics : Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia*.

perpetuated the privileges of Amhara in Federal institutions. Other than top positions that were replaced by Tigrayans and their surrogates, the entire bureaucracy from the middle down the hierarchy was overwhelmingly dominated by Amhara.[752] Because of the path-dependent historical privileges of the Amhara compounded by the exclusion of the Oromo language as the Federal Government's working language, there were threefold Amhara employees compared to Oromo employees in the Federal bureaucracy.[753]

Table 3: Politically Significant Core and NCIGS based on the 2007 Census

No.	Identity Group	Population	Percentage	Political Significance
1.	Oromo	25,488,344	34.5	Significant NCIG
2.	Amhara	19,867,817	26.9	Core
3.	Somali	4,581,793	6.2	Significant NCIG
4.	Tigray	4,483,776	6.1	NCIG/Core
5.	Sidama	2,966,377	4.0	NS
6.	Gurage	1,867,350	2.5	NS
7.	Walayta	1,707,074	2.3	NS
8.	Hadiya	1,284,366	1.7	NS
9.	Afar	1,276372	1.7	NS
10.	Gamo	1107,163	1.5	NS
	Other NCIGs	9,288,073	12.6	NS

Source: FDRE Central Statistical Authority[754]

The third source of contestation was politically insignificant NCIGs (see **Table 3** above) that were forcefully clustered by the EPRDF into non-titular regions. All linguistic groups (about eighty-one) other than the top four, Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, and Somali, for the purpose of this study, constitute politically insignificant by a combination of three factors: 2% of the national population, contiguous settlement with international boundaries and aspiration to autonomous or independent nationhood. There was one exception to these criteria when a group of NCIGs organized themselves into an overarching collective political identity with a common history and aspiration of forming a common political community. By these exclusion criteria and justification provided in the methodology section of Chapter

[752] Milkessa Midega, "The Politics of Language and Representative Bureaucracy in Ethiopia: The Case of Federal Government," *Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research* 7, no. 1 (2015): 15–23, https://doi.org/10.5897/JPAPR2014.0295; Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics : Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia*; Bulcha, "The Politics of Linguistic Homogenization in Ethiopia and the Conflict over the Status of Afaan Oromoo."

[753] Midega, "The Politics of Language and Representative Bureaucracy in Ethiopia: The Case of Federal Government," 19.

[754] FDRE, *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size by Age and Sex*.

1, politically insignificant NCIGs were deliberately excluded from the analysis. The fourth source contestation of the EPRDF nation-building project was Eritrea, which will be discussed in Section 6.5.

Before directly delving into the analysis of national identity contestations and their implications for the regional security policy of Ethiopia, first, let us discuss a unique governance dimension of the EPRDF regime that made national identity contestations both difficult and inevitable at the same time. The TPLF-dominated EPRDF regime's responses to the contestations of its nation-building project varied depending on the source and magnitude of the resistance or contestation. Most of the contestations were, however, dealt with institutionally through two-tiered vanguard party structures. Unlike the past regimes, the TPLF governance structure was not mainly based on the formal state structures elaborated above. Rather, the state structure was embedded in a loyalty-based vanguard party structure that ran from ceiling to the floor, replicating and even perfecting the hierarchical, monopolistic and kleptocratic power relationship of the past regimes.

The first tier of the EPRDF was established in 1989 by the TPLF, as discussed in Chapter 5. The TPLF, claiming to represent the Tigray people, which was about 6% of the Ethiopian population, could not claim to represent other oppressed nationalities. To solve this problem of legitimacy and upgrade its vanguard from Tigray to Ethiopia, the TPLF minted junior parties from defeated EPRP splinter group and Darg soldiers. The first group was Ethiopian, which was Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). The Second junior partner created from soldiers of the Darg regime was the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO). Together the three organizations represent about 70% (Tigray 6.2, Amhara 26.9%, and Oromo 34.5%, according to the 2007 census).[755] To further bolster the representation, it minted the fourth party South Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM), in 1994. These four parties constitute the EPRDF. Both in EPRDF Congress and Executive Council, the four parties nominally, had equal representation 25% votes each. In other words, the TPLF, which represented 6.2 % of the population had 25% equal to OPDO which was meant to represent 34.4% of the population. Even worse, all the important national decisions were made by the TPLF Politburo based on democratic centralism, while the rest of the junior parties in the EPRDF were the implementation arms of the TPLF

[755] FDRE, *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census: Population Size by Age and Sex*.

decisions.[756]

As discussed in chapter 5, the TPLF developed an organizational culture of democratic centralism during its armed struggle years against the Darg regime. The TPLF continued its culture of vanguard organization where the leadership of the party had exclusive authority to interpret, theorize, convert people's demands into actionable policies, and guide the implementation of the policies by lower cadres and the masses.[757] This vanguard model of party decision-making is antithetical to the self-governance of 'nations, nationalities, and peoples' that the Federal Constitution promised. Since self-governance calls for context-specific decision-making processes that reflect the wishes, values, and interests of the concerned people while democratic centralism was about the execution of uniform decisions across the board without latitude of context-specific innovations. Even before the constitution was written, during the Transitional Period, the TPLF had already made it clear that its ideology of revolutionary democracy which was based on democratic centralism was meant to establish a peasant-based dominant party that would not allow other parties to challenge it. For example, in 1993, EPRDF published a document that made the intention of the party to establish a dominant party as follows:[758]

> We can attain our objectives and goals only if Revolutionary Democracy becomes the governing outlook in our society, and only by winning the elections successively and holding power without let up can we securely establish the hegemony of Revolutionary Democracy. If we lose in the elections even once, we will encounter a great danger. So, in order to permanently establish this hegemony, we should win in the initial elections and then create a conducive situation that will ensure the establishment of this hegemony. In the subsequent elections, too, we should be able to with without interruption...We have military and political superiority, as well as considerable accumulated material resources.

The EPRDF published this position less than a year after expelling the OLF from the Transitional Government. Given the collapse of Somalia and the failure of the US-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the US foreign policy establishment seemed to be satisfied with the objective of the TPLF to establish a stable system. For instance, in a USAID-organized program in March 1993, Professor Samuel P. Huntington provided

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[756] Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions."
[757] Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building*, 89.
[758] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 270.

democratization and constitutional design policy options in which he recommended a "peasant-based dominant democracy"[759] in line with the TPLF project of establishing a de facto one-party system dressed as a multiparty system through two-tiered vanguard system.

The second-tier parties were satellite parties that were established to administer the remaining five pastoral or mini-regional states on behalf of the TPLF. The Chairman of TPLF/EPRDF publicly announced that his party focuses on oppressed peasants that constituted 85% of the Ethiopian population, mainly in the four regions represented by EPRDF, i.e., Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNPNRS. The remaining four peripheral regions and one micro-region that could not affect the electoral politics were administered by Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), Benishangul/Gumuz Peoples Democratic Party (BGPDP), (Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP) Gambella Peoples Unity Democratic Movement (GPUDM), Harari National League (HNL). What made these satellite parties different from the four EPRDF parties was that they were not allowed to vote in the EPRDF Congress, Central Committee, and Executive Council. These satellite parties, however, were allowed to participate without votes. The purpose of their establishment was not to make policies but to implement EPRDF policies to the letter in the regional states that they were created to administer.

Even before capturing power, the EPRDF avowed not to allow for the 'people would not be forced to 'elect' the oppressors"[760]. Revolutionary Democracy was the main ideology of the EPRDF, which married the democratic centralism of Marxism and Leninism with the Maoist peasant-centered mass line. The main referent constituency of the EPRDF was the oppressed peasant, who accounted for more than 85% of the population. To establish the hegemony of Revolutionary Democracy and rule Ethiopia indefinitely, the EPRDF used two interdependent mechanisms. First, perpetually mobilizing and organizing the masses to prohibit the emergence or maintenance of independent political groups. The EPRDF's top leadership had the exclusive authority to interpret the demands of the masses and translate them into actionable policies. The lower cadres and the masses were supposed to execute the "correct" policies produced by the "enlightened" leadership for the benefit of the masses. In line with the democratic centralism culture of the organization, the cadres engage and

[759] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant-Based Dominant Party Democracy?" (Addis Ababa, May 17, 1993).
[760] quoted in Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions," 70.

discuss with the public at the lowest levels and promptly report on the developments and concerns of the people. Through its two-tiered vanguard party structures, the TPLF established a hierarchical and interlocking network of power that ran from the chairman of the TPLF/EPRDF, Meles Zenawi, to the household level. This organization of the party structures not only produced highly centralized and disciplined power structures but also produced a de facto one-party system wherein autonomous power centers were actively sought and eliminated. As a result, peaceful contestations outside the EPRDF platform were practically made impossible.

6.2 Threats from Southeastern and Somali Actors and the EPRDF Responses

Even though Somalia was a collapsed state since the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, compounded problems of secessionism and irredentism against Ethiopia continued unabated. There were two types of organizations with different strategies and tactics that attempted secessionism and irredentism. The first type of organizations that attempted secessionism were nationalist organizations, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), with first peaceful and then insurgency methods to liberate the Oromo-speaking and Somali-speaking regions from Ethiopia, respectively. The second set of organizations that contested the national identity of Ethiopia were Islamist organizations whose goal was to establish Islamic Somalia that would include Ogaden of Ethiopia. These Islamist organizations were evolving one after another, sometimes simultaneously in the post-Cold War international context. The first Pan-Somali Islamist group, known as Al-Itihaad Al-Islami (AIAI) started claiming Ethiopian territory to construct an Islamic state by force.[761] Following its defeat, another Islamist organization emerged out of the ashes of AIAI, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which then metamorphosed into Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin (commonly known as al-Shabaab), which declared Jihad against Ethiopia. In this section, contestations by these two types of organizations, nationalist and Islamist, will be discussed for the period between 1991 and

[761] Sarah Vaughan, "Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Ogaden: Still a Running Sore at the Heart of the Horn of Africa BT - Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment," ed. Lotje de Vries, Pierre Englebert, and Mareike Schomerus (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 109, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7_4.

2012.

Internally, ONLF challenged the EPRDF regime the most by peacefully and formally requesting a referendum for the independence of Ogaden in May 1994, following in the footstep of Eritrea.[762] This request was the result of conflicting national identity claims of the ONLF and other Somali organizations. The ONLF, which was the offshoot of the WSLF aimed to establish "Ogadenia". [763] The nomenclature of Ogadenia was a radical political move on the part of the ONLF with revisionist identity, and territorial and temporal claims. It was radical in that it dropped the secession and merger policy of the WSLF in line with the Greater Somalia ideology.[764] Ogadenia was a project of construction of a unique nation different from both Ethiopia and Somalia. In terms of constituting identity, it was also implying who would be the dominant members of the Ogadenia, Ogaadeeni clan. Spatially it claimed the Somali-speaking territories as well as towns like Dire Dawa, which was also claimed by the Oromo.[765]

These claims of the ONLF invited opposition both from non-Ogaadeeni Somali elites and from the EPRDF. Even though the ONLF won regional elections in December 1992 and established the government of region 5 (later renamed Somali National Regional State (SNRS)), the opposition from non-Ogaadeenis forced the ONLF to accept the name of the Somali region instead of Ogadenia.[766] The opposition from the Oromia regional government also forced it to drop Dire Dawa and rather moved to the remote town of Gode. The preference of elites of the non-Ogaadeeni clans to make Jigjiga the capital of the region was rejected by the ONLF-dominated regional government. The EPRDF regime that gave ONLF breathing space to first deal with OLF, sacked the ONLF regional President Abdullahi Mohammed Sa'adi.[767] The dismissal of the President soured the relationship between ONLF and EPRDF. Subsequently, the ONLF-dominated regional council of the Somali region

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[762] Jean-Nicolas Bach et al., *Routledge Handbook of the Horn of Africa*, *Routledge Handbook of the Horn of Africa*, 2022, 24, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429426957.

[763] Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions," 135.

[764] Vaughan, "Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Ogaden: Still a Running Sore at the Heart of the Horn of Africa BT - Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment," 105.

[765] Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions," 136.

[766] Vaughan, "Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Ogaden: Still a Running Sore at the Heart of the Horn of Africa BT - Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment," 107.

[767] Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions," 136.

started to entertain the idea of exercising its right to self-determination of independence in January 1994. Meles Zenawi, Chairman of EPRDF and President of the TGE, convened Somali elites and clan elders and told them they could not exercise the right to self-determination because it was "exercised by the people and the nation, not a political party or a clan".[768] Meles was referring to the ONLF as a party whose constituency was included in its nomenclature and was not in a position to represent the Somali people or nation. Irrespective of the warning by the EPRDF, the regional council decided and officially requested a referendum on 24 March 1994.[769] Unlike in the case of Eritrea, where it facilitated the referendum, the EPRDF ordered the regional council to repeal its "illegal" resolution for self-determination.[770] The council refused to comply. The EPRDF summarily dismissed the regional government and minted a surrogate party called Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) in 1994, which was dominated by non-Ogaadeeni clan elites and took over the regional administration under the TPLF tutelage.[771]

The ESDL ideology was designed against the ONLF's vision of Ogadenia.[772] Rather, in an odd mixing of symbols, it married Greater Somalia and Ethiopia. It took the first word of its nomenclature to show membership in the new multinational Ethiopia. It also added the word "league" at the end of its nomenclature to include the legacy of the historic Somali Youth League (SYL), which was the source of the Greater Somalia vision, as discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, it also combined the flag colors of Somalia and Ethiopia with the loft justification that the party would serve as the bridge that connects the two states.[773] ESDL moved the regional capital from Gode to Jigjiga, and the Ogaadeeni elites were mostly excluded from the regional government. The exclusion and targeting of the Ogaadeenis helped the ONLF to mobilize the people for its armed struggle against continued Ethiopian "colonialism".[774]

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[768] qouted in Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 312.
[769] Vaughan, "Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Ogaden: Still a Running Sore at the Heart of the Horn of Africa BT - Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment," 108.
[770] Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions," 136.
[771] Adegehe, 137–39.
[772] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*; Vaughan, "Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Ogaden: Still a Running Sore at the Heart of the Horn of Africa BT - Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment."
[773] Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions," 138.
[774] Adegehe, 138.

Accordingly, when the peaceful demands for self-determination through the elected regional council were met with brute force, the ONLF returned to the Somali desert for armed struggle to resist the EPRDF-dominated nation-building project.[775] The ONLF's decision to return to the jungle had mixed opportunities and challenges to mobilizing the people on its side successfully. With regard to the opportunities side, it had a conscious and mobilized constituency that had been oppressed, dominated, and marginalized by successive Ethiopian regimes. More importantly, the massive crackdown on the areas that were supposed to be the core constituency of the ONLF after 1994 and the pervasive abuse of human rights against "sympathizers" of the ONLF pushed parts of the population to support the insurgency.[776] The geography, which was well known to its militants and further explored during the two years in power, was partially favorable for the insurgency. Furthermore, the absence of a central government was also partially favorable to using territories of Somalia to recruit and train militants and use it as a launching pad. The clan and religious affinity of the ONLF fighters help it relatively easily establish hiding sanctuaries beyond the reach of Ethiopian security forces and its Somalian agents.[777] The Transitional National Government (TNG) also allowed both the ONLF and OLF to operate in Somalia for the brief period it officially assumed the Government of Somalia.[778]

In addition to support from Somali sources, support for the ONLF among neighboring states was from Sudan and then Eritrea. In the early years, between 1994 and 1998, the NIF regime of Sudan supported the Somali insurgent and Jihadi movements, including ONLF and AIAI. However, the support from Sudan was not significant. As the NIF regime itself was in conflict with the usual Arab countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, due to its attempt to export its ideology of an Islamic state, Sudan was not in a position to provide arms and financial demands of all the nationalist and Islamist militant groups that took refuge in Sudan. Whatever assistance Sudan might have extended to the ONLF, it was never significant enough to strengthen the capacity of the ONLF to challenge the ERPDF regime effectively. On the other hand, even the limited assistance that the ONLF accessed in Sudan

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[775] Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia," *Third World Quarterly* 39, no. 11 (November 2, 2018): 2033–52, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1479186.

[776] Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions," 138.

[777] Teshale, "Insurgency in Ethnically Divided Authoritarian-Led Societies: A Comparative Study of Rebel Movements in Ethiopia, 1974-2014," 248.

[778] Teshale, 206.

ceased in 1998.

After the rapprochement between Sudan and Ethiopia after the outbreak of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, all insurgent groups that fought the Ethiopian government, including the ONLF, were expelled from Sudan. Insurgent groups, including the ONLF, were welcomed by Eritrea, which gave them training facilities and organizing headquarters in its bid to use them against the EPRDF regime.[779] Even though Eritrea, like Sudan, was not convenient for cross-border insurgency as the ONLF constituency was in the east, Asmara's logistical and arms support enabled the ONLF to conduct some insurgent attacks in Ethiopia.[780] Nevertheless, the ONLF could not access significant external support in the context of the international security environment of the post-Cold War period, which was not conducive for insurgency as there were no external powers that supported the insurgent groups in strategic competitions.

