T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE IMPACT OF ENCYCLOPEDIC CONCEPTUALIZATIONS ON PUBLICIZATION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE: A COMPARISON OF *ENCYCLOPÉDIE* AND AL-RASA'IL AL-IKHWAN AL-SAFA

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ONAY SAYFASI

Kemal UFUK tarafından hazırlanan “The Impact of Encyclopedic Conceptualizations on Publicization of Political Knowledge: A Comparison of *Encyclopédie* and al-Rasa’il al-Ikhwan al-Safa” adlı tez çalışması aşağıdaki jüri tarafından oy birliği ile Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı’nda Doktora tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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ÖZET

Ansiklopedik Kavramsallaştırmaların Siyasi Bilginin Kamusallaşması Üzerindeki Etkisi: *Encyclopédie* ve İhvan-ı Safa Risaleleri Üzerinden Bir Karşılaştırma

Bu çalışma, Immanuel Kant'ın aydınlanma tanımını merkeze alarak, farklı tarihsel ve kültürel bağlamlarda ortaya çıkmış iki kolektif ve ansiklopedik eseri karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. İncelenen eserler, İslam medeniyetinin Altın Çağı'nda yazılmış İhvan-ı Safa'nın Risaleleri ile 18. yüzyıl Batı Aydınlanması'nın ürünü olan ve Denis Diderot'un öncülüğünde hazırlanan *Encyclopédie*'dir. Karşılaştırma, temel olarak altı kavram üzerinden yürütülmektedir: özgürlük, hak, ahlak, eşitlik, egemenlik ve adalet. Bu kavramlar; birey (özgürlük ve hak), toplum (ahlak ve eşitlik) ve siyaset (egemenlik ve adalet) başlıkları altında, üç düzeyli bir analiz çerçevesiyle ele alınmıştır. Çalışmada Annales Okulu'nun tarihyazımı anlayışı, Derrida'nın yapısöküm yöntemi ve yorumlayıcı yaklaşım bir arada kullanılmış; ayrıca bulanık küme teorisi ve matematiksel fonksiyonların temel mantığı bu yöntemsel çerçeveye destek sağlamıştır. Her bir kavramın tarihsel gelişimi izlenmiş, bu kavramlara söz konusu eserlerde nasıl yaklaşıldığı analiz edilmiş, benzerlik ve farklılıklar ortaya konulmuş ve bu eserlerin sonraki düşünsel üretimlere etkisi belirli referanslar aracılığıyla tartışılmıştır. Çalışmanın temel iddiası, Kant'ın "aydınlanma"yı aklın kullanımıyla tanımlayan yaklaşımından hareketle, farklı dönem ve medeniyetlerde ortaya çıkan düşünsel projelerin benzer sorulara benzer cevaplar verebildiğini göstermektir. Bu bağlamda, bireyin akıl yoluyla özgürleşmesi, toplumun bilgi ve ahlaka dayalı olarak dönüşmesi ve siyasetin adalet temelinde örgütlenmesi gibi ortak düşünsel yönelimler, insanlığın evrensel entelektüel mirasının parçaları olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İhvan-ı Safa, Risaleler, Diderot'un *Encyclopédie*'si, Aydınlanma, İslam'ın Altın Çağı.

ABSTRACT

The Impact of Encyclopedic Conceptualizations on Publicization of Political Knowledge: A Comparison of *Encyclopédie* and al-Rasa'il al-Ikhwan al-Safa

This study explores two major encyclopedic works that appeared in different cultural and historical contexts, guided by Immanuel Kant's definition of enlightenment as the individual's use of reason when confronting problems. It focuses on al-Rasa'il al-Ikhwan al-Safa (the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity) from the Islamic Golden Age and the *Encyclopédie*, primarily initiated by Denis Diderot during the Western Enlightenment. The comparison focuses on six key concepts divided into three groups: the individual (freedom and rights), society (morality and equality), and politics (sovereignty and justice). Each concept is analyzed through its philosophical development leading up to these texts and how it is discussed within them. This study uses an interdisciplinary approach that combines the historiographical method of the Annales School, Derrida's deconstruction technique, and interpretive method, while utilizing the logic of the fuzzy set theory and mathematical functions. It aims to show how both texts addressed similar questions despite originating from different intellectual traditions. The study identifies conceptual similarities and differences and shows that rational thinking can produce similar responses across different enlightenment periods, highlighting a shared intellectual heritage that transcends geography and time. The findings indicate that using reason as a transformative force—at the level of the individual, social structures, and political authority—has been a common concern among thinkers separated by centuries and civilizations. Eventually, this study argues that enlightenment is not a solely Western phenomenon but a broader human pursuit of understanding and collective progress.

Keywords: al-Ikhwan al-Safa, al-Rasa'il, the *Encyclopédie*, the Enlightenment, the Golden Age of Islam.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation aims to identify a common thread in how encyclopedias have addressed political ideas across various phases of enlightenment—in the broader sense, despite these phases occurring at different times and in different places. To gain a clearer understanding, it examines two examples—al-Rasa'il al-Ikhwan al-Safa and the *Encyclopédie*—each tied to its own distinct historical context.[1] Since they come from such different backgrounds, the study needs a solid method to connect them meaningfully. That is why the sections on concerns and rationale outline where these texts overlap or address similar themes. The thinking here stems from a combination of factors—how encyclopedias played a role in enlightenment thought, how the concept of 'enlightenment' itself is not a singular entity, the interconnection between words and ideas, and the evolution of meanings over time. The conceptual framework part utilizes a theory called fuzzy set theory to group common ideas between these two encyclopedias. This ultimately points to three general areas that concern political knowledge and its transmission. From there, the methodology section explains how the research was conducted, outlines the main question, and states the hypothesis. The chapter concludes with a literature review that sets the stage for what follows.

1. Concerns of the Study

This section aims to highlight how the central problem of this study was discovered. It follows a gradual advancement; therefore, each section, identified by Roman numerals, represents a phase of mental reasoning in the process that shaped the question. This method, which links diverse thoughts to each other using Roman numerals, will also be employed throughout the Introduction section.

[1] The former name refers to a group of intellectuals who lived in 10th-century Basra, and these individuals were part of the Golden Age of Islam. Their full name is *Ikhwan as-Safa wa Khullan al-Wafa wa Ahl al-Hamd wa Abna al-Majd* (Brethren of Purity, and Loyal Friends, and People worth Praising, and Sons of Glory). This name will be shortened as "the Ikhwan" in the study. Their encyclopedic work is known as *al-Rasa'il al-Ikhwan al-Safa*, which will also be shortened as "al-Rasa'il". In the same vein, the *Encyclopédie* has a full name as *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (Encyclopedia, or [a] Systematic Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Crafts). However, this work will also be shortened to "the *Encyclopédie*" in the study.

I

In the present day, we are subject to different political paradigms and continuously evolving ideologies.[2] This reality goes beyond the general populace and encompasses various participants, including scholars, social scientists, survey researchers, and seasoned political practitioners: all are equally vulnerable to this paradigm. Still, people have a chance to shelter themselves from this paradigm with their once-acquired political insights. That is, a link can be established between what was accumulated and what they deal with in the present day within the realm of political knowledge. Modernity introduced several new political terms and concepts, which cover a broad spectrum, ranging from regional to national and from local to global. The experienced individuals, particularly the elders, can establish this link more easily; however, those born into this environment, such as Generation Z, aim to reassess and reclassify these paradigms (Seemiller & Grace, 2019, pp. 29–30; Kuran, 2021, pp. 49, 58). The Internet is crucial in this knowledge-acquisition process; it is remarkably easy to access unlimited information with a few taps on the screen, from learning about the current ministers of Nicaragua to the gross domestic product level of Cambodia. This is a fresh political socialization method that the world has never experienced before. Still, it has never been the sole path for receiving political knowledge, particularly in previous centuries.

[2] The significance of the term 'ideology' in this context should not be underestimated. Although the concept of ideology has its roots in the modern era, dating back to its coinage by Destutt de Tracy in the French Revolution, the importance of major political ideologies such as liberalism, communism, conservatism, and nationalism, which were once globally influential, has not faded away but have begun to lose their throne in terms of establishing a presence in the ideological field within their own parameters, that is, being reshaped and differentiated by various new ideological identities. Consequently, the intellectual products of Western Civilization in the modern era, namely ideologies, have given way, making room for a diverse spectrum of identities ranging from religious to cultural, as well as populist, after the Cold War (Huntington, 1997, pp. 53–54). These identities have taken on the role of ideologies, albeit in a [much] more minor capacity. For instance, Islamism, once a grand ideology seeking to unite all Muslims under one banner, has now fragmented into geographically or ethnically limited forms. Various manifestations of Islamism still exist, no doubt, from terrorism-related regional interpretations like those seen in ISIS, Hamas, and Abu Sayyaf (The World Factbook, 2023), to minority-related interpretations demanding sharia found in Muslim communities residing in Christian Europe. Similarly, the doctrines of conservatism have become subject to interpretation, primarily influenced by charismatic leaders. Modern movements like Erdoganism in Turkey, infused with a touch of Pax-Ottoman utopia and heavy populist discourses (Koukoudakis, 2017), and the QAnon movement in the U.S., characterized by conspiracy theories and a certain confidence in Donald Trump's government style (Amarasingam & Argentino, 2020), exemplify this trend. Likewise, feminism, once a unifying concept for women, has given rise to several movements that have evolved into distinct micro-ideologies. These movements range from body-positivity feminism (also known as the fat-acceptance movement) to LGBTQ+ communities, which initially found support within feminism for the latter (Bilodeau & Renn, 2005). They have articulated themselves within various grand ideologies. These movements, along with countless others, incessantly transform into micro-ideologies. Whether it is the Western-centric hesitant-acceptance of movements such as Black Lives Matter or the global phenomenon of Korean style of popular music (K-Pop) obsession amongst the youth in various nations, these involvements have become parts of daily life for all and have dynamic senses within the realm of politics, enriching and diversifying the aforementioned political panorama.

Communication tools assist the acquisition of new political concepts: the elders instantly recognize the theme, and the youth place them on the correct shelves immediately. Still, a pedagogical method utilizing similar communication instruments functioned differently in earlier times—before the information age to be exact—limitations were in effect in accessing the new political principles introduced by the scholars. Indeed, these erudite people were the primary sources of knowledge throughout history; still, they lacked an efficient means of disseminating their knowledge to the broader public.

II

A notable figure in the encyclopedic tradition, Ephraim Chambers (1728, p. i), claimed in the preface section of his *Cyclopeædia* that distributing knowledge to the masses efficiently was challenging for a scholar in their lives because of a certain principle of nature: humans die. Perhaps this is why scholars devised a solution by illuminating people with the texts they penned, which endures even after their death; that is, they found a form of immortality through this method (Ferry, 2007, p. 58).[3] Interestingly, some religions also promote this kind of immortality. For example, in Islam, the benevolent actions of believers continue to be recorded as good deeds even after their death; they only need to establish a contribution to the community that outlives their lives. These contributions vary; examples include some good actions, such as digging a water well, establishing a *waqf* (endowment), and compiling a reference book (Duman, 2008, pp. 383–384). In the same vein, Hinduism promotes this kind of immortality through a principle it introduced: *daan* (selfless giving), which is one of the essential *niyama*s—the constituting virtuous actions (Randhawa et al., 2012). Furthermore, the doctrine of *karma* (cycle of rebirth) underlines this enduring influence of an individual's choices across successive lifetimes (Renou, 1993, p. 53). That is to say, the link between enlightening the masses and searching for immortality could have been the reason that the scholars tended to express their

[3] Marking one's name to their creations was exalted as a means of achieving a form of immortality for the individual. Michel Foucault (2004) asserted that this practice, initially formulated as a strategy to ward off mortality, finds its echoes even in Scheherazade's tales within the *"One Thousand and One Nights"*, where the mentioning of her name [alongside her tales] became a symbolic quest for the perpetuity of her existence. This ritualistic practice has produced a temporal pattern, he claimed, a motif perhaps, eventually gave rise to the evolving concept of 'the author'. With the endurance of the authorial concept, the notion of 'ownership' emerged, thereby facilitated fresh avenues for authors to derive financial income from their works; escorted by some legal responsibilities for the content they have authored. Nevertheless, the conjunction of ownership and the financial benefits it granted has empowered authors with the autonomy to disseminate their very own conceptualizations of things to the public; afforded them the freedom to propagate their ideas and actualize their further projects afterwards.

thoughts in written form for ages.[4] Still, regardless of the chosen methodology or the original intention, transmitting knowledge to the masses has been a persistent challenge throughout history, and numerous methods have been developed to alleviate this issue.

In the past, scholars utilized libraries to disseminate their scholarly contributions, making it possible for knowledge to circulate. Still, the emergence of libraries was not related to this purpose, but rather aimed to satisfy the intellectual and academic needs of the royal elite—these repositories were not open to the general public. King Ashurbanipal II of the Neo-Assyrian Empire in the seventh century B.C.E. is known as an early pioneer of such knowledge repository systems. His library was located within the palace, and only a select group of noble individuals were allowed inside, alongside the king himself. The tablets in his library were regarded as so precious that some warnings were carved onto tablets that any attempted theft would anger the divine deities. Imminent royal punishments, including mutilation and execution, were also in effect (Casson, 2001, pp. 9–15). Three centuries after Ashurbanipal II, Alexander the Great established a city on the banks of the Nile Delta in Egypt, which is now known as Alexandria. This city changed the fate of libraries. The Great Library of Alexandria

[4] The concept of immortality mentioned here differs from the spiritual meanings seen in discussions such as Plato's *Phaedo*, where Socrates interprets the indestructible nature of the soul, or the enduring existence of the soul as contemplated in religious philosophy (Plato, 2005, pp. 277–279). Instead, the focus here is on guaranteeing the immortality of one's actual name. This approach aims to inscribe the creator's exact name on the creation rather than adopting a pseudonym. This tendency [or perhaps custom] dates back to the Renaissance period. With this, a new type of individualism was born, which detached itself from the Medieval mode of thinking. Such a trend extended beyond artistic and literary creations to various other domains of effort during the same era; designers, engineers, and artisans carved their names on public works ranging from siege machines to bridges and canals. Additionally, this practice occasionally included engraved silhouettes of the creators' faces. Such gestures not only served to fortify the credibility of their contributions but also functioned as an instrument to enhance the enduring legacy and immortality associated with their names (Eisenstein, 2005, pp. 147–154). True that, the quest for immortality through the act of inscribing one's name, or desiring to be remembered by future generations [or by other people of their times at the worst-case scenario], claimed to be manifesting itself in graffiti-like acts of mischief in public spaces as well. Although considered repulsive in several ways, this phenomenon has been coined the *"I was here syndrome"* (Chylińska & Kosmala, 2023). Historical evidences also underline this tendency, as even Roman ladies of pleasure carved their names on the walls of their working chambers (Mohr, 2013, p. 26), they desired a lasting legacy similar to the generals of Napoleon who, without any hesitation, left their marks on the walls and pylons of Egyptian pyramids (Warren, 2014). This tendency persists; in some easily accessible places, such as public building walls and restroom doors, many others would eventually notice a simple declaration to be written: "I was here" (Stocker et al., 1972). In a rather funny yet shocking incident, a highly skilled Internet hacker named Ekber successfully infiltrated the information networks of Istanbul's public transportation system on the morning of March 21, 2016, at a time when commuter flow often reaches its peak. During this breach, all digital screens within the public vehicles and stops displayed a singular and straightforward message to the people for approximately 90 minutes: "EKBER was here" (İETT, 2016). Despite Mr. Ekber's (assuming the hacker was a male since Ekber is a male name) proficiency in information technology, his ambitions seemed limited to a form of self-publicity, resembling historical instances mentioned above where individuals declared their presence with a simple and familiar phrase: "I was here". Indeed, this act brought Ekber instant fame, making him the most famous figure in Istanbul for a brief time on that particular day. Still, the echoes of his daring achievement continue to be shared through various social media platforms from time to time. The impact of his brief yet memorable violation, which continues to make him somewhat immortal, as his identity remains unknown except for his name, Ekber (assuming it was not an alias).

became the central repository for ancient Greek manuscripts, which gave prestige to scholars and scribes; they were now under royal patronage (Battles, 2003, pp. 26–27).

Still, it can be said that neither this nor the others were open to the public for centuries. This is also true for the Roman Empire, which was an intellectually vibrant era, and for the zenith of Islamic civilization, known as the Golden Age of Islam, during which the *Bayt al-Hikmah* (House of Wisdom) was established in Baghdad. The inception of the first public library, in the modern sense to be exact, can be traced back to the year 1444 in Florence. This development happened under the patronage of the House of Medici. Still, even this one was accessible only to the nobility, clergy, and wealthy elite—the general populace was not welcome (Battles, 2003, pp. 67–68). The emergence of the first publicly funded libraries, sustained through taxation alone, dates back to the 18th century. Some notable examples of such libraries include the establishment of a public library in Russia in 1714, the opening of the British Museum in 1753, and the founding of the *Bibliothèque Nationale* (National Library) of France in 1793 (Burke, 2000, p. 58; Battles, 2003, pp. 121–122). Still, one must realize that the compilers and authors of the texts stored in these repositories remained financially reliant on the benevolence and protection of rulers and/or the wealthy elite.[5]

III

In more recent centuries, in the 17th century to be exact, a new method was introduced in Europe for distributing knowledge: a subscription-based self-funding system. It first emerged in England through periodicals, which aimed to disseminate knowledge to the public by relying solely on their financial support. The method was highly effective because it relied on bilateral promises: customers paid the price of the product, and authors and booksellers promised that they would receive their texts on time. Thousands of separate books were published by

[5] This paragraph provides a general overview of the historical evolution of libraries. However, a notable inquiry arises regarding the equivalence in accessibility to knowledge between its producers and recipients. Throughout history, the 'produced' knowledge has maintained a shared "bookish" culture within its exclusive and parochial circles, as underlined by Elisabeth L. Eisenstein (2005, pp. 7–9). This cultural phenomenon is visible in various historical places such as the bookstores of Ancient Rome, the Library of Alexandria, medieval monasteries, university towns, and more. A parallel can be drawn for the Islamic geographies, where madrasas, mosques, and the libraries of sultans cultivated their own scholarly elites. In contrast, the laity in both spheres of influence acquired knowledge through alternative agents, including ballads, songs, gospels, sagas, parables, and fables. This oral transmission of knowledge gave rise to and developed its own unique cultural climate. The following chapters will delve into an exploration of these diverse cultures and examine the transformative influence of encyclopedias on the modes of disseminating and receiving knowledge—the aforementioned cultural nuances will be discussed thoroughly.

employing this approach during seventeenth-century England (Clapp, 1931). This method was a form of 'commercializing knowledge'; still, it was not an unfamiliar approach. This can be traced back to ancient times, where the Sophists taught people in exchange for money—Plato criticized them for their 'nasty' business. However, Cicero labeled knowledge as a form of possession, and suggested that it could be bought, leased, or even given away by its owner. In the Middle Ages, however, knowledge was regarded as a divine gift; nonetheless, these voices did not gain widespread acceptance over time (Burke, 2000, p. 150).[6]

Consequently, it can be said that there was no such ethical concern in eighteenth-century England; both the buyers and sellers of knowledge were satisfied. This satisfaction was so high that a significant number—no less than 100,000 individuals—subscribed to the soon-to-be-published books during this period, which underlines a mutual understanding and acceptance of this freshly introduced practice (Burke, 2000, p. 167). That is to say, scholars and authors were now able to disseminate their knowledge to a broader public, which also provided them with financial independence. For instance, [with its more famous name] Diderot's *Encyclopédie*, was a significant example of this practice outside of England; it was also motivated by financial gains. From this perspective, those who were unable to adapt to this new method were relegated from this league, such as the marginalized "Grub Street" community. In contrast, the successful ones were able to gain substantial financial rewards (Burke, 2000, pp. 29–31). Indeed, Charles Joseph Panckoucke, one of the notable publishers of the *Encyclopédie* and who became very rich in the publication business with a total of seventeen journals at his

[6] The aforementioned tendency did indeed gain support; however, it did not experience a universal acceptance during the medieval period in Europe. Minding that the extensive duration of the Middle Ages existed through a millennium, it is foreseeable that diverse ideas emerged over time. [Saint] Augustine, a seriously influential figure in scholasticism throughout this particular era, hypothesized that the essential value of knowledge lay in its teleological essence. According to his perspective, knowledge possessed a [religious] purpose; it was a manifestation of divine origin, with which God having implanted the seeds of knowledge within humanity. Yet, individuals could only recognize this purpose briefly, similar to a momentary illumination when lightning strikes, and at the mighty will of its celestial bestower as well (Adămut, 2009). Augustine (1953, pp. 103–107) openly confessed that in his youth, he possessed a fantasy involving Faustus of Mileve, a renowned philosopher of his time. He dreamed of Faustus granting him with comprehensive philosophical knowledge by simply presenting it in a bowl to eat and digest, rather than communicating through metaphors. Interestingly, he later condemned Faustus and deemed [can be read as doomed] his thoughts as demonic. This anecdote perhaps sheds light on his perspective. As a devout Christian believer, Augustine attributed the ultimate source of knowledge to the Christian God within the limitations of his beliefs. Consequently, he classified the stages of knowledge into three distinct categories as external, internal, and supernal. These categories encompassed knowledge derived from some outer sources, knowledge inherently recorded in the human mind, and knowledge directly bestowed by God, respectively (Fokin, 2015). To exemplify, the first category referred to empirical knowledge, such as an understanding that the fire burns. The second category hosted any metaphysical knowledge, including the belief in salvation after death. Lastly, the third category represented by the knowledge accessible only to prophets and mystics, a selected and privileged group throughout history. Augustine's perspective means that any knowledge fitting into the first category, which is observable and empirical, had no ethical doubts, even within the realm of his fanatical theological viewpoint.

disposal, clearly mentioned that his entire effort was to ‘sell’ knowledge in exchange for financial gains, with no ulterior motives (Lough, 1978, pp. 215–216; Burke, 2000, p. 173).

This profit-driven process was a natural consequence of the invention of the printing press in Europe. It managed to transform the dissemination of knowledge radically and to standardize it; the accessibility and sharing of knowledge became equalized for the general public (Burke, 2000, p. 11). The entire printing process was restricted by the availability of ink and paper alone; if the publisher had these, the rest of the business depended on the demand of the people. The importance of the printing press can be evaluated through *The Athenian Constitution* by Aristotle, which is said to be one of 158 treatises that examined the government style of a city-state in Greece. However, the only surviving copy of these is the one about Athens (Rackham, 1935, pp. 2–3). The rest of them are lost in history and unlikely to be recovered one day. It would be a fitting comment that Aristotle would have desired these texts to be passed on to future generations. Additionally, by reminding people of his insights and the value of his writings, he would have preferred to disseminate his work through the printing press. Although these comments cannot be proven, the printing press’ functionality was crucial for the dissemination of knowledge.

