T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE OXYMORON OF MONARCHIES PROMOTING CHANGE: QATAR AND THE ARAB SPRING

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

Ali ABO REZEG

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ANKARA, 2020

T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE OXYMORON OF MONARCHIES PROMOTING CHANGE: QATAR AND THE ARAB SPRING

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

Ali ABO REZEG

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Supervisor
Asst. Prof. Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA

ANKARA, 2020

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that this thesis entitled: The Oxymoron of Monarchies Promoting Change: Qatar and the Arab Spring, and submitted by Ali ABO REZEG has been approved unanimously by the examining committee members in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Title, Full Name	Affiliation	Signature
Asst. Prof. Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA	IYBU	
Prof. Dr. Muhittin ATAMAN	SSUA	
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Giray SADIK	IYBU	
Asst. Prof. Dr. Christian LEKON	IYBU	
Asst. Prof. Dr. Muhammed Hüseyin MERCAN	Marmara University	

Date of Defense: 27.11.2020

I certify that this thesis meets all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Ph.D. in International Relations at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Director of the Institute of Social Sciences Assoc. Prof. Dr. Seyfullah YILDIRIM

……

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

Name, Last Name : Ali ABO REZEG

Signature :

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to voice my sincere gratitude to the Turkish Scholarships (YTB) for giving me the chance to continue my higher education in Turkey, where I have come to realize that the world is much bigger than five.

Further, I would like to thank my wonderful supervisor, Bayram Sinkaya, for the meaningful notes and recommendations he provided while I was writing my dissertation. I am also thankful for the excellent jury members who spared no effort in helping me strengthen and improve many parts of the thesis, most notably Prof. Muhittin Ataman and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Giray Sadik.

Huge thanks also go to my mother, father and sisters, all of whom were among my main supporters throughout the course of my PhD journey.

Greatest thanks go to my beloved wife, who has been extremely patient despite the hundreds of hours spent away from her, and my lovely children, Yafa and Al-Hassan.

I am also grateful to many of my colleagues and friends from a host of different nationalities who have been more like brothers to me. A hearty '*Shukran*' is in order to Fatih, Adam, the Ahmeds, the Mohammeds, the Mahmouds, Youssef, Nasser, Amjad, Hatem, Hammam, Wael, Zaher, Omar, the Abdullahs, Yahya, Walid, Muhannad, Hamzeh, Ibrahim, Hassan, Bilal, Nidal, Mumin, Sharif, Huthaifa, Anas, Bashar, Bilal, Zaid, Issa, Muath, Saeb, Khalid, Islam, Assad, Hussein, Hussam, Saif, Bassem, Sufian and Yazan.

ABSTRACT

The Oxymoron of Monarchies Promoting Change: Qatar and the Arab Spring

Unlike the Arab monarchies, Qatar embraced a supportive position towards the Arab revolutions since the moment they broke out in late 2010. In fact, Qatar's Al-Jazeera network had been an essential media mobilizer for the Arab masses, and a major promoter of the revolutionary change process in the region by hosting pro-revolution Arab intellectuals and broadcasting pro-reform messages. Qatar firstly welcomed the Tunisian revolution, and financially backed the country in its transitional stage, the same it behaved with the Egyptian and Yemeni cases. What's more, Qatar made efforts to encourage Arab and international support for humanitarian intervention in Libya and Syria, and generously backed revolutionary forces there both financially and militarily. However, Qatar's pro-Arab Spring policies weakened its relations with its conservative neighbors, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, which, consequently, prompted them to boycott Doha and withdraw their ambassadors from there in 2014. Then, in the summer of 2017, the same three states, along with Egypt, announced a total boycott and embargo on Doha. Given the fact that Qatar's political system is of the conservative-monarchic type, this dissertation aims to review the dynamics that drove Doha to embrace a pro-change policy in the region during the Arab Spring by asking whether regime "types" matter in terms of their respective reactions to revolutions that occur in their geopolitical backyards. Along with studying Qatar's support for post-revolutionary Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Syria, a detailed analysis was conducted on Doha's role in Egypt with a view to better understanding what has come to be known as "Qatari Exceptionalism." This dissertation comes up with many conclusions with a view to understanding the geopolitical interests that drove Doha to adopt that exceptional position.

Key Words: Qatar, Arab Spring, revolutions, Egypt, Regime Type

ÖZET

Değişimi Teşvik Eden Monarşilerin Tezatı: Katar ve Arap Baharı

Arap monarşilerinin aksine Katar, 2010 sonlarında ortaya çıkan Arap devlerimlerine karşı ilk anlarından beri desteklemiştir. O zamandan beri Katar'ın El Cezire (Al Jazeera) ağı Arap toplulukları için en temel medya hareketlendiricisi olmuş ve devrim yanlısı Arap entelektüellerini ağırlayarak ve devrim yanlısı mesajlar yayımlayarak bölgedeki değişim sürecinin aktif bir destekcisi olmuştur. Katar Tunus devrimini de memnuniyet ile karşıladı ve tıpkı Yemen ve Mısır'da olduğu gibi, ülkeyi geçiş sürecinde maddi olarak destekleme sözü verdi. Katar, bunların yanında, Libya ve Suriye'deki insani müdahale için Arap ve uluslararası desteği harekete geçirmek adına büyük çaba sarf etti ve oradaki devrimci güçlere hem maddi hem askeri anlamda destek vererek cömertçe arka çıktı. Fakat Katar'ın Arap Devrimi yanlısı politikaları ülkenin muhafazakar komşuları olan Suudi Arabistan, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri (BAE) ve Bahreyn ile olan ilişkilerini zayıflattı ki bu da söz konusu ülkelerin Doha büyükelçilerini 2014 yılında geri çağırmalarına neden oldu. Yine bu ülkeler ve Mısır 2017 yazında Doha'ya karşı tam bir boykot ve ambargo ilan etti. Bu tez, Katar politik sisteminin muhazafakar-monarşi rejimi olduğu düşünüldüğünde, rejim tiplerinin devletlerin kendi jeopolitik çevrelerinde meydana gelen devrimlere karşı reaksiyonlarında fark yaratıp yaratmadığını analiz ederek, Doha'nın Arap Devrimi boyunca bölgedeki değişim yanlısı politikaları kucaklamasına neden olan dinamikleri incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Katar'ın Tunus, Libya, Yemen ve Suriye'ye verdiği devrim sonrası desteğin çalışılması ile birlikte, "Katar İstisnası" olarak bilinen hususu anlamak amacıyla Katar'ın Mısır vakasındaki rolü için detaylı bir analiz yapılmıştır. Bu tezde ulaşılan sonuçlar Doha'yı bu istisnai pozisyonu benimsemeye iten jeopolitik çıkarların neler olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Katar, Arap Devrimi, Devrimler, Mısır, Rejim Tipi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

ABSTRACT iv

ÖZET vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xi

CHAPTER 1 1

INTRODUCTION 1

1.1. Research Question 2

1.2. Research Argument 3

1.3. Literature Review 4

1.4. The Importance of this Study 15

1.5. Methodology 17

1.6. Organization of Chapters 17

CHAPTER 2 20

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, REGIME TYPE AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 20

2.1. International Relations and Revolutionary Change 20

2.2. Why States React to Revolutions 24

2.3. Regime 'Types' and Reactions to Revolutions 27

2.3.1. Authoritarian Republics and Revolutions 28

2.3.2. Democratic Republics and Revolutions 31

2.3.3. Absolute Monarchies and Revolutions 34

2.4. Arab Monarchies and Revolutionary Change 38

CHAPTER 3 42
ARAB MONARCHIES AND THE 2011 REVOLUTIONS 42
3.1. Monarchies Hit by Protests 43
3.1.1. Jordan 43
3.1.2. Morocco 44
3.1.3. Oman 45
3.1.4. Kuwait 46
3.1.5. Saudi Arabia 47
3.1.6. Bahrain 49
3.2. Monarchies that Backed Revolutionary Change 51
3.2.1. Qatar 52
3.3. Monarchies that Led Counter-Revolution 54
3.3.1. Saudi Arabia 55
3.3.2. The United Arab Emirates 57
CHAPTER 4 60
QATARI EXCEPTIONALISM: IDENTIFYING DOHA'S WAYS TO BACK THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS 60
4.1. Qatar and the Arab Spring 62
4.1.1. Al-Jazeera Coverage 64
4.1.1.1. Tunisia 65
4.1.1.2. Libya 67
4.1.1.3. Yemen 69
4.1.1.4. Syria 71
4.1.1.5. Bahrain 73
4.1.2. Financial and Military Support 75
4.1.2.1. Tunisia 75
4.1.2.2. Libya 76
4.1.2.3. Yemen 78

4.1.2.4. Syria 79
4.1.2.5. Bahrain 80
4.1.3. Official Visits and Diplomatic Support 81
4.1.3.1. Tunisia 81
4.1.3.2. Libya 82
4.1.3.3. Yemen 84
4.1.3.4. Syria 85
4.1.3.5. Bahrain 87
CHAPTER 5 89
QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT SINCE 2011: ANALYZING PRO-REVOLUTION POSITIONS AND POST-COUP TIES 89
5.1. The Egyptian Revolution 90
5.2. The Qatari Stance Towards the Revolution 91
5.2.1. Hosting Opposition and Pro-Revolution Figures 91
5.2.2. Al-Jazeera's Coverage of the Egyptian Revolution 94
5.2.2.1. Nonstop Coverage, Pro-Revolution Editorial Policy 95
5.2.2.2. Pro-Revolution Witnesses, Anchors, Commentators 96
5.2.2.3. Absence of Pro-Mubarak Commentators 97
5.2.3. Financial Support 98
5.2.3.1. Grants, Deposits, Interest-Free Loans 98
4.2.3.2. Direct Investment 99
5.2.3.3. The Higher Economic Council 100
5.2.4. Official Visits, Diplomatic Ties 101
5.2.4.1. First Official Visit, Improved Ties 102
5.3. Qatari Reactions Towards the Coup and Al-Sisi's Rule 104
5.3.1. Hosting Anti-Coup Figures 105
5.3.1.1. Deportations Under Saudi Pressure 107
5.3.2. Al-Jazeera Coverage of the Coup 109

5.3.2.1. Crackdown on Al-Jazeera 110
5.3.2.2. Pressure to Modify Policy 112
5.3.3. Economic Relations After the Coup 114
5.3.3.1. Refunding Qatari Loans 115
5.3.3.2. Calls to Boycott Qatari Investment Projects 116
5.3.4. Diplomatic Relations After the Coup 117
5.3.4.1. Saudi Efforts, Improved Ties 118
5.3.4.2. Gulf Crisis, Worsened Ties 120
CHAPTER 6 123
QATAR'S PRO-REVOLUTION STANCE: DEMYSTIFYING MOTIVES AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS 123
6.1. Main Driving Factors: A thirst for Power 124
6.1.1. An Ambitious Political Elite 125
6.1.2. Challenging Saudi Regional Hegemony 130
6.1.3. Competing Emirati Regional Ambitions 135
6.1.4. Ties With the US, Islamist Groups 142
6.2. Cultural, Ethical Dynamics: 'A haven for the Oppressed' 146
6.3. Intervening Factors 149
6.3.1. Globalization and the Rise of Small States 149
6.3.2. The Absence of Domestic Threats 152
CHAPTER 7 157
CONCLUSION 157
REFERENCES 164

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BICI	**:** Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
EU	**:** European Union
FSA	**:** Free Syrian Army
FSA	**:** FREEDOM Support Act
FSLN	**:** Sandinista National Liberation Front
GCC	**:** Gulf Cooperation Council
IAF	**:** Islamic Action Front
IMF	**:** International Monetary Fund
LNG	**:** Liquefied Natural Gas
MB	**:** Muslim Brotherhood
NATO	**:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTC	**:** National Transition Council in Libya
PRC	**:** People's Republic of China
QFF	**:** Qatar Friendship Fund
QFFD	**:** Qatar Fund for Development
SCAF	**:** Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt
SEED	**:** Support for Eastern European Democracies
SESRI	**:** Social and Economic Survey Research Institute
SIPRI	**:** Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNC	**:** Syrian National Coalition
UAE	**:** United Arab Emirates
UNSC	**:** UN's Security Council
US	**:** United States
YYC	**:** Yemeni Youth Coordination

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, monarchies have been largely skeptical regarding revolutionary change taking place within their geopolitical reach, with a majority of them positioning themselves in opposition to the revolutionary movements promoting such change. Since the French Revolution (1789), the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and the Iranian Revolution (1979), international factors have played a crucial role in the success or failure of various revolutions. Exporting revolutionary ideas and principles abroad has been the most critical issue of concern to the neighbors of revolutionary countries, especially monarchies, prompting them, in some cases, to establish counter-revolutionary coalitions with a view to foiling these movements or, at least, containing them within their borders.

In the case of the Arab Spring revolutions that erupted in Tunisia (in late 2010) and in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain (in early 2011), Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies, especially the UAE, played crucial roles in thwarting these revolutions and the nascent democratic process. Saudi Arabia even provided safe haven for Tunisia's fugitive president, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, and for former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. What's more, Riyadh, along with other Gulf monarchies, sent "Peninsula Shield" forces to help quell protests that erupted in Bahrain. With the exception of Qatar, the Gulf monarchies welcomed and financially supported Egypt's military coup against Mohammed Morsi, the country's first-ever democratically elected leader. Following the coup in Egypt, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also extended assistance to Libyan General Khalifah Haftar, who continues to lead counter-revolutionary forces in the North African country.

Unlike the Arab monarchies, Qatar adopted a supportive position vis-à-vis the Arab Spring uprisings. This was demonstrated by its Al-Jazeera media network, which played a major role in mobilizing the Arab masses who took to the streets to demand change and in promoting the revolutionary process. Indeed, Qatar firstly welcomed the Tunisian revolution and generously supported the country during its transitional stage, the same it behaved in the Egyptian and Yemeni cases. Qatar also exerted efforts to drum up Arab and international support for humanitarian intervention in post-revolution Libya and Syria. Al Thani's emirate

was even accused by its monarchial neighbors of covertly assisting peaceful protests that had erupted in Bahrain.

Qatar was also known for sending military and financial support to Syrian revolutionary forces. Qatar's pro-Arab Spring policies led to unprecedented tension between it and its royal neighbors before bilateral ties were indefinitely suspended when Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in 2014. The three countries, plus Egypt, also imposed a comprehensive boycott and embargo on Qatar in the summer of 2017.

Given that Qatar's political system is a conservative monarchic one, this study aims to review the dynamics that drove Doha to embrace a pro-change policy in the region during the Arab Spring. We have done this by analyzing Qatar as a case study to determine whether regime "type" matters regarding states' foreign policies vis-à-vis revolutions that take place within their geopolitical reach.

Contrary to the positions adopted by other Arab monarchies, Qatar was the only Arab monarchy that not only backed revolutionary change in the Arab world through its media (Al-Jazeera), but also provided financial, military and diplomatic support to those countries in which revolutions had occurred. Unlike its Gulf Arab counterparts, the Qatari leadership appeared unafraid of the apparent changes sweeping the region at this time.

1.1. Research Question

This study attempts to answer the question, why did the conservative Qatari monarchy, unlike the other Arab monarchies, embrace a supportive foreign policy towards the Arab Spring and endorse a pro-change strategy in the Arab world in 2011?

In order to answer this question and understand the Qatari oxymoron as a monarchic regime supporting revolutionary change, we first reviewed a number of essays, articles and books written on the topic since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 with a view to understanding how the Arab monarchies dealt with the revolutions that engulfed five or six of their fellow Arab states. We must also understand how these monarchies themselves were affected by the same winds of change, as most of the Arab monarchies were similarly hit by protests, which they managed to suppress before forming a coalition aimed at countering revolutionary change across the region. These events pose other questions, such as: What

are the motives and dynamics that prompted Doha to adopt such exceptional policies?; Why was the Qatari regime itself unafraid of being hit by the same winds of change?; Was the Qatari position based entirely on moral considerations, or was Qatar carrying out a US agenda in the region?; Did Qatar's position have anything to do with the alleged ideological background of the ruling family, which was known to be on good terms with Islamist groups in the region?; Were Qatar's pro-Arab Spring policies intended to challenge Saudi hegemony?; How can Qatar's position be understood from the perspective of historical tribal competition in the Gulf region?; and finally, How can we understand Qatar's decision to support militant Islamist groups in Libya and Syria?.

1.2. Research Argument

The policies that were adopted by Qatar during the Arab Spring were aimed at backing pro-change movements, which were largely supported by popular forces. In contrast with the other Arab monarchies, Qatar actively supported pro-change movements in almost all Arab countries that saw popular protests. Qatar's exceptional position leads us to question if the regime "type" doesn't matter in a country's foreign policy as it pertains to revolutions, given that Qatar's monarchic and conservative regime type did not prevent it from embracing pro-change positions in 2011. Qatar bet on the success of the Arab Spring, allying itself with pro-revolution figures and popular movements, assuming that such an alliance would give Al Thani's micro state more power and influence, which the country's ambitious leaders sought on both the regional and international levels.

Since 2008, Doha had been hosting Palestinian thinker Azmi Bishara, head of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, who had been calling for dramatic change in the Arab region's politics and who was described by *Le Monde*[1] -- due to his high-profile role in the Arab Spring -- as "the godfather of chaos in the Arab world." Further, Qatar had backed Wadah Khanfar, director manager of Al-Jazeera during the Arab Spring and coordinator of the network's pro-revolution news coverage. Khanfar currently leads many Qatar-funded projects targeting Arab youth, including the Al-Sharq Forum. Doha's media platforms, meanwhile, were also promoting Tawakkul Kerman, a Yemeni revolutionary figure who received Nobel Peace Prize for her "fundamental" role in Yemen's uprising.

[1] "Par Benjamin Barthe, Qatar: Azmi Bishara, l'éminence libérale de Doha" *Le Monde*, accessed on Feb. 25, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/long-format/article/2018/11/16/qatar-azmi-bishara-un-progressiste-a-doha_5384456_5345421.html.

Kerman had been vociferously calling for the removal of "Arab dictators," especially those at the helm of the Arab monarchies. Prominent Muslim cleric Yousuf al-Qaradawi, one of the historic leaders of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (MB) group (and often described as its spiritual guide), had also been frequently hosted by Doha since 1961. Al-Qaradawi was one of several high-profile clerics who vocally supported revolutionary change in the region. Many of al-Qaradawi's fellow MB members were also hosted by Doha for several decades. These figures, along with other popular forces, played a pivotal role in mobilizing support for the toppling of Arab dictators in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. What's more, Doha had promoted Ali al-Salabi and Abdel-Hakim Bilhadj, high-profile Libyan figures who helped mobilize revolutionary forces against Muammar Qaddafi.[2] Moreover, Qatar became the permanent residence of leaders of Palestinian resistance group Hamas, who departed the Syrian capital after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. Qatar was thus able to benefit from the wide popularity enjoyed by Hamas throughout the Arab world.

1.3. Literature Review

While studying many books, articles and essays to underline the existing literature on revolutions, Qatari exceptionalism, regime types and monarchic regimes, we have realized that there are many trends regarding the question of Arab revolutions in general and the Qatari role in support of these revolutions in particular. While many researchers prefer to describe the Arab Spring as no more than temporary uprisings and protests, we also have Azmi Bishara, Jack Goldstone, and Bayram Sinkaya, along with other academics, who insist that these uprisings developed into full-fledged revolutions, which we will discuss in detail below.

With regards to the Qatari interests and dynamics that drove Doha to embrace a supportive position towards the Arab Spring, we have no comprehensive study to fully explain these dynamics, especially the geopolitical ones. Hence, we see a large number of academics, mainly Ulrichsen and al-Hroub, highlight the domestic dynamics (the absence of domestic threats and the state's welfarism) to clarify Qatar's pro-Arab Spring policies. Others, like Roberts and Steinberg, focus on the country's close ties with Islamists in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, as the latter group saw a major rise at the beginning of the Arab Spring. A third trend highlights the personal diplomacy of the father,

[2] A detailed study on the Qatari forms of support to the Arab Spring will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

Emir Hamad, who ascended the throne in the mid-1990s as the ambitious leader for a small country. After he assumed power, Doha experienced a rebound in terms of power and influence in both the regional and international arenas.

What's lacking in the current literature is an analysis of the geopolitical interests behind Qatar's positions in favor of the Arab Spring, and a comprehensive study that includes the domestic, external, cultural and geopolitical interests behind these policies – a vacuum this dissertation hopes to fill. This involves Qatar's relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which Doha adopted in opposition to Riyadh and in competition with Abu Dhabi. This is not to mention its ambitious policy of having close ties with the West in general and the US in particular, with the latter taking advantage of Qatar's improved ties with regional Islamic groups that have enjoyed a degree of ascendancy since the 2011 revolutions.

Another critical point is that the current literature is in desperate need of a study assessing the relationship between regime 'type' and its foreign policies towards revolutionary states. The study by Gurses and Mason, *Weak States, regime types, and civil war*[3], is among few, if not the only, that examines the correlation between regime 'types' and their policies vis-à-vis revolutions and civil wars, with the two authors recognizing that democratic regimes are at least risk from the outbreak of revolutions and civil wars. They argue that authoritarian and monarchic regimes, by contrast, are exposed to much greater risk, given the fact that the 19th century saw the overthrow of dozens of monarchies. However, none of the existing literature prioritizes the correlation between regime 'type' and its foreign policy towards revolutions taking place within its geopolitical reach. Hence, the need to understand such correlations contributes to our endeavor to grasp what we have labeled the "Qatari oxymoron" in the regional foreign policy landscape since 2011.

Regarding Qatari exceptionalism and the geopolitical earthquakes that hit the Gulf in 2014 and 2017 (when Doha's monarchic neighbors imposed a boycott on Qatar), we have an interesting piece by Wadah Khanfar, former head of Qatar's Al-Jazeera media network. Khanfar addressed the issue in an article in *The Guardian*, entitled: *The blockade of Qatar is a move against the values of the Arab Spring*.[4] In it, he asserts that the main dynamic

[3] Mehmet Gurses & David T. Mason. "Weak states, regime types, and civil war," *Civil Wars*, 12, 1:2, (2010): 140-155.
[4] Wadah Khanfar. "The blockade of Qatar is a move against the values of the Arab spring," *The Guardian*, June 8, 2017.

behind the boycott by the three Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain) was Al-Jazeera's embrace of the ideas and values that characterized the Arab Spring. Khanfar recognizes that the Qatari regime is a non-democratic monarchic regime, but that it refused to stand with the three Gulf monarchies, which constituted a counter-revolutionary coalition. Khanfar goes on to affirm that Qatar in 2014 was punished for its independent policy towards the Arab Spring when the three countries withdrew their ambassadors from Doha before imposing even tougher sanctions three years later. Khanfar's article supports our assertion, which is that Qatari support for the Arab Spring alienated the neighboring Gulf monarchies, which eventually punished Qatar for its exceptionalism in 2014 and 2017. This raises additional questions as we try to understand the dynamics that prompted Qatar to jeopardize its strategic depth in the Gulf by backing the Arab Spring uprisings.

As for how conservative monarchies react to revolutions taking place within their geopolitical reach, we have two renowned books, *Revolutions and World Order*[5] and *Revolutions and World Politics*,[6] both of which confirm the theory that monarchies as conservative powers prefer to preserve the status quo and generally look askance at revolutionary change – no matter where it take place.

In respect to the position of the Arab monarchies during the Arab Spring, we have Mehran Kamrava's *The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution*[7], in which Kamrava analyzes the Saudi bid to thwart the Arab Spring as a typical monarchy, embracing to a large extent the same positions taken by conservative royal neighbors (Russia, Prussia, Britain and Austria) during the French Revolution of 1789. Notably, Saudi Arabia not only welcomed fugitive presidents in 2011, but also financially backed dissatisfied (i.e., anti-revolutionary) groups in the affected countries and helped ambitious generals stage military coups against democratically-elected governments. This is not to mention the Saudi bid to widen the GCC in hopes of including more monarchic states (Jordan and Morocco) in the council. The importance of these articles and books derives from the fact that they serve to confirm the exceptionalism of the Qatari state as an Arab monarchy that adopted a totally

[5] David Armstrong. Revolution and world order: The revolutionary state in international society. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993).
[6] Fred Halliday. *Revolution and world politics: The rise and fall of the sixth great power*. (Duke University Press, 1999).
[7] Mehran Kamrava. "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution," *Orbis* 56.1 (2012): 96-1.

different position towards the 2011 revolutions by supporting them with media, money, military backing and diplomatic support.

With a view to shedding light on the significance of these studies, and their possible contribution to our thesis, we have discussed each of them in a single paragraph before summarizing them all at the end of the chapter. This is also intended to determine the gaps to be covered in greater depth in our dissertation, most importantly, the correlation between regime 'type' and its general position vis-à-vis revolutions, along with the geopolitical interests that drove Al Thani to embrace pro-Arab Spring policies. In this regard, at least ten books and articles have been discussed and reviewed.

We have the book, *On Revolution and Revolutionary Potential*,[8] where Professor Azmi Bishara argues that there were distinctive features of the 2011 Arab revolutions, and that the revolutionary fervor that hit the Arab world as they should not be described as an "uprising" or "rebellion," but rather a full-fledged "revolution." He goes on to suggest that Arabs had contributed to the definition of "revolution" within the context of political science. According to Bishara, this contribution could be seen in the fact that protestors in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya did not directly overthrow these regimes, but rather were calling for change from within these regimes and ruling establishments. Therefore, they did not directly assume the reins of power; rather, changes took place from inside the regimes themselves. It is true, he asserts, that these events began as popular uprisings by angry protestors in different parts of the country demanding reform. However, these uprisings developed quickly -- and dramatically -- before ultimately led to the ouster of the Tunisian, Egyptian, Yemeni and Libyan presidents. Bishara goes on to say that, despite the fact that the uprisings called on these regimes to reform themselves, they can nevertheless be termed "revolutions," given the wide swathes of people who took part in them, which ultimately led to regime change in all four countries. Bishara argues that what makes the Arab revolutions different from their French, Bolshevik, and Iranian counterparts is the fact that the Arab people took to the streets, leaving the governing dictators no alternative, since the protestors' only aim was the change itself. He goes on to assert that the Syrian revolution, which eventually turned into a civil war, proves the fact that dictatorial and authoritarian regimes are very hard to overthrow once they decide to use excessive force against their people. In

[8] Azmi Bishara, An al-Thawra wal Qabiliyya lil thawra, *On Revolution and Revolutionary Potential* (Doha/Beirut, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012).

this regard, it is worth noting that these regimes only dare to do so because of a lack of action by the international powers, namely, the US, the EU, Russia and China. In his book, Bishara challenges mainstream academics, who described the Arab revolutions as mere "uprisings." Here we can also use the term "revolution" to understand the exceptional role of Qatar and its decision to support them. As mentioned earlier, Bishara was a high-profile Qatar-funded Arab intellectual, theorist and thinker, who had long called for revolutionary change in the region.

Sinkaya agrees to a big extent with Azmi Bishara in this regard. In his article: *Revolutions as an under-explored theme in the Middle East*,[9] Sinkaya agrees with Goldstone's[10] definition of revolutions as "an effort to transform the political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities." By taking this definition into account, Sinkaya argues, the Middle East region would be hit by five distinct revolutionary waves, the first of which included the constitutional movements that took place in Qajar Iran (1906) and Ottoman Turkey (1908). The second wave of revolution in the region, according to Sinkaya, had to do with anti-colonial and nationalist revolutions. In this category, he includes the Turkish revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; the Egyptian revolution of 1919; the Algerian resistance of 1954-61; and the South Yemen revolution of 1967. As for the third wave, this includes the revolutions of Arab nationalism that occurred in the period between 1952 and 1969. These revolutions shared the same goal of overthrowing traditional monarchies through military coups d'état. Despite the fact that these power changes occurred through military coups, these processes were regarded within the Arab region as "revolutions," given their ability to undermine traditional social structures; mobilize wide segments of society for their cause; and ultimately lead to significant political, economic and social change. The fourth wave was the Iranian Revolution, which served to inspire many Islamist groups in the region. The Arab Spring, meanwhile, due to its distinctiveness, amounted to the region's fifth wave of revolution, since this event exploded the myth of the invulnerability of the Arab authoritarian regimes. We can take Sinkaya's point here as confirmation that the literature on the history of revolutions in the region has yet to agree on the definition of the term "revolution." He also

[9] Bayram Sinkaya. "Revolution as an Under-Explored Theme in the Middle East", *Ulisa: Journal of International Studies*, Vol 2, No 2 (2018)1-12.
[10] Jack A Goldstone. *Revolutions: A very short introduction*. Oxford University Press, 2014.

says the upheavals, whether violent or not, are indeed "revolutions" if they end up substantially changing the political system of the country in which they occur. His mention of the anti-monarchic revolutionary wave that hit the region in the 1950s and 1960s supports our general assertion that the Arab monarchies have historically had an anti-revolution mindset, with Qatar being the only Arab monarchy to welcome the fifth revolutionary wave.

Regarding the Qatari policies during the Arab Spring, we have a fruitful piece published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, entitled *Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications.*[11] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen attributed the dynamism of Qatar's foreign policy to Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, who assumed power in 1995 and focused on securing the export of large amounts of liquefied natural gas by adopting a policy of soft diplomacy. This included Qatari mediation in several regional and international disputes. Secondly, the changes that impacted the international system through globalization allowed micro-powers and small states like Qatar to punch far above their weight by exerting soft power. For Ulrichsen, Qatar is the best example of this, especially in the role it played during the Arab Spring and the role played by its Al-Jazeera media network. Ulrichsen believes that Qatar's intervention in the Arab Spring and its support for Arab revolutionary movements (especially the MB) shook Doha's image as a credible and transparent mediator and subjected it to pressure from neighboring monarchic countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE), who withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in 2014. Ulrichsen also asserts that Doha, following the inauguration of Emir Tamim, started to backtrack after Egypt's coup in 2013, which was seen as a major setback to the Arab Spring, or at least a failure of its first wave. Moreover, Qatar tried to repair its reputation as a regional and international mediator through its efforts in 2014 to mediate between the US and the Taliban; mediate prisoner swap deals between Hezbollah and Syrian revolutionary forces; and play a diplomatic role in halting an Israeli offensive against the Hamas-run Gaza Strip in 2014. Ulrichsen concludes his study by saying that Doha might succeed in restoring its image as honest mediator, but this will take a long time to achieve. While agreeing that Qatar's foreign policy differed from that of its monarchial neighbors during the Arab Spring, Ulrichsen fails to provide a convincing answer as to why Doha did so. Nor does he examine the dynamics that prompted Doha to adopt a position contradictory to those embraced by the other Gulf monarchies vis-à-vis revolutionary change. Ulrichsen sees Qatari support for the

[11] Kristian C. Ulrichsen. "Qatar and the Arab Spring: policy drivers and regional implications." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Vol. 224, (2014).

MB as an end unto itself, despite the fact that Qatar backed post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia while they were under a military council and a secular leader respectively.

As for Qatari support for revolutionary change in general and the Islamist groups in particular, we can refer to the paper, *Qatar and the Arab Spring: Support for Islamists and New Anti-Syria Policy*,[12] in which Guido Steinberg reviews recent Qatari history and the country's sensitive geopolitical situation, which required it to perform a balancing act between its two formidable neighbors, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Qatar, which had traditionally supported Saudi policies, adopted a totally independent foreign policy under Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani since his rise in 1995. At the same time, it sought to maintain good relations with the US with a view to protecting the wealthy monarchy from its neighbors' ambitions. In the early weeks of the Arab Spring, Steinberg argues, Qatar generously backed Islamist revolutionary movements in the region, especially in Libya and Syria, and spared no effort to mobilize Arab military action against both these regimes. Its position was completely different in regards to the Bahraini uprising, though Qatar agreeing with Saudi Arabia to deploy "Peninsula Shield" forces in that country. Steinberg believes that the absence of proactive diplomacy by the two biggest Arab countries -- Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- gave space for Qatar to play an active role in the Arab arena, since no international power can ignore Qatar in political processes affecting the Middle East. Steinberg also asserts that, although Qatar did play a noticeable role in the Arab Spring, the Arab Spring itself showed how much Qatar's potential was limited in terms of its support for the upheavals, while at the same time refraining from doing the same in Bahrain. In his article, Steinberg focuses on the external dynamic that prompted Doha's rise on the regional level as a result of the vacuum left by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. While this confirms the dynamism of Doha's political elite, domestic factors [the cultural dynamic in particular] must nevertheless be analyzed with a view to producing a comprehensive study.

With regard to the explanations highlighting the domestic reasons in general and the ambitions leadership in particular, we have *Features of the Qatari Foreign Policy*,[13] al-Modallal and al-Rantisi outline several features of Qatari foreign policy since the rise of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa in the mid-1990s, especially his foreign policy approach which was

[12] Guido Steinberg. "Qatar and the Arab Spring: support for Islamists and new anti-Syrian policy," *Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politik,* (2012).
[13] Walid Al-Modallal and Mahmoud Al-Rantisi. "Features of the Qatari Foreign Policy," *Islamic University Journal*, 22-1 (2014) 1-33.

highly independent from neighboring GCC countries. Doha's close ties with the US allowed the small monarchy to adopt policies consistent with its interests with a degree of independence, leading Qatar to pursue a significant mediating role. That independent foreign policy, according to the two researchers, was seen in an emergency summit in Doha held to discuss Israeli aggression on Gaza in 2009, despite opposition by influential Arab countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Qatar also took a position independent of the Gulf countries regarding the Iranian nuclear program, with then Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim saying: "Qatar affirms its position regarding the Iranian nuclear program which is the necessity to resolve such disputes by peaceful means."[14] In this article, many questions were asked due to an apparent contradiction. Doha had established economic relations with Israel, and, at the same time, was the main Gulf monarchy to show solidarity with Lebanon in the 2006 war, paying tens of millions to rebuild what Israel had destroyed during the conflict. What's more, the Qatari alliance with the Syrian regime helped diminish the implications of an international embargo imposed on Damascus in the period from 2005 to 2009, although Qatar's position changed dramatically in 2011. The two authors highlight the seeming contradiction of a monarchy choosing to stand with revolutionary change within the context of the Arab Spring. They assert that, not only since the Arab Spring era but since the rise of Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to power in the mid-1990s, Emir Hamad had distanced himself from the Saudi foreign policy orbit and chose to pursue his own path. Our study will contribute to answering why and how Emir Hamad -- along with his aid, Hamad bin Jassem -- insisted on doing so.

Another work was focusing also on the domestic dynamics and at most the personal diplomacy of Emir Hamad. In his *Qatar and the Arab Spring*,[15] Khaled al-Hroub comments that Qatar took advantage of the 2011 revolutions to expand its influence in the region. For him, the Arab revolutions were genuine popular upheavals against decades of suppression and corruption by authoritarian regimes, and against government exploitation of national wealth by both ruling families and military juntas. At the time, he says, the rapid spread and extent of these revolutions took almost everyone by surprise, with the Arab masses, in the absence of any single driving ideology, outperforming so-called "opposition parties" of all stripes, thereby garnering regional and international sympathy. Al-Hroub goes on to argue

[14] US' Department of State, "Remarks With Qatar Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani After Their Meeting," https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/134671.htm, accessed on Sept. 15, 2020.
[15] Khaled Al-Hroub. "Qatar and the Arab Spring," *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*, (2012).

that conservative monarchic regimes and their allies could not keep silent in the face of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, fearing the challenges to their authority that these uprisings could bring. Al-Hroub is quick to note that only Qatar behaved differently. Doha, despite its conservatism, distinguished itself in the Arab region by welcoming and supporting the uprisings. It can be said that the Qatari leadership saw the Arab Spring as the opportunity it was waiting for to assert its regional influence. Al-Hroub attributes Qatar's immediate response to the Arab uprisings to its formidable media arsenal, proactive diplomacy, financial support, and military support (at least in Libya and Syria). Al-Hroub's article confirms the role of the Qatari leadership itself in embracing pro-Arab Spring policies, as the process of revolutionary change appeared to be the culmination of a decade and a half of active foreign policy in the region. He also emphasizes the military support Doha provided to revolutionary groups in Syria and Libya, along with financial support. However, the article overlooks one important form of support that Doha provided to revolutionary Arab countries in general and Libya, Yemen and Syria in particular -- namely, diplomatic support. In this regard, it should be remembered that Doha lobbied regional and international organizations, including the GCC, Arab League and UNSC, to intervene to stop the atrocities committed by the regimes in these countries.

As for the Arab Spring and the counter-revolutionary monarchic coalition that was formed to reverse the pro-change stream in the region, we have Mehran Kamrava's article, *The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led Counterrevolution.*[16] Kamrava found that Saudi Arabia, since the early weeks of the Arab uprisings, had put itself in a leading role as a counter-revolutionary force with a view to containing -- and even reversing -- the winds of change in the region. This was seen in Saudi policy when it came to the non-GCC countries while another policy was adopted for the GCC itself. Hence, Saudi Arabia, as the biggest power in the GCC, sought to consolidate the Arab monarchies' identities by suggesting that another two monarchic Arab regimes (Jordan and Morocco) should be included within the council. This move was aimed at countering the perceived danger of the Arab Spring. Kamrava goes on to note that Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf countries, depicted the Arab Spring as the most serious threat to the status quo since the Iranian revolution in 1979. Therefore, Saudi Arabia adopted internal and regional policies with a view to protecting its borders from expanding revolutionary threats. Internally, most of the Gulf States tightened their

[16] Mehran Kamrava. "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution," *Orbis* 56.1 (2012): 96-1

security grip and launched crackdowns on opposition figures and reformist groups. Additionally, they increased economic incentives and welfare measures targeting civil servants and the middle class. In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, monthly salaries were doubled by the two governments. On the regional level, Saudi Arabia, hand in hand with the UAE, shored up regional alliances aimed at foiling nascent democratic processes in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. These developments rocked the Arab countries, while what took place in Egypt in particular provided an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to take the lead in the GCC, which, according to Kamrava, may have contributed to increasing Saudi influence in the region and in the global arena. Kamrava's article helps us understand how the pro-status quo Arab monarchies behaved as traditional and typical conservative monarchies through their ongoing bid to repulse the Arab Spring and defeat revolutionary groups. On the opposite side, Qatar was absent from the Saudi-led monarchic coalition, becoming the only monarchy to promote revolutionary change through its media, money and diplomacy.

With a view to grasp the way the monarchic regimes behave vis-à-vis the revolutions taking place within their political reach, we have the book, *Revolution and World Order*,[17] David Armstrong addresses the implications of the revolutions on the world order and international system. In his chapter on the French Revolution, Armstrong analyzes three schools of thought on the causes of the warfare in Europe that followed the French Revolution. Firstly, it was a reaction to the revolution itself, since these wars were intended to repulse revolutionary principles and ideas that were being exported, which also provoked the formation of a coalition of conservative powers. The second school of thought attributes the war to the nature of conflict between the powers and traditional rivalries that already existed in the world in general and in Europe in particular. Thirdly, many French historians contend that the outbreak of war following the French Revolution was due to various individual motives. For example, some sought to profit from war, while ambitious generals saw war as a means of advancement. Armstrong goes on to affirm that the French Revolution presented a major challenge to international social norms, which was either "in direct and implicit way and by its conduct and rhetoric."[18] Armstrong's work helps us in theorizing for our dissertation, as he provides rational analysis on revolutionary change and its impact on the regional and world order, the regional and international system, which can prompt states

[17] David Armstrong. Revolution and world order: The revolutionary state in international society. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993).
[18] Armstrong, Revolution and world order, 111.

to adopt positions either supportive or opposed to revolutionary upheavals. This helps us understand how the Arab Spring reshaped the geopolitics of the Arab region by creating new alliances and coalitions, with Arab monarchies playing the most pivotal role, both by supporting the revolutions (Qatar) and opposing them (Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain).

In the same context and in a way to understand why and how the states feel they have to react towards revolutions, we reviewed Fred Halliday's *Revolution and World Politics.*[19] Halliday tackles the history of revolutions and their impact on the international system. He devotes an entire chapter to theorizing and discussing monarchies-led counter-revolutions and the reasons that prompt states to back pro-change movements. For Halliday, the counter-revolutionary process is the same as the revolutionary one in its international dimension; they are both constitutive elements in the discipline of international relations. The phenomenon shares the same feature with revolution in that it challenges the established values of states, regardless of its program. Defining the term itself, Halliday argues that counter-revolution is "a policy of trying to reverse a revolution, and by extension, the policies designed to prevent revolutionary movements that had already gained some momentum from coming to power." The term "counter-revolution" first originated in the months following the French Revolution among the monarchic regimes neighboring France, which joined forces in hopes of restoring the Bourbon dynasty to power. Its manifest idea is that revolutions provoke response both within the revolutionary country and abroad, and that this response lasts as long as the revolution itself. The French Revolution triggered both domestic and external reactions, with the first challenge coming from politicians who were dissatisfied with its results. The importance of Halliday's study to our thesis is that it helps understand the behavior of the Arab monarchies during the Arab Spring, and why those states reacted to revolutionary change within their geopolitical reach. Like the French example, revolutions tend to provoke a response from monarchies, as we saw with the coalition between Russia, Prussia, Britain and Austria. Arab monarchies acted in much the same way during the Arab Spring, with only Qatar adopting a pro-revolution stance.

Qatari support for the Arab revolutions, and its adoption of anti-status quo positions, still represents the main puzzle for us in this dissertation, as none of the previously-reviewed literature provides a comprehensive explanation of what we have termed as Qatari

[19] Fred Halliday. *Revolution and world politics: The rise and fall of the sixth great power*. (Duke University Press, 1999).

"exceptionalism." While many studies have focused on domestic reasons, like the rise of ambitious leaders since the mid-1990s and the absence of domestic threats, none of these studies have focused on the correlation between regime "type" and countries' responses to revolution. What's more, there was little focus on the Qatari geopolitical interests with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and the US that might have driven Doha to adopt supportive policies vis-à-vis the revolutionary process. Nor did these articles highlight cultural dynamics, such as tribal competition and popular support, as possible reasons for Doha's policies.

1.4. The Importance of this Study

The importance of the current study derives from its being the first study to assess the correlation between regime "type" and states' reactions to nearby revolutionary upheavals. Looking at Qatar's exceptional case, this study challenges current theories explaining the role of conservative monarchic regimes in countering revolutions in neighboring states. The existing theories interpret the Arab monarchies' reactions to the Arab revolutions as little more than attempts to preserve the status quo. Halliday and others highlight the role of monarchies and conservative powers in thwarting the French Revolution, theorizing that counter-revolutionary powers, which are usually monarchies, fear what Halliday terms the "domino effect." Here, Kamrava agrees in regards to the Saudi-led coalition of Arab monarchies, which sought to repulse revolutionary change in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Tunisia.

During the Arab Spring, we saw an exceptional role played by Qatar, which adopted a sympathetic attitude toward the revolutions. This role raised a number of questions regarding the factual motives that drove Doha to arrogate these policies and the geopolitical interests that prompted Qatar to sacrifice its historic relations with its Arab Gulf neighbors. Qatar is a non-democratic, conservative monarchy that nevertheless supported pro-change movements in the region, which poses questions that require answers. This study is also an attempt to understand the reasons behind Qatar's formidable influence in the region, despite its being a tiny state with a population of less than 300,000.[20] Additionally, this study hopes to provide a better understanding of the rifts that emerged within the GCC in 2014 and 2017, when a Saudi-led bloc imposed a crushing embargo on Doha. Finding answers to the

[20] Planning and Statistics Authority, Population Towards Better Life For Population, https://www.ppc.gov.qa/Admin/sukkannewletter/PPC_Sukan_2019_issue44_EN.pdf, published on Oct. 2019, (Accessed on Aug. 17, 2020).

questions raised by this study will make it easier to comprehend the dynamics behind Al Thani's independent foreign policymaking since 1995, by which Doha managed to extract itself from decades of Saudi political trusteeship.

Which, will help to understand the corrleation between regime "type" and the reactions of various states to revolutions occurring within their geopolitical reach. It also helps to understand the resilience of the Arab monarchies during the Arab Spring by dividing them into the following categories: Arab monarchies affected by the revolutions; Arab monarchies that supported the revolutions; and Arab monarchies that actively opposed the revolutions -- categorizations that have yet to be encountered in the existing literature analyzing the Arab monarchies.

There is also a chapter devoted to the ways that Qatar supported these revolutions, which were manifested primarily by media support through the Al-Jazeera network; military support for pro-change forces in Syria and Libya; and financial and diplomatic support for post-revolution Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya and Syria. This helps us document a very sensitive stage of the Middle East and the Gulf recent history.

Another major significance of the dissertation is its focus on what we have termed "diplomatic support" for revolution-hit countries, a conceptualization of this type of support that was largely lacking in the preexisting literature. Here, the term reflects Qatar's policy of engaging in mutual visits and lobbying regional and international organizations (Arab League, GCC, UNSC, etc.) on behalf of revolutionary forces.

A detailed focus on the Egyptian case is a critical contribution too. This focus was intentional, as Egypt represents the largest and most influential Arab country and Egypt's revolution served to inspire revolutionaries in other Arab states. What's more, the setbacks that undermined revolutionary change in Egypt ended up badly affecting the entire region. Existing studies on Qatar-Egypt relations are relatively rare; our comparison between the two countries' bilateral ties -- first under Morsi and then under Al-Sisi -- serves to shed fresh light on the subject.

What's more, a considerable contribution has to do with the driving dynamics we are discussing, including the issue of personal diplomacy and Qatar's ties with both the US and Islamist groups. Since, studying Qatar's pro-Arab Spring polices cannot be viewed in isolation from the rise of the "Two Hamads," who were not only desirous of power and

influence but who were also keen to pursue policies independent of Saudi Arabia. Qatar also benefitted from close ties with Islamist groups, which were based on mutual trust, with Doha becoming a conduit for Western (mainly US) engagement with Islamist forces. Qatari leaders were the only Arab leaders who called for recognizing the Islamists as a rising power that enjoyed tremendous support on the Arab street.

1.5. Methodology

Given the fact that Qatar is presented as a deviant case among the Gulf monarchies, we will examine it as a case study here. In social and humanitarian studies, case studies are typically applied to anomalies, or cases whose outcomes were not predicted or inadequately explained by existing theories. The Qatari monarchy as a conservative power in the Arab world, and its unique and exceptional support for revolutionary movements (which differed from other Arab conservative powers during the Arab Spring), should be investigated and researched as a case study, since Doha's actions have yet to be sufficiently explained by current revolutionary theories. Qatari policies represent an anomaly in terms of monarchies and their respective reactions to revolutions. Many studies and research papers, which have been critically reviewed, show that monarchic regimes situated near revolutionary countries fear of being engulfed by the winds of change, and therefore typically oppose revolutionary movements.

This study relies on an analytical approach with methods of data collection that focus on primary sources, such as interviews, government websites and official news agencies. Qatar's Al-Jazeera will be one of our main sources, as it is widely understood to reflect the views of the Qatari state. Interviews with Arab officials and academics (mainly Egyptians and Qataris) were also conducted with a view to obtaining first-hand information and answering the questions posed by this dissertation. We will also utilize a range of secondary sources, such as books, essays, opinion pieces and news articles.

1.6. Organization of Chapters

The first chapter of this dissertation includes the introduction, research argument, literature review, importance of study, and research methodology.

The second chapter discusses the international system and revolutionary change, and the dynamics that drive states to react to revolutions. Regime "types" and their reactions to revolutions will also be discussed before going into the history of Arab monarchies and their various responses to revolutionary change. The aim of this chapter is to understand the theoretical approach of this dissertation and how existing theories are unable to explain the Qatari position and the dynamics that drove it to pursue this exceptional policy.

The third chapter deals with how the eight Arab monarchies addressed the revolutionary fervor that swept the region in 2011, which may shed some light on the exceptionalism of the Qatari case. It also discusses how these monarchies were affected by this wave of change, as some monarchies were engulfed by protests, some backed the protests, and others combined to contain -- and counter -- the revolutionary change. Here we have a novel categorization for the Arab monarchies' behavior during the Arab Spring, reflecting how they were all affected by events. The third chapter proves the importance of our study by highlighting the need to find convincing answers to explain the Qatari case.

The fourth chapter addresses the various manifestations of Qatari exceptionalism by exploring the country's support for the upheavals in Tunis, Yemen, Syria, Libya and Bahrain. This chapter analyzes the forms of Qatari support, including Al-Jazeera's media coverage, financial and military assistance, official visits and diplomatic support. The fourth chapter focuses also on different kinds of military support and the motives that prompted Doha to provide an air bridge for revolutionaries in Libya and Tunisia. Various forms of diplomatic support, which are rarely discussed in the existing literature, are also analyzed in the same chapter.

The fifth chapter discusses the Qatari role in Egypt in detail. We compare the Qatari positions vis-à-vis Egypt during the two main post-revolution periods: that of Morsi, the first elected leader in Egypt's history, and that of al-Sisi, who led a military coup against Morsi's government. This comparative study takes into consideration four variables, including Qatar's hosting for pro-revolution/anti-coup figures, Al-Jazeera's news coverage, financial support and diplomatic relations. The decision to use Egypt as a focus country can be attributed to its importance in the Arab region, and to the fact that the rise and fall of Egypt's revolution impacted the entire Arab world.

The sixth chapter examines Qatar's motives for backing the Arab revolutions. The primary and secondary (driving and intervening) dynamics that prompted Doha to adopt its pro-revolution policy are amply discussed in this chapter, as these provide the crucial answers to the main questions posed by this dissertation. The last chapter contains a conclusion, thesis strengths, and recommendations for fellow researchers interested in this and similar topics.

CHAPTER 2

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, REGIME TYPE AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

This chapter aims at examining the relationship between regime "type" and states' reactions to revolutions taking place within their geopolitical reach. Starting with the impact of revolutions on the international system, a handful of international relations theories -- mostly Realism and English School theories -- will be reviewed with a view to paving the way for grasping states' foreign policies and reactions to nearby upheavals.

Before discussing states' reactions, a summarized version will be given to discuss the motives and dynamics that lead states to react to political change resulting from revolutions, either by welcoming, supporting, or even countering them. Then, three regime types -- democratic, authoritarian and monarchic -- will be examined to see how each type reflects the state's reaction. After that, attention will be given to the Arab monarchies and revolutionary change in recent history to explore how the Arab monarchies have historically behaved when revolutionary change occurred within their near surroundings, or even farther away.

Here, we are dealing with the Qatari monarchy as our target of study, given that the Al Thani's monarchic regime presented an exceptional case during the Arab revolutions. Qatari exceptionalism took the form of the Gulf monarchy giving all forms of support to the revolutions that hit the Arab world in 2011, with the monarchic state's behavior creating a puzzling case that needs to be discussed and understood.

2.1. International Relations and Revolutionary Change

While understanding how states react to social revolutions and their motives for supporting or confronting them, the nature of the international system ought to first be discussed. We don't live in an international system in which only sovereign states interact and relate to each other, but in a system that maintains certain international preconditions --

social and political -- for the stability of particular societies.[21] International norms do not only demand cooperation from states, but they also require consolidating laws and constitutions to respect and sustain the international order. Hence, domestic order was and has been a precondition for international order, and a part of the broad international consistency. Although social revolutions have a major influence on the international system in different stages of modern history, the study of revolutions nevertheless has a marginal presence in the literature of international relations.[22]

Looking first at the realist school, the central principles of its approach argue that states -- whatever their ideologic sphere -- focus on maximizing power, and deny the significance of domestic factors in determining a state's foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz, a prominent neo-realist, said in an article written at the pinnacle of the upheavals that rocked the Third World in the late 1960s: "The revolutionary guerrilla wins civil wars, not international ones, and no civil war can change the balance of world power unless it takes place in America or Russia."[23]

However, several approaches contributed to untangling the international impact of revolutions: Henry Kissinger's Dissatisfaction Theory;[24] David Armstrong's Challenge to International Society Theory;[25] Kim Kyung-won's Heterogeneity and Misperception Theory;[26] Stephan Walt's Pertinence of Politics Theory;[27] Richard Rosecrance's Balance of Power Disturbed Theory;[28] James Rosenau's Transnationalism and Violence Theory;[29] and Immanuel Wallerstein's Anti-Systemic Movements Theory.[30]

Kissinger asserted that a revolutionary state is "dissatisfied" with the existing international system. This dissatisfaction is demonstrated in its refusal to "accept the existing distribution of power, strategic balance, and spheres of influence." This kind of dissatisfaction, Kissinger says, is seen as a challenge not only to the legitimacy of the

[21] Fred Halliday. *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 229.
[22] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics,* 229,
[23] Kenneth N. Waltz. The politics of peace. *International Studies Quarterly*, *11*(3), (1967) 199-211.
[24] Henry A Kissinger. *A world restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and the problem of peace*." (1957).
[25] David Armstrong and James David Armstrong. *Revolution and world order: The revolutionary state in international society*. Oxford University Press, 1993.
[26] Kyung-Won Kim. *Revolution and International System*. (New York: New York University Press, 1970).
[27] Stephen Walt. *The origins of alliances*. (New York, Ithaca New York, 1987).
[28] Richard N. Rosecrance. *International relations: Peace or war?,* (McGraw-Hill Companies, 1973).
[29] James N. Rosenau. International Studies in a transnational world. *Millennium*, *5*:1, (1976) 1-20.
[30] Immanuel Wallerstein. *The politics of the world-economy: The states, the movements and the civilizations*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984).

existing international balance of power, but also to the legitimacy and principles of the established regimes, be they monarchies or parliamentary democracies.[31]

David Armstrong represents an alternative to the realist perspective, which could be derived from the English School, in which the "international society" concept is highlighted. Here, the effects of revolutions on the community of states are debated, based on shared interests, rules and institutions. At the same time, this school accepts that revolutions -- at least to some degree -- pose a challenge to the norms of international society, and may even result in big changes to it, like, for example, the French Revolution. The fundamental view of this school is that revolutions can ultimately be socialized or tamed through the environments in which they occur. Armstrong's work was seen as one of the most systematic attempts to come out of the English School to meet the challenges revolutions pose to the existing system. His ideas examined the impact of revolutions on three aspects known as the "foundations" of international order: diplomacy, international law and the balance of power.[32]

Kim Kyung-won suggested another point of view, stressing that the way in which a revolution takes place can lead to misunderstandings and misperceptions between states, thus leading to a greater potential for conflict. In the afterword of his study on the French Revolution, Kyung-won argues that conflict among states becomes less likely when they share common values, and in this way become better able to anticipate the reactions of other states. Regarding differences in ideology, Kyung-won says that these can potentially damage the international system, as they vastly increase the potential for international misunderstandings.[33] Taking the Pillnitz Declaration of 1791 as an example -- in which the monarchic regimes of Austria and Prussia threatened to intervene in France to free Louis XVI from prison -- Kyung-won says this move led to a mass mobilization in France instead of reducing revolutionary aspirations, and ultimately resulted in the 1792 war. He concluded that conservative powers should embrace alternatives with a view to avoiding a provocation of revolutionary states, and should accept them into the international system.[34]

[31] Kissinger, *A world restored*, 270.
[32] Armstrong. *Revolution and world order: The revolutionary state in international society*. (Oxford University Press, 1993), 176.
[33] Kyung-Won Kim. *Revolution and International System*. (New York: New York University Press, 1970) 300.
[34] Kim. *Revolution and International System*, 301.