In addition, the federal system established by the EPRDF respected the Somali identification markers and removed the ontological insecurity element that used to be the main mobilizing factor during previous regimes. The EPRDF regime was distinctly different from previous regimes in two dimensions. First, the administrators of the regional government at all levels were Somalis. Second, and more importantly, Somalis, like other NNPs, use their language in primary school, administration, court, media, and public spaces throughout the region.[781] In other words, the Somali people are told the EPRDF policies in their own language by their own children. The main problems were that the people could not choose their own representatives and could not own policy-making power to make relevant policies and decisions that were relevant to their specific environment. Like all other NCIGs of Ethiopia, the Somali people are also obliged to execute the "correct" policies made by the EPRDF and translated by Somali-speaking agents of the EPRDF.

As long as Somali identification markers, including its language, culture, and religion, were respected through the federal system, the question of having the ultimate democratic

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[779] Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 109, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183h0x7.

[780] Aleksi Ylönen, "The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Dilemma of Liberation," in *Routledge Handbook of the Horn of Africa* (New York: Routledge, 2022), 26, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429426957-4.

[781] Adegehe, "Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions."

power of choosing their own representatives and making their own policies, laws, and decisions from Ethiopia led to fragmentations of the Somali political groups. In addition to divisions between the Ogaadeenis versus non-Ogaadeeni clan political divisions, there were divisions within the Ogaadeeni clan itself. There was even a fragmentation within the ONLF itself. For instance, a faction of the 'Legal ONLF' renounced armed struggle and returned to the EPRDF surrogate networks. To rob the ONLF of popular support, EPRDF instructed the 'Legal ONLF' and ESDL to merge and establish an EPRDF-affiliated party that would administer the SNRS on its behalf.[782] The two organizations merged and formed Somali People's Democratic Party in 1998 under the chairmanship of Abdulmajid Hussein, one of the leading ESM activists from the Somali region in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[783]

Third, the post-9/11 terrorist incident regional security environment has made it difficult to conduct a national liberation movement. In the context where armed nonstate actors were securitized as terrorist groups, it was difficult to acquire assistance, as was the case during the Cold War. Because of these challenges, the ONLF was limited to conducting a low-intensity insurgency, mainly targeting government officials and EPRDF sympathizers. Later, however, the ONLF conducted an attack that gave it disproportionate attention. The attack targeted a Chinese oil exploration site in April 2007, which killed 9 Chinese and 65 Ethiopian workers.[784] Specifically, the killing of Chinese nationals was a major blow to the EPRDF regime that considered itself the bulwark of regional security. The response of the EPRDF regime was consequently atrocious counter-insurgency comparable to the previous regimes, which will be discussed in the next section.

The second category of Somali organizations that contested the EPRDF nation-building project were Islamist organizations. The first sign of contradictory nation-building goals, which were like the Greater Somalia ideologies, was that of Al-Itihaad Al-Islami (AIAI). AIAI was founded in 1982 as an antidote to growing clan politics after Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War in 1978. Following the political vacuum created by the Collapse of the state of Somalia in 1991, the AIAI emerged with an alternative ideology of establishing an Islamic state that would include all Somali-speaking Muslims of the Horn of

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[782] Adegehe, 138.
[783] Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, c. 1960-1974*.
[784] Tobias Hagmann, "Punishing the Periphery: Legacies of State Repression in the Ethiopian Ogaden," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 725–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.946238.

Africa, Greater Somalia, with Islamist ideology.[785] Under the leadership of the Somali veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War like Ibrahim al-Afghani[786], and with financial and material assistance from wealthy Saudis, the Somali diaspora, and Sudan, the AIAI tried to start its Islamic first at Kismayo and then Bosasso in 1991. It was defeated and expelled by militias of General Mohammed Farah Aideed from Kismayo and by militias of Colonel Abdullah Yusuf from Bosasso.[787] Consequently, the AIAI moved its bases to the Gedo region, which connects Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya.[788]

From Gedo, the AIAI started attacking Ethiopia. With ONLF's assistance, the AIAI claimed responsibility for bomb blasts in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa in 1996 and 1997.[789] The EPRDF regime also blamed the AIAI for an attempt on the life of Dr. Abdulmajid Hussein, Ethiopia's Minister of Transportation from the Somali region, in July 1996.[790] The EPRDF regime has already made Islamic extremism the priority national security threat following the assassination attempt against the Egyptian President in Addis Ababa, intervened in Somalia's Gedo region to respond to the AIAI attacks. In battles led by prominent Somali militant commanders like Hassan Dahir Aweys, Aden Hashi Ayro, Hassan Turki, and Muktar Robow, Ethiopia crushed the AIAI as a fighting force.[791]

The remnants of the AIAI moved to Mogadishu and started a new organization called Islamic Courts Union (ICU) with Hawiye clan Sharia courts in South-central Somalia between 2004 and 2006. While the regional states, mainly Ethiopia and Kenya, with the US backing, were negotiating to install a friendly government of Abdullahi Yusuf, the ICU started to remove the clan warlords from Mogadishu and its surrounding with its relatively

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[785] Michael Woldemariam, *Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and Its Discontents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/9781108525657; Stig Jarle Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group* (London: Hurst & Company, 2016).

[786] Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 20.

[787] Woldemariam, *Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and Its Discontents*, 232–34.

[788] Harun Maruf and Dan Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab : The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2018), 20.

[789] Vaughan, "Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Ogaden: Still a Running Sore at the Heart of the Horn of Africa BT - Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment," 110; Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*.

[790] Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia," 2018, 2038, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1479186.

[791] Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*, 21.

better trained and disciplined militias.[792] Mogadishu was placed under a centralized authority for the first time since the 1991 collapse of the central government.[793] However, the election of Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, the commander of the defunct AIAI terrorist group, as chairman of the Shura of ICU, and the presence of other Jihadists in the ICU leadership created apprehension in Ethiopia and Kenya. Furthermore, Washington securitized the ICU by comparing the ICU governance structure and the speed with which it started to control Mogadishu and the surrounding region to that of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.[794] American officials tried to subvert the ICU by trying to prop up clan-based warlords that had all been defeated one after another and chased out of Mogadishu by the ICU. In a way that seemed to fulfill the fear of the EPRDF regime, the ICU declared Jihad against Ethiopia.[795] Ethiopia responded by directly invading Somalia with full force to eliminate the ICU. In the next section, I will discuss how the EPRDF regime responded to contestations and resistance to its nation-building project from southeastern organizations of NCIGs and Islamist movements.

6.3 Threats from South-eastern regions, 9/11, and Securitization of collapsed Somalia

After the overthrow of the Barre regime in 1991, the Republic of Somalia became a collapsed state without a central government. As a result, the nature of support from the government of Somalia to organizations of Oromo and Somali NCIGs has changed. Instead of the state, clan, religious, and other nonstate actors became the main routes of support for the ONLF and AIAI. Both the nationalist and Islamist organizations used these networks and ungoverned spaces and porous borders to easily traverse the Ethio-Somalia borders in challenging the EPRDF regime towards the goal of secession of the Ogaden region or establishing an Islamic state that would include the Ogaden region. Due to the change in the variable of the central government in Somalia, Ethiopia's security policies towards Somalia

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[792] Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab : The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally*; Ingiriis, "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia," November 2, 2018.

[793] Mark Fathi Massoud, *Shari'a, Inshallah: Finding God in Somali Legal Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108965989.

[794] Abdi Ismail Samatar, "Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, US Warlordism & AU Shame," *Review of African Political Economy* 34, no. 111 (May 10, 2007): 155–65.

[795] Abdeta Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones" (Northwestern University, 2017), 246.

after 1991 were designed and executed differently.

Consequently, the EPRDF regime's responses to threats from southeastern Ethiopia (mainly OLF and ONLF, AIAI and its transmutations) and the collapsed state of Somalia (Islamist groups and external actors such as Eritrea and Egypt) started with attempts at accommodation and peacemaking followed by progressive securitization that ranged from building buffer zones to direct military interventions. In this phased foreign and security policy towards Somalia and Somali organizations that contested the EPRDF nation-building project, the EPRDF regime tried to accommodate different Somali political groups with the assumption that the new multinational federal Ethiopia would satisfy their demands and address the past social injustices that the Somali people suffered as NCIGs. Similarly, early on, the TPLF leadership approached different Somali factions in 1993 in Addis Ababa so that they could establish a stable government in Somalia.[796] However, both accommodations and peace-making failed, and rather contestations continued both from within and from Somalia. As a result, the EPRDF regime continued and intensified securitization policies.

The Security policies of the EPRDF regime towards the failed state of Somalia included several strategies that aimed to deny haven for Ethiopia's insurgent groups like OLF and ONLF, contain successive Somali and international Islamist and terrorist groups, counter Eritrean proxy wars, minimize Egypt's influence and, control state building in Somalia. Like previous Ethiopian regimes, the EPRDF regime devised strategies that simultaneously targeted regions bordering Somalia. Accordingly, regimented control of the Somali region and multifaceted counterinsurgency, creating and maintaining buffer zones and supporting "islands" of governance, installing and supporting the friendly government, surgical strikes and direct military interventions, aligning Ethiopia's interest with the US GWOT, dominating regional politics to limit support from and through neighboring countries, and using international organizations were major strategies employed by the EPRDF regime.[797] In this section, I will briefly discuss the first four strategies. The last three

[796] Ingiriis, "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia," November 2, 2018.

[797] Mesfin and Beyene, "The Practicalities of Living with Failed States"; Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones"; Yonas K Mulat, "Domestic Sources of International Action: Ethiopia and the Global War on Terrorism," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 10, no. 11 (November 30, 2016): 131–44, https://doi.org/10.5897/ajpsir2016.0906.

strategies will be discussed in section 6.7.

First, to separate ONLF from the SNRS and 'immunize' populations against infiltration by Islamist and terrorist cells, the EPRDF regime established social regimentations and intelligence networks that dwarf the strategies and tactics of the past regimes in both reach and sustainability, partly due to collaboration with the US. It created a control mechanism that managed access to food aid and access to state resources starting from the provision of sugar and cooking oil to employment to residential and commercial land provision and trade license.[798] In addition to regimentation created on the basis of access to life necessities, the more successful strategy was divide and rule, which had also been successful during the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes. For instance, a notorious counterinsurgency regional police known as the "Liyu Police", Special Police, were recruited mainly from the constituency of the ONLF to prosecute ONLF.[799]

The coming to power of Abdi Mohamed Omer (popularly Abdi Iley) as President of the Somali region in 2010 from the Ogaadeeni clan, extended the EPRDF's strategy of divide and rule. The ruthless Abdi Iley, along with TPLF army officers, combined counterinsurgency, and illicit trade along the Ethio-Somalia borders. The rents collected from the contraband trade were in part used to buy loyalties from Somali clans and protection at the EPRDF headquarters.[800] Abdi Iley's notoriety for persecuting individuals sympathetic to militants and elites who have the potential to unseat him was outstanding, even for the blatant and gross human rights abuses by the EPRDF. [801]

The second strategy of the regime to manage threats that emanated from Somalia was

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[798] Daniel K Thompson, "Respatializing Federalism in the Horn's Borderlands: From Contraband Control to Transnational Governmentality," *Journal of Borderlands Studies* 37, no. 2 (March 15, 2022): 295–316, https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2021.1943494; Tobias Hagmann and Jon Abbink, "Twenty Years of Revolutionary Democratic Ethiopia, 1991 to 2011," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 5, no. 4 (November 2011): 579–95, https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2011.642515.

[799] Vaughan, "Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Ogaden: Still a Running Sore at the Heart of the Horn of Africa BT - Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment," 112.

[800] Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones"; Tobias Hagmann, "Beyond Clannishness and Colonialism: Understanding Political Disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991–2004," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 4 (December 24, 2005): 509–36, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X05001205.

[801] Tobias Hagmann and Benedikt Korf, "Agamben in the Ogaden: Violence and Sovereignty in the Ethiopian–Somali Frontier," *Political Geography* 31, no. 4 (May 1, 2012): 205–14, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.POLGEO.2011.12.004; Vaughan, "Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Ogaden: Still a Running Sore at the Heart of the Horn of Africa BT - Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment."

creating buffer zones and supporting "islands" of governance.[802] To deny access to OLF, ONLF, Al Shabaab, and other insurgent and terror groups, Ethiopia created buffer zones throughout the territories of Somalia bordering Ethiopia. In addition to working security to the stable and peaceful Somaliland, the EPRDF regime created buffer zones by supporting major clan warlords in Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug, Southwest, and Hirshabelle. In addition to the provision of weapons, training, and diplomatic cover for elites from these regions, Ethiopian defense, and security agents occasionally intervened and protected them whenever they were overpowered by Islamist groups like ICU and Al Shabaab.[803] As part of this strategy of buffer zones, the EPRDF regime successfully kept Al Shabaab and other insurgent groups at bay.

The third strategy of the EPRDF to protect the country against threats and vulnerabilities which emanated from Somalia was installing and maintaining a friendly government. Since the collapse of the central government of Somalia, several actors, including Ethiopia, Egypt, and Kenya, convened conferences to install a central government in Mogadishu.[804] From over 14 attempts at establishing a central government of Somalia, the Arta conference that established the Transitional National Government (TNG) of Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was ephemerally the successful one. The EPRDF regime did not approve of the presence of Islamist elites within the government. To undermine the TNG, Ethiopia supported the formation and maintenance of an alliance of clan militias called Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in 2001. A close EPRDF ally and president of Puntland, the autonomous northeastern Somalian region, emerged as the leader of the SRRC. In addition to providing SRRC with weapons and technical support, the EPRDF regime started pushing to create a unity government that would displace the TNG. Ethiopia's plan worked through the Eldoret/Mbagathi Peace Conferences between October 2002 and October 2004, which were chaired by Kenya under the auspices of IGAD.[805]

With a federal state structure pushed by Ethiopia, Somali delegates that took part in the conferences agreed to a transitional charter that provided for Transitional Federal

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[802] Mesfin and Beyene, "The Practicalities of Living with Failed States," 129.
[803] Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*; Ingiriis, "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia," November 2, 2018.
[804] Bach et al., *Routledge Handb. Horn Africa*, 85.
[805] Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones," 248.

Institutions, including the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). TFG was formed in 2004 with Abdullahi Yusuf as the President and planned its capital at Baidoa instead of Mogadishu.[806] Abdullahi Yusuf's TFG was dominated by SRRC and his Darood clan elites vis-à-vis the defunct TNG of Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, which was perceived as a more Hawiye-dominated faction and Islamist elites from the southern Somalia region that included Mogadishu.[807] President Abdullahi Yusuf requested the UN, OAU, and Ethiopia for 20,000 strong peacekeeping force to help him re-establish authority and protect his government.[808] The Mogadishu-based movements, particularly the ascending Union of Islamic Courts Union (ICU), categorically opposed the invitation of foreign forces and started counter-mobilization.[809]

Consequently, Abdullahi Yusuf's TFG was not welcomed in Mogadishu and was rather considered a puppet government installed by the US and Ethiopia, the historic enemy neighbor.[810] ICU, the offshoot Islamist movement, emerged to overcome the problem of clan politics and establish an Islamic state, as discussed above. The gathering of Somali jihadi groups under the umbrella of the Islamic Court Union (ICU) to establish an Islamic state in southern Somalia led to a further securitization of Mogadishu. The election of Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, the commander of the defunct AIAI terrorist group, as Chairman of the Shura of ICU, and the presence of other Jihadis, including those responsible for the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi in the ICU leadership created apprehension in Kenya, as well in addition to the US and Ethiopia.[811] Moreover, Washington feared that the style of the ICU governance structure it started to build and the speed with which it started to control Mogadishu and the surrounding region was similar to that of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.[812] American officials tried to subvert the ICU by trying to prop up clan-based warlords that had all been defeated one after another and chased out of Mogadishu by the

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[806] Yuusuf, *The Genesis of the Civil War in Somalia: The Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on the Conflict*, 124.
[807] Paul D Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia : A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 27.
[808] Williams, 26.
[809] Mulat, "A Rising Regional Power : Making Sense of Ethiopia's Influence in the Horn of Africa Region," 50.
[810] Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding*.
[811] Woldemariam, *Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and Its Discontents*, 243; Ingiriis, "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia," 2018.
[812] Samatar, "Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, US Warlordism & AU Shame."

ICU.[813] When this attempt failed, US officials agreed to Addis Ababa's plan to intervene to eliminate the ICU.[814] This gave Meles Zenawi's regime an opportunity to use its fourth strategy openly.