IV

The paragraphs in this section above indicate that there were two primary ways to disseminate knowledge in pre-modern times: through libraries and via subscription. These methods remain valid in the current intellectual and academic climate. However, the concern had to be supported by some notable figures. By performing a quick search in the memory, one may come up with numerous names. Still, the intellectual products of these names fall short in representing the pure dissemination of knowledge and its intention. This concern arose in two intellectual groups that possessed these two traits: the Ikhwan al-Safa (Brethren of Purity), with their al-Rasa’il (Epistles) from the 10th century, and the *Encyclopédie,* co-edited by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert in the 18th century. Besides, these works were not written by a single author, but instead were the products of two groups of intellectuals, which means the knowledge found in these texts reflects a consensus, to some extent. Additionally, al-Rasa’il was a product of the Golden Age of Islam, whereas the *Encyclopédie* was a product of the Western Enlightenment, allowing for a cross-cultural examination. Under these circumstances, the concern was in need of just one link to connect these two texts, and Immanuel Kant

completed the circuit. According to him, the concept of enlightenment was *"the escape of men from their self-incurred tutelage"* (Kant, 1995, p. 6), which means it is required to use reason to become enlightened. His period was not an enlightened one, but they were living in an age of enlightenment since people were able to solve their problems by utilizing their reason (Kant, 1995, p. 5). From this perspective, the Golden Age of Islam can be viewed through the same lens as Kant. That is to say, both ages can be categorized under the title of age of enlightenment, both intellectual groups were sharing same consensus with their colleagues, both texts were the compilations of this consensus, both texts aimed to disseminate knowledge, and this is why, both texts were written in the form of an encyclopedia. This is how the earlier concern was transformed into a problem.

2. Rationale and Limitations of the Study

This study aims to compare two different encyclopedic traditions through their most well-known products: al-Rasa'il of Ikhwan al-Safa and the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and d'Alembert. The primary purpose is to select specific political terms, which will be specified below, and to cross-compare these works while evaluating their impacts on their civilizations by expanding political knowledge and assisting political socialization. However, there are some obstacles that need to be removed or put into quarantine before; so that these two different items can become subjects to a comparison. These obstacles include the different methodologies employed in these two encyclopedic works, the varying timelines and civilizations, and, finally, the incompleteness of some political terms in both texts.

I

The word encyclopedia comes from a Greek phrase, *enkylkios paideia*, which means 'general education', and its origins can be traced back to the time of Plato (Collison & Preece, n.d.). Indeed, as it is known that he focused on providing young students with an all-around education in his Academy, his purpose parallels the concept of encyclopedias, although it was an oral encyclopedia. Plato's lectures were scribed by his nephew, Speusippos, after his death, in *c.* 370 B.C.E., who became the headmaster of the same establishment after Plato's death. These scripts were organized through fields and were utilized as textbooks in the same school (Collison, 1964, pp. xiii, 21–22).

The rationale behind the encyclopedic tradition was to explain all the known mechanisms the world had experienced to the laypeople; to teach them what is what. Besides, an encyclopedia aims to serve as a reference point for the known world through words, inspiring future generations to experience it in a different way; a teaching manual that provides guidelines for the future, 'just in case'. Several authors had carried this banner forward in time in various parts of the world; Cato the Elder's *Praecepta ad Fillium*, Varro of Rieti's *Disciplinarum*, and Pliny the Elder's *Historia Naturalis* during the Roman Empire, Ibn Qutaiba's *Kitab 'Uyun al-Akhbar* and al-Khwarizmi's[7] *Mafatih al-Ulum* in the Muslim world, and *Huang Ian* in Ancient China [which was written by the order of the emperor] can be counted amongst the early samples of encyclopedias (Collison & Preece, n.d.; Collison, 1964: xiii, 23–26). Still, these were all penned by single authors, and they carried the characteristics of monographs. The first collective encyclopedic work, on the other hand, was Ikhwan al-Safa's al-Rasa'il, written in the last quarter of the tenth century C.E. (Collison, 1964, pp. 41–42). Diderot and d'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*, too, was a collective work that aids comparison by allowing the tracing of changes in the contributors' discourses over time.

II

All the encyclopedic texts follow a methodology; they are either systematically organized or alphabetically listed. It is not possible to say that one method is better than another; it depends on whether the work will cover all-around topics or be thematic. Plus, even the alphabetically organized texts utilize a systematic scheme (Collison, 1964, p. 3). That makes the installation of a knowledge tree into the text mandatory. The concept of the knowledge tree

[7] The al-Khwarizmi name mentioned here does not correspond to the actual figure widely recognized by the global scholarly population. The author mentioned here is Mohammad ibn Ahmad al-Khwarizmi, whose only literary creation, *Mafatih al-Ulum*, is his primary legacy. Scholars and travelogues authored by voyagers, including Kâtip Çelebi, although limited in their reach, recorded his death in the year 997 C.E. Despite this, little information is available about his life. He is believed to have held a prominent position within the state hierarchy (vizirate, or a position of similar rank) in Bukhara, as indicated by semi-historical records. His work, *Mafatih al-Ulum*, seems to have been written with the sole purpose of instructing his [future] colleagues and fresh officials about any forthcoming responsibilities within the chambers of the state mechanism. Although there were no obvious [and even proto-] scientific intentions in composing this text, contemporary scholars examine the book as a sample worth investigating to understand the typical political climate of the era. Al-Khwarizmi's efforts, however, often intertwine with the renowned Mohammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi, a distinguished scientist [to some extent] known from the Muslim world of the 9th century C.E. Confusing enough, the latter is known for his significant contributions in various fields, including mathematics, astronomy, geography, and algebra. The confusion between these two figures can be traced back to the geographical location of Khwarazm, which [although no longer exists in name] is now geographically divided between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Kutluer, 1997; Fazlıoğlu, 1997). It is worth noting once again that both Mohammad ibn Ahmad al-Khwarizmi and Mohammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi originated from this particular region; their names added a layer of complexity to their historical identification, which is unfortunate given the non-existence of traditional surnames during that time.

is used to list all known knowledge up to that day, categorizing it, organizing similar categories within the same title, and establishing relationships between them. Al-Rasa'il had compiled this tree into 52 pamphlets, each representing a field of knowledge, ranging from geometry to philology and from spiritual beings to zoology. The *Encyclopédie*, too, follows a similar classification, with its famous knowledge tree, known as the *Système figuré des connaissances humaines* (the Figurative System of Human Knowledge). Still, it must be known that these categories are not universally accepted; they have often been produced by the belief, imagination, and perception of the encyclopedists throughout history (Foucault, 1966, pp. 7–8, Burke, 2000, p. 82). Thus, these two classifications should be considered as representing the worldviews of their creators; al-Rasa'il is presenting a more religion-centric classification of things, as each of the 52 pamphlets starts with a blessing to God *(basmalah)*,[8] while the *Encyclopédie* aimed to follow a more secular path, as it was clearly stated in the *Discours Préliminaire* (Preface) penned by d'Alembert (1751, p. ii) that anything beyond human sensation should be left to metaphysicians.

Beyond these, neither these works nor their contributors share the same timeline, sociopolitical culture, and civilization. However, it is possible to find a common ground for them, which materializes in the concept of enlightenment. It is a known fact that the *Encyclopédie* was a part of 'the Enlightenment', which is often affiliated with the 17th and 18th centuries' Europe, or more commonly, the West. As will be widely discussed in the following chapters, the concept of enlightenment does not belong solely to the Western Enlightenment. A relatively similar period, often referred to as the Age of Enlightenment or the Golden Age, is also associated with notable achievements in Islamic civilization. The Golden Age of Islam is

[8] The expression commonly referred to as Basmalah, Bismillah, or Tasmiyah (the latter also addresses the ceremonial process of naming newborns in Islamic traditions; a direct translation to English might be "naming"), originates from the Arabic phrase *"bi-smi-llahi'rrahmani'rrahim"*, translating to "In/with the name of God who is the Merciful and the Compassionate". This phrase, vital to Islamic tradition, appears at the beginning of all chapters (Surah) of the Quran, except in the case of the ninth chapter, Surah at-Tawbah. Its profound significance is emphasized by its widespread presence in the Quran and the guidance of Mohammad, the Prophet of Muslims, who advised his followers to begin any new endeavor with the recitation of Basmalah. Consequently, Muslims have adopted this idiom in their daily lives and artistic expressions, notably in calligraphy, as any depiction on surfaces was previously prohibited. Moreover, the Basmalah holds a unique position in Verse 27:30 (Surah an-Naml), where it narrates a scene of reading Prophet Solomon's letter to the Queen of Sheba, Bilqis. This occurrence led to the establishment of a tradition within Muslim political culture, to the point where official correspondences have commenced with the Basmalah ever since. However, during the late Ottoman era, a deviation emerged from this tradition due to the zealous belief that papers bearing God's name should not touch the ground. Consequently, a new stylistic approach emerged, where the Basmalah was represented solely by its somewhat altered calligraphic initial, thus believed in ensuring the sanctity of the written word (Derman & Uzun, 1992). Such a tradition also found followers among the prestigious authors and scholars of the Muslim world across centuries. Men of letters in Islamic Civilization exclusively favored starting their written works with the Basmalah. Furthermore, some poets chose to structure their poems in a way that amalgamated with the syllabic order of the Basmalah, integrating it as a prosodic element in their literary compositions (Uzun, 1992).

often referred to as the period spanning from the 8th to the 13th century. Therefore, it is possible to say that both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* were the products of their respective enlightenment periods.

III

One of the most significant challenges this study faced revolves around the complexities of specific political terms in terms of their creation, dissemination, and interpretation. Such a problem becomes even more complicated when geographical locations and historical periods are added to the equation. Because the articulation of a specific notion or concept has a varying nature: the nomenclature for the same concept can be addressed differently in different regions and times. Besides, the very same entity can hold different meanings in different paradigms. For example, let us consider the well-known children's game called hopscotch, which can be traced back to ancient times. Some argue that it can be traced back to Ancient Greece, while others claim it was a military-themed game for boys in the Roman barracks of Ancient Rome. The game is simple: multiple courts are drawn on the ground, each court has a specific name [or number], players take turns to complete the courts by jumping on one leg and kicking a small stone to the next court. The people have widely recognized these rules for millennia; however, the number of courts and their names have varied across different cultures and periods (Crombie, 1886). The game is called with different names in various languages, such as *"rayuela"* in Spanish and *"seksek"* in Turkish. Still, these different denominations do not restrict children of the world from playing this game; they might even play together if they had a chance. Here, the meaning has a universal understanding without having a particular name; however, its opposite is also possible: the same name may not always carry the same meaning. This situation can also be exemplified. Let us consider three elements: one tree, and two well-known animated movies, namely *The Jungle Book* (2016) and *Ratatouille* (2007). The mental image of a tree has some 'constitutive' elements within, such as a trunk, roots, branches, leaves, and perhaps flowers and fruits; these make the concept of a tree 'a tree'. However, the interpretation of this concept differs significantly between the protagonists of these movies. Mowgli, the main character in *The Jungle Book*, probably imagines a lush forest when he hears of 'tree', what he might consider a home. In contrast, Remy the Mouse, the protagonist of *Ratatouille*, was living in the concrete jungle of metropolitan Paris. He probably will envisage a tree as a randomly planted green 'thing' which he rarely encounters in his city. These examples illustrate the complex issues arising from the flexibility of language, cultural contexts,

and individual perspectives. This is also true for political concepts; for instance, the concept of liberty does not have the same meaning for each of us in the course of history—the participants in humanity.

This discussion can be further elaborated through the liberty example above. In normal parameters, this term addresses certain notions related to freedom and/or individual autonomy in both decisions and actions: a commonly recognized, fixed, and universal meaning in the modern era. However, in Ancient Greece, the residents of a polis defined liberty through active participation in politics. This definition automatically excludes women, children, and non-residents: they are non-free by this standard (Karagiannis & Wagner, 2013). This recognition of liberty is entirely irrelevant for today's conceptualization. In the same vein, during the late 18th century, as the Enlightenment was coming to a close, the definition of liberty varied between the eastern and western ends of Europe. For instance, liberty was conceptualized through religion in the Ottoman Empire: freedom from state intervention in matters of religious life and its practices (Yılmaz, 2016). During the same period in France, for example, liberty was conceptualized as the emancipation from the constraints of religion and the Church (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765).[9] These historical examples suggest that the concept of liberty has a fluid nature; its attributed meaning changes across diverse cultural and political realms. These nuances are crucial to understanding in order to comprehend the complex nature of some political and philosophical concepts.

In light of these observations, it can be said that a singular concept does not always have to conserve a particular meaning. Still, the core elements of such a concept may share a fundamental feature. For example, the concept of liberty in the late 18th century for both Ottomans and the French, as mentioned above, where the common element was religion. In this framework, a comparative study can be conducted on the notion of liberty within these two distant parts of Europe for the same historical period, as long as the encompassing theme is religion. Additionally, words that denote the same concept in different languages can have different etymological roots and meanings. The earlier example of the concept of a tree can also be applied here; people may visualize a similar entity when they hear the word 'tree', but its interpretation varies in different contexts. Reading that word in a botanical text and a pastoral

[9] This definition is summarized from the liberty article of the *Encyclopédie*. In the original text, the *Liberté* article was not signed by the author[s]. However, John Lough, a famous researcher known for his studies about the Encyclopédie, revealed that Jacques-André Naigeon and Abbé Claude Yvon wrote this article. Lough explained this in a book chapter titled "The Problem of the unsigned articles in the *Encyclopédie*" in 1965. Indeed, the same discovery was mentioned in Lough's other work titled "The *Encyclopédie*" six years later (Lough, 1971, pp. 53, 134, 163–164).

poem would definitely ring different tones in one's mind: the contextual influence on human perception. Jacques Derrida explained these differences in language and meaning with a term he coined: *différance*. According to him, *différance* is an economical way of describing the true meanings of things in language. This term is an amalgamation of two French words, *"difference"* and *"deference"* (deferral), and it signifies that the signifier—whether a word, hieroglyph, rune, or symbol—does not entirely represent the actual meaning. The contrast between the signifier and the meaning creates a difference, according to Derrida; it holds the signifier's ability to encapsulate the meaning entirely. That is why a thorough examination of the signifier is necessary in multiple layers to unveil additional signifiers. Such an analysis would eventually place the effort into a never-ending chain (Derrida, 1997, pp. 22–24, 63, 141–143). This analytical approach was the core of his innovative methodology known as deconstruction, a technique that will be thoroughly inspected in the following pages.

IV

With the extensive explanations provided here, it is clear that these two seminal works, namely al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, from different historical and cultural contexts, can indeed be compared. However, an appropriate methodology is required. These two texts share a particular common ground: they were produced during intellectually active periods, employed specific methodologies, claimed scientific validity, aimed to enlighten the masses, and used a persuasive language while spreading their ideas to the public. With this, it is possible to bring forward a confident closing that distinct paradigms can share some fundamental elements when it comes to the dissemination of intellectual knowledge.

Albeit this is the case, a common element mentioned above on the use of persuasive language requires clarification. Holy texts, such as the Torah, the Bible, and the Quran, employ a language that aims to find a balance between persuasion and intimidation with their audience. These approaches can be seen in some vivid examples; they are often presented in the form of parables that resemble fables or short stories. For instance, the Torah, which is essentially a collection of numerous short stories, frequently relates narratives about Moses or the ancient Jewish people while mentioning the divine gifts and punishments between its lines. The Bible too, follows the same technique; some famous quotes like [Matthew 22:21] *"They say to him, Cæsar's. Then says he to them, [r]ender therefore to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's"* (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 37) is part of larger

story about Jesus. This narrative mimics the attributed differences between this world and the afterlife in the eyes of divinity. Similarly, the Quran utilizes stories, parables, and proverbs to make explanations more accessible to the general populace, primarily for educational purposes (Müftüoğlu, 2020). Some clear exemplifications, such as paralleling people who choose patrons other than God to building fragile houses as weak as the web of a female spider,[10] can be found throughout the text. This storytelling technique is not confined to sacred texts alone; it finds expression in works like Herodotus' *The Histories*, Vishnu Sharma's *Panchatantra*, Rumi's *Masnavi,* Jean de La Fontaine's fables, Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tales, Yusuf Balasaguni's *Kutadgu Bilig,* and more. Interestingly, this method is also exercised in both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*.

Ikhwan al-Safa's al-Rasa'il consistently employs a persuasive approach in all its chapters and subchapters. Almost every few paragraphs are framed with an address to the audience, often beginning with "O, brother!" callings. This technique serves to keep the reader on track while complex concepts are clarified through simple allegories across all 52 pamphlets. For example, the fifth pamphlet of al-Rasa'il particularly delves into the domain of sound and music. Here, the Ikhwan (V, p. 136) chose to exemplify the continuity and intensity of sound sources by providing familiar resonances. They compared the sounds of laundry sticks used by launderers, hammers wielded by blacksmiths, and paddles utilized by ferrymen. These comparisons were intended to make it easier for laypeople to understand the concept that different vibrations produce different sounds. Similarly, the Enlightenment thinkers also favored the use of metaphors and parables to persuade their audience. These metaphors could be brief but repetitive, as seen in Adam Smith's attempts to explain the power of self-interest and money through the motives of bakers, butchers, and brewers (Smith, 1909, pp. 19–20). These simplifications can also manifest as entire texts, as seen in Bernard Mandeville's renowned work, *The Fable of the Bees* (1966), which sought to describe a healthy society through the metaphor of an ordinary beehive. In the case of the *Encyclopédie*, its authors utilized a similar technique as well. However, their persuasion methods often relied on citing references to other texts by renowned scholars and/or historians. With this, they attempted to enhance the credibility and comprehensibility of their articles, and these endeavors can be likened to those found in modern academic writing. For instance, Louis de Jaucourt (1755d), a prominent contributor to the *Encyclopédie*, incorporated Aristotle's comments on Phaleas of Chalcedon—

[10] [Surah al-'Ankabut (The Spider) Verse 41] The likeness of those who take to themselves protectors other than God is that of the spider. It builds a house. But the most fragile of houses is the spider's house. If they only knew (Itani, 2015, p. 173).

an Ancient Greek statesman—in his article titled *egalité naturelle* (natural equality), which can be read through this lens: aimed to bolster the credibility of the *Encyclopédie*'s content.

V

With the latest paragraph above, the rationale of this study is clarified: these two texts share several aspects in common. Although it aims to employ a multilayered set of methodologies to conduct a thorough analysis of al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, some limitations exist for this work. These limitations can be grouped under three titles: disciplinary scope, temporal scope, and comparative pairing scope. The first item, namely the disciplinary scope, simply addresses that the discussion will be restricted to the domain of political science exclusively. That is, both the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists will be confined within this domain. Naturally, their formulations will get in contact with some other disciplines of social science like anthropology, sociology, economics, linguistics, even theology; however, some less relevant domains like mathematics, engineering, chemistry, physics will remain aside unless they had found a common ground with their explanations on the examination of the chosen concept.

The second concern, related to the temporal scope, serves as a limitation in guise. Because this study aims to incorporate various "concluding remarks" at the end of each subchapter, that is, complementary and interpretive thoughts were placed under these headlines. In these sections, the concepts introduced from the times of Plato and discussed in these primary texts will be evaluated in terms of their subsequent impact. Albeit these evaluations will not be as detailed as those covering a timeline from Plato to these seminal works, some cornerstones of the transformation and/or reinterpretation of these conceptualizations within these particular civilizations will be presented. A structured timeline is not intentionally identified here, as most of these concepts gained a universal understanding in the 20th century. Still, some monumental interpretations "after" the publications of these texts will be given in the "concluding remarks" sections.

The third limitation, namely the comparative pairing scope—as the phrase is self-explanatory, addresses that this study accepts al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* as the core dataset. Indeed, numerous cultural and/or civilizational sources can be added to this comparison mechanism; yet, this study focuses on these two texts alone. Still, that does not mean that their contributors, shareholders, mentors, masters, guides, and so on, will not be mentioned. In

contrast, under the guidance of the Annales School-type methodology, as discussed in detail in the following pages, these additional texts and comments facilitate an understanding of the approach to these texts. That is, as the famous saying "Rome was not built in a day", these intellectuals did not complete their texts, namely al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, in a day. Their labor required some tremendous effort, and this effort was highlighted in this study. Still, a third dataset is considered out of context within the parameters of this study.

In light of these limitations, however, a fourth one emerges: the orthodoxy. These people, namely the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists, were loyal to their societies. Their primary intention was to illuminate the people in need. That is why they penned their works. They were not revolutionists, albeit they looked like—they were reformists. They rejected political cruelty and exalted humanity. True that they represented some unorthodox factions of their civilizations, like the Ismailism in Islam or a radical version of the Enlightenment; still, they desired to witness a sociopolitical transformation "in" their societies. That is why this study will maintain a distance from some "reinterpreted" historiography of the Muslim world, as well as focusing on some revolutionary closures that ended the Revolution of 1789. That is, some mental revolutionists [in the broader sense] like Marquis de Sade will not be discussed here. The mainstream closings will be discussed, while some alternative interpretations, such as the one made by Musaylima b. Habib will either be ignored or placed in footnotes—concerning the contribution to the study.

"Nemo propheta in patria" is a Latin idiom that has been widely circulated since its inception in the Bible.[11] True that, neither Jesus nor Mohammad, nor al-Rasa'il nor the *Encyclopédie* found peace in their homelands—each of their stories in this manner will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters. In a subsection that aims to identify the study's limitations, this idiom would fit the picture perfectly.

[11] [Matthew 13:57] And they were made to stumble because of him. But Jesus said to them, A prophet is not without honor, except in his own country, and in his own house (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 26), [Mark 6:4] And Jesus said to them, A prophet is not without honor, except in his own country, and among his own kindred, and in his own house (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 56), [Luke 4:24] And he said, Verily I say to you, No prophet is acceptable in his own country (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 81), and [John 4:44] For Jesus himself testified, that a prophet has no honor in his own country (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 122) can be given as different interpretations and translations of this Biblical idiom.