For Stephan Walt, revolutions matter in terms of theory due to the lack of rational assumptions in power politics that are able to satisfactorily explain why revolutionary states and the counter-revolutionary powers act in the ways they do. Walt argues that "Balance of Threat" should replace the analysis of "Balance of Power" with a view to understanding the significance of the role of states' domestic politics and the role of beliefs, ideology and perception in designing a state's foreign policy. In contrast to Kyung-won, Walt believes that it is not misperception that prompts revolutionary leaders to diffuse their messages, but rather an ideational international system that is always present in their principles and ideas. It has nothing to do with imperfect information, as Lenin knew very well what Germany was, and the Iranian revolutionary elite and Fidel Castro were well-informed about consecutive US administrations.[35]

Richard Rosecrance, in contrast to Walt and Kyung-won, highlights the role of domestic change in the conduct of foreign policy, and developed a theory linking it with international relations. Rosecrance contends that conflicts resulting from revolutions are produced by deep structural changes, for which diplomacy alone cannot provide a remedy. The balance of power, according to Rosecrance, was operating prior to the French Revolution, and conflicts among states were restricted due to political values shared between their rulers. However, the French Revolution destroyed this system, and the revolutionary elite were ambitious enough to call for a restructuring of Europe and a shaping of the political systems of other states. In Rosecrance's view, states' limited resources constrained them in what they might attempt abroad, and the international system no longer had the capability to contain the demands of a revolutionary actor.[36]

James Rosenau sheds light on the phenomenon of "transnationalism," which posits that societies do affect each other; particularly, in times of conflict. Taking the form of violence, this can affect other states -- a mechanism known as "linkage." This broad category, which is related to the inter-societal process, calls for more discussion regarding the other ways -- besides violence -- by which events occurring in one country may have an influence on another, no matter the other state's capabilities or intentions. For Rosenau, the international effects of violence within one state are attributable to at least three factors: it

[35] Stephen Walt. The origins of alliances. *Ithaca New York*, 1:87. (1987), quoted in Fred Halliday. *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power, p. 301-302*

[36] Richard N. Rosecrance. *International relations: Peace or war?,* (New York, McGraw-Hill Companies, 1973), quoted in Fred Halliday's *Revolution and World Politics,* p. 303.

stimulates the interest of others; it removes constraints on intervention by others by fostering a state of amorality; and it summons responses due to rapid and unpredictable developments. Conflicts, says Rosenau, may lead to the modification of the foreign policy of states, and then they may pose particular challenges to others, mostly pro-status quo powers.[37]

Immanuel Wallerstein's Anti-Systemic Movements Theory is seen as a very different approach from the contributions of other world-systems theorists, who have called for the creation of a broad, worldwide coalition that includes forces against the dominant system. This approach is known to constitute international relations, and looks to revolutions as an inevitable phenomenon and desirable product of the contradictions engendered by that system. Although this school is to a large extent influenced by Marxism, it is critical for the theoretical and political attitudes of orthodox communism. Wallerstein argues that a continued and cumulative development of anti-systemic movements is achievable, and the onset of this can be seen in class-based movements, which successively incorporate both movements of national self-determination and social movements based on status, gender, ethnicity, and opposition to specific issues. Stressing that "the central fact of the historical sociology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that Europe has been [a place for the] emergence of powerful social movements which implicitly or explicitly challenged the achievements of triumphant capitalism."[38]

Studying the previous theories on revolutions and their impact on the international system paved the way for understanding the reactions of states, no matter regime "type," to the phenomenon of revolution. Armstrong's definition of international society and the impact of revolution on it, in addition to Rosenau's transnationalism -- in which societies do affect each other -- are the best means of clarifying the dynamics that drove Arab monarchies (except for Qatar) to react as pro-status quo powers to the Arab revolutions of 2011.

2.2. Why States React to Revolutions

The dynamics that prompt states to react positively or negatively to revolutions vary from one state to another. Some states welcome and support revolutionary change in accordance with their geopolitical interests, especially if that change leads to dramatic

[37] James N. Rosenau. International Studies in a transnational world. *Millennium, 5*(1), (1976): 1-20, quoted in Fred Halliday's *Revolution and World Politics,* p. 305.
[38] Immanuel Wallerstein. *The politics of the world-economy: The states, the movements and the civilizations*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), 86-90.

changes in the regional or international political system. Other states see themselves as a source of inspiration for that kind of change, which prompts them to welcome and support revolutionary change. Moreover, support in some cases comes as a result of ideological pressure, or domestic calls to help revolutionary movements that have shared principles or ideas.

The keenness for giving forms of support to the revolutionary countries are not only seen in revolutionary cases with obvious international dimensions and universalist ideologies, such as France, Russia, China and Iran, but also in the declarations by America's founding fathers, who viewed themselves as a source of inspiration for the whole world. Almost a century after the US Revolution and within the 1886 Statue of Liberty, the transmission of the American Revolution to various continents was symbolized by consecutive American leaders.[39]

That was seen in American support for the French Revolution from the very beginning, with American leaders viewing it as a revolution that served their geopolitical interests after it challenged Great Britain at the time. Thomas Jefferson, one of America's founding fathers, welcomed the early movements of the French Revolution, claiming that they were influenced by the American example. He wrote from Paris: "The nation has been awakened by our revolution, they feed their strength, they are enlightened, their lights are spreading and they will not retrograde."[40]

Moreover, great powers and neighboring states may welcome or support revolutions because of their tremendous impact on the international system.[41] The 1989 revolutions, which were welcomed by the US, transformed the international system as a whole by contributing to changing the rules governing the superpower conflict, and, thus, the norms sustaining the international system.[42] Furthermore, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe caused by the 1989 revolutions led to the termination and disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and then to the demise of the Soviet Union, confirming the transformation of the international system.[43]

[39] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, 59.
[40] Armstrong. *Revolution and world order, 60.*
[41] Armstrong. *Revolution and world order, 92.*
[42] Armstrong. *Revolution and world order, 305.*
[43] Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. "Understanding change in international politics: the Soviet empire's demise and the international system." *International Organization*, 48.2 (1994): 214.

Among other cases, we have states that not only welcome revolutionary movements, but also support them financially and militarily. These states prefer to promote pro-change ideas and principles because of the pressure they are subjected to from ideologies and domestic communities. These initiatives contribute to promoting a country's national glorification, and such assistance may lead to the triumph of revolutionary movements. That was seen in Russian assistance to Mongolia, Chinese support for Vietnam, and Cuban support for Nicaragua. In the same context, backing a revolution gives the supporting state a significant asset on the negotiation table -- an asset that may be needed for resolving conflicts to have emerged as a result of the revolutionary process.[44]

In the opposite, we find that many states stood against the revolutions, fearing that the effects of these upheavals could extend to the entire international system.[45]As these countries and powers not only stand against revolutionary change but spare no effort to counter their activities, they do so because of the threats that these upheavals pose to their national and geopolitical interests. The "color revolutions" that took place in some Eastern European countries at the beginning of the current millennium were seen by Moscow as part of the decades-long geopolitical struggle between Russia (formerly the USSR) and the West. Russia saw the protests taking place in Georgia, Ukraine, Serbia and Kyrgyzstan as a Western tool for strengthening and broadening the regional and global influence of the US and EU.[46]

The geopolitical threat was highly seen in an economic field, since Russia deemed that these protests were aimed at serving Western economic interests under the guise of ideological democratic ideals. "Democracy" was the unifying ideology defining the color revolutions in these countries.[47]

Additionally, many countries, mostly the regional powers, may oppose or even engage in conflict with revolutionary movements, because of the credibility of their own ideologies, ideas and principles.[48] Hegemonic powers try to sustain alliances with many states or clients, as these powers provide their allies with some degree of security. The hegemonic power's failure to support its ally in periods of danger threatens the feasibility of the alliance system

[44] Halliday, Revolution and World Politics, 97.
[45] Koslowski and Kratochwil, Understanding change in international politics, 215.
[46] Leva Bērziņa. "Color Revolutions: Democratization, Hidden Influence, or Warfare?. *CSSR Working Paper Series* 1: 2014, (2014) 3-4.
[47] Bērziņa, Color Revolutions, 4
[48] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, 227-228.

as a whole.[49] Moreover, the failure of some revolutionary countries to respect private property, international private property, and economic contracts signed by former regimes can prompt the affected parties to intervene against the new, revolutionary regime.[50]

What's more, states fear the "domino effect," by which change in a single state goes on to affect others within its geopolitical orbit. This took place in Southeast Asia and in Southern and Central Africa, leading to the victory of revolutionary nationalism in Angola and Mozambique (former Portuguese colonies) in 1975, which was followed by victory in Zimbabwe in 1980. This led to a decade of war that culminated in the demise of South Africa's apartheid regime in the early 1990s.[51]

Here we find that many states react positively to neighboring revolutions if they are in line with their geopolitical interests, especially if they see themselves as sources of inspiration for such change. They do the same if these revolutions cause a dramatic change in the international or regional systems that serves the interests of the supportive countries. They also support revolutions due to pressure exerted by their ideologies and peoples.

As for countries that stand against revolutions, they do so because of the dramatic change that such upheavals may inflict on the regional and international order, along with the threat they may pose to their ideologies and principles. They also may do so in fear of the "domino effect," by which chaos in a neighboring country may quickly extend to its own territories.

2.3. Regime 'Types' and Reactions to Revolutions

There are many reasons that prompt states to embrace a foreign policy welcoming or standing against revolutions. Here, as we are mainly dealing with the Qatari monarchy as an exceptional case, we will explore whether there is a correlation between a country's regime "type" and its reaction to revolutionary change by studying cases of various reactions by authoritarian, democratic and monarchic regimes to revolutions taking place within their geopolitical reach.

[49] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, 229.
[50] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, 230.
[51] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, 231.

2.3.1. Authoritarian Republics and Revolutions

In the study, *"Weak States, Regime Types, and Civil War,"* which attempted to measure the relation between regime "types" and the possibility of exposure to revolution and/or civil war,[52] Mehmet Gurses and T. David Mason argue that authoritarian regimes, especially personalist and military authoritarian ones, are typically prone to revolutionary unrest and civil war due to their weak institutional capabilities and arbitrary and predatory pattern of government.[53] There is a greater risk of revolution among these regime types, note Gurses and Mason, not only when they are compared with democratic regimes, but also with other types, including monarchies.[54] Being at greater risk of revolution and/or civil war, authoritarian regimes tend to undertake protectionist measures -- both on the internal and external levels -- to respond to revolutions taking place in a neighboring country or farther away.[55]

The experience of the color revolutions, which swept away authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in Georgia, Ukraine, Serbia and Kyrgyzstan in the period between 2000 and 2005, indicates that neighboring authoritarian regimes in Russia,[56] Belarus, Azerbaijan, China and Iran were panicked by the ongoing upheaval, and reacted to it by adopting many internal and external measures.[57]

On the internal level, these authoritarian regimes relied on five major strategies to counter this wave of revolution, and spared no effort to prevent it from extending into their territories: isolation, repression, marginalization, distribution and persuasion. These authoritarian regimes attempted to isolate themselves and their people from unwelcome external elements by refusing to register foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs), refusing to grant visas to election observers, or by censoring media outlets and even shutting them down.[58]

---

[52] Mehmet Gurses & David T. Mason. "Weak states, regime types, and civil war," *Civil Wars*, 12, 1:2, (2010): 140-155.
[53] Gurses & Mason, Weak states, regime types, 141.
[54] Gurses & Mason, Weak states, regime types, 150.
[55] Evgeny E. Finkel, E., & Yitzhak M. Brudny. "No more colour! Authoritarian regimes and colour revolutions in Eurasia." *Democratization*, 1:14, (2012) 5-6.
[56] According to the 2019's Democracy Index, Russia is classified as authoritarian regime and occupies the 134th out of 167 countries.
[57] Finkel & Brudny, No more colour, 5-7.
[58] Finkel & Brudny, No more colour, 6

These regimes also repressed opposition figures by withholding benefits from opposition-affiliated elites and businesspeople, having them imprisoned or disappeared, or by sending them into exile or put under house arrest. They also imposed measures aimed at marginalizing or eliminating opposition leaders by interfering in electoral legislation; restricting the opposition's access to mass media; portraying them in a negative light; and accusing them of being corrupt or of being the "pawns" of foreign agendas.[59]

Regarding distribution policies, these were manifested in the regimes' bids to "buy off" important or potentially threatening groups. As for persuasion, the regimes struggled to convince the masses that the democratic ideals the opposition parties were calling for had nothing to do with their country's history, identity and traditions, and that these parties were "funded by foreign security forces, or driven by the US and Western geopolitical and economic ambitions."[60]

On the external level, authoritarian states may resort to several measures, such as severing ties with a revolutionary regime, withdrawing from bilateral cooperation agreements, and even launching a war against a revolutionary regime, depending on the state's own geopolitical interests.

China and Russia did not welcome the color revolutions, and considered them a genuine threat to the internal security and stability of their regimes.[61] Russia went further and carried out a counter-operation aimed at neutralizing channels of Western support to the color-revolution countries, launching military offensives against two of them -- Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014 -- following the latter's Euromaidan revolution.[62]

In another case, almost one year after the Iranian Revolution, the authoritarian regime in Iraq severed diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran and invaded Iranian territory. Baghdad feared that the revolution, which had brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power, would lead Iraq's Shia majority to revolt against Saddam Hussein's Baathist government.[63]

---

[59] Finkel & Brudny, No more colour, 7.
[60] Finkel & Brudny, No more colour, 8-10
[61] Titus C Chen. "China's reaction to the color revolutions: Adaptive authoritarianism in full swing." *Asian Perspective*, (2010) 2.
[62] Nicolas Bouchet. "Russia's "militarization" of colour revolutions." *Policy Perspectives*, 4:2, (2016) 3.
[63] "Iran-Iraq War: 25 Years On," *BBC*, accessed on July 8, 2018, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm,

We witnessed similar developments or behavior on the part of authoritarian states after the Arab revolutions of 2011. Days after the fall of Tunisia's President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's authoritarian regime denounced events in Tunisia, and security forces were deployed in Cairo's streets, while Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit warned Western powers "to stay out of Egypt's affairs." He also dismissed fears that the Tunisian scenario would be repeated in other Arab states.[64] The Libyan position was tougher than the Egyptian one, with Muammar Qaddafi describing the removal of Ben Ali as "painful" -- an expression of solidarity that was not surprising from the Arab world's longest-serving leader, who had stayed in power for 42 years.[65]

The above-mentioned examples of authoritarian regimes acting against revolutionary change do not mean that pro-change movements are always rejected by them. Many examples reveal that they may welcome and support revolutionary movements if their approach is in line with their ideology and geopolitical interests. The USSR welcomed and backed Latin American revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua since these posed a threat to its rival, the US.[66] But Moscow did not do the same with the Iranian Revolution, which it greeted with anxiety and apprehension.[67]

Regarding China and its reaction to the Third World revolution, the diplomacy embraced by the authoritarian People's Republic of China (PRC) showed to a noticeable satisfaction, since the PRC, years after the 1949 revolution, sent forms support to many of the outdoor revolutionary movements. It is true that this kind of support was encouraged by the victory of the Chinese revolution, but it was accompanied by a desire for major influence on the regional and international spheres, especially over China's neighbors. However, China's domestic orientation remained dominant at the expense of the "extroversion" strategy, except for the vast aid that was sent to revolutionary Vietnam in its war against the

[64] "Tunisian uprising fires a warning to region's hardliners," *The Guardian*, accessed on July 10, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/tunisia-uprising-regional-reaction.
[65] "Tunisian uprising fires a warning to region's hardliners."
[66] "Cuban History: Cuban Revolution," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed on July 5, 2018, https://www.britannica.com/event/Cuban-Revolution.
[67] Alvin Z. Rubinstein. "The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini." *International Affairs: Royal Institute of International Affairs*, (1944): 601.

French occupation in 1950, in addition to the Chinese troops sent to take part in the Korean War.[68]

To sum up, authoritarian regimes tend to look askance at revolutions taking place within their geopolitical reach, although some may welcome revolutionary change if it serves their geopolitical interests.

On the internal level, these regimes respond to such change by embracing the five strategies of isolation, repression, marginalization, distribution and persuasion. On the external level, meanwhile, they tend to adopt the following strategies: Severing ties with the revolutionary regime; withdrawing from bilateral agreements; launching wars against the revolutionary regime.

2.3.2. Democratic Republics and Revolutions

Many works on revolutions -- including those by Theda Skocpol,[69] Jeff Goodwin[70] and Samuel Huntington[71] -- show an emerging consensus that democratic regimes are relatively immune to revolution. Huntington argues that democratic political regimes and systems have thus far not been subject to any kind of revolution and/or civil war.[72] Skocpol and Goodwin, for their part, say that ballot boxes have proven to be the coffin of revolutionary movements.[73]

The arguments of the three scholars have been backed by empirical tests conducted on the domestic version of the democratic peace, and it was concluded that democratic regimes rarely, if ever, launch wars against each other and are hardly subject to revolution and/or civil war.[74]

---

[68] Niu I. U. Jun."The Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy and Its Impact on East Asia: International Patterns in the 1950s." Empire and After: Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies (Sapporo: The University of Hokkaido Slavic Research Center, 2012): 82-85.
[69] Theda Skocpol. *States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979).
[70] Jeff Goodwin & Theda Skocpol. "Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third World," *Politics & Society*, *17*:4, (1989): 489-509.
[71] Samuel P. Huntington. Transnational organizations in world politics. *World Politics*, *25*:3, (1973): 334-368.
[72] Gurses & Mason, Weak states, regime types, 150.
[73] Goodwin & Skocpol, Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third World, 495.
[74] Gurses & Mason, Weak states, regime types, 142.

They attribute this hypothesis to the presence of norms and institutions among democratic regimes that allow for non-violent forms of protest, in addition to these regimes' keenness to resolve their conflicts via peaceful methods, like bargaining and negotiations. Moreover, the constraints these states put on leaders willing to resort to repression against their people should be highlighted.[75]

While democratic regimes are relatively unthreatened by revolution, they commonly welcome and, in some cases, support pro-change revolutionary movements if they are in line with their political identity and geopolitical interests.[76] As we mentioned earlier, Thomas Jefferson, one of the US founding fathers, welcomed the early movements of the French Revolution, and considered them to be highly influenced by the American example, affirming that the French people had been "enlightened" by their revolution.[77]

The supportive reactions of democratic states to revolutions can be seen in the financial support they give to revolutionary countries. The US and some European countries backed and welcomed the 1989 revolutions that hit Eastern Europe and led to the demise of authoritarian regimes and the Soviet Union.[78] They behaved the same, and they financially helped the NGOs responsible for diffusing ideas and principles that paved the way for the color revolutions that rocked Russia's neighbors in the period between 2000 and 2005.[79]

Democratic states may also give economic support to revolutionary regimes, especially in the sensitive transitional stage, which comes months -- or years -- after the former regime is overthrown. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union as a result of the 1989 revolutions, the US government responded by giving "generous" economic support to Eastern Europe's revolution-affected countries. US Congress speedily passed the Support for Eastern European Democracies (SEED) Act in 1989, which paved the way for a legal and financial basis by which to support Central Europe's transformation. The Freedom Support Act (FSA) in 1992 was an additional move to help these countries.[80] Moreover, democratic regimes may launch wars against a dictatorial regime to help revolutionary movements protesting and battling on the ground.

[75] Gizachew Tiruneh. "Social Revolutions: Their Causes, Patterns, and Phases," *SAGE Open*, *4*:3, (2014): 1.
[76] Tiruneh, Social Revolutions: Their Causes, Patterns, and Phases, 1-2.
[77] Armstrong, *Revolution and world order*, 59.
[78] Timothy G. Ash. "1989 changed the world. But where now for Europe?" *The Guardian*, Nov. 4, 2009.
[79] Finkel & Brudny, No more colour, 5-7.
[80] "20 Years of USAID economic growth assistance in Europe and Eurasia," USAID, 2013 report, accessed on Aug. 5, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/EE_20Year_Review.pdf.

Although the Western democracies, especially the US and many EU countries, were late in adopting a supportive position toward the youth protests in many of the Arab countries, especially Tunisia and Egypt, these powers eventually okayed a NATO-backed humanitarian intervention to support the revolutionary movement in Libya, which culminated in the overthrow of Qaddafi only weeks after the military campaign was launched.[81] However, a similar action has yet to be adopted by these powers regarding the revolution in Syria, which ultimately devolved into civil war.

Nonetheless, the political and economic support democratic states may give to pro-change revolutionary movements becomes elusive if these movements pose geopolitical threats or their demands do not match the geopolitical interests of democratic regimes. We have seen how democratic powers spare no effort to topple revolutionary regimes, especially if they challenge US-backed leaders. For example, months before the Iranian Revolution, the US sent financial and military support to Iran's shah, fearing that his overthrow could affect US influence on the Iranian arena. Months after the revolution, the US severed diplomatic ties with Tehran and imposed an economic embargo on the revolutionary regime, particularly after the hostage crisis.[82]

Likewise, with the Nicaraguan revolution that took place in 1979 and overthrew the US-backed Somoza regime, the US, since the early months of the revolution, had collaborated with and supported the dissatisfied groups loyal to the Somoza-led regime against the revolutionary Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Early in 1981, during the first months of the Ronald Reagan era, the US supported counter-revolutionary forces comprised of former members of the Somoza regime's National Guard unit and those loyal to the exiled Somoza.[83] Reagan also cut economic aid that the US was giving to Nicaragua, and in August of 1981 he approved a national security strategy that authorized the production and shipment of arms to the counter-revolution coalition there without deploying US troops to the region. Three months later, he approved another decision providing covert support to anti-Sandinista forces.[84]

---

[81] Elina Viilup. "EU's Weak and Slow Reaction to Arab Spring has no Excuses." *Opinión Europa", Barcelona Centre for International Affairs*, (2011) 1-2.
[82] Krysta Wise. "Islamic Revolution of 1979: the downfall of American-Iranian relations." *Legacy*, 11:1, (2011): 11.
[83] "Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras," *USDepartment of Justice*, accessed on Ag. 17, 2018, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9712/appa.htm.
[84] "Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras."

Accordingly, democratic regimes -- like authoritarian ones -- are driven by their geopolitical interests and political identities, rather than democratic norms, when adopting foreign policies in regards to revolutionary change taking place within their geopolitical reach. We can summarize the measures taken by democratic states when aiding their revolutionary counterparts as follows: Diffusing pro-change ideas via NGOs; financially backing revolutionary movements in targeted countries; helping the economies of revolutionary countries during transitional periods; Launching wars to topple the heads of authoritarian regimes.

2.3.3. Absolute Monarchies and Revolutions

Theoretically, the patriarchal system of monarchies[85] makes them different from authoritarian personalist and military regimes in terms of duration, as they have institutionalized methods of leadership succession represented in the heredity system, which ostensibly makes them deeply-rooted regimes rather than personalist dictatorships.[86] However, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen dozens of upheavals carried out against monarchic systems. In fact, a large number of revolutions that changed the course of history were launched against monarchies. These include the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution (also known as the October Revolution) and the Iranian Revolution.[87]

Monarchies, meanwhile, have traditionally taken a tough position towards revolutions that hit other monarchies, since we mean the absolute monarchies here not the constitutional ones, given the fact that our focus is on the Arab monarchies, and none of which applies to be a constitutional monarchy.

As a reaction to the French Revolution, an ideology of reaction was born under the name of “conservatism” among France’s neighboring monarchies of Russia, Prussia and Austria. Conservatism dates back to 1790, when Edmund Burke[88] (1729–1797) wrote

[85] We use monarchies here to refer to the absolute monarchy not constitutional monarchies.
[86] Gurses & Mason, Weak states, regime types, 145.
[87] “Top 10 Revolutions Felt Around the World,” *Listverse*, accessed on June 28, 2018, https://listverse.com/2010/10/04/top-10-revolutions-felt-around-the-world/.
[88] Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was a renowned Irish philosopher who served as an MP for almost three decades in the British parliament. Burke was known for views underpinning virtues with manners in society and he highlighted the significance of religious institutions for the moral stability and good of the state. He was also of the thinkers who violently slammed the French Revolution for what he described as "destroying the fabric of good society and traditional institutions of state and society." He was also decrying the persecution of the Catholic Church as a result of the huge upheaval.

Reflections on the Revolution in France as a reaction to the French Revolution, particularly to the radical republican ideas it spawned. Burke argued that a single generation has no right to finish the monarchic contract, as each generation should preserve it and transfer it to later generations.[89] Joseph de Maistre[90] (1753–1821), too, was seen as the most influential spokesman for conservative, counter-revolutionary regimes. He advocated the restoration of the hereditary monarchy in France, considering this system to be a divinely-sanctioned institution. Order in society and the avoidance of chaos produced by the French Revolution, De Maistre says, can only be guaranteed by absolute monarchies.[91] Since its early days, the French Revolution was seen as a threat to the legitimacy of hereditary governments in Europe and to the principle that states had no right to intervene in each other's internal affairs.[92]

Soon, a response came from monarchic regimes in Europe that felt targeted by this threat. They adopted a series of strategies aimed at countering and weakening the revolutionary states, firstly by helping internally dissatisfied forces within France. This strategy targeted people who were affected by the revolution, such as politicians, conservative peasantry[93] and movements such as the Monarchist Action Française, which was an internal counter-revolutionary movement that opposed the revolution and called for anti-democratic rules.[94]

The second strategy was threatening the "use of force" against the revolutionary regime. In August 1791, the Prussian monarchy's Leopold and Frederick William II embraced the Declaration of Pillnitz, in which they announced that the fate of Louis XVI would be "a matter of common concern" to all the sovereigns of Europe, going on to assert that they would use force on behalf of Louis before imposing a moderate constitution on France.[95]

---

[89] Michael Broers. *Europe After Napoleon: Revolution, Reaction, and Romanticism, 1814-1848*. (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996) 52-55.
[90] Joseph-Marie, comte de Maistre (1753-1821) a well-known philosopher, lawyer, writer, and diplomat who was defending and theorizing for the social hierarchy and monarchy in the period immediately followed the French Revolution. Maistre was considering monarchy both as "a divinely sanctioned institution and as the only stable form of government."
[91] Broers. *Europe After Napoleon,* 55-60.
[92] Armstrong. *Revolution and world order,* 89.
[93] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, 209.
[94] Richard S. Levy. *Antisemitism: a historical encyclopedia of prejudice and persecution*. (Santa Barbara, California, US2005) 1-3.
[95] Armstrong. *Revolution and world order,* 101.

The third strategy was launching wars with the aim of defeating the revolution and restoring the monarchy. In 1792, Prussia, along with other European powers that were intimidated by the revolution, invaded France in a bid to end the upheaval there and restore the monarchy to power. France, for its part, prepared for the war by including a large number of French citizens in the army, which was relatively small compared to the professional armies of the invading powers. The revolutionary army then managed to defeat the allied forces, thus preserving the revolution.[96]

The fourth strategy was forming coalitions among threatened countries to defeat the revolution. At least seven coalitions were formed by the various European powers to halt the expansion of revolutionary ideas across Europe, including the Britain-backed First Coalition (1793-97), Second Coalition (1798-1801), Third Coalition (1805) and Fourth Coalition (1813).[97]

The fifth strategy the neighboring monarchies depended on to counter the revolution was holding regional and international conferences meant to contain revolutionary ideals and principles. In March 1814, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia -- France's main adversaries -- agreed to remain united against revolutionary France, not only to conquer it but also to ensure peace after the war, in which French leader Napoleon was defeated. After his defeat, the Quadruple Alliance announced the return of the Bourbon monarchy to France, in the person of Louis XVIII, and decided to hold the famous Congress of Vienna in September of the same year to hash out a final peace settlement.[98]

Saudi Arabia, which represents a typical absolute monarchy, has embraced similar positions regarding revolutions that took place within its geopolitical reach and farther away. In response to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Saudi monarchy played a major role in countering the revolution and weakening the revolutionary regime, fearing the export of revolutionary ideas. Saudi involvement in the counter-revolution appeared in its financial support for the Iraqi invasion of Iran and its funding of Iranian opposition groups. Almost a year after the Iranian revolution, in August 1980, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein made an official visit to Saudi Arabia, where he seemingly received King Khalid's approval to

[96] "The Wars of Prussia (1792-1871): From the French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian War," *History Guy,* accessed on July 13, 2018, https://www.historyguy.com/wars_of_prussia.htm.
[97] Mamta Aggrawal. "Coalitions: First, Second, Third and Fourth Coalition: French Revolution," *History Discussion,* accessed on July 13, 2018.
[98] Broers, *Europe After Napoleon,* 55-57.

finance his planned invasion and thus take advantage of Tehran's political transition.[99] Saudi Arabia delivered billions of dollars in financial assistance for Saddam's invasion, and pressed other Gulf States, especially Kuwait, to follow suit.[100] What's more, the Gulf monarchies, mainly Saudi Arabia, were behind the establishment of the GCC as a regional organization, bringing together the Gulf monarchies -- a measure seen as a reaction to the Iranian Revolution in which popular forces managed to topple the region's strongest autocracy.[101]

Saudi support for counter-revolutionary movements was not specific to those in neighboring countries, but extended to Latin America as well, including the Nicaraguan revolution.[102] Saudi Arabia was among the most generous supporters of the Reagan Doctrine, which came into force to suppress communist revolutions worldwide. In 1985, Saudi King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz arrived in Washington -- one of the first official visits after Reagan's second term began -- where the US president thanked Fahd in person for the "new" Saudi contribution to the FSLN, a pro-Somoza movement. The Saudi contribution was $24 million, bringing the total to $32 million, which went mostly to "arms, ammunition, and other ordnance items." The Saudi support was considered a crucial component of the counter-revolutionary effort in the Latin American state.[103]

Throughout history, absolute monarchic regimes have looked suspiciously at revolutionary change. As mentioned above, monarchic regimes' responses to revolutions often include the following: Helping internally dissatisfied forces within revolutionary countries; threatening force against revolutionary regimes; launching wars to defeat revolutions and restore ousted regimes; forming coalitions of threatened countries to defeat revolutions; holding regional and international conferences meant to contain revolutionary ideas, such as the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the GCC (1981); and financially backing wars and invasions against revolutionary countries.

One recent example is Saudi Arabia standing against the Arab Spring revolutions while simultaneously backing revolutions in Libya and Syria. In the latter cases, the Saudi

[99] Kasra Arabi and Ali Ansari. Ideology and Iran's Revolution: How 1979 Changed the World, *Institute for Global Change*, Feb. 11, 2019.
[100] Mohammed Ayyoub, The GCC shows its true color, the Saudi counter revolution, *Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)*, (2011): 33.
[101] Ayyoub, The GCC shows its true color, 31.
[102] Jonathan Marshall. "Saudi Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine." *Middle east report*, *155*, (1988):12-17.
[103] Marshall, Saudi Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine. 16-17.

position cannot be interpreted as a pro-change one. Rather, it was anti-Qaddafi and anti-Assad in person, driven by longstanding antipathies between Qaddafi and Assad on one hand and successive Saudi leaders on the other. Notably, shortly after Qaddafi's departure, Riyadh supported a putschist military general in Libya who was committed to reversing revolutionary gains. Besides, Saudi Arabia[104] and the UAE have recently taken tentative steps towards reconciliation with the Assad regime, the most recent of which was the reopening of the UAE's embassy in Damascus.[105]

It is only the Qatari case that proves exceptional in the Arab region, with that country sending all forms of support to protest-hit Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen.

2.4. Arab Monarchies and Revolutionary Change

Studying the Qatari monarchy's exceptionalism during the Arab Spring prompts us to review the history of the Arab monarchies' reactions to revolutions in the twentieth century.[106] If a monarchy is a regime "type" in which the hereditary king -- whether sultan or emir -- holds varying degrees of power, then, currently, there are at least eight Arab monarchies (out of a total of 22 Arab states). These are: Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, all the leaders of which possess something approximating absolute[107] power.[108] Among the eight Arab monarchies, none qualifies as a constitutional monarchy (despite pretentions of being so by Jordan and Morocco), in which the king only has symbolic authority, with real power lying with an elected parliamentary government.[109]

In the first place, Arab kings and emirs not only hold the reins of power but rule the country entirely. They do this by appointing cabinets; dictating internal and foreign policy; controlling the state's coercive apparatus; and allowing limited authority to parliament (in the few countries in which they exist) and the judiciary.[110] In the twentieth century,

[104] Middle East Eye. "Why the UAE and Saudi Arabia are reaching out to Assad." Accessed on Dec. 24, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-arab-states-are-lining-work-syria-1164125942.
[105] "UAE Embassy in Damascus resumes diplomatic service," *UAE News Agency*, accessed on Dec. 28, 2018, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302729363.
[106] Most of the Arab monarchies, especially the Gulf-based ones, were not existed before the 19th century since they were a group of tribes and Sheikhdoms governed by their heads or Sheikhs.
[107] Although some of them -- Morocco and Jordan -- claim that they are constitutional monarchies.
[108] Ean L. Yom, & Gregory F. Gause. "Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on," *Journal of Democracy*, *23*:4, (2012): 76.
[109] Yom & Gause, Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on, 75.
[110] Yom & Gause, Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on, 76.

especially in the postcolonial era, the Arab world experienced rebellions, revolts and military coups that led to the overthrow of six monarchies. This happened in Egypt (1952), Tunisia (1957), Iraq (1958), North Yemen (1962), and Libya (1969).

While the Arab monarchies seem impervious to revolutionary change today, especially after the Iranian Revolution and the Arab Spring, Oman's Sultan Said bin Taimur faced regional rebellions in the 1960s; Jordan's King Hussein faced a coup attempt in 1957 and a civil war in 1970; and Morocco's King Hassan II weathered a military coup in 1972.[111] The 1952 revolution[112] led by Egyptian army officers, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the ideals Nasser espoused, was seen as a major threat to the conservative Arab monarchies, especially those of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Nasser called these monarchies "reactionaries" and accused them of standing in the way of his attempts to unify the wider Arab nation.[113]

The disagreement between the Saudi monarchy and post-revolutionary Egypt reached its peak with the war that broke out in Yemen in 1962 following a Nasser-backed coup led by anti-monarchy officers against Imam al-Badr, the last king of North Yemen. Nasser's support for al-Badr's adversaries led many to question Nasser's real motives. The Saudi monarchs suspected that Nasser had set his sights on the Kingdom's natural resources, and that his invasion of Yemen represented a bid to assume control of the entire Arabian Peninsula.[114]

Nasser's nonstop bids to undermine monarchic regimes in the Arab region forced the Saudi royal family to prepare for a frontal Egyptian attack by maintaining support for North Yemen's pro-monarchy regime and by highlighting the danger posed by the Egyptian presence there. Riyadh also depicted Nasser's moves as "anti-Western" and "revolutionary," which threatened Western policies of safeguarding the region's oil supply.[115]

As a result of the creation of a revolutionary regime in neighboring Yemen, Saudi Arabia established a security net comprised of Saudi and foreign soldiers, which served as a barrier against Nasser's revolutionary project. This coincided with the presence of British

[111] Yom & Gause, Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on, 78.
[112] Defined as a military coup in different sources.
[113] "Egypt and the Arab World," *U.S.' Library of Congress*, accessed on July 13, 2018, http://countrystudies.us/egypt/33.htm.
[114] Joseph Mann. "King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser's Revolutionary Ideology," *Middle Eastern Studies*, *48*:5, (2012): 750-752.
[115] Mann, King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser, 753.

forces in Aden and Oman, which protected the two strategic areas from a possible revolutionary wave in the Persian Gulf.[116]

The situation in the Saudi monarchy was similar to that in Jordan, where Nasser also posed a threat to the rule of King Hussein, who tried in vain to embrace Nasser's popular pan-Arab rhetoric. In 1955, Britain added insult to injury by exerting pressure on Hussein to join the Baghdad Pact, a security defense coalition founded by Turkey and Hashemite Iraq with the aim of countering Soviet influence in the Middle East and Egyptian ambitions. Amid the worst riots Jordan had seen since King Hussein had assumed power, the Hashemite king hesitated to join. Nasser's influence in the kingdom was so strong that he managed to turn the majority of the Jordanian street against King Hussein.[117]

Early in 1957, the revolutionary Egyptian president once again made trouble for Jordan's king by financially backing Ali Abu Nawwar, an ambitious royal advisor, to attempt a military coup. King Hussein survived the coup after a fierce battle erupted between loyalist and pro-Nasser army units in the capital Amman.[118]

As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia, along with the other Arab monarchies, felt threatened by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, when Riyadh embraced several polices to counter the revolution. However, the Arab monarchies' resistance to the revolutionary threats was seen as running counter to leading traditions of political science, by which such regimes have been classified as a kind of "anachronism" within the modern international system. They appeared able to overcome what Samuel Huntington has called the "King's Dilemma,"[119] a longstanding assumption that absolute monarchies are incompatible with the modern political order. Outside the Arab region, political developments that have taken place since 1945 seem to have confirmed Huntington's assertion. As of 2008, the last king of Bhutan had surrendered his royal supremacy for parliamentary democracy, and only a handful of absolutist monarchies remained outside the Middle East, such as those in Brunei and Swaziland.[120]

---

[116] Mann, King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser, 754.
[117] "King Hussein of Jordan," *The Telegraph*, accessed on July 13, 2018, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/royalty-obituaries/7136625/King-Hussein-of-Jordan.html.
[118] King Hussein of Jordan, *The Telegraph.*
[119] Huntington said in his book, Political Order in Changing Societies, issued in 1968, that it is true that political centralization of a monarchy proves useful for development in the traditional societies undergoing modernization but that constrains to combine new groups emerged by modernization.
[120] Yom & Gause, Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on, 76.

However, there is one case that not only showed resilience during the Arab Spring, but also backed revolutionary change in the Arab world and embraced an "exceptional" foreign policy totally at odds with that of its fellow Arab monarchies -- a case we will examine in upcoming chapters.

Conclusion:

Revolutionary upheavals have a considerable impact on the international system and nearby countries, and may prompt revolution-affected countries -- and regional powers and superpowers -- to react. Independent of regime "type," conservative regimes (authoritarian and monarchic) typically oppose, and work to thwart, revolutionary movements within their geopolitical reach, especially if they threaten their political identity. However, authoritarian regimes have, in some cases, welcomed pro-change movements that do not pose threats to their stability and are in line with their geopolitical interests. Both democratic and authoritarian regimes, as was shown in different cases, behave in accordance with their interests when adopting foreign policies vis-à-vis revolutions.

Monarchies act as pro-status quo powers in nearly all pro-change revolutions, no matter the ideas and principles of the revolution, and generally perceive them as threats. Saudi Arabia, an obvious example of a pro-status quo monarchy, stood against revolutionary socialist movements in the Arab world (especially during the Nasser era); backed the Iraqi war against the Iranian Revolution; and established the GCC as a counterweight to the revolution. Riyadh also financed counter-revolutionary groups in faraway Nicaragua, and, as we will see in the next chapter, how it led -- along with the UAE -- a counter-revolutionary bloc to thwart the 2011 Arab Spring.

CHAPTER 3

ARAB MONARCHIES AND THE 2011 REVOLUTIONS

If a monarchy is a regime "type" in which the hereditary king -- whether sultan or emir -- holds varying degrees of power, then there are at least eight Arab monarchies (out of a total of 22 Arab states) in the world today. These are: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, all the leaders of which possess something approximating absolute power.[121] Among these eight Arab monarchies, none qualifies as a constitutional monarchy (despite pretentions of being so by Jordan and Morocco), in which the king only has symbolic authority, while executive power lies with an elected parliament.

Arab kings and emirs not only hold the reins of power, but rule the country entirely by naming cabinets, dictating internal and foreign policy, and controlling the state's coercive apparatus. They also concede limited authority to parliament (in the few countries in which they exist) and the judiciary.[122]

However, many disparities can be seen among these eight monarchies. When it comes to the royal family's political influence and executive power, we have dynastic monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman), and linchpin monarchies -- individual monarchies[123]-- which include Jordan and Morocco. Within dynastic monarchies, ruling family members dominate the top political offices of the country, and are actively involved in the daily management of its bureaucracies. Moreover, the family's male members compete with each other for influence and power, which means the monarchy as a whole is ruled directly by the royal family. As for the linchpin (individual) monarchies, political engagement by the royal family is generally limited to managing the country's political-strategic orientation. Here, the king prefers to stay away from the essentials of everyday politics with a view to maintaining his image "above the fray," with kings also preferring to rule far removed from the "commoners" running the government. Nevertheless, the royals hold executive power in their hands, which can be seen in their authority to appoint

[121] Yom & Gause, Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on, 76.
[122] Yom & Gause, Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on, 77.
[123] Gregory F. Gause III. "Kings for all seasons: how the Middle East's monarchies survived the Arab spring." *Brookings Doha Center Analysis, Paper* 8 (2013): 15.

key ministers, including prime ministers, and dictate internal security policy, foreign policy, and defense policy.[124]

The categorization of monarchies into "dynastic" and "linchpin" reflects the distinction between the oil-rich dynastic monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula and the resource-poor linchpin monarchies of Morocco and Jordan. The six dynastic monarchies are also the countries that form the membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).[125] This classification will help us understand, in this chapter, how these monarchies dealt with the protests that took place inside their territories, or within neighboring Arab states, so as to shed light on how regime "type" affects countries' positions vis-à-vis revolution. The Arab Spring saw some monarchies hit by protests; some monarchies supporting the protests; and some monarchies forming a coalition to counter the revolutionary change.

3.1. Monarchies Hit by Protests

Although many Arab monarchies were engulfed by the Arab Spring protests, no single monarchic regime met its demise -- even Bahrain, which saw months of protests with dozens killed and thousands more injured and arrested. While violent protests were seen in Bahrain, largely peaceful protests took place in Oman, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

3.1.1. Jordan

Jordan saw protests early in 2011, with people calling, not for King Abdullah II to step down, but for more jobs and an end to government "corruption."[126] Weeks later, the demands escalated, and demonstrators began calling for greater democracy and a reduction of the king's powers.[127] King Abdullah II responded to the protests by pursuing measures aimed at satisfying the opposition, including the sacking of three consecutive unpopular premiers (whom he had appointed earlier) within 15 months, and ordering the detention of a former intelligence chief on corruption charges. He also held talks with leaders of the Islamic Action Front (IAF) -- considered the Muslim Brotherhood's branch in Jordan -- and paid several

[124] Zoltan Barany. "The 'Arab Spring' in the Kingdoms," *Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies* (2012) 2-3.
[125] Abdullayev. *Arab Spring and the Resilience of Arab Monarchies*
[126] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Jordan," *BBC*, accessed on Nov. 14, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482679.
[127] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Jordan."

visits to tribal constituencies in the kingdom.[128] Additionally, he appointed a committee to draft a new electoral law with the authority to enact constitutional reforms. In June 2011, the commission introduced 42, mostly minor, changes to the constitution.[129]

The Jordan protests were largely peaceful, except for some deadly clashes that erupted in 2012 amid popular rage over a government decision to cancel fuel subsidies in order to qualify for an IMF loan. In January 2013, early parliamentary elections were held amid promises by the king to "consult" with the incoming parliament, for the first time ever, in order to nominate candidates for the premiership. The most powerful opposition party, the IAF, boycotted the poll, claiming that amendments made to the electoral law favored pro-king indigenous Bedouin tribes over Palestinian-origin[130] Jordanians.[131]

Many explanations have been given for the resilience of the Jordanian monarchy during the Arab Spring and the lack of escalation in Jordan, especially given that the king granted no serious concessions to the protestors. One explanation was Jordan's societal divide, which made it difficult for the royal family to satisfy the two different camps of protestors. While tribal (Bedouin) Jordanians were calling for legislation that would not give their Palestinian-origin counterparts the upper hand in the polls, the latter were demanding more representation.[132] David Ignatius[133] argues that the Jordanian king benefited from this by depending "on the entrepreneurial Palestinian business elite for Jordan's economic growth; but he needs the army, dominated by the Bedouin tribes of the East Bank, for security. This balancing act has allowed the Hashemite monarchy to survive for 90 years, despite the civil wars, assassination attempts and regional mayhem."[134]

3.1.2. Morocco

Only days after the fall of Egypt's Mubarak regime on Feb. 11, 2011, major protests were held in Rabat and Casablanca, from which demonstrations rapidly spread to over 50

[128] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Jordan."
[129] Barany, The Arab Spring in the Kingdoms, 30.
[130] According to estimates, Jordanians of Palestinian origin form around 60 percent of the country's population.
[131] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Jordan."
[132] Marissa Cramer. "Regime reform in the Arab Spring: Explaining divergent paths of Jordan and Morocco," *Paris School of International Affairs* 1:2012, (2012) 11.
[133] David Ignatius. "A tough Balancing Act for Jordan," *Washington Post*, Feb. 22, 2011.
[134] Ignatius, "A tough Balancing Act for Jordan.

Moroccan cities. Protestors called on King Mohammed VI to relinquish some of what they described as his wide-ranging powers.[135]

On March 9 of the same year, King Mohammed VI delivered an unexpected televised speech to address the Moroccan people, in which he promised a "new charter between the throne and the people." He also pledged a package of comprehensive constitutional amendments and reforms. Although this pledge was rejected by the February 20 Movement, a youth group that had organized the protests in June of the same year, many constitutional amendments were approved, which saw -- for the first time ever -- a prime minister chosen by the majority-winning party. In November 2011, the first Moroccan parliamentary polls were held after the constitution was amended, in which moderate Islamists belonging to the Justice and Development Party (PJD), known to be close to the Muslim Brotherhood, won a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. The king then asked the PJD head Abdelilah Benkirane to form a coalition government, which officially took power in January 2012.[136] Whether the king's concessions were genuine or not, they were enough to help the country avoid the economic and political turmoil of the kind seen in several other Arab countries in the early stages of the Arab Spring.[137]

3.1.3. Oman

In February 2011, Oman saw the outbreak of unprecedented protests, with thousands taking to the streets to demand jobs and an end of government "corruption." Like Jordan and Morocco, there were no calls to overthrow the royal family by the protestors, who confined their demands to improved living standards, thus prompting the security forces to show a degree of tolerance.[138]

However, lethal force was employed by the authorities in the town of Sohar, where demonstrations turned violent. In May 2011, several sit-ins were staged in capital Muscat and in the provinces of Sur and Salalah, for which 15 protestors received years-long prison

[135] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Morocco," *BBC*, accessed on Nov. 14., 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482680.
[136] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Morocco."
[137] Joakim Carbonnier. "The Arab Spring and its different outcomes: Explaining the variation in the state of democratization," master's thesis, Lund University, (2013) 27.
[138] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Oman," *BBC*, accessed on Nov. 17, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12598273.

sentences. Sultan Qaboos, in power since 1970,[139] making him the region's longest-serving monarch before he died early in 2020, vowed to make social and political reforms. These included the granting of some legislative and regulatory powers to Muscat's Shura Council. In May 2012, the Omani authorities carried out a crackdown on writers, activists and bloggers who had criticized the slow pace of reform -- along with 30 other people -- many of whom received prison terms (ranging from 12 to 18 months) for "defaming the Sultan."[140]

With a view to easing public discontent caused by the protests, the government in February 2013 announced plans to increase salaries and diminish unemployment. A month later, Sultan Qaboos pardoned several of the activists arrested in 2012 before releasing them all in July of the same year.[141] Moreover, several government ministers were dismissed in hopes of persuading protestors that the government was fighting corruption.[142] Meanwhile, the government was emboldened to announce many economic subsidies after Saudi Arabia pledged financial assistance to poorer GCC members. A total of $20 billion was pledged by the attending countries to Bahrain and Oman, and GCC ministers began talking of something akin to a "Marshall Plan" to help the entire Gulf region.[143] The Saudi move was seen as a bid to foster greater integration among GCC member-states, which had (allegedly) been impeded by Oman due to the latter's relatively close ties with Iran, Riyadh's primary regional rival.[144]

3.1.4. Kuwait

Protests in Kuwait began in February 2011 when scores of stateless Arabs,[145] known as "bidoon," staged demonstrations to decry their second-class status.[146] In the summer of the same year, several Kuwaiti youth groups began calling for the immediate resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed Al-Sabah, nephew of Emir Sheikh Sabah al-

[139] Sultan Qaboos passed away on Jan. 10 2020 with his nephew Haitham bin Tareq Al Said assuming affice.
[140] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Oman."
[141] "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Oman."
[142] "Oman's Ruler Dismisses Ministers," *Al-Jazeera*, https://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2011/03/20113565533194678.html (Accessed on Nov. 17, 2018).
[143] James Gavin, "Taking the GCC Vision Forward", *Middle East Economic Digest*, supplement GCC Anniversary (2011) 31.
[144] Guido Steinberg. "Leading the counter-revolution: Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring." *SWP Research Paper*, (2014): 15.
[145] Social class refers to the Illegal migrants who are living in Kuwait for decades and still hold no citizenship, their numbers are estimated at 120,000 people.
[146] Barany, The Arab Spring in the Kingdoms, 5.

Ahmed Al-Sabah.[147] Protests escalated following the prime minister's involvement, along with a handful of pro-government MPs, in a controversial bribery case. In November 2011, protestors, who were demanding the PM's dismissal, stormed the Kuwaiti parliament (National Assembly) in a move described by the emir as a "black day"[148] in the country's history.[149]

The emir nevertheless made major concessions to opposition groups by replacing his nephew and dissolving parliament, after which the Islamist-led opposition registered significant gains in legislative polls held in February 2012. The newly-elected parliament, however, was soon dissolved after Kuwait's Constitutional Court ruled to invalidate the poll results and reinstate the previous parliament. The emir responded by dissolving the reinstated parliament in October 2012 and calling for snap elections.[150]

After the fall of several leaders in other Arab countries, the Kuwaiti monarchy responded domestically by adopting steps aimed at "buying" the public's loyalty and preempting social unrest. In February 2011, every Kuwaiti citizen received $3,500 in cash from the government, while the emir announced that several basic food items (including sugar, cooking oil and flour) would be provided for free for a one-year period. The largesse was ostensibly intended to mark the passage of 50 years since the country's independence and 20 years since its liberation from the Iraqi invasion of Saddam Hussein. These decisions, however, did not apply to Kuwait's bidoon community, prompting the latter to stage further demonstrations. The government also approved a record annual budget of $70 billion, most of which was allocated for fuel subsidies and salary raises for public-sector employees.[151]

3.1.5. Saudi Arabia

Rapid developments in Tunisia and Egypt in February and March of 2011 prompted many Saudi citizens to stage their own anti-government protests, since these developments coincided with devastating floods that hit the kingdom's western Jeddah province that

[147] Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed Al-Sabah passed away on Sept. 29, 2020 before his cousin Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah assumed power.
[148] "Arab Uprisings: Country to Country: Kuwait," *BBC*, accessed on Nov. 17, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-19401680.
[149] "Arab Uprisings: Country to Country: Kuwait."
[150] "Arab Uprisings: Country to Country: Kuwait."
[151] Barany, The Arab Spring in the Kingdoms, 24.

resulted in extensive property damage.[152] The Saudi authorities responded to these protests by detaining dozens of activists, while deploying security forces in major cities throughout the kingdom.[153]

Days after the protests, Saudi Arabia saw the establishment of its first-ever political party, the Ummah Islamic Party, which was founded by Saudi Islamists, lawyers and opposition activists. Given the fact that the move was not officialized, it was seen as a rare challenge to the absolute rule of the regime. Apparently prompted by the popular revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, the party's establishment at this sensitive time was largely seen as a means of registering discontent rather than constituting an effective political party per se. Saudi Arabia had no elected parliament and the establishment of political parties in the country was banned, as was any manifestation of public dissent.[154] The Ummah Party's founders, therefore, were all arrested within days, but were later released in late 2011 after vowing not to engage in future political activity. Only one member, lawyer Abd al-Aziz al-Wuhaibi, refused to renounce political activism, and was therefore slapped with a seven-year prison term in September 2011.[155]

Amid the ongoing turmoil in the Arab world, King Abdallah announced direct and indirect payments to be made to the public in hopes of alleviating the economic factors that had led to popular dissatisfaction. In February and March of 2011, he announced the disbursement of $130 billion to address unemployment and chronic housing shortages. The country's western and central regions remained largely calm, while its Shia-majority Eastern Province continued to see protests.[156]

The Eastern Province, home to a Shia majority accounting for nearly 15 percent of the national population, had long complained of discrimination by the country's Sunni majority. Since 2011, hundreds of people in the region had been arrested, while dozens more had reportedly been killed. Riyadh's Specialized Criminal Courts, which specialized in ostensible cases of terrorism, had prosecuted numerous Shia opposition and human rights

---

[152] "Arab Uprisings: Country to Country: Saudi Arabia," *BBC*, accessed on Nov. 22, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482678.
[153] Steinberg, Leading the counter-revolution, 6.
[154] "Pro-reform Saudi activists launch political party," *Reuters*, accessed on Nov. 22, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-opposition/pro-reform-saudi-activists-launch-political-party-idUSTRE71942L20110210.
See "Saudi Protests in 2011-2012," *Marefa Encyclopedia, a*ccessed on Nov. 21, 2018, https://www.marefa.org.
[155] Steinberg, Leading the counter-revolution, 8.
[156] Steinberg, Leading the counter-revolution, 7.

activists, mainly the Shia prominent figure Shiekh Nimr.[157] The hearings were held on a range of charges, the most common of which was "disobeying the ruler."[158]

As protests erupted in Shia-majority areas, Saudi Arabia accused Tehran of inciting Shia populations in the Gulf States to rise up against their respective regimes, thus destabilizing the entire region. The unrest that had convulsed the Eastern Province since 2011 intensified, with Shia youths increasingly engaging in militant activities, claiming they no longer believed that their demands for equality could be attained through peaceful means. This led some radicalized Shia youths to adopt views contrary to those held by their older counterparts who still maintained that a viable modus vivendi could be achieved with the Saudi regime.[159]

3.1.6. Bahrain

The uprising that took place in Bahrain was unprecedented for the Arab monarchies, not only because of its magnitude, but because of the threat it posed to the very survival of the Al Khalifa regime. After first erupting in capital Manama on February 13, 2011, the protests quickly took on a sectarian character. They were dominated by Shia demonstrators, who staged sit-ins at Manama's Pearl Roundabout before the unrest spread to the city center and to practically all Shia-majority neighborhoods.[160]

Their initial demands were political rather than economic, unlike the protests in other monarchies, as they did not call for improved living standards but for a move towards a constitutional monarchy. There were also calls to end decades of discrimination against the country's Shia majority (estimated at 70 percent of the population), particularly in terms of education, housing and employment. Protesters also demanded an end to the government's preferential policies vis-à-vis workers of Sunni origin, especially as they applied to foreign laborers from Yemen, Syria, Jordan and Pakistan, for whom the Al Khalifa regime often fast-tracked citizenship with a view to raising the Sunni share of the population. Police

[157] Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a prominent Shia cleric who was born in 1959 in the Saudi eastern city of Awamiya in the Qatif Governorate. Al-Nimr was also of the main opposition figures in the country, who was sentenced to death after being charged of "sowing discord" in the country. Al-Nimr was hanged out by Saudi authorities in Jan. 2,2016.
[158] "Arab Uprisings: Country to Country: Saudi Arabia."
[159] Steinberg, Leading the counter-revolution, 10.
[160] Kenneth Katzman. "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and US Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, March, 21, 2011.

responded to the protests with excessive force, and at least four demonstrators were killed on a February 17 'day of rage,' which led to further escalations as demonstrators began openly calling for the overthrow of the regime.[161]

One month later, King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa called for dialogue with opposition forces, announcing measures aimed at appeasing opposition parties. These measures included the release of political prisoners, the dismissal of four government ministers, and the forgiving of 25 percent of housing-loan debt owed by citizens. Additionally, the GCC pledged billions of dollars in financial support to Bahrain, as a result of which Interior Minister Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa announced plans to hire 20,000 new employees, while the Housing Ministry declared that 50,000 new homes would be built.[162]

Despite these moves, demonstrators remained in the streets, and some protests even turned violent, with protestors cordoning off the Bahraini parliament and closing the capital's financial district. It was reported at the time that some of these protests saw the participation of at least 100,000 people, accounting for more than 10 percent of the country's total population of less than one million.[163] The protests were organized by the Shia Al-Wefaq organization, which repeatedly warned the Al Khalifa regime to make its "political exit" before the crisis "gets out of control."[164]

On March 13 of the same year, the GCC's "Peninsula Shield" force, the organization's collective security mechanism, entered Bahraini territory with the aim of helping Manama "restore the stable situation to the country." Two days later, a three-month state of emergency was declared by the Bahraini government, while opposition parties asked to enter talks with Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa to discuss a reform plan and draft a new constitution. The move suggested that the opposition trusted the crown prince more than it did to his ruling father with secret negotiations were launched between the two sides.[165]

---

[161] Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and US Policy.
[162] Al-Ihtijajat al-Bahreiniyya, "Bahraini Protests," *Al-Jazeera Encyclopedia*, accessed on Nov, 23, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/events/2015/7/14.
[163] Anar Abdullayev. *Arab Spring and the Resilience of Arab Monarchies. The Case of Bahrain* (Budapest: Central European University, 2012) 22.
See also. "Bahraini Protests," Al-Jazeera Encyclopedia
[164] Abdullayev. *Arab Spring and the Resilience of Arab Monarchies*, 24.
[165] Frederic Wehrey. The Precarious Ally: Bahrain's Impasse and US Policy. Washington, DC: Carnegie endowment for international peace, 2013.