The fourth strategy of the EPRDF regime was direct military interventions in Somalia. Ethiopian defense forces entered southern Somalia multiple times from 1996 to 2012 to eliminate and control threats from Somalia. Even though there were earlier surgical operations in Somalia by Ethiopian security units, the first major force entered the Somalia Gedo region in 1996 and 1997 to eliminate AIAI. It was a successful operation that degraded AIAI as a fighting force and forced it to give up on armed struggle as a strategy to build an Islamic state. Moreover, an OLF contingent that was transiting through Somalia with the support of Eritrea was eliminated in Somalia in 1999.[815] Furthermore, in 2001 Ethiopian units supported Abdullahi Yusuf's SRRC militia alliance.[816] More importantly, the largest Ethiopian army unit invaded Somalia in December 2006 under the pretext of protecting the TFG that invited it.[817] With an estimated force of between 8000-12,000 well-equipped troops with artillery and air support, Ethiopian National Defense Forces chased out the ICU militias in less than two weeks.[818] To legitimize its invasion, get external support, and put in place an exit strategy, the EPRDF regime relied on US support and regional and international organizations, IGAD, AU, and UN, as clearing houses, which will be discussed in section 6.7.

6.4 The EPRDF Policies toward the NIF Islamist Regime of Sudan

During the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes, Ethiopia's policies toward Sudan were shaped primarily by three interrelated factors: fear of supporting Eritrean NCIG organizations, mainly Jebha and Shaebia, border controls, and refugee management issues, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. During the EPRDF regime under study, 1991-2012, both

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[813] Mulat, "A Rising Regional Power : Making Sense of Ethiopia's Influence in the Horn of Africa Region"; Hansen, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia the History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group*.
[814] Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab : The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally*, 44.
[815] Mulat, "A Rising Regional Power : Making Sense of Ethiopia's Influence in the Horn of Africa Region," 52.
[816] Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones."
[817] Awol Allo, "Ethiopia's Armed Intervention in Somalia: The Legality of Self-Defense in Response to the Threat of Terrorism," *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 39, no. 139 (2010): 1–39.
[818] Tadesse, "Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence."

the nature of the factors and their magnitude have evolved in line with the new developments in Sudan, Ethiopia, and worldwide. First, the internal configurations of the powers in Sudan have changed since the overthrow of Sadikal Mahdi's government in 1989. The regime of the National Islamic Front (NIF), which replaced the former regime, has been a new chapter in Sudan in that both Ansar and Khatimiyya were put aside, and it has emerged as the dominant force in Sudan's politics.[819] As we will discuss in the following paragraphs, the Islamist state ideology of the NIF regime shaped the orientation of the foreign policy of Sudan towards neighboring states, including Ethiopia. Second, with the independence of Eritrea, the nature of the relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia with regard to Eritrea has changed. After the independence of Eritrea, Sudan's support of Oromo and Somali militant organizations partially took the place of Jebha and Shaebia between 1992 and 1997. Third, the end of the Cold War and subsequent withdrawal of the US from the region, coupled with reformist ideology in Khartoum, attracted varieties of Islamist and rebel organizations to Sudan, which later colored the lenses of the Western security establishment about the entire region.

To begin with, the most important factor that shaped the policies of the EPRDF regime towards Sudan was the ascendance of an Islamic state ideology of the NIF as a governing ideology in Sudan. Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, the founding leader of the Sudanese chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, the chief ideologue of the Islamic state ideology, and the architect behind the coup that brought the NIF regime in 1989 to power, initiated a revisionist foreign policy that partially undermined Westphalian understanding of the territorial state.[820] The main aspiration of the Turabi's Islamic state ideology was that the Muslim majority states need to reflect the values and principles of the Ummah, which is Sharia. In other words, laws, policies, and strategies of the state need to be in line with Sharia because Sharia is all-encompassing "way of life".[821] Against the Turabi's Islamic state ideology, the hereditary, dictatorial, or secular rulers of the Muslim world were illegitimate because their governing ideologies did not reflect Sharia. As a result, he started propagating his idea of a reawakening and reform of the Muslim majority societies to refashion their governments in their own

[819] John Young, *The Fate of Sudan the Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Process* (London; New York: Zed Books, 2013).
[820] Willow Berridge, *Hasan Al-Turabi : Islamist Politics and Democracy in Sudan.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Millard J. Burr and Robert O Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan : Hasan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
[821] Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan : Hasan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000*.

image and replace the alien dictators who inherited colonial legacies.[822]

This includes his attempt to make Sudan an Islamic state, as well as his ideal of making Sudan the epicenter of the cascade of Islamic states from the Atlantic Ocean in west Africa to the Indian Ocean in east Africa[823], including Ethiopia. Ethiopia ostensibly had more Muslim population than Sudan or Saudi Arabia; however, Ethiopian Muslims were erroneously assumed to constitute a majority in Ethiopia as well.[824] Meanwhile, the Islamic state ideology, along with the establishment of the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC) in 1991 with Turabi as its secretary general, opened avenues for Islamic thinkers and leaders of insurgent and Islamist groups and made Khartoum the magnet of international and regional insurgent and terrorist groups.. In addition to convening these conferences until 1995, three times, passports and visas of Sudan were handed out to militants in need of them. Moreover, future leaders of Al-Qaeda, including Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were invited and hosted in Sudan.[825] In addition to hosting Islamist groups such as the Lebanese Hizballah, Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS, and Abu Nidal organization, Khartoum gets closer to Iran to promote its version of the Islamist agenda. For instance, it created Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in 1989, supported Al-Itihaad Al-Islami (AIAI) of Somalia as well as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) of Ethiopia in the 1990s.[826]

The activist regional policies of the NIF regime that accommodated these nationalist and Islamist organizations and movements were in direct contradiction to the nation-building policies of the EPRDF regime. Even though the EPRDF regime tried to pay back the NIF regime for its support and role in their last years of armed struggle and the subsequent establishment of the transitional governments in Ethiopia in 1991, the NIF regime's Islamist agenda directly contradicted the EPRDF project of building a secular multinational federation.[827] While Turabi's ideology made Sharia the essence of political life, the EPRDF promulgated that religion and the state are separate. The FDRE

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[822] Berridge, *Hasan Al-Turabi : Islamist Politics and Democracy in Sudan.*, 119.
[823] Lata, *The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland : The State and Self-Determination in the Era of Heightened Globalization*.
[824] John Young, "Transitions in Modern Ethiopian – Sudanese Relations," no. May (2020): 1–20, https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/HSBA-BP-Ethiopia_0.pdf.
[825] Berridge, *Hasan Al-Turabi : Islamist Politics and Democracy in Sudan.*, 181.
[826] David H Shinn, "Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 23, no. 2 (2003): 79–91.
[827] Tadesse, "Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence," 337.

Constitution[828] article 1, sub-articles 1-3 proclaim: "state and religion are separate; there shall be no state religion; and state shall not interfere in religious matters and religion shall not interfere in state affairs". Consequently, the EPRDF regime's secular position about the regime of the NIF that essentializes religion followed contradictory state policies towards religion.

In addition to irreconcilable ideological positions, the strict adherence of the EPRDF regime to the Westphalian conception of the state, particularly nonintervention in internal affairs of the state and sanctity of territorial boundaries, put it on the opposite side of the claim of the idea of Ummah that ultimately will outgrow the arbitrary boundaries placed by colonial powers. Accordingly, the idea of erasing state boundaries and the ideal of building an Islamic state from Morocco to Somalia, as well as the practical "open policy" of Sudan, which considered Arabs/Muslims who abide by Sharia as deserving of citizenship in Sudan and extended support to Islamist movements[829] threatened the EPRDF regime as well as other neighboring states of Sudan including Uganda, Eritrea, and Egypt.

Because of the threats from the NIF Islamist regime, these countries started to align against Khartoum. The opposition of the EPRDF regime to the export of the Islamist agenda was started with solidarity with Eritrea in opposition to Khartoum's support of the EIJ. Eritrea accused the NIF regime of trying to export its Islamist agenda through its support to EIJ. With the support of Ethiopia and Uganda, which securitized the Islamist regime in Khartoum, Eritrea lodged a protest against Sudan with the United Nations. Security Council and warned Khartoum. After a year of protests and warnings, Asmara broke off diplomatic relations with Sudan on 5 December 1994. Uganda, which has had problematic relations with Khartoum over the support of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), also broke diplomatic relations with Khartoum in April 1995.[830] Finally, the EPRDF regime also joined Eritrea and Uganda in breaking diplomatic relations following an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak by Egypt's Gama'a al-Islamiyya in June 1995.

When Mubarak arrived in Addis Ababa on 26 June for the annual OAU summit, his motorcade was surrounded by members of Egypt's Gama'a Islamiyya based in Sudan. The

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[828] FDRE, Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
[829] Berridge, *Hasan Al-Turabi : Islamist Politics and Democracy in Sudan.*, 101.
[830] Jonathan Fisher, *East Africa after Liberation Conflict, Security and the State since the 1980s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 163–64.

assassination failed. Ethiopia accused Sudan of supporting the assailants in attempting the assassinations. As Egypt's Gama'a al-Islamiyya claimed responsibility, the Mubarak regime of Egypt opened a smear campaign against Sudan, calling it the "fountain of terrorism" and "hub of murderers and assassins".[831] President Mubarak claimed that Turabi was personally involved in planning the attempted assassination. Furthermore, Mubarak also gathered Sudanese opposition groups to help them overthrow the NIF and did some propaganda stunts that included the option of removing the NIF from power in two weeks.[832]

Simultaneously, the assassination attempt was a turning point in the EPRDF regime's policy towards Sudan in particular and Islamist movements in the Horn of Africa in general. For Ethiopia, which considers itself the beacon of independence and nerve-center of African diplomacy, the incident was a source of national embarrassment.[833] It created a sense of urgency that called for the securitization of the Islamist regime in Khartoum and its proxy agents in Somalia. As a result, Addis Ababa automatically expelled all Sudanese diplomats except Ambassador Osman el Sayid,[834] who was left in his position and has taken several measures. First, to unplug Sudanese influence in Ethiopia, the EPRDF carried out a widespread purge in regions that share boundaries with Sudan, expelled Islamist NGOs, and arrested many Sudanese in the country. Second, by cooperating with US officials, Ethiopia successfully pushed for the US[835] and UN sanctions, in rare cooperation with Egypt, in a concerted effort to isolate the Sudanese regime.[836] Third and more importantly, Ethiopia has taken military actions that fundamentally changed the domestic balance of power in Sudan and Ethiopia's regional power position.[837]

In this most significant move that was blessed and financially supported by the US and other Western powers, Ethiopia resumed supporting and fighting alongside the SPLM/A, an insurgent group that was fighting to liberate Southern Sudan.[838] Addis Ababa did not only provide full support to the SPLM but also deployed its army units and directed SPLA military operations. Ethiopia's support changed the course of the war in favor of

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[831] Burr and Collins, *Revolutionary Sudan : Hasan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000*.
[832] Burr and Collins, 192.
[833] Mulat, "Domestic Sources of International Action: Ethiopia and the Global War on Terrorism."
[834] Young, "Transitions in Modern Ethiopian – Sudanese Relations," 6.
[835] John Young, *South Sudan's Civil War : Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking*, 2019, 6.
[836] Mulat, "Domestic Sources of International Action: Ethiopia and the Global War on Terrorism," 136.
[837] Tadesse, "Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence."
[838] Young, *South Sudan's Civil War : Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking*, 41.

SPLA and fundamentally changed the military balance of power in Sudan. In the words of Medhane Tadesse, "it is no exaggeration to say that were it not for the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, the Sudanese regime would have come close to collapse".[839] The comprehensive offensive of Ethiopia against targets in both Sudan and Somalia simultaneously forced the NIF regime to recalibrate its national security conception. As a result, it redirected its security focus from Egypt to Ethiopia as the main threat to both national and regime security.[840] With the pressure from the Clinton administration, the NIF regime was forced to expel Islamist groups and their leaders, including Osama bin Laden, and shut down training camps.[841]

Furthermore, following the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, Sudan chased out Ethiopia's militant groups, including the OLF and ONLF, in a move to develop trust. The rapprochement was further consolidated by simultaneous developments of the decline of the influence of Turabi in the politics of Sudan in 1999 following al-Bashir's dissolving of the parliament, which was chaired by Turabi. After Ethiopia retook Badme, the flashpoint of the Ethio-Eritrea war of 1998-2000, al Bashir visited Ethiopia as it was apparent that Ethiopia took the helm of the regional balance of power by defeating Eritrea that was posing as a regional bulwark against terrorism. The personal relationship between Meles Zenawi and al Bashir was further enhanced by the presence of and leader and emergence of al-Bashir as the leader of the rebranded regime of NCP in place of NIF, the start of exporting of oil by Sudan as well as Ethiopia's emergence as a regional power by decisively defeating Eritrea. Furthermore, al-Bashir's policy towards Ethiopia was further shaped by choice of the US administration to make Ethiopia a regional anchor state while simultaneously securitizing Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. Between 1998 and 2012 (limited to the scope of the study), the al-Bashir regime stopped supporting nationalist and Islamist groups that targeted Ethiopia, and, as a result, the relationship between the two states transformed into a status quo partnership.

After Khartoum stopped its support for Ethiopia's insurgent groups, the EPRDF defined Sudan as potentially the most important development partner among neighboring states. This position was taken because of market size, the potential of using port Sudan,

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[839] Tadesse, "Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence," 339.
[840] Young, "Transitions in Modern Ethiopian – Sudanese Relations," 2.
[841] Young, *South Sudan's Civil War : Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking*, 42.

particularly following the loss of Assab and Massawa ports after the outbreak of Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998, and, more importantly, the role of Sudan in supporting Ethiopia's objective of using the Nile waters for development based on principles of fair and equitable use.[842] This policy idea was the output of Ethiopia's water management policy of 1999 that aimed at the utilization of transboundary water resources. Both water and foreign and security policies consider Sudan, a 'middle master'. The idea of the middle master was that Ethiopia is the source of 86% of Nile waters, while Egypt uses over two-thirds of the water by justifying through colonial treaties of 1929 and 1959 that gave exclusive use rights to Egypt and Sudan.[843] Ethiopia was totally excluded from these treaties and henceforth started hydro-diplomacy to replace Egypt's "historical use right" with the "fair and equitable use" principle.

As Sudan was heavily influenced by Cairo and switching Khartoum to Addis Ababa was difficult, Ethiopia started a basin-wide negotiations framework in 1999 through the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in the same year.[844] The NBI brought all the upper riparian countries to the side of Ethiopia, 'equitable use'; Sudan still sided with the 'historical use rights' principle of Egypt for over a decade. Finally, the breakthrough came following Ethiopia's declaration to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dame (GERD) in April 2011[845] when Egypt was amidst the Arab Spring. Practically, Ethiopia unilaterally annulled the colonial water treaties that Ethiopia was not a party to and removed the Nile waters agenda from the political to the technical sphere. Sudan also came along, accepted the Dam as a fait accompli, and reduced the issue to the timeline of filling the dam. And finally, the EPRDF achieved making a sustainable partnership with Sudan that transformed Khartoum into a reliable partner in the region. Even when the Troika (US, UK, Norway) decided to separate South Sudan from Sudan, and International Criminal Court (ICC) released an arrest warrant for al Bashir, the EPRDF stood by Sudan. The Focus of Addis

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[842] FDRE, *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy*, 51–54.

[843] Goitom Gebreluel, "Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa's Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry?," *Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (2014): 25–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.926207; Fana Gebresenbet and Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu, "New Dimensions in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Negotiations: Ontological Security in Egypt and Ethiopia" 14, no. 1 (2021): 80–106, https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1905921.

[844] Rawia Tawfik, "The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A Benefit-Sharing Project in the Eastern Nile?," *Water International* 41, no. 4 (June 6, 2016): 577, https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2016.1170397.

[845] Ana Elisa Cascão and Alan Nicol, "GERD: New Norms of Cooperation in the Nile Basin?," *Water International* 41, no. 4 (June 6, 2016): 550–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2016.1180763. Cascão and Nicol.

Ababa was keeping peace in Sudan and minimizing Cairo's intervention. The peace-making and peacekeeping role of Ethiopia in Sudan will be discussed in Section 6.7.2.