3. Conceptual Framework of the Study

This section aims to link the acquisition of political knowledge to the functionalities of al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* in this matter. Some parts of the methodology will be explained here in order to constitute a ground for the further section that aims to explain the methodology of this study.

I

Political science is a unique discipline. It allows for a thorough exploration through its complex elements. Still, such complexity can be reduced to two main aspects: the governing authority and the governed. Harold D. Lasswell (1950, pp. 3, 23–25) claims that politics is a dynamic interplay between the struggle for influence and its response, emphasizing a precise yet delicate relationship. The outcome of this interplay is the emergence of certain political conditions, which often accompany constantly changing political values. That is, a dichotomy arises from this interplay at the social level: the elite few and the majority, collectively referred to as the mass. The dominance of the former over the latter determines the characteristics of politics, which are often characterized by the famous question, "who gets what, when, and how". A notable French scholar, Maurice Duverger (1964, pp. 11–12), picks up where Lasswell left off and asserts his words even louder. Accordingly, a political theory that is accepted in the universal sense constitutes a problematic struggle because the power dynamics are effective for him. Still, he had received the central interaction between the ruler and the ruled. His stress here is the *raison d'être* of the state concept, which underlines the primary role of power. Here, it is very possible to liken politics to the two-faced Roman god, Janus. Similar to him, politics encompasses all aspects of societal life, making it both omnipresent and pervasive by its nature. The dual visage of politics here symbolizes the necessity of reconciling the sovereignty of the elite with the rest of society, which presents a delicate equilibrium between these two factions, akin to a trade to some extent—that is, politics (Duverger, 1964, pp. 15–23). These perspectives highlight a complex cyclical pattern between the elites and the masses. David Easton's famous System Theory provided a framework for understanding this complex phenomenon. In this framework, the masses speak of their political demands, and these are transmitted to the elites [which can be read as decision-makers]. The elites, in turn, respond to these demands, evaluate them, and turn these inputs into answers [which can be read as outputs]. The masses serve as the central referees in this framework; they assess the outputs and either accept them as they

are given or transform them into new inputs. This process exhibits a continuous loop of communication and response between these two actors (Easton, 1965, pp. 29–33).[12] In light of this method, the innate mechanism of politics either produces new concepts with each cycle or alters its former products, causing an endless evolution. Each loop of this cycle, therefore, produces fresh political knowledge.

II

Political concepts do not have a universal characteristic in their applications; they differ in time and context. The differences in subjects and their subjectivity across various periods lead to alterations in the concepts. Indeed, the main encyclopedic datasets of this study, namely the *Encyclopédie* and al-Rasa'il, identified the same concepts in different interpretations. Additionally, some political concepts or terms that the *Encyclopédie* addressed were absent in the times of al-Rasa'il, as al-Rasa'il is several centuries older than the *Encyclopédie*. That is to say, traditional methods cannot be used to compare these two works; they will inevitably miss the essence of the comparison. For instance, the concept of "republic" *(République)* was extensively reviewed in the *Encyclopédie* (Jaucourt, 1765ab); however, this is not directly evident in al-Rasa'il. Still, some indirect references to the Roman Empire exist, indicating that the Ikhwan were aware of the concept and its associated implications. Therefore, the categorical organization must recognize this central difference in comparing these two texts. That is why

[12] These three scholars mentioned here share a common intellectual era in modernity and operate within the borders of the behavioralist paradigm. It may seem senseless to generalize their modern political conclusions to the pre-modern era, especially with the pre-modern actors involved. Still, the political role of actors has persisted throughout time. For example, consider the 32nd article of the Code of Hammurabi, which dates back to approximately the 18th century B.C.E, and exemplifies the interaction of individuals, society, and decision-makers in a political context: *"If a chieftain or a man is captured on the 'Way of the King' (in war), and a merchant buy him free, and bring him back to his place; if he have the means in his house to buy his freedom, he shall buy himself free: if he have nothing in his house with which to buy himself free, he shall be bought free by the temple of his community; if there be nothing in the temple with which to buy him free, the court shall buy his freedom. His field, garden, and house shall not be given for the purchase of his freedom"* (King, 2018, p. 28). Another historical example is found in the Orkhon Inscriptions of the 8th century C.E., where Yollıg Khan voices the ascendancy of Bumin Khan and Istämi Yabgu as supreme rulers over the Turkish individuals and society (Tekin, 1998, p. 39). Similarly, Plato, in the eighth book of *Republic*, summarizes the role of politics with a tripartite focus on individuals, society, and the ruler. At the same time, Aristotle, in the 31st article of *The Athenian Constitution*, mirrors this structure in his analysis of politics in Athens during the times of crisis (Plato, 2007, p. 240–268; Aristotle, 1935, pp. 93–95). Skipping in time, the discourse on the roles of individuals, society, and rulers in politics extends into the 18th century as well, with Montesquieu's seminal work, *The Spirit of Laws*, published in 1748. He emphasizes the indispensable nature of a triple construct of political actors for the maintenance of any political society, noting that *"Besides the law of nations relating to all societies, there is a polity or civil constitution for each particularly considered. No society can subsist without a form of government. 'The united strength of individuals', as Gravina well observes, 'constitutes what we call the body politic'"* (Montesquieu, 2001, p. 22). This multifaceted examination across various historical periods (albeit it can be multiplied) underlines the enduring relevance of the tripartite framework in understanding political actors.

this study aims to group different individual concepts and assign them to a more refined title, which will then facilitate a more accurate comparison between these two encyclopedic texts.

In this study, Georg Cantor's groundbreaking contribution to mathematics, set theory, will serve as the foundational framework for grouping the examined political concepts. He had written this theory in a paper titled *Mengenlehre* in German in 1874. His central purpose was to demonstrate that the concept of infinity in mathematical understanding does not require addressing a singular magnitude; instead, it can encompass varying degrees of it. Four years later, he advanced his thoughts and claimed that sets that possess different infinities can be encircled as "manifolds" (mathematical sets). These manifolds contained different infinities, which could be compared systematically by examining their constituent elements. That is, these manifolds exhibited a relative characteristic in their power, which can be expressed in mathematical language as a~b, a<b, and a>b, signifying equivalence, smaller size, and larger size, respectively (Grattan-Guinness, 2000, pp. 88–89). Cantor's introduction built a bridge between "the purpose designation of a set" and "its infinity over the concept of magnitude" (Dauben, 1983).[13] This can be exemplified as follows: consider a fictional set named "red things". Within this set, items such as Snow White's poisoned red apple, Little Red Riding Hood's iconic hoody, Ferrari's renowned Rosso Corsa sports car, a ruby gem, human blood, a ripe tomato, a Turkish flag, and a traffic stop sign can be put. However, a Japanese flag cannot be placed. Although it has a red color, its magnitude cannot prevail over the white color, unlike the Turkish flag.[14] Nevertheless, following the same rationale, the red piece of the Japanese flag

[13] To picture the underlying mathematical logic here, we may consider a hypothetical scenario based on this explanation. Let us consider an imaginary world where both student numbers and phone numbers have an infinite number of digits. Within this context, we draw two distinct sets: one including exclusively phone numbers that stop at even digits, and another constituted solely of student numbers ending in even digits. Upon investigating these sets at a specific point in time, a precise comparison happens. Through a systematic removal of mutually corresponding numbers, it becomes possible to judge the relative magnitudes of these sets. This evaluation allows for the determination of whether the sets are equivalent, smaller, or larger than each other.

[14] Both the Japanese and Turkish flags are designed with a height-to-width ratio of 2:3; let us assume a measuring of 20 cm by 30 cm for both flags. The red portion, symbolizing the rising sun on the Japanese flag (National Flag, n.d.), should be positioned at the center and corresponds to 3/5 of the flag's height, making the radius (r) of the red part 6 cm. Utilizing the formula for the area of a circle ($A = \pi r^2$), the red part covers an area of 36π, which, with consideration of π as approximately 3.14, equates to 113.04 cm². In contrast, the area of the rectangle covering both the white and red parts of the Japanese flag is 600 cm² (20 cm × 30 cm). Consequently, the ratio of red to white in the Japanese flag is 113.04/600, resulting in the red portion covering only 18.84% of the entire flag. The Turkish flag, on the other hand, features both a crescent and a star, demanding more intensive calculations. According to the Turkish Flag Law (Bayrak Kanunu, 1983), and by simplifications as transforming the diameter to radius, the outer side of the crescent has a radius of ¼ of the flag's height (5 cm), the inner side has a radius of 2/10 of the height (4 cm), and the circle surrounding the star has a radius of 1/8 of the height (2.5 cm). Using the same formula and considering π as 3.14, the area of the crescent is approximately 28.6 cm². Assuming the star is a circle without any further precise area calculations to avoid extra labor, its area can be estimated as 19.625 cm². Consequently, the total area of the white parts in this particular representation of the Turkish flag is 48.225 cm², constituting 8.0375% of the entire flag. With the obvious mathematical principle that [approximately] 92% of red is significantly larger than 19%, the Turkish flag is inherently more inclined to be part of the aforementioned set

has a chance to be put into the set if we name it as "the red part of the Japanese flag". Such a methodology may seem arbitrarily designed and open to manipulation, which could lead to the design of some subjective sets. However, when the name of the set was determined objectively, such as "things that include red color", then the Japanese flag could also be included in this set, since the ratio of red color was undetermined—therefore, it was unnecessary to take into consideration. These types of sets, which are characterized by uncertainties, are recognized as fuzzy sets within the realm of mathematics.

We can bring numerous definitions to the concept of fuzzy sets; however, an explanation through an example may work better. Consider a universal set named U, which includes everything except the null elements. Binary digits represent membership in this set: an element x is denoted as 0 ($x \notin U$) if it is not a member and 1 ($x \in U$) if it is a member. That is to say, on a numerical axis, any value falling between the 0 and 1 points identifies a "potential" membership in this set (Zimmermann, 2010). Here, we can return to the earlier example about the color red; this time, through its corrected version: things that include the color red. This version expanded inclusivity; that is, it can encompass Little Red Riding Hood entirely, not just her hoodie. Additionally, some other items, such as a green pen with a red cap and the Japanese flag, can become its members. Fuzzy set theory is widely used in the social sciences; scholars often employ it in quantitative research areas, but it is also occasionally applied in qualitative studies. Michael Smithson and Jay Verkuilen (2006, pp. 1–2) clarified the application of set theory in social sciences to highlight its advantages. According to these scholars, fuzzy set theory systematically addresses the inherent vagueness of concepts, eases categorical and dimensional challenges, facilitates the analysis of multivariate concepts beyond their paradigmatic constraints, upholds theoretical fidelity, and fosters a careful integration of methodological thinking and continuous variables. Since there was a lack of common ground for the political concepts examined in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, utilizing the essence of fuzzy set theory could be beneficial.[15] Such a methodology will both clarify the nuances of the chosen political

of "red things" in this comparative context when compared to its Japanese counterpart. Further explanations in the main body of the text will clarify this example on the red-to-white ratio.

[15] Fuzzy set theory finds qualitative applications across various branches of the social sciences by facilitating the grouping of diverse elements within a single set based on shared characteristics. This method has been observed in different studies, such as the exploration of market performances across 48 public-private partnership cases (Casady, 2020), the analysis of positive public behaviors toward institutional emergency risk management during the COVID-19 pandemic across 735 cases (Gu et al., 2022), and the examination of voter turnout fluctuations in 29 OECD countries with consideration of elements such as corruption, education, inequality, and trust in parliament (Cruz, 2023), among others. While this study will not directly apply fuzzy set theory to the text, it will utilize an indirect application of this method to determine precise groups.

concepts and provide a systematic and detailed comparative analysis. With this, similar concepts in different political panoramas can be reviewed through these two iconic texts.

III

With respect to the interpretation of politics mentioned in a few paragraphs earlier, and Easton's System Theory was incorporated into these definitions, it is clear that the scene of politics is inherently shaped by three leading actors, all equally essential for the play: the individual, society, and the decision-maker. This triumvirate of actors has remained constant since ancient times, unchanged, no doubt, serving as the main pistons for political dynamics to function.[16] Consequently, employing the fuzzy set theory to the nature of these actors, and by the political concepts to be excavated, analyzed, and compared from al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, the main focusing theme of this work can be categorized into three distinct sets:

1. Political concepts related to the individual: This set encompasses notions such as citizenship, freedom, natural law, rights, etc., all intricately linked to the individual's role in the realm of political contexts.
2. Political concepts related to society: Within this predefined set, concepts such as traditions, customs, religion, equality, fraternity, solidarity, rebellion, revolution, ethics, and others find their place. These concepts are deeply rooted in societal norms and dynamics, which reflect the collective consciousness of communities.
3. Political concepts related to the ruler: This set explores fundamental concepts that shape political structures, including government, state, monarchy (king or sultan), caliphate *(khalifat)*, taxation, war, justice, and other related concepts. The rulers possess significant influence over the political domain, and these concepts explain their roles and responsibilities.

Naturally, some elements within one set may [and quite possibly will] overlap with others. For instance, the concept of liberty belongs to the set of concerns regarding individuals

[16] I preferred to exclude the role of multifaceted international organizations in the "international politics" here since their absolute dominance to the internal politics has never been clearly existed with respect to the central theme of the theory of classical realism [as the states are absolute units in international domain with no superior patrons] since the inauguration of them with the early 20th century with respect to the League of Nations; leaving the regional board commissioned to regulate the naval navigation of the Rhine in the early 19th century aside. However, David Easton's imperative condition, called "recognized by other states" to be considered as being a state, next to Max Weber's three central conditions as having a territory, a group of common people, and a government, constitutes an exception to this remark. Still, both cases remain beyond the timeline of this study.

by its nature; however, it has been subjected to a new characterization afterwards by some human-made and artificial creations in the guise of legal entities, such as companies, foundations, and even the state itself. Nevertheless, the limitations and allowances of such liberty are apt to be intertwined with societal and decision-maker sets.[17] In order to identify the elements that will go into which set, a delicate examination must be made. This examination will be made through Jacques Derrida's renowned methodology, named "deconstruction", which will be explored in the methodology section in detail.

IV

As previously indicated, the texts under examination, specifically *al-Rasa'il* and the *Encyclopédie*, illustrated specific definitions of political concepts. These definitions were subsequently transcribed and disseminated by transforming them into accessible political knowledge. The intended audience absorbed this knowledge, and they integrated it into their daily lives within their communities. This process can be likened to political socialization, where individuals possess political knowledge, use it to form a political culture, and influence both individual behaviors and societal interactions. It is possible to claim that this process leaves a mark on the written works of their particular paradigm. This study, therefore, will delve into the fundamental aspects of this paradigm through al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*.

The concept of political knowledge is often examined through the lens of democratic citizenship patterns in the contemporary world. It highlights the awareness of some related concepts and conditions within the grandiose realm of politics. However, this characterization of the concept lacks depth. The depth of this identification can be provided through a quote as *"the range of factual information about politics that is stored in long-term memory"* (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 10). Here, the emphasis lies on long-term memory, which constitutes a key element in the step-by-step development of cultural understanding in the realm of politics.

[17] As a side note, Isaiah Berlin's theory on the "two concepts of liberty" (2008) challenges the traditional notion of liberty within the context of a progressing [modern] state on this matter. According to Berlin, liberty can be divided into two types: negative and positive liberties. Negative liberty implies minimal state interference in individuals' personal choices, hence emphasizing freedom from external limitations. Positive liberty, on the other hand, augments the state to the equation in creating an environment beneficial for individuals to fulfill their desires and potentials, which I humbly read as the last stage of Maslow's thesis on the hierarchy of needs (though no references exist in the text). In this concept, the state plays an active role in removing obstacles and providing opportunities for individuals to pursue their goals. Berlin's theory redefines the role of the state in the realm of liberty by acknowledging the evolving complexities of a modern society. His ideas, which were initially formulated in the mid-20th century, continue to shape discussions on individual freedom and state intervention in contemporary political philosophy.

For example, assume a hypothetical scenario where a thirty-year-old Muslim farmer lives in a remote town in the year 1566, under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. This man was governed by one of the Empire's most celebrated sultans, Suleiman the Magnificent, who reigned for over 45 years, and that farmer spent three decades of his life under this rule. Suleiman died that year, and with his death, his son Selim the Drunk ascended to power. He was known for his excessive alcohol consumption, which has long been considered an ill practice amongst Muslims. Because communication techniques were limited in that period, that farmer would probably hear about this fresh coronation months later. In this context, the short-term memory that the farmer possesses will experience a transformation—from a glorious sultan to a drunk one. He did not experience any changes in the sultanate earlier; however, with this small knowledge on the transformation, the farmer will immediately realize the very essence of the monarchical system: it is indifferent to the personal attributes or merits, only the predetermined bloodline is important. With this, the farmer's earlier short-term memory transformed into a long-term one; that is, if he were lucky to live long enough, he would not be surprised to hear the news about Murad III's coronation eight years later (1574) since he was already acculturated with the monarchic succession process in the Empire.

The acquisition of political knowledge through experience is significant in this debate; however, it is not the sole path that leads to this destination. In theory, political knowledge can be acquired through three distinct mechanisms: textbook facts, surveillance facts, and historical facts. Textbook facts originate from the fundamental structure of politics, which holds elements such as the type of government and the state. Surveillance facts related to in-person continuous monitoring of ongoing events regarding the political matter allow individuals to remain informed about current political developments. For example, an ordinary Parisian citizen living near the Bastille Fortress on July 14, 1789, undoubtedly gained some fresh political knowledge through the events they experienced that day. The final mechanism, known as historical facts, is a hybrid approach. It encompasses both personal experiences of political history and some narratives overheard from others (Jennings, 1996). This study aims to review the political information presented in two encyclopedic texts, namely al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, and the third mechanism aligns with the study's intention. Moreover, political knowledge can be influenced by various internal and external factors, including individual abilities, opportunities, and motivations (Barabas et al., 2014). Education, for example, is amongst them; it directly influences one's abilities since it would be impossible for a man to absorb political knowledge from textual sources. In the same vein, opportunities also play a pivotal role in this scheme; a

farmer living in a remote part of his country cannot possess the same level of political knowledge as his fellow citizen who is a bureaucrat in parliament. The motivational factor, on the other hand, emphasizes personal or group interests. Individuals can enhance their political knowledge through various affiliations, ranging from sectarian to terrorist groups; however, the depth and nature of such knowledge vary depending on the context.

The link between these methods and factors is mainly related to the physical spaces. By remembering the earlier example of an Ottoman farmer, this conclusion becomes even clearer: he had spent time in that place, which shaped his political knowledge. This link was explained by Jürgen Habermas, a distinguished German philosopher, who linked the European Enlightenment to a concept he coined as "the public sphere". This place, which took different forms according to him—coffeehouses, pubs, salons, and Freemason lodges—played a role in socialization institutions in eighteenth-century Europe, where information was exchanged. People from different social layers were able to meet in these places, albeit with some preconditions in effect. Additionally, following the Printing Revolution, printed texts circulated constantly in Europe, creating a growing demand for information in European society. Diderot and d'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* was also considered part of these public spheres (Robertson, 2015, pp. 83–97). These places gave rise to a new type of political socialization, where people acquired political knowledge through social interactions. It is theorized that as people accumulate experience and understanding, their political behaviors are modified by their psychological conditions. Such progress begins during childhood, where children categorize political concepts as they learn from their families and environments. However, children often categorize them under the title of "indifference". Still, this is not valid for all children. If a child comes from a challenging environment, such as poverty, a segregated community, or just being a female, that child aims to develop a sensible form of political knowledge (Hyman, 1959, pp. 25–29). Political socialization in this scene, according to David Easton, is a developmental process through which the individual acquires their political orientations and patterns of behavior. His comments align with system-maintenance theory. This theory assumes that political socialization aims to maintain the existing political system by emphasizing stability, and such stability comes in two forms: vertical and horizontal. The former addresses an inter-generational stability, where the old socialize with the young to maintain political durability. The latter, on the other hand, examines intra-generational aspects, which involve the socialization patterns within specific but identical groups (Easton, 1968).

The system-maintenance theory guides the highlighting of the different roles of the analyzed encyclopedic texts in this study. According to this theory, both texts, namely al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, played both inter-generational and intra-generational roles. Still, neither text openly advocated political stability. The contributors of both texts enjoyed a horizontal form of political socialization with their colleagues in some specific circles. At the same time, they got in vertical contact with the further generations through the texts they penned. After this clarification, it is safe to say that this study aims to explore al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* by recognizing the fact that these texts enhanced the political knowledge of their societies that lived in different periods and in different civilizations, in addition to the further generations with the legacies of their texts.

4. Methodology of the Study

This study will employ a methodological triangulation approach to the organizational structure of the text. This methodology incorporates the historiographical technique of the Annales School *(École des Annales)*, which seeks to examine historical phenomena over an extended period of time, the deconstruction technique that analyzes the relationship between the text and its meaning, as developed by Jacques Derrida, and the interpretive method.

Additionally, the fuzzy set theory and mathematical functions will be utilized in this study; however, not their formulations, but rather their central rules. The detailed explanation given in the following pages will clarify their uses.

I

The Annales School is a historiographic movement that takes its name from a history journal founded in 1929 by two eminent French historians, Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch (Stoianovich, 1976, p. 19). The journal aimed to discover a new type of historiography to serve as an original methodology in examining history. The founders of this method advocated that historiography tends to focus on events that occurred in the past, particularly in the realm of politics. However, history must also be considered in conjunction with other disciplines, such as geography, sociology, anthropology, economics, and others. The followers of the School had witnessed several fluctuations in their methodologies *en route*, each wave fortified the heritage of the movement, and the School turned into a historiographical movement (Burke, 1990, pp.

1–2). The founders of the movement merged history with various disciplines of social sciences—or, at least—did not hesitate to utilize them. Still, these practices were inherently limited. The younger disciples of the School then gave the movement an eclectic shape by incorporating various disciplines into the Annales School (Clark, 1990, pp. 186–187).

Fernand Braudel, one of the most enthusiastic followers of the Annales School, was a symbol of the second wave of this methodological movement. His doctoral thesis, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1949), introduced a new concept to the methodology of historiography: *La longue durée* (the long duration). His technique aimed to defeat the confusion between timelines, events, and their relative importance in history. He categorized them into three distinct elements: short-term events, cyclical movements of periods, and the *longue durée* period—which extends beyond centuries and examines the relationship between humans and the historical structures they lived with (Clark, 1990, pp. 182–183). The primary social sciences discipline he utilized in his thesis was geography, albeit not limited to it. He then wrote a three-volume masterpiece, *Civilisation materielle et capitalisme* (Material Civilization and Capitalism) between 1967 and 1979, which examined the relationship between economics and capitalism at three levels, from minor to major, using a similar technique to that he used in *The Mediterranean*. The three levels examined were, respectively: daily material routines (*i.e.,* exchanging goods), economic life associated with general rules (*i.e.,* taxation), and the capitalist mechanism that covered all economic transactions on a global scale (Burke, 1990, pp. 44–46). With this, Braudel made the methodology of the Annales School interdisciplinary.