After dozens of Bahraini demonstrators were killed, protestors began adopting slogans like those being used in the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. These included "The people want the downfall of the regime," and "Down with the Al Khalifa Family," which amounted to unambiguous calls for the overthrow of the Al Khalifa monarchy.[166]

With the help of GCC forces, Bahraini security forces managed to suppress the protests, during which at least 46 people were killed (including police officers) and some 3,000 imprisoned. Another 4,000 reportedly lost their jobs due to their involvement in the protests.[167] After the first six months of protests, Bahraini King Hamad bin Issa appointed the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), which included five international legal experts, to examine possible means of opening a national dialogue. One of the BICI's critical findings, made public in late 2011, was that Bahraini security forces had resorted to "systematic and deliberate excessive use of force, including torture and forced confessions, against protestors."[168]

Qatar and the UAE, for their part, were spared the unrest that engulfed other countries during the Arab Spring. One reason for this (among many) is that both monarchies enjoy per-capita income rates that are among the highest in the world. It should be noted, however, that the UAE did preemptively detain several activists who had called for protests, thereby nipping any potential unrest in the bud.[169]

3.2. Monarchies that Backed Revolutionary Change

The Arab Spring saw some monarchies support revolutionary change in the region, with Qatar being the prime example. Qatar embraced a supportive policy vis-à-vis protests that erupted in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria. Doha was even accused by Bahrain of instigating protests by Bahraini opposition forces.[170] Saudi Arabia and the UAE, meanwhile, both supported the Libyan and Syrian opposition, although the UAE eventually

[166] Abdullayev. *Arab Spring and the Resilience of Arab Monarchies,* 24.
[167] Barany, The Arab Spring in the Kingdoms, 6.
[168] Kenneth Katzman, "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and USPolicy, *CRS Report for Congress (Washington DC, USA: Congressional Research Service*, May 14, 2012.
[169] Al-Imarat tataqilu khamsat ashkhas bituham tahreed, "The UAE arrests five people for incitement charges," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on September 12, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/4/25/%D8.
[170] "Security apparatus find Qatari accounts inciting against Bahrain," *Bahraini News Agency*, accessed on Dec. 25, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wh-A8DoFtz8&ab_channel=BahrainTVNewsCenter.

gave up and normalized ties with the Assad regime.[171] This culminated in Abu Dhabi's reopening of its embassy in Damascus in late 2018.[172] Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, for his part, recently hinted at the possibility of "improved ties" with the Assad regime.[173]

3.2.1. Qatar

Qatar adopted a supportive role vis-à-vis the protests that rocked the Arab region in early 2011, particularly those in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Qatari support for the Arab Spring employed both hard and soft power to promote regime change in certain Arab Spring countries.[174]

In the cases of Libya and Syria, Qatar backed revolutionary forces in the form of both military and financial support. Qatar's Al-Jazeera news network, which enjoyed wide popularity throughout the region, played a key role in raising Arab public awareness, mobilizing the masses against autocratic Arab governments, and even calling for regime change. It broadcast round-the-clock news about the protests, contributing to the revolutionary fervor engulfing the region.[175] Doha also called for military intervention on behalf of the revolutionary forces battling the Assad and Qaddafi regimes, while also sending large amounts of money and arms to revolutionary groups in both Libya and Syria.[176]

Qatar's role in the Libyan and Syrian upheavals was not limited to financial and military support, but also included various forms of diplomatic support in the regional and international arenas. Doha backed revolutionary groups in both countries in regional and international forums, most notably at the United Nations and the Arab League.[177] At the same time, Doha called for giving Syria's Arab League seat to the opposition Syrian National Coalition,[178] while also trying to persuade the UNSC members to adopt the 1973 resolution

[171] "Why the UAE and Saudi Arabia are reaching out to Assad," *Middle East Eye*, accessed on Dec. 24, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-arab-states-are-lining-work-syria-1164125942.
[172] "UAE Embassy in Damascus resumes diplomatic service," *UAE News Agency*, accessed on Dec. 28, 2018, http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302729363.
[173] "Why the UAE and Saudi Arabia are reaching out to Assad."
[174] Khalil Rinnawi. "Cyber Uprising: Al-Jazeera TV channel and the Egyptian uprising," *Language and Intercultural Communication*, 12:2, (2012) 118-120.
[175] Rinnawi, Cyber Uprising: Al-Jazeera TV, 120-122.
[176] Mohammed Nuruzzaman. "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Down the foreign policy slope." *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 8:2 (2015) 228.
[177] Nuruzzaman, Qatar and the Arab Spring: Down the foreign policy slope, 230.
[178] "Qatar pushes to give Syria's seat on Arab League to rebels," *The Guardian*, accessed on Nov. 30, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/25/syria-qatari-influence-rebels-arab-league.

calling for a no-fly zone over Libya.[179] What's more, Qatar was the first Arab country to recognize the newly-formed Libyan National Council as the only legitimate representative of the Libyan people.[180]

In Tunisia, Rachid Ghannouchi, head of the Ennahda Party, repeatedly hailed the Qatari role in the Tunisian revolution, describing Doha as the revolution's "partner and first overseas backer." He also voiced appreciation for Doha's "generous" economic support for Tunisia, both immediately following the revolution and during the subsequent transitional stage.[181] Since the toppling of the Tunisian president in early 2011, Qatar has been the second largest foreign investor in Tunisia after France, accounting for 16 percent of total foreign direct investment in the country.[182] Ghannouchi also commended Qatar's Al-Jazeera for "not only backing the democratization process in Tunisia, but for introducing the revolution's leaders to the whole world."[183]

Regarding Egypt, Qatar did not view the Egyptian uprising as a threat -- as did other Arab monarchies -- but as an opportunity.[184] Al-Jazeera also played a key role in the overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak regime due to its considerable influence on Arab public opinion, especially vis-à-vis Arab leaders. For these reasons, Qatar played a large role in the Arab and international political arenas, despite its being a tiny state subject to certain geopolitical weaknesses. Only three days after protests erupted against Mubarak, Al-Jazeera was describing them as a "revolution" against the Mubarak regime.[185] Qatari support also manifested itself in visits to Cairo by Qatari officials a year after Mubarak was forced to step down, with the emir making several visits to the country during the rule first of Egypt's military council and then during the one-year tenure of President Mohammed Morsi.[186] Moreover, Qatari financial support for Egypt after the revolution was substantial, with Qatar

[179] "Qatar's Role In Libya and Beyond," *Stratfor*, Accessed on Nov. 29, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/qatars-role-libya-and-beyond.
[180] Qatar tatarifu bil-majles al-Libi kamumathel li al-Shab al-Libi, "Qatar recognizes Libya council as representative of Libyan people," *Qatari News Agency (QNA) by Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Nov. 28, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/3/28/,.
[181] Al-Ghanouchi yashkuru Amir Qatar ala al-Daam, "Ghannouchi thanks Qatari Prince over Support," *Al-Sharq Daily*, accessed on Nov. 29, 2018, https://www.al-sharq.com/article/07/10/2016/.
[182] "Qatar has 2nd largest FDI in Tunisia," *Qatari News Agency (QNA), via Peninsula Newspaper*, accessed on Nov. 29, 2018, https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/22/07/2018/Qatar-has-2nd-largest-FDI-in-Tunisia.
[183] "Ghannoushi thanks Qatari Prince over Support."
[184] Sherif Elashmawy. "The Foreign Policies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar towards the Arab Uprisings: The Cases of Egypt, Libya and Bahrain," *5th ECPR Graduate Student Conference, University of Innsbruck*, (2014) 13.
[185] Lawrence Pintak, "The Al Jazeera revolution," *Foreign Policy*, Feb. 2, 2011.
[186] Amir Qatar yakhtatimu ziyara li Masr, "Qatari Emir Concludes Visit to Egypt," *Sky News Arabia*, accessed on Nov. 30, 2018, https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/51891.

depositing $4 billion in the Egyptian Central Bank before another $1 billion was loaned to Cairo. Additionally, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani pledged to give Egypt $18 billion in direct and indirect investments to help the country's struggling post-revolution economy.[187]

Regarding Yemen's revolution, here, too, Al-Jazeera's coverage took the side of revolutionary groups by providing a platform for Yemeni opposition figures, most notably Tawakkul Kerman, who later received a Nobel Prize for her role in the upheaval.[188] Weeks after the outbreak of the revolution, Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem Al Thani called upon Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down before he himself withdrew from a GCC meeting on Yemen in May 2011, citing Saleh's "hesitation and delay in signing his departure agreement."[189] Months after the uprising, Qatar also provided Yemen with needed supplies of LNG to help the country combat chronic energy shortages. Qatari company Silatech, meanwhile, which was affiliated with Emir Hamad, sponsored education and training programs aimed at tackling youth unemployment in the war-torn country.[190]

3.3. Monarchies that Led Counter-Revolution

At the same time that Qatar adopted exceptional positions regarding the Arab Spring by providing different forms of support to revolutionary groups, ranging from pro-change media coverage to substantial financial aid, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were taking counter-revolutionary positions in contradiction from their Qatari counterpart. The positions of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi vis-à-vis the Arab Spring varied from providing safe haven to ousted Arab dictators and anti-revolution figures to helping dissatisfied military juntas and trying to expand the membership of the GCC to include other Arab monarchies to strengthen the monarchic regimes' bloc in the region.

[187] "Qatari financial aid to Egypt wins praise," *Qatari News Agency (QNA) via Gulf News daily*, accessed on Nov. 30, 2018, https://www.gulf-times.com/story/338206/Qatari-financial-aid-to-Egypt-wins-praise.

[188] "Tawakkul Kerman speaks to al-Jazeera," Al-Jazeera, accessed on Nov. 30, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lu9uOq2OeNE&ab_channel=alqershi2011.

[189] "Qatar withdraws from Yemen mediation bid," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Nov. 30, 2018https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/20115136324483285.html,.

[190] Jessica Forsythe. "Opportunities and Obstacles for Yemeni Workers in GCC Labour Markets," Chatham House MENAP Briefing Paper, (2011).

3.3.1. Saudi Arabia

Since the first days of the Arab Spring, the Saudi Kingdom positioned itself as a core component of a conservative and counter-revolutionary bastion in the region, hoping to not only contain the impact of the revolutions but to reverse them.[191] Fearing the protests might threaten the Arab monarchies' stability,[192] Saudi Arabia undertook internal and external measures with a view to accomplishing this overriding objective. These measures included offering safe haven to ousted Arab dictators; intervening militarily in protest-hit monarchies; enlarging GCC membership to include other Arab monarchies; "buying off" the loyalty of the Arab public; allying itself with military juntas; and financing military coups d'état.

Hours before Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was toppled, the Saudi royals offered refuge to the dictator, who had not been previously considered a Saudi ally. The move was seen as an early act of counter-revolutionary intent aimed at containing the winds of change engulfing the Arab world. Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, who was then in charge of international relations at the Saudi Foreign Ministry, told *Foreign Policy* at the time that the offer reflected longstanding Arab cultural norms. He said: "You cannot refuse if someone comes and asks for your assistance and protection." Saudi Arabia also provided refuge and medical treatment to embattled Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, along with several of the latter's aides, who had been injured in a deadly explosion in Sanaa.[193] The Saudi offers of safe haven were in line with a longstanding Saudi policy of providing refuge to powerful former dictators, such as Uganda's Idi Amin and other former ministers and officials.[194]

Saudi Arabia also led military intervention in neighboring Bahrain to quell anti-regime protests in that country. On March 13 of 2011, Saudi-led GCC forces -- known as "Peninsula Shield" Forces -- entered Bahrain in answer to a request by the Bahraini authorities to "restore the stable situation to the country." With the help of GCC forces, Bahraini security forces suppressed the demonstrations, which led to the deaths of at least 46 people, including police officers, and the imprisonment of about 3,000 others.[195]

[191] Mehran Kamrava. "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution." *Orbis* 56:1 (2012): 96-97.
[192] Steinberg. Leading the counter-revolution: 3-4.
[193] Ellen Knickmeyer. "A Five-Star Retirement Home for Dictators," *Foreign Policy*, June 23, 2011.)
[194] Knickmeyer. "A Five-Star Retirement Home for Dictators."
[195] Barany. "The 'Arab Spring' in the Kingdoms," 6.

Saudi Arabia also led a diplomatic campaign within the GCC to make two more Arab monarchies -- Jordan and faraway Morocco --members of the council.[196] In May 2011, Saudi King Abduallah bin Abdulaziz formally invited the two countries to join the GCC in a move seen as a bid to contain escalating unrest in the region and fostering solidarity among the monarch regimes in the region. The GCC monarchies not only feared protests inside their territory, but they were also concerned about the US reaction to the upheavals. Shadi Hamid of the Doha-based Brookings Institution told the *New York Times* at the time that the Saudis were "worried that if the US was able to turn its back on one of its closest allies in the region when former President Hosni Mubarak left, will they do it again if unrest erupts somewhere else in the region? Who will they throw under the bus next?"[197] Months after the Saudi invitations, and amid opposition to the idea inside the GCC (mostly from Kuwait and Qatar), the offer was downgraded to one of "strategic partnership" rather than full membership.[198]

Saudi Arabia also tried to "buy" social stability, both in the Gulf region in general and inside the kingdom in particular. Days after Mubarak's removal from power, King Abdallah announced direct and indirect payments to all Saudi citizens in hopes of alleviating economic factors that might contribute to popular dissatisfaction. In February and March of 2011, he announced a $130-billion package meant to address unemployment and housing shortages.[199] For the neighboring monarchies, the Saudi authorities announced they would help fellow GCC members Bahrain and Oman, the economies of which lagged behind those of the other Gulf States. Riyadh pledged to grant $20 billion in aid to the two fellow monarchies, with $10 billion allocated for each. The enormous sums were earmarked for development and social projects to be carried out over the next ten years.[200] Government ministers of the GCC states spoke of a Gulf "Marshall Plan" aimed at helping struggling monarchies.[201]

Saudi Arabia also helped undermine democratic experiments underway in Arab Spring countries by supporting coups carried out by military juntas. Most notably, King Abdullah

[196] "Gulf Council Reaches Out to Morocco and Jordan," *New York Times*, accessed on Dec. 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/world/middleeast/26iht-M26-GCC.html,.
[197] Gulf Council Reaches Out to Morocco and Jordan."
[198] Steinberg, Leading the counter-revolution, 16.
[199] Steinberg, Leading the counter-revolution, 7.
[200] "Analysis: Politics hinders aid to Arab Spring economies Reuters," *Reuters*, accessed on Dec. 16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-aid/analysis-politics-hinders-aid-to-arab-spring-economies-idUSBRE85Q0W720120627.
[201] Gavin, Taking the GCC Vision Forward, 31

welcomed a coup d'état carried out on July 3 of 2013 against Egypt's first-ever democratically elected leader, Mohammed Morsi. After the coup, the king sent a congratulatory message to Abdelfattah al-Sisi, army's chief-of-staff who led the coup. Almost a week later, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Kuwait, pledged $12 billion in financial aid to prop up post-coup Egypt's economy. The massive sum was deposited into Cairo's Central Bank to prevent Egypt's currency from further deteriorating.[202] In the wake of the coup, Saudi Arabia also provided Egypt with petroleum products at reduced prices. Some months after the coup, Egypt's putschist regime banned the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) -- of which Morsi was a member -- before classifying it as a terrorist group in December of 2013. Following Egypt's lead, Riyadh added the MB to its own terrorism list in March of 2014,[203] as did the UAE in November of the same year.[204]

3.3.2. The United Arab Emirates

The UAE adopted an anti-Arab Spring polices in the region, mainly in the countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria and Libya. The policies of the UAE ranged from hosting counter-revolutionary figures linked to ousted regimes to providing financial support for military coups against elected governments and military support for armed anti-revolution groups.

The UAE has since 2011 become a refuge for anti-change figures linked to Arab regimes toppled by the 2011 revolutions.[205] Abu Dhabi has played host to Egypt's Mubarak-era Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq[206] and the sons of ousted Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, to name only a few.[207] It has also hosted members of the Syrian president's family, including his mother and sister,[208] and relatives and supporters of Muammar Qaddafi,

[202] "UAE offers Egypt $3 billion support, Saudis $5 billion," *Reuters*, accessed on Dec. 16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-loan/uae-offers-egypt-3-billion-support-saudis-5-billion-idUSBRE9680H020130709.
[203] "Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood 'terrorist group'," *BBC, a*ccessed on Dec. 14, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26487092.
[204] UAE lists Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist group, *Reuters*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-politics-brotherhood/uae-lists-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSKCN0IZ0OM20141115.
[205] Kaif qawwadat al-Imarat al-Rabeei al-Arabi, "How the UAE Undermined the Arab Spring," *Sasapost*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.sasapost.com/why-emirates-against-the-arabic-spring/.
[206] Al-daim al-sirri Al-Imarati lil Houthiyeen, "UAE's Secret Support for Houthis," *Al-Sharq Daily*, accessed on Dec. 17, https://www.al-sharq.com/article/22/07/2018/.
[207] "How the UAE Undermined the Arab Spring."
[208] Kayfa Tala'abat al-Imarat fi al-Thawra al-Souriyya, "How UAE Manipulated Syrian Revolution," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2018, https://midan.aljazeera.net/reality/politics/2017/6/22.

including the latter's son, Al-Saidi, who was accused of trying to assassinate the late Saudi King Abdullah.[209] The UAE has also hosted Mohammed Dahlan, a Palestinian leader thrown out of the Fatah movement for corruption. Abu Dhabi has been accused of utilizing these figures for its own political purposes.[210]

Shortly after the military coup against Egypt's Morsi, the UAE pumped $4.9 billion worth of financial support to the military regime headed by Al-Sisi. With this move, the UAE sought to prevent the MB, which briefly led the government after the revolution, from continuing another year in power.[211] An interesting leak regarding the UAE's involvement in backing the Egyptian army was revealed in March 2015 by Egyptian opposition TV channel *Mekameleen,* which played an audio recording of a telephone conversation between General Abbas Kaamil, Al-Sisi's office manager, and UAE Minister of State Sultan Al-Jaber. During the call, Kaamil asks Al-Jaber to send fresh funds to support Egypt's army weeks after the coup. Kaamil also speaks of an agreement with the UAE by which roughly half of all Emirati financial aid was to be allocated to Egypt's armed forces.[212]

The UAE also played a role in providing military aid to various groups and militaries. For example, the UAE provided military aid to forces loyal to Khalifa Haftar, a Libyan military leader who has continued to wage war against revolutionary and Islamist groups in Libya. Haftar has consistently been viewed as an opponent of the Libyan revolution**.** Aqilah Saleh,[213] speaker of Libya's Tobruk-based House of Representatives, has mentioned the "brotherly" support provided by the UAE to General Haftar. Explaining the UAE's support for his country's military, Saleh said: "We went to the UAE to ask for support. Libyans should mention and should say to their children that the UAE stood with us as a brother would. Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed literally said at the first meeting:[214] 'What is ours is yours.' He meant to say, 'Our wealth is your wealth.' They

[209] Al-Imarat tastadeefu al-Shakhs al-laze hawala ightiyal al-Malek Abdullah, "UAE hosts the person who Tried to Assassinate King Abdullah," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/6/16/.
[210] Al-Imarat maljau al-Fasideen, "UAE: Refuge for Corrupt," *Al-Sharq Daily*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.al-sharq.com/article/01/12/2017/.
[211] "Saudi and UAE ready $20bn boost for Egypt's El-Sisi," *The Telegraph*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2018https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10868522/Saudi-and-UAE-ready-20bn-boost-for-Egypts-El-Sisi.html.
[212] "New Sisi leaks expose UAE support for military coup," *Middle East Monitor*, accessed on Dec. 18, 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150302-new-sisi-leaks-exposes-uae-support-for-military-coup/.
[213] Head of the Tobruk-based parliament and Haftar's close ally who, together with Haftar, stood against the Tripoli-based government, which is recognized by the UN and the all world's powers.
[214] A meeting supposedly came to raise funds for pro-Haftar militias against the Tripoli-based government.

spared no effort in supporting us despite the pressure."[215] General Haftar launched a military campaign dubbed "Operation Dignity" in May 2014 aimed at uprooting Libya's many rival militant groups.[216] Haftar also confirmed in a 2015 interview with the BBC that his militias had received military support from both the UAE and Egypt.[217] What's more, the US has accused the UAE of conducting airstrikes in Libyan capital Tripoli, where several revolutionary groups were based.[218]

Conclusion

The Arab monarchies showed resilience during the wave of Arab Spring revolutions. Although most were hit by protests in February and March of 2011, the Arab kings and emirs managed to contain the unrest through the use of various measures. Linchpin (individual) monarchies contained the protests by making limited concessions, as was seen in Morocco, and through rational measures, as was seen in Jordan. The dynastic GCC monarchies, meanwhile, managed to do so by using different means, including the "buying off" of their own populations with generous grants and subsidies.

This chapter serves to confirm the "exceptionalism" of Qatar, which provided various forms of support to revolutionary forces in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen. It can also be seen in the case of Bahrain, which accused Qatar, following the Gulf rift in 2017, of backing Manama-based protest groups.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE -- along with Kuwait and Bahrain in the Egyptian case -- have constituted typical conservative, pro-status quo monarchies, sparing no effort to undermine revolutionary change in the region. This can be seen in the generous financial and military aid they provided to numerous anti-change groups, along with the safe haven they gave to high-ranking officials linked to autocratic regimes.

[215] "UAE provided military aid for Haftar, says Libyan politician," *Middle East Eye*, Accessed on Dec. 18, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-provided-military-support-haftar-says-libyan-politician-1056112839.
[216] "Haftar's Coup: Reality or merely show off," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Dec. 18, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2014/2/14/.
[217] "UAE provided military aid for Haftar, says Libyan politician."
[218] "Libya air strikes: Conflict linked to wider Middle East, *BBC*, accessed on Dec. 19, 2018 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28948948.

CHAPTER 4

QATARI EXCEPTIONALISM: IDENTIFYING DOHA'S WAYS TO BACK THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS

The emerging role of Qatar during the Arab Spring was, in fact, a continuation of the active and growing foreign policy Doha had embraced over the previous two decades. Before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Doha's mediating role had been seen in different areas of the Middle East. This role was crowned by the brokering of several deals between historical rivals in the region. For example, Qatari diplomats managed to bring the Sudanese government and Darfur rebels together, while Cairo (a regional power with a major influence in the Arab region and Africa) did nothing to end the decades-long conflict in its southern neighbor. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, the largest Gulf country, did nothing to defuse mounting tension between rivals in Yemen (Houthi group and the Yemeni government led by President Ali Abdullah Saleh), while the Qataris engaged in talks with both sides, thus gaining their trust. The effectiveness of Qatari foreign policy in easing conflicts in neighboring countries increased while the Arab League appeared helpless and incapable of acting as a regional organization that should have assumed these roles.[219]

Qatar was also vigorous in defusing tension between Lebanese foes in 2008, which ultimately prevented that country from plunging into another civil war. Doha not only hosted Lebanese rivals, but also engaged in talks with regional powers that had political influence and interests in Lebanon.[220] Qatar also played a crucial role on the Palestinian front, as it enjoyed good ties with Palestinian rivals Fatah and Hamas. Duirng the 2008/2009 Israeli aggression on Gaza, Qatar was the first Arab country to call for holding an urgent Arab meeting with a view to forging a unified Arab position aimed at ending Israel's aggression against the blockaded strip. In February 2012, Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa brought the Palestinian rivals together and a unity agreement was reached between Fatah and Hamas. Later the same year, the emir visited the Gaza Strip, becoming the first Arab leader to do so since Israel imposed its blockade after Hamas won parliamentary polls in 2006.[221] In fact,

[219] Khalid Al-Hroub. "Qatar and the Arab Spring," *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*, MENA, Beirut, (2012).
[220] Al-Hroub. Qatar and the Arab Spring.
[221] Gazza tastaqbilu Amir Qatar wa ghadab fi Israel, "Gaza to receive Qatari Emir, Israel outraged," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sep. 12, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2012/10/23/.

the emir was the first Arab leader to visit the Gaza Strip since the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000.[222]

But what are the dynamics behind Qatar's rise? And what drove the tiny state to assume this influence on both the regional and international levels? This had much to do to with the country's possession of almost one third of the world's total natural gas reserves and its successful utilization of policies designed to operationalize this tremendous asset. These policies were developed and implemented during the reign of Emir Hamad (1995-2013) and his powerful Foreign Minister (and prime minister from 2007 to 2013), Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. The two men emerged as the architects of a bold internationalization strategy that put Qatar on the map as a dynamic regional player. The steps they took reflected an orientation at the heart of Qatar's foreign and security policies aimed at ensuring stability in a volatile region and addressing the vulnerabilities inherent in a small country surrounded by larger and stronger neighbors.[223]

With regard to its gas reserves, Qatar adopted an active foreign policy that aimed to strike a balance between competing interests, and, more specifically, address its need to protect its valuable natural resources. These enormous resources, along with its small geographical size and small indigenous population, gave Qatari officials a space in which to maneuver, thus freeing the country from the socio-economic pressures that its neighbors were subject to. Over time, this translated into a significant amount of soft power that strengthened Qatar's reputation in the Arab, regional and international arenas.[224]

Diplomatic mediation eventually became a key element of Qatar's independent and innovative regional politics, which distinguished it from its neighbors in the Gulf and the wider Middle East. This foreign policy trajectory became entrenched in the Qatari Constitution[225], Article 7 of which states that Qatari foreign policy is "based on the principle of the consolidation of international peace and security by promoting the peaceful settlement of international disputes." Placing this principle at the heart of its foreign policy reflected

[222] "Qatar's Emir Visits Gaza, Pledging $400 Million to Hamas," *New York Times*, accessed on Sep. 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/world/middleeast/pledging-400-million-qatari-emir-makes-historic-visit-to-gaza-strip.html.
[223] Kristian C. Ulrichsen. "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Vol. 224, (2014) 3.
[224] Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 5.
[225] Constitution of Qatar is the supreme law of the Gulf country, it entered into force on April 9, 2004, after it was approved by overwhelming majority in a referendum held a year earlier, with nearly 98% in favor.

both the specificity of the Qatari leadership's motives and its desire to make this principle an opportunity to defend the country's independence on the regional and international stages.[226]

Along with its desire to protect its natural gas reserves and its emphasis on mediation, extensive changes in the international system facilitated Qatar's emergence as a major regional player. Globalization, in particular, made it easier for small countries to punch far above their weight and exhibit new forms of soft power. The shifting nature of the concept of power in an interdependent world enabled small states like Qatar to exert much greater influence overseas. During the oil boom from 2002 to 2008, GCC countries utilized their energy resources and accumulated capital to exert greater influence and become more active in international politics.[227]

Qatari wealth was not the main dynamic behind the active foreign policy that the country embraced for two decades. It also had much to do with its ambitious political elite, members of which rose to power following the coronation of Emir Hamad in the mid-1990s. Emir Hamad bin Khalifa, along with his prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim, saw that state-building was for their small monarchy inextricably linked to the emergence of a robust and independent foreign policy.[228] A more detailed analysis of Qatari motives and dynamics will be discussed in the sixth chapter.

4.1. Qatar and the Arab Spring

Hours after a blockade was imposed on Qatar in the summer of 2017 by a Saudi-led bloc of Arab states, Wadah Khanfar, former head of Al-Jazeera, wrote in *The Guardian* that the main reason behind the sanctions was Doha's embrace of the Arab Spring, which contradicted the hostile policies adopted by other Gulf monarchies, mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[229]

What made Qatar an exceptional case in 2011 was the lack of any kind of domestic political opposition,[230] either organized or informal. The resource-demand equation in Qatar

[226] Ulrichsen Qatar and the Arab Spring, 6.
[227] Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 7.
[228] Babak Mohammadzadeh. "Status and foreign policy change in small states: Qatar's emergence in perspective." *The International Spectator* 52:2 (2017): 20-22.
[229] Wadah Khanfar."The blockade of Qatar is a move against the values of the Arab spring," *The Guardian*, June 8, 2017.
[230] Qatari opposition became active on the media following the 2017 crisis with some Saudi-backed figures announcing their opposition to the Qatari authorities. However, observers downplay the weight of those figures

was unique also at the same year, distinguishing it from the rest of the Middle East and North Africa, with per-capita GDP hitting $147,000 in the year that the Arab Spring erupted.[231] This meant that any potential economic or political dissatisfaction among Qatari citizens was improbable. Qatar's vast wealth provided a buffer against the spread of Arab Spring protests inside the country, except for a request for reform by Qatari academics in 2011.[232] This degree of wealth led to a kind of political apathy among Qataris, practically none of whom were inclined to rock the boat or challenge the status quo.[233]

However, the outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 2010 and early 2011 put Qatar in a critical position, which came amid celebrations following its successful bid to host the 2022 World Cup and the international recognition it received for the mediation role it had played over the previous decade. Given the country's seeming invulnerability to socio-economic unrest, the Qatari leadership dealt with the wave of change as an opportunity. With the outbreak of revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, which focused primarily on demands for social justice, human dignity, and political and economic freedom, Qatar felt there was much to gain by taking a clear stance against authoritarian regimes in those countries (and against those in Libya, Syria and Yemen). The cost of doing so appeared low at first, with Qatar's explicit expression of solidarity with -- and material support for -- opposition movements unlikely to boomerang.[234]

Many analysts, if not the majority of them, agree that Qatari officials and Al-Jazeera were slow to recognize Tunisia's formidable protest movement until it rocked capital Tunis. Even Egyptian calls to protest on January 25 received little attention from Al-Jazeera until the full scope of what was happening in that country became clear. Qatar's leadership, however, soon recognized the dramatic shifts underway in the region and adjusted its policies accordingly.[235] Al-Jazeera helped in this regard, rapidly becoming a "focal point for viewers everywhere, mobilizing them to take part in the pro-change protests" through its 24-hour coverage of the revolution as it unfolded in Cairo's Tahrir Square.[236]

---

saying that they were "intentionally invented and exploited by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi following the infamous crisis."

[231] "GDP per capita: Qatar," *World Bank*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=QA&view=chart.

[232] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen. *Qatar and the Arab Spring*. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 147.

[233] Ulrichsen. *Qatar and the Arab Spring,* 104.

[234] Ulrichsen. *Qatar and the Arab Spring,* 105.

[235] Ulrichsen. *Qatar and the Arab Spring,* 100.

[236] Ulrichsen. *Qatar and the Arab Spring,* 110.

As we argued in the introduction when analyzing Qatar's supportive position vis-à-vis the Arab Spring, three variables will be discussed: Al-Jazeera's coverage, investments and financial support, and diplomatic support. Here, we will analyze Qatari support by discussing all three points as they relate to Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Egypt will be discussed in detail in the upcoming chapter. The choice of the three variables was made after thorough study of Qatar's role in these revolutions, especially in the literature review conducted at the beginning of this study. Examination of these three variables makes our analysis more comprehensive, as it covers all forms of support provided by Doha.

4.1.1. Al-Jazeera Coverage

Since its establishment in 1995, Al-Jazeera has gained credibility in the Arab street and transcended the role of a mere news channel to become a giant media network. It operates from inside the small Gulf emirate while occupying an outsized position on the Arab and regional media map. Al-Jazeera managed initially to give space for anti-government views and opinions that the Arab masses had been largely deprived of due to restrictions imposed on official Arab media platforms. It went from a mere Arab news channel to a multilingual international media conglomerate, winning Qatar acclaim for its willingness to cover dissident views from different parts of the world.[237]

However, this tendency towards impartiality did not last long, as the network was accused of becoming a platform for "pro-change revolutionary propaganda" while covering the Arab Spring, with the channel directly adopting the slogans of revolutionaries in protest-hit countries, particularly Tunisia and Egypt. In order to cover the situation in Arab Spring countries, Al-Jazeera canceled its usual programs, turning into a 24-hour newsroom and launching an affiliate channel, *Al-Jazeera Mubashir*, to cover uprisings as they unfolded in real time.[238]

Meanwhile, relations between Qatar's ruling family and Al-Jazeera were rocky from the outset. However, empirical studies have found a strong correlation between Doha's foreign policy and the news channel's coverage. An eight-year study of the channel's coverage of Saudi affairs concluded that Al-Jazeera's Arabic-language version became a

[237] Fatmah Massaeed. Mustaqbal al-dawr al-iqleemi al-Qatari fi doua al-thawaat al-Arabiyya bayna al-tarajuu wa al-tamaddud, "The Future of Qatari Regional Role in light of the Arab Revolutions between Retreat and Expansion," *Qasidi Merbah University*, master's thesis (2014) 49.
[238] Massaeed, The Future of Qatari Regional Role, 39.

vehicle for Qatari public diplomacy, with Doha operating Al-Jazeera as a "hybrid state-sponsored/private network, effectively transforming the network into a highly potent public diplomacy tool." The study also found that the Doha/Al-Jazeera relationship had given rise to a new form of media diplomacy, dubbed the "hybrid model." This model allows the state-sponsored news channel to operate independently in routine affairs, giving it the credibility of a privately-owned network, while reverting to a totally state-sponsored network during times of perceived crisis. Peacetime coverage gives the channel an influential public diplomacy role, allowing the state to influence public opinion while also exerting pressure on the elites of foreign states in an effort to change the policies of those states in line with Doha's interests.[239]

But as for the Arab revolutions rocked the region in 2011 and how Al-Jazeera tackled these historical events, we will analyze Al-Jazeera's coverage in the five protests-hit countries of Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. A summarized preface will be also given on the dynamics led to the revolutions in these countries.

4.1.1.1. Tunisia

Throughout the 50 years since Tunisian independence and the declaration of the Tunisian republic in 1957, only two presidents have governed the country. Despite several changes and supposed reforms of the Tunisian Constitution during these five decades, no actual breakthroughs in Tunisia's political scene has taken place, with executive power limited to President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and a few people close to him.[240] This is not to mention the high rates of poverty and unemployment that plagued the country in the months leading up to the upheaval, which erupted after a young man, Mohammed al-Bouazizi, set himself on fire to protest the country's dire economic and social situation.[241]

Qatar was one of the few Arab countries to welcome the changes that hit the North African country, with the head of Tunisia's Ennahda Party, Rachid Gannouchi, saying that Qatar was not only supportive of the pro-change revolution but it was a "partner."[242]

[239] Tal Samuel-Azran. "Al-Jazeera, Qatar, and new tactics in state-sponsored media diplomacy." *American behavioral scientist*, 57:9 (2013): 1293-94.
[240] Raghib Al-Sirgani. *Qissatu Tounis, min al-bidaya hatta Thawra 2011, "Tunisian Story, from the Start until the 2011 Revolution*." (Cairo, Aqlam House for Publishing and Translation, 2011) 77-78.
[241] Al-Sirgani. *Tunisian Story*, 77-80.
[242] Al-Ghanouchi: Qatar shareeka fi al-thawra al-Tounisiyya, "Ghanouchi: Qatar is Partner in Tunisian Revolution, *Al-Arab Daily*, accessed on Sep. 15. 2019, https://alarab.qa/article/16/05/2012/189284.

Ghannouchi ascribed this "partnership" to "Doha's media contribution via Al-Jazeera, which encouraged pro-change ideas and principles, even before the uprising" through its hosting of Tunisian opposition figures and intellectuals calling for Ben Ali's ouster. Ghannouchi added: "We are grateful to Qatar and to its emir for encouraging foreign investment in Tunisia."[243] The remarks by the head of Ennahda, which was a part of consecutive post-uprising governments, coincide to a large extent with the three variables we have chosen to analyze Qatar's role in the Arab Spring and the geopolitical motivations for its position.

For Tunisia, Al-Jazeera was one of the few Arab platforms that allowed Tunisian opposition figures Najib Chebbi and Moncef Marzouki (who later became the country's first post-revolution president) to speak directly and mobilize the Tunisian public both before and during the revolution.[244]

Lutfi Hajji, Al-Jazeera's undercover reporter in Tunisia before the upheaval, spoke in an interview about the role he and his team of rights activists and bloggers played in covering the uprising from its very beginning.

> "Ben Ali's regime was imposing strict censorship on the Internet so made us use 'proxies' to send the images and videos of the protests. There were a lot of jurists, politicians and trade unionists who helped Al-Jazeera in this regard. They showed a great ability to challenge, since the uprising had created a kind of collective courage. They were sending photos and films covering the demonstrations taking place on daily basis, mainly in Sidi Bouzid, where the uprising was ignited. After that, the spark went to Kasserine, then Tala, before the rest of Tunisian cities were engaged. We at Al-Jazeera benefited a lot from the courage of Tunisians, since everywhere there was a Tunisian volunteer covering the protests for Al-Jazeera. Once the protests hit almost all Tunisian cities, Ben Ali's regime was unable to suppress all these reporters and correspondents."[245]

Al-Jazeera's role in covering the revolution was praised by many Tunisian figures. As mentioned earlier, Ghannouchi opined that Al-Jazeera's role in mobilizing the public and covering the protests served to make Doha a "partner" of the revolution.[246] Mohammed Krichan, a Tunisian news anchor and columnist, described Al-Jazeera as the "media front" of the revolution. According to Krichan, the news channel broadcast material exposing all

[243] "Ghanouchi: Qatar is Partner in Tunisian Revolution."
[244] "Ghanouchi: Qatar is Partner in Tunisian Revolution."
[245] Taghtiyat al-Jazeera lil thawarat al-Arabiyya, "Al-Jazeera's Coverage for Arab Spring," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sep. 17, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/withoutbounds/2011/11/12/.
[246] "Ghanouchi: Qatar is Partner in Tunisian Revolution."

the oppression and brutality his country had faced under Ben Ali, and allowed dissidents to convey the reality of what was taking place on the street.[247]

Meanwhile, statements by various political parties, organizations and trade unions were first broadcast by Al-Jazeera. Prominent figures -- including Hamma Hammami, Rachid Ghannouchi, Najib Chebbi and Moncef Marzouki -- were given a space to say what they wanted with a view to mobilizing the Tunisian public. Krechan asserts that the free media was the primary enemy of the Ben Ali regime, the massive corruption of which made it fear any form of free media coverage.[248]

4.1.1.2. Libya

Libya's long-serving leader Muammar Qaddafi had remained in power since the coup he orchestrated against Libyan King Idris bin Abdullah al-Senussi in 1969. Qaddafi's tenure was largely totalitarian, as he suppressed freedoms, imprisoned opposition figures, and hanged hundreds of regime opponents in 1996 because they opposed his regime and called for dramatic political reform.[249]

In mid-February 2011, after the Egyptians and Tunisians had managed to depose their leaders, Libyans took to the streets to call for an end to the four-decade-long regime. Peaceful protests were met with ferocity by the regime, which brought African mercenaries to put down the protests. This plunged the country into civil war, as hundreds of Libyan policemen and army personnel defected from the regime, while dozens of diplomats based overseas followed suit. Weeks after the start of the uprising, Libyan opposition and revolutionary forces took control of several cities in the eastern and coastal parts of the country, raising Libya's pre-Qaddafi flag which the ruler had changed in 1969. On February 27, the Libyan National Transitional Council was established and became the political front for opposition forces. Qaddafi's regime was eventually toppled by a NATO-led campaign aimed at

[247] Mohammed Krechan. Fil Zikra al-sanawaiyya al-oula lil Thawra, shukran li qanat al-Jazeera, "In First Revolution Anniversary: Thanks go to Al-Jazeera Channel," *Babnet*, Jan. 13, 2012.
[248] Krechan. In First Revolution Anniversary.
[249] Yousef El-Gimati. *Thawrat 17 Fibrayer, al-dawafi al-haqeeqiyya lil thawra wa al-awamil al-musaida laha, "The February 17 Revolution: True Motives and Factors*," University of Benghazi, master's thesis, (2014). 1-2

protecting civilians from regime forces which were about to capture Benghazi, the opposition's last stronghold.[250]

The Qaddafi regime had very poor relations with Al-Jazeera, and the news channel, along with international outlets, was banned by the authorities from covering events inside the country. In a 2003 speech, Qaddafi accused the Qatari channel of "relying on rumors and being involved in incitement against the Arab regimes in general and his regime in particular."[251]

Days after the protests broke out, footage emerged showing Libyan protestors chanting pro-Al-Jazeera slogans for what they described as the channel's "media support for the Libyan people and its coverage of the revolution."[252] Al-Jazeera was also the first Arab and international media outlet to enter Libyan territory to cover events. An Al-Jazeera crew was smuggled into Libya's eastern Benghazi province, which was held at the time by pro-revolution forces.[253] On a daily basis, Al-Jazeera hosted prominent Libyan scholar Ali Al-Salabi, who benefited from Al-Jazeera's efforts to mobilize the Libyan people to take part in the protests.[254] Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, head of the newly-formed Libyan National Transitional Council, was also given space by Al-Jazeera to direct opposition forces on the ground. The prominent field commander, Abdelhakim Belhadj, also appeared on Al-Jazeera to "reassure Libyans who were threatened by regime strikes on their areas."[255]

Al-Jazeera was accused of being "biased"[256] due to its anti-Qaddafi coverage, which appeared to urge Libyans to mobilize against their leader.[257] Two dynamics explain Al-Jazeera's enthusiasm in covering the Libyan revolution and broadcasting pro-change messages. For one, the media platform considered itself more than just a typical news

[250] El-Gimati, The February 17 Revolution, 1-2.
[251] Amal Jaafari. *Sourat qanat al-Jazeera lada al-Nukhab al-Jazairiyya baad al-thawarat Image of Al Jazeera among Algerian Elites after the Arab Revolutions*, Al-Arabi Bin Mheidi University, Master's Thesis, (2014) 94.
[252] "Al-Jazeera's Coverage for Arab Spring,"
[253] "Al-Jazeera's Coverage for Arab Spring,"
[254] Al-Salabi yatahaddathu an al-Thawra al-Libiyya, "Al-Salabi Speaks on Libyan Revolution," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 20, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6D6CdE3WWd0.
[255] Mustafa Abdel-Jalil yatahaddathu an al-Thawra al-Libiyya, "Mustafa Abdel-Jalil Speaks on Libyan Revolution," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 20, 2019https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GTHPhiY-P2Y.
See: Abdul-Hakim Bilhadg yatahaddathu an al-Thawra al-Libiyya, "Abdul-Hakim Bilhadg Speaks on Libyan Revolution," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 20, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJzOsHNixKo.
[256] Kioko Ireri. "News from Tripoli, Benghazi, Brega and Misrata: How Al-Jazeera and BBC Online News Framed the Libyan Revolution." *AEJMC Conference*, (2012).
[257] "Most famous promos of Libyan revolution," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 20, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Txd1PM2ujVQ.

channel; rather, it saw itself as the voice of the "voiceless Arab street" -- despite the fact that the channel's motto was "The opinion and the other opinion." The network's motto was later changed to "The peoples make their own revolution."[258]

Secondly, the channel's editorial policy was in line with Qatari military policy. During the NATO-led campaign against Libya, at least six Qatari Mirage fighters joined the air operations. In this regard, Nabil Echaibi said in an editorial for the *Huffington Post* that "Al-Jazeera is not a typical news network, as it serves a critical purpose in the Arab World: it speaks on behalf of the ordinary people."[259] He added: "Aggressive reporting in Libya is also supported by the use of its reporters in the battlefield as news sources. Journalists were the second most commonly used sources by Al-Jazeera after the rebels."[260]

4.1.1.3. Yemen

The Yemeni revolution, also known as the "February 11 Revolution," was a series of popular protests that broke out in Yemen on January 15, 2011, to call for an end to President Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime. On February 11, 2011, large protests were held at Sanaa University, with students and human rights activists calling on Saleh to resign. Protestors, who flocked to the Tunisian embassy to show solidarity with the country that had deposed its own leader, were faced with an iron fist, and many of them were arrested.[261] Saleh, who had stayed in power for roughly 33 years, announced on February 2 of the same year that he would not run for another presidential term, and would not bequeath the presidency to his son, Ahmed, who was an army general. By March, Yemeni security forces had started crushing the peaceful protests. On March 18, during what was known as the "Friday of Dignity," more than 52 people were killed by snipers. Despite the fact that Yemen was one of the world's most heavily-armed countries, protestors were keen to keep their revolution as peaceful as possible.[262]

[258] Ireri, News from Tripoli, Benghazi, Brega and Misrata.
[259] Ireri, News from Tripoli, Benghazi, Brega and Misrata.
[260] Ireri, News from Tripoli, Benghazi, Brega and Misrata.
[261] Al-Thawra Al-Yamaniyya, "The Yemeni Revolution," *Al-Araby Encyclopedia*, accessed on Sept. 25, 2019, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/encyclopedia/2015/7/8/,.
See also: Thawrat al-Shabab al-Yamaniyya, "The Yemeni Youth Revolution," *Al-Jazeera Encyclopedia*, accessed on Sept. 25, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/events/2016/5/25/.
[262] "The Yemeni Youth Revolution."

The Gulf countries, from the beginning, played an active role in not allowing Yemen to fall into civil war, and the GCC countries introduced what was known as the "Gulf Initiative" to resolve the months-long crisis. The initiative was signed on November 23, 2011, and the Yemeni Constitution was suspended as the initiative became a constitutional reference for the country's new administration. In accordance with the initiative, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi assumed power on February 21, 2012 to lead Yemen's transitional period.[263]

In the wake of the uprising, the Sanaa-based offices of Al-Jazeera were shut amid accusations that they were "spreading false news about the situation in Yemen."[264] A report by the Yemeni Information Ministry, quoted by the Saba Network Channel, accused Al-Jazeera of misinforming the Arab public by "airing footages of events that took place in Iraqi prisons as events taking place in Yemen." The same channel said that after the outbreak of the revolution around 20 armed Yemeni men had stormed Al-Jazeera's Sanaa offices and suspended journalists' accreditation before shutting the offices again.[265]

Al-Jazeera was accused of playing a key role in mobilizing[266] people to take to the streets, which ultimately led to the spread of the revolution to different parts of Yemen. However, the Yemen-based Al-Jazeera office said that its correspondents were covering events impartially, emphasizing that they were working under deteriorating security conditions in order to convey what it called "the voice of truth." Further, it assured viewers that its coverage of the Yemeni situation would continue despite the closure of its offices.[267] This occurred as the channel was depending on undercover reporters in the country, along with revolutionary activists, as its main source of information.[268]

As in Tunisia and Libya, Al-Jazeera was very active in displaying footage of the protests throughout the country and arrests of Yemeni youth activists, while broadcasting their statements and speeches. This prompted the Yemeni Youth Coordination (YYC) to acknowledge this role by saying that Al-Jazeera's coverage had made the first day of protests

[263] "The Yemeni Youth Revolution."
[264] Gabriel C Udoh, "International Coverage of the Arab Spring," *University of Uyo*, (2012) 6.
[265] Udoh, International Coverage of the Arab Spring, 5.
[266] Personal Interview, Palestinian researcher and writer Sary Sammour, (September 27, 2020), Zoom.
[267] Udoh, International Coverage of the Arab Spring, 7.
[268] Al-Sultat al-Yamaniyya tughliqu maqar al-Jazeera, "Yemeni authorities shut Al-Jazeera office." *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 24, 2019, http://aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/3/23/.

"a turning point in the Yemeni revolution."[269] This role was also praised by prominent Yemeni activist Tawwakul Kerman, who later received Nobel Peace Prize for her role in the revolution. She recently asserted that Qatar was punished by its Gulf neighbors in 2017 for its role in backing the Arab Spring and covering the revolutions, especially in Yemen.[270] At the time, Yemeni revolutionary forces voiced their appreciation for Al-Jazeera's media support, although some criticized the channel for giving more space to events in Egypt.[271]

4.1.1.4. Syria

The Syrian upheaval emerged following events that took place in the southern province of Daraa, where security forces arrested 15 children for writing anti-regime slogans on the wall of their school on February 26, 2011. However, the real start of the Syrian revolution was on March 18, when Syrian activists called for holding protests on a "Friday of Dignity." The protests erupted in the cities of Daraa, Damascus, Homs and Banias, and were met with unprecedented ferocity by the regime, mostly in Daraa, where four people were killed. The protests lasted for almost one week, before dozens of Syrian cities were likewise engulfed by protests the following Friday. Although the protests were extremely bloody, they continued week after week and gradually expanded.[272]

The Syrian regime was keen to divert the revolution from its peaceful trajectory by giving it a bloody and military character in hopes of presenting its opponents as mere militias. The regime did so by taking advantage of regional polarization and the divergent geopolitical interests of the great powers.[273]

Al-Jazeera remained relatively silent at the beginning of the protests in Syria, and the Qatari regime was cautious about taking a stance on the situation there. This was due to the fact that Doha had good ties with what was known as the "Axis of Resistance" (i.e., Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas). However, coverage intensified once the ties between Doha and

[269] Tanseeqiyyatu al-Shabab al-Yamani yusheedoun bi dawr al-Jazeera fi taghtiyat al-Thawra, "Yemen Youth Coordination hails Al-Jazeera for revolution coverage," *Al-Bayda News Network*, accessed on Sept. 24, 2019, https://sahafahnet.net/news337628.html.
[270] Qatar tuaqabu li damiha al-Thawra al-Yamaniyya, "Qatar is punished for supporting Yemeni revolution," Al-Sharq, accessed on Sept. 24, 2019, https://www.al-sharq.com/article/01/07/2017/,.
[271] Mohammed Al-Ibsi. Al-Thawra Al-Yamaniyya biwasfiha dahiyya li-taghtiyat al-Jazeera, Yemen's revolution as a victim of Al-Jazeera coverage, *Personal Blog Post*, Aug. 20, 2012.
[272] Al-Thwara al-Souriyya, "The Syrian Revolution," *Al-Araby Encyclopedia*, accessed on Sept. 30, 2019, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/encyclopedia/2015/7/20/Syrian-Revolution.
[273] Al-Thwara al-Souriyya, "The Syrian Revolution," *Al-Jazeera Encyclopedia*, accessed on Sept. 30, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/events/2016/3/7/Syrian-Revolution,.