6.5 Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000 and Reconfiguration of Regional Balance of Power

After the EPRDF agreed to facilitate Eritrean independence in 1993, Eritrea became the fifth case study to understand the relationship between external support to national identity contestations and regional security policy. As a result, the first five years of Eritrea's behaviors toward Ethiopia were mainly characterized by strong status quo orientations characterized by amicable relations. Furthermore, the EPRDF regime supported the process of formal and peaceful independence of Eritrea in several significant ways. First, EPRDF leaders not only allowed the independence of Eritrea, making Ethiopia the most populous landlocked country in the world again, but they also made Ethiopia the first state to recognize the independence of Eritrea after the referendum. Second, they allowed Eritrea to separate from Ethiopia debt free by retaining the entire debt of the past regimes that were owed partly due to wars in Eritrea.[846] Third, the EPRDF regime provided Shaebia with financial support to run the independent Eritrean state.[847]

However, Isaias and Meles followed contradictory nation-building projects, the former assimilationist and the latter accommodationist with a primordial bent, which were bound to collide. Despite the incompatibility of their nation-building policies, the two regimes bypassed resolving basic issues like boundary demarcation and citizenship and focused on consolidating power in their respective domains. Shaebia was busy constructing a unitary national identity that crosses religious, regional, and other identification markers, deliberately restructuring the Eritrean boundaries to cut across multiple identities.[848] On the opposite side, the EPRDF regime was building a multinational federation that was supposed to address social injustices produced by assimilationist policies of the past regimes in the past, thereby restructuring states wherein NCIGs self-rule and contribute to diverse

[846] Worku Aberra, "Asymmetric Benefits: The Ethio-Eritrea Common Market (1991 to 1998)," *International Journal of African Development* 4, no. 1 (2016): 61.
[847] Aberra, 60.
[848] Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay*, 118.

Ethiopia's shared rule.[849]

One of the issues that the victorious rebel groups, Shaebia and TPLF, were assuming but not candidly communicating was about the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea as independent states. The Eritrean elites envisioned making Eritrea a 'Singapore' of Africa, assuming to source raw materials and profits from the Ethiopian hinterland.[850] With this assumption, Eritrea signed several agreements with TPLF-dominated Ethiopia that were dubbed the "Asmara Pact" four months after the independence of Eritrea.[851] The agreements include Eritrea's use of Ethiopian currency until issuance of its own, free movements of goods and people, Ethiopia's use of Assab and Massawa ports 'free' of charge, and a defense pact, among others.[852] On the opposite side, the TPLF, on its part, was planning to monopolize Ethiopia's resources and rule the country indefinitely and autonomously. Eritrea was just a sea outlet in the TPLF's outlook. With this assumption in the background, once it had consolidated its power by ejecting OLF and ONLF, the TPLF-dominated EPRDF started to regulate trade and economic activities. For instance, Ethiopia started to tighten control on the re-export of Ethiopian products, including coffee, by establishing cross-border control and limited participation of foreign nationals in sectors like banking and finance.[853]

The TPLF/EPRDF's move to control the Ethiopian economy progressively placed hurdles on the Eritrean elites tapping into Ethiopia's resources and markets. To solve the problem, the Eritrean government proposed renegotiation of the "Asmara Pact" to ensure free trade, free movement of people, investment rights to Eritreans on equal terms with Ethiopian citizens, one-on-one exchange of the new Eritrean currency, Nakfa, to Ethiopian currency, Birr.[854] The EPRDF regime chose to decline the Eritrean demands.[855] On the contrary, the EPRDF regime changed Ethiopian currency notes to stop Eritrea from using the old Ethiopian currency. Some Eritrean elites complained that Ethiopia refused to recognize Nakfa for its name because Nakfa was the symbol of Ethiopia's defeat during the

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[849] Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building*.
[850] Gebru Asrat, "Towards a Sustainable Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea," in *The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea*, ed. Leenco Lata (Oslo: Allkopi AS, 2006).
[851] Asrat.
[852] Meressa T Gebrewahd, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: National Security, Militarization and Normalization Predicaments," *National Political Science Review*, no. December 2019 (2019): 117.
[853] Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building*, 208.
[854] Gebrewahd, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: National Security, Militarization and Normalization Predicaments"; Asrat, "Towards a Sustainable Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea."
[855] Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay*, 119.

Eritrean war of independence, while it was the symbol of Eritrean resilience and triumph in the face of adversity.

Following the currency and economic conflicts and Ethiopia's move to control cross-border trade, the Eritrean government requested a boundary demarcation.[856] While the Boundary Commission of the two states was discussing, gun fires were exchanged between Eritrean soldiers and Tigrayan militia on 6 May 1998.[857] Eritrea recalled its members of the Boundary Commission, invaded and occupied Badme, and expelled Tigrayan local administrators, changing its orientation to revisionist vis-à-vis Ethiopia.[858] In the ensuing Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000, between 70,000 and 100,000 combatants lost their lives on both sides.[859] Over half a million people were displaced, and properties were damaged.

This Ethio-Eritrean War was the second declared inter-state war in the Horn of Africa after the Ethio-Somalia War of 1977/78, which was reduced to border conflicts. However, closer examination reveals that the war was an extension of competing for national identity conceptions by elites of the same ethnic group. Even though the ruling elites of both Ethiopia and Eritrea were Tigrigna speaking and from the Abyssinian core culture community across the Mereb river, they had identity, spatial and temporal claims, and henceforth divergent national identity construction projects. Eritrean ruling elites focused on colonial experience (after 1890) to define both temporal and spatial dimensions with the goal of an overarching Eritrean national identity that would be constructed through assimilationist nation-building. On the contrary, the TPLF sanitized the Tigrayan history from Solomonic myth (one thousand years less from the claim of Kebre Nagast), reduced it to the civilization dimension of the Aksumite Empire, claimed both primordialist origins of Tigray with the modernist claim of building an overarching Ethiopian political and economic community.[860]

In line with its colonial conception of national identity, Shaebia correctly claimed that Badme, the flashpoint of the war, belonged to Eritrea by virtue of the colonial treaty between Italy and Ethiopia. Furthermore, to realize its claim, it used its army with the assumption

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[856] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 266.
[857] Alexandra Magnolia Dias, "An Inter-State War in the Post-Cold War Era: Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000)" (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008), http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2011/1/U501303.pdf.
[858] Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building*, 210.
[859] Richard J Reid, *Shallow Graves : A Memoir of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War*, 2020, xvi.
[860] Bach, "EPRDF's Nation-Building: Tinkering with Convictions and Pragmatism1," 115.

that TPLF did not have the capacity to respond, and the case would go to international adjudication like the case of Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish Islands.[861] Even if Ethiopia chose to take back Badme, it was not a match for the "superior" Eritrean force. This view of Shaebia, which was a legacy inherited from the thirty years of war of independence as a vanguard party, had produced an ostensibly exaggerated sense of Eritrea's powerful presence in the Horn of Africa region with histories to back them up. The first and most glorious evidence was its victory over the largest army in black Africa, the Ethiopian army, during the Darg regime. Second, the Eritrean army had engaged in skirmishes[862] with all neighbors, Yemen (1994), Sudan (1995), and Djibouti (1996), which further emboldened it. Furthermore, Shaebia elites thought that TPLF was a junior partner, which they assisted in capturing and consolidating power at Addis Ababa. To sum up, in Shaebia's national power perception, Eritrea was "the regional power" that would dictate the terms.[863] In line with this self-image, Shaebia invaded Ethiopia and controlled Badme. The control of Badme changed Eritrean orientation towards Ethiopia from status quo strong to irredentist strong.

After Eritrea's control of Badme, several peace initiatives were introduced, mainly by the US-Rwanda duo as well as by the OAU since the outbreak of the war in May 1998. The EPRDF regime agreed to peace talks with the condition of the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from areas it controlled after 6 May 1998.[864] This was because, contrary to Shaebia's view, the TPLF elites believed that Badme had always been part of Tigray because residents of the region had always lived under Ethiopia's jurisdiction. What was on the map claimed by Eritrea and lived experience of residents of Badme did not match. Even when TPLF was fighting against Jebha over Badme in 1981, it was based on an incompatible understanding of where Badme belonged. In the TPLF elites' view, Badme was part of Tigray, which was kept by the blood and bones of Tigrayans. Badme was a small dusty border town with negligible economic or strategic value to fight over and sacrifice 70,000 to 100,000 combatant lives. However, it was accorded top priority national value because of the symbolic representation of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia in general and the sacrifices it represented for the TPLF. Furthermore, as it defeated Jebha at Badme and emerged as the vanguard of Tigray, the TPLF decided to reaffirm that EPRDF was the vanguard of the new

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[861] Berhane Woldegabriel, "A War for National Unity," in *The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea*, ed. Leenco Lata (Oslo: Allkopi AS, 2006).
[862] Dias, "An Inter-State War in the Post-Cold War Era: Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000)."
[863] Berhane Woldegabriel, "A War for National Unity."
[864] Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building*, 210.

Ethiopia beyond the reach of Shaebia. In other words, the TPLF elites had a reverse mirror image of the idea of Shaebia's elites. For them, Shaebia would not have survived the Darg had it not been for the TPLF. It was the TPLF forces that shielded Shaebia from total defeat and served as a buffer between the Ethiopian army during the Darg and Shaebia's forces. The TPLF elites, like Shaebia, believed that it was their organization that 'defeated the largest army in black Africa'.[865] This last phrase was the favorite line to declare the upper hand and declare victor's settlement by elites of both Shaebia and TPLF.

However, structural factors like demography, economy, and ideational structures like glories of past victories favor Ethiopia over Eritrea, which TPLF included in its role conception, but Shaebia seemed to downplay. The first significant factor that determined the contestation of protagonists was demography. There were 20 Ethiopians for every Eritrean. Second, as Darg did during the Ogaden war of 1977/78, the EPRDF called for national mobilization for respect for territorial integrity. The responses of the masses of Ethiopians were a surprise even for the EPRDF itself. In no time, over three hundred thousand young men and women, including the disbanded members of the past regime army members showed up. Second, Ethiopia had over tenfold land area and over tenfold economic size compared to Eritrea. Other than huge demographic and economic advantages, the image of Ethiopia as a never-colonized beacon of independence for the black race, a 'multinational nation' that defeated all foreign aggressions, and other numerous past glories was summoned effectively.[866]

In an interesting turn of events, the TPLF elites started to frame Ethiopian national identity that resembled that of the Darg in their call for mobilization to defend the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. For example, one of the founders of the TPLF and the Regional President of Tigray, Gebru Asrat, said[867], on the anniversary of the fall of the Darg regime on 28 May 1998:

> This is because Ethiopia means 'anti-invasion'. Ethiopian means one who dies for his honour and fights for freedom and independence. You have seen this week how all Ethiopians from Moyale [southernmost point of Ethiopia on the Kenya border], to people in Gode and Wardier [Ethiopian Somalis] have felt sad and have condemned the act of aggression. … They [the Eritrean leadership] might have wrongly felt that the confrontation is only with the

[865] Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay*, 111.
[866] Kjetil Tronvoll, *War and the Politics of Identity in Ethiopia* (London: James Curray, 2009).
[867] quoted in Tronvoll, 149.

> people of Tigray, whom they undermine most. That is not the case. They have made a wrong evaluation. They should know that they now have to face the entire Ethiopia!

Following Eritrea's invasion of Ethiopia, the EPRDF regime started singing unity songs like those of the Darg. Moreover, in similar words that the Darg regime propaganda machine used to portray Shaebia, the EPRDF regime also started to portray Shaebia enemy image. It was even compared to the Italian colonial empire.[868] Shaebia was also compared to the Darg regime in a bizarre, confusing reinvention of roles. Hundreds of thousands were mobilized and joined the war fronts. Confident of its preponderant human and material advantage and war plans, the EPRDF called its biggest operation of 1998-2000 of the Ethio-Eritrean War "Operation Sunset". It was called so because early on, when mediators provided Ethiopia's condition of withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Badme, President Isaias of Eritrea emphatically refused claiming that "…withdrawing from Badme means the sun would never rise in the east for the second time".[869] In February 1999, Ethiopia retook Badme through Operation Sunset. Following the fall of Badme, Isaias accepted the OAU peace plan. However, Ethiopia continued the war until all Ethiopian territories were recaptured, and some Eritrean territories were occupied as well.

After ensuring a comfortable victory to degrade Eritrea as a regional power and reaffirm the helm of regional military power to Ethiopia, the EPRDF regime agreed to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in June 2000 and to the Framework for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Algiers Peace Agreement) in December 2000.[870] Furthermore, the EPRDF regime dictated some of the terms of the agreement that favored the victor, Ethiopia. The important one was the establishment of a Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) twenty-five kilometers within Eritrean territory, where the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) came in July 2000. Moreover, to sustainably resolve the Ethio-Eritrean conflicts, the Algiers Agreement included two commissions. First, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission was authorized to deal with issues related to settling public and private claims for loss or injury from the war. Second, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission was authorized to determine the location of the boundaries between

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[868] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa : Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800*, 248.
[869] quoted in Gebrewahd, "Ethiopia and Eritrea: National Security, Militarization and Normalization Predicaments," 120.
[870] Reid, *Shallow Graves : A Memoir of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War*, 16; Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*; Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay*.

the two countries. Both countries were pre-agreed to the commissions' decisions. Both the Boundary and Claims commissions reached decisions. Both Eritrean and Ethiopian regimes claimed victory and rallied their respective populations to celebrate the "diplomatic" victory. However, when the Boundary Commission announced its findings in April 2002 in line with colonial treaties, the results were bewildering for the EPRDF regime officials. For instance, Badme which was the flash point of the war, and Ethiopia's victory showcase was placed on the Eritrean side of the border.

When the Boundary Commission explained its technical findings, Eritrea accepted the decisions and demanded its immediate implementation in accordance with the binding agreement they reached in the Algiers Agreement.[871] The EPRDF regime, on the other hand, accepted the decisions in principle and refused to allow its implementation. As a result, the Boundary Commission was limited to publishing its virtually demarcated boundary. Developments after 9/11, 2001 further bolstered Ethiopia's refusal to allow implementation of the agreement. As a frontline state in GWOT and a regional anchor state, Washington shielded Ethiopia from international pressure.[872] Furthermore, Ethiopia's definitive victory not only defined the regional military balance of power but also led to the reconfiguration of domestic forces both in Eritrea and Ethiopia, which in turn shaped the regional security policy of Ethiopia.

Eritrean elites, who believed their nation was invincible as it defeated the largest army in black Africa, could not understand the defeat at the hand of TPLF. Questions of accountability and reform started shaking Shaebia. One movement that demanded change was a group of 15 (G15). The G15 comprised of senior political and military figures, started criticizing Isaias Afewerki for the defeat. Other groups, like the Eritrean diaspora, also produced their ideas. Isaias responded by imprisoning members of the G15 in an undisclosed location and by securitizing Eritrean national life. Isaias put Eritrea on siege mentality and focused on rebuilding the Eritrean army, providing a haven to all armed groups that opposed to Ethiopia, both nationalist and Islamist, including OLF, ONLF, G7, and ICU, and sending troops and arms to assist al-Shabaab against Ethiopia in Somalia.[873] Consequently, Eritrea

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[871] Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay*, 127.
[872] Woldemariam, "Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia"; Verhoeven and Woldemariam, "Who Lost Ethiopia? The Unmaking of an African Anchor State and U.S. Foreign Policy."
[873] Mulugeta, *Laying the Past to Rest the EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building*.

became the only neighboring state that supported Ethiopia's militant groups after 2001. By hosting, training, and arming ICU and al-Shabaab, he gave the EPRDF regime diplomatic weapons to isolate and weaken Eritrea as a "state sponsor of terrorism", which will be discussed in Section 6.7.

Like in Eritrea, TPLF members also started a reform movement to unseat Meles Zenawi in opposition to his handling of the war. Meles responded differently. He reinterpreted the EPRDF ideology and introduced the developmental state model to fight "Bonapartism". Using his ideological reinterpretation, he expelled the TPLF splinter group.[874] Their sympathizers were "re-educated" into the "correct" line of EPRDF as defined by Meles, and henceforth, he emerged as the undisputed leader of both EPRDF and Ethiopia.

Meles' triumph was not limited to Ethiopia. As an outstanding ideologue and academic, whom Christopher Clapham of the leading scholars of the Horn of Africa region, called "the philosopher-king of the EPRDF regime",[875] Meles attracted admirers from academic and policy establishments of the West. Even though his analysis was mainly within the neo-Marxist tradition that privileges vanguard party political organization and statist economic policies, his ideas were defended by economists like Joseph Stiglitz.[876] That gave him and his regime a latitude of policy independence vis-à-vis the World Bank and the IMF while utilizing different kinds of funding with fewer conditionalities. Furthermore, the US and Europe, as well as emerging powers like China and India, also stood by Meles' vision of a middle-income economy that helped Ethiopia with unprecedented financial and material support, averaging three billion dollars per annum between 2004 and 2012. Furthermore, the EPRDF regime used its closer ties with the US as a bulwark of counterterrorism and its diplomatic weight in regional organizations to further capture external resources for state building, neutralize Ethiopia's militant groups, isolate Eritrea, intervene in Somalia to eliminate threats, which will be discussed in Sections 6.7.1. and 6.7.2.

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[874] Markakis, *Ethiopia : The Last Two Frontiers*, 273.
[875] Clapham, *The Horn of Africa : State Formation and Decay*, 69.
[876] Joseph Stiglitz in his *Globalization and Its Discontents* (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002)., defended Meles's macro-economic policies as sound policies in the context of the mainly agrarian economy of Ethiopia.