Numerous historians utilized this methodology over time, both Eastern and Western historians. For example, the esteemed Turkish historians Ömer Lütfi Barkan and Halil İnalcık applied Braudel's methodology to their works on the Ottoman Empire. They utilized this technique to comparatively examine population, prices of goods, agricultural production levels, and similar other factors (İnalcık, 1978; İnalcık, 2008, pp. 311–324). This approach provided historians with a comfortable area of consideration, as they only had to take into account two elements: location and long duration. This study aims to utilize the same technique; here, the location will be the encyclopedias, and the long duration will cover the answers to two questions: "What did they know?" and "How did they present?". To clarify this tendency, let us consider the earlier example given on the concept of liberty in the earlier pages. To understand what the Ikhwan knew about the concept of liberty, it is necessary to examine the long history of the concept until it reached their ears. Only then would it become possible to

review what they had written on this concept in al-Rasa'il. To achieve this, the conceptualizations of the liberty concept in Ancient Greek, the holy scriptures, and various texts that have reached their time should be examined. The same method is also valid for the *Encyclopédistes*, albeit their *longue durée* covers a more extended period.

II

The deconstruction methodology is often affiliated with Jacques Derrida. This method does not accept the fixed and stable meanings of denominations; it tries to unveil the influence of power dynamics and social constructs on language and discourse. As it was extensively examined earlier, the *différance* technique is the cornerstone of this approach. *Différance*, used to reveal the true meanings of linguistic elements in order to achieve a clarification. Unearthing the underlying essence of words and concepts is required to form the fuzzy sets for this study.

In the transition from *différance* to deconstruction, Derrida borrowed a technique from Martin Heidegger known as *"sous rature"* (under erasure). This technique aimed to cross out some words in a sentence; these words were there, but simultaneously they were not. They become visible to the reader, and in Derrida's view, they are necessary but insufficient for the text. His rationale is based on his keen belief that language has limitations; these limitations were shaped by sociopolitical conditions throughout history, which have become insufficient for fully capturing the complexities of concepts or ideas (Wolfreys, 1998, pp. 57–59). An example can be given at this point for easier comprehension. Let us assume that Derrida had written a provocative sentence, even anarchic to some extent, as follows: "Money is a ~~conspiracy~~ created by the ~~state~~ to maintain the social classes intact". Here, "conspiracy" and "state" words are under erasure. With this technique, Derrida aimed to demonstrate that these words were not addressing objective or fixed concepts; instead, they were some fabricated products of our interpretations and cultural affiliations. The term "conspiracy" emphasizes that money is not an authentic and natural entity, but a construct. Similarly, the word "state" under erasure addresses that it does not treat everyone equally, which was its original essence in its first creation; it creates divisions amongst people. With these crossed-out words, Derrida intended to encourage readers to question the genuine meanings of these words: were they natural or constructed?

With this technique, Derrida discovered that the same word can take on different meanings in different texts. A microscopic analysis was required to be applied to these texts,

and Derrida attempted to eliminate binary oppositions and hierarchical structures in these words, as they granted themselves certain privileges over other terms. A careful tracing effort was constituted, and Derrida managed to recover the essence of the text: the *arche*. This effort may seem related to literary and philosophical contexts; however, it has received a warm welcome in other fields, such as law, politics, social theory, pedagogy, and more (Silverman, 1989, pp. 3–4; Derrida, 1997, pp. 60–62). Moreover, this technique is able to assist cross-comparisons of texts written in different cultures or times, which would ease comparing al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, so long as the *arche*-concept can be traced. An example can be given by following the previous example on the concept of liberty. It may not be easy to trace the term "liberty" in al-Rasa'il and/or the *Encyclopédie*; however, by deconstructing the term, the *arche*-concept reveals itself: free. This term refers to a state of being "unchained" from societal norms, religious regulations, or state interference. By following this *arche*, coupled with the fuzzy set theory, several elements related to the term "free" can be put inside a set named "liberty".

III

In one of his widely referenced articles, Clifford Geertz (1973) claimed that the essence of understanding the contributions of [social] sciences cannot be achieved by looking at its theories or empirical findings; in contrast, it is required to examine how it is practiced. In the realm of anthropology, the discoveries made must be evaluated within the cultural context in which they emerged and were affiliated. That cultural environment can explain the behavioral patterns of individuals within that society, making the culture public and open to further analysis. Geertz gave a simple example on this matter: the act of winking. According to him, the meaning attached to a wink varies across different cultures. That is, these basic anthropological elements should be evaluated within their own cultural environments. Actions and their associated meanings in a culture cannot be interpreted uniformly; they are robust in resisting to be examined through a standardized lens.

Geertz's article is widely regarded as a cornerstone of the interpretive approach in the social sciences. This methodological approach is focused on the process of meaning-making; it inspects the construction of words into meanings which were [*haute couture*] tailored to individual perceptions (Çınar, 2018, p. 21). Indeed, a national flag, for example, does not carry the same meaning for every citizen residing in the country of which that flag belongs. Its

interpretation varies with different factors, such as occupations, memories, ideological stances, and social status. Each individual's *sui generis* experiences and standpoints characterize the flag with different meanings (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006, pp. xii–xxvii). This approach, as one may notice, shares an intense kinship with Derrida's methodology. Because, by following the same example, soon after unveiling the *arche*-concept as "free", the interpretive method will complete the circuit by assisting in inspecting the attributed meanings of different concepts related to the term "free" in the course of the meaning-making process across diverse paradigms. In the same vein, only with this method can we uncover what the concept of "tree" means for characters such as Mowgli and Remy the Mouse, as mentioned above.

Here, although each of these approaches will be demonstrated one by one per chapter in the following pages, a general assessment of the applied methodology of this study can be made. First, this study aims to reveal what the authors of these two texts knew; to achieve this, the method of the Annales School will be employed. Second, the *arche*-concepts by utilizing Derrida's methodology will be determined for a possible comparison through two texts. Third, different fuzzy sets will be constructed using various concepts that incorporate these *arche*s. At this point, another mathematical approach comes to the stage—similar to fuzzy set theory; both will be utilized through their conceptual spirit, but not their mathematical capabilities—and this requires a clear explanation.

A mathematical function *"is a rule that assigns to each element x in a set A exactly one element called f(x) in a set B*"; it is shown by an "f" letter, or f in a stylized fashion (Stewart et.al, 2016, p. 91). The word "rule" is the key here, because whatever is put inside a function gives the exact output under this rule. For example, in a rule like $f(x) = x + 3$, it means that whatever number someone puts into x, they will receive "3 more" of it as the final output. Say, if we put "5" into x, we will receive "8". A similar tendency can be followed in some symbolic aspects for the sake of this study. For instance, if we consider apples and bananas as mathematical units such as 1, 5, 887, etc., in a functional rule like f(apple) = 2(bananas), when one puts "one apple" into this function, the function will give them "2 bananas": the rule is fixed. In the methodological architecture of this study, the mathematical functions can be likened to a mechanism box, where someone (in this case, al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*) operates the box, allowing the same input (a predetermined fuzzy set) to produce two different outputs in a "two-boxed situation", depending on which source defines the function—that is, the rule. These two outputs are currently accessible for comparison to determine how their mechanism boxes (functions) operate, highlighting their similarities and differences regarding

the selected concept. That is, as the fourth stage of the combined methodologies, these two new outputs are now subjected to a thorough comparison. A comparison with the interpretive method will now be used to evaluate outputs through newly created fuzzy sets, which constitutes the fifth phase of this methodological chain of approaches. That is, the concept of liberty in these texts—by following the earlier example—can now be compared systematically.

5. Organization of the Study

The central hypothesis of this study posits that "different enlightenment periods, each bearing a distinct name in history, can provide similar answers to the same questions". These similarities can empirically be verified through a comparative analysis of two iconic and encyclopedic texts from different cultural and historical contexts: al-Rasa'il from the Golden Age of Islam and the *Encyclopédie* from the Enlightenment. This section outlines the sequence of the study.

This study poses several research questions concerning the central hypothesis mentioned above. First, this research tends to find an answer to the "Do the selected political and philosophical concepts undergo significant conceptual changes across different enlightenment periods?" question. Several questions follow, like "How do the texts al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* transform 'what was known' into 'what was written', and what does this reveal about their respective conceptualizations of key ideas?", "What are the societal impacts—direct or indirect—of the way knowledge is conceptualized in these encyclopedic texts?", "To what extent did their contemporary intellectual environments influence these encyclopedic projects, and did they in turn influence others?", and finally, "Did these texts contribute to or reflect broader sociopolitical transformations in their respective societies?". The answers to these questions will constitute the central cornerstones of this study in supporting the main hypothesis.

In this respect, it is possible to identify five constituent chapters for this study, which aim to find satisfactory answers to these five questions. Albeit a writing technique was preferred to link each chapter to the previous one, the conceptual and contextual links between chapters were preserved. That is to say, some in-text and/or footnote references were put to direct readers between the former and the latter sections, which was devised to follow a harmonious and organic sequence. Here, each of these chapters will be introduced with the preferred methodology applied and its contents.

Chapter 1 is designed to find an answer to "What did the *Encyclopédistes* know about their enlightenment period during the penning of the *Encyclopédie*?"; that is, the central topic of Chapter 1 is the Western Enlightenment. Here, the methodology of the Annales School and the interpretive method will be utilized, albeit through a grouping. This grouping will be realized through a fire metaphor. Accordingly, to light a fire, three elements are required: oxygen, heat, and fuel. By likening the Enlightenment to fire, this study likens the environment of the Enlightenment to oxygen, its intellectuals to heat, and its venues to fuel—emphasizing the importance of social interaction. After a detailed examination of the concept of enlightenment, a broad definition attempt of the Enlightenment will be made. The oxygen part of the Enlightenment will be discussed under three central themes: embracing reason, challenging authority, and pursuing progress. The heat section, which reviews the intellectuals of the Enlightenment, preferred to divide the central figures of the period through their linguistic capacities: the Anglophone, the Francophone, and the Austro-Germanic philosophers. The leading philosophers will be introduced here through the themes they contributed to the Enlightenment thought, with these, which aim to complete the panorama of the Enlightenment through their intellectual contributions. The final element of fire, the fuel, will assess the places of the Enlightenment. In this respect, the salons, coffeehouses and taverns, Freemason lodges, and finally the *Encyclopédie* will be introduced. Their contribution to the dissemination of Enlightenment thoughts will be discussed here. The chapter will conclude with a section on conclusions.

Chapter 2 mainly deals with the Golden Age of Islam, mimicking the same structure as Chapter 1; it will provide a detailed evaluation of the Golden Age of Islam by following the Annales methodology and the interpretive method. This chapter also follows the same structure as Chapter 1, which examined the Enlightenment. After clarifying the concept of the golden age, the chapter will remain loyal to the aforementioned fire metaphor. Here, the environment (oxygen) of the Golden Age will discuss the translation movements, the role of the Caliphate institution, and the political and theological divisions in Islam. The heat section will refer to the Muslim intellectuals, who will be introduced through a tripartite grouping as the Sunni, the Shi'ite, and the Al-Andalusian intellectuals. Both the differences in their mental world and their contributions to the Golden Age will be reviewed. This section also hosts the Ikhwan, and through their introduction, their *magnum opus*, al-Rasa'il, will be introduced here as well. As for the fuel, which addresses the places of the Golden Age, including mosques and the *halqa*

tradition of learning, *madrasa*s, and libraries, will be discussed. The characterization of the Golden Age of Islam will be completed through a concluding section.

These chapters can be evaluated as the formation of two universal sets: one for the Ikhwan and one for the Encyclopedists, which aimed to reflect the knowledge they knew within their particular civilizations. The following chapters, namely Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are the main body of this study. These chapters aim to evaluate six concepts through three themes. The central theme of Chapter 3 is the individual tenets, and the concepts of freedom and rights will be evaluated and compared separately. Following an example could be beneficial in explaining the structure of the subsequent chapters. First, the concept of freedom will be discussed through dictionary definitions, and by the retrieved *arche*-concept, the elements related to this *arche* will be put inside a fuzzy set. Afterwards, the journey of the concept of freedom will be discussed chronologically and thematically from Ancient Greece to the Enlightenment. Next, the Ikhwan's and the Encyclopedists' formulations and evaluations of the concept will be presented separately, remaining loyal to the two encyclopedic texts they penned. After clarifying their thoughts on the concept, these two outputs will be divided into separate fuzzy sets, and a thorough comparison will be made by following these thematic sets. Their similarities and differences will be highlighted. A concluding remarks section will follow the comparison part, in which the chosen concept's journey after the publication of these texts will be evaluated within their own civilizations, albeit briefly, and by highlighting some key cornerstones. The exact structure will be followed for the concept of rights. Chapter 3 will conclude with a conclusion. This section combines the concepts of freedom and rights, and under the theme of "individual", a general comparison will be provided. Comparison tables will be provided at the end of each comparison subchapter and at the beginning of the conclusion section. This chapter primarily applies the interpretive method to the text, drawing on the concepts of fuzzy set theory, Derrida's deconstruction method, and the mentality of mathematical functions.

The central theme of Chapter 4 is the social tenets, and the concepts of morality and equality will be discussed here. An identical structure and methodology will be adapted as Chapter 3. Chapter 5, on the other hand, focuses on the political tenets, and the concepts of sovereign[ty] and justice will be discussed. This chapter also follows the same structure and methodology as Chapter 3.

A general conclusion part will follow Chapter 5. Here, through the examination of individual, social, and political themes, the thoughts of the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists will

be compared and discussed, with the assistance of a table. The hypothesis will be tested here, and the research questions will be answered. The contributions of this study to the field will be evaluated, and some further research topics that warrant investigation will be suggested.

At the end of the entire study, a reference section was placed. Here, a predetermined categorization was utilized as the main structure, comprising articles and book chapters, books, *Encyclopédie* articles, and the epistles of al-Rasa'il. The latter, the epistles, were numbered with Roman numerals for each epistle, as they were translated by different people one by one. For the respect to these translators and the hardship of providing in-text citations, such as (Ikhwan al-Safa, 2020, pp. 155–162), in this study, these citations were formatted as follows: (XXII, 155–162). A similar approach is also valid for the *Encyclopédie* articles. Some of these articles were unsigned, and d'Alembert's name as the co-editor was not mentioned after the seventh volume (*see* Ch. 1.2.3.4). However, these unsigned articles were mentioned with their names in this study such as (*Moine*, 1765, p. 616) and in the reference section, and d'Alembert's name was not removed from the *Encyclopédie* volumes following the eighth volume.

Before concluding this section, two warnings should be noted. First, as one can see, the selected concepts do not fit perfectly into their sets. For example, the concept of morality has traditionally been viewed within the parameters of the individual; however, this study prefers to place it within the set of society. These nuances stem from both the starting point and the destination of al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*—depending on their intentions. The society set is more closely associated with the concept of equality, with morality seen as a bridge that can help reduce inequalities in society. Similarly, the concept of rights was placed in the individual set; however, it is more connected to justice. This choice can also be understood as creating a link from the individual to politics. The second warning is necessary: all translations from other languages into English in this text are my own, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

6. Literature Review

Numerous scholarly works have been [separately] dedicated to analyzing both *al-Rasa'il* and the *Encyclopédie*; however, it is worth noting that I have not encountered one that attempted to make a direct comparison between these two influential texts.

Some notable works related to al-Rasa'il as well as its authors, Ikhwan al-Safa, can be listed as follows: an early English translation of selected parts of al-Rasa'il named "English

Translation of Akhwa-noos-Safa" (Monshee Syed Hoosain, Military Male Orphan Asylum Press, 1855), an introductory work on Ikhwan titled "Ikhwan al-Safa': A Brotherhood of Idealists on the Fringe of Orthodox Islam" (Godefroid de Callataÿ, Oneworld Publications, 2005), another introductory work delving into the Ikhwan's cosmology in addition with other Muslim scholars named "An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines" (Seyyed Hossein Nasr, State University of New York Press, 1993), Ian Richard Netton's famous work titled "Muslim Neoplatonists: An Introduction to the Thought of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa)" (Edinburgh University Press, 1991), a Turkish work reviewing the Ikhwan's religious and political discourses through the text of al-Rasa'il named "*İhvan-ı Safa'nın Dini ve İdeolojik Söylemi*" (Religious and Ideological Discourse of Ikhwan al-Safa) (Bayram Ali Çetinkaya, Elis Yayınları, 2003), and finally the complete translation of al-Rasa'il into Turkish with the editorship of Abdullah Kahraman under five volumes (Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2014, 2016 respectively) can be counted amongst them. In addition to these, the Oxford University Press translated al-Rasa'il into English under the name Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, which consists of 17 separate volumes. The content of the epistles differs in each volume—from one epistle per volume to six epistles in a volume, depending on the bulk of the translated epistles. The very first volume of these translations (Nader el-Bizri (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 2008) is reserved for an introduction to the Ikhwan al-Safa, which consists of different articles penned by renowned scholars like Farhad Daftary, Godefroid de Callataÿ, Carmela Baffioni, and Lenn A. Goodman.

There are a plethora of notable works on the French encyclopedists and the *Encyclopédie* on the other hand; still, it is possible to make a critical selection amongst them: Works on the translation of selected articles from the *Encyclopédie* to English like "Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment" (Michel Delon, Ed., Routledge, 2013) as well as "The *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and d'Alembert: Selected Articles" (John Lough, Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1969) and to Turkish like "*Ansiklopedi, ya da Bilimler, Sanatlar ve Zanaatlar Açıklamalı Sözlüğü*" (Salahattin Hilav, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1996). Similarly, a work that reviews the impact of the *Encyclopédie* in England titled "The *Encyclopédie* in Eighteenth-Century England" (John Lough, Oriel Press, 1970) as well as two comprehensive studies on the *Encyclopédie*, one titled with the exactly similar words "The *Encyclopédie*" (John Lough, David McKay Company Inc., 1971) while another titled as "Enlightening the World: *Encyclopédie*, The Book that Changed the Course of History" (Philipp Blom, Palgrave

Macmillan, 2005), and "*Encyclopédie*: The Triumph of Reason in an Unreasonable Age" (Philipp Blom, Fourth Estate, 2004) are worth mentioning here.

These existing works above, alongside the original texts of *al-Rasa'il* and the *Encyclopédie*, will serve as fundamental sources to be extensively utilized in this study. In addition to these considerations, the primary reference for the *Encyclopédie* belongs to a project aimed at digitalizing all volumes of the work, known as *Édition Numérique Collaborative et Critique de l'Encyclopédie* (ENCCRE, Collaborative Digital Edition and Review of the *Encyclopédie*, enccre.academie-sciences.fr/encyclopedie/). The digital library of *Bibliothèque Nationale de France* (National Library of France), named Gallica (gallica.bnf.fr), with over ten million documents, also serves as a fruitful reference point for further analyses of the research. Albeit there are some other digital projects like the ones produced under the patronage of University of Michigan Library with the name of "The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert: Collaborative Translation Project" (quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/) and University of Chicago's project named "ARTFL *Encyclopédie*" (encyclopedie.uchicago.edu) exist, they are purely translation tasks and their contributions to the research remain minor, excluding commentaries of the contributors. However, websites like "Electronic Enlightenment" (e-enlightenment.com) which includes thousands of letters and documents, "18thConnect" (18thconnect.org) which includes near one million peer-reviewed digital objects, "Eighteenth Century Journals" (18thcjournals.amdigital.co.uk) which includes several difficult-to-detect journals from mid-seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries in Europe, "Voltaire Foundation for Enlightenment Studies" (voltaire.ox.ac.uk) which operates under the support of University of Oxford and has numerous documents within, and "Early Modern Letters Online" (emlo.bodleian.ox.ac.uk) that covers a feast of letters from the years of 1500 to 1840 assist the Enlightenment period of the research to remain lively.

Speaking of the digital sources, "al-Mostafa Electronic Library" (al-mostafa.com) and "Nour Library" (noor-book.com) which contain numerous manuscripts in Arabic written during the Islamic age of enlightenment (the name of the latter is the correspondent to the "light" as well, sharing same etymological root with "enlightenment") assist the research in tracking the evolution of political concepts in the Islamic civilization.

Apart from these pivotal references, there are numerous works that do not place the *Encyclopédie* at the center of their studies but have nonetheless contributed to the field of research. Among these, John Lough's "France on the Eve of Revolution: British Travellers' Observations 1763-1788" (The Dorsey Press, 1987), "An Introduction to Eighteenth Century

France" (Longmans, 1960) and "Writer and Public in France: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day" (Clarendon Press, 1978), Robert Darnton's "Censors at Work: How States Shaped Literature" (The British Library, 2014), "George Washington's False Teeth: An Unconventional Guide to the Eighteenth Century" (W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), and "The Literary Underground of the Old Regime" (Harvard University Press, 1982), Gregory Fremont-Barnes' two-volume work titled "Encyclopedia of the Age of Political Revolutions and New Ideologies, 1760-1815" (Greenwood Press, 2007) and Marian Hobson's "Diderot and Rousseau: Networks of Enlightenment" (Voltaire Foundation, 2011) can be counted in terms of the compilation of books in connection with the Enlightenment and the *Encyclopédie*.

For the Islamic selections within the similar parameters of this literature, Frederick Starr's "Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia's Golden Age, from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane" (Princeton University Press, 2013), Bernard Lewis' "The Political Language of Islam" (The University of Chicago Press, 1988), Linda S. George's "The Golden Age of Islam" (Benchmark Books, 1998), Nilofer Ahmad and Majdood Ahmad's "The Golden Book of Islam" (Lotus Press, 2009), Eugene A. Myers' "Arabic Thought and the Western World in the Golden Age of Islam" (Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1964), Maurice Lombard's "The Golden Age of Islam" (Markus Wiener Publishers, 2004), Akbar Ahmed's "The Flying Man, Aristotle and the Philosophers of the Golden Age of Islam: Their Relevance Today" (Amana Publications, 2021), Farhad Daftary and Josef W. Meri's (Ed.) "Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam" (I. B. Tauris, 2003), Lenn E. Goodman's "Islamic Humanism" (Oxford University Press, 2003), Hamilton A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen's "Islamic Society and the West" (Oxford University Press, 1957), W. Montgomery Watt's "Islamic Political Thought" (Edinburgh University Press, 1968), Ibn 'Abd Rabbih's two-volume encyclopedic work titled "*Al-'iqd al-Farid*" written in 10th century to determine a 'perfect and well-informed individual' which was translated to English by Issa J. Boullata under the name of "The Unique Necklace" (Garnet Publishing Limited, 2006 and 2009), George Saliba's "Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance" (The MIT Press, 2007), and Ignaz Goldziher's "Muslim Studies" that was edited by S. M. Stern (Aldine Publishing Company, 1966) constitute the bulk of the studies.