Damascus deteriorated.[274] As the protests expanded throughout the country, Al-Jazeera actively covered developments by hosting speakers from the Syrian opposition, along with eyewitnesses and civil-society activists. Given the close Qatar-Syria ties during the pre-revolution era, the Syrian authorities were somewhat surprised how Al-Jazeera was covering events. The channel aired anti-Assad activities and slogans being chanted by protestors -- as it had in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya -- in a bid to "show solidarity with the people at the expense of their rulers."[275]

This outraged Syrian regime officials, who were very critical of the Qatari media platform. They accused Al-Jazeera of covering minor events taking place in small neighborhoods while ignoring "million-man" pro-regime demonstrations that were being staged throughout the country.[276] Al-Jazeera was also active in broadcasting statements by Syrian opposition forces, especially statements by military officers who had defected from the Syrian army, citing the regime's "ferocity, brutality and savagery" in dealing with peaceful protests. Covering these defections gave momentum to the revolution and encouraged many other officers to follow suit.[277]

With a view to curbing Al-Jazeera's coverage of the events, the Assad regime launched a counter-attack against the news channel. Firstly, it shut all Al-Jazeera offices in Syria, with Syrian staff at these offices resigning in fear of reprisal by the regime. The regime also pressured Syrian staff working at the channel's Doha offices to resign. Secondly, it urged pro-regime people working at Al-Jazeera -- like Ghassan bin Jaddo, then head of Al-Jazeera's office in Lebanon -- to publicly denounce "Al-Jazeera's financers, its editorial policy and the [Qatari] state's intervention in the news channel."[278] The regime also called on media workers who had previously resigned from Al-Jazeera (such as Louna al-Shibl) to denounce the channel with a view to tarnishing its image among the Syrian community.[279]

[274] Shaima Al-Houari. "The influence of Al Jazeera media network in the Arab public affairs," *Media Studies Journal*, (2018).
[275] Khaled Al-Azzi. Dawr al-Ilam fi taghtiyat rabeei Souriya "Media role in covering Syrian Revolution*," Al-Hiwar Al-Mutamadin*, May 5, 2011.
[276] Al-Azzi, Al-Jazeera's role in covering Syrian Uprising.
[277] Tatheer inshiqaq Junoud al-Jaysh ala al-Thawra al-Souriyya, "The Impact of Army's Members' Defection on Syrian Revolution," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 29, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/behindthenews/2013/2/2/,.
[278] Al-Azzi, Al-Jazeera's role in covering Syrian Uprising.
[279] Al-Azzi, Al-Jazeera's role in covering Syrian Uprising.

Al-Jazeera was also accused of a "lack of professionalism" in covering the Syrian uprising and of ignoring events taking place in Bahrain at the same time, to which Ahmed Kaamil, former head of Al-Jazeera's office in Belgium, replied: "There was a real reason for Al-Jazeera's tendency to cover events in Syria more than Bahrain…, the number of victims in a year and a half of confrontations was 35 deaths in Bahrain, while this number of casualties was falling within an hour in Syria."[280] As for the channel's alleged lack of neutrality and professionalism, he added: "When it comes to genocide and crimes against humanity, neutrality is out of the question. This is different from whether it is a purely political conflict; the crisis in Syria was not merely political. There were certainly crimes against humanity committed against innocent people, as international human rights organizations say. Al-Jazeera definitely didn't make the Syrian revolution, but it backed it."[281]

4.1.1.5. Bahrain

The protests that took place in Bahrain were unprecedented for the Arab monarchies, not only because of its magnitude but also for the threat it posed to the survival of the Al Khalifa regime. After the protests were first held in February 2011 in capital Manama, they rapidly took on a sectarian character and were overwhelmingly dominated by Shia protestors, who held sit-ins at the Pearl Roundabout before the unrest spread to the city center and to all Shia-majority neighborhoods.[282]

Al-Jazeera's coverage of the protests was unfamiliar to Arab audiences, and the news channel seemed unenthusiastic about broadcasting protests in the neighboring Gulf country as it had with the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. When the Bahraini opposition announced plans for a "Day of Rage" on February 14, 2011, Al-Jazeera ignored the news. However, when a few people were killed in Manama, the channel spoke about the issue as

[280] Al-Azzi, Al-Jazeera's role in covering Syrian Uprising.
[281] Qanat al-jazeera al-Qatariyya bayn maeayeer almisdaqiyya wa itihamat bil tateem wal intiqaiyya, "Al-Jazeera between credibility and accusations of blackout and selectivity," *DW*, accessed on Sept. 30, 2019, https://www.dw.com/ar/a-16486692.
[282] Kenneth Katzman. "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and USPolicy," *Congressional Research Service*, March 21, 2011.

secondary news, and without showing footage of the large number of demonstrators. This was perhaps because Bahrain is a member of the GCC and a neighboring country to Qatar.[283]

Bahraini journalist Lamis Deif opined that the Bahraini uprising was excluded from Al-Jazeera coverage, decrying what she described as Al-Jazeera's policy of ignoring the protests there. "There were young people demonstrating; they were not doing so because they were Shia," she said.[284]

A Bahraini activist and head of the Bahraini Center for Human Rights, Nabeel Rajab, said that Al-Jazeera "deliberately" ignored events in Bahrain, casting doubt on Al-Jazeera's assertions that it represented the people and not regimes. He added that this "makes me think that the Arab world desperately need news channels funded by the people, not regimes; because the regimes are clearly moving in accordance to their agendas and interests, but we need channels that convey the true voice of the people."[285]

General Director of Al-Jazeera Wadah Khanfar rejected these accusations, saying that "from Syria to Bahrain, we reject the accusations of being unbalanced and selecting subjective coverage. We were present everywhere, we covered the events on a daily basis, and after the sit-ins turned into security and political events, we continued to cover." He also denied claims that his channel was disregarding the killing and arrest of dozens of dissidents in Bahrain.[286]

Here, it is easy to see the substantial role played by Qatar's Al-Jazeera in covering and mobilizing for the Arab revolutions which make many of the revolutionary icons to thank Al-Jazeera for that role. However, there was a shift in Qatar's pro-Arab Spring policy in the case of Bahrain. Al-Jazeera was not only passive about covering the protests, but many Qatari troops were also part of "Peninsula Shield," which came to suppress the anti-Manama

[283] Al-Thawarat al-Arabiyya taqefu inda hudood al-Khalij, "Arab Revolutions ceased on the outskirts of the Gulf," *Al-Akhbar Daily*, accessed on Oct. 7, 2019, http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/4614.
[284] Al-Jazeera tubarriru ada'aha khilal al-Thawarat al-Arabiyya, "Al-Jazeera justifies its performance during the Arab revolutions," *Al-Akhbar Daily*, accessed on Oct. 7, 2019, https://al-akhbar.com/Media_Tv/89233.
[285] Nashit Bahraini: Al-Jazeera tajahalat Ahdath al-Bahrain, "Bahraini rights activist: Al-Jazeera ignored Bahraini events," *Masress Research Engine*, accessed on Oct. 7, 2019, https://www.masress.com/tahrirnews/66989.
[286] "Al-Jazeera justifies its performance during the Arab revolutions."

protests. This occurred despite the fact that the Bahraini king, on different occasions, had slammed Qatar and Al-Jazeera for their role in "destabilizing" his country.[287]

4.1.2. Financial and Military Support

Qatar generously backed the Arab uprisings with both financial and military forms of support. Financial support was sent to pro-change movements in Syria and Libya, and huge loans and donations were allocated for the transitional governments established after the ouster of regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. Also, enormous shipments of military equipment were sent by Doha to Libyan and Syrian revolutionary forces in a bid to help them topple the regimes there.

4.1.2.1. Tunisia

Qatar has been ranked first in the Arab world and second in the world after France in terms of its investment in Tunisia, which stood at 26.2 percent of total foreign direct investments in 2018, amounting in total to $270 million compared to $54 million in 2010[288], only one year before the revolution.[289] According to official Qatari data, Doha deposited $500 million in the Central Bank of Tunisia to support Tunisia's foreign currency reserves following the 2011 uprising.[290] In April 2012, following a visit by then Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki to Doha, the emir announced plans to give a $1-billion loan to Tunisia to support the North African country's efforts to restructure its economy. Qatar also declared that it was intending to offer job opportunities to up to 20,000 Tunisian university graduates.[291] It was said that half the loan would be used to reinforce the asset position of the country's central bank, while the other half was earmarked for infrastructural

[287] "Bahraini King's Comments on Qatar Provokes Controversy," *Tasnim news agency*, accessed on July 17, 2020, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2018/08/19/1806854/bahraini-king-s-comments-on-qatar-provokes-controversy.

[288] Which indicates that the Qatari FDI amount was extremely small if it is compared with the post-revolution amount.

[289] "Tunisia's official website of FDI in Figures," accessed on Dec. 18, 2019, https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/establish-overseas/tunisia/foreign-investment, ().
See: "Investment Country Profiles: Tunisia," accessed on Dec. 18, 2019, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d7_en.pdf.

[290] Qatar Akbar dawla Arabiyya mustasmira fi Tunis "Qatar is Biggest Arab Investor in Tunisia," *Al-Khaleej Online*, accessed on Sep. 18, 2019, https://alkhaleejonline.net/.

[291] "Qatar provides financial support to Tunisia," *The Economist*, accessed on Sep. 18, 2019, http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1649086349&Country=Qatar&topic=Politics&subtopic=Recent+developments&aid=1&oid=327865217.

investment.[292] Additionally, the Qatar Friendship Fund (QFF) was formed in Tunisia in May 2013 to encourage local entrepreneurship and help Tunisian youth.[293] At another Qatar-backed investment conference held in Tunis in 2016, Qatar also pledged to invest $1.25 billion in the country within the next several years.[294] At the same conference, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani said his country would give that assistance:

> "To support the Tunisian economy and strengthen its process of development…, in Tunisia we face a people who decided to build their country based on plurality, dignity and human freedom…, we will help them so that the experience can succeed, or until we see them being able to face the difficulties themselves."[295]

Commenting on Qatar's generous support for Tunisia, the first post-revolution president Moncef Marzouki stressed that Qatar was Tunisia's only economic supporter during the transitional period.[296] Habib Essaid, Tunisian prime minister from 2015 to 2016, also remarked in this regard that "the State of Qatar was one of the first countries in the world that stood by Tunisia and assisted it politically and economically in the transitional period."[297]

4.1.2.2. Libya

In the Libyan case, Qatar supported revolutionary forces with money and weapons more than any other country.[298] Qatar provided revolutionary forces with weapons and equipment, and hundreds of them received training in Doha before being sent back to fight on the ground. It also helped the transitional council sell Libyan oil in order to cover the salaries of Libyan civil servants and fighters, and helped launch the pro-revolution Free

[292] "Qatar provides financial support to Tunisia."
[293] "Qatar is Biggest Arab Investor in Tunisia."
[294] "Qatar to give $1.25 billions of aid to Tunisia: Emir," *Reuters*, accessed on Sep. 18, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-qatar-idUSKBN13O0Z5.
[295] "Qatar emir pledges $1.25B to support Tunisian economy," *Daily Sabah*, accessed on Sep. 18, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2016/11/30/qatar-emir-pledges-125b-to-support-tunisian-economy
[296] Marzouki: Qatar kanat al-Daem al-Iqtisadi al-Waheed lil Tajruba al-Tounisiyya, "Marzouki: Qatar was only economic support for Tunisian experience," *Al-Sharq Daily*, accessed on Sep. 18, 2019, https://www.al-sharq.com/article/05/10/2018/.
[297] Essaid: Qatar akthar dawla saadat Tounis iqtisadiyyan wa siyassiyyan fil marahala al-intiqaliyya, "Essaid: Qatar the most country helped Tunisia politically and economically in the transition period," *Babnet*, accessed on Sep. 18, 2019, https://www.babnet.net/rttdetail-116861.asp .
[298] Al-Adwar al-Arabiyya fi al-Thwara al-Libiyya asbahat wadiha, "Arab Roles in Libyan Revolution Became Clear," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sep. 18, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/10/26/.
See: "Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels," *The Guardian*, , accessed on Sep. 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/26/qatar-troops-libya-rebels-support

Libya satellite channel by providing an office in Doha and financing its signal.[299] Then head of the Libyan Transitional Council Mustafa Abdel-Jalil estimated Qatari support for his country's revolution at $2 billion.[300]

The emir of Qatar, in remarks he made to clarify his country's support for Libya, said the assistance was meant to "alleviate the suffering of the brotherly Libyan people and meet their humanitarian needs."[301] Abdul Rahman Shalgam, Libya's representative at the UN, accused Doha of interfering in Libyan affairs and impeding efforts to restore stability to his country. He also accused Doha of favoring certain sides of the conflict and of sending financial and military support to Libya.[302] Qatar also sent anti-tank weapons to the Libyan opposition based on its strategy of overthrowing the Qaddafi regime. Then Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim said that UN officials in Doha had confirmed that the country's military had been shipping French-made Milan rockets to the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. Bin Jassim attributed this to UNSC Resolution1973[303] on Libya, which permitted "the supply of defensive weapons to opposition forces struggling to fight Libyan armor."[304]

In a report published by *The Guardian*, Qatar admitted that it had sent hundreds of troops to Libya to train Libyan fighters and fight alongside them against the Qaddafi regime. Qatari Special Forces reportedly provided infantry training in the western Nafusa Mountains and in eastern Libya. Qatari military officers also took part in a final offensive against Qaddafi's Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli, where they were reportedly seen on the front lines.[305] The Qatari flag was often raised during the Libyan people's celebrations in central

[299] Abdul-Jaleel yatahaddathu an al-dawr al-Qatari fi al-Thwra al-Libiyya, "Abdul-Jaleel Speaks on Qatari Role in Libyan Revolution," *Al-Ayyam Daily*, accessed on Sep. 21, 2019, https://www.alayam.com/online/international/175819/.
[300] "Abdul-Jaleel Speaks on Qatari Role in Libyan Revolution."
[301] Jaafari, *Image of Al Jazeera among Algerian Elites after the Arab Revolutions*," 96-98.
[302] Shalgam yattahimu Qatar fitasleeh al-Mutamarrideen fi Libya, "Shalgam accuses Qatar of arming Libyan rebels," DW, accessed on Sept. 22, 2019, https://www.dw.com/ar//a-15541722.
[303] Adopted on March 17, 2011 and called for "Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council."
[304] "Libyan rebels receiving anti-tank weapons from Qatar," *The Guardian*, accessed on Sept. 22, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/14/libya-rebels-weapons-qatar.
[305] "Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels," *The Guardian*, accessed on Sept. 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/26/qatar-troops-libya-rebels-support.

Tripoli, while a public square in the city was renamed “Qatar Square” in honor of the country's help in deposing Qaddafi.[306]

4.1.2.3. Yemen

In the months following the Yemeni revolution, Qatar provided the country with needed supplies of LNG to help it avoid energy shortages. The Qatari company Silatech, linked to Emir Hamad, sponsored education and training programs aimed at addressing the country’s youth unemployment crisis.[307] Furthermore, Doha generously contributed to relief and reconstruction efforts in Yemen. Qatari aid was also delivered to the war-torn country by sea -- in successive batches -- via the Djibouti airport.[308]

The most critical assistance Doha gave to the Yemeni people at this time was a national-funded power station in Aden, which was inaugurated by a government delegation to the city.[309] Qatar also hosted, in February 2016, the Humanitarian Crisis Conference on Yemen, which raised $223 million to support humanitarian efforts in the country, to which Qatar Charity pledged $100 million.[310]

Qatar Charity and the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) also signed an agreement with the Hadi government to provide relief to the Yemeni people worth $3 million due to the difficult humanitarian situation and rising poverty rates. Moreover, upon the opening of Aden airport in August 2015, Qatar dispatched a plane carrying humanitarian aid, including medicine, medical supplies and foodstuffs, which was followed by further aid disbursements. On August 10, 2015, the Humanitarian Relief Coalition in Taiz announced the opening of seven hospitals in the governorate with the support of the Qatari Red Crescent. It said this was intended to accommodate injured persons and medical patients, especially those suffering from dengue fever, which had become increasingly widespread in Yemen.[311] The Qatari Red Crescent was also operating in Taiz despite exceptionally difficult

[306] “Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels.”
[307] Forsythe. Opportunities and Obstacles for Yemeni Workers.
[308] Qatar fil Yaman, juhoud azeema listiaadat al-shariyya wal binaa, “Qatar in Yemen: Great efforts to restore legitimacy and reconstruction,” *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 27, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/6/5/.
[309] Bin Dagr yaftatihu mahattat kahrabaa madouma min Qatar, “Bin Dagr inaugurates Qatar-funded power plan in Aden,” Al-Jazeera, accessed on Sept. 27, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2017/5/26/.
[310] Nahwa 90 muassasa fi Addawha limunaqashat huloul al-azma al-Yamaniyya,“Around 90 NGOs in Doha to discuss solutions to Yemeni crisis,” *Al-Sharq*, accessed on Sept. 27, 2019, https://www.al-sharq.com/article/19/02/2016/90.
[311] “Qatar in Yemen: Great efforts to restore legitimacy and reconstruction.”

circumstances that had forced other foreign NGOs to leave due to the lack of safe corridors in the country.[312]

4.1.2.4. Syria

Qatar initially financed the Syrian uprising with at least $3 billion in aid and military support during the first two years of the revolution.[313] According to an investigative report by the *Financial Times*, Qatar supported the rebels in Syria to enable them to topple the Assad regime. The report, which was based on interviews with dozens of Syrian army officers and activists, found that Doha had given some $50,000 to each army officer who defected from the Syrian regime.[314]

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute also published a report that asserted that Qatar had helped "ignite" the war in Syria by providing more weapons to Syrian revolutionary forces than any other country. The same report noted that Qatar had sent rebels in Syria more than 70 different types of weapon on cargo flights from Doha to rebel-held parts of the war-torn country (via Turkey). The report also indicated that the arms shipments that Qatar was sending to opponents of the regime had doubled in the period between April 2012 and March 2013.[315]

It further disclosed that Qatar was operating a training base for Syrian revolutionary forces who were being hosted on its territory in cooperation with the US military (which was overseeing the training), and that more than 1,200 fighters were graduating each year.[316]

For its role in supporting the Syrian opposition, Qatar was criticized by many countries (including several Arab countries), which feared the support was being used to overthrow the Syrian regime. Doha was criticized not only for arming opposition forces, but also for funding and training regiments of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and for its "unique" relationship with the Al-Nusra Front, opposition fighters close to Al-Qaeda in Syria. Doha

---

See: Qatar taftatihu 7 mustashfayat maydaniyya fi taiz,"Qatar opens 7 field hospitals in Taiz," *Al-Sharq*, accessed on Sept. 27, 2019, https://www.al-sharq.com/article/11/08/2015/7-.

[312] "Qatar opens 7 field hospitals in Taiz."

See: Rughma al-Harb, Qatar tadam al-mustashfayat al-Yamaniyya, "Despite war, Qatar aids Yemeni hospitals," *Al-Khaleej Online*, accessed on Sept. 27, 2019, https://alkhaleejonline.net/.

[313] "Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms," *Financial Times*, accessed on Sept. 30, 2019, http://ig-legacy.ft.com/content/86e3f28e-be3a-11e2-bb35-00144feab7de#axzz64DkG4Eh1.

[314] "Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms."

[315] "Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms."

[316] "Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms."

vigorously denied the assertions, saying it only had ties with "moderate" opposition groups.[317]

One Syrian opposition group, the Army of Conquest (Jaish al-Fath),[318] also criticized Qatar for its involvement with the Syrian opposition, and for supporting one party (the name of which it did not mention) at the expense of another.[319]

4.1.2.5. Bahrain

Qatar was accused by Bahraini King Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa of backing the protests that erupted in Bahrain in 2011, despite the fact that Doha had been among the Gulf countries that participated in the "Peninsula Shield" force,[320] which was deployed to Manama to suppress the protests.[321] The accusation was seen as politically-motivated since it was issued by Manama only weeks after the 2017 Gulf crisis in which a blockade was imposed on Qatar by a Saudi-led bloc of Arab states (Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt). The blockade was imposed to punish Doha for allegedly "having good ties with Iran, backing terror and hosting Islamists." On August 29, 2017, Bahrain's official news agency published details of what it described as a "Qatari scheme to destabilize" the country. It asserted that Qatar had "launched the first spark that led to chaos and vandalism in the country by using social media to provoke strife in Bahrain and give financial, media and logistical support for acts of violence."[322] The accusations were vehemently denied by Doha, which decried what it described as a Bahraini bid to involve it in "political disputes and internal conflicts."[323]

[317] David Roberts. "Is Qatar bringing the Nusra Front in from the cold? *BBC English*, March 6, 2015.
[318] A group belong to the Idlib-based armed rebels, which was formed in March 2015, days before it managed to seize control over the city.
[319] "Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms."
[320] Peninsula Shield Force amounts to be the military arm of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It was established in 1982 with aims to deter and respond to any military attack against any of the GCC member states: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.
[321] Al-qowwa al-Qatariyya fil Bahrain tahdefu lihifz al-amn wa al-nizam, "Qatari military force in Bahrain is responsible for maintaining security and order," *Al-Wasat Daily*, accessed on Oct. 7, 2019, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/532796.html.
[322] Albahrain: qatar wara' ahdath 2011 wuqufan wa takhtitan, "Bahrain: Qatar behind the 2011 events, by planning and supporting," *CNN Arabic*, accessed on Oct. 7, 2019, https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/2017/08/29/bahrain-qatar-2011-responsibility.
[323] Qatar tanfi al-tadakhul fi al-shaan al-Bahraini al-dakhili, "Qatar denies meddling in Bahrain's internal affairs," *France 24*, accessed on Oct. 7, 2019, https://www.france24.com/ar/20181105.

4.1.3. Official Visits and Diplomatic Support

Another Qatari form of support for the Arab uprisings was its effort to drum up support for pro-revolution positions in regional and international organizations. Qatar played a major role in lobbying for joint Arab action, especially via the Arab League, against the Syrian regime. Doha was also the first to call for resolving the Yemeni crisis through the GCC. What's more, Qatar endeavored to convince the members of the UN Security Council to support a NATO-backed action against Libya's Qaddafi regime, which can be viewed as a form of diplomatic support given by Doha to pro-change forces.

4.1.3.1. Tunisia

The most significant measure by which Qatar helped Tunisia in the diplomatic arena was Doha's assistance to Tunis in retrieving money pilfered by the Ben Ali regime.[324] In 2012, then President Marzouki acknowledged Qatar's role in paying for international advocates to help Tunisia recover the stolen funds. In a speech delivered after receiving the first batch of looted funds in the presence of a UN lawyer and Qatari Attorney-General Ali bin Ftis al-Marri, Marzouki hailed Qatar's role in helping his country's justice ministry retrieve the money.[325]

Many official visits were also paid by Qatari officials to Tunisia in the early months of the revolution to express Doha's support for the North African country. Those visits included the following:

Year	Visits
2011	A visit by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim
2011	A visit by Minister Khalid bin Mohammed Al-Attiyah[326]
2012	A visit by Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani
2012	A visit by crown prince Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani

[324] By this move, Tunisia had received roughly $28.8 millions of the looted money.

[325] Marzouki: Qatar dafat amwalan listiadat al-amwal al-manhouba, "Marzouki: Qatar paid money to restore Tunisian looted Money," *Al-Masdar*, accessed on Sept. 19, 2019, http://ar.webmanagercenter.com/2013/04/11/15785/.

[326] Qatari Foreign Ministry, Official Website, accessed on Sept. 19, 2019, https://www.mofa.gov.qa/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85?country=TN#bilateral-relations.

2014	A visit by Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani[327]
2016	A visit by Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in 2016, during which Qatar pledged to invest $1.25 billion in Tunisia, the "biggest single pledge of its kind to Tunisia since the 2011 uprising, which caused a kind of economic uncertainty and weak growth."[328]
2019	A visit by Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, during which he took part in an Arab League summit.[329]

These figures show that within only seven years, the Qatari emirs (father and son) paid seven official visits to Tunisia, more than any other Arab leader in general and more than any other leader of an Arab monarchy in particular. This shows that Qatar embraced a supportive foreign policy vis-à-vis post-revolution Tunisia, with different forms of financial and diplomatic support being extended by Doha. This comes in addition to earlier media support by the Al-Jazeera news channel, which played a role in mobilizing Tunisians to take to the streets against the regime in 2011.

4.1.3.2. Libya

Qatari Crown Prince Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, accompanied by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Khaled al-Atiyyah, paid an official visit to Tripoli in July 2012, becoming the first Qatari official of that level to do so since the ouster of the Qaddafi regime. Al-Atiyyah said the visit was meant to "congratulate the Libyan people on the success of the electoral process which came to culminate the election of the members of the country's 'National Conference'."[330]

As for diplomatic support, Qatar was the first among Arab countries (second only to France) to recognize Libya's revolutionary council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people. The Qatari decision, adopted March 28, 2011, came one day after the Libyan

[327] "Qatari Emir Arrives in Tunisia," *Tunisian State Channel*, accessed on Sept. 19, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0xQnvkUzRQ.
[328] "Regional partners pledge billions in help for Tunisia," *Reuters*, accessed on Sept. 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-investment/regional-partners-pledge-billions-in-help-for-tunisia-idUSKBN13N1KC.
[329] "Qatar's emir leaves Arab League summit in Tunisia prior to delivering his speech," *Daily Sabah*, accessed on Sept. 19, 2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/world/2019/03/31/qatars-emir-leaves-arab-league-summit-in-tunisia-prior-to-delivering-his-speech.
[330] Waliy al-Ahd al-Qatari yasilu ila Tarablus, "Qatari Crown Prince Arrives in Tripoli," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 21, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovnkA-K0F_0.

National Transitional Council (NTC) announced it had signed an oil contract with the Gulf monarchy.[331]

Emir Hamad bin Khalifa and his prime minister embraced an approach based on providing "Arab solutions to Arab conflicts," particularly during preparations for international intervention in Libya in May 2011. In line with this diplomatic support, Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim mobilized support for UNSC Resolution 1973, by which a no-fly zone over Libya was established. Qatar's support for the resolution was critical, as it contributed to enhancing the image of the international intervention in Libya by alleviating regional suspicions that the campaign was "a new Western interference in the Arab world."[332]

Since the beginning of the revolution in Libya, Qatar, along with France and the United Kingdom, played a pivotal role in rallying the international community to military action.[333] Doha worked to mobilize Arab joint diplomatic action via the Arab League to enforce the no-fly zone. Bin Jassim also engineered the suspension of Libya's membership in the Arab League, and thus secured unanimous support for a no-fly zone despite Algerian opposition. Doha's role in the Arab League served the interests of the newly-formed opposition council. Bin Jassim explained his country's active diplomacy vis-à-vis Libya, saying: "To stimulate the hope that the Arab League could have a mechanism to prevent these things from happening anymore…, Arab politicians should be more serious, the Arab League and UN support for the no-fly zone was an example of how we can cooperate."[334]

We can summarize Qatar's diplomatic support for the Libyan opposition in the following: Making official visits to Tripoli despite the unstable situation there; recognizing the opposition council as the only representative of the Libyan people; mobilizing Arab support for intervention in Libya; calling to suspend the Qaddafi regime's membership in the Arab League; lobbying for international action against the Qaddafi regime, which culminated in the UN's adoption of Resolution 1973, which called for a no-fly zone; promoting the NATO intervention in Libya.

[331] "Qatar recognizes Libyan rebels after oil deal," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 25, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/201132814450241767.html.
[332] Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 10.
[333] Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 11.
[334] Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 10.

4.1.3.3. Yemen

Qatari diplomacy regarding the Yemeni revolution was seen in Doha's struggle to establish a collective position from inside the Gulf umbrella of the GCC. Qatar was very active in doing so, despite President Saleh's remarks against Qatar and Al-Jazeera.[335] This approach was not new for Doha, given the complicated political scene in Yemen. Doha's efforts alone failed to defuse the Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen in 2007/2008. For this reason, it introduced a multilateral (regional) initiative to deal with the Yemeni crisis. As part of Operation Friends of Yemen, which began in 2010 amid growing regional and international concerns about terrorism emanating from Yemen, Qatari and Gulf officials worked closely with Western governments to stabilize the country, urging Saleh to undertake concrete political reforms.[336]

Just weeks after the crisis, Qatar's foreign minister (Bin Jassim) became the first international party to call on President Saleh to step down.[337] Qatar also allowed the Yemeni community in Doha to demonstrate outside their embassy to exert pressure on Saleh and his government to resign.[338]

This occurred despite the fact that the momentum of popular protests against Saleh had only just begun. Following the announcement of the Gulf Initiative, Saleh said that, while he welcomed the move, he would reject any Qatari role in defusing the crisis. "Our legitimacy derives from the strength of our great Yemeni people, not from Qatar, and the Qatari initiative is rejected,"[339] Saleh said in a speech on April 8, 2011, while addressing large crowds of supporters. In reaction, Qatar withdrew from the Gulf Initiative believing it offered too much to the regime.[340] A Qatari Foreign Ministry source said at the time:

> "Doha has made this decision because of procrastination and delay in signing the proposed initiative and its terms, since this delay comes amid the escalation in the country and amid the ongoing confrontations. This is seen as contrary to the spirit of the initiative, which aimed at resolving the crisis in Yemen as soon as possible and

[335] Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 17.
[336] Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring, 17.
[337] Rabeeul Dawha fi Sanaa yamnahu nufouzan li hulafaiha al-Judud, "The Doha Spring in Sanaa is producing influence for its new allies," *Al-Sharq Daily*, accessed on Sept. 28, 2019, http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/12/12/620296.
[338] "The Doha Spring in Sanaa is producing influence for its new allies."
[339] "The Doha Spring in Sanaa is producing influence for its new allies."
[340] "The Doha Spring in Sanaa is producing influence for its new allies."

achieving the aspirations of the brotherly Yemeni people and maintaining security and stability in Sanaa."[341]

Regarding the official visits, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani paid an official visit to Yemen's post-revolution President Hadi at his temporary residence in Riyadh on April 10, 2015, while the latter visited Doha three times -- in 2013, 2015 and 2017.[342]

The Qatari role was effective in Yemen as well. Despite modest media coverage of the protests in Sanaa, Qatar played a considerable diplomatic role that led to the ouster of President Saleh. Doha's role was also very proactive in terms of humanitarian support, especially after the country plunged into civil war in 2014.

4.1.3.4. Syria

Qatar was the first Arab country, even the first country in the world, to shut its embassy in Damascus to protest the brutality of the Syrian regime when dealing with peaceful protests at the outset of the uprising. The closure came following attacks on the building by pro-Assad demonstrators.[343] Additionally, Qatar, on November 14, 2012, recognized the Syrian National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces[344] as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. The move followed a Friends of Syria conference that was held in Marrakesh, Morocco on December 12, 2012.[345] Also, Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani invited the outgoing head of the Syrian opposition coalition, Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, and the head of the interim government, Ghassan Hito, along with other members of the opposition delegation, to take Syria's seat at an Arab League summit held in Doha in March 2013. This took place despite the opposition of some Arab countries that had expressed reservations about the move, including Iraq and Algeria.[346] Shortly

[341] Qatar tansahibu min al-mubadra al-Khaleejiyya hawl al-Yaman, "Qatar Withdraws from Gulf Initiative on Yemen," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Sept. 28, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/5/13/.
[342] Al-Raees Hadi yabhath maa Amir Qatar al-Wada al-Yamani, "President Hadi discusses with Qatari Emir Yemeni Situation," *Al-Jazirah*, Accseed on Sept. 28, 2019, http://www.al-jazirah.com/2015/20150410/ln92.htm.
[343] Syrian Embassy in Qatar, National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, official website, accessed on Oct. 7, 2019, https://syrembassy.com//
[344] A coalition of Syrian opposition groups that emerged after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011. The coalition was established in Doha, Qatar, in November 2012 and was headed by Moaz al-Khatib, the former imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, before he resigned on April, 21 2013.
[345] Syrian Embassy in Qatar, official website.
[346] "Arab Summit begins by inviting Syrian opposition to sit on the Syrian seat," *BBC*, accessed on Oct. 4, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/01/120114_syria_qatar_troops.

afterward, an embassy for the opposition coalition was inaugurated in Doha on March 23, 2013, and remains active to this day.[347]

Qatar also criticized international efforts to find a negotiated solution to the war in Syria, while demanding that Syrian President Bashar Assad be prosecuted as a war criminal for massacres committed in Syria. Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid al-Attiya said before the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London: "Assad has lost any consideration in reaching a political solution. The only acceptable outcome of the new talks is his removal from power."[348]

Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani spearheaded Arab and international efforts to intervene in Syria on a humanitarian basis. He proposed sending Arab troops to stop what he called "bloodshed in Syria," becoming the first Arab leader to call for such an escalatory step vis-à-vis the Syrian regime. The emir's proposal came in response to a question about whether he favored Arab intervention in Syria in an interview with the CBS news channel. "In such a situation, some troops must be sent to stop the killing," he said.[349]

In terms of visits, Emir Hamad and his son Tamim received many leading opposition figures in Doha, including the head of the Syrian National Coalition, Moaz al-Khatib,[350] and Ahmed al-Jarba,[351] while also holding talks with the head of the coalition's government, Ahmed Al-Khader.[352]

Here, we find that Qatar gave all forms of support to the Syrian opposition and provided media coverage of the revolution since the very beginning. Doha's generous financial and military support was conspicuous, with the Gulf state paying billions of dollars in a bid to overthrow the Assad regime. In this regard, we can say that the ferocity of the

[347] Syrian Embassy in Qatar, official website.
[348] "Assad should face war crimes trial, not peace conference, says Qatar," *Daily Telegraph*, accessed on Oct. 4, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10495630/Assad-should-face-war-crimes-trial-not-peace-conference-says-Qatar.html.
[349] "Emir of Qatar proposes sending Arab troops to "stop massacre in Syria," *Al-Jazeera English*, Accessed on Oct. 5, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/1/14/qatars-emir-suggests-sending-troops-to-syria.
[350] "Emir of Qatar receives head of Syrian National Coalition," *Qatari News Agency (QNA), by Zaman Al-Wasl Daily*, accessed on Oct. 5, 2019, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/34688.
[351] Amir Qatar yastakbilu raees al-itilaf al-watani al-Souri "Emir of Qatar receives head of Syrian National Coalition," *Al-Ahram Gate*, accessed on Oct. 5, 2019, http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/378200.aspx.
[352] Amir Qatar yastakbilu raees hukumat al-itilaf al-watani al-Souri, "Emir of Qatar receives head of Syrian National Coalition's Government," *Al-Wasat Daily*, accessed on Oct. 5, 2019, http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/840427.html.

Assad regime, which killed hundreds of thousands of people, prompted Qatar to embrace this strong and moral position.

4.1.3.5. Bahrain

As mentioned above, accusations of Qatar's alleged support for the Bahraini uprising were largely politically-motivated. They were linked to the Gulf crisis of 2017, during which Bahrain joined a Saudi-led bloc of Arab states that accused Doha of backing "terror" and destabilizing the region -- allegations that Qatar has consistently denied.

However, these accusations came despite the fact that Doha was a part of the Saudi-led Peninsula Shield that was sent to Manama months after the crisis erupted. They came also at the time the Bahraini pro-change activists were slamming Al-Jazeera of turning a blind eye to the events rocking the country, which, as mentioned earlier, was explained by the Qatari officials as their coverage for the escalating events in Egypt and Libya came at the expense of the Bahraini given the relative calm in the latter.

Conclusion

Unlike its neighboring monarchies, Qatar supported almost all of the revolutions that took place within its geopolitical reach. Qatari backing varied from media support through Al-Jazeera to financial, military and diplomatic forms of support. This diplomatic support was obvious in Doha's efforts to drum up enthusiasm at the Arab League for "genuine Arab solutions to Arab conflicts."

This chapter shows how Al-Jazeera coverage of the Arab Spring varied from country to country, with most of its focus on Tunisia, Libya and Syria at the expense of Yemen and Bahrain, prompting some pro-change activists to criticize the apparently lopsided nature of the coverage.

Secondly, it shows how Doha generously supplied money and arms to pro-revolution groups, including financial and military support given to movements in Syria and Libya, along with financial assistance for transitional governments set up after the fall of the Tunisian, Libyan and Yemeni regimes.

A third means of support came in the form of Qatar's efforts to promote pro-change positions in regional and international forums. Qatar played a major role in calling for joint Arab action against the brutality of the Syrian regime. Doha was also the first to call for a resolution of the Yemeni crisis through the GCC. What's more, Qatar tried to convince non-permanent members of the UN Security Council to support a NATO-backed campaign against Libya's Qaddafi regime.

CHAPTER 5

QATAR'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT SINCE 2011: ANALYZING PRO-REVOLUTION POSITIONS AND POST-COUP TIES

Parallel to the pro-change stances the Gulf monarchy assumed during the Arab Spring, Qatar was supportive of the pro-change protests that hit Egypt and led to the toppling of long-serving President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011. Qatari support was highly manifested in Al-Jazeera's long, deep and attentive coverage of the 18-day-long events, since the very beginning of their dramatic outbreak. That was also seen in the diplomatic support displayed by the official visits Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani paid to the country, as well as the huge amounts of money Doha pledged to back Cairo with to help the country survive the unsteady transitional period. This is not to mention Qatar's harboring of high-profile pro-revolutionary Egyptian figures on its territories who were among the main mobilizers of the protests, days ahead of their outbreak, which contributed to that historical change.

However, this chapter will also discuss Qatari reactions against the July 2013 military coup with a view to comparing them to the policies adopted in the two years that followed the revolution, such as Al-Jazeera's anti-coup coverage, hosting anti-coup figures, the recession of diplomatic relations, and the lack of financial support to Al-Sisi's regime. Qatar was taking on policies at odds with the Egyptian army's move to topple Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically-elected and civilian president in Egypt's history. This chapter will analyze these varied positions in an attempt to understand the dynamics that were driving Qatar to adopt such stances in many decisive periods of Egyptian history:

- The period of anti-Mubarak protests, which extended from January 25, 2011 to February 11, 2011.
- The transitional period, which refers to the period of the SCAF government in the period between February 12, 2011 and June 30, 2012.
- Morsi's government, which started on July 1, 2012 until the coup d'etat carried out on July 3, 2013.

Analyzing Qatari policies towards Egypt not only gives us a glance at Doha's driving policies to back revolutionary change, but contributes to understanding the limits and variables influencing that level of support. Given Cairo's regional power, strategic location, and cultural influence on other Arab countries, we allocated an entire chapter to undertake in detail Doha's policies in the Nile country and how media and economic support mattered.

5.1. The Egyptian Revolution

The Egyptian revolution (known also as the "January 25 Revolution") erupted on January 25, 2011, following calls for popular protests by many groups[353] and social-media activists[354] in the country. The groups' primary goal was to protest police violence and the fierce crackdown on the opposition, mostly the ones who were killed after reportedly being tortured to death while in solitary confinement, such as Khaled Said and Sayyed Bilal.[355]

The protests were also staged to denounce poor living, political, and economic conditions, along with what was seen as an unprecedented rise in corruption among Mubarak regime officials.[356]

The demonstrations and sit-ins, which were held in parallel with celebrations of Police Day, gained momentum on January 28, 2011, which saw mounting protests with tens of thousands filling the main squares and streets throughout the country, leading in turn to a security vacuum in the Egyptian capital after hundreds of policemen left police stations in a deliberate move aimed at causing chaos and unrest. The protests eventually led President Mubarak to step down on February 11, 2011 before he designated the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to rule the country.[357]

[353] April 6 Movement, Kifaya Movement, and National Change Front were of the main groupings called for anti-Mubarak protests. The Muslim Brotherhood was calling its members to take part in the protests but with no official announcements. A week later, the MB made it in public and called all Egyptians, including MB cadres, to take part in the protests.
[354] Admin of Facebook page of Khaled Said: Wael Ghoneim, Mustafa al-Naggar, Nawwara Nagm, Asmaa Mahfouz, Saif Abdel-Fattah were of the main youth activists calling for taking part in the protests.
[355] "The January 25 Revolution," *Government's State Information Service (SIS)*, accessed on Feb. 17, 2020, https://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/egyptionrevoution/indexjuly.html.
[356] Itlaq sarah alshurtiayn almasriyyain almutahamin biqatl Khalid Saeid, "Egyptian authorities release two suspects of Khaled Saied case," *BBC*, accessed on Feb. 15, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/06/130601_khaled_said_trial_egypt.
[357] "The January 25 Revolution."

A year-long transitional period was run by the SCAF, during which the military establishment supervised parliamentary and presidential elections that were swept by Islamists and revolutionary figures. Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi won the presidential poll in June 2012 to be the first-ever elected and civilian president in the country's history. Almost a year after Morsi's victory, anti-Morsi protests flared up in different parts of the country to call on the army to intervene. Army general and Morsi's defense minister Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi led a coup against the elected president on July 3, 2013 and jailed him before a Cairo court sentenced him to life imprisonment on politically-motivated charges.[358]

5.2. The Qatari Stance Towards the Revolution

Qatar welcomed the winds of change that hit the region in general and Egypt in particular. The Gulf monarchy was not only welcoming, but adopted a supportive policy to foster that change. Doha had been hosting many Egyptian high-profile and opposition figures for decades, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who was among the main mobilizers of reform in his country. Al-Qaradawi was among the main religious mobilizers of the revolution in its early days and weeks.[359] The cleric had huge popularity among Egyptians, mostly inside the Islamic (Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood) currents.

Meanwhile**,** Qatari support was manifested in Al-Jazeera's long, deep and attentive coverage of Egyptian events since the very beginning of their outbreak. This was also seen in diplomatic support embodied by the official visits that Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani paid to the country, as well as the huge amounts of money Qatar sent to support Cairo's economy to enable it to get through the transitional period.

5.2.1. Hosting Opposition and Pro-Revolution Figures

Since 1961, Qatar had been hosting prominent Egyptian opposition figure Yusuf al-Qaradawi. The Islamic scholar was an opponent of the Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak regimes, and was one of the MB's leading theorists and Islamic ideologists. For his pro-change

[358] "Mohammed Morsi's trials and convictions," *BBC*, accessed on Feb. 18, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806.
[359] Qaradawi's Official Website, accessed on Feb. 12, 2020, https://www.al-qaradawi.net/.

positions, he was described in books and articles as the "Revolutionary Imam,"[360] and many researchers and journalists likened his return to Egypt after the revolution to Khomeini's return after the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[361]

Al-Qardadawi was one of the most prominent figures of the religious current in the Arab world, who obviously backed the pro-change protests in the Arab world in general and Egypt in particular. Days before the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution, Al-Qaradawi was interviewed by Egyptian dailies *Al-Masry Al-Youm* and *Al-Shorouk*, in which he directly called on Egyptian youth to take part in the protests slated for January 25, 2011, before more than two million Egyptians from different parts of the country converged on Tahrir Square to hear him preach on the first Friday after Mubarak's removal.[362] The cleric also called for easing the country's political conditions and helping people attain their long-awaited rights, especially their right to free expression. He also appealed to Egyptian police not to use force against peaceful demonstrators and demanded that they respect their will.[363]

During the protests, Al-Qaradawi used Al-Jazeera to address protestors in different parts of the country in a bid to reassure and mobilize them to continue their anti-Mubarak rallies, especially on the "Friday of Rage," which saw fierce clashes between peaceful protestors and police, as a result of which dozens of young men were killed and hundreds injured.[364]

He also played a pivotal role in calling on Egyptian youth to repulse a thug attack aimed at dispersing a sit-in in Tahrir Square, known as the "Camel Incident." Hundreds of regime-backed thugs (*baltagiyya*) broke into the square to disperse protestors with a view to ending the sit-in.[365] Dr. Issam Tellima, head of Al-Qaradawi's office, said that, despite the sheikh's

[360] Aaron Rock, "Qaradawi's Return and Islamic Leadership in Egypt." *Eurasia Review*, 20 (2011).
See: Yana Korobko and Mahmoud Musa. *The shifting global balance of power: Perils of a World War and preventive measures*. Xlibris Corporation, (2014) 100.
See also: Barry Robin. "The Region: Egypt gets its Khomeni," Jerusalem Post, Feb. 20, 2011.
[361] Wasfi Abu Zeid. *Al-Qaradawi: al-Imam al-Thair, "Al-Qaradawi: the Revolutionary Imam*," (Washington D.C., Sultan Publishing House, 2011.)
See: Issam Tellima. Al-Qaradawi wa thawrit yanayer, "Qaradawi and January Revolution," *Al-Jazeera*, Sep. 27, 2019.
[362] Abu Zeid, *Al-Qaradawi: The Revolutionary Imam*, 179.
[363] Abu Zeid, *Al-Qaradawi: The Revolutionary Imam*, 157, 216.
See: Tellima, Qaradawi and January Revolution, Al-Jazeera.
[364] Tellima, Qaradawi and January Revolution, Al-Jazeera.
[365] Qaradawi's slogans included: "The army should hand over power to civilians, Current Pharaohs should understand the lesson, Mubarak lives in another world, Mubarak should dissolve parliament now, Mubarak should resign"

illness at the time, he rushed to Al-Jazeera's office to encourage protesters and convince them to stay in the square, as their departure would end the revolution prematurely.[366]

Another manifestation of Al-Qaradawi's role in the revolution was his sermon in Tahrir Square on the first Friday after Mubarak's ouster, in which more than two million Egyptians took part. This showed, according to Tellima, the enormous respect Al-Qaradawi enjoyed due to his pro-change and pro-reform calls, both before and during the revolution.[367]

Unlike the mainstream religious approach in the Gulf, which sees revolution and pro-change movements as *fitna* (sedition), Al-Qaradawi saw the change as "a source of hope and mercy to the oppressed people."[368] These positions were stated by Al-Qaradawi during his weekly program on Al-Jazeera, called "Sharia and Life." Despite the fact that the cleric didn't directly call on people to revolt against their rulers before the Arab Spring, he was nevertheless telling them not to obey the "tyrants" (Arab presidents and rulers), and to speak up against injustice in line with Islamic strictures, citing the Hadith: "The best form of Jihad is to tell a word of truth in front of a tyrant ruler."[369]

However, Al-Qaradawi shifted to openly inciting the Arab masses to rise up against the dictators after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in early 2011. This was seen in his sermons and messages of support to Yemeni, Libyan and Syrian revolutionary groups.[370] He noted, however, that it was not permissible for people to revolt against a president who was freely chosen by the people, as long as he is committed to Islam and believes in God and His Messenger. He said people had the right to rise up against the presidents of the five Arab countries that were hit by protests in 2011: Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria. He argued that presidents of these republics acted as if they were kings, as they hoped to bequeath their power to their sons (Assad to Bashar, Mubarak to Gamal, Qaddafi to Saiful-Islam, Ali Abdullah Saleh to Ahmed).[371]

> "I can't understand why some preachers describe these revolutions as fitna. These peaceful demonstrations are the essence of the pro-change revolutions worldwide. Here, we see people taking part in peaceful protests; they don't carry a stick, stone, or even a

[366] Tellima, Qaradawi and January Revolution, Al-Jazeera.
[367] Personal Interview, Issam Tellima, head of Al-Qaradwi's office, (March 15, 2020), Zoom.
[368] Al-Thawra: Fitna am Rahma, "Revolution: Sedition or Mercy," *Al-Jazeera*, an episode of the weekly program of Sharia and Life, host: Shiekh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, broadcast on Sep. 11, 2011, accessed on Feb. 25, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/religionandlife/2011/9/15/.
[369] "Revolution: Sedition or Mercy."
[370] "Revolution: Sedition or Mercy."
[371] "Revolution: Sedition or Mercy."

> knife, they have no will to clash or attack anyone. People are taking to the streets saying nothing but 'There is no God except Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.' People are taking to the streets seeking the truth and to resist the falsehood, so it is not permissible for anyone to tell them: No, this is not your right. Oh, tell me, who told you that people do not have the right to stand against disbelief, to revolt against immorality, injustice and aggression? This is a kind of distortion of the Ulema's (scholars) sayings in the big books. These sayings aim at nothing but to support falsehood. I can't imagine that still there are many scholars who stay defending Qaddafi and Bashar al-Assad. Some sheikhs in Syria are, unfortunately, silent at the time pro-Assad thugs assault innocent people and even assault the corpses of their opponents. Those scholars have no intercession before Allah."[372]

In an episode of his program "Sharia and Law," Al-Qaradawi voiced pleasure for the victory of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, considering them as a "flame" that paved the way for the winds of change to spread to Yemen, Libya and Syria. Al-Qaradawi opined that the victory was not for the peoples of these two countries, but for the whole Islamic Ummah (nation). Most importantly, he hailed what he described as the "historic" role of Qatar in backing these revolutions, as Qatar, for him, was a "linebacker" for revolutionary change.[373]

Therefore, we can say that al-Qaradawi, from his residence in Qatar, played an effective role, not only by inciting people to revolt as a respected opposition figure, but also by providing religious justification for the revolt against what he termed "the Arab tyrants and dictators." The Qatari authorities didn't stop the imam from stating his pro-revolution sentiments, and gave him space to mobilize Arab youth from its territory.

5.2.2. Al-Jazeera's Coverage of the Egyptian Revolution

Al-Jazeera's coverage of the Arab Spring in general and the Egyptian revolution in particular was highly controversial, as it called the channel's impartiality and professionalism into question.[374] However, there was no doubt that Al-Jazeera played a pivotal role in covering the protests that hit Egypt around the clock, which contributed to their spread into Syria, Yemen and Libya. Al-Jazeera's role in the Egyptian case came to confirm the claim that the news channel was "a voice for the voiceless Arab people," who had been deprived of free access to media outlets by their autocratic governments.[375] This

[372] "Revolution: Sedition or Mercy."
[373] "Revolution: Sedition or Mercy."
[374] Mohanmed Aref Abdulla. *Dawr qanat al-Jazeera alfadayiya fi ihdath altaghyir alsiyasii fi alwatan al-Arabii: al-thawrat almasriyya namudhjaan*, "*The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change in the Arab World*," Master's thesis, An-Najah University, Palestine, (2012) 84.
[375] Abdullah. *The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change*, 84.

role was also embodied in the channel's siding with the peaceful protestors against the regimes, and by covering their activities, which led to a turning point in the region's history.[376]

Dozens of academic studies on Al-Jazeera's coverage of the Arab Spring found that Al-Jazeera had chosen a pro-change editorial policy, which was confirmed by Wadah Khanfar, director general of the media platform from 2003 to 2011. Khanfar confirmed this claim in a speech he delivered for TED Talks and in an editorial he wrote for *The Guardian*, in which he said Qatar was punished in 2017 for its support for the Arab Spring and for Al-Jazeera's role in the revolutions.[377]

5.2.2.1. Nonstop Coverage, Pro-Revolution Editorial Policy

Al-Jazeera reported on the Egyptian revolution extensively, with its main channel broadcasting 24-hour coverage from Tahrir Square. The Cairo events became correspondents' primary concern, and even commercial breaks contained pro-revolution promos and recordings.[378]

The following points sum up how Al-Jazeera contributed to giving the Egyptian revolution the media and information impetus that pro-change activists and groups needed:

Firstly**,** Al-Jazeera's political programs contributed to forming pro-change opinion among the Arab masses, who embraced the revolutions. The role of Al-Jazeera in this regard served to create knowledge and awareness by giving the people an access to anti-regime news and exposing government corruption, nepotism and mismanagement, along with a focus on high rates of poverty and unemployment. This led to a surge in the Egyptian people's opposition to Mubarak's regime.[379]

Secondly**,** Al-Jazeera's extensive coverage of the protests helped the revolution gain momentum, which ultimately helped protestors remain steadfast in the face of dozens of pro-Mubarak media outlets and newspapers. The focus on daily activities in Tahrir Square, and

[376] Abdullah. *The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change,* 85.
[377] "Wadah Khanfar: A historic moment in the Arab world," *TED talks*, accessed on Feb 18, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/w:atch?v=yKQnL9Mmgng.
[378] Abdullah. *The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change,* 6.
[379] Musa Abu Rayash. Al-Jazeera wa Senaat al-Wai al-Arabi, "Al-Jazeera and the Making of Arab Awareness," *Al-Jazeera Blogs,* Nov. 25, 2016.

the depiction of pro-revolution youths as "heroes," not only reassured those taking part in the sit-ins, but emboldened thousands of others to join them, making it even more difficult for security forces to disperse the rallies, thanks to the live broadcasts from Tahrir Square during the 18-day uprising. The nonstop coverage of these events had a profound impact on the Egyptian masses, and deepened public sympathy for the youth movements leading the anti-Mubarak protests.[380]

Thirdly, Al-Jazeera was using, in its coverage, a glossary of positive terms about the revolution, such as "revolution of the people," "revolution of dignity," "freedom and social justice," "free Egypt," etc. These tactics contributed to conveying a positive image of the revolution, its goals, and the revolutionaries themselves, who were viewed sympathetically by the Arab masses.[381]

5.2.2.2. Pro-Revolution Witnesses, Anchors, Commentators

Al-Jazeera was highly dependent on eyewitnesses during its coverage of the revolution, which contributed to convincing ordinary people to view the news channel as their most reliable source of information. These eyewitnesses played a pivotal role in the ongoing protests, as they voiced the demands of the ordinary people who were filling public squares across the country. Hosting these humble figures not only strengthened the channel's credibility, but provided viewers with news, photos and video, with every youth activist becoming a virtual correspondent for Al-Jazeera.[382]

This is not to mention the way Al-Jazeera's broadcasters and anchors behaved while covering news coming from Egypt. While covering the news and using social media, they were acting as pro-revolution activists themselves. This showed their obvious bias towards revolutionary groups at the expense of Mubarak's regime.[383]

---

[380] Abu Rayash. Al-Jazeera and the Making of Arab Awareness.
[381] "Al-Jazeera's pro-change promos," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Feb 22, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSVuvV4HZXk, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwoaGzKSD48, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A0pIRVluT-I&list=TLPQMTAwNDIwMjB3ofSYln3KwQ&index=2.
[382] Abdullah. *The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change,* 92.
[383] Abdullah. *The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change,* 129.

Hosting pro-change Arab figures was not merely meant to analyze the situation in the protest-hit countries, especially Egypt. The role Arab thinker Azmi Bishara[384] played in his daily appearance on the channel was not only descriptive or analytical. Rather, he played an active role in the Egyptian revolution since its very beginning. Bishara, via Al-Jazeera, gave instructions to revolutionary groups on how to deal with events on a daily basis, along with steps that should be taken to give momentum to the revolution with a view to toppling the regime. Bishara was dubbed by French daily *Le Monde* the "Godfather of the Arab Revolutions."[385]

5.2.2.3. Absence of Pro-Mubarak Commentators

The views of the Egyptian regime were largely nonexistent during the revolution in Al-Jazeera's coverage, which weakened the channel's credibility and brought its professionalism and objectivity into question -- despite the fact that pro-Mubarak figures refused to take part in Al-Jazeera programs or even appear as news commentators.[386]

By covering the revolution in such a way, Al-Jazeera helped to promote it in other Arab countries, where anti-regime protests and sit-ins later took place. This was a result of the high viewership of Al-Jazeera's unending news on Egyptian events and anti-regime propaganda circulated by Arab opposition figures via the news channel.[387]

Here we see the huge impact Al-Jazeera had on the Egyptian revolution, as the media platform played a role beyond mere news coverage. Rather, it was mobilizing the Egyptian masses in the streets and using terms showing revolutionary figures as heroes, which contributed to making the channel a main source of information during the 18-day protests.