6.6. Regional Diplomacy and Peaceful Relations with Djibouti and Kenya

The EPRDF regime, like the preceding regimes, maintained and further built on Ethiopia's peaceful relations with Djibouti and Kenya. Relations with Kenya and Djibouti were clear of contradictory nation-building policies and support for militant groups from Ethiopia. On the one hand, the relations between Ethiopia and Kenya were mainly shaped by the threats emanating from Somalia's failed state. To control and eliminate threats from Islamist groups in Somalia, both Addis Ababa and Nairobi worked together to install a government of their choice in Mogadishu, built buffer zones, intervened militarily, and served as the bulwark against international terrorism in the region within the framework of Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Besides, they also coordinated their regional peacemaking policies in Sudan.

On the other hand, relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia were mainly defined by port use. Temporary disagreement on the nature of government to be installed in Mogadishu was resolved in favor of Ethiopia. Subsequently, Ethiopia included Djibouti as a strategic partner in its national development plan, which was being challenged by Djibouti's policy of hosting multiple militaries as a strategy of extraversion and policy autonomy. In the next two subsections, the peaceful relations of Ethiopia with Djibouti and Kenya will be briefly discussed.

6.6.1 The EPRDF Regime's Policy Towards Djibouti

During the EPRDF regime, Djibouti's capacity to support Ethiopia's militant groups, as well as its willingness to support them, could reasonably be classified as a weak status-quo state, as its population continued to be a fraction of that of Ethiopia, its area, economic size, and defense capacity, and all capacity measures made it dwarf compared to Ethiopia. Furthermore, its economy overwhelmingly depended on Ethiopia's port rent and the Ethiopian market. Since 1998 Ethiopia has virtually depended on Djibouti for import-export, completing the mutual dependence. However, variations in the level of mutual dependence and externalities of foreign policy behaviors over the study period, 1991-2012, challenged the weak status-quo state framework.

In the early years, when Shaebia and TPLF were in the honeymoon stage of their relationship, Djibouti was carefully marketing its port with better deals to Ethiopia so that Ethiopia would not relocate its port uses to Eritrean ports. However, following the outbreak

of the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000, the EPRDF regime totally relocated port uses of Ethiopia to Djibouti, making it the sole port of entry and exit, accounting for 95% of the volumes of Ethiopian imports and exports.[877] In addition to increasing revenues from Ethiopia's growing port use, Djibouti considerably boosted its income by increasing the rent of port use, as Ethiopia had no option but to comply. The new President of Djibouti, Ismael Omar Guelleh, who replaced his retiring uncle and first President, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, in 1999, further advanced the peaceful and strategic relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti.[878] His regime was totally cleared of supporting Ethiopia's militant groups and henceforth exempting Djibouti from Ethiopian insecurity externalities. However, his successful Somali peace-making process made him to compete with the EPRDF for some time unsuccessfully.

With the approval of IGAD, President Guelleh started his most illustrious regional peace-making attempt in 2000.[879] He broke the decade-long failure to establish a central government in Somalia by hosting the Arta Peace Conference, which established the Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG, which was created based on the 4.5 power-sharing formula, formed a government led by Abdiqasim Salad Hassan. Even though Abdiqasim, an Islamist from the Hawiye clan, was warmly welcomed in Mogadishu, he was considered a faction by regions who refused to participate in the Arta Peace Conference, mainly Somaliland (self-declared independent state) and Jubaland, a strong region led by pro-Ethiopian Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf. Even though Djibouti supported TNG was accorded instant international recognition, including by Ethiopia initially, and Somalia reassumed its seat at the UN General Assembly, the Abdullahi Yusuf faction opposed it as a Hawiye-dominated illegitimate government. Furthermore, the Abdiqasim government provoked the EPRDF regime by supporting ONLF and OLF and sending Jama Ali Jama's force to remove Abdullahi Yusuf from Puntland.[880]

To appease Djibouti, the EPRDF regime tolerated the Arta Peace Process and even

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[877] Yihun, *Djibouti (YeTigegninetachin Mesferia) ጅቡቲ (የጥገኝነታችን መሰረታዎ)*.

[878] Joanna Mormul, "Ethio-Djiboutian Relations in the 21st Century – towards New African Cooperation," *Politeja* 13, no. 3 (42) (2021): 267, https://doi.org/10.12797/politeja.13.2016.42.16.

[879] Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones"; Yuusuf, *The Genesis of the Civil War in Somalia: The Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on the Conflict*.

[880] Yuusuf, *The Genesis of the Civil War in Somalia: The Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on the Conflict*, 131.

recognized the TNG changed its policy following the TNG's orientation towards Ethiopia's militant groups and Islamist movements. Before President Abdiqasim of the TNG finished international tours of announcing his government, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia, removed Jama Ali Jama and restored Abdullahi Yusuf, and started another peace process to replace the TNG with a friendly regime.[881] Accordingly, Ethiopia gathered warlords that were opposed to the Islamist coalition supported by Egypt[882] and other Arab countries and established Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in 2001 to oppose the TNG, whose mandate would end in 2003. Djibouti continued supporting the centralized national unity government of the TNG, while the EPRDF regime wanted decentralized federal states, in line with Ethiopia's regional states, which would follow pro-Ethiopian policies. Kenya took over the task of reconciling Ethiopia-backed SRRC and Djibouti-backed TNG in 2002.

Meanwhile, Djibouti tried to use its newly found importance to convince the US that TNG leaders were not in bed with Islamic fundamentalists as the EPRDF regime claimed. The Bush administration established the Combined Joined Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, to "detect, disrupt, and defeat" terrorists in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and in addition to Yemen.[883] According to Ingiriis[884], the US sided with Ethiopia's understanding of the TNG as part of the problem. Djibouti's support to TNG expired with the ascendance of the Ethiopia-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) following the Eldoret/Mbagathi peace processes. After, Djibouti's policy became what a diplomat dubbed "as Ethiopia goes, so goes Djibouti".[885]

While peaceful and mutually prosperous economic integration continued to blossom, Djibouti encountered another option to reclaim some of its policy autonomy from the EPRDF regime with the increasing menace of piracy in 2007 in the coastal regions of

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[881] Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones," 232.

[882] Yuusuf, *The Genesis of the Civil War in Somalia: The Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on the Conflict*, 134.

[883] Shinn, "Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview."

[884] Ingiriis, "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia," November 2, 2018.

[885] quoted in Zach Vertin, "Great Power Rivalry in the Red Sea: China's Experiment in Djibouti and Implications for the United States," *Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World*, no. June (2020): 13, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FP_20200615_china_djibouti_vertin.pdf.

Somalia and the subsequent emergence of military bases on the African side of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In addition to existing French and American military bases, Djibouti extended its rent leases to the EU, Italy, Japan, and China, which was planning to open its first overseas military base. In addition to substantial rent that has reached one hundred million dollars and counting, Djibouti was also able to capture international resources flow in the range of 200-300 million dollars[886] , giving it a considerable latitude of policy independence from dependence on Ethiopia's port use rents. Furthermore, Djibouti's hosting of multiple foreign military bases ironically gave the micro security from bigger neighbors, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. On the other hand, even if the EPRDF regime was categorically opposed to these ventures of Djibouti, it was following policies of appeasement through two major tools. The EPRDF regime came with two major appeasement tools to further entrench mutual dependence.

First, the EPRDF regime made Djibouti a major part of its long-term national development plan. For example, in the five-year Growth and Transformation Plan I of 2010-2015 (GTP I) that envisioned making Ethiopia a middle-income country by 2025, Ethiopia included the Ethio-Djibouti railway as the most ambitious project. The 752 km electrified railway connecting Djibouti with Addis Ababa was started in 2011 at the cost of 3.5 billion dollars. For landlocked Ethiopia, which almost totally depended on Djibouti for its logistics, the railway was a big gamble meant to unlock Ethiopia's economy. Other important projects like the Ethio-Djibouti water pipeline and provision of electricity were also added to the mix to ensure Djibouti's further dependence on Ethiopia.[887]

In addition to making Djibouti part of the national development plan, the EPRDF regime also appeased the Djiboutian ruling class. Djibouti politicians were encouraged to own apartments and businesses in Ethiopia, as did President Guelleh's residence in Dire Dawa. Furthermore, the Guelleh family was also furnished with thousands of hectares of agricultural land in Oromia. In general, Djibouti's ruling class members were included in the EPRDF regime's oligarchic privileged wealth network. Furthermore, as the Darg regime did, Djibouti citizens were also accorded the right to engage in any business in Ethiopia,

[886] Vertin, 6.
[887] Mormul, "Ethio-Djiboutian Relations in the 21st Century – towards New African Cooperation"; Vertin, "Great Power Rivalry in the Red Sea: China's Experiment in Djibouti and Implications for the United States."

unlike citizens of other countries.[888] To sum up, the EPRDF regime was committed to a mutual dependency relationship with Djibouti.

6.6.2 Ethio-Kenyan Relations: Strengthened Strategic Partnership

Like it was the case during Haile Selassie and Darg regimes, Kenya maintained its strong status-quo orientation in its relationship with the EPRDF regime's Ethiopia. Even though Kenya and Ethiopia were comparable economies with the possibility of competing for US resources, Nairobi and Addis Ababa kept a peaceful relationship and advanced it with their collaboration to deal with the newly emerging threats from nonstate actors and transnational terrorist networks. These threats were also mainly connected to Somalia, like in the previous decades when the state of Somalia was the source of the threats, as we have discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Furthermore, the US also engaged both Kenya and Ethiopia as bulwarks against international terrorism in the Horn of Africa region. In addition, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi spearheaded peacemaking in Sudan. This subsection will briefly discuss collaborative relations between the two countries from 1991 to 2012.

The governments of PM Meles and President Moi first came to terms in 1998 following attempts of the OLF to use the cross-border Borana Oromo as a haven to attack Ethiopian government targets from Kenya. Border controls and security were increased to deny the OLF, hiding places, and launching pads in Kenya. However, the Moi government was not willing to go beyond normal border controls and policing.[889] Other than allowing Ethiopian forces to pursue OLF and AIAI militants, Nairobi did not join the EPRDF regime's offensive. When he was going to retire as President, Moi wanted to raise his status by seeking a lasting solution to the Somali problem.[890] Consequently, he started the Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process in 2002 in consultation with Meles. As discussed in Subsection 6.6.1, the process was concluded by producing the TFG, whose structure reflected Ethiopia's plans.

After placing pressure on the TFG to move to Somalia from Nairobi, the Kenyan

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[888] Yihun, *Djibouti (YeTigegninetachin Mesferia) ጅቡቲ (የጥገኝነታችን መስፈሪያ)*.

[889] Jessica Piombo and Pierre Englebert, "The War on Terror in Context: Domestic Dimensions of Ethiopia and Kenya's Policies towards Somalia," *Third World Quarterly* 43, no. 5 (May 4, 2022): 1176–96, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2057292.

[890] Yuusuf, *The Genesis of the Civil War in Somalia: The Impact of Foreign Military Intervention on the Conflict*, 134.

government left Ethiopia to do the intervention on behalf of the TFG when the ICU started to control the entire south-central Somalia. That was irrespective of the presence of terrorists who blasted bombs in Kenya before.[891] While Ethiopia proactively worked to physically eliminate a possibility of an Islamist regime emerging in Somalia, Kenya, on the other hand, focused on diplomacy.[892] As emerged out of the insurgency of the 1980s, the EPRDF regime feared a possibility of a coalition of an Islamist government in Mogadishu with Eritrea, OLF, ONLF, and other Ethiopian militants working in tandem to bring about a regime change in Ethiopia.[893]

For some time, Nairobi continued supporting Ethiopia's initiative of intervening in Somalia to protect the TFG. Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in December 2006 and clearing of the ICU was a relief for Kenya that pushed for the AU exit strategy by establishing AMISOM. Meanwhile, Kenyan, US, and Ethiopian security establishments continued working on the possibility of Kenya legislating anti-terror laws like Ethiopia and establishing a buffer zone in the Somali regions that border Kenya. However, Kenyan lawmakers were not willing to adopt the anti-terror law for some time for fear of negative externalities on the Kenyan tourism sector. Meanwhile, Ethiopia and Kenya, along with Uganda and Djibouti, were sharing information through the U.S. Terrorist Interdiction Programme (TIP), which security and immigration officials used to check the identities of travelers leaving or entering their respective countries against the most current international "terrorist watch-list", at their respective airports, seaports, and border posts.[894] Despite these mechanisms, Kenya was frequently attacked by Al Shabaab.[895]

As a result, Kenya was finally forced to join Ethiopia by militarily intervening in Somalia to control Al-Shabaab. On October 16, 2011, Kenya sent two thousand troops into Somalia because Al Shabaab started directly affecting Kenya's image as a tourist destination. By kidnapping tourists and aid workers from Kenya, Al Shabaab finally

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[891] ICG, "Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained?," *Review of African Political Economy* 33, no. 110 (June 1, 2006): 752–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240601119307. ICG.

[892] Piombo and Englebert, "The War on Terror in Context: Domestic Dimensions of Ethiopia and Kenya's Policies towards Somalia."

[893] Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones," 250.

[894] David H Shinn, "Ethiopia: Governance and Terrorism," in *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Robert I Rotberg (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 111–12, https://doi.org/10.7864/j.ctt128137.8.

[895] Piombo and Englebert, "The War on Terror in Context: Domestic Dimensions of Ethiopia and Kenya's Policies towards Somalia."

triggered Kenya to adopt Ethiopia's strategies of both direct military intervention and establishing a buffer zone. [896] As a result, Kenya and Ethiopia continued working on these strategies, focusing on a structure that might avoid the amalgamation of the Ogaadeen clan into a unified administrative territory with control of sea outlets like Kismayo.

In addition to the main common goal of controlling threats from Somalia, Kenya worked with Ethiopia on several regional issues. The most successful one was the Sudan process which began with the Machakos Protocol in July 2002 and concluded with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, ultimately leading to the peaceful separation of South Sudan from Sudan.[897] By siding with Ethiopia, Kenya also led the process of isolating and sanctioning Eritrea as a state sponsor of terrorism. Along with eastern African Nile Basin upper riparian countries like Uganda and Rwanda, Kenya played a significant role in signing a Cooperative Framework Agreement at Entebbe, Uganda, that challenged Egypt's discourse of "historical use right".[898]

6.7 Using GWOT in Pursuit of Domestic Security and International Organizations to Legitimize Interventionist Policies

6.7.1 Using GWOT to Capture International Assistance in Pursuit of Domestic Security

Like the preceding regimes, the EPRDF regime also made the control of external resources flow the highest priority foreign policy strategy in conjunction with denying external aid to organizations of NCIGs and Islamist movements in the Horn of Africa region. Early on, even though the EPRDF regime tried to present itself in contrast to the anti-American Darg regime, the US assistance was not as expected, and the conditionalities of the IMF and World Bank, on the other hand, were debilitating. To attract more external resources, the EPRDF regime tried to sell its definition of security threats as common security threats to the US foreign policy establishment and tried to diversify sources of external assistance. Both strategies worked in two phases.

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[896] Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones," 188.
[897] Young, *South Sudan's Civil War : Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking*.
[898] Laura Parkes, "The Politics of 'Water Scarcity' in the Nile Basin: The Case of Egypt," *Journal of Politics & International Studies* 9 (2013): 460.

The first phase was between 1991 and 2001. In this phase, following President Hosni Mubarak's assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in 1995, the EPRDF regime returned to the old-age Ethiopian strategy[899] of selling the "clash of civilizations" thesis to get support from the West. Following the assassination attempt, Islamic extremism was defined as the most threatening security menace in the region. In addition to getting the NIF regime of Sudan sanctioned and ultimately forced to give up its project of exporting Islamic state ideology, the EPRDF regime was able to use the US backing to force the NIF regime of Sudan to stop supporting Ethiopia's insurgent groups, including OLF and ONLF as well as AIAI, expelled Islamist leaders including Osama bin Laden and removed Turabi from the political influence.

While pressuring Sudan was mainly to change the NIF regime's orientations towards Ethiopia's insurgent groups and international Islamist groups as well as to tame the Islamist agenda of Turabi, the EPRDF regime policies towards the collapsed Somali state were mainly geared towards two goals: preventing the emergence of nationalist/Islamist regime on Mogadishu and controlling the threats that emanate from the ungoverned spaces of Somalia.[900] With the knowledge of the US establishment, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia between 1996-1997 and eliminated the AIAI as a fighting force. Furthermore, Ethiopia and the US also propped up the same warlords to balance against the emergence of Islamist groups. These limited working relationships of Ethiopia's security forces with the US foreign policy establishment were further increased following the terrorist blasting of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, which killed about 263 people and injured thousands.[901] The 9/11, 2001 terrorist incident, however, instantly transformed Ethio-American relations and started the second phase, which helped the EPRDF regime access unprecedented financial, arms, and technical support.[902]

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[899] Since 16th century as discussed in chapters 3 and 4, Ethiopia's ruling elite always requested technologies of war to defend the "Christian" Ethiopia against the invading Islamic power. The difference of the EPRDF regime from the past regimes was it targeted "Islamic extremism", not the entire Muslim community, in contemporary parlance. In an odd turn of ideology, the AIAI and its reincarnations including ICU and Al Shabaab tried to define Ethiopia as a Christian force that was conducting holy war against Muslims. Empirically, however, in the 1990s Ethiopia was secular which was the home of a Muslim population twice the size of the entire population of Somalia.