Articles, too, constitute a great number in this literature. Though it would be improbable to count them one by one, some notable titles could still be named as follows: Frank A. Kafker's "The Risks of Contributing to Diderot's Encyclopedia" (*Diderot Studies*, 1973, Vol. 16, 119-143) and "The Recruitment of the Encyclopedists" (*Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 1973, Vol. 6, No. 4, 452-461), Glenn Roe, Clovis Gladstone, and Robert Morrissey's "Discourses and

Disciplines in the Enlightenment: Topic Modeling the French *Encyclopédie*" (*Frontiers in Digital Humanities*, 2016, No. 2, 8), Marian Hobson's "Diderot's *Encyclopédie* and the French Enlightenment: Summarizing Knowledge and Questioning Knowledge" (*Frontiers of Philosophy in China*, 2013, Vol. 8, No. 2, 215-229), David Adams' "*The Système figuré des connaissances humaines* and the Structure of Knowledge in the *Encyclopédie*" (In D. Donald, F. O'Gorman (Ed.), 2006, *Ordering the World in the Eighteenth Century*, Springer, 190-215), Yves Marquet's "*Les epîtres des Ikhwân as-Safâ', œuvre ismaïlienne*" (The Epistles of Ikhwan al-Safa, [an] Ismaili Work) (*Studia Islamica*, 1985, No. 61, 57-79), Godefroid de Callataÿ's "Encyclopaedism on the Fringe of Islamic Orthodoxy: The *Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ*, the *Rutbat al-ḥakīm* and the *Ghāyat al-ḥakīm* on the Division of Science" (*Asiatische Studien-Études Asiatiques*, 2017, Vol. 71, No. 3, 857-877) and "*Ikhwân al-Safâ: des arts scientifiques et de leur objectif*" (Ikhwan al-Safa: Scientific arts and their objective) (*Le Muséon*, 2003, Vol. 116, No. 1, 231-258), Abbas Hamdani's "Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi and the Brethren of Purity" (*International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1978, Vol. 9, No. 3, 345-353) and "The Name 'Ikhwan al-Safa'" (*Digest of Middle East Studies*, 1999, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1-11), and Bayram Ali Çetinkaya's "*Bilimler Ansiklopedisi Klasiği Olarak İhvân-ı Safâ Risaleleri*" (Treatises of Ikhwan al-Safa as a classical example of the encyclopedia of sciences) (*Dini Araştırmalar*, 2005, Vol. 8, No. 22, 263-286) and "*İhvân-ı Safâ Felsefesinde Bilimler ve Tasnifi*" (Sciences and their Classification in the Philosophy of Ikhwan al-Safa) (In İ. Özcoşar, A. Karakaş, M. Öztürk, S. Aslan (Ed.), 2019, *Keşf-i Kadîmden Vaz'-ı Cedîde: İslâm Bilim Tarihi ve Felsefesi*, Divan Kitap, 79-113).

CHAPTER 1

THE WESTERN ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE *ENCYCLOPÉDIE*

The concept of enlightenment is not exclusive to English; it also has its counterparts in different languages such as *Lumières* in French, *Ilustración* in Spanish, *Aufklärung* in German, *Aydınlanma* in Turkish, تنوير (*tanweer*) in Arabic, and so forth. Despite contextual differences, these share a common metaphor of "light", evoking reason, knowledge, and intellectual progress. Equally revealing is the *Encyclopédie,* which clearly states that earlier centuries could be named 'centuries of ignorance' *(siècles d'ignorance)*, where not even most of the kings were literate. The clergy exploited this ignorance by forging marriage certificates, since reading and writing were limited to them: they were the ones who recorded family lines—both among the laity and nobility (Jaucourt, 1765, p. 172). Such a state of ignorance was likened to darkness by eighteenth-century philosophers, as well as to night. Fontenelle, for instance, a popular philosopher in France, claimed that the night could only be illuminated by light. This night-light dichotomy was employed in numerous works by thinkers of the same era, as Daniel Roche claimed: *"the philosophers fear the night"* (Roche, 2000, pp. 118–119). The light, paralleled with reason, finds its resonance in Bruno Snell's claim that the Greeks discovered the concept of mind—a faculty that gives rise to reason, the men hesitated to use ideas that come from it in the Medieval times, but people strived to acquire knowledge by searching for better in time (Snell, 1953, pp. v–vii, 139–140).

The effort of searching for light manifests in different forms, and the Enlightenment in the 18th-century West can be counted among them.

1.1. The Concept of Enlightenment

The concept of enlightenment is directly related to the concept of light and encompasses a meaning linked to the state of understanding something, often something crucial. Since the process of such understanding occurs in the mind, enlightenment should be viewed as a rational process that transforms an individual's understanding from obscurity to clarity. Indeed, in daily life, the verb *to enlighten* means 'to explain clearly', whether in casual conversations or

academic endeavors. As can be seen here, this word is conceptualized within the domain of an individual. Indeed, Immanuel Kant (1995), a prominent German philosopher of the European Enlightenment, clearly articulated in his renowned work titled *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* (An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, 1784) that enlightenment can be defined as the use of one's own intellect to find solutions to emerging challenges. This principle is encapsulated by his famous motto, *"Sapere aude!"* (Dare to know!). The same tendency to define the concept through individuals is also visible here. However, the term can encompass a broader range of people, from a group of students in a classroom to the inhabitants of an entire continent, over a relatively extended period. When the latter resonates at a given moment, the term 'enlightenment' often serves as a supplementary word to describe that radiant epoch, similar to how the Japanese Enlightenment refers to the Meiji Restoration of the late 19th century or the Turkish Enlightenment addresses a period covering both the late Ottoman times and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Keeping this in mind, Moses Mendelssohn, another German thinker of the Age of Enlightenment, distinguished *Kultur* (practical cultivation) from *Aufklärung* (theoretical enlightenment) in his article titled *Über die Frage: Was heißt aufklären?* (On the question: What does it mean to enlighten?, 1784).[1] He said education was the sole indicator of a society's destiny and comprised culture and enlightenment. In his account, culture serves as a tool that individuals can utilize in the practical aspects of life, such as seeking beauty in the arts and being diligent in their work, while enlightenment focuses on the theoretical side of human existence; reasoning and facilitating rationality in their lives highlight the concept of enlightenment (Mendelssohn, 1996).

Intellectually flourishing periods do not have to carry the term "enlightenment" directly within their denominations; the terms "renaissance" and "golden age" are often used interchangeably as well. The usage of these terms depends on the historian's or author's

[1] In the original title of Mendelssohn's work, *"Ueber die Frage: Was heißt aufklären?"*, the word *"aufklären"* is a verb (to enlighten) in German; it corresponds closely to what was mentioned a few sentences earlier about clarifying, comprehending, fully understanding, etc. However, *"Aufklärung"* is a noun that aligns with "enlightenment" in this context, but not with "the Enlightenment"; it remains without the capital "E" and does not include a "the" since it lacks any article here. It is important to note that modern German nouns are capitalized. Although I utilized James Schmidt's translation here, to whom I owe a debt for his work, as referenced in the bibliography, I found it necessary to correct the title of the article in English. The original title translation in the aforementioned work is "On the Question: What Is Enlightenment?", which has to correspond to *"Über (Ueber) die Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?"*, but it did not. Still, we must note that Mendelssohn did not refer to "the Enlightenment"; otherwise, it would require a "die" article as follows: *"Über (or Ueber) die Frage: Was ist die Aufklärung?"* (On the question: What is the Enlightenment?).

choices; however, the designation of the period remains constant: an intellectually active and fruitful time.[2]

From the historiographical perspective of Marshall Hodgson, the world has experienced only two civilizations of what we might call 'global': the Islamic Civilization and the Western Civilization. The former dominated the world from its inception to the 17th century. He argued that a Martian visitor to Earth might have thought *"the human world was on the verge of becoming Muslim"* due to the widespread Islamic culture (Hodgson, 1993, p. 97). On the other hand, Western Civilization has prevailed since then and is particularly renowned for its technological advancements (Hodgson, 1993, p. 48).[3] As can be anticipated, both civilizations have undergone their enlightened epochs; the enlightenment period of the former is referred to as the Golden Age of Islam, while the latter is called "the Enlightenment". Although the Golden Age of Islam chronologically precedes the Enlightenment, this study will introduce these two intellectually active periods, beginning with the Enlightenment.

1.2. The Enlightenment of the 18th Century: How a Civilization Caught Fire

The Enlightenment can be likened to fog in a room, whether it be dark or illuminated; scholars tend to describe this fog through their own senses and perspectives. Consequently, numerous definitions have been formulated regarding the phenomenon of the Enlightenment in the past, and more will undoubtedly emerge in the future. John Robertson asserts that speculations about the main characteristics of the Enlightenment result in the concept lacking a thorough definition in its own period (Robertson, 2015, pp. 7–9),[4] and such a definition still might remain incomplete. While this statement holds valuable merit, an introductory-level definition of the Enlightenment could be established by employing a different approach. The 5W1H circumstances, which originally encompassed seven elements known as "the rhetorical device" in ancient times, comprise six distinct questions: who, what, when, where, why, and how. Answers to these questions were deemed sufficient for crafting a comprehensive explanation and have eventually become the hallmark of journalism over time under the name

[2] The "golden age" idiom will be discussed in the early pages of Chapter 2.
[3] Hodgson does not dismiss the philosophy here but emphasizes its practical application, which he conceptualizes with technical terminology. The concept's invention was likely derived from the significant paradigm shift in American social sciences during the 20th century, manifesting in the form of pragmatism, first introduced by notable American social scientists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey (Wolff, 2006, p. 1539).
[4] "*A definition of the Enlightenment still lay some distance in the future"* (Robertson, 2015, p. 8).

of “the Kipling Method”, inspired by the opening of Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem titled “I Keep Six Honest Serving-Men” (Sloan, 2010, p. 250).[5] Utilizing this method allows for a provisional, albeit compilatory, definition of the aforementioned fog until a more precise one becomes available, by offering brief answers to the essential questions as follows:

> The Age of Enlightenment, or simply “the” Enlightenment, is a significantly prominent intellectual, political, and cultural process that took place in eighteenth-century Europe and the North American colonies [which can also be stretched from the last quarter of the 17th century to the first quarter of the 19th century] (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 179). This period was marked by the valiant physical and academic efforts of numerous men of letters and thinkers known as *philosophes* in France, but not limited to them alone. These individuals, who had previously held scientific backgrounds, then turned their concerns to social and political matters (Burns, 2003, pp. 92–93) in pursuit of a grand transformation project encompassing both political and philosophical aspects. The political aspect in this panorama aimed to develop formulations to create a more humane environment for its people, while the philosophical aspect sought to dethrone the authority of religion and replace it with the sovereignty of nature and reason (Rorty, 2001, p. 19). This was achieved through the public exchange of ideas with both the intellectual elite and the laity in non-ecclesiastical venues (S. Brown, 1996, p. 4).

At first glance, it seems that this brief definition is satisfactory. However, the nature of the concept and its impact on Western civilization require a detailed explanation. Since the central theme of enlightenment is light,[6] and the oldest and most practical light source known to humanity is fire, introducing the concept through a fire metaphor could be helpful.[7] It is scientifically proven that fire is a combustion process requiring three essential elements: oxygen, heat, and fuel. This formulation is known as “the fire triangle” (Schaschke, 2014, p. 146). The Enlightenment process shares characteristics similar to those of fire. Here, oxygen symbolizes the intellectual environment necessary for the fire to grow, heat represents the intellectuals as the spark that lights the fire, and fuel depicts the venues that help the fire ignite. Only these three elements must unite to light a fire in achieving the Enlightenment. The brief definition of the Enlightenment above can be expanded upon by following this metaphor through a fire triangle.

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[5] “I keep six honest serving-men / (They taught me all I knew); / Their names are What and Why and When / And How and Where and Who.” (Kipling, 1976, p. 83).

[6] Academics studying the Enlightenment often reference either Daniel Chodowiecki's illustration, *Aufklärung*, as used by Ulrich Im Hof (1994, pp. 3–4), or the Platonic cave allegory, as utilized in Georg Picht’s work (1996, pp. 377–378), at the beginning of their texts. Chodowiecki’s relief represents the sun rising in the morning, symbolizing the world’s illumination through the light of knowledge. In contrast, the Platonic allegory highlights the light of fire, emphasizing both the use of reason and its resistance.

[7] Both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes* value fire in illumination. Al-Rasa’il claimed that light is the complementary manifestation of the essence of fire (XVII, p. 50), and the *Encyclopédie* characterizes fire through its internal ability to produce heat and light (d’Alembert, 1756, p. 599). Both texts approach fire from an ontological perspective focused on its essence. Since this study aims to compare these two texts, it would be beneficial to begin by examining their shared thoughts on the topic of fire.

Before concluding this debate, it must be highlighted that most of the intellectuals [if not all] who challenged the eighteenth century's authority with their fresh ideas, whether religious or political, were often striving to produce original answers to the question of "What *should* be done?". However, others amongst them preferred to answer the "What *must* be done?" question; naturally, they came up with even more accurate and rigid answers than their contemporaries. Jonathan Israel conceptualized the latter group of these individuals over radical adjective and coined their understanding of the Enlightenment as the Radical Enlightenment. As Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks (2013, pp. 371–372) aptly summarized, twentieth-century Enlightenment historians employed a diverse range of approaches in their studies. Peter Gay primarily focused on the French side of the Enlightenment and its emphasis on anticlericalism and the exaltation of science in the 1960s, while others, such as Margaret Jacob and Robert Darnton, delved into the cultural aspects of the Age of Reason and aimed their research at the societies of the Enlightenment in the 1980s. Similarly, Roy Porter detached himself from the Parisian Enlightenment's dominance and reviewed its British counterpart in the next decade. In the 2000s, however, Israel emerged on the stage. He managed to merge the authoritarian side of the Enlightenment, as encapsulated in the words *"Sapere aude!"* proposed by Reinhart Koselleck, with its secular and scientific aspects, as Gay defended. Thus came the Radical Enlightenment, which distinguishes the intellectuals of the Enlightenment as moderates, such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, and radicals, including Spinoza and Diderot. Israel's conceptualization is worth mentioning in a paragraph or two.

Though the Radical Enlightenment conceptualization is often attributed to Israel's labor, in truth, its disposal date back to the nineteenth century. The term was often utilized against Christianity or against timely political structures, but remained at the intellectual level alone. Its emphasis aligns with the changing nature of the world, directly related to a process of what we may call modernization; thus, it aims to eradicate what resists such modernization. In the nineteenth century, when the first conceptualizations of it emerged, the resisting parties were often the king or ecclesiastical figures, and sometimes both (Stjernfelt, 2017, pp. 82–87). Because the 'radical' term was described as *"believing or expressing the belief that there should be great or extreme social or political change"* (Procter, 1995, p. 1167), there have to be some other people who devised such an extreme change during the Age of Reason. Indeed, Margaret Jacob pioneered this debate, publishing her book titled *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons, and Republicans* in 1981. The pictured partakers of such radicalism were characterized as intellectual dissenters who did not share the same gradual optimism in change

as most philosophers or those who adhered to enlightened despotism. She claimed that these radical opinions gained ground after the Glorious Revolution in England by championing nature as the patron of spirit and matter, excluding God from the system. John Toland (1670–1722) was the leading figure in this understanding, and Jacob claims that his friends took these ideas to the Netherlands, where they contributed to the establishment of European Freemasonry. Its lodge in The Hague hosted radical thinkers and their ideas, which clashed with those of moderate intellectuals during its golden age, namely, the eighteenth century, a period that then spread to the rest of Europe, particularly Parisian salons (Jacob, 1981, pp. 20–27). She claims that the French Protestants who were forced to leave the country after the Edict of Nantes in 1685 resided in the Netherlands, full of hatred, which led to the radicalization of their ideas in both political and religious domains (Jacob, 2014, pp. 99–102). Thus, their followers in the next century, like Diderot and d'Holbach, claimed materialism more than ever and sought the destruction of the old while aiming to create the new. The enlightened milieu of the eighteenth century, therefore, *"[…] produced two versions of Enlightenment, one that was moderate, deistic, Newtonian, and supportive of court-centred government, the other was pantheistic, politically radical, and often republican"* (Jacob, 1981, p. 263).

Jonathan Israel, on the other hand, accepted what Jacob said but anchored Jacob's theses with the ideas of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) while seasoning the elements of Radical Enlightenment with the concept of equality in his book of 2001 titled *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity: 1650-1750*. He began his journey by claiming that a movement in Europe had initiated in the second half of the seventeenth century, which he referred to as Spinozism, whose roots are based on Spinoza's thesis on the equivalence of God and nature. This was a proto-form of atheism, and it gained acceptance over time, reaching its golden age with the materialistic and atheistic works of La Mettrie and Diderot (Israel, 2001, pp. 3–7). Thus, he claims, a new trend had emerged among some Enlightenment thinkers that denied compromise with the residues of the past, focusing on making a complete change in the sociopolitical domains of Europe. Thus, he summarizes Radical Enlightenment as follows:

> "[…] the Radical Enlightenment, whether on an atheistic or deistic basis, rejected all compromise with the past and sought to sweep away existing structures entirely, rejecting the Creation as traditionally understood in Judeo-Christian civilization, and the intervention of a providential God in human affairs, denying the possibility of miracles, and reward and punishment in an afterlife, scorning all forms of ecclesiastical authority, and refusing to accept that there is any God-ordained social hierarchy, concentration of privilege or land-ownership in noble hands, or religious sanction for monarchy" (Israel, 2001, pp. 11–12).

The modern usage of the term "Radical Enlightenment" gained prominence in Germany during the early 20th century. However, its introduction to the Anglophonic communities happened with the works of Leo Strauss. He, too, underlined the role of Spinoza while conceptualizing the term (Stjernfelt, 2017, p. 95). Still, Israel did not find the attributed role of Spinoza in the works of Strauss, criticized him with *"[…] Strauss identified Spinoza as "a", but not necessarily "the", pivotal figure"* (Israel, 2015, p. 10) words.[8] Additionally, what Israel did was to link the mid-seventeenth century's radical efforts to the modernity, which he marked these efforts as "the true beginning of modernity" idiom (Israel, 2001: 24). It seems, the difference between Jacob's and Israel's conceptualizations of the Radical Enlightenment rests upon the origins, that is, the Masonic lodges for the former and Spinoza alone for the latter, and the ultimate destination came as practical outcomes like republicanism for the former and a *mere* abstract concept like modernity for the latter. This might be why Jacob accused Israel of writing an idealistic history of *Ideengeshichte* (story of an idea), focusing on the legacy of a single man. At the same time, Israel rejects these accusations by defending his standpoint (Stjernfelt, 2017, p. 97).

1.2.1. The Oxygen: Atmosphere That Fed the Flame

Formulations simplify our lives; they are easy for most people to memorize and quick to use when needed. The well-known Pythagorean Theorem, for instance, instead of memorizing all the functional units and innate properties of a right triangle, one can memorize the formulation $a^2 + b^2 = c^2$ and apply this formula to any suitable situation. The Enlightenment of the 18th century can also be summarized with a simple formula, at least according to its central tenets, the Enlightenment thinkers focused on: "Embrace reason, challenge authority, and pursue progress".[9] Although "the Enlightenment" includes a grammatical article in English,

[8] The stress on the grammatical articles here as "a" and "the" were given in italic form in the original text. The employed quotation marks upon these articles are mine.

[9] The construction of this study followed a gradual path. First, I thoroughly read al-Rasa'il (twice) and took notes. Then I listed the articles of the *Encyclopédie* that would help this study. I reduced around 5,000 relevant articles to a certain number. Then, I read them and took notes. I wrote Chapters 4, 5, and 3—in this order. Only then did I write this chapter and Chapter 2. I considered the *Encyclopédie* as the manifesto of the Enlightenment, and bolstered my knowledge with further readings. This formulation is my own invention, since I realized that the philosophers of this age aimed to define the link between the individual and society, knowledge and power, and tradition and change. As the "Introduction" section and the paragraph above revealed, I tend to approach problems through mathematical formulations—to carve them into my mind. Following the formulations kept the study on track. A similar formulation can be produced for the Golden Age of Islam: "seek knowledge, harmonize faith and reason, cultivate both worlds". However, the period had a compressed historical arc; it developed with extraordinary speed, leaving little room for early or gradual phases. That is why I refrained from offering a precise formulation while touching upon its boundaries. The Enlightenment and the Golden Age of Islam were both

specifically the "the" article, which emphasizes the uniqueness of the concept, the words in this motto—reason, authority, and progress—were not written with articles. This is because there was no single reason to embrace, no authority to challenge, and no progress to pursue. Considering that the Enlightenment was a movement[10] experienced in various contexts [with a humble generalization] throughout the West, its targets of critique and visions of progress inevitably differed.

1.2.1.1. Embracing Reason

Reason may be defined as confidence in one's mind when conducting philosophical inquiry. Since contemporary science was referred to as the philosophy of nature in the eighteenth century, it was essential to set aside older ideas and superstitions to establish a legitimate 'science' (Shorr, 1967, p. 24). Based on *a priori* deduction, the Cartesian rationalism still dominated seventeenth-century natural philosophy, where knowledge was derived by systematic deduction. It gradually gave way in the 18th century to Newton's synthesis—a method that emphasized empirical observation and mathematical modeling, and avoided speculative first principles. The Newtonian way of thinking, therefore, did not move *"[…] from concepts and axioms to phenomena, but vice versa"* (Cassirer, 1951, pp. 6–8). This synthesis was crucial for the Enlightenment and necessary; empiricism had to emerge to bring prominent French figures, such as Montesquieu and Voltaire, to the forefront (Gay, 1967, p. 12). Indeed, as Marquis de Condorcet (1995, pp. 64–69) claimed, observational sciences (empiricism) are interconnected and support each other by focusing on nature, while social sciences, such as economics and politics, are not exceptions in this regard. Some critics of the Enlightenment, such as Burke, de Maistre, and Hegel, challenged the era's "overconfidence" in reason—albeit from different perspectives. While Burke and de Maistre viewed reason as dangerous when detached from tradition and divine authority, Hegel saw the failure not in reason itself, but in

rational human enterprises, but their sources and trajectories differed significantly. Their knowledge repositories, too, varied in scale and nature. For example, this study chose not to explain the concept of reason in the Enlightenment chapter through definitions, but through tension—through the metaphor of blindness. Similarly, the harmony of faith and reason in the Golden Age resists simplification; instead, it is better grasped through the concept of *madhhab*, as detailed in the following chapter. Comparing such distinct paradigms is certainly troublesome, but still possible—so long as we remove the obstacles at the outset.