---

[384] Azmi Bishara (born Nazareth, 22 July 1956) is a renowned Palestinian intellectual based in Qatar since 2010. Bishara, a well-known political writer, holds a PhD in philosophy, and serving currently as the General Director of the Doha-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Bishara has dozens of published books and hundreds of academic papers on political thought, social theory, and philosophy. Bishara was named as a godfather for the pro-change movement that has been shaking the Arab region since late 2010.

[385] "Par Benjamin Barthe, Qatar: Azmi Bishara, l'éminence libérale de Doha" *Le Monde*, accessed on Feb. 25, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/long-format/article/2018/11/16/qatar-azmi-bishara-un-progressiste-a-doha_5384456_5345421.html.

[386] Abdullah. *The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change,* 129.

[387] Abdullah. *The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change,* 130.

5.2.3. Financial Support

Qatar was the main Gulf state to allocate financial support to Egypt after the revolution to help it overcome severe economic conditions during the transitional government led by the military council. It was also the only Gulf state to back Egypt during Morsi's era. Qatari financial support for Egypt was manifested in loans, deposits, large investments and the establishment of a joint Qatar-Egypt higher economic council.

5.2.3.1. Grants, Deposits, Interest-Free Loans

In a visit to Egypt in May 2011, Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani pledged to invest $10 billion in different sectors to help the turmoil-hit country overcome its central bank's financial crisis and ailing economy.[388] Qatari donations and loans stood at $5.5 billion, with a $500-million grant sent in October 2011,[389] $2 billion in loans sent to the Egyptian Central Bank in August 2012, and $500 million in donations sent a month later.[390] Early in January 2013, the Gulf monarchy announced another $2-billion loan and donated $500 million in grants to help the country stave off the depreciation of its currency and balance its accounts. The announcement of the new aid package was made by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani following a meeting with President Mohammed Morsi.[391] Another $3 billion was transferred to Egypt in April 2013 in the form of bonds to help the country's economy.[392]

The generous Qatari support came as a way to stabilize the transitional period led by newly-elected civilian President Morsi. Qatar saw Egypt as an important strategic player and invested more in the country than any other Gulf state since the outbreak of the revolution. Qatar, through this largesse, wanted a strong regional ally in Egypt. Along with Turkey, this axis could have given Doha the vital role it had been longing for.[393] Shadi Hamid of the

[388] Tantawi yastaqbilu amir Qatar libahth al-Taawun, "Tantawi receives Qatari emir and discuss cooperation," *Official Al-Ahram Daily*, Accessed on March 7, 2020, http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/66586.aspx.
[389] Abo Al-Naga: Qatar manahat Masr 500 milyon dolar lidaam al-Mizaniyya, "Abo Al-Naga: Qatar granted Egypt with $500 million to help the Egyptian budget," *Youm-7 Daily*, accessed on March 7, 2020, https://www.youm7.com/story/2011/10/5/506376.
[390] "Abo Al-Naga: Qatar granted Egypt with $500 million to help the Egyptian budget."
[391] "Egypt finance: Qatar steps in to ease Cairo cash crisis," *BBC*, accessed on March 8, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20945844.
[392] Addawha tashtari 3 miliar dolar sanadat min Masr, "Doha buys 3-billion bonds from Egypt," *Anadolu Agency*, accessed on March 8, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/ar /242036.
[393] Qatar tudaif al-musaadat li Masr, "Qatar doubles aid to Egypt," *France 24*, accessed on March 8, 2020, https://www.france24.com/ar/20130109.

Brookings Doha Center saw these loans as "a great opportunity for Morsi's government, which was desperate for more time to negotiate a new [IMF] loan agreement and garner public support for it."[394]

We should note that Qatari financial support was not sent in donations to Egypt directly; rather, it was sent in the form of direct investments or loans to help the country's central bank avoid a severe cash crisis that appeared in the period following the revolution. Of the promised financial support, at least $3 billion was sent from the Gulf state in the period between 2011 and 2013, $2 billion of which was deposited in the central bank to help the Egyptian currency, and $1 billion sent in the form of donations.[395]

4.2.3.2. Direct Investment

As mentioned above, the first visit by a Qatari official to Cairo after the revolution (in May 2011) saw a Qatari pledge to invest $10 billion in different sectors to help the turmoil-hit country's crippled economy.[396] In September 2012, in his first visit during Morsi's era, the Qatari emir raised the amount of the promised investment from $10 billion to $18 billion, with an agreement signed to carry out these investments within five years. Some $8 billion of investments was allocated to power plants, natural gas and giant factories in Port Said. The remaining $10 billion was allocated for huge tourism ventures on the country's northwestern coast to create jobs for hundreds of thousands of jobless Egyptians.[397]

Egyptian Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Fayza Abu Al Naga commented on these decisions at the time by saying that an Egyptian-Qatari Ministerial Committee had been formed to discuss ways of using the Qatari investment. She further explained that the investments would include several in the fields of tourism, housing, oil, transportation, agriculture, education, health and justice.[398]

This generous Qatari support for Egypt was followed by an anti-Qatar campaign from inside and outside Egypt, which claimed that the Qatari largesse was meant to help the Muslim Brotherhood-led government. Mohammed Sadat, head of Egypt's Reform and

[394] "Qatar doubles aid to Egypt."
[395] Azmi Bishara. Masr, mina al-Thawra ila al-inqilab, *Egypt from the Revolution to Coup*, (Doha, Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2016) 59.
[396] "Tantawi receives Qatari emir and discuss cooperation."
[397] Bishara. *Egypt from the Revolution to Coup*, 59-60.
[398] "Abo Al-Naga: Qatar granted Egypt with $500 million to help the Egyptian budget."

Development Party, said that the large investments had a "suspicious agenda," accusing Morsi of "selling Egyptian territories to Doha."[399] Veteran Egyptian liberal politician Ayman Nour[400] saw that Egypt at the time was in dire need of financial support to overcome its economic crisis.[401]

> "Qatar has proven that it is more committed to its promises and more eager to help Egypt in these difficult circumstances, which we highly respect. The anti-Qatar media campaign comes for jealousy reasons due to the major role Qatar has been playing on the regional and international levels. The aim of this anti-Qatar attack comes to strangle the new [Morsi] regime in Cairo and cut off all bridges aiming to stand with it. There is no regional country that currently cooperates with Egypt except for Qatar."[402]

Nour went on to assert that Qatar, by these large donations, was helping the entire country -- not just the ruling Muslim Brotherhood.[403]

5.2.3.3. The Higher Economic Council

With a view to deepening economic bilateral relations, the Qatar-Egypt Business Council was launched in September 2012 and attended by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani and Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Qandil.[404]

Ahmed Al-Wakil, president of the General Union of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce, said the council, which included 70 Egyptian members, highlighted the need to increase Qatari investment in the country, noting that Qatar only occupied the 17th position among countries that had invested in Egypt during the Mubarak era. The number of Qatari companies that were interested in the Egyptian market before the council's inauguration amounted to 156 with a combined capital of $568 million. He expected a boom in trade between the two countries through the new council, in line with Qatari plans to invest

[399] Morsi yabeeu Masr lilqatariyeen mukabil al-Musaadat, "Morsi sells Egypt to Qataris in exchange for aid," *Al-Masry Al-Youm Daily*, accessed on March 5, 2020, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/285066.
[400] Ayman Nour: a renowned Egyptian politician and opposition figure and a former member of the Egyptian Parliament. He was the founder of the country's opposition El Ghad party. Nour ran against Mubarak in the 2005 presidential election and came the second. He was arrested in 2005 for politically-motivated issues before being released in 2009. He has been of the harsh opponents to 2013 military coup.
[401] Qatar tad'am Masr walays al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, "Qatar helps Egypt not Muslim Brotherhood, Interview with politician Ayman Nour," *Al-Arab Daily*, accessed on March 7, 2020, https://www.alarab.qa/story/233821/, ().
[402] "Qatar helps Egypt not Muslim Brotherhood, Interview with politician Ayman Nour."
[403] "Qatar helps Egypt not Muslim Brotherhood, Interview with politician Ayman Nour."
[404] Raees al-Wuzaraa al-Qatari sayahdur itlaq al-Majles al-Iqtisadi al-Masri al-Qatari, "Qatari PM to attend launching of Qatar-Egypt Business Council," *Youm-7 Daily*, accessed on March 12, 2020, https://www.masress.com/youm7/778951.

roughly $18 billion within the next five years.[405] Council Chairman Muharram Hilal stressed the importance of the council, given the enhanced bilateral ties following the revolution.[406]

The Egyptian-Qatari Business Council was set to play a major role in increasing bilateral cooperation; providing assistance to investors from both sides; and facilitating the investment climate in both countries. This coincided with a Qatari government decision to raise the quota of Egyptian laborers in Doha -- which stood at 70,000 -- thus raising the number of Egyptian firms working there, especially those involved in projects related to the Qatar 2022 World Cup.[407] However, many disputes surfaced in the early days of the council after the aims of the Qatari aid were brought into question, especially the country's desire to invest in the Suez Canal.[408]

Here we find that Qatar-Egypt economic relations were fostered through high-profile visits between the two sides and the establishment of the joint economic council. We can say that Qatar was generous in financially supporting Egypt after the revolution given the huge amounts of money (donations, loans and deposits) sent during SCAF-run government and Morsi's one year in power to help Egypt deal with foreign currency shortages.

5.2.4. Official Visits, Diplomatic Ties

Qatar was the first Arab country to voice support for the Egyptian revolution since its very beginning. Hours after the ouster of Mubarak, the official Qatari news agency quoted a statement by the royal court, which stated that Qatar "expresses its respect for the will and choices of the Egyptian people and salutes the great and important role of the Egyptian armed forces in defending Egypt, the Arab nation and the interests of the Egyptian people."[409] The statement added that Qatar "believes that the transfer of power to the Supreme Military Council constitutes an important positive step towards achieving the aspirations of the Egyptian people in democracy, reform and a decent life."[410]

---

[405] Al-Istismarat al-Qatariyya: noqta fasila fi al-Alaqat al-Iqtisadiyya bayna al-Qahira wa Addawha, "Qatari Investments: Turning Point in Economic Relations," *Mubashir Daily*, accessed on March 12, 2020, https://www.mubasher.info/news/2153945/.
[406] "Qatari Investments: Turning Point in Economic Relations."
[407] "Qatari Investments: Turning Point in Economic Relations."
[408] Majlis al'aemal al-Misrii al-Qatari: alghumud sayyid almawqif, "Vagueness of Qatar-Egypt Business Council," *Al-Watan Daily*, accessed on March 12, 2020, https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/124243.
[409] Qatar turahhibu bitanahhi Mubarak, "Qatar welcomes Mubarak's overthrow," *Qatari Official News Agency*, accessed on March 13, 2020, http://www.qna.org.qa/arabic-international-news/171857/12-02-2011.
[410] "Qatar welcomes Mubarak's overthrow."

Qatari-Egyptian ties were very cold during Mubarak's era for many reasons. Firstly, Qatar had good relations with the Iranian regime, with which Mubarak had no official ties since the 1979 revolution due to Sadat's signing a deal to normalize ties with Israel in the same year. Qatar's Al-Jazeera had been a fierce critic of Mubarak-led governments, which prompted the latter to accuse it of sowing chaos in the region. The close relations between Hamas and Doha were another reason for poor Qatari-Egyptian ties, as Mubarak openly opposed Hamas, the de facto ruler of the neighboring Gaza Strip.[411] These strained relations changed after the revolution, with the first visit by an Arab official being carried out by the Qatari emir and the establishment of the Joint High Committee headed by the two countries' prime ministers.

5.2.4.1. First Official Visit, Improved Ties

On May 3, 2011, Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani became the first Arab leader to pay an official visit to Egypt after the revolution. Al Thani was received by Hussein Tantawi, head of Egypt's ruling military council at the time. Al-Jazeera said the visit came after years of "diplomatic indolence between the two sides, amid expectations of strengthening bilateral relations in the upcoming days."[412] Al Thani's visit was followed by another visit by his crown prince, Tamim bin Hamad, during which the latter discussed with Tantawi "the latest developments in the regional and international arenas, and ways to enhance the Egyptian-Qatari partnership via a number of joint economic and development projects aiming to support the Egyptian economy."[413]

Al Thani was not only the first Arab leader to visit Egypt after the revolution; he was also the first Arab leader to visit newly-elected President Mohammed Morsi only a month after the latter assumed power on June 30, 2012. During the visit, which was held on Aug 12, 2012, the emir pledged to donate $2 billion into the country's central bank to help the Egyptian economy.[414] The emir paid another visit to Egypt in October of the same year after

[411] Addawha, Tarikh min al-Adaa li Masr, "Doha: history of hostility to Egypt," *Al-Wafd Daily*, accessed on March 13, 2020,
https://m.alwafd.news/article/1564717.
[412] Qatar tudashenu marhalatan jadeeda fi al-Ilaqat maa Masr, "Qatar launches a new stage in ties with Egypt, *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on March 14, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/5/3/.
[413] Tantawi yastaqbilu waliy al-Ahd al-Qatari, "Tantawi receives Qatar's Crown Prince," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on March 14, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/6/30/.
[414] Amir Qatar yazouru Masr litaziz al-Alaqat, "Qatari Emir visits Egypt to foster bilateral ties," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on March 14, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2012/8/11/.

visiting the Gaza Strip, entering Egypt through the Rafah crossing.[415] A third visit was held in November, which focused on Arab efforts to stop ongoing Israeli aggression on Gaza.[416] Morsi, for his part, visited Qatar on March 26, 2013 to participate in an Arab League summit in Doha.[417]

There were many other visits by prime ministers and foreign ministers. Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim paid four official visits to Egypt during Morsi's one-year tenure. These visits were conducted on (September 6, 2012; January 8, 2013; April 30, 2013; and May 23, 2013).[418] For his part, Egyptian Prime Minister Hisham Qandil visited Doha on April 9, 2013.[419]

In the media, economic and diplomatic spheres, Qatar backed the Egyptian revolution and the two governments that came afterward, regardless of who headed these governments. It helped both the government formed by the SCAF and the elected government of Morsi.

The huge Qatari support for the Egyptian revolution was in line with the Gulf country's political and diplomatic interests, given the strained relations between Doha and Cairo before the revolution. This is understandable, since politics and international relations don't depend on lasting alliances or permanent disagreements.[420]

Jawad Al-Hamad, head of the Amman-based Center for Middle East Studies, said he was not surprised by the Qatari strategy towards Egypt, as each country, no matter its weight, is looking for influence in the region and has geopolitical interests. He said: "By these moves towards the Arab Spring in general and Egypt in particular, Qatar wanted to maintain its

---

[415] Amir Qatar yazouru Masr, "Qatari emir visits Egypt," *Official Akhbar al-Youm Daily*, accessed on March 14, 2020, https://akhbarelyom.com/news/newdetails/320214/1/,.

[416] Al-Raees Morsi yastaqbilu Amir Qatar fi al-Qahira, "Morsi receives Qatari emir in Cairo," *Official Akhbar al-Youm Daily*, accessed on March 12, 2020, https://akhbarelyom.com/news/newdetails/316858/1.

[417] "Egypt's Morsi in Qatar Monday for Arab League Summit," *Official Al-Ahram Daily*, accessed on March 12, 2020, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/67652/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Morsi-in-Qatar-Monday-for-Arab-League-Summi.aspx.

[418] Al-Raees al-Misry yujri Mubahasat maa al-Amir al-Qatari, "Egyptian President holds talks with Qatari prime minister," *Kuwaiti news agency*, accessed on March 17, 2020, https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2308107&language=ar.
See:http://www.alkhaleej.ae/alkhaleej/page/4217ba0f-132c-4f2e-8ede-6e047c3ed1b6,
https://www.albawaba.com/ar/-462395,
https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2308107&language=ar.
https://www.aljarida.com/articles/1462096636894876900/

[419] Wazeer al-Thaqafa al-Qatari yastaqbelu raees al-wuzaraa al-Masri, "Qatari culture minister receives Egyptian PM," *Youm-7 Daily*, https://m2.youm7.com/story/2013/4/9//1013081.

[420] Mahmoud Rantisi. Al-Siyasa al-kharijiyya al-Qatariyya tijah al-rabeei al-Arabi wa al-qadiyya al-Filisteeniyya, *The Qatari Foreign Policy Towards the Arab Spring Countries And The Palestinian Issue*, Master's thesis, Al-Aqsa University, (2013) 92.

regional role [which emerged with the mediation parameter in the previous decade]. Therefore, Qatar saw itself obliged to react to the storm that hit the region in 2011,[421] most specifically, to focus more on Egypt, which has a very big cultural, religious and economic impact on the entire Arab world.[422]"

Egyptian thinker Fahmy Howeidi opined that discussing the Qatari influence during the Arab Spring should not drive us to say that the problem lies in the role that Qatar played. The essence of the problem, he said, was embedded in the vacuum in the Arab world's leadership, as a body that had long remained "headless." Howeidi added that many Arab analysts see the exceptional Qatari role as a problem because Doha pursued an independent foreign policy and took a political path different from the Saudi one. He believes that anti-Qatar discourse would decline if a kind of a political rapprochement occurred between Doha and Riyadh. "Qatar is not a superpower in the region as many try to depict the Qatari role, but it has attempted to fill the vacuum in the Arab region, an effort that it should not be blamed for. Our blame should be focused on those who have huge capabilities but have no action or strategy for the Arab world," he asserted, referring to Saudi Arabia.[423]

5.3. Qatari Reactions Towards the Coup and Al-Sisi's Rule

On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military led by Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi ousted Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically-elected president in the country's history. Morsi, members of his cabinet, and thousands of his supporters were thrown in jail for their rejection of the army's move. The military coup was seen as a rapid end to the nascent democratic experiment in the country, which was terminated only one year after Morsi was sworn in as the first post-revolution president.

Qatar strongly condemned a massacre carried out against Morsi's supporters, committed five days after the coup and which led to the death of 42 Egyptians. A statement by the Qatari Foreign Ministry called for a political solution to the crisis to preserve the gains accomplished by the revolution.[424] Another Qatari condemnation was released following the

[421] Rantisi. *The Qatari Foreign Policy Towards The Arab Spring,* 92-93.
[422] Rantisi. *The Qatari Foreign Policy Towards The Arab Spring,* 93.
[423] Rantisi. *The Qatari Foreign Policy Towards The Arab Spring,* 93.
[424] Idanat Arabiyya wa dawliyya li hadith al-aras al-gomhouri, "Arab and international condemnation to Republic Guards incident," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on May 10, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20140101073716/http://aljazeera.net/news/pages/ec0f8544-18c9-49db-9449-3d47cad4c94e.

Egyptian authorities' decision to disperse two pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo's Rabaa and Al-Nahda squares that left hundreds dead and many more injured. Dispersal of the two sit-ins happened while Qatar was trying to mediate between the Egyptian military and the MB at the request of Mohamed El-Baradei, who was then deputy prime minister, to help find a peaceful solution to the crisis.[425]

Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad, in an interview with CNN anchor Christine Amanpour, called the Egyptian military move a "complete coup d'état,"[426] which reflected the level of strained relations between the two sides.

The same four parameters will be analyzed here to continue our comparison between Qatari policies vis-à-vis Egypt during the post-revolution and post-coup eras -- namely, hosting anti-coup figures, Al-Jazeera's anti-coup coverage, economic ties, and diplomatic relations.

5.3.1. Hosting Anti-Coup Figures

Since the early weeks following the ouster of President Morsi through a military coup, Doha has hosted hundreds of Egyptian anti-coup figures, along with others who later became opponents of Al-Sisi's regime.[427] Although Egyptian opposition forces have been staying in Doha since 2013, they have yet to create a single umbrella gathering them all. The opposition forces staying in Qatar hail from Islamic, jihadist, liberal and socialist backgrounds, with some belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Asala Party, the Construction and Development Party, the Revolutionary Socialists, the Wasat Party, the "Youth against the Coup" grouping, and the Dhameer Front (a coalition of anti-coup forces).[428]

---

[425] "Al-Atiyya: solution to Egypt crisis getting more difficult," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on April 10, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/8/14/.
See: Al-Mujtamaa al-Dawli yudeen qami al-Sulutat al-Masriyya li itisam al-Ikhwan bil-Quwwa, "International community condemns dispersing MB's sit-in in Cairo," *Al-Arabiya*, accessed on March 10, 2020, https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/egypt/2013/08/14/.

[426] "His Highness Interview with Amanpour," *Official Emiri Court*, accessed on March 17, 2020, https://www.diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/news/media-participations/2014/september/26/cnn-interview.

[427] Personal Interview, Egyptian researcher Saifulislam Eid, (April 19, 2020), Zoom.

[428] Tafahumat bayn addawha wa muaridoun masriyyoun bishan iqamatahum fi addawha, "Understandings reached between Doha and Egyptian opponents regarding their residence in Qatar," *Al-Alam TV*, accessed on March 17, 2020, https://www.alalamtv.net/news/1584772/.
See: Muaridoun masriyyoun yastabidooun tarheelahum min Qatar, "Egyptian opposition figures rule out reports on their deportation from Qatar," *Al-Akhbar Daily*, accessed on March 17, 2020, https://al-akhbar.com/Arab/43627.

Prominent names include the MB's Mahmoud Hussein, Hamza Zouba, Amro Darrag and Issam Tellema. They also include Ihab Sheha, head of the Asala Party; Tarek al-Zumar, a former jihadist and head of the Construction and Development Party; Nivein Muluk, a leading figure in the Wasat Party; Mohamed Abbas of the Revolutionary Socialists; and Amro Abdelahdi, a spokesman for the Dhameer Front.[429]

In a CNN interview, Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad spoke about the presence of several MB leaders and Egyptian opposition figures in Qatar. He said:

> "After what happened in Egypt a year ago, many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood came to Qatar because they were threatened and afraid, and they are feeling safe and being welcomed here in Qatar as long as they do not practice any organized political activity. Many of them are still present here and some of them left the country because they believe that it is time to engage in a political action, and they are aware that the rules of their residence in Qatar prevent them from engaging in any political activity against any other Arab country."[430]

Despite these remarks, a quick look at the official accounts of Egyptian opposition figures living in Doha shows that they have continued to attack Egypt's putschist regime in essays, interviews and tweets, but that does not amount to organized political action.[431]

Mohammed bin Abdel-Rahman Al Thani, a deputy for the Qatari Foreign Ministry, confirmed the emir's statement by saying that Doha was embracing an "open-door" policy regarding the Egyptian opposition in general and the MB in particular.[432] Lolwa al-Khater, spokesperson for Qatar's Foreign Ministry, pointed out that Qatar doesn't classify the MB as a terrorist organization as do the EU, UK, Bahrain and Kuwait. She also said that Qatar was frequently criticized for hosting MB figures, while at the same time leaders of the organization were living peacefully in the UK but no one was raising the issue before the UK government.[433]

---

[429] "Egyptian opposition figures rule out reports on their deportation from Qatar."
[430] "His Highness Interview with Amanpour."
[431] "Selim Azouz's reaction to Sisi's remarks," *Twitter*, accessed on April 12, 2020, https://twitter.com/selimazouz1/status/1273287528263680000.
See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-z3NtN_UL_o,
See also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xn_hWphemvw.
[432] "Al-Jazeera Mubashir's interview with Al Thani," *Al-Jazeera Mubashir*, accessed on April 12, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-j-NL9qXV_Y.
[433] "Press conference for Lolwa al-Khater," *Al-Jazeera Mubashir*, accessed on April 12, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQV5zDeclDk.

5.3.1.1. Deportations Under Saudi Pressure

Qatar's welcoming of the Egyptian opposition didn't continue for long, given the unprecedented pressure the Gulf monarchy came under from its royal neighbors. The shift in Doha's policy came months after the first Gulf crisis erupted in March 2014, which culminated in the withdrawal of the Saudi, UAE and Bahraini ambassadors from Doha. The decision was due to what the three states described as "Qatar's interference in their internal affairs."[434]

A joint statement from the three countries said the surprising decision was intended "to maintain the principles that guarantee non-interference in the internal affairs of the GCC countries directly or indirectly, and not to support anyone who works to threaten the security and stability of the GCC countries, either organizations or individuals, through direct security actions, political influence, or supporting hostile media outlets." The latter referred to Al-Jazeera and its affiliate channels, Al-Jazeera Mubashir and Mubashir Masr. Qatar expressed regret over the decision by the three neighboring countries, but said it would not reciprocate.[435]

Months of mediation between Qatar and the three Gulf countries led to Qatar deciding, in September 2014, to deport seven of the MB's most prominent figures, only five of whose names were disclosed: Mahmoud Hussein, Hamza Zouba, Amro Darrag, Wajdi Ghoneim and Issam Tellema.[436]

However, many other opposition parties and second-tier MB leaders and activists stayed in Doha. Ihab Sheha, head of the anti-coup Al-Asala Party, commented on the news that Qatar was intending to deport more opposition figures in December of the same year: "Doha runs its foreign affairs in a professional manner; it had no dispute with Egypt. Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi is the one who instigated the dispute, because Qatar saw al-Sisi's ouster of Egypt's legitimate president, Mohamed Morsi, as a coup. I don't think Qatar will restrict our movement or ask us to leave." Answering a question about Qatar's having asked seven senior

[434] Al-Soudiyya wal-Imarat wal-Bahrain tashabu sufaraaha min Qatar, "Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain withdraw ambassadors from Qatar," BBC, accessed on March 20, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/03/140305_gulfstates_qatar_envoys.
[435] "Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain withdraw ambassadors from Qatar."
[436] "Egypt opposition figures in Qatar rule out deportation," *Anadolu Agency via Middle East Monitor*, accessed on March 20, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20141222-egypt-opposition-figures-in-qatar-rule-out-deportation/.

MB members to leave the country, Sheha said: "The move was not for the sake of al-Sisi, but for other reasons." He did not provide further details.[437] A source from the Doha-based Egyptian opposition was also quoted as saying that a meeting had been held between Qatari officials and a group of Egyptian opposition figures, at which it was decided that less prominent figures could stay in Doha provided they did not criticize the Gulf monarchies in speeches, interviews or writings.[438] Meanwhile, Amro Darrag, a prominent MB leader, issued a statement in which he said that they had voluntarily decided to leave Doha given the mounting pressure on the Gulf country by its monarchic neighbors.

> "We value the role of the State of Qatar in supporting the Egyptian people in their revolution against the military coup, and we understand very well the conditions the entire region is facing. In order to remove the embarrassment from the State of Qatar, in which we found nothing but appreciation and welcome, some figures of the Freedom and Justice Party[439] and the Muslim Brotherhood were asked to transfer their residence outside the state and we responded to that and decided to leave."[440]

Renowned Egyptian historian Mohamed Elhami argued that there were several reasons for Qatar's haste to back the Arab Spring in general and the Egyptian revolution in particular. He noted that although Qatar is a Gulf state of the emiri (i.e., monarchic) type -- without elections, opposition, a democratic regime, or a free press -- it had adopted a strategy of strongly supporting change in the Arab world.[441] Elhami believes that this can be attributed to Doha's keenness to assume an active role in the regional political sphere in spite of its small size and modest military capabilities. However, it has benefited from its wealth and media capabilities, which allowed it to assume a significant regional mediation role for decades by utilizing the twin powers of money and media (Al-Jazeera). This role was seen more than once in Sudan, Lebanon, Yemen and other countries. This policy required the country to have good ties and communication with opposition parties throughout the region, while its media platform disturbed Arab regimes. This may clarify why Qatar welcomed the Egyptian opposition after the 2013 military coup.[442]

---

[437] "Egypt opposition figures in Qatar rule out deportation

[438] "Understandings reached between Doha and Egyptian opponents regarding their stay in Qatar."

[439] Political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The party was established few months after the ouster of Mubarak's regime with a view to engaging in politics via having a new name. The party was dissolved and outlawed in a military court's ruling after the 2013 coup.

[440] Qatar tatlob min qiyadat al-Ikhwan al-mughadara khilal osbou, "Qatar asks MB leaders to leave within a week," *DW*, accessed on March 17, 2020, https://www.dw.com/ar /a-17919602-0.

[441] Personal Interview, Egyptian historian Mohammed Elhami, (2020, April 14), Zoom.

[442] Personal Interview, Egyptian historian Mohammed Elhami.

Another dynamic, he added, can contribute to understanding the Qatari monarchy's willingness to host pro-change movements, especially Islamists. Elhami believes, like many others, that Qatar was entrusted by Western powers, mainly the US, to deal with Islamic parties. Therefore, Doha forged very good relations with Hamas, the Taliban, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah. It has hosted leaders of Hamas, provided a temporary office for the Taliban, and provided a free residence for the MB. Through this support, Qatar appears to be a loyal and honest supporter of these movements, which allows it to gain their confidence and ultimately contain their activities and doctrines.[443] "If we add to this the Qatari tensions with the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt since the failed coup attempt plotted in 1996, we will understand that this state policy sees communication with Islamists, pro-change figures and regime opponents as an effective way to consolidate its power and allies,"[444] Elhami said.

Here we see that Qatar welcomed dozens of Egyptian opposition figures on its territory after the 2013 coup, and allowed them to criticize Al-Sisi and write anti-regime essays. With regard to the decision to deport some MB leaders, this was a bid to satisfy Saudi rulers who were leading rapprochement efforts between Qatar and Egypt. However, other opposition figures were allowed to stay, and they continued to engage in personal opposition activities rather than "organized opposition" per se.

5.3.2. Al-Jazeera Coverage of the Coup

Since the early moments of the Egyptian military coup against elected President Morsi, Al-Jazeera termed the move a "military coup." For this, the channel faced a severe crisis with the Egyptian putschist authorities. The situation deteriorated after the latter raided and shut the channel's offices in Cairo, which was followed by the jailing of its reporters and cameramen on charges of "belonging to a terrorist group."[445] However, the channel continued its "intensified" coverage of events, including live broadcasts of anti-coup protests and sit-ins held throughout the country.[446]

[443] Personal Interview, Egyptian historian Mohammed Elhami.
[444] Personal Interview, Egyptian historian Mohammed Elhami,.
[445] Al-Jazeera fi Muwagahat al-Sisi, al-Taghtiya mustamirra, "Al-Jazeera vs. Sisi: Coverage is ongoing," *Annahar Daily*, accessed on March 25, 2020, https://www.annahar.com/article/129094.
[446] "Al-Jazeera vs. Sisi: Coverage is ongoing,"

Al-Jazeera also broadcast reports portraying Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as an army general who was launching a new dictatorial project in Egypt. It also criticized -- through news reports and commentators -- Al-Sisi's moves against journalists and public freedoms, with a focus on arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, the shutting of charity associations and political parties, and the confiscation of media equipment.[447]

Al-Jazeera also closely covered the violent dispersal of the Rabaa and Al-Nahda sit-ins, which led to the death of hundreds of protestors and the injury of thousands of others. Al-Jazeera also held live interviews from the peaceful sit-ins to refute the narrative of official Egyptian media outlets that were claiming the sit-ins harbored pro-Morsi "militants." Al-Jazeera was harshly criticized by the Egyptian regime, which accused it of deliberately ignoring the presence of militants to mislead the public.[448]

Hatem Azzam, leader of the opposition Al-Wasat Party, said that Al-Jazeera, by covering events in Egypt -- both before and after the coup -- had played a "resistance role." He said: "Al-Jazeera was able to play the role of resistance and defend Arabs issues, because the media is the air force in this battle. Since our battle is primarily a battle for awareness, Al-Jazeera has been able to serve the [pro-change] resistance project…, and this is extremely vital and no less important than what the Palestinian resistance is doing in the face of the Israeli occupier."[449]

5.3.2.1. Crackdown on Al-Jazeera

A crackdown on Al-Jazeera offices and reporters coincided with measures taken by the military junta against the elected president. On the days following the coup, paid thugs distributed leaflets in the streets of Cairo inciting citizens against the channel. One such leaflet read: "A bullet may kill a human being, but a false camera kills a nation." Anti-Al-

[447]"Al-Jazeera vs. Sisi: Coverage is ongoing,"
See also https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bZKbOJo-TQ,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMJ6Bx1udso,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-4Ngsju1PI.
[448] Al-Jazeera wa Rassd taqoudan al-Hamla didda thawrat youniyu,"Al-Jazeera and Rassd lead anti-Egypt campaigns," *Al-Bawaba Daily*, accessed on March 25, 2020, https://www.albawabhnews.com/176619/
[449] Azzam: al-Sisi yunaffizu Ajenda Imaratiyya fi Masr, "Azzam: Sisi carries out Abu Dhabi's Agenda in Egypt." *Al-Sharq Daily*, accessed on March 25, 2020, https://al-sharq.com/article/23/11/2017/,.

Jazeera posters filled Cairo's streets, squares and metro stations, with images portraying a blood-stained hand with Al-Jazeera's logo on it.[450]

The campaign accelerated after the channel's Cairo headquarters were stormed twice in one week, and the channel's director in Egypt, Abdel Fattah Fayed, was investigated for working for the "hostile" channel before being released on bail. Fayed, along with his crew, were expelled from a press conference held by spokespeople for the Egyptian Armed Forces and the Interior Ministry.[451] A number of the channel's Egyptian employees also resigned from their positions, citing the channel's "non-professional" coverage of Egyptian affairs.[452] One Qatari official told France 24 that they had been forced to resign by the Egyptian authorities with a view to "embarrassing" the channel.[453]

The crackdown intensified when Egyptian authorities jailed Al-Jazeera reporter Abdullah al-Shami in mid-2013, prompting the latter to go on a hunger strike that lasted 130 days, forcing the authorities to release him.[454] An Egyptian court also slapped two Al-Jazeera journalists with the death penalty -- a ruling condemned by the US and international advocacy groups. The two Al-Jazeera employees were identified by the judge as news producer Alaa Omar Mohammed Sablan and news editor Ibrahim Mohammed Helal, both of whom were sentenced to death in absentia. The advocacy group Amnesty International called for revoking the death sentences and for the "ludicrous charges against the journalists to be dropped."[455]

At the time, US State Department spokesperson Elizabeth Trudeau said in a press briefing: "We understand an Egyptian court is seeking the death penalty for two journalists affiliated with Al-Jazeera. Apparently, they were tried in absentia, which we understand automatically leads to the maximum allowable sentencing per Egyptian law…, the State Department is concerned about the deterioration in respect to freedom of expression and

[450] Masr al-Sisi fi muwajaha maa al-Jazeera, "Sisi's Egypt in confrontation with Al-Jazeera," *Masr Al-Arabiyya daily*, accessed on March 25, 2020, https://masralarabia.net/53847.
[451] "Sisi's Egypt in confrontation with Al-Jazeera,"
[452] "Sisi's Egypt in confrontation with Al-Jazeera,"
[453] Fatma Nabil wa Akharin yastaqilun min al_Jazeera, "Fatma Nabil, others resign from Al-Jazeera," *France 24 via Elaph daily*, accessed on March 25, 2020, https://elaph.com/Web/Entertainment/2013/7/822795.html.
[454] Itlaq sarah murasil al-Jazeera Abdullah al-Shami, "Al-Jazeera's journalist Abdullh al-Shami got released," *BBC*, accessed on March 25, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/06/140617_egypt_aljazeera_release.
[455] "Al-Jazeera employees among six sentenced to death in Egypt," *The Guardian*, accessed on May 17, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jun/18/al-jazeera-employees-among-six-people-sentenced-to-death-in-egypt.

association in Egypt and will continue to have very frank conversations with the Egyptians on this."[456]

Notably, Al-Jazeera correspondent Mahmoud Hussein[457] has been languishing in an Egyptian jail since June 2016 and has yet to be released, prompting Al-Jazeera to launch several regional and international solidarity campaigns on his behalf.

5.3.2.2. Pressure to Modify Policy

The diplomatic crisis of 2014 ratcheted up pressure on Qatar, mostly by Saudi Arabia, to ease its media coverage against the military coup in Egypt, to which the news channel decided to partially comply. This culminated in a degree of reconciliation in November of the same year. This was followed shortly afterward by the return to Doha of ambassadors from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain.[458] The settlement included a commitment by Al-Jazeera to soften its anti-coup coverage, which was seen in the following developments:

Firstly, Al-Jazeera decided on December 22, 2014 to shut its Al-Jazeera Mubasher Masr channel, which had been dedicated to covering Egypt-related news. The Egypt-focused channel had been established one month after the revolution and had enjoyed wide viewership.[459]

Muhammad Shoman, an Egyptian media expert and professor, said: "The channel's closure constituted a big loss for a media platform such as Al-Jazeera Mubasher Masr, a loss that cannot be easily compensated because of its high professionalism in reporting on Egyptian events, despite its coverage in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood."[460]

Secondly, there was a change in the editorial policy of Al-Jazeera's main channel in accordance with Qatar's deal with its Gulf neighbors. For example, it began to use the term

[456] "State Dept "Concerned" By Death Sentence for Al-Jazeera Journalists," *POMED*, accessed on March 25, 2020, https://pomed.org/egypt-daily-update-report-documents-massive-abuse-of-pretrial-detention/.
[457] Last update: (Oct. 27, 2020).
[458] Al-Musalaha al-Khaleejiya tutawweju aman min al-khilafat, "Gulf reconciliation culminates a year of odds," *Al-Khallej Online*, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://alkhaleejonline.net /2014.
[459] Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr: tuarrikhu li al-Thwra al-Masriyya, "Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr, chronicling Egyptian revolution," *Sasapost*, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://www.sasapost.com/aljazeera-mubasher-misr-from-begnning-to-ending/.
[460] "Closure of Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr big blow to MB," *Al-Monitor*, Accessed on April 1, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2015/01/al-jazeera-egypt-suspension.html.

"president" to describe Al-Sisi instead of "putschist leader."[461] Sources from inside the channel told news agencies at the time: "There was discontent among the workers regarding the new policy. Al-Jazeera anchor Mohammed Maher Aql refused to abide by the new editorial policy regarding Egypt and didn't use the word 'president' to identify Al-Sisi."[462]

Thirdly, Al-Jazeera refrained from covering certain anti-Sisi protests, which surprised the Egyptian opposition and Arab viewers in general. For example, large protests erupted against Al-Sisi's decision to concede two Egyptian islands -- Tiran and Sanafir -- to Saudi Arabia. But Al-Jazeera refrained from covering these protests, which were held in April 2016.[463] The reason for Al-Jazeera's failure to cover anti-Sisi protests was Qatar's fear that anti-Egypt coverage would strain its ties with Riyadh, with which it enjoyed better relations under King Salman. The latter had paid an official visit to Doha, which had helped alleviate tension between Egypt and Qatar.[464]

However, Al-Jazeera returned to its negative coverage of the Al-Sisi regime following the second Gulf crisis that erupted in the summer of 2017 when a Saudi-led bloc of Arab states (Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain) imposed an embargo on Doha for harboring MB leaders; for having good ties with Iran and Hamas; and, perhaps most importantly, for Al-Jazeera's coverage.[465]

Here we can see that, due to the 2014 Gulf crisis and Saudi pressure, Qatar's relations with Egypt softened, which was reflected by Al-Jazeera's coverage. However, the situation did not dramatically change, as many of the channel's programs that had been shut were simply transferred to an Al-Jazeera affiliate channel -- Al-Jazeera Mubashir -- which continued to slam Al-Sisi and his regime.

---

[461] Al-Jazeera tastakhdimu mustalah raees liwasf al-Sisi, "Al-Jazeera uses term 'President' to identify Sisi," *Moroccan News Hespress*, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://www.hespress.com/international/249960.html.
See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XjcEJ_xhEdg.

[462] Al-Jazeera uses term 'presidnet' to identify Sisi."

[463] Wasail Ilam tajahalat taghtiyat muzaharat al-Ard, "Media outlets ignored to cover land protests," *Annahar Daily*, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://alnnhar.com/Show_news5068.html.

[464] Ma sir tajahul al-Jazeera litaghtiyat muzaharat al-Ard, "Secret of Al-Jazeera's ignorance to cover land protests," *Almal News Daily*, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://almalnews.com/,.

[465] Mohamed Ali: nukhattaitu lihukumat kafa'at lidaratel al-balad baada al-Sisi, "Mohamed Ali: We prepare for experts' government to lead country after Sisi," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on April 7, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UzL68Q0nR6M, ().
See: "How Sisi's image is seen by Egyptians," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on April 7, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E9JxRdlCIcE.

5.3.3. Economic Relations After the Coup

Unlike Qatar, which was the main supporter for post-revolution governments, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the main supporters of the Egyptian regime after the military coup, with billions of dollars pledged by both countries to help Egypt on the financial level. According to reports and leaks from the Egyptian military, some $40 billion was delivered to Egypt by the two Gulf countries in the period between 2013 and 2014, which to a large extent replaced Qatari financial support for Egypt after the revolution.[466]

At the same time, Qatari financial support was cut in the post-coup era, although official data shows that the political crisis between the two countries did not negatively affect their economic ties. In fact, total trade volume between the two countries grew in the one year after the coup, doubling in 2015, 2016 and 2017 before falling again in 2018 due to the second Gulf crisis, in which Egypt played a role. Qatari foreign direct investment, however, saw a notable decrease in the years immediately after the coup, falling from $375 million in 2013 to only $109 million in 2014.

Table 5.1. Qatar-Egypt bilateral trade (2012-2019)[467]

Values in million QR

Details	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012
1. Total Exports(f.o.b.)	40	1,524	4,394	4,054	2,570	246	164	691
1.1 Exports of domestic goods	29	1,495	4,360	3,961	2,083	127	132	669
1.2 Re-Exports	11	29	34	93	487	119	32	22
2. Imports(c.i.f.)	1	93	1,170	1,187	1,313	1,178	853	1,019
3. Trade Balance	39	1,431	3,224	2,867	1,257	-932	-689	-328
4. Trade Volume	41	1,617	5,564	5,241	3,883	1,424	1,017	1,710

[466] Maseer majhoul lil miliyarat al-Khaleejiyya al-mamnouha lil Sisi, "Unknown end for Gulf billions delivered to Sisi," *Al-Araby Al-Jadeed*, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2015/2/14/.

[467] Qatar's official Planning and Statistics Authority website, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics1/ft/pages/tradebalance.aspx.




Figure 5.1. Qatari direct investment in Egypt (2007-2017)[468]

5.3.3.1. Refunding Qatari Loans

By the end of 2014, Egypt had returned a $2-billion deposit it had received from Qatar, given to Egypt during the Morsi era. This was seen as an indicator of deteriorating economic ties between the two countries. Hisham Ramez, head of Cairo's central bank, said the $2 billion was out of a total of $6 billion that his country had returned to Doha in the aftermath of the coup.[469] Ramez also noted that Kuwait intended to deposit $2 billion into the Egyptian Central Bank for a five-year period. He stressed that the financial position of the Egyptian banking sector was very strong, and had enough cash to finance projects needed for Egypt's economic growth.[470] Dr. Noha Bakr, a professor of political science at the American University in Cairo, said there was a political decision and a "popular desire" to return the Qatari deposit, adding that Egypt should not accept deposits and funds from a country "attacking and threatening" Egyptian interests.[471]

Refunding the Qatari deposits in such a way shows how much bilateral economic ties had deteriorated. Bakr's remarks also show how Qatar was perceived by some quarters as an "enemy." This is not to mention reactions by other parties, such as the Saudi-linked Al-

[468] Qatar's official Ministry of Planning Website, via CEIC center, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/egypt/foreign-direct-investment-by-country-annual/foreign-direct-investment-inflow-arab-countries-qatar.
[469] Masr tueed 2 miliyr dollar li Qatar, "Egypt returns two billion to Qatar," *Sky News Arabia*, accessed on April 7, 2020, https://www.skynewsarabia.com/business/700430.
[470] Masr tueed 2 milira dolar li Qatar, "Egypt returns two billion to Qatar," *Al-Arabiya*, accessed on April 7, 2020, https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/economy/2013/09/19/.
[471] Khabir: qarar siyasi wa shabi liiadit al-amwal al-Qatariyya, "Expert: Political, public decision to refund Qatari loans," *Youm-7 Daily*, accessed on April 7, 2020, https://www.youm7.com/story/2014/10/15/1906399.

Nour Party, which hailed the decision to refund the Qatari deposit, saying "no one can influence Egypt."[472]

5.3.3.2. Calls to Boycott Qatari Investment Projects

Coinciding with the Gulf crisis that erupted in the summer of 2017, many Egyptian businessmen and lawyers were calling for boycotting and confiscating Qatari investments in the country. Egyptian tycoon Naguib Sawiris, for example, known for being close to Al-Sisi's regime, called on Arab businessmen "to boycott Qatar."[473]

Egyptian Public Prosecutor Nabil Sadek also received a complaint by an Egyptian legal center calling for the seizure of Qatari funds in Egypt, while many pro-Sisi lawyers petitioned to seize (nationalize) Qatari investments and funds on the pretext that Doha was involved in "funding terrorism."[474] Another request was also made to shut the Qatari-Egyptian Business Council established during Morsi's era to promote bilateral ties and encourage Qatari investment in the country.[475]

These calls were seen as a zero-sum game in which everyone lost, and the 2017 Gulf crisis, in which Egypt played a role, was a diplomatic one. But it took an economic turn when sanctions were imposed on Qatar by its Gulf neighbors. There were also warnings that such moves would have no major impact on Qatar, where 350,000 Egyptians were working in 2017, and Egypt would pay the price if Doha decided to deport them all.[476]

These calls seemed to be made by businessmen with close ties to the Egyptian regime and its military establishment. The calls for confiscating Qatari funds and nationalizing investment projects not only showed declining economic ties, but also displayed the fierce attack on Qatar that aimed at punishing the Gulf monarchy for its pro-Arab Spring positions.

---

[472] Hizb al-Nour yurahhib biiadat al-minah al-Qatariyya, "Al-Nour party hails decision to refund Qatari loans, *Youm-7 Daily*, accessed on April 7, 2020, https://www.youm7.com/story/2014/11/12//1948318.

[473] Maseer al-Alaqat al-Qatariyya al-Masriyya faad qati al-alaqat, "The fate of Egypt-Qatar relations after cutting ties," *DW*, accessed on April 9, 2020, https://www.dw.com/ar/a-39162694.

[474] Khubara qanoun, Masr la tastatee' musadarat al-Istithmarat al-Qatariyya, "Legal Experts: Egypt cannot confiscate Qatari investments," *Al-Khaleeg al-Jadid*, accessed on April 9, 2020, https://thenewkhalij.news/article/80127.

[475] Balagh qanouni lighlaq al-majless al-iqtisadi al-Masri al-Qatari, "Legal complaint to shut off Qatari-Egyptian Business Council, Youm-7 Daily, accessed on April 9, 2020, https://www.youm7.com/story/2013/4/11//1015116.

[476] "The fate of Egypt-Qatar relations after cutting ties."

5.3.4. Diplomatic Relations After the Coup

Despite the fact that Qatar was outraged by the Egyptian military move orchestrated against the country's first ever elected president, a statement from the Qatari Foreign Ministry was released on the second day after the coup that asserted that Qatar "respects the Egyptian people's will."[477] However, Qatar slammed the Egyptian authorities' move to disperse the pro-Morsi sit-ins in Rabaa and Al-Nahda, which left hundreds of people dead and injured. Dispersal of the sit-ins came amid a Qatari endeavor to lead mediation efforts between the Egyptian military and the MB upon a request by Mohamed El-Baradei, then deputy prime minister, in hopes of finding a peaceful exit to the crisis.[478]

Bilateral ties worsened further after an Egyptian court on December 25, 2013 classified the MB as a "terrorist group."[479] The Qatari Foreign Ministry said in a statement released on January 4, 2014, almost a week after the court's ruling, that the Egyptian court's decision to list the MB as a "terrorist group" was a prelude to "shooting peaceful demonstrators."[480] Which highly angered the Egyptian Foreign Ministry prompting that latter to summon the Qatari ambassador to Cairo to inform him of Cairo's rejection of a statement by the Qatari Foreign Ministry regarding the political situation in Egypt and on the MB in particular. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry saw the Qatari statement as "interference" in the country's affairs, stressing that Cairo "does not accept such kinds of interference."[481]

Following this, a lawsuit was opened by pro-Sisi lawyers against the Qatari ambassador urging his expulsion from Egypt. This was rejected due to the court's "lack of jurisdiction."[482] Days later, Qatari Ambassador to Egypt Saif bin Mugaddam al-Bounain left his residence for Doha.[483]

---

[477] Qatar: nahtarim khayarat al-Shaab al-Masry, "Qatar: We respect Egyptian people's choices," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on April 10, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/7/4/,.
[478] Al-Atiyaa: al-Hal lil azma al-Masriyya yazdadu Sououba, "Al-Atiyya: solution to Egypt crisis getting more difficult," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on April 10, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/8/14/.
Also: "International community condemns dispersing MB's sit-in in Cairo."
[479] Al-Hukouma al-Misriyya tusannifu al-Ikhwan jamaa irhabiyya, "Egyptian gov't classifies MB as terror group," *France 24*, accessed on June 15, 2020, https://www.france24.com/ar/20131225.
[480] Qatar tudeenu qarar mahkama masriyya biwadaa al-Ikhwan ala qawaimu al-irhab, "Qatar slams Egyptian court's decision to enlist MB on Terror List," *BBC*, accessed on June, 12, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/01/140104_qatar_egypt.
[481] Al-Azma al-siyasiyya bayna Addawha wa al-Qahira tatasa'ad, "Political Crisis between Doha-Cairo Escalates," *Rai Al-Youm Daily*, accessed on April 10, 2020, https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/.
[482] "Political Crisis between Doha-Cairo Escalates."
[483] "Political Crisis between Doha-Cairo Escalates."

In February of the same year, the Qatari chargé d'affaires was summoned by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry after Qatar had hosted Egyptian opposition figures. He was told that Qatar should cooperate with Interpol to extradite individuals "wanted" by Cairo. He was further told that the Qatari authorities should stop intervening in Egyptian affairs, and put an end to what the ministry called "Qatari abuses against Egypt." Egyptian outrage followed an earlier statement issued by Qatar-based Egyptian scholar Youssef Al-Qaradawi in which he fiercely criticized the situation in Egypt and the crackdown on pro-Morsi activists.[484]

Meanwhile, Qatar-Egypt diplomatic relations, which were largely strained in the second half of 2013 and 2014, saw slight advances in the two years that followed thanks to the Gulf reconciliation that happened in late 2014. The situation, however, worsened again following the Gulf crisis of 2017.

5.3.4.1. Saudi Efforts, Improved Ties

Many developments affecting Qatar-Egypt bilateral ties took place after the second half of 2014 showing Qatar's keenness to normalize ties with Egypt, which, eventually, would satisfy Saudi Arabia and improve Doha's relations with neighboring Gulf monarchies -- until the crisis that erupted after the withdrawal of the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini ambassadors from Doha. This was seen first in a congratulatory letter Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim sent to Egyptian President Al-Sisi on the occasion of the latter's inauguration as president. Qatari Ambassador Saif bin Mugaddam al-Bounain also arrived in Cairo -- after a five-month absence -- to attend Al-Sisi's inauguration ceremony.[485]

Another major diplomatic breakthrough was achieved via a Saudi-brokered visit by a Qatari envoy to Egypt. Al-Sisi met with Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani, Qatar's deputy foreign minister, in a meeting also attended by Khalid bin Abdul Aziz Al-Tuwaijri, a special envoy of Saudi King Abdullah. In a statement, the Egyptian presidency said that Egypt was "looking forward to a new era to end past differences." Shortly after the meeting, the Qatari Royal Court issued a statement affirming Doha's keenness to restore

[484] Al-Kharijia al-Masriyya tastadei alqayimain bial'amal al-Qatarii wa al-Bousnii, "Egyptian Foreign Ministry summons Qatari, Bosnian Chargé d'Affaires," *CNN Arabic*, accessed on April 10, 2020, https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/02/04/egypt-qatar-bosnia.
[485] Al-Amir al-Qatari yuhanni al-Sisi, al-Safeer yaoud li al-Qahira, "Qatari Emir congratulates Sisi, ambassador returns to Cairo," *Official Qatari News Agency, via CNN Arabic*, Accessed on Abril 11, 2020, https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/06/08/qatar-ambassador-return-egypt.

relations with Egypt, reiterating its compliance with the Saudi initiative to end its dispute with Cairo.[486] Hours after the meeting, the Saudi Royal Court announced that Qatar and Egypt had "positively" responded to the initiative, which was aimed at achieving "reconciliation" between the two countries.[487]

One can understand the Egyptian regime's position as reflecting a desire for positive Qatari policies to mitigate Al-Jazeera's anti-Sisi coverage, as the news channel was ratcheting up popular pressure on Egypt's new president at a very sensitive time. Many observers ruled out the possibility of seeing "strong ties" between the two sides "at least in the short term, due to the complexities of the regional situation and the conflict of interests of the two regimes, given the internal Egyptian situation, differences on regional developments of the Arab Spring, and divergent positions on the Palestinian Hamas group."[488]

In another development affecting mutual relations, the emir of Qatar visited Egypt in March 2015 to take part in the 26th Arab League Summit, with al-Sisi personally receiving him at the Sharm al-Sheikh airport. News circulated that Saudi Arabia wanted to take advantage of the emir's presence in Cairo to hold a tripartite meeting with Saudi Arabia aimed at alleviating tensions between the two countries.[489]

We can see how the Saudi regime was keen to have Qatar-Egypt relations normalized by examining two factors: Al-Jazeera and the harboring of MB leaders by Doha. Qatar was also keen not to antagonize its Gulf neighbors and agreed to soften Al-Jazeera's coverage of Al-Sisi, which was seen in the channel's subsequent editorial policies. What's more, the Arab Spring and the rise of the Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya discomfited the Gulf kingdoms, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which saw the MB as a strategic threat and linked improved ties with Qatar to the latter's distancing itself from the MB and its leaders.

---

[486] Ijtimaa Qatari Masri fi al-Qahira lilrad ala al-Mubadara al-Soudiyya, "Qatari-Egyptian meeting in Cairo to respond to Saudi initiative," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Abril 11, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2014/12/20/.

[487] Musalaha Qatariyya Masriyya biriaayat al-Soudiyya, "Saudi-sponsored reconciliation between Qatar, Egypt" *Rai Al-Youm*, accessed on Abril 11, 2020, https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/.

[488] Hal hana al-waqt al-munasib lilmusalaha bayna Masr wa Qatar, "Is it exact time for reconciliation between Qatar, Egypt," *France 24*, accessed on Abril 11, 2020, https://www.france24.com/ar/20141211.