[900] Mulat, "Domestic Sources of International Action: Ethiopia and the Global War on Terrorism"; Woldemariam, "Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia"; Ingiriis, "From Al-Itihaad to Al-Shabaab: How the Ethiopian Intervention and the 'War on Terror' Exacerbated the Conflict in Somalia," November 2, 2018.

[901] Maruf and Joseph, *Inside Al-Shabaab : The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally*, 25.

[902] Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*, 93.

Phase two, coincidentally, began with Ethiopia's emergence as the clear regional military power after decisively defeating Eritrea and the Bush administration's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Next to Afghanistan as the first front, a secondary front of the GWOT was opened in the Horn of Africa because the region was where Osama bin Laden and other Jihadist leaders had stayed in the early 1990s. Somalia was targeted as the ungoverned and hiding space for jihadists responsible for bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. After 9/11, weak states like Afghanistan and failed states like Somalia jumped from marginal humanitarian concerns to critical security concerns in the eyes of the US security establishment. This was because weak states with porous borders, a range of poor governance issues, and political instability were considered highly vulnerable to turning into breeding and training grounds and launching pads for international terrorists. The US National Security Strategy of 2002 recommended rebuilding weak states as a policy of securitization in the following words: "…we must help strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists".[903]

In the Horn of Africa, the Bush administration targeted Somalia through the countries that share its boundaries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. In 2002, President Bush invited PM Meles to Washington to appreciate Ethiopia's counterterrorism and promised to help disrupt any act of terrorism targeting Ethiopia.[904] Consequently, the new security environment elevated Ethiopia as the anchor state in the Horn of Africa in the GWOT with the corresponding multidimensional assistance of the US and other partners. The EPRDF regime wasted no time capitalizing on the opportunities of the GWOT. With the goals of further consolidating Ethiopia's regional hegemony, controlling terrorist threats and insurgent groups, realizing its state-building project through external support, capturing as much financial resources for its development projects, and securitizing and delegitimizing local opposition groups to ensure its survival, the EPRDF regime presented Ethiopia as the 'anchor state' in the turbulent region and as a strategic ally of the West.[905] In addition to its usual attempts to prove its suitability as the regional 'deputy sheriff', Addis Ababa joined

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[903] George W. Bush, "National Security Strategy 2002 – National Security Strategy Archive" (2002), 11, https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2002.pdf.

[904] Shinn, "Ethiopia: Governance and Terrorism," 111.

[905] Mulat, "A Rising Regional Power : Making Sense of Ethiopia's Influence in the Horn of Africa Region"; Woldemariam, "Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia"; Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*.

the coalition of the willing in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.[906] It also provided the US with a 'black site' where undeclared GWOT prisoners were interrogated and a drone base from which the US conducted operations against targets in Somalia and Yemen.[907]

In return, the US helped the EPRDF regime capture the largest foreign development aid, with an annual average passing three billion US dollars, more than the country's annual export earnings. The regime also used the military aid and security sector reform to bolster its defense, intelligence, and police institutions, making the already strong and resilient security apparatus unparalleled in the region.[908] The EPRDF regime also adopted Anti-money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist framework to control terrorists, liberation movements, and opposition political parties. In using GWOT to silence domestic opponents and deny foreign support to groups that were waging armed struggles, the EPRDF regime legislated the infamous Antiterrorism Proclamation of 2009. Based on this law, the Ethiopian Parliament (HPR) designated five groups as terrorist organizations: OLF, ONLF, G7 as well as al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab.[909] Even if the US refused to list the first three movements as terrorists, Ethiopia was able to deter other countries from supporting these militant groups, except Eritrea.

Eritrea, under Isaias Afewerki, wanted Washington to pressure Addis Ababa to respect the decision of the Ethio-Eritrean Boundary Commission and was trying to be the partner of the US in its GWOT. However, the United States chose Ethiopia as the regional anchor state. Using its indispensable role in counterterrorism, Ethiopia convinced the Bush administration not to press it concerning the binding decision of the boundary commission that awarded Badme to Eritrea. Washington removed the Ethio-Eritrean boundary agenda from the UN Security Council and assigned it to the Office of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to mediate.[910] According to Woldemariam, from 2006 onwards, the Bush administration prevented the passage of a resolution about the Ethio-Eritrean boundary issues, thereby shielding Ethiopia from measures that could have been taken for not

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[906] Shinn, "Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview," 84.
[907] Mulat, "Domestic Sources of International Action: Ethiopia and the Global War on Terrorism," 136.
[908] Shinn, "Ethiopia: Governance and Terrorism"; Piombo and Englebert, "The War on Terror in Context: Domestic Dimensions of Ethiopia and Kenya's Policies towards Somalia."
[909] Piombo and Englebert, "The War on Terror in Context: Domestic Dimensions of Ethiopia and Kenya's Policies towards Somalia."
[910] Woldemariam, "Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia," 282.

complying with a binding decision.[911]

The Isaias regime of Eritrea could not accept the US hypocrisy and the inability of the international community to force the EPRDF regime to respect the final and binding decision from the Boundary Commission. When Meles was playing smartly by recognizing the boundary commission's decision 'in principle' without committing to implementation, Isaias further increased assistance to insurgent and Islamist groups opposed to Ethiopia, including ICU and al-Shabaab. Ethiopia used Eritrean support to ICU and Al-Shabaab to push for sanctions against Eritrea. Through UN Security Council sanction No. 1907 of December 2009, Eritrea was barred from any trade in arms as well as travel bans and asset freezes, thereby further curbing Eritrea's capacity to challenge Ethiopia. Furthermore, the EPRDF regime not only used the closer ties with the US to isolate Eritrea but also masterfully capitalized on its closer ties with the US to increase Ethiopia's influence in international organizations to legitimize its interventionist policies, deny support to its insurgent groups, ostracize Eritrea, and emerge as the preferred regional peacemaker. This aspect is discussed in the next section.

6.7.2 Using International Organizations to Legitimize Interventionist Policies and Channel External Resources

Like the Haile Selassie regime, the EPRDF regime capitalized on Ethiopia's preponderance in the Horn of Africa region to use international organizations, IGAD, AU, and UN to advance its regional security interest vis-à-vis Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea between 1996 and 2012. Even though the EPRDF did not have a positive attitude towards regional organizations in the early years because of their default position to support the incumbent regime that they were fighting against, both IGADD and OAU. As the incumbent, the EPRDF regime adjusted to the new reality and embraced both organizations to punish activist regional actors, Islamist Sudan, AIAI, and other Islamist movements, and later Eritrea. The EPRDF regime viewed both IGADD and the OAU as forums for peacemaking and peacekeeping in Sudan, legitimizing interventions in Somalia, isolating Eritrea, and socializing regional actors into governance rules.

For instance, the EPRDF regime started the idea of reinvigorating the IGADD at the

[911] Woldemariam, 382.

IGADD fourth annual summit of 1993 that was held in Addis Ababa. In a move that mirrored the EPRDF regime's making of self-determination of NCIGs as the pillar of its new nation-building policy, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi proposed a resolution called "Declaration of Principles" (DoP) in 1994. The DoP suggested that the peoples of Southern Sudan's right to self-determination through a referendum should be respected by Khartoum if it insisted on nation-building that was centered around making Sharia the essence of Sudanese national identity. [912] Sudan refused to accept the DoP.

Following the placing of Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorism in 1993[913] by the Clinton administration and subsequent the naming of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda as frontline states to contain the Islamist agenda of the NIF regime,[914] the regimes in Addis Ababa and Asmara, then friendly, attempted to mediate between the Sudanese government and SPLM/A insurgent group. At the end of this failed attempt, Ethiopia convened an extraordinary session in Addis Ababa to expand the mandate of the IGADD from managing drought and development to high politics of peace and security. The renewed and reinvigorated IGADD changed its nomenclature from the Intergovernmental Authority for Development and Drought (IGADD) to the "Intergovernmental Authority for Development" (IGAD) in 1996.

However, after Ethiopia-backed SPLM/A defeated Sudanese Defense Forces in multiple battles and occupied territories, including Kurmuk-Geizan[915], Sudan accepted a peace agreement that the US also pushed. Furthermore, the lack of commitment of the al-Bashir regime to the peace agreement was changed following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. To escape the fate of Saddam Hussein, al-Bashir agreed to IGAD-led and Troika-sponsored (U.S., U.K., and Norway) peace talks, which were concluded with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. Under the influence of GWOT and the earlier backing of the EPRDF regime, South Sudan became the second republic, after Eritrea, to gain independence in the Horn of Africa in July 2011 through a referendum in which 98.83% of the voters preferred secession.[916] The EPRDF regime played an important

[912] Dribssa Beyene, "Sovereignty Preservation Attenuating It Elsewhere: The Political and Security Dimensions of Buffer Zones," 281.
[913] Shinn, "Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview," 82.
[914] Mulat, "Domestic Sources of International Action: Ethiopia and the Global War on Terrorism," 136.
[915] Tadesse, "Making Sense of Ethiopia's Regional Influence," 339.
[916] Arnold and Leriche, *South Sudan from Revolution to Independence*, 23.

role in empowering the fragmented SPLM/A to challenge the Sudanese state between 1995-1997 and in making the peace that produced the CPA. Although the independence of South Sudan was not a preferred outcome of the EPRDF regime in 2011, due to the growing strategic partnership between Addis Ababa and Khartoum and Ethiopia's need to keep Sudan away from the influence of Cairo, its previous roles as an anchor state for the United States (West) contributed substantially to increased resource capture and diplomatic weight.

Following the CPA, another crisis also broke out in Darfur. The Darfur elites who contested Sudanese national identity, as was South Sudan, started an armed struggle. The Al Bashir regime dispatched a genocidal militia called Janjaweed to defeat the rebellion in Darfur. The outcome was horrifying, with over 200,000 deaths and millions of displacements.[917] The African Union took charge of resolving the violence. While the African Union was trying to solve the problem, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Bashir on charges of genocide in Darfur in 2006 and released the arrest warrant in 2009. When Bashir was targeted, the EPRDF regime stood by Sudan and dispatched peacekeepers in three separate missions between 2006-2011: UNAMID, UNISFA, and UNMISS.

The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was a hybrid, joint peacekeeping mission that was meant to oversee the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and protect civilians in Darfur and monitor and verify the implementation of agreements. The United Nations in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was the UN-mandated peacekeeping mission created following the independence of South Sudan. While the first two missions were important for Ethiopia's role in regional peace-keeping missions, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), which was started with a 4,200 exclusively Ethiopian peacekeeping force to monitor Abyei, a disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan, in 2011 was an exception and source of national pride for Ethiopia.[918] This was because the agreement of Sudan and South Sudan to the deployment was considered the trust that Ethiopia earned from both Khartoum and Juba. Furthermore, it was a unique case in that Ethiopia was the only country that deployed an UN-mandated

[917] Guy Arnold, "Sudan and the Horn of Africa," in *Migration* (New Jersey: Pluto Press, 2012), 151, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183h0pm.16.

[918] Kidist Mulugeta, "The Role of Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security: The Case of Ethiopia," *Horn of Africa Security Dialogue*, no. July (2014): 1–42, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10879.pdf. Mulugeta.

peacekeeping mission to enforce peace between two neighboring countries.

Somalia was the other neighboring state where Ethiopia capitalized on international organizations to achieve its foreign and security goal. As discussed in section 6.3., Ethiopia unilaterally intervened in Somalia in December 2006 with massive force with justifications of protecting the TFG and self-defense. Even though the US defended this intervention, the Arab League opposed Ethiopia's intervention.[919] To avoid diplomatic isolation with Arab countries and the inevitable quagmire, Ethiopia asked IGAD, which it dominated, to establish a regional peacekeeping mission as an exit strategy in early 2007.[920] In line with the request and the authority the African Union accorded to regional organizations like IGAD of the Horn of Africa to spearhead the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in their respective regions,[921] IGAD established IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM). However, IGASOM could not be cleared by the UN Security Council even if approved by the African Union. Following the intervention of Ethiopia, however, both the African Union and the UN Security Council immediately authorized and approved the deployment of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in February 2007 with Security Council resolution 1744.[922] This gave Ethiopia the necessary diplomatic cover to withdraw its forces from Somalia without losing face.

Aside from masterfully using IGAD and AU for peace-making and peacekeeping in Sudan and for state-building and intervention in Somalia, it has also used international organizations to achieve its foreign policy goal against the third neighboring state. After 9/11, 2001, Eritrea was the only neighboring state that hosted and supported Ethiopia's militant groups, including the OLF, ONLF, G7, and other smaller rebel groups. In its proxy war against the EPRDF regime, the Isaias regime of Eritrea assisted Islamist groups, including the ICU and Al Shabaab. To the advantage of Ethiopia, Eritrea also temporarily left both IGAD and the AU, arguing that they are tools of the EPRDF regime. The EPRDF regime used this, along with Eritrea's support for Al Shabaab, to accuse it of being a 'terror-

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[919] Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia : A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017*, 33. Williams, 33.

[920] Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia : A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017*, 21. Williams, 21.

[921] AU, "Constitutive Act of the African Union," 2000, Article 4, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.

[922] Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia : A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017*, 42.

sponsoring state' that was endorsed by IGAD, the AU, and then by the UN Security Council. Accordingly, as discussed in the previous section, the UNSC sanctioned Eritrea in 2009, causing it to become increasingly isolated. In addition, routinized legitimization work through IGAD, AU, and the UN, the personal diplomatic acumen of Meles Zenawi helped Ethiopia emerge as one of the representatives of Africa in global forums that placed it well to manage criticisms of its atrocious counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism strategies in Oromia, Somali region, and Somalia.[923]

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter addressed how the nation-building policies of the victorious NCIG organizations, EPRDF, Shaebia, and early on the OLF, led to a redefinition of the national identity of Ethiopia to address the past injustices of political domination, economic exploitations, and cultural marginalization of NCIGs by recognizing the secession of Eritrea and restructuring the rest of Ethiopia in a way that NCIGs were protected and promoted. However, the EPRDF regime also excluded significant political forces from the core and the NICGs. Elites of the past regimes and organizations of Ethio-nationalists, including EPRP and MEISONE, were barred from participating in the national conference that legitimized the redefinition of the national identity of Ethiopia. The EPRDF also made sure other autonomous organizations of NCIGs, mainly OLF and ONLF, were expelled from Oromia and Somali regions, respectively, to ensure the EPRDF hegemony by establishing surrogate organizations. The autonomy and devolution of powers that were constitutionally guaranteed were recentralized and placed under strict control of the TPLF network, which resulted in contestations of the nation-building policies of the EPRDF regime.

As the EPRDF by design precluded peaceful contestation, apart from the 2005 general elections, organizations of NCIGs returned to armed struggle to realize their conception of national identity. The OLF and ONLF returned to the armed struggle in 1992 and 1994, respectively. Other organizations of the core group, like G7, also took arms after the 2005 elections. In the context of the post-Cold War international environment, these armed groups could not attract considerable external support, even though their choice of armed struggles were resource-intensive undertakings. These organizations and Somali-based Islamist

[923] Tadesse, “Making Sense of Ethiopia’s Regional Influence.”

groups like AIAI had limited support from Somali nonstate actors, as Somalia was a failed state. The NIF regime of Sudan also hosted and assisted Ethiopia's organizations of NCIGs, including ONLF, OLF, and other smaller Islamist movements between 1994-1998. Following the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean War of 1998-2000, Khartoum dropped its project of exporting Islamic state ideology, sidelined Turabi, and sustainably partnered with Addis Ababa. Eritrea became the hub of Ethiopia's armed groups in place of Sudan. As in the cases of the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes, the nature and magnitude of external support for these militant groups shaped the regional security policy of the EPRDF regime.

As was the case during previous regimes, in the south-eastern, the OLF, ONLF, and AIAI started armed resistance against the national power of the TPLF and the imposition of surrogate organizations, as well as restructuring of the Ethiopian state that undermined the territorial and identity claims of these organizations. The OLF was the first group to seriously challenge the EPRDF regime, with limited support from Somali nonstate actors and the NIF regime of Sudan. The second and more enduring organization was the ONLF, while the Islamist AIAI was changing its form and structure after major defeats at the hands of the Ethiopian forces. The EPRDF regime focused on four major strategies to manage threats in southeastern Ethiopia and Somalia; a divide and rule strategy backed up by strict control through surrogate parties and counterinsurgency were the main tools used domestically. Building buffer zones throughout the ungoverned spaces of Somalia was the main strategy to control the threats from organizations of Somali and Oromo NCIGs, transnational terror groups, and Eritrean infiltrators. The third strategy was to support and consolidate governance islands like Somaliland and Jubaland, which later formed an Ethiopia-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The EPRDF regime's role in establishing and maintaining the TFG was mainly to deny the emergence of a nationalist/Islamist central government in Somalia that may summon the Greater Somalia ideology. Finally, direct military interventions were also employed to eliminate threats or protect friendly clients. These strategies were further bolstered by the strategy of extraversion as an anchor state and the use of international organizations for legitimacy.