[10] This study humbly favors John Robertson's (2015, p. 13) characterization of the Enlightenment as a movement. A similar approach can be traced in Peter Gay's thesis as well, where he confined the essence of the Enlightenment to the efforts of "the little flock of *philosophes*," inspired by Horace Walpole's negative denomination of these fellow thinkers (Gay, 1967, pp. 6–14). Still, some features were portrayed within the parameters of a 'process' throughout the text.

its abstract and decontextualized use. They argued that when reason was elevated above all other forms of legitimacy, it became vulnerable to excess—and this excess, they claimed, found violent expression in events like the French Revolution (Bates, 2002, p. 2).

While it is often assumed that the *Encyclopédistes* distanced themselves from the metaphysical rationalists, this generalization does not hold uniformly. For instance, Jean le Rond d'Alembert—the co-editor of the *Encyclopédie* with Denis Diderot—explicitly credited thinkers such as Descartes and Leibniz for their intellectual contributions (d'Alembert, 1751, p. iii). This aligns with what Descartes said (d'Alembert, 1751, pp. xxv–xxvi) and what Bacon, *"the greatest, most universal, and most eloquent of all philosophers"*, proposed (d'Alembert, 1751, pp. xxiv–xxv).[11] Additionally, he accepts the cumulative nature of science, which materializes through Descartes' method and Bacon's technique, later combined by Newton to explain the material universe. Consequently, as d'Alembert asserts, Newton did not address the nonmaterial aspects of the universe, which, in turn, were left to John Locke to explain this metaphysical realm systematically. D'Alembert, thus, did not hesitate to declare that Locke *"[…] qu'il créa la métaphysique à peu-près comme Newton avoit créé la physique"* (d'Alembert, 1751, pp. xxvi–xxvii).[12] What Locke did was undeniably innovative. In the second book of his masterpiece, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, published in 1690, he claimed that ideas are merely objects fabricated in the mind and that the source of all ideas stems from either sensations or reflections. This means humans enter this life with no innate ideas, like a blank paper without written words. In his view, sensations consist of the senses that humans innately possess at birth, such as taste, hearing, sight, smell, and touch. Meanwhile, reflections are further aspects residing within our minds, such as thinking, believing, reasoning, and so forth (Locke, 1997, pp. 109–111). D'Alembert was correct in this regard, as he adeptly distinguished the knowledge humans have acquired, paving a superhighway toward answering 'central' questions about cosmology in the eighteenth-century West.

Lockean disposal of reason is perhaps best manifested in individuals who lack one of the innate senses. In the same book, Locke (1997, pp. 143–144) presented an argument, a question in truth, posed to him by William Molyneux, a British philosopher, as follows:

> Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube, and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly[13] of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one

[11] *"[…] le plus grand, le plus universel, & le plus éloquent des Philosophes".*
[12] *"[…] he created metaphysics in much the same way Newton created physics".*
[13] Proximately, imminently, closely.

> and t'other,[14] which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see: Quære,[15] whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube.

Molyneux answered his own question and claimed that a blind man could not distinguish between a sphere and a globe since he had not formed the sensory link between touch and sight; Locke agreed.[16] The question of Molyneux gained widespread attention with the promotion of Locke, leading many philosophers to reflect on it in the subsequent century. George Berkeley, for example, in his text titled *Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision* (1709), approached the concept from what we might consider a scientific rather than a philosophical standpoint. From his perspective, such a man would be confused when trying to differentiate the items, as he had never experienced essential positional concepts like depth, width, distance, figure, number, motion, and more in a two-dimensional space. A blind man who was cured and received immediate sight, according to Berkeley, would indeed understand what "upper" or "lower" means and could utilize these spatial positions from his blind days; however, he could only recognize these positions through tactile experiences after he regained his sight (Paulson, 1987, p. 26; Armstrong, 1960, pp. 23, 47).[17]

Interestingly, Molyneux's problem, which focuses on the difference between senses and reason, found fertile ground in France. This study will examine the perspectives of four individuals on this topic: Voltaire, Condillac, Diderot, and d'Alembert.

In his *Élements de la philosophie de Newton* (The Elements of Newton's Philosophy), published in 1738, Voltaire examines this hypothetical question through an actual case. According to him, an English surgeon named William Cheselden claimed in 1729 that he could restore a blind person's sight by removing cataracts from their eyes. Fortunately for him, a thirteen-year-old boy volunteered for the operation and saw the light for the first time when he was fourteen. Voltaire credits Locke and Berkeley for their judgments because the boy was confused by what he had seen and thoroughly believed that an inch-sized object in front of his eyes was as big as a house resting meters away, since he had no understanding of spatial positions, especially distance. His experience of sight was so shocking that he thought the objects surrounding him were stuck to his eyes. After several months of hesitation, and with the

[14] Short form of 'the other'.
[15] Ask, inquire, query.
[16] A mark here is required; that is, this acceptance of Locke was not mentioned in the first draft of his *Essay* in 1689. In truth, he was rejecting the notion that the idea produced by the hand on the cube may be confused with another idea produced by sight on the sphere (Falkenstein, 2014, p. 347).
[17] The Ikhwan, too, believe that a blind man cannot imagine the shape of a *thing* with his reason (XXXI, p. 97).

assistance of his other senses, particularly touch, the boy gradually adjusted to his new world. Building on this case, Voltaire asserted that the senses could only understand the world by aligning with one's own experiences (Voltaire, 1967, pp. 63–66). Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, in his *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines* (Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge), published in 1746, synthesized what Locke proposed and what Berkeley emphasized, using Voltaire's example. According to him, these two thinkers were making hasty conclusions, which was a mistake; humanity's knowledge of the rules of optics was limited at the time. The boy's cataracts were removed, restoring his sight, but he had never used his eyes in his life; therefore, his cornea could have been either too convex or not convex enough. Thus, the link between touch and sight that developed over months could have been accelerated by frequent practice. This was his scientific explanation; however, for the philosophical perspective, in three-dimensional space—comprising width, depth, and length—the boy could easily distinguish a globe from a cube at first sight, he stated, because he had formed the ideas of the globe and cube's shapes in his mind by touching them long before he regained his sight (Condillac, 2001, pp. 107–110). As seen so far, from Locke to Condillac, philosophers generally viewed blindness as a deficiency of one sense, leading them to consider blind individuals as incomplete. However, Diderot synthesized all these data and offered a new perspective by examining people with only four senses as complete individuals (Paulson, 1987, p. 13).

Denis Diderot, in his *Lettre sur les aveugles à l'usage de ceux qui voient* (Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who Can See) of 1749, answers questions about cubes and globes, as well as the experience of first-time sight after the operation. He said that the boy could easily differentiate simple objects, like a ball from a cube. However, he would be extremely confused when distinguishing complex items, such as everyday garments like gloves from a robe (Diderot, 2020, p. 55). Additionally, the connection between sight and touch is not always clear, which can lead to misleading conclusions, since knowledge of colors does not relate to touch (Diderot, 2020, p. 49). Therefore, it was necessary to study this issue among the blind who did not regain their sight. To do this, he examined two blind individuals: a born-blind peasant from the Puiseaux region and Nicholas Saunderson, a blind English mathematician who lost sight due to smallpox as a toddler. According to Diderot, the peasant understood the concept of a mirror; however, he thought that images were displayed on the mirror as reliefs that could be touched, claiming that the eye was merely an organ that interacted with air in the same manner that his cane interacts with his hand (Diderot, 2020, pp. 5–7). Similarly, Saunderson created a

primitive calculator-like device that allowed him to perform sums and make geometric calculations by touching small pins attached to squares or placing strings between them (Diderot, 2020, pp. 19–27). Diderot emphasized these examples to illustrate their ability to perceive the world solely through touch; he was so convinced that he claimed a blind philosopher, in a Cartesian manner, would place the man's soul at his fingertips (Diderot, 2020, p. 17). Thus, he concluded his thoughts on this matter by acknowledging the role of experience, which enables us to compare senses to what was previously sensed (Diderot, 2020, p. 47). He asserted that the human mind can connect insensible things and ideas through the experience of what was previously sensed (Diderot, 2020, p. 11), highlighting the supremacy of reason. Jean le Rond d'Alembert took up this issue where Diderot left off. In an article he wrote for the *Encyclopédie* examining blindness, d'Alembert (1751a, pp. 870–873) clearly states that he will not delve into the medical explanation of blindness but will review its philosophical implications regarding the loss of a sense. After this clarification, he summarizes Diderot's *Lettre* in the article, noting that it was written by an anonymous author in 1749. He follows a similar structure, declaring that the author self-censored by omitting sections that might offend some pious audiences. D'Alembert concluded the article by quoting a section from the *Lettre*, which hypothesized that if a blind man were to gain sight for only a day or two before becoming blind again, it would be better for him to remain silent and not tell other blind people about his experiences; otherwise, he would be regarded as a madman.

D'Alembert's preference for concluding the article with this quote is appealing since Diderot (2020, pp. 13–14) chose to place these words in the early pages of his *Lettre*. In this section of the text, Diderot criticizes the long-accepted norms of society, particularly in the realm of religion. Considering that the eighteenth century in the West is rightly characterized by the Age of Reason idiom (Becker, 1932, p. 8) and that Locke's revolution in metaphysics, as d'Alembert noted, resonated loudly throughout the century, it seems only natural to challenge these outdated forms of knowledge. Perhaps this is why French thinkers examined the concept of blindness more than others; the French mode of thought in the eighteenth century was more aligned with Descartes, as Diderot (2020, pp. 5–7) praised the reasoning of the blind peasant concerning the behavior of mirrors, suggesting that Descartes would have appreciated such a description. In the same vein, Voltaire (1967, pp. 6–7) also commended Descartes, referring to him as a "great man" for the system he established. D'Alembert (1752, pp. 716–726) too felt indebted to Descartes, not hesitating to call him *"génie"* (genius). However, Condillac (2001, p. 4) criticized Descartes' methodology, accusing him of being unaware of the origins and

generating points of ideas, while expressing admiration for Locke on this matter. Although the Frenchmen's sympathy for Cartesian reasoning belongs to another study, Condillac's attitude toward Descartes may have stemmed from his deep devotion to Christian belief, as the others are known for their critical stances toward institutionalized religions. That is to say, the philosophers of the Age of Reason were able to exercise their reason in questioning established ideas and norms, as exemplified by a debate on blindness.

The might of reason that was seen as unlimited remained at the center of human thinking for a long time. This approach became a sacralized notion during the Enlightenment. It was assumed that reason could solve anything and everything, alongside comprehending them, as was evident in the discussion about blindness. However, another intellectual of the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant, rejected the omnipotence of reason and strived to examine the structure and limitations of reason in his famous work titled *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). Still, this work is not an attack against reason; in contrast, it aims to show what reason can know and cannot—it aims to provide a concrete ground to reason. If reason does not know its limits and boundaries, then it will follow imagination, run into contradiction, and pursue empty beliefs. Reason tends to transcend itself when it comes to concepts like God, spirit, and the boundaries of the universe; such a situation would eventually create intellectual chaos (Kant, 2010, pp. 3–5). Therefore, Kant preferred to approach reason from two aspects by explaining the difference between *a priori* knowledge, which comes before experience—with birth—and *a posteriori* knowledge, which depends on experience (Kant, 2010, p. 27). Besides, he divides the judgments into two: analytical and synthetic. Accordingly, the analytical judgments reveal the knowledge it already contains, while synthetic judgments add new knowledge. With this contribution, Kant aimed to show that some knowledge can be innate and new. Such judgments are called "synthetic *a priori*", which is often accepted as a revolutionary introduction to philosophy (Kant, 2010, pp. 32–36). Additionally, Kant discussed the roles of senses, perception, and the faculty of understanding in producing knowledge. Time (Kant, 2010, pp. 49–51) and space (Kant, 2010, pp. 45–47), for instance, are necessary conditions for our perception of the external world. We can only know things according to the categories of our reasons. That is, reason does not adapt to things, but things adapt to reason (Kant, 2010, pp. 80–87). In short, Kant neither exalts reason nor abhors it; he analyzes reason and advises using it more cautiously. Because a reason that does not know its limitations cannot produce liberty, but becomes an illusion.

1.2.1.2. Challenging Authority

A six-penny pamphlet of poetry was widely circulated in 1705 under the title *The Grumbling Hive; or Knaves Turn'd Honest*, which includes a satirical poem that critiques the ineffective workings of society. Its author, Bernard Mandeville (1966, p. 4), expanded this poem with additional texts and published it under the title *Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Public Benefits* in 1714. Setting aside the additional texts, the original poem criticized the authorities of society by comparing them to an ordinary beehive. The author claimed that the leading figures of societal authority—from ministers to priests, soldiers, and physicians—tended to prioritize their own interests, which led to societal corruption. However, he generously offered a solution to this dire situation:

> Knowing the God sent no disease
> To nations without remedies (Mandeville, 1966, p. 30).

What Mandeville conceptualized in this poem was not unfamiliar to the philosophers of the eighteenth century. It was the age of absolutism, and kings were intent on absorbing all power within themselves, bypassing ministers and employing direct administration. The roots of such absolutism, particularly in France, had long been discussed among jurists and royal publicists since Medieval times. They either envisioned the king as the defender of the public good against private interests, in stark contrast to what the *Fable* stated, or as the suzerain of suzerains. Additionally, titles such as "inheritor of the Roman emperor" and "defender of the Church and faith" were widely used (Keohane, 1980, pp. 54–58). The latter title prevailed historically, and the seventeenth century saw an intimacy between religion and state (Robertson, 2015, pp. 15–16) similar to historical examples discussed in the cases of Charlemagne and Pope Leo III or the state-religion synthesis of the Roman Empire. Indeed, even the newly built cities in the New World, such as Lima in Peru, did not hesitate to construct the cathedral and the palace next to each other, following this philosophy (Im Hof, 1994, p. 26). Such absolutism reached its pinnacle during the extensive reign of Louis XIV in France, from 1660 to 1715, who was known by the title of the Sun King. Bishop Bossuet, the advisor to the king at that time, revived and theorized the archaic concept of the "divine right of kings", which emphasized the idea that power to rule was granted to kings by God and that they ruled on behalf of the Lord. Louis XIV was unable to transform the monarchy into a fully-fledged absolutist regime due to dissenting voices within the royal court, and his successors, Louis XV and Louis XVI, were even weaker in this debate (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 1–3, 15). Still, this repellent concept had already infiltrated the minds of French thinkers. Even without an omnipotent and omnipresent

king on the throne, the possibility of fully functional absolutism lingered as an unsettling prospect. In this context, the philosophers of the Enlightenment identified their archrivals as the authorial bodies of the state and religion, since the cure coexisted with the disease, as Mandeville suggested.

A philosopher's sword was his pen; thus, they continued writing several treatises and essays challenging this absolutism. They first analyzed the roots of the state, considering the origins of the concept and the reasons behind the motive to establish one. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) offered the first systematic social contract theory. Hobbes firmly believed in the existence of limitations on the human mind within the realm of philosophy, which led him to adopt a practical approach and promote order and stability in politics. According to Brian Duignan, Hobbes believed that *"the fundamental physics of law of life was motion and that the predominant human impulses were fear"*, and laws existed to remind them of this fear. Law, therefore, derives its force from the sovereign power authorized by the covenant. This is why humans submitted their only proper form of equality—the liberty to kill one another—to a higher power he called Leviathan, or the ruler. Leviathan's sole responsibility is to maintain peace among the members of society (Duignan, 2013, pp. 73–76). Hobbes promoted an undivided sovereign, which we can refer to as an absolutist, rather than a ruler who shares his power with any parliamentary body—an undivided power. Although this formulation might have seemed welcome to the centralized monarchs in Europe, they did not accept it; Hobbes's point of view did not stem from the long-accepted concept of divine right but from a secular position (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 274). The concept of private property had long been discussed, notably by Grotius and Pufendorf; however, they were not related to the birth of government until Hobbes. The Hobbesian framework rejected the existence of any form of private property without a government—property cannot remain safe without it, binding its sole *raison d'être* to Leviathan (Harris, 1996, p. 88).

John Locke (1632–1704) was a proponent of the social contract theory, linking private property to it, considering it the most fundamental natural right—alongside life and liberty (Anchor, 1967, p. 9), as he developed his argument for the contract. The Lockean state of nature was not chaotic—as Hobbes proposed, but a "state of perfect freedom", characterized by equality in power and jurisdiction, where harming others is permissible only in self-defense cases. The legitimate authority of such a system is reason alone. Thus, reason dictates that when an individual faces wrongful action from another, they have the right to punish the offender, granting them temporary authority over the transgressor for proportional punishment as

reparation (Locke, 2015, pp. 269–272). Additionally, this nature acknowledges that individuals and their labor are their own private properties, along with what they have acquired through reason and labor. Given that God provided the earth and its resources to all humanity collectively, anything a person rightfully acquires on this earth through labor belongs to them—by respecting the principle of equity. Otherwise, the concept of private property would be eliminated from the equation; therefore, nothing on this earth could be utilized, as its inherent status would be undefined (Locke, 2015, pp. 285–292).[18] Locke asserted that people in the state of nature unite to form a society to protect their members' liberties and private properties (Locke, 2015, pp. 366–368). He took a moderate approach in characterizing his social contract; he preferred to establish a balance among the branches of government, which served as a justification for the outcomes of the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689 in Britain (Duignan, 2013, p. 79).[19] Verily, in the nineteenth chapter of his *Second Treatise of Government*, 1689, Locke discusses the dissolution of government. According to him, people enter into society to protect their properties; thus, when a government violates this right, people's rights of liberty and life are also violated, which means society has the right to alter or change the government (Locke, 2015, pp. 411–414). This conclusion can be read in parallel to Locke's emphasis on people's consent in government and the legitimacy of the deposition of James II during the Revolution.

The path Hobbes paved was also well-received in continental Europe. Hobbes championed absolutism, while Locke rejected such a tendency, and numerous treatises arose, choosing either the Hobbesian or Lockean path. Since concepts like the Enlightenment, Renaissance, and Scientific Revolution were names constructed by historians (Robertson, 2015, p. 10), absolutism was a concept like these; the Enlightenment thinkers used the word despotism instead (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 155). According to Montesquieu (2020, p. 11), the world experienced three forms of government: republic, monarchy, and despotism. These, respectively, focus on sovereignty resting with the people, upon one person with effective laws, and upon one person without any laws. In this context, the sole code of despotism is the ruler's ability to act as they please, similar to savages who cut down a tree entirely to eat a few fruits

[18] *"For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good lest in common for others"* (Locke, 2015, p. 288).

[19] Although many political philosophers in eighteenth-century Europe welcomed Locke's theory of the social contract, some found it ridiculous and rejected it. Montesquieu, for instance, in his *Persian Letters*, claimed that public rights and the origins of societies were interconnected from the birth of a man, similar to a boy born into his father's world, which makes society both the reason for and the result of itself (Dupré, 2004, p. 163).

(Montesquieu, 2020, p. 74). Additionally, he promoted the necessity and existence of aristocracy to serve as a barrier between monarchy and despotism (Anchor, 1967, p. 15). Though Montesquieu came from noble origins, he purchased a judicial post and elevated himself to the judicial nobility, which was mocked by Voltaire, the son of an ordinary notary (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 397; Anchor, 1967, p. 16). The monarchy and its potential transformation into a despotic regime had long been a source of dread for French thinkers. During the reign of Louis XIV, Blaise Pascal advocated for the restoration of the principle of equity in the French monarchic tradition, ultimately bringing the concept of enlightened despotism to the forefront (Anchor, 1967, pp. 20–21). This term refers to the tendency of European absolutist rulers in the latter half of the eighteenth century to govern according to Enlightenment principles, particularly reason, in their internal policies (Scott, 2003, p. 415). Fortunately, the eighteenth century witnessed numerous enlightened despots, often referred to with the title "Great": Frederick II of Prussia, Maria Theresia of Austria, Joseph II of the Holy Roman Empire, Catherine II of Russia, and several others (Im Hof, 1994, pp. 15–16). Claude-Adrien Helvétius, a notable philosopher of the Enlightenment and indirect contributor to the *Encyclopédie*, praised enlightened despots, particularly Frederick II, for his patronage of the Berlin Academy. However, Diderot disagreed with his friend (Thielemann, 1952, p. 242). Diderot's stance on any form of despotism was clear:

> I see only a formal difference between despotism and pure monarchy. The despot does what he wants, without formality. The monarch is subjected to formalities which he neglects whenever he wants and which, when he does respect them, only delay the fulfillment of his wishes (Diderot, 1992, p. 90).

This section above is taken from his critique *Observations sur le Nakaz*, which addresses Catherine II directly.[20] The text begins with a certain observation: *"There is no true sovereign except the nation; there can be no true legislator except the people"* (Diderot, 1992, p. 81). Diderot criticizes the tsarina as a despot (Diderot, 1992, p. 82) and adds that he had also stated this directly to her, claiming that if England were to have three more despots after the reign of Elizabeth, it would have been enslaved ever since. The tsarina agreed (Diderot, 1992, p. 89). In another text, as part of a collective work from 1770 titled *Histoire des deux Indes* (History of

[20] It was July 1767 when Catherine II ordered her ministry to create a new code of law for Russia, providing her own manifest and asking them to take inspiration from that text. This manifest, titled *Nakaz kommissii o sochinenii proekta novago ulozheniia* (The grand instructions to the commissioners appointed to frame a new code of laws), or briefly *Nakaz*, was claimed to follow the Enlightenment mode of thinking (Dulac, 2013, p. 1172). Diderot received a copy of this after his visit to Russia in 1774 and wrote his critique the following year. Only after his death was a copy of this unpublished critique sent to St. Petersburg, and Catherine II became furious. It is assumed that the tsarina destroyed that copy (Mason & Wokler, 1992).

the two Indies), he wrote a separate article discussing enlightened despots. Here, he openly rejects the idea that enlightened despotism is the best kind of government and reinforces his earlier example of Elizabeth and England: *"A first despot who was just, resolute and enlightened would be a great evil; a second would be a greater evil; a third would be the most terrible scourge a nation could ever suffer"* (Diderot, 1992, pp. 207–208).