[489] Al-Sisi yastaqbilu Amir Qatar fi Matar Sahrm al-Shiekh, "Al-Sisi receives Qatari emir in Sharm El-Sheikh airport," *Al-Masry Al-Youm Daily*, accessed on Abril 12, 2020, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/691119.

Deporting only seven MB leaders while keeping dozens of others shows how Doha tried to strike a balance between Saudi pressure and its own interests.

5.3.4.2. Gulf Crisis, Worsened Ties

On June 5, 2017, a Saudi-led bloc of states including Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain unilaterally cut ties with Qatar and imposed an embargo on the Gulf state. Egypt was at the heart of this crisis, with the Saud-led bloc accusing Qatar of helping the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and calling on Doha to deport the Egyptian opposition figures it had been hosting since the 2013 coup.[490] A day after ties with Doha were cut, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry summoned Qatari Ambassador Saif bin Mugaddam al-Bounin to inform him that he was persona non grata, asking him to leave the country immediately, which he did the following day.[491]

Egypt's role in the crisis was questioned by many commentators. Former Egyptian MP Mona Makram Obeid asked whether Egyptian policy on the issue had been "active" (i.e., carried out in line with the country's national interests) or "passive" (i.e., subject to Saudi/UAE pressure). Obeid called on Egyptian policymakers to follow their "own and clear agenda and to adopt a strategy that serves Egyptian interests, not Saudi/UAE interests."[492]

The Gulf crisis showed how post-coup Egypt became dependent on the Saudi/UAE axis, reflecting Egypt's dwindling regional importance and weight.[493]

> "The Egyptian regime is currently an inherent subordinate to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and, therefore, if Gulf reconciliation takes place, Egypt will be part of it as any decision on this direction comes from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, not Cairo anymore. Egypt's impact on the Gulf crisis is limited, and, in fact, Cairo has nothing to do with it, but it was this dependent foreign policy that made Egypt a passive part of the crisis."[494]

[490] Qatar's Government Official Communication Office, accessed on Abril 15, 2020, https://www.gco.gov.qa/ar/focus/gcc-crisis/.
[491] Al-Safeer al-Qatari yughadiru Addawha, "Qatari envoy leaves Cairo," *Masrawy Daily*, accessed on April 15, 2020, https://www.masrawy.com/news/news_egypt/details/2017/6/7/1101043/.
[492] Al-Mawqef al-Masry min al-Azma al-Khaleejiyya: Qaed am tabi, "Egyptian position in Gulf Crisis: leading or dependent," *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, accessed on Abril 15, 2020, https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1154661.
[493] Wast Anbaa an musalaha Khaleejiyya: ayna Masr?, Mohamed Maghawri. "Amid reports on Gulf reconciliation, where is Egypt," *Arabi-21*, Nov. 19, 2019.
[494] Maghawri. "Amid reports on Gulf reconciliation."

Here we can see how the Saudi factor has played a crucial role in Egypt-Qatar relations since the coup, with Riyadh exerting pressure on Doha to normalize ties with Cairo in the 2014 Gulf crisis before asking the latter to cut ties with Doha in the 2017 Gulf crisis. This Saudi role illustrates one of our main conclusions -- to be explained in more detail in the following chapter -- that a main reason for Qatari exceptionalism in Gulf foreign policy is its attempt to offset Saudi political weight (in the Arab region in general and in the GCC in particular) by adopting independent foreign policies that serve Qatari national interests. This began with the rise of the father, Hamad bin Khalifa, and was consolidated after the failed coup attempt in 1996, orchestrated by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, one year after Emir Hamad assumed power.

Conclusion

We can now say that Qatar was the Arab country that had the most influence on Egyptian domestic affairs in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 revolution. It managed to utilize its twin capabilities -- money and media -- to impact Egypt's political scene in particular and that of the Arab world in general. Qatari financial and diplomatic support for post-revolution Egypt was granted to governments led first by the military and then by the MB, proving that Qatar did not only back Islamist-led governments.

The vacuum left in the Arab region due to Egypt's preoccupation with its own post-revolution affairs paved the way for Qatar to assume a greater influence on the country's politics. This was also due to the close ties the Gulf monarchy had forged with the MB and other Egyptian pro-change groups and youth activists.

The nonexistence of a post-revolution Saudi role also mattered, as Riyadh had embraced anti-revolution strategies in the region before the 2013 coup. But Al-Sisi's coup enabled the kingdom to restore its regional influence at the expense of Qatar. It dealt a major blow to Qatari aspirations vis-à-vis post-revolution Egypt, and had negative repercussions on Qatari influence in the war-torn countries of Libya, Syria and Yemen.

The restoration of the Saudi role was clearly seen in the pressure Riyadh exerted on Doha to normalize ties with the Al-Sisi regime and to soften Al-Jazeera's coverage of Al-Sisi and his coup. This culminated in the shutting down of one of Al-Jazeera's main channels that had been dedicated to covering events in Egypt.

This confirms, once again, that the Saudi variable was a main parameter affecting the two countries' bilateral relations in the period from the 2011 revolution to the 2017 Gulf crisis.

CHAPTER 6

QATAR'S PRO-REVOLUTION STANCE: DEMYSTIFYING MOTIVES AND GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS

There are many reasons explaining Qatar's supportive positions vis-à-vis the Arab Spring, especially if we know that such positions came following almost a decade and a half of proactive foreign policymaking by Doha. The country's mediation efforts bore fruit in Darfur in 2011; in Palestine (between Fatah and Hamas) in 2012; in Lebanon (to resolve a presidential crisis) in 2008; in Libya (to assist in the case of the Bulgarian nurses) in 2008; and in the Horn of Africa (between Djibouti and Eritrea) in 2011.[495]

As mentioned in previous chapters, Qatari exceptionalism was seen in Al-Jazeera's pro-revolution coverage, which worked for years to expose Arab regimes' corruption and nepotism while describing these regimes as "tyrannical and dictatorial."[496] According to many experts and observers,[497] Al-Jazeera contributed to creating a pro-change consciousness among the Arab elite, which eventually began embracing notions of resisting the status quo. Meanwhile, Qatar's harboring of pro-change and opposition figures from different parts of the Arab and Islamic world, mainly from Egypt, helped the small country forge close ties with many Islamist and pro-change movements, not least of which was the Muslim Brotherhood. This enabled Doha to embrace these movements after the fall of autocratic regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. Qatar was also the main supporter, on both the financial and military levels, of the governments formed in the wake of the 2011

[495] Taarraf ala 14 najah lilwasatat al-Qatariyya, "14 successes in history of Qatari mediation," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on June 12, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2020/2/29/A9.

[496] Hal itadat al-Sho'oub al-Arabiyya ala al-Qama, "Do Arab peoples get used to oppression," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on June, 13, 2020 "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KjEGygFrMEA, published a month before the eruption of Arab revolutions.
See: Ajhizatu al-Amn al-Arabiyya, "Arab Security Apparatus," *Al-Jazeera*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJeyuK5RPlg, published on Dec. 22, 2010. This episode displays to which degree the security apparatus, across the Arab world, are oppressing and dehumanizing its peoples by depriving them from their basic rights.

[497] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
See: Abdullah, *The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change in the Arab World*.
See: Abu Rayash. "Al-Jazeera and the Making of Arab Awareness."

revolutions, with Doha spending billions of dollars[498] to help revolutionary groups topple the Libyan and Syrian[499] regimes.

What's more, it was a primary supporter on the diplomatic level, with Qatar lobbying international (the UN Security Council) and regional (the Arab League and the GCC) organizations to intervene in conflicts that erupted in Libya, Yemen and Syria.

Qatari leaders also paid official visits to post-revolution governments in Tunisia and Egypt, with the Qatari emirs (Hamad and Tamim) were first of Arab leaders making official visits to these countries in a bid to win recognition for newly-elected leaders with whom Doha showed solidarity.

Many dynamics and driving policies have been examined in our discussions of the Qatari role in the Arab Spring. This chapter will analyze these further to help us better understand -- and answer -- the puzzle we have faced in this dissertation: Why did Qatar adopt an "exceptional" policy, different from the other Gulf monarchies, and support the revolutions of the 2011 Arab Spring?

This chapter aims to uncover the factors behind this Qatari exceptionalism, and thereby provide explanations for these factors, which can be divided into three categories: Main driving factors, cultural dynamics and intervening factors.

6.1. Main Driving Factors: A thirst for Power

A thirst for more power and influence in the Middle East was the main driving factor that prompted the monarchic state of Qatar to adopt exceptional policies during the Arab revolutions. An eagerness for more political weight was an inevitable outcome of the rise of Qatar's ambitious political elite since the mid-1990s. This was clear in the policies

[498] Libya's former Justice Minister and the first chief of Libyan Transitional Council Mustafa Abdel-Jalil had estimated the Qatari support for his country's revolution by $2 billions.
See: Abdul-Jaleel yatahaddathu an al-dawr al-Qatari fi al-Thwra al-Libiyya, "Abdul-Jaleel Speaks on Qatari Role in Libyan Revolution," *Al-Ayyam Daily*, accessed on Sept. 21, 2019, https://www.alayam.com/online/international/175819/.

[499] Regarding Syria, Qatar had initially financed the revolution with at least $3 billion in aid and military support during only the first two years of the upraising. According to an investigation published by the Financial Times, Qatar had been supporting the rebels in Syria with a view to enable them toppling the regime there. The investigation, which was done upon interviews with dozens of Syrian army's officers and activists, included that Doha had been giving some $50,000 for each army officer who decided to defect from the Syrian regime.
See "Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms."

engineered by that elite, which governed the monarchy in the period from 1995 to 2013, and came to be known as the "Two Hamads" (Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, and his prime minister and foreign minister, Hamad bin Jassim).

Resisting Saudi hegemony over the Gulf region was another way for Qatar to assume regional power, most importantly, by taking advantage of the political vacuum left by the fall of Egypt's Mubarak regime, Saudi Arabia's chief regional ally. Doha also competed with the UAE for influence in the Middle East, with Al Thani standing against Al Nahyan's bid to counter the Arab revolutions, especially those in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. US support and protection also proved to be a critical manifestation of Qatar's keenness to accumulate power. Doha spared no effort to convince the US that it was the best Middle Eastern state to forge close ties with Islamist groups in the region, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, which attained power in different parts of the Arab world following the political earthquake of 2011.

6.1.1. An Ambitious Political Elite

The individual characteristics of state leaders can have, under certain circumstances, a significant impact on policy outcomes.[500] The most prominent of these circumstances has to do with non-routine and high-level policymaking tasks, often involving crises or major events,[501] which were manifested by Qatar's unwavering support for and promotion of the Arab Spring.[502]

Personal traits are significant when analyzing the rise of the Qatari regional influence since Emir Hamad bin Khalifa came to power in 1995. Hamad's assumption of power coincided with the discovery of massive gas reserves in Qatar (nearly 5.4 percent of global reserves in 1997), allowing him to adopt a proactive foreign policy over the last two decades.[503]

---

[500] Fred I. Greenstein. "*The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush". American Political Science Review*, 6, (1967) 629-30.
See: David G. Winter. *Personality and Political Behavior*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
[501] Greenstein. "*The Impact of Personality on Politics.*
Winter. *Personality and Political Behavior.*
[502] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[503] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.

Emir Hamad was accompanied by an ambitious political elite, particularly his prime minister, Hamad bin Jassim. Both men had a strategic vision for assuming influence in the region, not only for purposes of survival, but also for achieving leverage.[504] It was either by bandwagoning off Saudi Arabia, as Bahrain does, or by having an independent foreign policy that the small state of Qatar could achieve relevance on the regional and international levels.[505]

The two Hamads[506] saw that state-building by their monarchy was inextricably linked to the emergence of a robust and autonomous foreign policy.[507] Following his seizure of power from his father in a bloodless coup, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa was anxious to take an independent path and uncouple his country's foreign policy from that of Saudi Arabia. Like the other Gulf States, Qatar's foreign policy to a great extent mirrored that of Saudi Arabia until the mid-1990s, when the Gulf monarchy, under the leadership of Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, carved out its own independent path.[508]

This was soon reflected by his establishment of the Al-Jazeera news network in 1996, with dozens of Arab journalists -- many of whom held anti-Riyadh views -- joining the news platform.[509] It was also seen in his rush to normalize ties with Iran, with which Qatar shared enormous offshore gas fields, and Israel, after the latter took part in the 1997 Doha Conference.[510]

The emir's particular personality, and the way he was running the state, made his foreign policy unpredictable and idiosyncratic. This could be seen in his effective mediation efforts, close ties with Iran and Hamas, positive relationship with the US, and, perhaps most importantly, his pro-Arab Spring policies.[511] The emir, in his speeches at UN General Assembly meetings, clearly voiced his country's policy of backing anti-corruption and anti-

[504] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[505] Personal interview, Professor at Doha University Majed al-Ansari, (2020, June 8) Zoom.
[506] By this term, we refer to the former emir Hamad bin Khalifa and his prime minister and foreign minister Hamad bin Jassem.
[507] Mohammadzadeh. "Status and foreign policy change in small states," 21.
[508] Jamal Abdullah. "Analysis: Qatar's foreign policy, the old and the new," *Al-Jazeera English*, on Nov. 21, 2014, accessed on July 17, 2020.
[509] Christopher Phillips. *The battle for Syria: international rivalry in the new Middle East.* (Connecticut, Yale University Press, 2016) 37.
[510] "The Doha Conference: A Post Mortem," *The Washington Institute*, accessed on Sept. 20, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-doha-conference-a-post-mortem.
[511] "The Doha Conference: A Post Mortem."

authoritarian revolutionary change in the region with a view to achieving what he termed "reconciliation between the [Arab] peoples and their states."[512]

Meanwhile, his ambitious premier and foreign minister, Bin Jassim (1995-2013), was known as the engineer of Qatar's increasingly proactive foreign policy in the region.[513] Emir Hamad bin Khalifa trusted him, and gave him the powers he needed to manage the country's affairs on the internal and external levels. He also acted on the regional and international levels by managing the country's investments through the massive Qatar Sovereign Fund.[514] Bin Jassim was also a co-founder of Al-Jazeera, which became bin Khalifa's trump card in his efforts to offset Saudi hegemony and oppose the blockade imposed on Qatar in 2017.[515] Al-Jazeera was emboldened to broadcast programs that would have been considered taboo in the past, providing, for example, details of the 1996 Saudi/UAE-backed coup attempt against Qatar and government corruption in the UAE.[516]

Hamad bin Jassim also pursued Qatari mediation in the Middle East and Africa, which, as mentioned earlier, was the main dynamic behind the country's reflective foreign policy over the last two decades.[517] He convinced Hamas to come to Doha in 2012 and take up a temporary residence there, making the Gulf monarchy a political incubator for the Palestinian resistance group. Qatar also provided generous financial support to both the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority and Hamas. This support, along with the hosting of reconciliation meetings between the two rivals, allowed Qatar to play a crucial role in the Palestine issue and attract Western powers that sought to engage with Hamas.[518]

---

[512] "Emir Hamad bin Khalifa speech at the UN's General Assembly meetings in 2011", *official page of Amiri Court*, accessed on July 20, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxeHMQ58fwQ&ab_channel=AmiriDiwan.
See: "Emir Hamad bin Khalifa speech at the UN's General Assembly meetings in 2012," *official page of Amiri Court and Russia Today*, aaccessed on July 20, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99DGtRxENZc&ab_channel=RTArabic.

[513] Hal sayughayiru Amir Qatar al-jadeed siyasat Addawha al-kharijiyya "Will Qatar's New Emir Change Doha's Foreign Policy," *France24*, accessed on Dec. 15, 2019, https://www.france24.com/ar/20130726.
See: Awdit muhandis al-Siyasa al-Kharijiyya al-Qatariyya, "Engineer of Qatar's foreign policy comes back," *Sasapost*, accessed on June 17, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20190401021811/https://www.sasapost.com/sheikh-hamad-bin-jassem-the-architect-of-qatars-regional-policy-is-back/.

[514] "Engineer of Qatar's foreign policy comes back."

[515] "The Doha Conference: A Post Mortem."

[516] Fi ghudoun 23 Sana, al-Jazeera manassa Qatariyya mawthouqa, "In 23 years, Al-Jazeera as Qatari-platform trusted by peoples," *Al-Khaleej Online*, accessed on June 17, 2020, https://alkhaleejonline.net/%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9.

[517] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.

[518] "Engineer of Qatar's foreign policy comes back."

Bin Jassim also managed to bring together Lebanese rivals Nabih Berri, Saad Hariri and General Michel Aoun, with four-way summits being held between Doha and Beirut in 2009 with the aim of ending the power struggle in Lebanon. In addition, Bin Jassim had good ties (rare among Arab countries) with the Iran-backed Hezbollah group due to Qatar's generous support for reconstruction efforts in Lebanon following a destructive war with Israel in 2006. The close ties Bin Jassim forged with Hezbollah culminated in a meeting between Emir Hamad and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in August 2010.[519]

Due to his county's soft diplomacy and successful mediation efforts in both Africa and the Arab world, Bin Jassim was dubbed the "Gulf Fox." He presided over a diplomatic breakthrough between Sudan and Chad in 2009, a historic peace deal in Darfur in 2011, and an agreement to end the longstanding rift between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2011.[520]

Bin Jassim also played a pivotal role in drumming up regional and international support for revolutionary forces in Libya in April 2011; in Yemen in May 2011; and in Syria in January 2012.[521] He also led his country's delegation at meetings aimed at ending a dispute between Doha and Riyadh over the territory of Al-Udeid, where he later convinced the US to establish an enormous military base in 1996. The Al-Udeid Airbase is now considered the largest US military base in the region, and it played a role in the failure of a Saudi-led bloc of nations to launch a military offensive against Qatar in 2017.[522]

Qatar sees Al-Udeid as its main source of protection from any hostile actions that might be launched by its opponents in the region, and Doha has worked to turn the base into a permanent military facility with a view to enhancing its regional influence.[523]

What's more, Qatar wanted to see Bin Jassem assume the world's top diplomatic post, thus, his eyes were on the UN secretary-generalship after Ban Ki-moon's term ended in 2016. A report in the *Telegraph* indicated that Qatar's former prime minister was being

[519] "Engineer of Qatar's foreign policy comes back."
[520] "Engineer of Qatar's foreign policy comes back."
[521] "Hamad bin Jassem speaking to Al-Jazeera," Al-Jazeera, accessed on July 17, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=seiABoeLxDo&ab_channel=AlJazeeraChannel%D9%82%.
[522] "Hamad bin Jassem speaking to Al-Jazeera."
[523] Al-Udeid satabqa qaida daima fi Qatar, "Al-Udeid to remain as a permanent military base in Qatar," *France 24*, accessed on June 20, 2020, https://www.france24.com/ar/20180724-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%.

considered as a possible candidate to replace Ban after the emir offered to back him for the prestigious position.[524]

These aspirations were fostered through a distinguished advisory body. Although Qatar is a tiny state with a very limited population, it has managed to forge its own cultural, economic, media and sport status in the region, which we can term "status-making" policy.[525]

Qatar saw that enjoying status in the region was key to protecting its existence. To achieve -- and maintain -- this status, Doha spared no effort in projecting soft power. According to both history and geopolitical theories, it is difficult for small states to achieve such an oversized status within their geopolitical surroundings, and this also applies to small Gulf monarchies. Qatar's soft power was manifested mainly through tourism conferences; think-tanks and research centers; the Qatar Foundation for Education; and the Qatar Charity.[526]

Qatar was exceptional in this regard given the presence of its ambitious ruling elite. Its ambitious leaders have attracted hundreds of advisors from throughout the Arab world, especially from Egypt, Palestine, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. These experts and advisors played a critical role in the success of the mediation efforts Doha has engaged in over the last two decades. This has been accompanied by the country's tremendous oil wealth, which allowed its leadership to translate their regional ambitions into reality. Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman are also wealthy countries, but they all lack the same will and ambitions for regional status.[527]

It has been asked whether the ascendancy of Emir Tamim in 2013 will affect the ambitious foreign policy that the "Two Hamads" pursued for almost 18 years. While Majed al-Ansari argues that Qatari foreign policy has adopted a "withdrawal approach" since 2014,[528] David Roberts says this is unlikely to change Qatari foreign policy under Emir Tamim, who came to power after his father's abdication,[529] for four reasons. Firstly, it is not

[524] "Former Qatari PM has eyes on top UN job," *The Telegraph*, accessed on Dec. 15, 2019, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11172018/Former-Qatari-PM-has-eyes-on-top-UN-job.html.
[525] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[526] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[527] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[528] Personal interview, Professor at Doha University Majed al-Ansari, (2020, June 8) Zoom.
[529] David B Roberts. "The four eras of Qatar's foreign policy." *La Política Exterior de Qatar* (2016) 7-9.

easy to change decades-long policy via a decree, as the communications and good ties Emir Hamad forged with certain groups (the MB, Azmi Bishara's team, Hamas, etc.) remain unchanged. Secondly, it will be difficult for Tamim to behave in a way that contradicts the life's work of his father. The latter was an iconic leader who continues to cast a long shadow over the entire Arab world, not to mention the fact that Tamim's mother, Moza bint Nasser, still plays a key role in Qatari politics. Thirdly, Tamim's first months in office showed that his priority is foreign economy, not foreign policy. Fourthly, Emir Tamim came to power amid traumatic regional shocks, including the 2013 Egypt coup and the 2014 Gulf crisis, prompting him to focus more on domestic fiscal affairs.[530]

6.1.2. Challenging Saudi Regional Hegemony

Saudi Arabia has enjoyed hegemony over the Arabian Peninsula since the British withdrawal from the region, which ended decades of British custodianship over Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE. This withdrawal paved the way for the rise of three countries in the region -- Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia -- which have vied for regional supremacy ever since.[531] Against this backdrop, there has been a long history of Gulf monarchies resisting Saudi hegemony, which has become a hallmark of Qatar-Saudi relations.

The emergence of the Qatari-Saudi rift dates back to the 1960s, when the two countries differed over border demarcations, despite the fact that a demarcation agreement was signed in 1965. Saudi Arabia ceded parts of the Buraimi Oasis to the UAE in return for the latter's cession of the coastal strip known as "Al-Udid."[532] With this move, a common border no longer existed between the UAE and Qatar, leading to complaints by the latter that the step had turned it into a Saudi enclave, forcing Qataris to go through Saudi Arabia in order to reach the UAE.[533] This way, Riyadh sought to tighten its grip on its Qatari neighbor, as it had with Bahrain. Because geographical control leads inevitably to political hegemony, Saudi Arabia opposed construction of a sea bridge between the UAE and Qatar in 2005.[534]

---

[530] Roberts. "The four eras of Qatar's foreign policy," 9.
[531] Yom & Gause, Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on, 76.
[532] "Qatari-Saudi Relations: A History of Conflicts and Tensions," *BBC*, accessed on Oct. 15, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-40172427.
[533] "Qatari-Saudi Relations: A History of Conflicts and Tensions."
[534] Ali Fawwaz. Asl al-hikaya: Haza ma hasala bayn al-Soudiyya wa Qatar, "Origin of the Saudi-Qatari Story," *Al-Mayadeen News*, on June 19, 2017.

In 1992, armed clashes erupted on the Saudi-Qatari border after Saudi forces allegedly attacked a Qatari border post, leaving two Qataris and a Saudi officer dead. Additionally, the Qatari government accused members of the Saudi-backed Bani Murra[535] tribe of planning the 1996 coup attempt in cooperation with ousted Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani. In 2000, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz boycotted an OIC summit held in Doha to protest what he described as "the presence of an office for the Israeli trade representative in Qatar."[536] In 2002, Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador to Qatar after a Saudi dissident appeared on Al-Jazeera and criticized the Saudi royal family.[537] In the same year, another coup was attempted against Emir Hamad, which Doha accused Saudi Arabia of orchestrating.[538]

The surprise participation of former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at a GCC summit in Doha also impacted Saudi-Qatari relations, with Saudi daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* quoting senior Gulf officials as saying that they had not been informed of Ahmadinejad's presence in advance, going on to describe his participation as "disgusting," reflecting Saudi anger over Qatar's "unilateral" move.[539]

Qatari-Saudi relations worsened further after Qatar's support for the 2011 revolutions that took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Saudi Arabia saw extraordinary changes affecting any Arab regime, whether through revolution or displacement, in a negative light. Saudi Arabia believes that any abrupt change (revolution, rebellion or uprising) constitutes *fitna* (sedition) and has ruinous effects[540] that could put its century-old

[535] Bani Murra is a well-known Arab tribe descended from the Banu Yam tribe and scattered in the Gulf countries of Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A majority of Al Murra were known of being strong supporters for the former Qatari emir Sheikh Khalifa Al Thani, who was removed from power in 1995 by his son Hamad. Some eight months after the coup, militants belong to Al Murrah tribe took part in a Saudi and Emirati-backed military campaign aimed at overthrowing the son Hamad in favor of the father Khalifa. At least 19 of the alleged perpetrators were sentenced to death in Feb. 2000, while another 33 were sentenced to life in prison, before acquitting the rest.
Source: Robert L Headley. "People of the Camel," *ARAMCO WORLD*, accessed on April 19, 2020, https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/196405/people.of.the.camel.htm.
[536] Qatar-Israel relations dates back to 1996 when Doha established trade relations with Israel, becoming the first Gulf state to do so. The Israeli trade office in Qatar was shut down by Qatari authorities during the second Palestinian Intifada before the Gulf monarchy permanently severed trade relations with Israel following the latter's offensive against Gaza in 2009.
[537] Headley. "People of the Camel."
[538] Headley. "People of the Camel."
[539] "Doha Summit: A Controversial Iranian Day," *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, accessed on Sept. 18, 2020, https://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=448341&issueno=10598#.X3NP8pMzZQI,
[540] Mohammed Al-Misfir. *Al-Alaqat al-Khaleejiyya al-Khaleejiyya wa mudelat al-Faragh al-israteeji, Gulf conflicts and the strategic gap challenge*, (Al-Jazeera Center for Researches and Studies, Doha, 2018).

absolute monarchy in danger.[541] For this reason, Saudi Arabia believed that the spark of revolution, which was first ignited in Tunisia, should have been snuffed out immediately and its advocates swiftly suppressed. What's more, Riyadh gave shelter to the deposed President Ben Ali.[542]

It is worth mentioning that the Arab Spring came at a time of regional polarization that amounted to a kind of "cold war" between Iran and Saudi Arabia,[543] and the outbreak of protests in five Arab countries served to amplify Saudi anxieties. However, Qatar viewed it as an opportunity to reverse Saudi hegemony and project its own power on a regional scale. Conflicting Saudi and Qatari views on the Arab Spring not only revealed the rivalry between them, but confirmed the fact that, since the early years of the 1900s, and since the British withdrawal from the Gulf region, Riyadh had striven to subordinate its neighboring monarchies and treat them as dependent entities that should unquestioningly follow its foreign policy.[544]

Saudi Arabia, throughout the 20th century, acted as the Gulf's "big sister,"[545] with its kings expecting its Gulf neighbors to adopt foreign policies in line with its interests. It wanted these states under its heel on the economic, social and religious levels.[546] The Bahraini case is a clear example of Saudi expectations vis-à-vis neighboring monarchies, since Bahrain has faithfully replicated Saudi policies, including Manama's position on the 2017 Gulf crisis.[547] This was also the case with Qatar before Khalifa bin Hamad came to power in 1995.[548]

> Qatar, since the mid-1990s, has refused to play a subordinate role to Saudi Arabia. Before this, it could not compete with Saudi influence given Saudi Arabia's religious significance in the Islamic world. However, it later learned how to offset Saudi

[541] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
[542] "Qatar and Saudi Arabia .. Disputes sparked by storms of the Arab Spring," *Masr al-Arabiyya*, accessed on Oct. 15, 2019, http://www.masralarabia.com/1440975.
[543] Bayram Sinkaya. "Implications of the Arab Spring for Iran's Policy towards the Middle East," *Middle Eastern Studies/Ortadogu* Etütleri 6:2 (2015) 57.
[544] Rawan Kanaan. Al-Alaqat al-Qatariyya al-Soudiyya: bayna al-taawun wal tasadum, "Saudi-Qatari relations: from cooperation to clash," Lebanese University, Master's thesis, 2017) 44.
[545] Professor Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24). Personal interview, Zoom.
[546] Vijad Parshay, "Saudi Arabia Wants Qatar to Come Under Its Heel: Even Old Saudi Allies Aren't Exactly Going Along with That," *Salon*, on June 18, 2017.
(Accessed on Oct. 15, 2019).
[547] Kareem Asaad, Albahrayn muhafaza Saudiyya: limadha taqbalu dawlatan biltabaiyya? "Bahrain is a Saudi province: why does a state accept dependency?," *Idaat*, on July 4, 2018.
[548] Professor Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24). Personal interview, Zoom.
Also: Egyptian thinker and professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, (2020, May 17). Personal interview, Zoom.

> hegemony in the Gulf by adopting independent foreign policies and rejecting Saudi intervention in its domestic affairs.[549]

Qatar's refusal to play a subordinate role to Saudi Arabia has been a feature of Doha's policymaking since 1995. Since then, Qatar has adopted an independent foreign policy that has put Doha's interests first and those of the rest of the Gulf second.[550] A look at some of the Saudi conditions[551] for ending the blockade imposed on Qatar may make this more understandable.[552]

Independent foreign policymaking was seen as "evidence of mistrust" by the monarchies neighboring Qatar as it "flouts traditions of tribal consensus." This perspective was expressed by many writers and commentators close to the Saudi/UAE bloc. Editor-in-chief of the UAE's *Al-Ittihad* newspaper, Mohammed al-Hammadi, said that Saudi Arabia had been outraged by Qatar's independent foreign-policy trajectory, asserting that Doha's behavior "not only challenges Gulf interests, but flouts traditions of tribal consensus."[553] His remarks shed light on the dynamics that led to Saudi anger over Qatar's Al-Jazeera channel, which routinely criticizes the Gulf royal families. "The one thing foremost in our Bedouin culture is trust. Today, the UAE, the Saudis and Bahrain don't trust the Qatari regime."[554]

---

[549] Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, (2020, May 17). Personal interview, Zoom. Abdel-Fattah was also one of the advisors for the late Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi.

[550] Parshay. "Saudi Arabia Wants Qatar to Come Under Its Heel: Even Old Saudi Allies Aren't Exactly Going Along with That."
See: Asaad. "Bahrain is a Saudi province: why does a state accept dependency?,"

[551] These conditions were seen by many experts and academics as blatant violation for the Qatari sovereignty, foremost the condition to shut Al-Jazeera down and the one asking Doha to abandon its military cooperation with Turkey. The international norms guarantee for each country to have foreign relations with any country as an internationally recognized sovereign right and what Saudi Arabia was doing on this regard has been nothing but "a stark violation against this right."
The Saudi conditions included:

- "Scale down diplomatic ties with Iran and close the Iranian diplomatic missions in Qatar
- Immediately shut down the Turkish military base, which is currently under construction, and halt military cooperation with Turkey inside of Qatar.
- Sever ties to all "terrorist, sectarian and ideological organizations," specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIL, al-Qaeda, Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front) and Lebanon's Hezbollah.
- Stop all means of funding for individuals, groups or organizations that have been designated as terrorists by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, US and other countries.
- Hand over "terrorist figures", fugitives and wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain to their countries of origin.
- Shut down Al Jazeera and its affiliate stations."

[552] "Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html.

[553] "Princely feuds in the Persian Gulf thwart Trump's efforts to resolve the Qatar dispute," *The Washington Post*, accessed on May 12, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/princely-feuds-in-the-persian-gulf-thwart-trumps-efforts-to-resolve-the-qatar-dispute/2018/05/13/7853cc88-39cf-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html.

[554] "Princely feuds in the Persian Gulf thwart Trump's efforts to resolve the Qatar dispute."

This shows how difficult it is for any Gulf monarchy to adopt a regional vision that diverges from that of Riyadh.

Relations with Egypt were a critical indicator of Qatari endeavors to offset Saudi hegemony. Mubarak's regime had forged "distinguished" ties with the Saudi authorities, as the latter invested $7 billion in Cairo, not to mention the fact that there were "distinguished personal ties" between Mubarak's family and the Saudi royals.[555] The enormous Saudi influence on Egypt, on the economic level in particular, constituted a stumbling block for Qatari intervention in the country.[556]

Defying Saudi influence in Egypt can be seen as one of Doha's driving policies in terms of its decision to back the revolution in Egypt,[557] and came parallel with the Qatari strategy of countering Saudi hegemony in the Gulf.[558] Following the Arab Spring, the Gulf monarchies' reactions varied from a "wait-and-see" policy to explicitly countering pro-change movements in the Arab world. Regarding Egypt, Qatar was the only Gulf monarchy that reacted positively to the revolution, which gave Doha a foothold in a strategically vital country that had been the exclusive jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia during Mubarak's era.[559]

It is also worth mentioning the role Qatar played (directly and indirectly) in breaking a taboo imposed on the Arab monarchic regimes since their establishment.[560] The radical change that hit the regional system built a half-century earlier, and the rise of the monarchic Gulf states, encouraged these states to defend the international system that recognized the legitimacy of monarchic regimes.[561] However, the international system, which is composed of democratic republics and constitutional monarchies, has been validated in different parts of the world, except for the Gulf States. The Arab Spring constituted a real danger for these monarchies, mainly Saudi Arabia, which saw the Qatari royal family's support for the Arab Spring with a great deal of suspicion. Saudi Arabia saw this support as part of efforts to erode the legitimacy of the monarchic regimes, thus posing an existential threat to these

[555] Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020), Zoom.
[556] Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020), Zoom.
[557] Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020), Zoom.
[558] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24), Zoom.
[559] Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020), Zoom.
[560] Ali Aslan. Limaza tatasadam Qatar wa al-Soudiyya? "Why Qatar and Saudi Arabia are clashing?" *Insight Turkey-(Arabic)*, 6:4, (2017) 2-3.
[561] Aslan. "Why Qatar and Saudi Arabia are clashing," 3.

monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which were hit hard by protests in early 2011.[562]

Resisting Saudi regional hegemony in the Gulf and Arab region was one of Qatar's main geopolitical objectives in backing the Arab Spring. Countering Saudi influence in Egypt was also important, as Doha had been blocked from getting a foothold in Egypt under Mubarak, who did not want to anger the Saudis, as they represented the biggest investors in his country.[563] This is also related to Qatari attempts to pursue an independent foreign policy separate from Saudi Arabia's narrative of the "Gulf Home." This was supported by the considerable soft power seen in Qatar's massive media outlets and think-tanks, many of which promoted revolutionary change that Riyadh perceived as a threat to the entire monarchic system in the Gulf.

6.1.3. Competing Emirati Regional Ambitions

The influence of the British Empire on the world in general and the Gulf region in particular began to diminish after World War II, especially after the independence of India in 1947. In the 1950s, oil began to replace pearling and fishing as a major source of income in the Gulf emirates, and petroleum revenues helped finance, develop and modernize the infrastructure there. The pressure on the British to withdraw from the nine Arab emirates of the Persian Gulf increased during the 1950s, before Britain officially announced in 1968 that it would leave the Persian Gulf within three years. Qatar and Bahrain were among what were known at the time as the "Trucial States" and were all supposed to be part of a future United Arab Emirates before disputes prompted the two emirates to remove themselves from the would-be union.[564]

Despite the fact that the period following independence saw normalized ties between the UAE and Qatar, many developments took place on the regional level that turned the two countries into rivals. This can be seen in the failed coup attempt in 1996, Qatar's winning its bid to hold the World Cup in 2022, tribal jealousies, and, most recently, the Arab Spring.

[562] Aslan. "Why Qatar and Saudi Arabia are clashing," 3.
[563] Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020), Zoom.
[564] Mufid Al-Zaidi. *Tarikh Qatar al-Muasser,* "*Qatar's Contemporary History,"* (Amman, Al-Manahig Publishing House, 2010). 70.

On June 27, 1995, Qatari Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani led a bloodless coup against his father, Khalifa bin Hamad, who was on an official visit to Switzerland at the time. The deposed emir refused to recognize the new regime, and decided to reside in Europe before moving between the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.[565]

The three countries, mainly the UAE, later orchestrated a coup to depose Emir Hamad and restore his father, Khalifa, to the throne. This was because the new emir was known, since the very beginning, for advocating for a Qatari foreign policy independent of Saudi Arabia. He also wanted to establish good ties with Iran and restore ties with Iraq's Saddam Hussein regime.[566] Furthermore, Emir Hamad's removal of his father represented a blow to the Gulf leaders and a threat to their dynastic principles,[567] prompting them to support a counter-move aimed at restoring the deposed father.[568]

Fahd al-Maliki, one of the Qatari military generals who was involved in the failed coup attempt, revealed that the UAE had played the most pivotal role in staging and backing the attempt against the Qatari emir. "Sheikh Zayed, then ruler of the UAE, was the main planner for the coup. He was the one who coordinated with Bahrain through his son Mohammad bin Zayed [Abu Dhabi's current crown prince]. He managed to convince Saudi Arabia to support Sheikh Khalifa... I lived through these events and took part in the Sheikh Khalifa's attempt, I sat with Mohammad bin Zayed and Sheikh Zayed, and I heard their intentions."[569]

Al-Maliki also revealed the role of Sheikh Hazzaa bin Zayed, the head of Emirati intelligence at the time, in planning to invade Qatar, and also provided details on how weapons were transferred from the UAE. "The weapons that were available with the French mercenaries, most notably, Paul Barril, who oversaw the thwarted operation,[570] were sent by the Emirati army from the Intercontinental Hotel with the knowledge of Sheikh Hazzaa bin Zayed, the head of Emirati intelligence at the time..., I was a witness to that incident as I was

[565] Qatar tusdiru afwan an al-muttahameen bimuhawalet al-inqilab, "Qatar pardons prisoners of failed coup attempt," *CNN*, accessed on May 5, 2020, http://archive.arabic.cnn.com/2010/middle_east/5/25/qatar.saudi/.
[566] "Emir of Qatar deposed by his son," *The Independent*, accessed on Sept. 17, 2020, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html.
[567] Qasaed Mutabadala bayna al-Sheikh Zayed wa al-Shiekh Khalifa bin Hamad, "Poems traded between Emir Zayed and Emir Khalifa bin Hamad," *Al-Bayan Daily*, accessed on Sept. 17, 2020, https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2018-04-02-1.3226895.
[568] Personal Interview, Palestinian researcher and writer Sary Sammour, (September 27, 2020), Zoom.
[569] Ahad qadat inqilab 1996 yakshef tafaseel jadeeda, "One of 1996's coup leaders reveal new details," *Al-Sharq Daily*, accessed on May 5, 2020, https://al-sharq.com/article/24/12/2018/.
[570] Different reports, including ones published on Al-Jazeera confirmed the involvement of a French mercenary company called "SECRETS" led and established by Paul Barril in attacking Qatari interests to pave the way for the coup.

among the military generals planning for the coup."[571] Barril, for his part, confirmed that the UAE intelligence chief had a hand in the coup attempt, also known as "Operation Abu Ali." According to Barril, "the UAE in particular had provided him with great support to carry out the operation. At the time, I had taken 40 highly-trained soldiers to carry out the plan. What had affected the operation was a call from former French President Jacques Chirac, who personally ordered me to stop any 'foolishness' from happening."[572]

While the UAE said that its intervention, along with that of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, had come at the request of the deposed Emir Khalifa,[573] the incident constituted a turning point in the ties among the GCC monarchies, specifically in relations between Doha and Abu Dhabi.[574] This shows that the Qatari-Emirati rivalry -- and mutual mistrust -- mounted in the wake of the failed coup, especially between Qatari Emir Hamad on the one hand and UAE Chief-of-staff Mohammed bin Zayed and security head Hazzaa bin Zayed on the other.

Regarding Egypt, it is worth mentioning that Mubarak's regime provided a helping hand in the failed coup attempt. According to Jaber al-Marri, another Qatari military official involved in the coup attempt, meetings between the coup plotters were held in Egypt's Red Sea city of Hurghada, while weapons were sent from Egypt under the auspices of Omar Suleiman, head of Egypt's intelligence service.[575] This was another reason for the strained Egypt-Qatar relations that lasted for almost a decade and a half under Mubarak. It is also a dynamic behind the Qatari rush to back the Egyptian revolution since its very beginning.

The second factor explaining the UAE-Qatar rivalry in the region is the UAE's outrage over a FIFA decision in 2010 to give Qatar the privilege of hosting the 2022 World Cup. The decision did not only outrage the UAE, but Egypt as well, where the Arab monarchies were competing for influence. The Mubarak family saw Qatar's successful bid as a personal

[571] "One of 1996's coup leaders reveal new details."
[572] "Qatar 1996 coup plot: New details reveal Saudi-UAE backing," *Al-Jazeera English*, accessed on June 20, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/qatar-1996-coup-plot-details-reveal-saudi-uae-backing-181217083526698.htm.
[573] Al-Imarat taruddu bishakl rasmi ala ittihamat Qatar bishaan inqilab 1996, "UAE officially responds to Qatari accusations regarding 1996's coup," *Sputnik*, accessed on May 12, 2020, https://arabic.sputniknews.com/arab_world/201812171037552899.
[574] Ma khafiya Azam: Inqilab 1996, "What was hidden is greater: 1996 coup," *Al-Jazeera*, accessed on May 12, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcyP_b435TQ.
[575] "What was hidden is greater: 1996 coup."

slight since Egypt had failed in its own bid to host the 2010 World Cup. Egypt thus felt outdone by Qatar, which became the first Arab country to win the distinction. [576]

The World Cup issue was one of the main reasons for the UAE's hostility and frequent attacks on Qatar.[577] Analyzing UAE positions and UAE officials' remarks in this regard makes it easier to understand Abu Dhabi's policies in the Gulf in general and towards Qatar in particular.[578]

American news website *The Intercept* confirmed these claims in a leaked document from Youssef Al-Otaiba, the UAE's ambassador to the US. The leaked information revealed that Abu Dhabi had been plotting a propaganda campaign against Qatar with a view to foiling its plans to host the 2022 World Cup. The document outlined a strategy to wage a campaign aimed at defaming Qatar in hopes of convincing FIFA that Doha was incapable of providing the infrastructure needed to host the global event.[579]

Abu Dhabi's attempt to undermine Qatar was clearly seen in the words of its deputy chief of police and security, Dahi Khalfan, and UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash, who openly said that one of the reasons for the two Gulf crises (in 2014 and 2017) was that Qatar did not ask its monarchic neighbors for help in hosting the sports event.[580]

Abu Dhabi's attempt to defame Qatar and thwart its plans to host the World Cup came as part of its efforts to expand its influence in the region by pulling the rug out from under the feet of all parties concerned, starting with Qatar, the UAE's chief Gulf rival.[581] It was

---

[576] Mohammed Al-Baz. *Suqout al-Aliha, kayfa inhara Mubarak wa rijaluh, "The Fall of the Gods: How Mubarak and His Men Collapsed,"* (Cairo, Al-Ward Island Publishing House, 2011) 115-116.
[577] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[578] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[579] "Leaked Documents Expose Stunning Plan to Wage Financial War on Qatar, and Steal the World Cup," *The Intercept*, accessed on Sept. 19, 2020, https://medium.com/theintercept/leaked-documents-expose-stunning-plan-to-wage-financial-war-on-qatar-and-steal-the-world-cup-a2ccf802fa0c.
See also: Al-Imarat Khattatat lifshal istidafet Qatar li qaas el-Alam 2022, "UAE planned to thwart Qatar's hosting for the 2022 World Cup," *Al-Arabi Al-Jadded*, accessed on May 12, 2020, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/sport/2017/11/9/.
[580] The al-Oteiba leaks provided that the UAE spared no effort to undermine the Qatari accomplishment by insisting that the blockade would double the expenses of the construction supplies and make it very costly to recruit high-ranking experts to develop the sport infrastructure in the Gulf monarchy. The Emirati plan hoped that the economic war would make it difficult for Qatar to continue in building the needed stadiums and disturb the arrangements the FIFA conditioned on Doha to allow it host the huge event. "If Qatar now spends its reserves protecting the currency and local credit markets, there will be less financial liquidity to finance infrastructure expenditures." According to the same documents, the UAE was looking forward to push the FIFA appeal to the GCC countries, as a whole, to host the world's top sporting event, not only Qatar.
[581] "UAE planned to thwart Qatar's hosting for the 2022 World Cup."

also in line with the goals of anti-Arab Spring figures in Egypt, who urged FIFA to stop Qatar from hosting the event. A look at reports from several UAE and Egyptian newspapers and websites from this time makes this abundantly clear.[582]

A third factor explaining the Qatari-UAE rivalry goes beyond mere political interests, but has to do with the tribal culture of jealousy, mistrust and competition. This is not something new. The tribes, scattered for millennia throughout Arabia, have always fought one another, and rivalries run deep in the pasts of both families.[583]

The Gulf ruling families were keen to forge close ties with Egypt, given the latter's regional weight. At the time, the UAE's Sheikh Zayed Al Nayhan had good ties with Mubarak, while Al Thani's relations with the Egyptian regime had been cold since the rise of Hamad bin Khalifa in 1996. This contributed to deepening the rivalry between the two families for Egypt's affections. It is significant to recall that the only Arab foreign minister to pay an official visit to Mubarak during the 2011 protests was UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, who sought to show solidarity with the embattled Egyptian president.[584] Al Nahyan's visit came at a time when Al-Jazeera was airing 24-hour anti-Mubarak coverage and calling for change in Egypt. This was to give Al Thani the lion's share of influence in post-Mubarak Egypt, mainly during Morsi's one year in power.

Jocelyn Mitchell, an assistant professor at the Doha campus of Northwestern University, argued: "There's always been competition and jealousy between the Gulf States…, you've got Qatar becoming the face of the Arab world in many aspects…,".[585] Editor-in-chief of Emirati newspaper *Al-Ittihad*, Mohammed al-Hammadi, linked the UAE-Qatar rivalry with historical tribal considerations. He said the Gulf monarchies, mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, were furious over Qatari behavior, which, they believe, "flouts traditions of tribal consensus." He pointed to Al-Jazeera's tendency of routinely criticizing the region's other royal families.[586]

[582] Dandarawi Al-Hawwari. Hal sataqoum al-Fifa bisahb Hak Qatar min istidafat Kaas al-Alam, "Will FIFA drop Qatari right to host 2022 World Cup," *Youm-7 Daily*, on March 7, 2015.
[583] "UAE planned to thwart Qatar's hosting for the 2022 World Cup,"
[584] Mubarak yastaqbelu wazir kharijiyyat al-Imarat, "Mubarak receives UAE's Foreign Minister," *Elaph news*, accessed on July 17, 2020, https://elaph.com/Web/news/2011/2/630430.html.
[585] "Princely feuds in the Persian Gulf thwart Trump's efforts to resolve the Qatar dispute."
[586] "Princely feuds in the Persian Gulf thwart Trump's efforts to resolve the Qatar dispute."

The rivalry was also linked to the high living standards that Qatari citizens had enjoyed over the last decade when compared to their Saudi and Emirati counterparts. Qatari citizens enjoyed the world's highest per-capita income ($147,000) in 2011,[587] not to mention the country's advanced educational and health systems, which were considered superior to those found in other Gulf monarchies.[588]

Fourthly, the Qatar-UAE rivalry, in terms of policy drivers, was exacerbated during and after the Arab Spring, with Doha backing pro-change groups in the region, mainly Islamists, while Abu Dhabi fiercely defended the status quo.[589] While the UAE saw Islamist groups as a strategic threat to the Gulf monarchies, Qatar saw them as highly-organized groups sure to sweep any free election they were allowed to take part in, making cooperation with them the wisest course of action.[590]

The UAE-Qatar rivalry was made clear by the tension that rocked Arab North African countries, namely, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Following the ouster of Mubarak in Egypt, Qatar actively backed Mohammed Morsi, Egypt's first-ever democratically elected president, and generously supported post-revolution governments while hosting opposition groups that were actively working for change.[591]

By contrast, Abu Dhabi adopted a hostile attitude towards the newly-elected president as part of its strategy to thwart pro-change movements in the region, mainly Islamist groups, and counter the revolutions in these countries. Abu Dhabi's hostile policies were also manifested by its support for anti-Morsi media outlets, which sought to defame and embarrass Morsi, and funds sent to thug groups set up by its agent, Mohammed Dahlan, to sow chaos in the country.[592] Morsi, in a televised speech, warned of these groups and their efforts to destabilize the state and sabotage state facilities.[593]

---

[587] "Qatar's $129,000 Average Income Is Double Saudi Arabia's: Chart," *Bloomberg*, accessed on Sept. 25, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-08/qatar-s-129-000-average-income-is-double-saudi-arabia-s-chart.
[588] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
[589] Antonino Occhiuto. Balance of Interests: The UAE-Qatar Competition, *Euro-Gulf Information Center*, (2018) 2.
[590] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
[591] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
[592] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
[593] Khitab Morsi youm 27 Huzairan, 2013, "Morsi's speech on June 27, 2013," *MBC Egypt*, accessed on June 19, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPwBswZ7cng.

Abu Dhabi's anti-change policies culminated in its support for the 2013 coup d'état led by Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, which put an end to Egypt's democratic experiment.[594]

In Libya, too, Qatar and the UAE embraced opposing positions regarding the revolution, with Doha supporting revolutionary groups and figures (such as Abdel-Hakim Bilhadje and Ali Al-Salabi) in 2011 and 2012 and opposing putschist general Khalifa Haftar. Inspired by Al-Sisi's coup in Egypt, UAE helped and generously backed Haftar who has tried since 2013 to wrest power from Libya's legitimate government.[595]

In Tunisia, meanwhile, Qatar supported the revolution and the country's post-revolution transitional period in the form of generous financial assistance. The UAE, by contrast, suspended all its investments in Tunisia and has continued to back politicians and public figures hostile to the Ennahda Party.[596]

The UAE's destabilizing role in the Arab Spring countries proves that Abu Dhabi's short-term objective is to thwart the Arab peoples longing for change in favor of dictators and military generals.[597] The UAE not only backs Arab dictators and generals, but spares no effort to cover up their crimes, as was seen in the twin massacres that happened in Egypt.[598] What's more, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed's strategy is to prevent the Arab peoples from taking part in electing their own rulers. Egypt's Yahya Hamed says his short stint as investment minister showed him that Mohamed bin Zayed sees the Arab people as no more than cattle and are not entitled to any rights whatsoever. Hamed said: "The UAE rulers believe that the Arab people should kneel before them, or they will not be allowed to breathe."[599]

At the same time, Qatar's good governance and the political convergence between leadership and people regarding the country's reformist and conservative project drove Doha

---

[594] "Morsi's speech on June 27, 2013."
See: UAE lists Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist group, *Reuters*, accessed on June 19, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-politics-brotherhood/uae-lists-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSKCN0IZ0OM20141115.
"How the UAE Undermined the Arab Spring," *Sasapost*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.sasapost.com/why-emirates-against-the-arabic-spring/.
[595] Kaif qawwadat al-Imarat al-Rabeei al-Arabi, "How the UAE Undermined the Arab Spring."
[596] Al-Imarat taqoud hamla li-takhreeb tounis, "UAE is messing around in Tunisia," *Noonpost*, accessed on May. 17, 2020, https://www.noonpost.com/content/23171.
[597] Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020), Zoom.
[598] A massacre committed on August, 14, 2013, by the Egyptian army against the pro-Morsi protestors who were gathering in Rabaa Square in Cairo. Opposition data confirms that nearly 1000 people were killed in the army-led violence.
[599] Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020), Zoom.

to embrace a positive stance towards the Arab Spring. We can safely say that Qatar stands behind the Arab people and their legitimate governments, regardless of who is in power. Qatari support for Egypt was provided during the military council's tenure, while support was also extended to Tunisia's secular president, Beji Caid Essebsi (2014-2019). This shows that the claim that Qatar only supports Islamists is totally baseless.[600]

There is still a fierce rivalry between the two countries, mostly between Qatari Emir Hamad and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed, who orchestrated the 1996 coup against the emir. This rivalry is related to a longstanding tribal culture of mistrust and jealousy, along with Emirati resentment over the 2022 World Cup decision, which made Abu Dhabi's Al Nahyan feel their tribe had been outdone by Qatar in the international sports arena.[601] The Arab Spring, especially as it pertained to Egypt, represented the acme of this longstanding rivalry, with the Qataris keen to support change in the region while the Emiratis spared no effort to thwart it.

6.1.4. Ties With the US, Islamist Groups

Many regional governments, particularly Qatar's Gulf neighbors,[602] portray Qatar as having an insatiable appetite for backing Islamist groups, including extremist ones, especially since the outbreak of the 2011 revolutions.[603] It is undoubtedly true that Doha has worked, over the last two decades, with a range of Islamist forces throughout the Middle East and North Africa. But there is much to say regarding the argument that Qatar's rulers -- both Hamad and Tamim -- are active Islamists, or that their support for Islamist groups in the region is an end unto itself.[604]

Qatar has been one of the few Arab countries, if not the only one, to emphasize on different occasions that Islamist groups represent different components of the Arab people, and should therefore share power within their respective countries via a democratic process.

[600] Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020), Zoom.
[601] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
See: Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[602] Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt.
[603] David B. Roberts. "Reflecting on Qatar's "Islamist" Soft Power," *Brookings Institution*, (2019) 6.
[604] Roberts. "Reflecting on Qatar's "Islamist" Soft Power," 6.