In the early 1990s, Sudan became the hub of international Islamist and insurgent groups. Ethiopia's nationalist groups like OLF and ONLF and Islamist groups like AIAI were among the insurgents hosted and supported by the Islamist NIF regime. To break the strong revisionist orientation of the NIF regime and stop it from supporting OLF, ONLF,

AIAI, and other small groups across the Ethio-Sudanese border, the EPRDF regime invited the SPLM to return to Ethiopia and fight the NIF regime with the support from the West. As the Darg regime did in the 1980s, the EPRDF regime not only supported SPLM/A but also dispatched special operation units of battle-hardened Ethiopian troops to depose the NIF regime. However, the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2008 intervened. To focus on Eritrea, the EPRDF regime accepted rapprochement with Sudan, which transformed into one of the closest partners of Ethiopia in the region. As the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes sustainably befriended Kenya and Djibouti, respectively, the EPRDF also sustainably partnered with Sudan following Khartoum's ceasing support for Ethiopia's insurgent groups in the context of GWOT. Furthermore, the issue of Nile waters which was progressively becoming a bone of contention between Egypt and Ethiopia, was also transformed by starting of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2011 and further consolidated with Sudan's support for the dam in 2012. As a result, Khartoum's strong revisionist orientation was transformed into a strong status quo orientation that resulted in a sustainably amicable relationship, with only technical issues like the timeline of filling GERD and border demarcation that were yet to be settled.

Even though the EPRDF regime assumed that facilitating independence and international recognition of Eritrea would solve one of the basic contradictions of the national identity of Ethiopia, Eritrea invaded Ethiopia after only five years of formal separation, thereby shortly moving from a strong status quo orientation to a strong revisionist orientation. The precipitating and formal cause of the war was conflicting claims to Badme; the underlying cause was incompatible nation-building policies of Shaebia and EPRDF. On the one hand, Shaebia was busy constructing a unitary national identity that crosses religious, regional, and other identification markers, deliberately restructuring the Eritrean boundaries to cut across multiple identities. The Eritrean elites envisioned making Eritrea a 'Singapore' of Africa, assuming to source raw materials and profits from the Ethiopian hinterland. On the other hand, the EPRDF regime was building a multinational federal state under the monopoly of two-tiered TPLF vanguard party structures. The inevitable violent clash between the two parties was concluded with a definitive Ethiopia victory in 2000. The post-war international arbitration gave Badme to Eritrea, and Ethiopia refused to vacate it, using closer ties with the US as a shield. The frustrated Isaias of Eritrea chose to support militant groups opposed to the EPRDF regime, including OLF, ONLF, G7, ICU, and Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia used Eritrean support to ICU and Al-Shabaab to push for sanctions

against Eritrea. Accordingly, the UNSC sanctions barred Eritrea from any trade in arms on top of targeted travel bans and asset freezes against its leaders, which in turn, led to further isolation of Eritrea along with insurgent groups.

During the EPRDF regime, Djibouti maintained its weak status quo orientation towards the EPRDF regime and its armed opponents. After the breakdown of the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti became the sole port of entry and exit, accounting for 95% of Ethiopian imports and exports since 1998. First, Djibouti had a different conception of rebuilding the central government for Somalia. Djibouti led a peace process that created TNG, perceived as a Hawiye-dominated and Islamist regime that started provoking Ethiopia before consolidating power. Even though initially recognized to appease Djibouti, the EPRDF eventually eliminated and replaced the TNG with a friendly TFG. Subsequently, Djibouti consistently supported Ethiopia's regional policy, except its policy to host multiple foreign militaries that Ethiopia categorically rejected. However, the EPRDF regime still wanted mutual dependence with Djibouti by including Djibouti state in Ethiopia's long-term national development plans and by including Djibouti's ruling class in privileged access to wealth in Ethiopia.

As was the case during the preceding regime, Kenya maintained a strong status-quo orientation toward the EPRDF nation-building policies and organizations that oppose them. Furthermore, both Kenya and Ethiopia were mainly concerned with Somalia and its insecurity externalities. To manage threats from Somalia, Nairobi worked with Ethiopia to install a government of their choice in Mogadishu. With agitation from Ethiopia and the US, along with increasing transborder kidnapping of Al Shabaab, Kenya also adopted Ethiopia's strategies of military intervention and establishing a built buffer zone within Somalia. Furthermore, while Kenya and Ethiopia worked to control possible adverse effects from the Sudan conflict through peace-making, Nairobi further strengthened its partnership with Addis Ababa by standing with Ethiopia against Eritrea proxy wars and Egypt's hydro-hegemony.

Finally, the EPRDF regime was able to capture far more external resources in the context of GWOT and, more importantly, was able to deny the flow of external aid to its opponents, organizations of NCIGs, and Islamist movements in the Horn of Africa region. As the anchor state of the region, Ethiopia was able to simultaneously build its capacity with external support while successfully denying external assistance to militant groups from

neighboring states, except for Eritrea. Furthermore, Eritrea, which supported Ethiopia's militant groups, was isolated and sanctioned with the help of the US and international organizations. Besides, after directly invading Somalia, Ethiopia used regional organizations, IGAD and AU, to develop an exit strategy with the deployment of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which the UN Security Council ultimately authorized in 2007. By combining its closer ties with the US with its diplomatic weight in regional international organizations, Meles Zenawi's EPRDF legitimized its interventionist policies, denied support to its insurgent groups, ostracized Eritrea, and emerged as the preferred regional peacemaker between 1991 and 2012.

CHAPTER VII

7. CONCLUSION

The modern Ethiopian state was founded by combining two categories of cultural constituencies through treaties signed with neighboring colonial powers after the victory of Adwa in 1896. The first cultural constituency was the Abyssinian core, whose identification markers, including the shared myth of origin and ancient history of statehood, writing system, ancient Christian tradition, and court culture, were superimposed as the national identity of Ethiopia. To maintain the Abyssinian core as the permanent source of sovereign political authority, the ruling class determined its exclusionary myth of origin and values to anchor the state's laws, policies, and institutions. The second cultural constituency is the remaining multicultural noncore identity groups that responded differently to the nation-state project of homogenizing them into the values of the Abyssinian core. Furthermore, with the imposition of Amharic as the sole medium of public communication in the 1950s, non-Amharic members of the Abyssinian core groups were demoted to the rank of NCIGs required to learn Amharic to integrate.

The ensuing resistance against the top-down project of building a nation out of a multinational society produced cyclical and episodic wars of belonging internally and externally. Due to violent contestations, regimes were overthrown, national identities were defined and redefined, and territories were redrawn, internally and externally. For instance, the Haile Selassie regime was abolished by the Darg regime. The Darg regime, which eliminated class oppressions and secularised the religious dimension of Ethiopian national identity, was overthrown by the TPLF-led EPRDF regime, which restructured administrative boundaries based mainly on linguistic criteria to address the past national oppressions. The second group that defeated the Darg regime, Shaebia, declared the independence of Eritrea in 1993 by redrawing the boundary of Ethiopia and making it landlocked. There were also related interstate wars with Somalia and Eritrea, armed interventions, and proxy wars in Somalia and Sudan. With the overthrow of the TPLF and the ascendancy of the Abiy Ahmed regime in 2018, another episode of violent wars of national belonging is ongoing, with regional countries like Eritrea

heavily involved. To understand these complex wars of national belonging and their interplay with the regional security policies of Ethiopia, this study answers the following questions: Why and how have domestic and regional actors contested the national identity of modern Ethiopia? How have contestations of national identity constituted changes and continuities in Ethiopia's regional security policy throughout the three regimes?

These questions are answered by developing an analytical framework that bridged the internal and external dimensions of national identity contestations and how these interplays constituted Ethiopia's regional security policy. This framework of analysis takes national identity contestations and regional security policies as socially constructed, each mutually constituted by ideational and material factors within their historical contexts. The model is based on a two-stage qualitative research design. First, data collected from foundational texts such as Kebre Nagast, archival sources, chronicles, constitutions, proclamations, diplomatic letters, and secondary sources were analyzed and interpreted within their specific temporal contexts to establish the dominant discourse of constructing a nation-state out of a multinational society as well as counter-discourses. Second, each regime's longitudinal dyadic cases were selected and analyzed to understand the links between domestic resistance against nation-state projects and regional security policies. Ethiopia's regional security policies during the Haile Selassie period (1941-1974) were studied using three dyads, Ethio-Sudan, Ethio-Somalia, and Ethio-Kenya. During the Darg period (1974-1991), the Ethio-Djibouti dyad was added as the fourth case, while Eritrea was added as the fifth case during the EPRDF period (1991-2012). The changes and continuities of Ethiopia's policies towards its neighboring states were traced based on their willingness and capacity to support nationalist movements over time.

The analysis of dominant discourses, counter-discourses, and case studies revealed three major findings that answered the research questions. First, the modern Ethiopian state was a product of centuries-old internal processes stacked on an imported European nation-state model. The combination of the already exclusionary, monopolistic, and violent history of statehood in Ethiopia and the European nation-state model that required congruence of the nation and the state resulted in exclusionary nation-building projects that reproduced political domination, economic exploitation, and cultural marginalization of the NCIGs.

As detailed in Chapter 3, Ethiopia has a long history of statehood grounded in the myth of origin provided by the Kebra Nagast, which defined identity and temporal and spatial dimensions of the national identity of Ethiopia. Accordingly, Ethiopia was born out of divine will 3000 years ago when the son of the biblical King Solomon of Israel and Queen Sheba of Ethiopia, Menilek I, brought the Ark of Covenant to Ethiopia. According to the discourses of the Kebra Nagast, the typical national identification markers of the people of Ethiopia and its rulers are the Solomonic dynasty, Tabot Christianity and the Ge'ez writing system, Aksum civilization, and ancient history of statehood. Spatially, the Kebra Nagast gave the king of Ethiopia the authority to conquer and demand tribute from dominions up to Jerusalem. The configuration of these ideational factors recreated a hegemonic state around 1270 that aggressively expanded and established tributary relationships with other polities in the Horn of Africa, including with the Muslim sultanates to the east.

However, two events in the first half of the 16th century produced different configurations of the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. First, one of the tributaries of the Ethiopian kingdom, which was pushed to the periphery over two centuries, the Adal Sultanate, led by Imam Ahmed Gragn, defeated and conquered Ethiopia with the support of the Ottoman Empire. Imam Ahmed conquered most of the domains of Ethiopia, destroyed some of its institutions, and converted some of its population to Islam. Ethiopia sent for support from Europe to overcome this catastrophe. The Portuguese Empire responded with four hundred musketeers. One of the Portuguese marksmen killed the Imam on the battlefield. After the death of the Imam, the Adal Sultanate left the highland Christian Kingdom and retreated to Harar. The survival from permanent conquest created an enduring Ethiopian "exceptionalism", "Ahmed Gragn" syndrome, and siege mentality and with the enduring quest for external technologies of war.

Second, Oromo emerged as the third major force in the 16th century, along Ethiopia and Adal Sultanate, in the Horn of Africa. With its Gadaa governance system, it dominated both the Ethiopian Christian Kingdom and Adal Sultanate until the mid-19th century when European missionaries and arms merchants started to show up in the Red Sea region, including the highlands of Ethiopia. Emperors Tewodros II and Yohannes IV requested modern arms from

European powers to cleanse the Abyssinian core from the Oromo and Muslims. On the other hand, their successor, Emperor Menilek II, concluded modern Ethiopia's state-making process, after Adwa's victory, with two critical decisions. First, Menilek expanded Ethiopia beyond its core of Abyssinia by conquering peoples of diverse history, pedigree, tribes, ethnicity, languages, religion, and other identification markers that are a demographic majority compared to the core of Abyssinia. At the same time, he allowed the core Abyssinian people of Kebessa, in what is now highland Eritrea, to be a colony of Italy, making Ethiopia both landlocked and encircled by colonial powers. These two decisions, the conquest of peoples of different history and identities and leaving the core people beyond defined territorial borders, have become the bones of contention concerning nation-building and national identity contestations that have rocked both the Ethiopian state and its relations with neighboring postcolonial states, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan.

His successor, Lij Iyasu, tried to overcome these contradictions by trying to integrate the diverse population and strategizing to expel European colonial powers from the Red Sea and control Eritrea and Djibouti by making an alliance with Somali freedom fighters and attempting to align with Ottoman and German side during the First World War. The reaction of the Christian establishment combined with threatened European colonial powers was not only the deposition of Iyasu through ex-communication but also a commitment to prohibit leaders of Muslim backgrounds and other confessional groups from participating in the sovereignty of the Ethiopian state. Ras Tafari (later Emperor Haile Selassie), who led the coup against Iyasu with foreign support, started the reverse process of nation-building that excluded even those allowed by Emperor Menilek II to join the governance networks from the periphery. Haile Selassie's move to combine European nation-state structure to further enhance the exclusionary national imagination of Kebra Nagast created a hybrid state with which he arrogated to himself and his line as only legitimate sovereigns of Ethiopia, with Tabot Christianity, Amharic, and Abyssinian court culture defined as markers of Ethiopian national identity and power.

After a brief occupation of Fascist Italy between 1936 and 1941, Britain put Emperor Haile Selassie back on his throne. He returned from exile with a commitment to build a nation from a multicultural, multilinguistic, and multireligious society. To that end, the Haile Selassie regime took an absolutist and violent state based on the exclusionary national imagination of

Kebre Nagast and stacked it on an inherently uniformity-seeking European nation-state model. The objective of nation-building was using modern state institutions to assimilate the noncore identity groups (NCIGs) to drop their "tribal" and "backward" identities and instead integrate into the historical and core 'Ethiopian' national identity. The Abyssinian core values and Amharic were propagated through the state and ideological state apparatuses. Schools, courts, local governments, the army, history writing, cultural productions (including in cinema, radio, newspapers, TV, museums, festivals, and holidays), and all tentacles of the state and ideological apparatuses were directed to regenerating core values. At the same time, identification markers of NCIGs were progressively removed from public use or display. Languages of NCIGs and all other cultural practices and identity regeneration institutions of NCIGs were proscribed. The only means to access state power and resources and to be included in the networks of the ruling class was assimilation into one nation, one religion, and one language core values.

The Haile Selassie regime's exclusionary nation-building policies faced resistance from Muslim-majority areas, first from Eritrean Muslim League. When exclusions took a linguistic turn in the 1950s, Christian Eritreans started to be disenchanted by the domination of Shewa Amhara. With political domination, economic exclusion, and ontological insecurity, the Eritrean Muslims were the first to start an armed struggle against the Amharization policy of the Haile Selassie regime by establishing the Eritrean Liberation Front (Jebha) in 1961 in Cairo and started the armed struggle. Even though Jebha's territorial claim of Eritrea was based on colonially defined borders, in terms of identity, it was Muslim dominated and was not inclusive enough of the more organized Eritrean Christians. Because of its organizational weakness, Jebha was replaced by a more inclusive Eritrean People's Liberation Front (Shaebia) by 1981. Shaebia used support from the Eritrean diaspora, the Arab world, and the humanitarian agencies of the West, mainly through Sudan, to challenge massive Ethiopia's army. Finally, Shaebia defeated the Ethiopian army in 1991 and declared the independence of Eritrea.

The Second politically significant group that started an intense and durable armed struggle to separate from Ethiopia was the Somali NCIGs. First, different Somali movements, later organized under Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), aspired to secede with a fifth of the Ethiopian territory and join their kin in Somalia. Second, as the Ogaadeni clan of Ethiopia was part of the Darod ruling super-clan, the Somali quest for self-determination was both secession

and irredentism at the same time. The fighting units of WSLF were trained, organized, armed, and controlled by the Republic of Somalia. When the WSLF failed to produce the desired result, the Somali National Army (SNA) invaded Ethiopia in July 1977. SNA and WSLF were defeated decisively, and secession and irredentism did not materialize. Instead, the Somali state and the WSLF could not recover from the defeat. After the defeat, elements of WSLF founded a new organization, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), in 1984 to establish a new state called Ogadenia instead of joining Somalia. When its quest for a referendum for self-determination of the Somali-speaking region was denied in 1994, it returned to the desert to fight the EPRDF regime.