Voltaire, too, delved into the debate on enlightened despotism. He equated monarchy with despotism, similar to Diderot (Voltaire, 1994, p. 76), while asserting that Frederick II was undoubtedly a despot (Voltaire, 1995, p. 109). However, he was considered an enlightened man and was repelled by his father, Frederick William's, despotic traits during his time as crown prince (Voltaire, 1995, p. 99).[21] Finally, Voltaire examines the discussion of a non-despotic regime in England from a different perspective than Diderot: *"Were there only one religion in England, despotism would be a threat; were there two, they would be at each other's throats; but there are thirty, and they live happily and at peace with one another"* (Voltaire, 2007, p. 20).

These debates continued, but then Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) from Geneva entered the scene with his answer to the question posed by the Academy of Dijon in 1749. The question was straightforward: *Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs* (Whether the re-establishment of the sciences and the arts has helped to purify morals), but Rousseau's answer was even more straightforward: No! According to him, there is a direct link between science and art and sin; the sciences and arts are mere products of specific human vices.[22] People engage in these domains to create something new only to be flattered by society; a "commerce with the muses", he claims, which fosters a hypocritical environment that ultimately leads men to lose virtue. Rousseau advanced this idea in his 1753 play, Narcisse, where he characterized these individuals with *amour-propre* terms, which imply self-esteem. Here, he criticized philosophers who, he believes, live in their own fantasies, blinded by their love of ideas, and who, he adds, ignore the rest of society, from their families to fellow citizens (Keohane, 1980, pp. 425–427). An observant eye can see the parallelism between Rousseau's thoughts and those expressed by Mandeville in the *Fable*. Indeed,

[21] Interestingly, Peter Gay (1969, pp. 483–484) indeed considers Frederick II a philosopher-king within the parameters of the eighteenth century, similar to d'Alembert, the only *philosophe* who shares this idea. However, Gay notes that the relationship between Voltaire and crown prince Frederick has always existed on the edges of reciprocal adulation.

[22] *"Astronomy was born of superstition, eloquence of ambition, hatred, flattery, lying; geometry of avarice; physics of vain curiosity; all of them, even moral philosophy, of human pride. Thus the sciences and the arts owe their birth to our vices […]"* (Rousseau, 1987, p. 11).

Rousseau took these ideas and elevated them in a speech delivered at the Academy of Dijon in 1754, focusing on the topic of human inequality. Here, he asserted that rulers and the public should share the same interests, but this would be impossible unless these two parties united as one. However, if the citizens of a state could collaborate to create their laws and codes together, this unity would be regarded as complete, and the public would then be transformed into a true ruler (Rousseau, 1990, pp. 66–69). It is evident that Rousseau perceived an inequality in society, stemming from the self-esteem of the rulers; thus, he introduced another term in the following years: *amour de soi*, which translates to self-love in English. In the fourth book of his didactic novel titled *Émile, ou de l'éducation* (Émile, or on education), published in 1762, Rousseau laments the brevity of life and the loss of its beauties. However, he acknowledges the dominance of passion and exalts it, arguing that passion makes us human; it enables us to love ourselves. This love is a primitive feeling that precedes all other emotions. To thrive in this world, individuals must prioritize self-love while pursuing their passions (Rousseau, 2017, pp. 281–286). At this very moment, Rousseau had three items in his bag: self-esteem,[23] which leads humans to see themselves as superior to others, and self-love, which leads us to put ourselves at the center, and the existence of inequality among the members of society. What he did was nothing more than sealing the bag with a new concept: general will. In his masterpiece, *Du contrat social* (The Social Contract) of 1762, the same year as *Émile*, Rousseau claimed that all people are born free (Rousseau, 2020, p. 4). However, influential individuals within society create societal inequality (Rousseau, 2020, p. 6). To reclaim its equality, society needs to come together as one and establish a resistance against the powerful (Rousseau, 2020, p. 13). Since this unity would cause each individual to find themselves bound to society, they will realize that they are bound not to anybody but a commonwealth (Rousseau, 2020, p. 14). Thus, he claims, this mechanism is a new explanation of the social contract that makes all the participants of a given society the masters of their own selves: *"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole"* (Rousseau, 1995, p. 433).

It seems that Rousseau[24] sought the solution within the problem and challenged the political authority with issues stemming from within that authority. While many challenges

[23] Voltaire, too, shares a belief similar to Rousseau's about the concept of *amour-propre* in his *Dictionnaire Philosophique* of 1764. Here, he claims that our self-love is the foundation for all other feelings, and such egotism helps us to persevere (Voltaire, 1973, p. 253). It seems Voltaire does not differentiate *amour-propre* and *amour de soi* as Rousseau does but embraces them together as one.

[24] Both Locke and Rousseau underlined the necessity of a social contract for societies to survive, but their conclusions on this matter differ in three key points: First, the Lockean social contract finds its essence in the

could be raised about the political side of the authority here, the voices of countless eighteenth-century philosophers presented here would suffice to showcase the overall picture. However, challenging authorities was not confined to the political side alone; it also had religious counterparts. Indeed, Enlightenment philosophers advocated for a secular worldview, one that was expected to be established by the prevalence of reason over tradition and the natural over the supernatural (Watkins, 2021, p. 10). However, the complex link between the Enlightenment and religion was not established—or perhaps detached—overnight. John Robertson (2015, p. 16) followed a three-phase approach in explaining it, and this study aims to follow a similar path, albeit not in an orderly manner, but rather interlaced: the nature of religion, the mechanism of toleration, and the link between the sacred and the civil.

Many Enlightenment thinkers believed that the rise of Christianity was a natural consequence of the Middle Ages since all other religions had failed to flourish (Gay, 1967, p. 209).[25] Given this situation, exploring the origins of such a rise was necessary. The *Encyclopédie* began this exploration by categorizing religion into two types: natural and revealed. It asserted that all religions must encompass a god who demands worship in various forms; natural religion adheres to reason and embodies this worship through ethics, which involves loving God's creations and refraining from abusing them, while revealed religions come with an instructional guide, detailing each relationship with God and its cosmology through the voices of *his* prophets, who provide little to no explanation regarding the circumstances faced by people (*Religion*, 1765). The revealed religion referenced here was Christianity, and the Enlightenment intellectuals had several valid reasons for criticizing its practices. The absolutist tendencies of the European kingdoms also included the dominance of Catholicism, as evident in the Edict of Fontainebleau in 1685, which rendered Protestantism illegal in France, and James II's desire to grant privileges to Catholics in England. These practices equated the Christian faith with tyranny (Jacob, 2006, pp. 265–266). Considering that even the Papacy was conceived and has operated as a principality since its inception (Im Hof, 1994, p. 44), it was only natural for its bureaucrats, including the clergy, to become involved in worldly politics, under the motto of "shepherds of the flock" (Im Hof, 1994, p. 36). Conversely,

theory of natural law, while Rousseau adopts a historical perspective to legitimize his contract. Second, Rousseau presupposes a state of equality, whereas Locke introduces inequality from the outset by integrating the concept of private property into the equation, thereby legitimizing the existence of inequality. Lastly, the Lockean contract posits the existence of social rights within society in the original state of nature, while Rousseau distinguishes between two types of natural rights: primitive and reason-centric, claiming that social rights can only be established if natural law is recognized as the law of reason (Dupré, 2004, pp. 163–165).

[25] Edward Gibbon equates the early Christians and barbarians in having a share in the fall of the Roman civilization (Porter, 1990, p. 33).

Protestant clergy were directly integrated into the state mechanism, as these churches were established as national institutions; this connection between clergy and state was so evident that even political decrees were proclaimed from church pulpits (Im Hof, 1994, pp. 45–46). From this perspective, the issue lies with the worldly servants of God, not God *himself*, at least at the outset of questioning religions. Indeed, as Newton (1995) stated, the celestial bodies in the universe were placed by a power of which he could not be sure whether it was natural or supernatural. However, he claims that the motion of the planets should be designed by an intelligent agent, which he believes could be explained by the existence of a deity. In a milieu where even Isaac Newton cannot question the nature of God, it would be absurd for others to do so. Indeed, in a similar vein, if not identical, Jonathan Swift, his contemporary known for his satirical writings, mocked people who sought a materialist and mechanistic explanation for the human soul. He claimed that it is impossible to explain certain metaphysical concepts, like spirit, without excluding the role of God and the transcendent (Swift, 1973, pp. 202–212). Notably, Swift (2020, pp. 36–38) was not shy about ridiculing the clergy of Lilliput and Blefuscu nations in his masterpiece *Gulliver's Travels* for their misinterpretation of a verse concerning the correct side of cracking an egg in Brundecral, the holy scripture of their religion, which caused a thirty-six-month-long war between them. These expressions could be seen as the earlier stones that were laid on the road to deism.

Deism *(déisme)* is defined as *"the doctrine of those whose entire religion is limited to admitting the existence of a God, and following natural law"* in the *Encyclopédie* (Mallet, 1754, p. 773).[26] The phrase "natural law" is key here, as both Newton and Locke, the founders of the new physics and metaphysics, smoothly incorporated God into their formulations, managing to reconcile a supernatural deity with the universe. Thus, most Enlightenment thinkers embraced the idea of God, while some rejected Christianity (Jimack, 1996, p. 205). Furthermore, deism is supposed to denounce anything inconsistent with natural law, such as mysteries, miracles, and secrets within religion (Cassirer, 1951, p. 171). These inconsistencies are often associated with ecclesiastical figures, as their origin lies in revealed religion, and the refusal to accept their role in the religion gave rise to a new term: 'freethinkers'. John Toland, as one of the important figures of freethinkers, for instance, rejected any alleged truths that were incomprehensible; they did not align with reason in his case, as they were fabricated by the clergy (Antognazza, 2014, p. 149). However, depending on the reason, many had also received criticism for ignoring the functioning mechanisms of society. Pierre Bayle (1995), for instance, was a Protestant who

[26] *"doctrine de ceux dont toute la religion se borne à admettre l'existence d'un Dieu, & à suivre la loi naturelle".*

claimed that some ingrained superstitious beliefs within society could also produce rational results; ignoring them entirely might cause undesired consequences. Still, freethinking prevailed in eighteenth-century Europe because its arguments about discovering the 'truth' were convincing. Anthony Collins, for example, was a notable freethinker of the same century, who emphasized the status of thinking as a duty and an obligation. According to him, leaving the ability to think aside would cause others to think in their own stead, be as elder family members or priests; thus, an individual can only receive their truth. Only by receiving self-truth can an individual transform it into opinions; these opinions serve as vehicles that assist the individual in knowing God. He claims that the opinion produced by freethinking is the only weapon to fight against innately evil superstitions that prevent individuals from recognizing the perfect God (Collins, 1995). His close friend, John Locke, agrees with him on the role of reason for discovering God. He rejected the archaic doctrine of *"credo quia impossibile"* (I believe because it is impossible), but favored reason as a means of accepting it as a natural type of revelation. As a pious Christian, while believing in miracles so long as they are compatible with reason, Locke remains indifferent to clergies and churches since it would be absurd to intervene in the individual's own decision to select the way or place for worship (Didier, 2019, pp. 61–65).

Alexander Pope, a famous English poet of the Enlightenment with a deistic worldview [except for the final phase of his life], wrote a renowned poem titled *An Essay on Man*, in which he took Voltaire as his model deist, praising him with the words: *"at once a freethinker and a lover of quiet; no bigot but yet no heretic"* (Dupré, 2004, p. 245). Pope was right in his conclusion, as the standard eighteenth-century deism was perhaps best represented by Voltaire for the Francophone part of the Enlightenment. Indeed, Voltaire was a sincere deist; he strongly opposed materialism, atheism, and Christianity, being so fierce on this matter that Roy Porter (1990, p. 33) did not hesitate to call him the "anti-Christ of the Enlightenment". His intolerance of metaphysics and mysticism sometimes led to him being labeled a crypto-atheist; nonetheless, (Jimack, 1996, p. 206).[27] Voltaire, along with other notable Enlightenment thinkers in France such as Turgot, Diderot, and Helvétius, was educated in Jesuit schools using the humanist educational method; the same humanism that Jeffrey Burson characterized as *"the midwife of eighteenth-century culture, and even the secular Enlightenment"* (Watkins, 2021, p. 27). Given this, it is understandable that Voltaire preferred to place the individual at the center of his

[27] This conclusion might be proper, and Voltaire might indeed have turned his face towards atheism after the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755, which led him to re-question the nature of God and reproach him for being cruel to execute a total massacre at the cosmic level (Porter, 1990, p. 34).

religious vision rather than the middlemen, which is a central theme of humanism. This tendency was evident during the first sixty years of his life, during which he traveled to numerous countries and observed the cultural lives of individuals (Thacker, 1995, pp. xix–xx). Voltaire's ideas on reasoning for belief and chance and his promotion of deism and rejection of atheism could perhaps be best encapsulated in one of his letters discussing Blaise Pascal's *Pensées* (Thoughts). In this letter, Pascal claims that *"Not to wager that God exists is to wager that He does not exist"*, and Voltaire (1994, p. 104) becomes irritated by such a conclusion. He criticizes Pascal as doubtful, indecent, and childish because his approach to such a topic was not serious. Voltaire adds:

> "[…] If you wish to convince me, do so differently, and do not at times talk of games of chance, of wagers, of heads and tails, and at other times frighten me by strewing thorns in the path that I wish to take, and must. Your reasoning would but create atheists, if the voice of nature did not cry out that there is a god with as much strength as these subtleties have weakness" (Voltaire, 1994, pp. 104–105).

As Voltaire was intolerant of metaphysics and mysticism, so were the rest of the Enlightened West regarding religious beliefs and practices. Although the Church's practices of burning people alive, torture, crusades, and inquisitions were no longer in effect (Porter, 1990, p. 34),[28] many philosophers were not tolerant of established religious practices, particularly in France, due to their awareness of Catholic antagonism and cruelty toward Protestants during the French Wars of Religion between 1562 and 1598, especially the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572 (Noll, 2011, p. 38). They also noted the revocation of the Edict of Nantes with the Edict of Fontainebleau in 1685, which compelled Huguenots (the French Protestants) to convert to Catholicism or face exile (Fitzpatrick, 2004, p. 149). They witnessed the execution of Jean Calas, who was allegedly charged with killing his son for converting to the Catholic faith (Porter, 1990, p. 39). The philosophers aimed to create an environment where society would judge individuals rather than religion. The solution was to promote the idea of tolerance toward both religious minorities and philosophical dissenters, as well as diverse sexual orientations (Gay, 1969, p. 399).[29]

[28] Still, Voltaire (1984, pp. 27–29) portrays a scene in his novel, *Candide*, where people were burned alive by clergy to prevent further damage the Lisbon Earthquake caused (which can be read as soothing God's wrath) and hanged, including Candide's Leibnizian mentor, Mr. Pangloss.

[29] Some academics consider the eighteenth century's toleration a belief rather than an idea. Historian Lionel Laborie (2017), for instance, asserts that the origin of tolerance can be found in sixteenth-century continental Europe. Accordingly, John Calvin, an eminent Protestant reformer, highlighted the power of predestination and received numerous criticisms. The most significant criticism came from millenarian universalists at the time, who favored embracing all people from all religions, sincerely believing that salvation would come for all. These universalists, though they formed a kind of fraternity, were often seen as fanatical and faced punishments, including execution, for their heterodox beliefs.

In the *"Tolérance"* article of the *Encyclopédie*, Jean-Edme Romilly (1765, p. 390) began to explain the concept with a vivid allegory, suggesting that human reason does not have a precise and determined measure by which we are apt to understand objects from the point of view from which we stand. Thus, he claims, it is normal that our perceptions of the concepts in the metaphysical realm are inherently different. He adds that humans must recognize that differing opinions exist, and we can only unite in our shared humanity through tolerance and mutual understanding. Such a conclusion legitimizes Peter Gay's (1969, p. 399) summary of intolerance, comparing it to the offspring of certainty. It is true that in the early years of his career, as early as 1728, right after his return from England, Voltaire wrote an epic poem titled *La Henriade*, in which he criticized the religious persecution of the 16th century (Gay & Wexler, 1972, p. 280) and specifically the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre, with the lines: *"We ought not to be shocked by human vice/But in the future no words will suffice/To justify what you won't understand"* (Warman, 2016, pp. 53–54), a massacre that makes him physically ill during its anniversaries (Porter, 1990, p. 39). The employed theme here is similar to the concept of certainty; humans often do not understand each other and lack respect for others' opinions. Indeed, John Locke's ideas were similar and undisputedly well-formulated. Locke took this situation of being certain and attached an institutional character to it; he claimed that the clergy and the royalty were using the doctrines of religion for their self-interest and forcing the people to obey their own interpretations of them. However, as he claimed, even Christ did not follow such a technique; instead, he embraced all humanity while respecting their opinions, and so shall the Church follow his method. His plan to realize the embedding of such tolerance was straightforward: *"[…] to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion […]"* (Locke, 1973, pp. 74–75). With the Glorious Revolution of 1688, John Locke's England gained religious toleration towards the Protestants and the rule of law, creating a prosperous environment for philosophers to contemplate (Porter, 2000, p. 14).[30] However, England disregarded residents' opinions in its overseas colonies less than a century later. The events that began with the Boston Tea Party of 1773 culminated in the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776. Indeed, as the Declaration clearly states, King George III of England did not show tolerance toward the American people—not in terms of religion, but in humanitarian and political matters. This situation compelled them to embrace Lockean principles while restoring their *sui generis* order, conceptualized with the understanding of

[30] The Toleration Act of 1689 is directly related to this Revolution. It did not introduce any fresh laws regarding toleration in the literal sense but gave the Protestant Dissenters some relief by easing their pain (Fitzpatrick, 2000, pp. 30–31).

"pursuit of happiness" among other ideals (Declaration, 1995, pp. 448–452). Verily, another rebellious declaration read in France during the Revolution of 1789, The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, pointed out the same notion of tolerance toward others' opinions in its second article; however, this time not with sympathy, but with "resistance to opposition" provision, which establishes a tolerant environment briefly (Declaration, 1995a, pp. 466–468). Though the course of the Revolution did not adopt a tolerant approach in the following years—being extremely intolerant, in truth—this Declaration laid the groundwork for universal human rights in the twentieth century.

Before concluding this section, a quick glimpse towards Baron d'Holbach's views on challenging authorities, since he and Diderot[31] had long been considered as the flagbearers of materialism and atheism in the Enlightenment (Chisick, 2017, p. 62) in addition to Voltaire's

[31] Diderot's ideas on the monarch, whether enlightened or not, were mentioned earlier. His substitution to this post that 'tends to become a corrupted system' was simple: general will, or with his words, *la volonté générale*. Because, according to him, natural law was applied to humans, and individual desires have a good chance to divert people from being human. He adds that if animals could have been capable of expressing their thoughts and desires to us as the way we do, then, natural law would have encompassed them as well wherein they would automatically claim the right to vote in a general assembly *(une assemblée générale)* like humans do (Diderot, 1755, p. 116). Such a system, he offered, brings us to his admiration of the republican Roman Empire, where he despised Caesar and Augustus for transforming it into a dictatorial regime (Fellows, 1977, p. 161). In his *Historie des Deux Indes* of 1772, in a chapter (Book 4, Ch. 18) where he addresses Louis XVI directly, Diderot openly criticizes him for losing his morals and virtue that he no longer values of his society by being in complete confidence of what his bureaucrats would tell him while prophesizing that the government style of this world would improve and change one day, similar to the advancements the world keeps experiencing in other domains like arts and sciences (Diderot, 1992, pp. 171–173). However, this prophecy includes some difficulties that, in another chapter (Book 11, Ch. 4) he claims that establishing a new nation and government was easy (this could be read as state); the hard part was to regenerate an already existing and corrupted one, which could only be achieved "in a bath of blood" (Diderot, 1992, pp. 183–184). Considering that his prophecy was fulfilled in 1789 through the Revolution, in both its reasons and the method it was practiced, such a prophecy could readily be placed within the Radical Enlightenment framework of Jacob and Israel. For his atheistic views, on the other hand, it is generally accepted that he had followed a deistic life until he wrote his *Lettre sur les aveugles* in 1749, at which point he became an atheist (Vartanian, 1949, p. 46). Diderot became more of a naturalist here, espousing the spontaneous generation of the universe, and in the closing of Aram Vartanian (1949, p. 57), biologist Abraham Trembley's discovery of the freshwater polyp's self-regenerating mechanism in 1740 accelerated his fall into materialism. Diderot's ideas on atheism can be observed in both his novel *Jacques le Fataliste et son maître* (Jacques the Fatalist and his Master), which was posthumously published in 1796. His philosophical dialogue titled *Entretien d'un philosophe avec Madame la Maréchale de* *** (Interview with Mrs. Marshall *** by a Philosopher) of 1773 [or 1774]. For the former, Diderot is playing the role of a narrator, who is capable of intervening the destiny of the protagonists and not hesitating to threat the readers with altering the story as he pleases (Diderot, 1999, p. 4) or showing mercy on them for skipping some annoying portrayals (Diderot, 1999, p. 14); thereby, Diderot clearly playing the role of God [or fate, at the very least] in this novel while criticizing the fatalist worldview from time to time throughout entire text, either from the mouth of Jacques or his master, like in one of their early dialogues on the origin of being a happy man where Jacques defended his position on the fact that happiness was pre-written on the "great scroll" but master preferred to postpone the debate (Diderot, 1999, p. 11). For the *Entretien*, on the other hand, Diderot takes a more direct approach. Here, Diderot (2009, p. 38) portrays himself in his dialogue with Mrs. Marshall, and the opening sentences begin with her question to Diderot about whether he has any religious beliefs. Diderot's answer is simple and straightforward: *Moi-méme* (Me-myself!). The dialogue continues for a relatively short time in pages as Diderot tries to persuade her that having a religion was unnecessary to be a moral, honorable, and good person. Within the parameters of Radical Enlightenment, I humbly shall highlight that these two works of Diderot constitute the materialized fashion of radicalism within the realm of extreme-challenging of religious authorities.

preference on calling d'Holbach as "the personal enemy of God" (Fellows, 1977, p. 79), could be helpful.