The Qatari leadership is convinced that, since Islamist electoral victories are inevitable,[605] so too is cooperation with Islamist groups.[606]

The good ties Doha has forged with the US on one hand and with many Islamist groups on the other is a main dynamic explaining Doha's quest for influence in the region, which culminated in its support for Arab revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya. The Qatari leadership was keen to gain the trust of conflicting sides (i.e., the US and Islamist groups) with a view to serving as a credible mediator in African and Middle Eastern disputes.[607]

Through this role, Qatar became a gateway for Islamist groups seeking to open backchannel talks with the US and become a trusted ally of Washington, which, for its part, has sought to temper the rise of these groups.[608]

In Egypt, Qatar had a close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. In Tunisia, the head of the Islamist Ennahda movement, Rachid Gannouchi, described Qatar as a "partner" in the revolution, while Islamist groups in Libya voiced similar sentiments. In Syria, Doha worked closely with US intelligence to shape a relationship with the Nusra Front (Jabhat Al-Nusra) with the aim of drawing the group away from Al-Qaida[609] -- a role praised by US policymakers.[610] Qatar benefited from its relations with the Nusra Front, which it convinced to release hostages and to renounce Al-Qaida.[611]

> "Critiques of Qatar's 'Islamist' agenda, such as working with the Taliban or Hamas, are especially nonsensical. Qatar only worked as an intermediary with the Taliban specifically on behalf of the US government, and with the explicit and practical help of the German government in launching the effort. Similarly, Qatar's relations with Hamas come with the direct blessing of the United States and pragmatic assistance from Israel. Such a multilateral reality cuts against critiques charging that Qatar is somehow beyond the pale in its interactions with Islamist actors."[612]

In an interview that Emir Tamim gave to CNN in 2014 to discuss the Qatari role in the Arab Spring and Doha's relationship with Islamist movements, we find Emir Tamim's

---

[605] "Interview with Hamad bin Jassim," *Charlie Rose*, accessed on August, 27, 2020, https://charlierose.com/videos/17340.
[606] However, Qatar waived good ties Islamic groups who don't believe in democracy as a way to reach power, ex. Al-Nusra and Taliban.
[607] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom. See: Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
[608] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[609] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[610] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
[611] Roberts. "Reflecting on Qatar's "Islamist" Soft Power," 7.
[612] Roberts. "Reflecting on Qatar's "Islamist" Soft Power," 7.

remarks help us understand how Doha took advantage of this role. When asked about his country's controversial support for Palestinian Islamic group Hamas, he said: "We believe that Hamas is an important component of the Palestinian people. We differ with our friends who classify Hamas as a terrorist group."[613] He noted that the US, ten years ago, had asked the Qataris to urge Hamas to take part in Palestinian legislative elections. "The Americans asked us to tell Hamas to engage in the 2006 elections, and Hamas' answer was that we would participate, but do you think that the international community would accept us? My father [Qatari Emir Khalifa bin Hamad] said yes, because the Americans told me that."[614] Regarding the evolution of Hamas' political discourse, Emir Tamim added: "I think there is a development in Hamas' political discourse as Hamas has become more realistic these days, Hamas believes in peace and wants peace but the other side [Israel] must believe in peace too and be more realistic."[615]

As for Qatar's ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, these were also in line with US political orientations in the region. Through these close ties, Doha played a functional role in crystallizing new American trends in the Middle East under the Obama administration. These trends included the allowance of moderate Islamist groups into the Egyptian government, meaning that the old proscription on Islamists taking part in the political process had been nullified. This new tendency came as a result of the rise of Islamist groups during the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen and Libya, which the US had no choice but to accept as a reality.[616]

One of Doha's key geopolitical goals was to play on regional contrasts with a view to gaining the trust of conflictual parties,[617] mainly the US and Islamists. This strategy had been adopted since 2001, after many Islamist figures were expelled from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The US, however, later sought to establish dialogue with many of these groups. Coinciding with these developments, Doha

[613] "His Highness' Interview on CNN."
[614] "His Highness' Interview on CNN."
[615] "His Highness' Interview on CNN."
[616] Kaifa Asbaha al-Ikhwan al-Halif al-aqrab li Qatar, "How MB became Qatari closest ally," *France 24*, accessed on July 19, 2020, https://www.france24.com/ar/20130214-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86,%20accessed%20on%20Apri%2027,%202020.
See also: Anne R. Pierce. "US "Partnership" with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Effect on Civil Society and Human Rights." *Society* 51:1 (2014): 68-69.
[617] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
See: Personal interview, Professor at Doha University Majed al-Ansari, (2020, June 8) Zoom.

hosted a number of regional and international pan-Islamist forums, including the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), the US-Islamic World Forum, and the Al-Nahda Project for Islamic Youth.[618]

A desire for improved ties with Islamist groups in the Middle East prompted US policymakers to have Doha mediate between them and these groups, especially the Taliban, which has an office in the Qatari capital.[619] Close Qatar-Taliban ties were the reason why recent US-Taliban talks succeeded in Doha within only two months while they failed to see any progress in the UAE, despite having gone on for six months.[620] The UAE[621] was eager to convince the US that it could replace Qatar in this role by hosting direct and indirect negotiations between the US and the Taliban.[622] The main reason for the UAE's failure in this regard was the fact that Taliban leaders felt they were being hosted in a "strange or a hostile environment to Islamists" rather than a sympathetic one.[623] Therefore, the Taliban was extremely rigid and didn't show any flexibility in negotiations. While in Qatar, by contrast, Taliban leaders felt they were in friendly (or at least neutral) territory where they could "make concessions and get US concessions in return."[624]

Qatar has not only gained regional influence through its role as mediator. It has also been given space by the US in which to maneuver, especially in regards to Al-Jazeera.[625] Al-Jazeera was the only Arab media platform to give voice to Arab political and religious parties that had been muzzled for decades. The US views this role as an opportunity to recognize and identify the structures, goals and activities of these groups.[626]

Regional influence was not the only gain from Doha's good ties with Islamist parties. The Gulf monarchy also benefited from the popularity of these groups in the Arab and Muslim street, thus bolstering its soft power. Doha managed to garner considerable popular

[618] Qatar wa al-Ikhwan: alaqat qadeema wa daima, "Qatar and the MB, new-old ties," Hafryat, accessed on July 19, 2020, https://hafryat.com/ar/blog/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1.
[619] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[620] US-Taliban talks were held in December 2018 in the UAE to reach a political exit for the Afghani crisis but ended with no breakthrough.
[621] "Taliban leaders meet US officials in UAE over Afghan peace effort," *The National*, accessed on June 17, 2020, https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/taliban-meet-us-officials-in-uae-over-afghan-peace-effort-1.803645.
[622] Trump's team was enthusiastic either for the UAE's plea before the whole bid utterly failed.
[623] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom. See: Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.
[624] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[625] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[626] Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.

support from across the Arab region as a result of its support for the Arab Spring and its close ties with popular Islamist groups. This could be observed in the aftermath of the Gulf crises, and following Qatar's winning of the Asia Cup on February 1, 2019. Spontaneous demonstrations to celebrate Qatar's victory erupted in Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, Palestine, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Somalia and Algeria.[627]

To sum up, Qatar's neighboring monarchies antagonized the Islamist movements that rose to prominence during the Arab Spring, and used their ties with the US to oppose these groups. Qatar, by contrast, took advantage of its good ties with Washington to help bridge the gap between the US and Islamist groups, which also served to promote these groups on the international stage.

6.2. Cultural, Ethical Dynamics: 'A haven for the Oppressed'

Cultural and ethical dynamics also serve to explain Doha's policies regarding the Arab Spring. The Qatari leadership justified its supportive positions by noting that they were in line with principles embodied in the Qatari Constitution, which cites "ethics" as being among the main foundations for the country's foreign policy. This was drawn from the writings and sayings of the founder of the emirate, Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani (1825-1913), who had called for helping and sheltering oppressed peoples. The Qatari emirate was known since his time for harboring opposition figures, including Abdul-Rahman al-Faisal and his son, King Abdul-Aziz, following the demise of the second Saudi State.[628] The culture of harboring oppressed peoples and opposition figures was embraced by Emir Hamad bin Khalifa on different occasions in line with Qatar's pro-Arab Spring policies.[629]

Despite its not being the main driving policy for Qatar's supportive stances toward revolutionary change in the region since 2011,[630] cultural and ethical dynamics matter, and should be highlighted with a view to understanding Qatari interests and policies, as culture and ethics both constitute key principles in the country's domestic politics.[631] While public opinion is rarely considered among the Arab Gulf monarchies, it to a big extent matters in

[627] Limaza fariha al-Arab bihazeemat al-Imarat min qibal Qatar, "Why Arabs are happy for Qatar defeating UAE," *Gulf Online*, https://alkhaleejonline.net/9F, accessed on June, 17, 2020.
[628] Abdul-Aziz Al-Owayyid, "Kaabat al-Madyoum and the Founder of the Qatari State," accessed on April 17, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmiiaDQyTyk.
[629] Abdullah Al-Athba. "Qatar: Kabbat al-Madyoum", *Al-Arab Daily*, Nov. 6, 2012.
[630] Personal interview, Professor at Doha University Majed al-Ansari, (2020, June 8) Zoom.
[631] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.

Qatar, where there is a degree of consistency between regime and society in terms of foreign policy positions. This harmony between the people and the royal family is termed by Kamrava "popular legitimacy."[632]

This was confirmed by the Annual Arab Youth Survey for 2012-2013 conducted by the Bursun-Marsteller Association, in which Qatar ranked first among 15 Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen) in terms of local youth support for the Arab Spring and a sense of "Arab Pride" amid the wave of change. Some 66 percent of Qatari youth agreed "a lot" with this view.[633]

Kamrava asserts: "The Qatari system remains remarkably stable, not so much because of its inherent authoritarianism, but because of its popular legitimacy among an overwhelming majority of Qatari nationals. The regime enjoys considerable legitimacy rooted in a deep nexus between society and the state or, more accurately, between society and the ruling family."[634]

Qatar is also one of the few countries to construct its foreign policy on an ethical dynamic.[635] This was asserted by the Foreign Ministry's *Al-Diplomacy Magazine* in its 28th edition.[636] The magazine asserts that the country's foreign policy is built on ethical principles including honesty, justice, equality and coexistence.[637]

With a view to showing how the country's foreign policy is crafted, Qatari leaders stress that the hosting of opposition figures comes in line with principles embraced by state founder Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed Al Thani. Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammed asserted in one of his poems that he wanted the new state to be a "*Kaabat al-Madiyoum*," meaning a "haven for the dispossessed." He hoped that the emirate would become a destination for oppressed and exiled peoples, as Mecca was a haven for Muslims worldwide. Therefore, for decades, Qatar has hosted a variety of exiled leaders and prominent figures from the Muslim Brotherhood, along with advocates of pan-Arabism and senior figures of the Palestinian

[632] Mehran Kamrava. *Qatar: Small State, Big Politics*, (New York, Cornell University Press, 2013), 14.
[633] "Bursun-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey," *Asdaabm.com*, accessed on July 27, 2020, .http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/pdf/whitepaper/en/2013-AYS-White-Paper.pdf,
[634] Kamrava. *Qatar: Small State, Big Politics,* 14.
[635] Professor Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24). Personal interview, Zoom.
[636] Qatar's Foreign Ministry, official website, *Al-Diplomacy Magazine*, 28 edition, accessed on June 22, 2020, https://en.calameo.com/read/005121764fb8b486ad0e0?authid=P33dur2g0oEP,.
[637] Qatar's Foreign Ministry, official website.

Liberation Organization (PLO).[638] Former Hamas chief Khaled Mishaal has lived between Damascus and Doha since 1999, before permanently residing in the Gulf monarchy following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution.[639]

Doha has also hosted Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a leading Muslim Brotherhood preacher, since the 1960s, along with controversial Indian artist M.F. Husain and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al Hadithi, who was appointed before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.[640]

The Gulf monarchy also harbored former Chechen President Zalimkhan Yandarbiyev from 1999 to 2004 before he was assassinated by Russian agents in the Qatari capital. Other figures include "Omar Bin Laden, a son of Osama Bin Laden; much of Saddam Hussain's family (his wife, daughters and grandsons)[641]; prominent Islamic preachers including the Canadian Bilal Philips and Wagdy Ghoneim; Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, former Mauritanian president, and his family; Abbas Madani, former FIS leader in Algeria; prominent Libyan cleric Ali Al-Sallabi; and former Knesset member and avowed pan-Arabist Azmi Bishara."[642]

This diverse collection of exiles represents a range of principles, ideas and backgrounds. However, most of them were high-profile opposition figures in their home countries, where they struggled against the status quo for decades, subjecting them to considerable danger. Qatar provided safe haven for them with a view to achieving what its leaders see as their country's long-term political and economic interests. All these exiled individuals enjoyed popular support in their respective countries.[643]

This policy was supported by Qatar's religious community, which embraced sensitive Arab issues, such as the Palestinian cause, the Syrian crisis and the Yemeni issue. Manifestations of this included popular Qatari campaigns to aid the Tunisian people in the

[638] Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his family holds Qatari citizenship since he was harbored in Qatar during the early year of the Palestinian revolution.
[639] Roberts, David. "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?." *Middle East Policy* 21:3 (2014): 84-86.
[640] Al-Qaradawi's official website, accessed on Nov. 12, 2019, https://www.al-qaradawi.net/.
[641] "Interview given by Harir Saddam Hussein to Al-Khaleej Online," *Al-Khaleej Online*, accessed on Nov. 12, 2019, https://alkhaleejonline.net.
[642] David, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood, 85.
[643] Andrew Lipp. *The Muslim Brotherhood: Exploring Divergent Views in Saudi Arabia and Qatar*. (Diss. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2019) 11.
See: "Interview with the Qatari former PM Hamad bin Jassim," *BBC*, accessed on June, 17, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8QMRb4mM0c.

wake of their revolution,[644] Syrian people affected by regime bombardments in 2012 and 2013,[645] and similar campaigns for war-torn Yemen.[646] Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, who lived and worked in Qatar for years, suggests a link between the religious community and the country's foreign policy in this regard.[647]

We can also argue that there were social and cultural factors behind Qatar's hosting of opposition figures and its pro-revolutions positions. This dynamic was seen in the people's approval of their country's pro-Arab Spring stance, along with popular campaigns to show solidarity with revolutions in Tunisia, Yemen and Syria. This was not only confirmed by opinion polls, but by the stability the state enjoyed in recent decades.

6.3. Intervening Factors

What we mean by "intervening factors" are the dynamics that helped Qatar take these extraordinary measures during the Arab Spring. These policies were not only designed to serve the country's interests in times of revolution, but also during previous periods. The explanatory factors included here serve to clarify Qatari exceptionalism in regards to the other Gulf monarchies, with the international system allowing, in recent decades, small states to assume outsized roles. The absence of domestic threats has also been a contributing factor in this regard. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Doha was among the few Arab monarchies -- if not the only one -- to see no political unrest upon the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The political unrest that affected Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco at the time serves to illustrate the "exceptional" nature of Al Thani's monarchy.

6.3.1. Globalization and the Rise of Small States

The discipline of international relations' realist approach interprets the behavior of small states (small powers) as always being dependent and subordinate to regional hegemons and international powers. However, a new trend has emerged in international relations

[644] Muhtagoon Tunisiyoun yastalimoun biyoutan madouma min Qatar, "Tunisian people receive Qatar-funded homes," *Babnet*, accessed on June, 17, 2020, https://www.babnet.net/rttdetail-63530.asp.
[645] Hayaa Qatariyya shabiyya tuwasel jamaa al-Daam li-Sourya, "Qatari people network continues fund raising for Syria," *Al-Sharq*, accessed on June, 17, 2020, https://al-sharq.com/article/28/12/2013/%D8%B4.
See also: https://www.qcharity.org/ar/qa/campaign?campaignId=147.
[646] "Qatari people network continues fund raising for Syria."
[647] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.

theorization[648] that gives major significance to the influence of these states, suggesting that small states can exert influence on larger powers if they utilize the potentials at their disposal, such as their strategic locations and resources for which international powers are in dire need. On this basis, many models of relationships between two states (a small one and a large one) have been applied to explain and interpret the behavior of mutual influence, and the impact that small states can have on regional powers and international hegemons.[649]

In the context of security-military alliances, we have the model of an alliance between South Korea and the US, as the Cold War made each international pole desperate to win over countries to its side. This provided opportunities for small states to play outsized roles in international politics, especially if their respective geographies provided one pole with an advantage over the other. This was clear in the advantage that the small island of Cuba gave to the Soviet Union during the 1960s.[650] While small states are usually underestimated in IR, they can play effective roles under certain conditions. For example, the small state of Qatar has played an extremely effective role and enjoyed disproportionate influence in recent decades.

In her book, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*, Annette Baker Fox, a researcher on US international relations, writes of the impact of small states. She points out that a state's capacity to use force is no longer the key determinant in international politics, which was made clear by the diplomacy pursued by small powers when trying to stop World War II.[651]

Major changes in the international system have facilitated Qatar's emergence as an influential player in the regional political arena. In particular, globalization has made it easier for small states to punch above their weight, and to exhibit and exert new forms of soft power. Thus, shifting concepts of power in an interdependent world have enabled small states like Qatar to exert much greater influence overseas. During the first decade of this

[648] Realism and its branch schools (classical realism and structural realism – neo-realism) have remained as the dominant school of thought in the international relations studies since the establishment of the IR discipline in the early 1900s.
[649] Robert O Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, Number 2, (1971) 161-182, quoted by Kanaan. *Saudi-Qatari relations: from cooperation to clash*, 9.
[650] Wayne Wilcox. "The Influence of Small States in a Changing World," *Annals of the American Academy of political and Social Science*, Volume 372, 1976, pp 80-92, quoted by Kanaan. *Saudi-Qatari relations: from cooperation to clash*, 9.
[651] Annette Fox, *The Power of Small States Diplomacy in World War II*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1959) 8, quoted by Kanaan. *Saudi-Qatari relations: from cooperation to clash*, 10.

century, the Gulf States in general and Qatar in particular were seen as effective actors in the global political system. During the oil boom from 2002 to 2008, GCC countries used their energy resources and capital to exert influence vis-à-vis international issues.[652]

The 2008 global economic crisis also accelerated the shift towards interdependence in the international political economy. It also provided an opportunity for Qatar to increase its influence on multinational institutions and IGOs. Qatar, for example, joined the World Economic Forum's Global Redesign Initiative, along with Switzerland and Singapore -- an initiative that brought 28 small- and medium-sized countries together into the G20 orbit. After 2008, as Western countries implemented austerity measures, Qatari LNG expansion peaked, with gross domestic product (GDP) rising by as much as 17 percent annually.[653]

This remarkable growth has provided Qatari policymakers with ample scope to reshape the structure of the international system in an ever-changing world. In May 2009, Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim addressed these issues directly, calling for a major reshaping of the "regulatory frameworks of the prevailing international political system" following the emergence of a multipolar system in which "the West was no longer the only player in the world." In this context, the Qatari emir said in March 2009: "China is coming, India is coming, Russia is on its way too... I don't know if the US and Europe will remain in the world command."[654]

Qatar, as mentioned above, has taken full advantage of its potential to become a significant player on the regional level, thanks to its policymaking approach and the near-total autonomy enjoyed by its small ruling circle of decision-makers. This autonomy has been largely unaffected by domestic political constraints.[655]

The dynamism of Qatari foreign policy during the post-1995 period constituted a challenge to the existing theoretical approach, according to which only large countries can launch initiatives (such as mediation efforts) on the regional and international levels, while small countries are confined to roles of attendance and enrollment. This dynamism has also challenged the view, formulated by Handel[656] and other theorists, that small states cannot

[652] Ulrichsen, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," 6-7.
[653] Ulrichsen, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," 7.
[654] Ulrichsen, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," 8.
[655] Ulrichsen, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," 8.
[656] Michael Handel. *Weak States in the International System*, (London, Frank Cass, 1990).

develop independent policies vis-à-vis international issues.[657] However, the Qatari case shows the state's willingness to offset -- and even compete with -- larger political players on substantial issues, regardless of its smaller size and capabilities.[658]

The clearest example of this was Al-Jazeera's coverage of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Qatar angered its US ally due to its influential Al-Jazeera news outlet, which adopted anti-invasion coverage that exposed abuses and human rights violations by US forces during the eight-year occupation.[659] In 2008, Saudi Arabia was outraged when Qatar hosted various Lebanese opposition factions, including the Iran-backed Hezbollah group, which is hostile to the West, at a peace conference in Doha. The following year, the US, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were similarly enraged when Qatar hosted mediation efforts between Palestinian groups Fatah and Hamas. In response to the move, Riyadh and Cairo boycotted meetings on the Gaza crisis, held in Doha in 2009. The boycott came as Doha "tried to maneuver" for more influence on the Palestinian file, which for decades had been the exclusive preserve of Riyadh and Cairo.[660]

To sum up, the mediation role that the Gulf monarchy has played over the past two decades has given Doha enormous influence in the regional and international arenas. This coincided, as mentioned previously, with the rise of an ambitious political elite that governed the country and took advantage of various dynamics to help Qatar's leadership raise its regional status despite the country's relatively small size and population. This also coincided with the retreat of classical interpretations of the role of small states in international politics.

6.3.2. The Absence of Domestic Threats

Recent years have seen Qatar become a successful model for other Gulf countries in terms of economy, education, health and sports, not to mention the fact that per-capita GDP for Qataris was the world's highest in 2011 and has remained within the top three positions over the last decade.[661]

See also: Maurice A. East, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models', World Politics, Vol. 25 (1973), pp. 556-576.

[657] Rory Miler. "Qatar's Resilience: A Model of Resisting Blockade and the Power of Small States," *Al-Jazeera Center for Studies*, on April 1, 2018.

[658] Miler. "Qatar's Resilience: A Model of Resisting Blockade and the Power of Small States."

[659] Miler. "Qatar's Resilience: A Model of Resisting Blockade and the Power of Small States."

[660] Miler. "Qatar's Resilience: A Model of Resisting Blockade and the Power of Small States."

[661] "Qatar's $129,000 Average Income Is Double Saudi Arabia's: Chart."

The level of individual income for Qatari citizens was very high in 2011, which constituted a unique situation in the Middle East and North Africa, prompting Doha to rule out any possibility of economic turmoil or local political dissatisfaction, with per-capita GDP hitting $147,000 in the year that the Arab Spring erupted.[662] Doha's vast wealth, and the general satisfaction of its citizens, contributed to protecting the country from the unrest that engulfed other states of the region. This level of wealth, along with its small population, led to political apathy among the Qatari people and tempered their democratic aspirations, with few Qataris -- if any -- inclined to challenge the status quo.[663]

A handful of opinion surveys carried out by Qatar University's Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) showed that citizens' confidence in government institutions had increased considerably in the wake of the Arab Spring, while interest in politics and democracy had moved in the opposite direction.[664] According to the results of an Arab Youth Survey carried out in 2010, the number of citizens who viewed democracy as "significant" fell by more than half -- from 68 percent in 2008 to 33 percent in 2010. These results illustrated the difference between Qatar and its Gulf counterparts. In the UAE, for example, the number rose from 58 percent in 2008 to 75 percent in 2011.[665]

When protests broke out in Tunisia in late 2010, the Qatari leadership was in a very favorable position, as the protests came in the midst of Doha's winning its bid to host the 2022 World Cup, which was seen as a recognition of the emirate's influence in the Gulf and the wider Middle East.[666]

With this development, the Qatari leadership seized the opportunity to classify its country as "totally safe" from the unrest then plaguing the region. Confident that their country would remain immune from the protests, Qatari policymakers adopted a clear stance against authoritarian regimes in North Africa and Syria. They were also confident that their financial, media and material support for opposition movements in these countries would

[662] "GDP per capita: Qatar," *World Bank*, accessed on Dec. 17, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=QA&view=chart.
[663] Ulrichsen, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," 9.
[664] Gengler, Justin, "The Political Costs of Qatar's Western Orientation." (2012).
[665] Ulrichsen, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," 9-10.
[666] Ulrichsen, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," 10.

have no domestic consequences, believing that this generous support would make Qatar a major player in the regional and international arenas.[667]

However, some Qatari opposition figures became active -- mainly on social media -- following the 2017 Gulf crisis, with Saudi-backed activists like Mona al-Sulaiti and Khaled Al-Hail openly criticizing the Qatari authorities.[668] The latter, however, downplayed this criticism, calling it "fake and intentionally invented by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi."[669]

Qatar was also among the few countries worldwide that did not feel the shock of the 2008 economic crisis.[670] Doha hosts Arab advisors from all over the region who typically tell the Qatari government to expect low oil prices when devising their annual budget. This solid advice has helped Doha avoid many financial crises, including those seen in 1997 and 2008.[671]

This went hand-in-hand with prudent management and good governance. Having a large number of advisors from across the Arab world, and depending on their advice for critical issues, can be termed "Practicing Consultation in a Royal Court's Context." This means that no one, regardless of rank or position, can alone make critical economic, political or strategic decisions.[672] Renowned Egyptian thinker Saif Abdel-Fattah, who taught in Doha for years, says the Qatari government has been very generous with its people, offering a plethora of job opportunities and high public-sector salaries. This assertion has been echoed by other professors and experts in Qatari affairs.[673]

Here we should note that Qataris in general do not feel deprived. Unlike in Qatar, protests were seen in other Gulf monarchies, including Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

---

[667] Ulrichsen, "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy drivers and regional implications," 10.
[668] "Head of Qatari opposition to launch community debate center in London," *Arab News*, accessed on Dec. 25, 2019, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1499291/world.
See: "Interview with Mona Al-Sulaiti," *Sky News Arabia*, accessed on Dec. 25, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ScvvfOH9b4.
[669] "Questions raised over paid protest timed for Qatari leader's No 10 visit," *The Guardian*, accessed on Dec. 12, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/23/qatar-accuses-gulf-rivals-of-paying-for-political-protest-in-london.
See: Muwatinan Qatariyyan faqat hadarou mutamar al-Muarada fi London, "Only two Qataris attended opposition conf. in London," *UAE-71 News*, accessed on Dec. 12, 2019, http://uae71.com/posts/47487.
[670] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[671] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[672] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.
[673] Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.

In Bahrain, Shias protested their bad conditions, while Kuwait's Saudi Arabia's "Bidoun" population took to the streets to demand greater rights.

Conclusion

Unlike its neighboring monarchies, Qatar was supportive of almost all the uprisings that took place within its geopolitical reach. Qatari backing varied from media support through Al-Jazeera to financial, military and diplomatic forms of support.

There are many driving and intervening factors that help us understand Qatari motives for its pro-revolution policies. A thirst for more influence was the main dynamic behind Doha's pro-change positions. This coincided with the rise of an ambitious political elite represented by the "Two Hamads" (Emir Hamad bin Khalifa and Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim). The personal ambitions of both leaders, and their ties to pro-change figures and Islamist groups, contributed to giving Qatar a considerable significance in the regional and international arenas.

Doha's bid to counter Saudi hegemony in the region also matters, and amounts to one of the main reasons for Doha's behavior. Qatar has refused to act as a passive or dependent entity in the Gulf (as Bahrain does) and has given priority to achieving its national interests at the expense of GCC leader Saudi Arabia and the notion of the "Gulf Home." Qatar challenged Saudi influence in Egypt by allying itself with pro-change movements there, achieving substantial influence in the year and a half following Mubarak's ouster.

Competition with the UAE should be underlined as one of the main geopolitical motives behind Qatari policies. This competition was to a large extent over Egypt, reflecting longstanding tribal jealousies. Following Egypt's revolution, Qatar allied itself with revolutionary figures while the UAE backed anti-revolution personalities and groups.

Furthermore, Qatar benefitted from its close ties with the US and various Islamist groups to accrue more power and influence. Doha has been one of the few Arab countries, and the only Arab monarchy, to emphasize on different occasions that Islamist groups represent wide swathes of the Arab public, and should therefore be included in political processes. The Qatari leadership is convinced that Islamist electoral victories are inevitable, so cooperation with Islamist groups is crucial.

It is worth noting that the role Qatar played during the Arab Spring was also affected by intervening factors, mainly its secure domestic conditions, as the country was practically the only Arab monarchy to face no unrest in 2011. Globalization and the end of the Cold War also contributed to giving small states like Qatar an outsized role in international politics.

The cultural dynamic should also be highlighted with a view to understanding Qatari interests, as culture and ethics constitute key factors vis-à-vis the country's foreign policy. While public opinion is rarely considered among the Arab Gulf monarchies, it mattered in Qatar during the Arab Spring, when there was a large degree of consistency between the regime and society in terms of foreign policy. The Qatari people largely backed their leadership and its pro-Arab Spring policies -- a situation described by Kamrava as "popular legitimacy."

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Unlike the Arab monarchies, Qatar embraced a supportive position towards the Arab revolutions since the moment they broke out in late 2010. In fact, Qatar's Al-Jazeera network had been an essential media mobilizer for the Arab masses, and a major promoter of the revolutionary change process in the region by hosting pro-revolution Arab intellectuals and broadcasting pro-change messages. Qatar also welcomed the Tunisian revolution, and financially backed the country in its transitional stage, as it did in the Egyptian and Yemeni cases. What's more, Qatar made efforts to encourage Arab and international support for humanitarian intervention in Libya and Syria, and generously backed revolutionary forces there both financially and militarily.

Given the fact that Qatar's political system is of the conservative-monarchic type, this dissertation aims at reviewing the dynamics that drove Doha to embrace a pro-change policy in the region during the Arab Spring by asking whether regime "types" matter in terms of their respective reactions to revolutions that occur within their geopolitical reach. Along with studying Qatar's support for revolutions in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Syria, this study has analyzed -- in detail -- Qatar's role in Egypt's revolution with a view to better understanding what has come to be known as "Qatari Exceptionalism."

Many studies have been conducted regarding Qatar's case, but none have examined the driving dynamics that prompted Doha to embrace a pro-revolution stance. Cultural dynamics were also largely overlooked in previous studies that focus on Qatar, including the question of whether public sentiment impacted Doha's foreign policy. Regarding other factors related to the Qatari dynamic, our study greatly benefitted from the existing literature, which includes numerous studies that stress the role of secure and stable domestic circumstances in emboldening Qatar to embrace an "exceptional" foreign policy. In this regard, these studies also cite the role of globalization, along with the rise of small states in international politics, as contributing factors.

This dissertation concludes that revolutionary upheavals have a considerable impact on the international system in general and on countries with vested geopolitical interests in

particular, which can prompt a reaction from the neighbors of the revolution-affected countries, as well as from the great powers. Regardless of regime type, conservative (i.e., authoritarian and monarchic) regimes typically stand against, and work to thwart, pro-change movements within their borders once these movements' ideas and principles don't align with their geopolitical interests. However, in some cases, these regimes have welcomed, or remained neutral towards, pro-change movements that don't pose a threat to their stability and are aligned with their geopolitical interests. As has been shown in various cases, democratic and authoritarian regimes behave in accordance with their particular interests when forging policy in regards to a revolution.

In the case of monarchies, we can say that they tend to support the status quo in regards to pro-change upheavals, regardless of the ideas and principles associated with these upheavals, which they almost invariably perceive as a threat. Saudi Arabia, a blatant example of a pro-status quo monarchy, has opposed pro-change socialist movements in the Arab world (such as Nasser's revolution); backed Iraq's war against Iran's Islamic revolution; financed counter-revolutionary groups in far-away Nicaragua; and became a core member of the counter-revolutionary coalition that emerged in opposition to the Arab Spring.

Here, we also examined the resilience of the Arab monarchies during the 2011 wave of Arab revolutions. Although most of them were hit by initial protests in February and March of 2011, the Arab kings and emirs managed to contain these disturbances through different means. Linchpin[674] (individual) monarchies contained the protests by making concessions, as was seen in Morocco, and by adopting rational measures, as was seen in Jordan. The dynastic GCC monarchies, meanwhile, managed to do so by different means, mainly by "buying" the loyalty of their people through generous grants and subsidies.

The "exceptionalism" of the Qatari monarchy was confirmed at the outset, as it was the only Arab monarchy that saw no dissident activity on its territory during the first weeks of the upheavals. Qatari exceptionalism was also manifested by the monarchy's policy of supporting, in various ways, revolutionary forces in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and -- allegedly – Bahrain. Which, lead us to suggest that the idea depicting monarchies as conservative powers acting against or adopting hostile polices vis-à-vis revolutionary change is falsified within the Qatari monarchy's case.

[674] See the second chapter, where a thorough discussion was made on this issue.

By contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE behaved like typical conservative (i.e., pro-status quo) monarchies, sparing no effort to undermine the wave of revolutionary change in the region. This could be seen in the generous financial and military aid they gave to Arab anti-revolution groups, along with the safe haven they provided to high-ranking regime officials in the early days and weeks of the revolutions.

Unlike neighboring monarchies, Qatar was largely supportive of the various uprisings that occurred within its geopolitical reach. Qatari backing took the form of media support (mainly through its Al-Jazeera network), in addition to financial, military and diplomatic support. Qatari diplomatic support could be seen in Doha's efforts to persuade the Cairo-based Arab League to find "Arab solutions to Arab conflicts," in hopes of arriving at viable and peaceful solutions to the 2011 upheavals in Libya, Yemen and Syria.

Media support by Al-Jazeera for revolutionary activity varied from country to country, with a primary focus on events in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria, and to a lesser degree on Yemen and Bahrain, prompting some pro-revolution activists to criticize the apparent disparity in media coverage.

Qatari financial and military support was reflected by Doha's policy of generously supplying money and arms to various pro-change movements across the Arab world. Both financial and military support was given to movements in Syria and Libya, while strictly financial support was earmarked for the transitional governments set up following the fall of the Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan and Yemeni regimes.

A third means of support was extended by urging regional and international organizations to adopt pro-change positions. For example, Qatar played a major role in calling for joint Arab action against the brutality of the Syrian regime. Doha was also among the first to call for a resolution of the Yemeni crisis through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), while Qatar also tried to convince non-permanent UN Security Council members to support a NATO-backed campaign against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.

In the Egyptian case, which we have studied in detail, we can say that Qatar became extremely influential in the country's politics in the post-revolution era (early 2011 to mid-2013), when Doha utilized its twin capabilities -- money and media -- to influence the Egyptian political scene in particular and that of the Arab world in general. Qatari financial and diplomatic support for post-revolution Egypt was granted to the government, led first

by the military and then by the Muslim Brotherhood, which confirms our view that Doha did not only seek to support Egypt's Islamists, but the revolutionary process in general.

The vacuum that the Arab region witnessed due to Egypt's preoccupation with its own post-revolution affairs allowed Qatar to assume more influence on the country's domestic politics. This was also a result of the close ties the Gulf monarchy was forging with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian pro-change groups and youth activists.

The relative nonexistence at this time of a Saudi role is also notable, since Riyadh adopted a counter-revolutionary strategy in the region before Egypt's 2013 military coup. We can say that Al-Sisi's coup helped the Kingdom restore its regional influence at the expense of Qatar, since the event dealt a major blow to Qatari aspirations in Egypt and had negative effects on Qatar's standing in Libya, Syria and Yemen.

The restoration of Saudi Arabia's regional standing could be seen in the pressure exerted by Riyadh on Doha to normalize ties with the Al-Sisi regime and force Al-Jazeera to soften its editorial policy regarding the coup and Al-Sisi. This ultimately culminated in Qatar's decision to close one of Al-Jazeera's affiliate channels that had been dedicated exclusively to covering events in Egypt as they unfolded.

There are a number of driving and intervening factors that help to explain Qatar's pro-revolution policies. For one, a desire for greater regional power and influence was a main motivator behind Doha's pro-change positions. Notably, Qatar's desire for greater regional sway coincided with the rise of an ambitious political elite, represented by what came to be known as the "Two Hamads" -- namely, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa and Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim. The personal ambitions of both men, along with their ties with pro-change figures and Islamist groups, combined to give Qatar a larger-than-life significance in regional and international affairs.

Doha's desire to counter Saudi hegemony in the region is among the main reasons behind Doha's actions and policymaking at the time. Unlike Bahrain, Qatar refused to behave as a passive or dependent entity in the Gulf, putting its national interests above those of GCC leader Saudi Arabia at the expense of what is referred to there as the "Gulf Home." Qatar vehemently opposed Saudi influence in Egypt by allying with Egyptian pro-change movements, thus achieving substantial influence itself in the first year and a half after Egypt's revolution.

The ongoing Qatar-UAE rivalry should also be underlined here as one of the main geopolitical motivations behind Qatari policymaking. This rivalry was largely over Egypt, with Qatar allying itself with pro-change forces after the revolution while the UAE supported groups opposed to the revolution.

Furthermore, Qatar benefitted from its close ties with the US on one hand and various Islamist groups on the other, which served to give it disproportionate power and influence. Doha has been one of the few Arab countries -- and the only Arab monarchy -- to repeatedly stress that these Islamist groups represent wide swathes of the Arab public, and should therefore be included in power-sharing through democratic processes. The Qatari leadership also believes that, since Islamist electoral victories are inevitable, the wisest course is to cooperate with these groups.

It is also worth noting that the role played by Qatar during the 2011 Arab uprisings was affected by intervening factors, not least of which was its secure domestic situation. As stated above, Qatar was among the few Arab monarchies -- if not the only Arab monarchy -- that did not face any unrest during the months-long initial upheaval. What's more, globalization and the end of the Cold War both gave the micro-state space to maneuver in the arena of international politics.

The cultural dynamic should also be highlighted here with a view to better understanding Qatari policies, as culture and ethics both represent important factors in Qatar's domestic politics. While public opinion is scarcely considered among the Arab Gulf monarchies, it was a key factor in Qatar at the time of the Arab Spring, when the country's foreign policy was closely in line with popular sentiment. The Qatari people largely supported the leadership's pro-Arab Spring policies (confirmed at the time by a number of independent surveys), a situation described by Kamrava as "popular legitimacy."

The strengths of this study and its contributions to the existing literature are as follows. Firstly, this dissertation confirms that regime "type" is not important when analyzing the reactions of various states to revolutions occurring within their geopolitical reach. Hence, the idea that monarchies always behave as conservative powers and adopt hostile polices vis-à-vis revolutionary change is falsified within the Qatari monarchy's case. Secondly, this study has emphasized the resilience of the Arab monarchies during the Arab Spring by dividing them into the following categories: Arab monarchies affected by the revolutions;

Arab monarchies that supported the revolutions; and Arab monarchies that actively opposed the revolutions -- categorizations I have not encountered in existing literature on the Arab monarchies.

Thirdly, there is also a chapter analyzed and documented the ways that Qatar supported these revolutions, which were manifested primarily by media support through the Al-Jazeera network; military support for pro-change forces in Syria and Libya; and financial and diplomatic support for post-revolution Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya and Syria.

A fourth major aspect of this dissertation is its focus and discussion on what for the Qatari "diplomatic support" for revolution-hit countries, a conceptualization of this type of support that was largely lacking in the preexisting literature. Here, the term reflects Qatar's policy of engaging in mutual visits and lobbying regional and international organizations (Arab League, GCC, UNSC, etc.) on behalf of revolutionary forces.

A detailed focus on the Egyptian case is our fifth contribution. This focus was intentional, as Egypt represents the largest and most influential Arab country and Egypt's revolution served to inspire revolutionaries in other Arab states. What's more, the setbacks that undermined revolutionary change in Egypt ended up badly affecting the entire region. Existing studies on Qatar-Egypt relations are relatively rare; our comparison between the two countries' bilateral ties -- first under Morsi and then under Al-Sisi -- serves to shed fresh light on the subject.

The sixth contribution has to do with the driving dynamics we found, including the issue of personal diplomacy and Qatar's ties with both the US and Islamist groups. Studying Qatar's pro-Arab Spring polices cannot be viewed in isolation from the rise of the "Two Hamads," who were not only desirous of power and influence but who were also keen to pursue policies independent of Saudi Arabia. Qatar also benefitted from close ties with Islamist groups, which were based on mutual trust, with Doha becoming a conduit for Western (mainly US) engagement with Islamist forces. Qatari leaders were the only Arab leaders who called for recognizing the Islamists as a rising power that enjoyed tremendous support on the Arab street.

As for future studies by fellow researchers, I highly recommend a greater focus on Qatar's domestic Islamic movements and their role in bridging the gap between current rulers and regional Islamist groups. Further studies should also be conducted on the cultural

dynamic, as the behavior of the Arab Gulf states on the international level cannot be understood through the mainstream IR theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism. The personal element should also be analyzed more closely, as we have seen how the personal views of a single Gulf ruler can run counter to the long-term interests of his country. In this regard, the regional policies of the UAE's Mohammed bin Zayed are a case in point, mainly, his intervention in Libya to back the putschist forces and the billions of dollars he spent to undermine the revolutionary process in the entire region.

The limits of Qatar's foreign policy should also come under greater scrutiny, along with Doha's capacity to resist regional pressure to bring its foreign policy -- especially as it pertains to Egypt -- in line with that of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Saudi factor should be taken into consideration in the future researchers' bid to understand the politics of the GCC in general and of Qatar in particular.

REFERENCES

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Al-Araby Encyclopedia. Al-Thawra al-Yamaniyya, "Yemeni Revolution." Accessed on Sept. 25, 2019. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/encyclopedia/2015/7/8/.

Al-Jazeera Encyclopedia. Al-Thwra al-Souriyya, "Syrian Revolution." Accessed on Sept. 30, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/events/2016/3/7/Syrian-Revolution.

Al-Jazeera Encyclopedia. Al-Thwra al-Yamaniyya, "Yemeni Youth Revolution. Accessed on Sept. 25, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/events/2016/5/25/.

Al-Khater, Lolwa: Press conference, *Al-Jazeera Mubashir*, March 14, 2018, accessed on Sept. 30, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQV5zDeclDk.

Al-Owayyid, Abdul-Aziz. "Kaabat al-Madyoum and the Founder of the Qatari State," Dec. 16, 2019, accessed on April 17, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmiiaDQyTyk.

Al-Qaradawi's main website. "Al-Qaradawi's biography." Accessed on Nov. 12, 2019. https://www.al-qaradawi.net/.

Bursun-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, *Asdaabm.com*, accessed on July 27, 2020, http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/pdf/whitepaper/en/2013-AYS-White-Paper.pdf.

Carlie Rose "Interview with Hamad bin Jassim made by Charlie Rose on May 13, 2014." Accessed on August, 27, 2020. https://charlierose.com/videos/17340.

Encyclopedia Britannica. "Cuban Revolution." Accessed on July 5, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/event/Cuban-Revolution.

Government's State Information Service. "The January 25 Revolution." Accessed on Feb. 17, 2020. https://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/egyptionrevoution/indexjuly.html.

Headley, Robert. People of the Camel, *ARAMCO WORLD*, accessed on April 19, 2020, https://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/196405/people.of.the.camel.htm.

History Guy. "The Wars of Prussia (1792-1871): From the French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian War, the History Guy." Accessed on July 13, 2018, https://www.historyguy.com/wars_of_prussia.htm.

Interview with Qatari FM's assistant, *Al-Jazeera Mubashir*, Dec. 21, 2014, accessed on Sept. 30, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-j-NL9qXV_Y.

Marefa Encyclopedia. "Saudi Protests in 2011-2012." Accessed on Nov. 21, 2018. https://www.marefa.org.

Official Akhbar al-Youm Daily. Al-Raees Morsi yastaqbilu Amir Qatar fi al-Qahira," "Morsi receives Qatari emir in Cairo." Accessed on March 12, 2020. https://akhbarelyom.com/news/newdetails/316858/1.

Official Akhbar al-Youm Daily. Amir Qatar yazouru Masr, "Qatari emir visits Egypt." Accessed on March 14, 2020, https://akhbarelyom.com/news/newdetails/320214/1/.

Official Al-Ahram Daily. Morsi fi Qatar yawm al-Ithnain lihudour al-Qimma al-Arabiyya, "Egypt's Morsi in Qatar Monday for Arab League Summit." Accessed on March 14, 2020. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/67652/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Morsi-in-Qatar-Monday-for-Arab-League-Summi.aspx.

Official Al-Ahram Daily. Tantawi yastaqbilu amir Qatar libahth al-Taawun, "Tantawi receives Qatari emir and discuss cooperation." Accessed on March 14, 2020. http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/66586.aspx.

Official Emiri Court website. "His Highness Interview with Amanpour." Accessed on March 17, 2020. https://www.diwan.gov.qa/briefing-room/news/media-participations/2014/september/26/cnn-interview.

Official page of Emiri Court. "Emir Hamad bin Khalifa speech at the UN's General Assembly meetings in 2012." Accessed on July 20, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxeHMQ58fwQ&ab_channel=AmiriDiwan.

Official page of Emiri Court. "Emir Hamad bin Khalifa speech at the UN's General Assembly meetings in 2012." Accessed on July 20, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=99DGtRxENZc&ab_channel=RTArabic.

Qatar's Foreign Ministry, official website, *Al-Diplomacy Magazine*, July 1, 2016, edition 28.

Qatar's official Government Communication Office, accessed on Abril 15, 2020, https://www.gco.gov.qa/ar/focus/gcc-crisis/.

Qatar's official Ministry of Planning Website, via *CEIC center*, accessed on April 1, 2020, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/egypt/foreign-direct-investment-by-country-annual/foreign-direct-investment-inflow-arab-countries-qatar.

Qatar's official Planning and Statistics Authority website, https://www.psa.gov.qa/en/statistics1/ft/pages/tradebalance.aspx.

Qatari Foreign Ministry, Official Website, accessed on Sept. 19, 2019, https://www.mofa.gov.qa/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85?country=TN#bilateral-relations.

Qatari Official News Agency (QNA) by Al-Jazeera. Qatar tatarifu bil-majles al-Libi kamumathel li al-Shab al-Libi, "Qatar recognizes Libya council as representative of Libyan people." Accessed on Nov. 28, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/3/28/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81-

%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%85%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7.

Qatari Official News Agency (QNA) via the Gulf News. “Qatari financial aid to Egypt wins praise.” Accessed on Nov. 30, 2018. https://www.gulf-times.com/story/338206/Qatari-financial-aid-to-Egypt-wins-praise.

Qatari Official News Agency (QNA), via Qatari Peninsula Newspaper. “Qatar has 2nd largest FDI in Tunisia.” Accessed on Nov. 29, 2018. https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/22/07/2018/Qatar-has-2nd-largest-FDI-in-Tunisia.

Qatari Official News Agency via Zaman Al-Wasl Daily. “Emir of Qatar receives head of Syrian National Coalition.” Accessed on Oct. 5, 2019. https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/34688.

Qatari Official News Agency, via CNN Arabic. Al-Amir al-Qatari yuhanni al-Sisi, al-Safeer yaoud li al-Qahira, “Qatari Emir congratulates Sisi, ambassador returns to Cairo.” Accessed on Abril 11, 2020. https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/06/08/qatar-ambassador-return-egypt.

Qatari Official News Agency. Qatar turahhibu bitanahhi Mubarak, “Qatar welcomes Mubarak’s overthrow.” Accessed on Sep. 22, 2019. http://www.qna.org.qa/arabic-international-news/171857/12-02-2011.

Syrian Embassy in Qatar, *official website*, https://syrembassy.com/.

TED talks. “Wadah Khanfar: A historic moment in the Arab world.” Accessed on Feb 18, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/w:atch?v=yKQnL9Mmgng.

Tunisia’s official website of FDI in Figures, accessed on Dec. 18, 2019, https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/establish-overseas/tunisia/foreign-investment.

Tunisian State Channel. “Qatari Emir Arrives in Tunisia.” Accessed on Sept. 19, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0xQnvkUzRQ.

U.S. Department of Justice, Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras, http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9712/appa.htm.

U.S. Library of Congress. “Egypt and the Arab World.” Accessed on July 13, 2018. http://countrystudies.us/egypt/33.htm.

UAE News Agency. “UAE Embassy in Damascus resumes diplomatic service.” Accessed on Dec. 28, 2018. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302729363.

UN website. “Investment Country Profiles: Tunisia.” Accessed on Dec. 18, 2019. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d7_en.pdf.

US’ Department of State, “Remarks With Qatar Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani After Their Meeting,” Accessed on Sept. 15, 2020. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/134671.htm.

USAID. “20 Years of USAID economic growth assistance in Europe and Eurasia.” Accessed on April 27, 2018. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/EE_20Year_Review.pdf.

World Bank, accessed on Dec. 17, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=QA&view=chart

INTERVIEWS

Personal Interview, Egyptian former investment minister Yahya Hamed, (June 1, 2020).

Personal Interview, Egyptian historian Mohammed Elhami, (2020, April 14).

Personal Interview, Egyptian researcher Saifulislam Eid, (April 19, 2020).

Personal Interview, Head of Al-Qaradwi’s office Issam Tellima, (March 15, 2020).

Personal Interview, Palestinian researcher and writer Sary Sammour, (September 27, 2020).

Personal interview, Professor at Doha University Majed al-Ansari, (2020, June 8).

Personal interview, Professor at John Hopkins University Khalil al-Anani, (2020, June 24) Zoom.

Personal interview, Professor Saif Abdel-Fattah, Egyptian thinker and advisor, (2020, May 17) Zoom.

BOOKS IN ARABIC

Abdullah, Mohanmed Aref. *Dawr qanat al-Jazeera alfadayiya fi ihdath altaghyir alsiyasii fi alwatan al-Arabii: al-thawrat almasriyya namudhjaan, The Role of Al-Jazeera in Enforcing Political Change in the Arab World*, Master’s thesis, (2012), An-Najah University, Palestine.

Abu Zeid, Wasfi. Al-Qaradawi: Al-Imam Al-Thaer, “Al-Qarawadi, the Revolutionary Imam,” Sultan Publishing House, Washington D.C., 2011.

Al-Misfir, Mohammed, *Al-Alaqat al-Khaleejiyya al-Khaleejiyya wa mudelat al-Faragh al-israteeji “Gulf conflicts and the strategic gab challenge,”* (Al-Jazeera Center for Researches and Studies, Doha, 2018).

Al-Sirgani, Raghib, Qissatu Tounis, min al-bidaya hatta Thawra 2011, “Tunisian Story, from the Start until the Revolution,” Aqlam House for Publishing and Translation, (2011), first edition.

Al-Zaidi, Mufid. *Tarikh Qatar al-Muasser*, “*Qatar’s Contemporary History,”* pp. 70, Al-Manahig Publishing House, Amman-Jordan, (2010).

Bishara, Azmi, Masr minal-Thawra ila al-Inqilab, *Egypt from the Revolution to Coup*, Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies. 2016.

Bishara, Azmi. An al-Thawra wal Qabiliyya lil thawra, *On Revolution and Revolutionary Potential*. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha/Beirut, 2012.

El Gimati, Yousef. Thawrat 17 Fibrayer, al-dawafi al-haqeeqiyya lil thawra wa al-awamil al-musaida laha, "*The February 17 Revolution: True Motives and Factors*," University of Benghazi, master's thesis, (2014).

Jaafari, Amal. *Sourat qanat al-Jazeera lada al-Nukhab al-Jazairiyya baad al-thawarat,* "*Image of Al Jazeera among Algerian Elites after the Arab Revolutions,"* (Al-Arabi Bin Mheidi University, Master's Thesis, 2014).

Kanaan, Rawan, *Al-Alaqat al-Qatariyya al-Soudiyya: bayna al-taawun wal tasadum,* "*Saudi-Qatari relations: from cooperation to clash*," (Lebanese University, Master's thesis, 2017.)

Massaeed, Fatmah. *Mustaqbal al-dawr al-iqleemi al-Qatari fi doua al-thawaat al-Arabiyya byna al-tarajuu wa al-tamaddud,* "*The Future of Qatari Regional Role in light of the Arab Revolutions between Retreat and Expansion*," (Qasidi Merbah University, Master's Thesis. 2014).

Rantisi, Mahmoud. Al-Siyasa al-kharijiyya al-Qatariyya tijah al-rabeei al-Arabi wa al-qadiyya al-Filisteeniyya, "*The Qatari Foreign Policy Towards the Arab Spring Countries and The Palestinian Issue*," (Master's thesis, Al-Aqsa University, 2013).

BOOKS IN ENGLISH

Andrew Lipp. *The Muslim Brotherhood: Exploring Divergent Views in Saudi Arabia and Qatar*. (Diss. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2019).

Armstrong, David, and James David Armstrong. *Revolution and world order: The revolutionary state in international society*. (Oxford University Press, 1993).

Finkel, E., & Brudny, Y. M. *No more colour! Authoritarian regimes and colour revolutions in Eurasia. In Coloured Revolutions and Authoritarian Reactions*. (Routledge, 2014).

Fox, Annette. *The Power of Small States Diplomacy in World War II*, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959).

Halliday, Fred. Revolution and world politics: The rise and fall of the sixth great power. (Duke University Press, 1999).

Handel, Michael. *Weak States in the International System*, 2nd edition. (London, Frank Cass, 1990).

Kamrava, Mehran. *Qatar: Small State, Big Politics* (Cornell University Press, 2013).

Kim, Kyung Win. *Revolution and International System*. (New York: New York University Press, 1970).

Korobko, Yana, and Musa, Mahmoud. *The shifting global balance of power: Perils of a World War and preventive measures*. (Xlibris Corporation, 2014.)

Phillips, Christopher. *The battle for Syria: international rivalry in the new Middle East*. (Yale University Press, 2016).

Rosecrance, Richard. *International relations: Peace or war?*. (McGraw-Hill Companies, 1973).

Skocpol, Theda. *States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*. (Cambridge University Press, 1979).

Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The politics of the world-economy: The states, the movements and the civilizations*. (Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Walt, Stephen. The origins of alliances. (Coronell University Press, 1990).

ARTICLES IN ARABIC

Abu Rayash, Musa. Al-Jazeera wa Senaat al-Wai al-Arabi, "Al-Jazeera and the Making of Arab Awareness," *Al-Jazeera Blogs*, on Nov. 25, 2016, accessed on Feb 20, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.net/blogs/2016/11/25/8A.

Al-Athba, Abdullah. Qatar: Kaabat al-Madyoum, *Al-Arab Daily*, published on Nov. 6, 2012, accessed on April 17, 2020, https://www.alarab.qa/story/215284/%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-.

Al-Azzi, Khaled. Dawr Al-Ilam fi taghtiyat al-Thawra al-Souriyya, "Al-Jazeera's role in covering Syrian Uprising." Al-Hiwar Al-Mutammadin, May 10, 2011, accessed on Sept. 29, 2019, https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/19541.

Al-Baz, Mohammed. Suqout al-Aliha, kayfa inhara Mubarak wa rijaluh, "The Fall of the Gods: How Mubarak and His Men Collapsed, Al-Ward Island Publishing House, 2011.

Al-Hawwari, Dandarawi. Hal sataqoum al-Fifa bisahb Hak Qatar min istidafat Kaas al-Alam, "Will FIFA drop Qatari right to host 2022 World Cup," *Youm7*, July 3, 2019, accessed on June 12, 2020, https://www.youm7.com/story/2019/7/3//4316449.

Al-Hroub, Khaled. "Qatar and the Arab Spring," *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*, MENA, Beirut, (2012).

Al-Ibsi, Mohammed. Al-Thawra al-Yamaniyya kadahiyya li taghtiyat al-Jazera, "Yemen's revolution as a victim of Al-Jazeera coverage," *Personal Blog Post*, Aug. 1, 2012, accessed on Sept. 24, 2019, http://mohamedalabsi.blogspot.com/2012/08/blog-post_20.html.

Al-Modallal, Walid and Al-Rantisi, Mahmoud. *Features of the Qatari Foreign Policy.* Islamic University Journal, Gaza, Palestine. 2014, 22-1 (1-33).