The third Politically significant group was the Oromo, a noncore national group that constituted over a third of the Ethiopian population. Following the crushing of peaceful movements for cultural recognition, Waldaa Maccaa-Tuulama, the Oromo Liberation Front, was founded in 1973 as a vanguard organization for the self -determination of the Oromo, with a territorial claim of about half of the country. Due to the overlap of territorial claims of the OLF and the Greater Somalia project, the Barre regime tried to silence Oromo nationalists by imprisonments and even killings at times. Irrespective of its claim to a large and relatively rich constituency, the OLF could not develop the organizational wherewithal to capitalize on the potential of the Oromo. In addition to organizational weakness, it could not build dependable external support because of geopolitical contradictions, internal infighting by elite interests, and regional and religious fragmentations. With limited support from Sudan, Shaebia, and sometimes from Somalia, the OLF joined the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in 1991 as a junior partner and contributed remarkably to national identity redefinition and state restructuring. In less than two years, it was forced out of the TGE and returned to armed struggle without much of an outcome.

The final politically significant group that joined violent national identity contestations was Tigray. The subjective awareness of exclusion by the Shewa Amhara ruling class monopolizing power and using Amharic as a device of exclusion led to university students founding the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in 1975. In addition to the distal memory of Tigray as the center of Ethiopian civilization, the decision to break Tigrayans into two at the end of the 19th century, political domination, and economic exclusion was a source of

mobilization against the Amhara power. After realizing the possibility of capturing the Ethiopian state, the TPLF established surrogate organizations from other NCIGs and established the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1989 to overcome its demographic disadvantage (6%). Upon controlling the seat of the government of Ethiopia in May 1991, the TPLF-dominated EPRDF regime introduced a new nation-building project that reorganized the Ethiopian state as a multinational federal state and redefined its national identity. In direct contradiction to the assimilationist policies of the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes, the EPRDF regime made two critical decisions regarding the 'nationalities question'. First, accepting the Eritrean question as a colonial question facilitated Eritrea's independence and international recognition through a referendum in 1993. Second, it declared that the "nationalities question" of the rest of NCIGs was a problem of "national oppression" that could be solved through internal self-determination. It restructured the Ethiopian state based on linguistic criteria. However, it soon continued the path-dependent hegemonic and monopolistic tendencies of the past regimes that triggered national identity contestations from Oromo, Somali, and other NCIGs.

The answer to the second research question about the mutual constitution of national identity contestations and regional security is based on the mechanism of external support. This study argued that Ethiopia's security policies and relations with countries with which it shares borders are mainly constituted by the nature and magnitude of external support that nationalist movements accessed through them. If the neighboring state is willing and capable of supporting the national identity contestations against Ethiopia, the neighboring state is defined as an existential threat that requires extraordinary measures to change its behaviors. If the neighboring state is willing but lacks the capacity to support the national identity contestation against Ethiopia, the neighboring state is partially securitized If the neighboring state is capable of supporting the nationalist movements but not willing to allow the nationalist movements to use its resources, Ethiopia follows amicable policies. If the neighboring state is unwilling to help the nationalist movement but lacks the capacity to stop the nationalist movement using its resources, Ethiopia supports the neighboring state.

The five cases presented in the empirical chapters overwhelmingly prove the argument that Ethiopia's regional security policies were mainly constituted by the willingness and

capacity of the neighboring state. Consequently, the nature of Ethiopia's security policy varied depending on the willingness and the magnitude of support the nationalist groups received from or through the neighboring states. Except for Somalia, which was engaged in an irredentist project that made it to the top of the security agenda. This major finding is briefly supported by evidence from the five cases studied longitudinally.

The first case study is Sudan, the first to gain independence in January 1956 from neighboring states sharing a boundary with Ethiopia. Initially, Sudan followed a status quo foreign policy orientation that respected Ethiopia's territorial integrity. However, its willingness and capacity to support Ethiopia's nationalist movement were mainly shaped by developments outside Sudan. The Nile hydro-politics and Arab-Israeli conflicts frequently intervened to change Khartoum's treatment of the nationalist movements. As a result, when military regimes supported by Egypt came to power, Sudan's support to Ethiopian insurgent groups increased. As a physical conduit that connected Ethiopian nationalist movements with their offices in Cairo and beyond, Ethiopia also used South Sudan insurgents as a bargaining chip. However, the support that northern nationalist movements, EPLF and TPLF, accessed through Sudan in the context of the Cold War led to a change of regime in Ethiopia, Eritrea's independence, and the redefinition of the national identity of Ethiopia. The activist foreign policy of Sudan in the 1990s led to massive support for SPLM that ultimately resulted in the independence of South Sudan. After 1998, Sudan completely disengaged from supporting Ethiopia's nationalist movements, producing the most amicable relationship between the two countries., the EPRDF regime also sustainably partnered with Sudan following Khartoum's ceasing support for Ethiopia's insurgent groups in the context of GWOT. Furthermore, the issue of Nile waters which was progressively becoming a bone of contention between Egypt and Ethiopia, was also transformed by GERD in 2011 and further consolidated with Sudan's support for the dam in 2012. As a result, Khartoum's strong revisionist orientation was transformed into a strong status quo orientation that resulted in a sustainably amicable relationship, with only technical issues like the timeline of filling GERD and border demarcation yet to be settled.

In the second case study, Somalia's open irredentism and support for the organizations of NCIGs have made it the most securitized neighboring state since its independence in 1960. Since its declaration of its intention to unite Somali-speaking territories, including Ogaden of

Ethiopia and Djibouti, the main port of Ethiopia, the Republic of Somalia emerged as the top national security threat throughout all three regimes. With diametrically opposite nation-state imagination, including by making Imam Ahmed of the 16th century, who conquered Ethiopia, its national hero, Mogadishu awakened ontological insecurity in Ethiopia that necessitated the employment of all strategies and resources at its disposal. Somalia's portrayal of Ethiopia as a "black colonial empire" and its open support for Eritrea, Oromo, and later Tigrayan nationalist movements defined Ethiopia's regional security policies since the Haile Selassie regime. Ethiopia's strategic relations with Kenya, Ethiopia's Africa policy and hosting of the OAU, and appeasement policies toward Djibouti and Sudan were constituted by the imperative to focus on Somalia. The Darg regime, on its part, employed all the security devices at its disposal to stop Somali irredentism and support of nationalist movements. As a result, the Ethio-Somalia war of 1977/78 was concluded with a definitive victory for Ethiopia. Subsequent proxy wars also ended with the collapse of the Somali state. The EPRDF regime also followed multidimensional security strategies, including buffer zones and direct military intervention to deny the emergence of irredentist and Islamist regime in Somalia.

The third longitudinal case is Kenya. Since the signing of the Defense Pact against Somali irredentism in 1963, Ethiopia and Kenya maintained amicable and cooperative relations. The status quo policies of Kenya and shared insecurities from Somalia's irredentist policies further pushed the two states to develop common policies that use the regional and continental organizations as a shield against Somali irredentism. Irrespective of ideological differences, Kenya stood with Ethiopia during the Somali aggression and conducted diplomatic wars against Somalia and its backers, including Egypt and Iran, in the 1980s. In the War on Terror context, Kenya and Ethiopia have also increased their cooperation to fight Al Shabaab, install a government of their preference and make peace in Sudan. Furthermore, while Kenya and Ethiopia worked to control possible adverse effects from the Sudan conflict through peacemaking, Nairobi further strengthened its partnership with Addis Ababa by standing with Ethiopia against Eritrea proxy wars and Egypt's hydro-hegemony.

Djibouti, the fourth dyadic case, gained independence in June 1977. It is the most important neighboring state for Ethiopia's national security. For the first eight months of its independence, Djibouti supported Greater Somalia. However, once the Somali army was

decisively defeated, Djibouti changed its approach to developing economic integration with Ethiopia. Furthermore, Djibouti redefined its role as a regional peacemaking state. Because of this, it became the seat of the IGADD (later IGAD) and helped make peace between the Bare regime and the Darg in 1988. During the EPRDF regime, Djibouti maintained its distance from Ethiopia's nationalist movements, continuing an amicable relationship. After the breakdown of the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Djibouti became the sole port of Ethiopia, accounting for 95% of the volumes of Ethiopian imports and exports since 1998. The only minor differences between the EPRDF regime and Djibouti's ruling family were over the peace-making in Somalia and Djibouti's hosting multiple foreign militaries, which Ethiopia categorically rejected. However, the EPRDF regime still wanted mutual interdependence with Djibouti by including Djibouti state in Ethiopia's long-term national development plans and by including Djibouti's ruling class in privileged access to wealth in Ethiopia.

Finally, Eritrea was the last case that combined both irredentism and support for Ethiopia's nationalist movements, thereby becoming the most securitized neighboring state after 1998. Even though the EPRDF regime assumed that facilitating independence and international recognition of Eritrea would solve one of the basic contradictions of the national identity of Ethiopia, Eritrea invaded Ethiopia after only five years of formal separation, thereby shortly moving from a strong status quo orientation to a strong revisionist orientation. The precipitating and formal cause of the war was conflicting claims to Badme; the underlying cause was incompatible nation-building policies of Shaebia and EPRDF. On the one hand, Shaebia was busy constructing a unitary national identity that crosses religious, regional, and other identification markers, deliberately restructuring the Eritrean boundaries to cut across multiple identities. The Eritrean elites envisioned making Eritrea the 'Singapore' of Africa, assuming to source raw materials and profits from the Ethiopian hinterland.

On the other hand, the EPRDF regime was building a multinational federal state under the monopoly of two-tiered TPLF vanguard party structures. The inevitable violent clash between the two parties was concluded with a definitive Ethiopia victory in 2000. The post-war international arbitration gave Badme to Eritrea, and Ethiopia refused to vacate it, using closer ties with the US as a shield. The frustrated Isaias of Eritrea chose to support militant groups opposed to the EPRDF regime, including OLF, ONLF, G7, ICU, and Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia used

Eritrean support to ICU and Al-Shabaab to push for sanctions against Eritrea. Accordingly, the UNSC sanctions barred Eritrea from any trade in arms on top of targeted travel bans and asset freezes against its leaders, which led to further isolation of Eritrea and insurgent groups.

The other finding that reinforces the works of other scholars about the determinants of Ethiopia's foreign policy is Ethiopia's use of alliances with external powers and membership in international organizations to ensure its survival and territorial integrity. First, the Ethiopian state has always been defended, expanded, and protected with imported arms since the 16th century. Parallel to blocking external support to nationalist movements and irredentist neighbors, the top foreign policy determinant has been accessing dependable arms suppliers. During the Haile Selassie regime, the US provided most of the weapons and training with more know-how acquired from Israel, Norway, Yugoslavia, and India, among others. The Darg regime switched to the Soviet bloc for its record acquisition of weapons for the army increased over ten times from the preceding regime. Thousands of Cuban, Soviet, and Yemeni fighters joined the Ethiopian side to expel the Somali invasion of 1977. The EPRDF regime, like its predecessors, relied on imports of weapons with some improvements in maintaining imported weapons and producing some.

The second strategy that all three regimes, particularly the Haile Selassie and EPRDF regimes, used to delegitimize secessionist movements and deny external support to them was international organizations. The utility of the international organizations' protective shield was understood early on when Ethiopia became a member of the League of Nations (LN). However, the LN could not save Ethiopia from the occupation of Fascist Italy in 1936. Upon returning to his throne, Emperor Haile Selassie used the failure of the LN and international society as a moral arsenal to extract outstanding concessions like the federation of Eritrea. Moreover, Ethiopian diplomats used the stature of the emperor and Ethiopia's closer relationship with the West to block the Eritrean plight and request to respect the Federal Act. As a result, until the independence of Eritrea in 1993, the Eritrean question was buried as an internal matter.

The British-American demarche of 1959, accepting the union of Somaliland and Somalia, was a watershed in Ethiopia's perception of its place in the international alliances of the time. In addition to the West, other powers like the USSR, UAR, and the Arab League supported the

union forcing Ethiopia to recognize its isolation. To overcome this predicament of isolation and insecurity, the elites of the Haile Selassie regime came up with the idea that differed from the usual tendency to look for solutions to the West. Ethiopia's first and arguably most significant diplomatic victory was realized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on May 25, 1963. Six months before the establishment of OAU, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea, thereby exempting it from the principles it would introduce into the charter of the would-be continental organization. Henceforth, the OAU became the continental diplomatic shield to contain Somali irredentism and block Eritrean secessionism. Second, the location deterrence impeded the leadership of the nationalist movements from lobbying African countries at the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa.

Furthermore, by generously supporting the independence of other African countries, leading the anti-Apartheid struggles, and engaging in extensive peacemaking efforts, the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes successfully concealed the internal problems of national identity contestations and other demands for reform. Finally, through continental diplomacy, the Ogaden question of Somalia was dismissed as territorial aggrandizement, and the Eritrean question was silenced during the Haile Selassie and Darg regimes. Moreover, the EPRDF, under the leadership of PM Meles Zenawi, perfected the use of IOs, both African Union and IGAD, in legitimizing Ethiopia's regional policies, including invading Somalia in 2006 using IGAD, AU, and the UN as an exit strategy and denying support to its insurgent groups, ostracise Eritrea and emerge as the preferred regional peacemaker between 1991 and 2012.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Survey of Ethiopian National Identity Contestants 1941-2012

Contestants and establishment year	Goals	Supporters	Current Status as of 2022	Policy Outcome
Afar- Afar Liberation Front (ALF)-1975	secession	Saudi Arabia, Eritrea	Dormant	Regional Autonomy
Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI)-1984	Establishing an Islamic state that includes the Ogaden region of Ethiopia	Al Qaeda and Sudan	Liquidated and mutated to UIC and then Al-Shabaab	Securitization of the operation area
Anuak- Gambella People's Liberation Front (GPLF)-1980	Autonomy	Sudan	Dormant	Regional autonomy
Benishangul People Liberation Movement (BPLM)-1975		Sudan	Dormant	Regional autonomy
Eritrea 1998-2000 conventional wars	Spatial claims	Unknown	Unresolved	Defeat, marginalization, and status quo
Darg/-Provisional Military Administration Committee, 1974-1991, Military junta that hijacked the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution	National identity redefinition	Soviet Union, Cuba,	Liquidated in 1991	Redefining national identity from Christian monarchy to People's Democratic Republic
Eritrea- Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)-1961	Secession	Egypt, Syria, PLO, Somalia	Liquidated and mutated	Secession
Eritrea- Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)-1972	Secession	Egypt, Syria, PLO, Somalia, US, China,	Transformed into the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ)	Secession
Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF)-1998	Regime change	Eritrea, Diaspora	Mutated into Patriotic Ginbot 7 and then EZeMa	unresolved
EPRP- Ethiopian People's Revolutionary-1972	Regime Change	Diaspora	Liquidated and Mutated into Multiple Ethiopianist and Amhara Organizations	Influenced redefinition of state identity from Monarchy to the Socialist Republic
Federalist-Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front-1989	Regime change	Sudan, Somalia, UK, US	Dominant/transformed into Prosperity Party in 2019	Redefined National Identity
Gambella People's Liberation Front-2004	Secession	Eritrea	Dormant	unresolved
Marxist- Ethiopian	Regime change	Diaspora	Failed and mutated into	failed

People's Revolutionary Party-1975			multiple parties	
MEISONE- All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement-1968	Regime Change	Diaspora	Failed and mutated into Pan-Ethiopian and NCIG organizations	Influenced redefinition of state identity from Monarchy to the Socialist Republic
Monarchy-Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU)-1974	Counter-Revolutionary	Sudan, Saudi Arabia	Liquidated	Failed
Oromo- Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO)-1986	secession	Sudan, Somalia	Irrelevant. mutated to OLF	Securitization of the operation area
Oromo- Oromo Liberation (OLF)-1974	Secession	Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya	fragmented	Regional Autonomy
Oromo Somali-Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF)-1991	Secession	-	Fragmented and mutated	Regional Autonomy
Sidama- Sidama Liberation Movement	Secession	Diaspora	active	Regional autonomy
Patriotic Ginbot 7-2008	Regime Change	Eritrea, Egypt, Diaspora	Transformed into EZeMa	NA
Somalia, 1961, 1964, 1967, 977-78 skirmishes and conventional wars	Irredentism, annexing the Somali region of Ethiopia	Egypt and Its allies	Unresolved	Defeat and collapse
Somali-Ogaden National Liberation Front-1984	Secession	Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea	active	Regional autonomy, securitization of the operation area
Somali-Western Somali Liberation Front-1961	Secession	Somalia	Liquidated and mutated into ONLF, AIAI	Regional autonomy, securitization of the operation area
Tigray-Tigrayan People's Liberation Front-1975	Redefinition of national identity, regime change, and regional autonomy	Eritrea, Sudan	Dominant armed opposition since November 2020	redefined national identity, controlled the helm of power, and regional autonomy
Umbrella-Ethiopian Student Movement 1960-1974	Redefinition of national identity	Diaspora	Transformed and mutated	Succeeded/failed

Source: compiled by the author