Asaad, Kareem. Albahrayn muhafaza Saudiyya: limadha taqbalu dawlatan biltabaiyya? "Bahrain is a Saudi province: why does a state accept dependency?," *Idaat*, July 4, 2018, accessed on July 7, 2019, https://www.ida2at.com/bahrain-saudi-arabia-why-does-country-accept-dependency/.

Aslan, Ali *Limaza tatasadam Qatar wa al-Soudiyya*, "*Why Qatar and Saudi Arabia are clashing*," Insight Turkey (Arabic), 6:4, 2017 (69-83).

Fawwaz, Ali. Asl al-hikaya: Haza ma hasala bayn al-Soudiyya wa Qatar, "Origin of the Saudi-Qatari Story," *Al-Mayadeen News*, June 19, 2017, accessed on Sept. 18, 2020, https://www.almayadeen.net/files/720820/%D8%A3%D8%B5.

Krechan, Mohammed. Fil Zikra al-sanawaiyya al-oula lil Thawra, shukran li qanat al-Jazeera, "In First Revolution Anniversary: Thanks Go to Al-Jazeera Channel," *Babnet*, Jan. 13, 2012, accessed on May 7, 2018, https://www.babnet.net/rttdetail-43806.asp.

Maghawri, Mohamed. Wast taqarir an musalaha khaleejiyya, ayna masr? "Amid reports on Gulf reconciliation, where is Egypt," *Arabi-21*, Nov. 19, 2019, accessed on March 17, 2020, https://arabi21.com/story/1223248.

Qasri, Madani. Qatar wa al-Ikhwan: alaqat qadeema wa daima, "Qatar and the MB, permanent-old ties," Hafryat, Sep. 29, 2019, accessed on July 19, 2020, https://www.hafryat.com/ar/blog/%D9%A9.

Tellima, Issam. Al-Qaradawi wa thawrit yanayer, "Qaradawi and January Revolution,"*Al-Jazeera*, Sep. 27, 2019, accessed on Feb. 12, 2020, http://mubasher.aljazeera.net/opinion/%D9%85%D8%B9.

ARTICLES IN ENGLISH

Abdullah, Jamal. Analysis: Qatar's foreign policy – the old and the new, *Al-Jazeera English*, Nov. 21, 2014, accessed on July 17, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/11/21/analysis-qatars-foreign-policy-the-old-and-the-new/.

Abdullayev, Anar. "Arab Spring and the Resilience of Arab Monarchies. The Case of Bahrain (Budapest: Central European University, 2012)." (2014).

Aggrawal, Mamta. Coalitions: First, Second, Third and Fourth Coalition | French Revolution, *History Discussion*, accessed on July 13, 2018, http://www.historydiscussion.net/world-history/french-revolution/coalitions-first-second-third-and-fourth-coalition-french-revolution/1422.

Al-Houari, Shaima. "The influence of Al Jazeera media network in the Arab public affairs," Media Studies Journal, Germany, Berlin (2018).

Arabi, Kasra and Ansari, Ali. "Ideology and Iran's Revolution: How 1979 Changed the World," *Institute for Global Change*, Feb. 11, 2019, accessed on Sept. 17, 2019, https://institute.global/policy/ideology-and-irans-revolution-how-1979-changed-world.

Ash, G. Timothly. "1989 changed the world. But where now for Europe?" *The Guardian*, Nov. 4, 2009, accessed on July 8, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/04/1989-changed-the-world-europe.

Ayyoub, Mohammed. The GCC shows its true color, the Saudi counter revolution, *Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)*, pp. 27-34.

Barany, Zoltan. "The ‘Arab Spring’in the Kingdoms." *Research Paper, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies* (2012).

Barthe, P. Benjamin. “Qatar: Azmi Bishara, l’éminence libérale de Doha,” *Le Monde*, Nov. 16, 2018, accessed on Feb. 25, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/long-format/article/2018/11/16/qatar-azmi-bishara-un-progressiste-a-doha_5384456_5345421.htm.

Bērziņa, Leva. "Color Revolutions: Democratization, Hidden Influence, or Warfare?. ashx 15 (2014): 2017.

Bouchet, Nicolas. Russia’s “militarization” of colour revolutions. *Policy Perspectives, 4*:2, (2016) 1-4.

Broers, Michel. *Europe After Napoleon: Revolution, Reaction, and Romanticism, 1814-1848*. Manchester University Press, 1996.

Carbonnier, Joakim. *"The Arab Spring and its different outcomes: Explaining the variation in the state of democratization."* 2013.

Chen, C. Titus. China's reaction to the color revolutions: Adaptive authoritarianism in full swing. *Asian Perspective*, 2010, (5-51).

Cramer, Marissa. “Regime reform in the Arab Spring: Explaining divergent paths of Jordan and Morocco.” *Paris School of International Affairs* 1: 2012.

East, Maurice A. ‘Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models’, World Politics, Vol. 25 (1973), pp. 556-576.

Elashmawy, Sherif. "*The Foreign Policies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar towards the Arab Uprisings: The Cases of Egypt, Libya and Bahrain*." 5th ECPR Graduate Student Conference, University of Innsbruck (2014).

Forsythe, Jessica. “*Opportunities and Obstacles for Yemeni Workers in GCC Labour Markets*,” Chatham House MENAP Briefing Paper, (2011).

Gause III, F. Gregory. "Kings for all seasons: how the Middle East’s monarchies survived the Arab spring." *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper* 8 (2013).

Gavin, James. “*Taking the GCC Vision Forward*”, Middle East Economic Digest, supplement GCC Anniversary 2011.

Gengler, Justin. "The Political Costs of Qatar's Western Orientation." (2012).

Goodwin, J., & Skocpol, T. (1989). Explaining revolutions in the contemporary Third World. *Politics & Society, 17*(4), 489-509.

Greenstein, Fred I. “*The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush”.* American Political Science Review 61:629–641. (1967).

Gurses, M., & Mason, T. D. (2010). Weak states, regime types, and civil war. *Civil Wars, 12*(1-2), 140-155.

Huntington, Samuel. Transnational organizations in world politics. *World Politics*, *25*(3), (1973) 334-368.

Ignatius, David, A tough Balancing Act for Jordan, *Washington Post*, Feb. 22, 2014, accessed on Nov. 17, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-tough-balancing-act-for-jordan/2011/02/22/ABucTZQ_story.html.

Ireri, Kioko. "News from Tripoli, Benghazi, Brega and Misrata: How Al-Jazeera and BBC Online News Framed the Libyan Revolution." *AEJMC Conference*, 2012.

Jun, Niu. "The Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy and Its Impact on East Asia: International Patterns in the 1950s." Empire and After: *Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies* (Sapporo: The University of Hokkaido Slavic Research Center, 2012).

Kamrava, Mehran. "The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution." *Orbis* 56.1 (2012): 96-104.

Katzman, Kenneth "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy," CRS Report for Congress, *Congressional Research Service*, May 14, 2012, accessed on Aug. 17, 2019 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.

Keohane, Robert. The Big Influence of Small Allies, *Foreign Policy*, Number 2, (1971) 161-182.

Khanfar, Wadah. "The blockade of Qatar is a move against the values of the Arab spring*," The Guardian*, June 8, 2017, accessed on July 17, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/08/blockade-qatar-against-arab-spring-close-down-al-jazeera.

Knickmeyer, Ellen. "Saudis Gain amid Islamist Setbacks", *Wall Street Journal*, July 7, 2013, accessed on June 20, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324867904578591851561360238.

Koslowski, Rey, and Kratochwil V. Friedrich. "Understanding change in international politics: the Soviet empire's demise and the international system." *International Organization* 48.2 (1994): 215-247.

Mann, J. King Faisal and the Challenge of Nasser's Revolutionary Ideology. *Middle Eastern Studies*, *48*:5, (2012) 749-764.

Marshall, Jonathan. Saudi Arabia and the Reagan Doctrine. *Middle east report*, 155, (1988) 12-17.

Miler, Rory. "Qatar's Resilience: A Model of Resisting Blockade and the Power of Small States," *Al-Jazeera Center for Studies*, April 1, 2018, accessed on June 15, 2020, https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/node/4283.

Mohammadzadeh, Babak. "Status and foreign policy change in small states: Qatar's emergence in perspective." *The International Spectator*, 52.2 (2017): 19-36.

Nuruzzaman, Mohammed. "Qatar and the Arab Spring: Down the foreign policy slope." Contemporary Arab Affairs 8:2 (2015): 226-238.

Occhiuto, Antonino. *Balance of Interests: The UAE-Qatar Competition*, Euro-Gulf Information Center, (2018).

Parshay, Vijad. "Saudi Arabia Wants Qatar to Come Under Its Heel: Even Old Saudi Allies Aren't Exactly Going Along with That," *Salon*, June 18, 2017, accessed on Dec. 18, 2018, https://www.salon.com/2017/06/18/saudi-arabia-wants-qatar-to-come-under-its-heel-even-old-saudi-allies-arent-exactly-going-along-with-that_partner/.

Pierce, Anne R. "US "Partnership" with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its Effect on Civil Society and Human Rights." *Society* 51:1 (2014) 68-86.

Pintak, Lawrence. "The Al Jazeera revolution", *Foreign Policy*, Feb. 2, 2011, accessed on Nov. 30 2018, online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/02/the_al_jazeera_revolution.

Planning and Statistics Authority. "Population Towards Better Life." Accessed on Aug. 17, 2020. https://www.ppc.gov.qa/Admin/sukkannewletter/PPC_Sukan_2019_issue44_EN.pdf.

Rinnawi, Khalil. "Cyber Uprising: Al-Jazeera TV channel and the Egyptian uprising," *Language and Intercultural Communication*, 12:2, (2012) 118-132.

Roberts, David B. *Reflecting on Qatar's" Islamist" Soft Power*. Brookings Institution, 2019.

Roberts, David B. *The four eras of Qatar's foreign policy*. La Política Exterior de Qatar (2016).

Roberts, David. "Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?" *Middle East Policy* 21.3 (2014): 84-94.

Roberts, David. "Is Qatar bringing the Nusra Front in from the cold?" *BBC English*, March 6, 2015, accessed on Oct. 3, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31764114.

Robin, Barry. "The Region: Egypt gets its Khomeni," *Jerusalem Post*, Feb. 20, 2011, accessed on June 10, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/opinion/columnists/the-region-egypt-gets-its-khomeini.

Rock, Aaron. "Qaradawi's Return and Islamic Leadership in Egypt." *Eurasia Review*, 20 (2011).

Rosenau, James. International Studies in a transnational world. *Millennium*, *5*:1, (1976) 1-20.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs* (1944) 599-617.

Sinkaya, Bayram, "Revolution as an Under-Explored Theme in the Middle East", *Ulisa: Journal of International Studies*, 2:2 (2018) 1-12.

Sinkaya, Bayram. "Implications of the Arab Spring for Iran's Policy towards the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Studies/Ortadogu Etütleri*, 6:2 (2015) 54-78.

Steinberg, Guido. "Leading the counter-revolution: Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring," *SWP Research Paper*, (2014) 1-27.

Steinberg, Guido. Qatar and the Arab Spring: support for Islamists and new anti-Syrian policy. *Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politik*, (2012) 1-8.

Stratfor. "Qatar's Role in Libya and Beyond." Accessed on Nov. 29, 2018. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/qatars-role-libya-and-beyond.

Tiruneh, Gizachew. Social Revolutions: Their Causes, Patterns, and Phases. *SAGE Open*, *4*:3 (2014) 1:12.

Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. Qatar and the Arab Spring: policy drivers and regional implications, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 224 (2014).

Viilup, Elina. EU's Weak and Slow Reaction to Arab Spring has no Excuses'. *Opinión Europa", Barcelona Centre for International Affairs*, (2011).

Waltz, Kinneth. The politics of peace. *International Studies Quarterly*, 11:3, (1967) 199-211.

Wehrey, Frederic. The Precarious Ally: Bahrain's Impasse and US Policy. Washington, DC: Carnegie endowment for international peace, 2013.

Wilcox, Wayne. "The Influence of Small States in a Changing World," *Annals of the American Academy of political and Social Science*, Volume 372, (1976) 80-92.

Winter, David G. *Personality and Political Behavior*. In Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, edited by D. O. Sears, L. Huddy and R. Jervis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2003).

Wise, Krysta. Islamic Revolution of 1979: the downfall of American-Iranian relations. *Legacy*, 11:1(2011) Article: 2.

Yom, L. Sean, & Gause III, F. Gregory. (2012). Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on. *Journal of Democracy*, *23*(4), 74-88.

NEWS WEBSITES

Al-Ahram. Amir Qatar astaqbel raees al-Itilaf al-Souri, "Emir of Qatar receives head of Syrian National Coalition." Accessed on Oct. 5, 2019. http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/378200.aspx.

Al-Akhbar Daily. Al-Jazeera tubarriru ada'aha khilal al-Thawarat al-Arabiyya,"Al-Jazeera justifies its performance during the Arab revolutions." Accessed on Oct. 7, 2019. https://al-akhbar.com/Media_Tv/89233.

Al-Akhbar Daily. Al-Thawarat al-Arabiyya taqefu inda hudood al-Khalij, "Arab Revolutions ceased on the outskirts of the Gulf." Accessed on Oct. 7, 2019. http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/4614.

Al-Akhbar Daily. Muaridoun masriyyoun yastabidooun tarheelahum min Qatar, "Egyptian opposition figures rule out reports on their deportation from Qatar." Accessed on March 17, 2020. https://al-akhbar.com/Arab/43627.

Al-Alam TV. tafahumat bayn addawha wa muaridoun masriyyoun bishan iqamatahum fi addawha, "Understandings reached between Doha and Egyptian opponents regarding their residence in Qatar." Accessed on March 17, 2020. https://www.alalamtv.net/news/1584772/.

Al-Arab Daily. Al-Ghanouchi: Qatar shareeka fi al-thawra al-Tounisiyya, "Ghanouchi: Qatar is Partner in Tunisian Revolution." Accessed on Sep. 15. 2019. https://alarab.qa/article/16/05/2012/189284.

Al-Arab Daily. Qatar tad'am Masr walays al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, "Qatar helps Egypt not Muslim Brotherhood: Interview with politician Ayman Nour." Accessed on March 7, 2020. https://www.alarab.qa/story/233821/.

Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed. Al-Imarat Khattatat lifshal istidafet Qatar li qaas el-Alam 2022, "UAE planned to thwart Qatar's hosting for the 2022 World Cup." Accessed on May 12, 2020. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/sport/2017/11/9/.

Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed. Maseer majhoul lil miliyarat al-Khaleejiyya al-mamnouha lil Sisi, "Unknown end for Gulf billions delivered to Sisi." accessed on April 1, 2020. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/economy/2015/2/14/.

Al-Arabiya. Al-Mujtamaa al-Dawli yudeen qami al-Sulutat al-Masriyya li itisam al-Ikhwan bil-Quwwa, "International community condemns dispersing MB's sit-in in Cairo by force." Accessed on March 10, 2020. https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/egypt/2013/08/14/%D8A9.

Al-Arabiya. Masr tueed 2 miliyr dollar li Qatar, "Egypt returns two billion to Qatar." Accessed on April 7, 2020. https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/aswaq/economy/2013/09/19/.

Al-Araby Encyclopedia. Al-Thawra al-Yamaniyya, "Yemeni Revolution." Accessed on Sept. 25, 2019. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/encyclopedia/2015/7/8/.

Al-Ayyam Daily. Abdul-Jaleel yatahaddathu an al-dawr al-Qatari fi al-Thwra al-Libiyya, "Abdul-Jaleel Speaks on Qatari Role in Libyan Revolution." Accessed on Sept. 21, 2019. https://www.alayam.com/online/international/175819/.

Al-Bawaba Daily. Al-Jazeera wa Rassd taqoudan al-Hamla didda thawrat youniyu, "Al-Jazeera and Rassd lead anti-June campaigns." Accessed on March 25, 2020. https://www.albawabhnews.com/176619.

Al-Bayan Daily. Qasaed Mutabadala bayna al-Sheikh Zayed wa al-Shiekh Khalifa bin Hamad, "Poems traded between Emir Zayed and Emir Khalifa bin Hamad." Accessed on Sept. 17, 2020. https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/arabs/2018-04-02-1.3226895.

Al-Bayda News Network. Tanseeqiyyatu al-Shabab al-Yamani yusheedoun bi dawr al-Jazeera fi taghtiyat al-Thawra, "Yemen Youth Coordination hails Al-Jazeera for revolution coverage." Accessed on Sept. 24, 2019. https://sahafahnet.net/news337628.html.

Al-Ghad News Channel. Hadi yasilu ila Addawha, "Hadi arrives in Doha." Accessed on Sept. 24, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a7HO7DLI8dA.

Al-Jazeera English. "Qatar 1996 coup plot: New details reveal Saudi-UAE backing." Accessed on June 20, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/qatar-1996-coup-plot-details-reveal-saudi-uae-backing-181217083526698.htm.

Al-Jazeera. "Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis." Accessed on Dec. 17, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html.

Al-Jazeera. "Oman's Ruler Dismisses Ministers." Accessed on Nov. 17, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2011/03/20113565533194678.html.

Al-Jazeera. "Promos of Libyan Revolution." Accessed on Sept. 20, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Txd1PM2ujVQ.

Al-Jazeera. "Qatar recognizes Libyan rebels after oil deal." Accessed on Sept. 25, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/201132814450241767.html.

Al-Jazeera. "Qatar withdraws from Yemen mediation bid." Accessed on Nov. 30, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/20115136324483285.html.

Al-Jazeera. Abdul-Hakim Bilhadg yatahaddathu an al-Thawra al-Libiyya, "Abdul-Hakim Bilhadg Speaks on Libyan Revolution." Accessed on Sept. 20, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qJzOsHNixKo.

Al-Jazeera. Ajhizatu al-Amn al-Arabiyya, "Arab Security Apparatus," Accessed on June, 11, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJeyuK5RPlg.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Adwar al-Arabiyya fi al-Thwara al-Libiyya asbahat wadiha, "Arab Roles in Libyan Revolution Became Clear." Accessed on Sept. 21, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/10/26/.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Amir Tamim yaltaqi al-Raees al-Yamani, "Emir Tamim meets Yemeni President," Accessed on Dec. 17, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6A_byLr4cWM.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Atiyaa: al-Hal lil azma al-Masriyya yazdadu Sououba, "Al-Atiyya: solution to Egypt crisis getting more difficult." Accessed on April 10. 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/8/14/.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Ihtijajatul al-Bahrainiyya, "Bahraini Protests." Accessed on Nov, 23 2018. https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/events/2015/7/14.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Imarat tastadeefu al-Shakhs al-laze hawala ightiyal al-Malek Abdullah, "UAE hosts the One who Tried to Assassinate King Abdullah. Accessed on Dec. 17, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/6/16/.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Imarat tataqilu khamsat ashkhas bituham tahreed, "The UAE arrests five people for incitement charges." Accessed on September 12, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/4/25/%D8.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Salabi yatahaddathu an al-Thawra al-Libiyya, "Al-Salabi Speaks on Libyan Revolution." Accessed on Sept. 20, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6D6CdE3WWd0.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Sultat al-Yamaniyya tughliqu maqar al-Jazeera, "Yemeni authorities shut Al-Jazeera office." Accessed on Sept. 24, 2019. http://aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/3/23/.

Al-Jazeera. Al-Thawra: Fitna am Rahma, "Revolution: Sedition or Mercy." An episode of the weekly program of Sharia and Life, host: Shiekh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, broadcast on Sep. 11, 2011. Accessed on Feb. 25, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/religionandlife/2011/9/15/.

Al-Jazeera. Amir Qatar yaqtarihu irsal junoud Arab ila Sourya, "Emir of Qatar proposes sending Arab troops to stop massacre in Syria." Accessed on Oct. 5, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2012/1/14/qatars-emir-suggests-sending-troops-to-syria.

Al-Jazeera. Amir Qatar yazouru Masr litaziz al-Alaqat, "Qatari Emir visits Egypt to foster bilateral ties." Accessed on March 14, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2012/8/11/.

Al-Jazeera. Bin Dagr yaftatihu mahattat kahrabaa madouma min Qatar, "Bin Dagr inaugurates Qatar-funded power plan in Aden." Accessed on Sept. 27, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2017/5/26/.

Al-Jazeera. Gaza tastaqbilu Amir Qatar wa ghadab fi Israel, "Gaza to receive Qatari Emir, Israel outraged." Accessed on Sep. 12, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2012/10/23/.

Al-Jazeera. Hal itadat al-Sho'oub al-Arabiyya ala al-Qama, "Do Arab peoples get used to oppression." Accessed on June, 13, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KjEGygFrMEA.

Al-Jazeera. Hamad bin Jassem yatahaddathu ila al-Jazeera, "Hamad bin Jassem speaking to Al-Jazeera, Without Borders Programme." Accessed on July 17, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=seiABoeLxDo&ab_channel=AlJazeeraChannel%D9%82%.

Al-Jazeera. Idanat Arabiyya wa dawliyya li hadith al-aras al-gomhouri, "Arab and international condemnation to Republic Guards incident." Accessed Jan. 1, 2014. https://web.archive.org/web/20140101073716/http://aljazeera.net/news/pages/ec0f8544-18c9-49db-9449-3d47cad4c94e.

Al-Jazeera. Ijtimaa Qatari Masri fi al-Qahira lilrad ala al-Mubadara al-Soudiyya, "Qatar-Egyptian meeting in Cairo in response to Saudi initiative," Accessed on Nov. 30, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2014/12/20/.

Al-Jazeera. Inqilab Haftar, hakika am isti'rad, "Haftar's Coup: Reality or Show off," Accessed on Dec. 18, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2014/2/14/.

Al-Jazeera. Kayfa Tala'abat al-Imarat fi al-Thawra al-Souriyya, "How UAE Manipulated Syrian Revolution." Accessed on Dec. 17, 2018, https://midan.aljazeera.net/reality/politics/2017/6/22.

Al-Jazeera. Ma khafiya Azam: Inqilab 1996, "What was hidden is greater: 1996 coup." Accessed on May 12, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rcyP_b435TQ.

Al-Jazeera. Mohamed Ali: nukhattaitu lihukumat kafa'at lidaratel al-balad baada al-Sisi, "Mohamed Ali: We prepare for experts' government to lead country after Sisi." Accessed on April 7, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UzL68Q0nR6M.

Al-Jazeera. Mustafa Abdel-Jalil yatahaddathu an al-Thwra al-Libiyya, "Mustafa Abdel-Jalil Speaks on Libyan Revolution." Accessed on Sept. 20, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GTHPhiY-P2Y.

Al-Jazeera. Qatar fil Yaman, juhoud azeema listiaadat al-shariyya wal binaa, "Qatar in Yemen: Great efforts to restore legitimacy and reconstruction." Accessed on Sept. 27, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2017/6/5/.

Al-Jazeera. Qatar tansahibu min al-mubadra al-Khaleejiyya hawl al-Yaman, "Qatar Withdraws from Gulf Initiative on Yemen." Accessed on Sept. 28, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/5/13/.

Al-Jazeera. Qatar tudashenu marhalatan jadeeda fi al-Ilaqat maa Masr, "Qatar launches a new stage in ties with Egypt." Accessed on March 14, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/5/3/.

Al-Jazeera. Qatar: nahtarim khayarat al-Shaab al-Masry, "Qatar: We respect Egyptian people's choices." Accessed on April 10, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2013/7/4/.

Al-Jazeera. Sourat al-Sisi inda al-Misriyyeen, "How Sisi's image seen by Egyptians." Accessed on April 7, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E9JxRdlCIcE.

Al-Jazeera. Taarraf ala 14 najah lilwasatat al-Qatariyya, "14 successes in history of Qatari mediation." Accessed on June 12, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/politics/2020/2/29/A9.

Al-Jazeera. Taghtiyat al-Jazeera lil thawarat al-Arabiyya, "Al-Jazeera's Covering for Arab Spring." Accessed on Sep. 17, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/withoutbounds/2011/11/12/.

Al-Jazeera. Tantawi yastaqbilu waliy al-Ahd al-Qatari, “Tantawi receives Qatar’s Crown Prince.” Accessed on March 14, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2011/6/30/.

Al-Jazeera. Tatheer inshiqaq Junoud al-Jaysh ala al-Thawra al-Souriyya, “The Impact of Army Members’ Defection on Syrian Revolution.” Accessed on Dec. 14, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/behindthenews/2013/2/2/.

Al-Jazeera. Waliy al-Ahd al-Qatari yasilu ila Tarablus “Qatari Crown Prince Arrives in Tripoli.” Accessed on Sept. 21, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovnkA-K0F_0.

Al-Jazirah. Al-Raees Hadi yabhath maa Amir Qatar al-Wada al-Yamani, “President Hadi discusses with Qatari Emir Yemeni Situation.” Accessed on Sept. 28, 2019. http://www.al-jazirah.com/2015/20150410/ln92.htm.

Al-Khaleeg al-Jadid. Khubara qanoun, Masr la tastatee’ musadarat al-Istithmarat al-Qatariyya, “Legal Experts: Egypt cannot confiscate Qatari investments.” Accessed on April 9, 2020. https://thenewkhalij.news/article/80127.

Al-Khaleej Online. Fi ghudoun 23 Sana, al-Jazeera manassa Qatariyya mawthouqa, “In 23 years, Al-Jazeera a Qatari-platform trusted by peoples.” Accessed on June 17, 2020. https://alkhaleejonline.net/%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9.

Al-Khaleej Online. Al-Musalaha al-Khaleejiya tutawweju aman min al-khilafat, “Gulf reconciliation culminates a year of odds.” Accessed on April 9, 2020. https://alkhaleejonline.net /2014.

Al-Khaleej Online. Mukabala maa Harir Saddam Hussein, “Interview given by Harir Saddam Hussein to Al-Khaleej Online.” Accessed on Nov. 12, 2019. https://alkhaleejonline.net/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9/%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86.

Al-Khaleej Online. Qatar Akbar dawla Arabiyya mustasmira fi Tunis, “Qatar is Biggest Arab Investor in Tunisia.” Accessed on Sep. 18, 2019. https://alkhaleejonline.net/.

Al-Khaleej Online. Rughma al-Harb, Qatar tadam al-mustashfayat al-Yamaniyya, “Despite war, Qatar aids Yemeni hospitals.” Accessed on Sept. 27, 2019. https://alkhaleejonline.net/.

Almal News Daily. Ma sir tajahul al-Jazeera litaghtiyat muzaharat al-Ard, “Secret of Al-Jazeera’s ignorance to cover land protests.” Accessed on April 1, 2020. https://almalnews.com/.

Al-Masdar. Marzouki: Qatar dafat amwalan listiadat al-amwal al-manhouba, “Marzouki: Qatar paid money to restore Tunisian looted Money.” Accessed on Sept. 19, 2019. http://ar.webmanagercenter.com/2013/04/11/15785/.

Al-Masry Al-Youm Daily. Al-Mawqef al-Masry min al-Azma al-Khaleejiyya: Qaed am tabi, "Egyptian position in Gulf Crisis: leading or dependent." Accessed on June 27, 2017. https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/1154661.

Al-Masry Al-Youm Daily. Al-Sisi yastaqbilu Amir Qatar fi Matar Sahrm al-Shiekh, "Al-Sisi receives Qatari emir in Sharm El-Sheikh airport." Accessed on April 12, 2020. https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/691119.

Al-Masry Al-Youm Daily. Morsi yabeeu Masr lilqatariyeen mukabil al-Musaadat, "Morsi sells Egypt to Qataris in exchange for aid." Accessed on March 5, 2020. https://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/285066.

Al-Monitor. "Closure of Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr big blow to MB," Accessed on April 1, 2020. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/originals/2015/01/al-jazeera-egypt-suspension.html.

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. Qimmatu Addawha: yawm Irani mutheer liljadal, "Doha Summit: A Controversial Iranian Day." Accessed on Sept. 18, 2020. https://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=448341&issueno=10598#.X3NP8pMzZQI.

Al-Sharq Daily. Ahad qadat inqilab 1996 yakshef tafaseel jadeeda, "One of 1996's coup leaders reveal new details." Accessed on May 5, 2020. https://al-sharq.com/article/24/12/2018/.

Al-Sharq Daily. Al-daim al-sirri Al-Imarati lil Houthiyeen, "UAE's Secret Support for Houthis." Accessed on Sept. 18, 2019. https://www.al-sharq.com/article/22/07/2018/.

Al-Sharq Daily. Al-Ghanouchi yashkuru Amir Qatar ala al-Daam, "Ghannouchi thanks Qatari Emir over Support." Accessed on Nov. 29, 2018. https://www.al-sharq.com/article/07/10/2016/.

Al-Sharq Daily. Al-Imarat hiya daim al-Assad al-raeesi didda al-Thawra, "UAE Assad's Biggest Supporter against Revolution." Accessed on May 5, 2020, https://www.al-sharq.com/article/28/12/2018/.

Al-Sharq Daily. Al-Imarat maljau al-Fasideen, "UAE Refuge for Corrupt." Accessed on Jan. 22, 2019. https://www.al-sharq.com/article/01/12/2017/.

Al-Sharq Daily. Azzam: al-Sisi yunaffizu Ajenda Imaratiyya fi Masr, "Azzam: Sisi carries out Abu Dhabi's Agenda in Egypt." Accessed on March 25, 2020. https://al-sharq.com/article/23/11/2017/.

Al-Sharq Daily. Hayaa Qatariyya shabiyya tuwasel jamaa al-Daam li-Sourya, "Qatari people network continues fund raising for Syria. "Accessed on June, 17, 2020. https://al-sharq.com/article/28/12/2013/%D8%B4.

Al-Sharq Daily. Marzouki: Qatar kanat al-Daem al-Iqtisadi al-Waheed lil Tajruba al-Tounisiyya,. "Marzouki: Qatar was only economic support for Tunisian experience." Accessed on Sep. 17, 2019. https://www.al-sharq.com/article/05/10/2018/.

Al-Sharq Daily. Nahwa 90 muassasa fi Addawha limunaqashat huloul al-azma al-Yamaniyya, “Around 90 NGOs in Doha to discuss solutions to Yemeni crisis.” Accessed on Sept. 27, 2019. https://www.al-sharq.com/article/19/02/2016/90.

Al-Sharq Daily. Qatar taftatihu 7 mustashfayat maydaniyya fi taiz, “Qatar opens 7 field hospitals in Taiz.” Accessed on Sept. 27, 2019. https://www.al-sharq.com/article/11/08/2015/7-.

Al-Sharq Daily. Qatar tuaqabu li damiha al-Thawra al-Yamaniyya, “Qatar is punished for supporting Yemeni revolution.” Accessed on Sept. 24, 2019. https://www.al-sharq.com/article/01/07/2017/.

Al-Sharq Daily. Rabeeul Dawha fi Sanaa yamnahu nufouzan li hulafaiha al-Judud. “The Doha Spring in Sanaa gives influence for its new allies.” Accessed on Sept. 28, 2019. http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2012/12/12/620296.

Al-Wafd Daily. Addawha, Tarikh min al-Adaa li Masr, “Doha: history of hostility to Egypt.” Accessed on Sept. 18, 2019. https://m.alwafd.news/article/1564717.

Al-Wasat Daily. Al-qowwa al-Qatariyya fil Bahrain tahdefu lihifz al-amn wa al-nizam, “Qatari military force in Bahrain is responsible for maintaining security and order.” Accessed on Oct. 7, 2019. http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/532796.html.

Al-Wasat Daily. Amir Qatar yastakbilu raees hukumat al-itilaf al-watani al-Souri, “Emir of Qatar receives head of Syrian National Coalition’s Government,” Accessed on Oct. 5, 2019. http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/840427.html.

Al-Watan Daily. Majlis al'aemal al-Misrii al-Qatari: alghumud sayyid almawqif, “Vagueness of Qatar-Egypt Business Council.” Accessed on March 12, 2020. https://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/124243.

Anadolu Agency. Addawha tashtari 3 miliar dolar sanadat min Masr, “Doha buys 3-billion bonds from Egypt.” Accessed on March 8, 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/ar /242036.

Annahar Daily. Al-Jazeera fi Muwagahat al-Sisi, al-Taghtiya mustamirra, “Al-Jazeera vs. Sisi, Coverage is ongoing.” Accessed on March 25, 2020. https://www.annahar.com/article/129094.

Annahar Daily. Wasail Ilam tajahalat taghtiyat muzaharat al-Ard, “Media outlets ignored to cover land protests.” Accessed on April 1, 2020. https://alnnhar.com/Show_news5068.html.

Arab News. “Head of Qatari opposition to launch community debate center in London.” Accessed on Dec. 25, 2019. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1499291/world.

Arabi-21 Daily. Wast Anbaa an musalaha Khaleejiyya: ayna Masr?, “Amid reports on Gulf reconciliation, where is Egypt.” Accessed on Abril 15, 2020. https://arabi21.com/story/1223248/.

Babnet. Essaid: Qatar akthar dawla saadat Tounis iqtisadiyyan wa siyassiyyan fil marahala al-intiqaliyya, “Essaid: Qatar the most country helped Tunisia politically and

economically in the transition period." Accessed on Sept. 19, 2019. https://www.babnet.net/rttdetail-116861.asp.

Babnet. Muhtagoon Tunisiyoun yastalimoun biyoutan madouma min Qatar, "Tunisian people receive Qatar-funded homes." Accessed on June, 17, 2020. https://www.babnet.net/rttdetail-63530.asp.

Bahraini News Agency's YouTube Channel. "Bahrain accuses Qatar of backing anti-Manama protests." Accessed on Dec. 25, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wh-A8DoFtz8.

BBC. "Arab Summit begins by inviting Syrian opposition to sit on the Syrian seat." Accessed on Oct. 4, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2012/01/120114_syria_qatar_troops.

BBC. "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Jordan." Accessed on Nov. 14., 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482679.

BBC. "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Morocco," Accessed on Nov. 14., 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482680.

BBC. "Arab Uprisings: Country by Country: Oman," Accessed on Nov. 14., 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12598273.

BBC. "Arab Uprisings: Country to Country: Kuwait," Accessed on Nov. 14., 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-19401680.

BBC. "Arab Uprisings: Country to Country: Saudi Arabia," Accessed on Nov. 14., 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482678.

BBC. "Egypt finance: Qatar steps in to ease Cairo cash crisis." Accessed on March 8, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20945844.

BBC. "Interview with the Qatari former PM Hamad bin Jassim." Accessed on March 8, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8QMRb4mM0c.

BBC. "Iran-Iraq War: 25 Years On." Accessed on July 8, 2018. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm.

BBC. "Libya air strikes: Conflict linked to wider Middle East." Accessed on Dec. 19, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28948948.

BBC. "Mohammed Morsi's trials and convictions." Accessed on Feb. 18, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806.

BBC. "Qatari-Saudi Relations: A History of Conflicts and Tensions." Accessed on Oct. 15, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-40172427.

BBC. "Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood 'terrorist group'". Accessed on Dec. 14, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26487092.

BBC. Al-Soudiyya wal-Imarat wal-Bahrain tashabu sufaraaha min Qatar, “Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain withdraw ambassadors from Qatar.” Accessed on March 20, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/03/140305_gulfstates_qatar_envoys.

BBC. Itlaq sarah alshurtiayn almasriyyain almutahamin biqatl Khalid Saeid, “Egyptian authorities release two suspects of Khaled Saied case.” Accessed on Feb. 15, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2013/06/130601_khaled_said_trial_egypt.

BBC. Itlaq sarah murasil al-Jazeera Abdullah al-Shami, “Al-Jazeera’s journalist Abdullh al-Shami got released.” Accessed on March 25, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/06/140617_egypt_aljazeera_release.

BBC. Qatar tudeenu qarar mahkama masriyya biwadaa al-Ikhwan ala qawaimu al-irhab, “Qatar slams Egyptian court's decision to enlist MB on Terror List.” Accessed on Feb. 18, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2014/01/140104_qatar_egypt.

Bloomberg. “Qatar's $129,000 Average Income Is Double Saudi Arabia's: Chart.” Accessed on Sept. 25, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-08/qatar-s-129-000-average-income-is-double-saudi-arabia-s-chart.

CNBC. “Qatari foreign minister criticizes Iran sanctions, UAE foreign policy as ‘destabilizing’.” Accessed on Dec. 17, 2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/16/qatar-foreign-minister-on-gulf-blockade-saudi-arabia-and-us-sanctions.html.

CNN Arabic. Albahrain: qatar wara' ahdath 2011 wuqufan wa takhtitan “Bahrain: Qatar behind the 2011 events, by planning and supporting.” Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/2017/08/29/bahrain-qatar-2011-responsibility.

CNN Arabic. Al-Kharijia al-Masriyya tastadei alqayimain bial'amal al-Qatarii wa al-Bousnii, “Egyptian Foreign Ministry summons Qatari, Bosnian Chargé d'Affaires.” Accessed on April 10, 2020. https://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2014/02/04/egypt-qatar-bosnia.

CNN Arabic. Qatar tusdiru afwan an al-muttahameen bimuhawalet al-inqilab, “Qatar pardons prisoners of failed coup attempt.” Accessed on May 5, 2020. http://archive.arabic.cnn.com/2010/middle_east/5/25/qatar.saudi/.

Daily Sabah. “Qatar emir pledges $1.25B to support Tunisian economy.” Accessed on Sep. 18, 2019. https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2016/11/30/qatar-emir-pledges-125b-to-support-tunisian-economy.

Daily Sabah. “Qatar's emir leaves Arab League summit in Tunisia prior to delivering his speech.” Accessed on Sept. 19, 2019. https://www.dailysabah.com/world/2019/03/31/qatars-emir-leaves-arab-league-summit-in-tunisia-prior-to-delivering-his-speech.

Daily Telegraph. “Assad should face war crimes trial, not peace conference, says Qatar.” Accessed on Oct. 4, 2019. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10495630/Assad-should-face-war-crimes-trial-not-peace-conference-says-Qatar.html.

DW. Maseer al-Alaqat al-Qatariyya al-Masriyya faad qati al-alaqat, “The fate of Egypt-Qatar relations after cutting ties.” Accessed on April 9, 2020. https://www.dw.com/ar/a-39162694.

DW. Qanat al-jazeera al-Qatariyya bayn maeayeer almisdaqiyya wa itihamat bil tateem wal intiqaiyya. “Al-Jazeera between credibility and accusations of blackout and selectivity.” Dec. 30, 2012. Accessed on Sept. 30, 2019. https://www.dw.com/ar/a-16486692.

DW. Qatar tatlob min qiyadat al-Ikhwan al-mughadara khilal osbou, “Qatar asks MB leaders to leave within a week.” Accessed on March 17, 2020. https://www.dw.com/ar /a-17919602-0.

DW. Shalgam yattahimu Qatar fitasleeh al-Mutamarrideen fi Libya, “Shalgam accuses Qatar of arming Libyan rebels,”, accessed on Sept. 22, 2019, https://www.dw.com/ar//a-15541722.

Elaph news. Mubarak yastaqbelu wazir kharijiyyat al-Imarat, “Mubarak receives UAE's Foreign Minister.” Accessed on July 17, 2020. https://elaph.com/Web/news/2011/2/630430.html.

Financial Times. “Qatar bankrolls Syrian revolt with cash and arms.” Accessed on Sept. 30, 2019. http://ig-legacy.ft.com/content/86e3f28e-be3a-11e2-bb35-00144feab7de#axzz64DkG4Eh1.

Financial Times. “Qatar gives Egypt $3bn aid package.” Accessed on Nov. 30, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/790a7d52-a1f4-11e2-8971-00144feabdc0.

Foreign Policy. “A Five-Star Retirement Home for Dictators.” Accessed on Dec. 3, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/23/a-five-star-retirement-home-for-dictators-2/.

France 24 via Elaph daily. Fatma Nabil wa Akharin yastaqilun min al_Jazeera, “Fatma Nabil, others resign from Al-Jazeera.” Accessed on March 25, 2020. https://elaph.com/Web/Entertainment/2013/7/822795.html.

France 24. “Gabriel C, International Coverage of the Arab Spring.” Accessed on Sept. 24, 2019. file:///Users/aa/Downloads/International_Coverage_of_the_Arab_Sprin.pdf.

France 24. Al-Hukouma al-Misriyya tusannifu al-Ikhwan jamaa irhabiyya,“Egyptian gov't classifies MB as terror group.” Accessed on June 15, 2020. https://www.france24.com/ar/20131225.

France 24. Al-Udeid satabqa qaida daima fi Qatar, “Al-Udeid to remain as a permanent military base in Qatar.” Accessed on June 20, 2020. https://www.france24.com/ar/20180724-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%.

France 24. Hal Amir Qatar al-jadeed sayughayiru siyasat Addawha al-kharijiyya, “Will Qatar’s New Emir Change Doha’s Foreign Policy.” Accessed on Dec. 15, 2019. https://www.france24.com/ar/20130726.

France 24. Hal hana al-waqt al-munasib lilmusalaha bayna Masr wa Qatar, “Is it exact time for reconciliation between Qatar, Egypt.” Accessed on April 11, 2020. https://www.france24.com/ar/20141211.

France 24. Kaifa Asbaha al-Ikhwan al-Halif al-aqrab li Qatar, “How MB became Qatari closest ally.” Accessed on April 17, 2020. https://www.france24.com/ar/20130214.

France 24. Qatar tanfi al-tadakhul fi al-shaan al-Bahraini al-dakhili, “Qatar denies meddling in Bahrain's internal affairs.” Accessed on Oct. 7, 2019. https://www.france24.com/ar/20181105.

France 24. Qatar tudaif al-musaadat li Masr, “Qatar doubles aid to Egypt.” Accessed on March 8, 2020. https://www.france24.com/ar/20130109.

Gulf Online. Limaza fariha al-Arab bihazeemat al-Imarat min qibal Qatar, “Why Arabs are happy for Qatar defeating UAE.” Accessed on June, 17, 2020. https://alkhaleejonline.net/9F.

Kuwaiti News Agency. Al-Raees al-Misry yujri Mubahasat maa al-Amir al-Qatari, “Egyptian President holds talks with Qatari prime minister.” Accessed on March 17, 2020. https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2308107&language=ar.

Listverse. “Top 10 Revolutions Felt Around the World.” Accessed on June 28, 2018. https://listverse.com/2010/10/04/top-10-revolutions-felt-around-the-world/.

Masr Al-Arabiyya daily. Masr al-Sisi fi muwajaha maa al-Jazeera, “Sisi’s Egypt in confrontation with Al-Jazeera.” Accessed on March 25, 2020. https://masralarabia.net/53847.

Masr al-Arabiyya. Saheefa Austuraliyya: Qatar wa al-Soudiyya: khilafat hkdalat bisabab awasif al-rabeei al-Arabi, “Australian daily: Qatar and Saudi Arabia .. Disputes sparked by storms of the Arab Spring.” Accessed on April 15, 2020. http://www.masralarabia.com/1440975.

Masrawy Daily. Al-Safeer al-Qatari yughadiru Addawha, “Qatari envoy leaves Cairo.” Accessed on April 15, 2020, https://www.masrawy.com/news/news_egypt/details/2017/6/7/1101043/.

Masrawy Daily. Ighlaq al-Jazeera Mubashir howa tasheeh limawqif, “Closure of Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr correction for situation.” Accessed on April 1, 2020. https://www.masrawy.com/news/news_egypt/details/2014/12/24/416265/.

Masress Research Engine. Nashit Bahraini: Al-Jazeera tajahalat Ahdath al-Bahrain, “Bahraini rights activist: Al-Jazeera ignored Bahraini events.” Accessed on Oct. 7, 2019. https://www.masress.com/tahrirnews/66989.

MBC Egypt. Khitab Morsi youm 27 Huzairan, 2013, “Morsi’s speech on June 27, 2013.” Accessed on June 19, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPwBswZ7cng.

Middle East Eye. “UAE provided military aid for Haftar, says Libyan politician.” Accessed on Dec. 18, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-provided-military-support-haftar-says-libyan-politician-1056112839.

Middle East Eye. “Why the UAE and Saudi Arabia are reaching out to Assad.” Accessed on Dec. 24, 2018. https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-arab-states-are-lining-work-syria-1164125942.

Middle East Monitor. “Egypt opposition figures in Qatar rule out deportation.” Accessed on March 20, 2020. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20141222-egypt-opposition-figures-in-qatar-rule-out-deportation/.

Middle East Monitor. “New Sisi leaks exposes UAE support for military coup.” Accessed on Dec. 18, 2018. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150302-new-sisi-leaks-exposes-uae-support-for-military-coup/.

Moroccan News Hespress. Al-Jazeera tastakhdimu mustalah raees liwasf al-Sisi, “Al-Jazeera uses term ‘presidnet’ to identify Sisi.” Accessed on April 1, 2020. https://www.hespress.com/international/249960.html.

Mubashir Daily. Al-Istismarat al-Qatariyya: noqta fasila fi al-Alaqat al-Iqtisadiyya bayna al-Qahira wa Addawha, “Qatari Investments: Turning Point in Doha-Cairo Economic Relations.” Accessed on March 12, 2020. https://www.mubasher.info/news/2153945/.

New York Times. “Gulf Council Reaches Out to Morocco and Jordan.” Accessed on Dec. 15, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/world/middleeast/26iht-M26-GCC.html.

Noon Post. Al-Imarat taqoud hamla li-takhreeb tounis, “UAE is messing around in Tunisia.” Accessed on May. 17, 2020. https://www.noonpost.com/content/23171.

Oriental Review. “What Does The UAE Stand To Gain By Destabilizing Somalia?.” Accessed on Dec. 17, 2018. https://orientalreview.org/2018/04/12/what-does-the-uae-stand-to-gain-by-destabilizing-somalia/.

POMED. “State Dept “Concerned” By Death Sentence for Al-Jazeera Journalists.” Accessed on March 25, 2020. https://pomed.org/egypt-daily-update-report-documents-massive-abuse-of-pretrial-detention/.

Rai Al-Youm Daily. Al-Azma al-siyasiyya bayna Addawha wa al-Qahira tatasa’ad, “Political Crisis Between Doha, Cairo Escalates.” Accessed on April 10, 2020. https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/.

Rai Al-Youm Daily. Musalaha Qatariyya Masriyya biriaayat al-Soudiyya, “Saudi-sponsored reconciliation between Qatar, Egypt.” Accessed on April 11, 2020. https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/.

Reuters. “Analysis: Politics hinders aid to Arab Spring economies.” Accessed on Dec. 16, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-aid/analysis-politics-hinders-aid-to-arab-spring-economies-idUSBRE85Q0W720120627.

Reuters. “Pro-reform Saudi activists launch political party.” Accessed on Nov. 22, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-opposition/pro-reform-saudi-activists-launch-political-party-idUSTRE71942L20110210.

Reuters. “Qatar to give $1.25 billion of aid to Tunisia: Emir.” Accessed on Sep. 18, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-qatar-idUSKBN13O0Z5.

Reuters. “Regional partners pledge billions in help for Tunisia.” Accessed on Sept. 19, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-economy-investment/regional-partners-pledge-billions-in-help-for-tunisia-idUSKBN13N1KC.

Reuters. “UAE lists Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist group.” Accessed on Dec. 17, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-politics-brotherhood/uae-lists-muslim-brotherhood-as-terrorist-group-idUSKCN0IZ0OM20141115.

Reuters. “UAE offers Egypt $3 billion support, Saudis $5 billion.” Accessed on Dec. 14, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-protests-loan/uae-offers-egypt-3-billion-support-saudis-5-billion-idUSBRE9680H020130709.

SABA News Agency. Al-Raees Hadi yasilu ila Qatar, “President Hadi arrives in Qatar.” Accessed on May 7, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_uH5C3xBCVo.

Sasapost. Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr: tuarrikhu li al-Thwra al-Masriyya, “Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr, chronicling Egyptian revolution.” Accessed on April 1, 2020. https://www.sasapost.com/aljazeera-mubasher-misr-from-begnning-to-ending/.

Sasapost. Awdit muhandis al-Siyasa al-Kharijiyya al-Qatariyya, “Engineer of Qatar’s foreign policy comes back.” Accessed on June 17, 2020. https://web.archive.org/web/20190401021811/https://www.sasapost.com/sheikh-hamad-bin-jassem-the-architect-of-qatars-regional-policy-is-back/.

Sasapost. Kaif qawwadat al-Imarat al-Rabeei al-Arabi, “How the UAE Undermined the Arab Spring.” Accessed on Dec. 17, 2018. https://www.sasapost.com/why-emirates-against-the-arabic-spring/.

Sky News Arabia. Masr tueed 2 milira dolar li Qatar, “Egypt returns two billion to Qatar.” Accessed on April 7, 2020. https://www.skynewsarabia.com/business/700430.

Sky News Arabia. Mukabala maa Munaal-Suleiti, “Interview with Mona Al-Sulaiti.” Accessed on Dec. 25, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ScvvfOH9b4.

Sky News Arabic. Amir Qatar yakhtatimu ziyara li Masr, “Qatari Emir Concludes Visit to Egypt.” Accessed on Nov. 30. 2018. https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/51891.

Sputnik. Al-Imarat taruddu bishakl rasmi ala ittihamat Qatar bishaan inqilab 1996, “UAE officially responds to Qatari accusations regarding 1996’s coup.” Accessed on May 12, 2020. https://arabic.sputniknews.com/arab_world/201812171037552899.

Tasnim news agency. “Bahraini King’s Comments on Qatar Provokes Controversy,”, Accessed on July 17, 2020. https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2018/08/19/1806854/bahraini-king-s-comments-on-qatar-provokes-controversy.

Telegraph. “Former Qatari PM has eyes on top UN job.” Accessed on Dec. 15, 2019. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11172018/Former-Qatari-PM-has-eyes-on-top-UN-job.html.

The Economist. “Qatar provides financial support to Tunisia.” Accessed on Sep. 18, 2019. http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1649086349&Country=Qatar&topic=Politics&subtopic=Recent+developments&aid=1&oid=327865217.

The Guardian “Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels.” Accessed on May 17, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/26/qatar-troops-libya-rebels-support.

The Guardian. “Al-Jazeera employees among six sentenced to death in Egypt.” Accessed on May 17, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jun/18/al-jazeera-employees-among-six-people-sentenced-to-death-in-egypt.

The Guardian. “Libyan rebels receiving anti-tank weapons from Qatar.” Accessed on Sept. 22, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/14/libya-rebels-weapons-qatar.

The Guardian. “Qatar admits sending hundreds of troops to support Libya rebels.” Accessed on April 2, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/26/qatar-troops-libya-rebels-support.

The Guardian. “Qatar pushes to give Syria's seat on Arab League to rebels.” Accessed on Nov. 30, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/25/syria-qatari-influence-rebels-arab-league.

The Guardian. “Questions raised over paid protest timed for Qatari leader's No 10 visit.” Accessed on Dec. 12, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/23/qatar-accuses-gulf-rivals-of-paying-for-political-protest-in-london.

The Guardian. “Tunisian uprising fires a warning to region's hardliners.” Accessed on July 10, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/tunisia-uprising-regional-reaction.

The Independent. “Emir of Qatar deposed by his son.” Accessed on Sept. 17, 2020. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html.

The Intercept. “Leaked Documents Expose Stunning Plan to Wage Financial War on Qatar and Steal the World Cup.” Accessed on Sept. 19, 2020. https://medium.com/theintercept/leaked-documents-expose-stunning-plan-to-wage-financial-war-on-qatar-and-steal-the-world-cup-a2ccf802fa0c.

The National. “Taliban meet US officials in UAE over Afghan peace effort.” Accessed on June 17, 2020. https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/taliban-meet-us-officials-in-uae-over-afghan-peace-effort-1.803645.

The New York Times. “Qatar’s Emir Visits Gaza, Pledging $400 Million to Hamas.” Accessed on Sep. 12, 2019.

https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/world/middleeast/pledging-400-million-qatari-emir-makes-historic-visit-to-gaza-strip.html.

The Telegraph. "King Hussein of Jordan." Accessed on July 13, 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/royalty-obituaries/7136625/King-Hussein-of-Jordan.html.

The Telegraph. "Saudi and UAE ready $20bn boost for Egypt's El-Sisi." Accessed on Dec. 17, 2018. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10868522/Saudi-and-UAE-ready-20bn-boost-for-Egypts-El-Sisi.html.

The Washington Institute. "The Doha Conference: A Post Mortem." Accessed on Sept. 20, 2020. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-doha-conference-a-post-mortem.

The Washington Post. "Princely feuds in the Persian Gulf thwart Trump's efforts to resolve the Qatar dispute." Accessed on May 12, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/princely-feuds-in-the-persian-gulf-thwart-trumps-efforts-to-resolve-the-qatar-dispute/2018/05/13/7853cc88-39cf-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html.

UAE-71 News Website. Muwatinan Qatariyyan faqat hadarou mutamar al-Muarada fi London, "Only two Qataris attended opposition conf. in London." Accessed on Dec. 12, 2019. http://uae71.com/posts/47487.

Youm-7 Daily. Abo Al-Naga: Qatar manahat Masr 500 milyon dolar lidaam al-Mizaniyya "Abo Al-Naga: Qatar granted Egypt with $500 million to help the Egyptian budget." Accessed on March 7, 2020. https://www.youm7.com/story/2011/10/5/506376.

Youm-7 Daily. Balagh qanouni lighlaq al-majless al-iqtisadi al-Masri al-Qatari, "Legal complaint to shut off Qatari-Egyptian Business Council. Accessed on April 9, 2020. https://www.youm7.com/story/2013/4/11//1015116.

Youm-7 Daily. Hizb al-Nour yurahhib biiadat al-minah al-Qatariyya, "Al-Nour party hails decision to refund Qatari loans." Accessed on April 7, 2020. https://www.youm7.com/story/2014/11/12//1948318.

Youm-7 Daily. Khabir: qarar siyasi wa shabi liiadit al-amwal al-Qatariyya, "Expert: Political, public decision to refund Qatari loans." Accessed on June 20, 2020. https://www.youm7.com/story/2014/10/15/1906399.

Youm-7 Daily. Raees al-Wuzaraa al-Qatari sayahdur itlaq al-Majles al-Iqtisadi al-Masri al-Qatari, "Qatari PM to attend launching of Qatar-Egypt Business Council." Accessed on March 12, 2020, https://www.masress.com/youm7/778951.

Youm-7 Daily. Wazeer al-Thaqafa al-Qatari yastaqbelu raees al-wuzaraa al-Masri, "Qatari culture minister receives Egyptian PM." Accessed on March 17, 2020. https://m2.youm7.com/story/2013/4/9//1013081.