Although Paul-Henri-Thiry, Baron d'Holbach, has long been known for his atheism, in truth, he was first and foremost a materialist; atheism was merely his natural and supplementary outcome. In one of his earlier works, titled *Le Christianisme dévoilé, ou Examen des principes et des effets de la religion chrétienne* (Christianity Unveiled, or Examination of the Principles and Effects of the Christian Religion) of 1761, he had shown the first sparks of his authority-challenging characteristic. The work's primary theme is to critique Christianity and highlight the harm it causes to society. To achieve this, d'Holbach first distinguished between Christian morality and political morality, holding the sincere belief that the former created useless saints, while the latter focused on creating active and dutiful members of society—citizens, in short (d'Holbach, 2004, pp. 5–6). After discussing the origins of *a* religion and its necessity, he examined the history, sources, mysteries, dogmas, morality, and virtues of Christianity. Eventually, he had come to the conclusion that Christianity was surrounded by dogmas and a stiff set of values, which he thought were harming both society and politics since *the* religion had managed to juxtapose itself with governance. Indeed, in a religious dispute within society, often initiated by priests, both parties claim that God favors them, and at some point, governments participate in that dispute by taking a side (d'Holbach, 2004, pp. 77–78). Such an action eventually brings fanaticism to the table because people are ignorant, and ignorance creates idiocy, which in turn creates superstitions. In a milieu where superstitions prevail, those encouraging them would gain an upper hand in politics. This is how d'Holbach argues: the priesthood becomes "an independent state within a state" where even the sovereigns turn into tyrants with this mechanism, let alone the impoverishment of the nation (d'Holbach, 2004, pp. 80–81).

Less than a decade later, in 1770 to be exact, d'Holbach published his *chef-d'œuvre* in two volumes with *the title Le Système de la nature, ou Des loix du monde physique et du monde moral* (The System of Nature, or Laws of the Moral and Physical World). Perhaps the best description suitable for this work would be a manifesto for the materialistic worldview; it reflects Baron's devoted dedication to nature. Indeed, the work begins with a certain verdict: *"The source of man's unhappiness is his ignorance of Nature"* (d'Holbach, 1889, p. iix). At first glance, it appears that the concept of ignorance, as he considered it to be the central problem of the Christian religion in his *Christianity Unveiled*, constitutes the central theme of this book as well. In fact, it does. According to him, whatever remains outside of nature belongs to our

imagination; this is why only humans have been capable of creating fantastic entities, such as centaurs and hippogriffs, as well as demons and even God (d'Holbach, 1889, p. 58). The humans, therefore, with this imagination, have created the concept of spirit for themselves to find an anchor to their desires, while conceptualizing spirit with some innate features, such as communicating through organs, giving motion, and showing impulses. Baron d'Holbach literally mocked such a characterization of spirit since its qualities reflecting the fact that spirit was equalizing itself with the matter; if spirit's duty is to give, say, arm of its motion, it means spirit operates within the parameters of general law of motion (d'Holbach, 1889, p. 48). He draws a parallel with this tendency and human desires. According to him, humans are motivated by their *wants* (d'Holbach, 1889, p. 164). In a parallel manner, they eventually considered that their imaginative entities might also have their own desires. They were on the verge of discovering the truth, actually, by looking at nature; they saw that their wants were afflicted by it, and the elements of nature were the source of their desires. However, instead of proceeding with further inspection, they created an invisible deity, God (d'Holbach, 1889, pp. 168–170). Furthermore, it was the man who designed and gave all of *his* abilities to this remote supreme being (d'Holbach, 1889: 229). Baron was highly confident in his thoughts; thus, he did not hesitate to criticize both Descartes and Newton, while also acknowledging their monumental contributions to science. For Descartes, d'Holbach claimed that having an opinion on the existence of God does not necessarily produce proof to the existence of it (d'Holbach, 1889, p. 226), and for Newton he was harsh; he criticized him of betraying what he had found in the nature and added *"[…] the sublime Newton is no more than an infant […]"* for his looking for an imaginary patron (d'Holbach, 1889, pp. 225–228).

Baron d'Holbach's words towards religion were bold and loud because he wanted them to be so. He openly declared that *The System of Nature* could be considered as "the principles of atheism" (d'Holbach, 1889, p. 324) and the invented Gods were nothing but usurpers against the rightful owner of the throne, nature (d'Holbach, 1889: 333). Still, his challenges to authorities were not confined to religion alone, but also touched upon politics. According to him, politics should follow the laws of nature, much like atheism. The communities in nature are living together with a single rule: reciprocity of interest. If this could be established in a society, its reflections would then evolve the individual's *wants* into mutual *wants*. Only by then could the governments secure their legitimacies, by the will and free consent of society; thus, *"[g]overnment only borrows its power from society"* (d'Holbach, 1889, pp. 69–70). Although d'Holbach counts different rulers under various titles, such as chief, sovereign, monarch, and

magistrate, to rule in such a system, he emphasizes his focus on the will of society, and its legitimacy can be considered revolutionary. Given this, it is safe to say that he rightfully deserves his place within the conceptualization of the Radical Enlightenment.

1.2.1.3. Pursuing Progress

In his best-seller *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress*, Steven Pinker (2018, pp. 3–4) begins his journey by narrating a dialogue between himself and one of his students, where she asked him why she should keep living, and Pinker's reply was philosophical: to flourish with the assistance of reason. The core of this reply highlights a parallel with the concept of progress, as its definition[32] draws a line between the old and the new, emphasizing the new as better. Given this, progress is related to time and, therefore, history. Indeed, we do not need to do anything as time passes to progress, since the world evolves every day into an advanced phase; we are in a better condition now than our fathers, both materially and spiritually, and they were in a better position than their own fathers (Israel, 2018, pp. 18–19). While it is true that we, as the children of modernity, for example, have not experienced catastrophic global events like famine thanks to our reason-based progress, this better situation has also given rise to new challenges, such as diseases related to overeating that history had never witnessed before (Harari, 2016, p. 14). Reinhart Koselleck (2018, pp. 4–5) defined this "better situation" through a succession of singular events, which he believed could cumulatively transform into progress with the assistance of time. Although it may seem like a modern concept, progress has relevant historical counterparts that can sometimes present themselves alongside their nemesis: decline. The salvation proposed by Christianity in the Middle Ages also represented a form of progress; it was still conceived within the parameters of time, allowing individuals to ascend to Heaven (Koselleck, 2002, pp. 220–224). However, the progress observed since the seventeenth century does not refer to a multitude of understandings as is seen in the case of Christianity; instead, it is associated with partial experiences (Koselleck, 2002, p. 235). Consequently, one might argue that characterizing the Age of Enlightenment through the lens of progress would be impossible because, as Giambattista Vico's (1948, pp. 17–18) conceptualization of history via progress suggests, which is framed through different designations of "age"—the age of the gods, the age

[32] Progress: /£ 'prəʊ·gres, $ 'prɑ:-/ *n* [U] advancement to an improved or more developed state, or to a forward position (Procter, 1995, p. 1129).

of heroes, and the age of men—these individual experiences fall short of providing a comprehensive portrayal since they did not achieve a leap in progress; instead, they followed a linear and gradual progress.[33] Still, the intellectuals of the Enlightenment succeeded in realizing such a leap by establishing an abstract republic, a Republic of Letters; that leap was realized with these people. As Peter Gay (1969, pp. 56–57) attentively explained, these men of letters transformed their partial experiences into realities, allowing the majority of their individual experiences to resonate throughout history and become a norm in shaping progress.

The Republic of Letters term can be read in two ways: reciprocal correspondences via mail or the master of literature. Jean Bodin introduced the essence of this term as early as the sixteenth century, without naming it, but describing its faculty to be able to interconnect people as if they were citizens of the same city, thanks to the circulation of books (Whelan, 2003, p. 437). Voltaire, too, enjoyed the fellowship of scholars and their insistence on sharing their knowledge, likening this environment to a republic, as he did in *The Age of Louis XIV* (1751) (Ultee, 1987, pp. 96–97). Six years later, however, he gave a name to this abstract fraternity, referring to it with the *gens de lettres* (people of letters) idiom, by respecting the core of the republic and highlighting the roles of its stakeholders. He described these shareholders as polymaths capable in literature and natural sciences. He specifically isolated individuals with limited knowledge and those specializing in a single genre. However, he did not exclude people who prefer not to write about their experiences and share them with others; he counted them within the same league by assigning them the role of social judges who share their ideas with society and judge its participants (Voltaire, 1757). Indeed, this kind of exchange was reminiscent of 'Solomon's House', a research center where philosophers and scientists exchanged ideas, first coined in Francis Bacon's utopian novel, *New Atlantis*, published in 1627 (Whelan, 2003, p. 437). Actual correspondences existed in the Age of Enlightenment, both between intellectuals and other parties, and towards foreign countries as well. At first glance, it may appear insignificant to focus on letters; however, it is known from the recovered ones that Leibniz had written over 15,000 letters, while Locke's number on this concern is 3,000, and Bayle's is 1,000 (Ultee, 1987, pp. 97–99). Accordingly, from letters to books, and journals to newspapers, the Western intelligentsia had begun to share their experiences with others, which

[33] According to Giambattista Vico, these three ages were the phases that humanity had passed through until reaching a state that was shaped by natural law. The first phase was the age of gods, when people were taking commands from the mediators of divine governments. The second phase was the age of heroes, and people deemed heroes as superiors and created some aristocratic governments, or became effective in these. Finally, the age of men was introduced, where people considered themselves equals in nature, giving way to the establishment of popular commonwealths and monarchies (Vico, 1948, pp. 17–18).

eventually encompassed the laity of society, contrary to what Voltaire championed in his definition of the *gens de lettres*.

A letter has to carry a characteristic of intimacy within, by its nature, and a certain degree of privacy in conversation. However, the philosophers of the Enlightenment had preferred to write their thoughts in the form of letters while publicizing them: *A Letter Concerning Toleration* of John Locke, *Letters Concerning the English Nation* of Voltaire, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania* of John Dickinson, *Letter on the Blind* and *Letter on the Deaf and Dumb* of Denis Diderot, *Persian Letters* of Montesquieu, *A Letter to a Noble Lord* of Edmund Burke, *Cato's Letters* of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, *Massachusetts Circular Letter* of Samuel Adams, *Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever* of Joseph Priestley, *Letter on French Music* and *Letters Written from the Mountain* of Rousseau, and numerous others. This tendency is striking; a question mark might be put in the minds of those who prefer to choose "letter" words for these treatises. In this discussion, the emphasis is placed on the concept of intimacy; they aimed to establish a link between themselves and the general populace for publicizing their thoughts, with the sole intention of elevating the fruits of the Enlightenment. By taking Immanuel Kant's (1995) stress into account as *"For there will always be some independent thinkers, […] who […] will disseminate the spirit of the rational appreciation of both their own worth and every man's vocation for thinking for himself"*, it becomes evident that the Enlightenment started as a set of individual ventures, which then transformed itself into a public process (Deligiorgi, 2005, p. 7). Since the Enlightenment was a socially mediated endeavor more than anything else (Siskin & Warner, 2009, pp. 2–7), it was natural for the participants of the Republic of Letters to serve the people of their era. Consequently, it is safe to say that the Enlightenment *might* have started with the motto "dare to know", but it indeed grew with the practice of daring to disseminate that *knowledge*.

Such a diffusion, naturally, required some educational process. This may be the reason why Enlightenment thinkers attached special importance to mass education. César Chesneau Dumarsais (1755, p. 397), a contributor to the *Encyclopédie*, compares education to the cultivation of plants, where both the owner of the field and nature must cooperate to produce the perfect product. This is why he emphasized it with *"[i]f each type of education was given with light and perseverance, the homeland would find itself well constituted, well governed, and protected from the insults of its neighbors"* words,[34] circumscribing the training of good

[34] *"Si chaque sorte d'éducation étoit donnée avec lumiere & avec persévérance, la patrie se trouveroit bien constituée, bien gouvernée, & à l'abri des insultes de ses voisins"*.

citizens. By reminding us of the efforts of philosophers in ameliorating the paralyzed parts of governance, while setting aside those who sought a complete transformation, it is only natural for Dumarsais to focus on the practical side of education. The nature within the exact parameters of this allegory is the uneducated ones, while the owner of the field addresses philosophers. Still, the uneducated population has two sides: children and the laity. Indeed, the Enlightenment intellectuals had given special emphasis to educating the youth within the parameters of pedagogy, while drawing a line between education and morals. Claude-Adrien Helvétius, for instance, established a pragmatic link between these two concepts by claiming anything can be achieved with the assistance of education (Copleston, 2004, p. 54); though his loyalty to this link has been labeled as "wishful thinking" from time to time (Gay, 1969, p. 56). In the same vein, Locke, too, can be put under the same list as Helvétius since the latter had taken his inspiration from the former on this matter (Fellows, 1977, p. 68). His coinage of the term *"tabula rasa"* in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* of 1690 served as a foundation for his further work in 1693, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, where he rejected the Platonic notion that infants come with some innate ideas. His claim on this matter was that children are educated with 'true' empirical data and that moral codes are injected into them (McNulty, 2021, pp. 48–51; Porter, 1990, p. 20). In his famous novel *Émile*, Rousseau focuses on a child's education to prepare them for life. He was firmly convinced that societies are prone to corruption and that their antidote is education. In this case, education could be utilized to address the aforementioned corruption and establish a connection between nature and humanity. The formulation of such an accomplishment rests within the separation of two phases: first, being one individual of *a* nature, and second, being *a* part of society. Therefore, Rousseau argues that education should focus on creating an individual first, and a citizen later (Hofman, 2021, pp. 72–74).

Though Rousseau's formulation seems appetizing, in truth, he was seeking a practical benefit in this. According to him, the common good was the only thing that mattered, and in order to preserve social cohesion in society, civic education was of paramount importance. His claim on this matter was to keep people away from factionalism through education—keeping them far from ill thoughts such as political dissent and criticism (Deligiorgi, 2005, pp. 5–6). On the other hand, some other philosophers did not follow such a conformist path; David Hume, for instance, utilized his writings to nurture a cultivated public, the same domain in which he was both fed and fed others (Gay, 1967, p. 14). Similarly, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781), a prominent figure in the Enlightenment, was seeking to enlighten all humanity via

education, which found its place in the title of his notable work *Education of Humanity*, albeit his theses were more religious than of being secular (Cassirer, 1951, pp. 191–192; Gay, 1967, pp. 334–335). Because distribution of knowledge did not have an egalitarian characteristic in the early modern Europe (Burke, 2000, p. 55) and the philosophers were in tendency to reject the Cartesian promotion of innate ideas while standing with Locke (S. Brown, 1996, p. 11), they treated the society as infants and focused on their education since their opinion on this matter was resting upon the progress could only be achieved by acquiring knowledge (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 484). Indeed, as the position of Latin in texts began to decay (Gay, 1969, p. 60) and the printing press was on the rise, a beneficial option had arisen for philosophers to disseminate their thoughts through publications. Since the primary purpose of the Enlightenment was the "progress of the society" for a venerated figure of the Neapolitan Enlightenment, Francesco Mario Pagano (Robertson, 2015, p. 34), philosophers of the era contemplated that publications could be utilized as portable representations of the Enlightenment.

Although these approaches were important in shaping the idea of progress during the Enlightenment, three notable figures—namely Turgot, Condorcet, and Kant—developed their own distinct views on progress, serving as a kind of roadmap. Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) argued that human history is always advancing; human reason and passions continuously trigger new events, and societies evolve through cause-and-effect relationships that connect the past and the future. The discovery of language and the invention of writing allowed knowledge to be passed down through generations, creating a shared reservoir of information that supports progress. That is why progress occurs in phases; humanity constantly undergoes transformative changes. These changes take various forms—from the rise and fall of empires to regime shifts, and from advances in arts and sciences to changes in laws. Warfare and conflicts often cause destruction in the short term, but they also bring different societies together to develop a better civilization for humanity. Similarly, commercial and political connections between societies foster integration, leading to slow but steady progress toward the ideal of perfect humanity. The pace of this progress varies due to differences in societal characteristics—though the laws of nature remain constant everywhere. Nature has endowed each society with specific capabilities, but these are not evenly distributed; environmental factors and internal or external conditions influence this inequality. Still, the invention of writing amplified knowledge, and the advancement of reason and sciences helped humanity enter a phase where people could improve themselves through reason. The sciences and the

philosophy of nature reinforce each other, making continuous progress inevitable. Every truth follows an error, and eventually humanity reaches a deeper, more inclusive, and shared understanding (Turgot, 1973, pp. 41–59).

Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) follows a similar approach to Turgot in his views on progress. According to him, humans have innate abilities in perception, comparison, remembrance, and expressing through signs. These cognitive skills develop through interactions with the environment, social communication, and cultural tools. Humans experience feelings driven by pleasure and pain; this allows them to relive others' experiences, forming the basis of social bonds. Condorcet sees this development as a collective evolution and traces its course to explain the progress of human reason scientifically, similar to how an individual's mental growth occurs over their lifetime. Initially, humanity progressed through an agricultural and livestock economy, which provided material security, free time, and opportunities for observation. These conditions fostered mental development. The invention of language and writing then allowed ideas to be passed across generations. The invention of the alphabet marked a turning point in this process. Condorcet believes a general trajectory of progress exists for humanity, despite some small interruptions. Like Turgot, he attributes these gaps to wars, political pressures, and superstitions; however, he asserts that progress is irreversible. Human abilities can be perfected, and the only limit to this progress is the life of this world. Therefore, humanity must learn from past errors and make more conscious, beneficial leaps into the future (Condorcet, 1979, pp. 3–13).

As it is clear, both *philosophe*s followed a step-by-step approach in explaining human progress; however, these are only explanations from the individual to society. Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, proposed a formulation on this matter known as the perpetual peace notion. The subject of this kind of peace is not societies but states; therefore, Kant's formulation was more institutionalized. If we accept Condorcet's idea of progress as inevitable, then we can also accept Kantian progress as a moral ideal since his teleological explanation was not guaranteed by history: states should ultimately achieve global perpetual peace at some point in history as the final stage of progress. According to him, this stage includes two parts: preliminary articles and definitive articles. For the preliminary articles, [1] peace treaties with hidden motives shall be invalid, [2] no independent state shall be transferred to another, [3] permanent armies shall be disbanded, [4] national debts should not be utilized in wars, [5] no state shall force another to change its regime, and [6] wars shall be fought within the bounds of certain ethical rules (Kant, 1917, pp. 107–116). When humanity accepts these preliminary articles, Kant believes,

states will then reach an understanding necessary for establishing a global perpetual peace. This phase includes three definitive articles: [1] all states shall adopt a republican regime, [2] international law shall be based on the principle of a federation of free states, and [3] the world citizenship principle shall be in effect, operating under the concept of universal hospitality rights (Kant, 1917, pp. 117–142). When these articles are met, a peaceful world order will be established where reason and morality prevail at the individual level, law and peace are practiced at the social level, and a cosmopolitan unity is experienced at the political level.

1.2.2. The Heat: Thinkers Who Sparked the Fire

A long-discussed debate on the characteristics of the Enlightenment revolves around the question of whether there was a single, monolithic Enlightenment or whether it was possible to speak of geographically distinguished enlightenments. Peter Gay's (1967, p. 3) response to this debate was inclusive, accepting the Enlightenment as a whole. He acknowledged the existence of numerous figures he referred to as "a little flock of *philosophes*" throughout the eighteenth century. However, it is equally valid to note that the Enlightenment did not exhibit uniformity throughout the West and was influenced by national characteristics. Noting that there was no clear and obvious concept of 'nation' in the modern sense during the Enlightenment, it would be difficult for the Enlightenment historiography to define clear borders and determine the patriotism of intellectuals (Withers, 2007, pp. 27–29). Still, slicing the Enlightenment into different contexts, such as national, regional or thematic became popular after the 1980s and it helps the concept to reflect different characteristics of the Enlightenment; *Haskalah*, for example, the Jewish Enlightenment transcends beyond regions and characterizes something more comprehensive than a national context (Oz-Salzberger, 2014, pp. 38–39). Drawing inspiration from these tendencies to categorize the Enlightenment into distinct contexts, this work aims to introduce the intellectuals of the Enlightenment through a tripartite classification by language. In this respect, the groups consist of Anglophonic philosophers, Francophonic *philosophes*, and Austro-Germanic *Aufklärers*. Following such a grouping primarily intends to present intellectuals within an encompassing framework via a prosopographical method. Given that we know prosopography refers to *"[…] the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in history […]"* (Clark, 2003, p. 212), this common background permits reviewing the Enlightenment philosophers in such groupings. Albeit they share some standard features as constituent members of the Republic of Letters, as the igniters

of the Enlightenment, they differ in culture. This section aims to introduce them briefly and explain their differences.

1.2.2.1. Anglophone Philosophers of the Enlightenment

The central theme of the well-known Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis is the linguistic relativity; it claims that our native language shapes the way of our thinking (Kay & Kempton, 1984, pp. 64–65) and Steven Pinker (2018a, pp. 27–28) underlines that the words do not belong to us but to the society since it would be absurd to strive for speaking with words that nobody knows. Concerning the progress of vernacular languages since the Renaissance and the decline of Latin, the English language has also developed its grammar *en route*. English scholars preferred to write in their own language (Auroux, 2013, pp. 755, 757–758). With the Act of Union in 1707, followed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the parliaments of England and Scotland were united, thus creating the Kingdom of Great Britain (Porter, 2000, p. xviii). Ireland and Wales, although not united with England then, remained on the periphery, and the North American colonies continued to be under English influence. This was the case for Anglophone societies in the Age of Reason.

A convenient starting point is Francis Bacon's confidence in creating a new theory of the human mind to understand its structure thoroughly (Cassirer, 1951, p. 102). Bacon was born into a noble family in London in 1561; his father was the Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, and his mother was a well-educated woman who was proficient in Greek, Latin, Italian, and French. His political career began in the House of Commons in 1581. Over the years, he entered the House of Lords, holding positions in various commissions and trials during the reign of Elizabeth I. It was during the reign of James I that Bacon rose in politics. He was knighted in 1603, appointed as Solicitor General in 1607, became Attorney General in 1613, a member of the Privy Council in 1616, and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal in the next year, and a new title as Baron of Verulam was created for him to be appointed as the Lord Chancellor in 1618. Unfortunately for him, three years later, he was impeached by parliament due to bribery accusations, and he lost all his political posts while retaining his titles and properties. He died of pneumonia in 1626 (Jürgen, 2020). Bacon was intellectually active during his engagements with politics; he had come up with his masterpiece in 1620, titled *Novum Organum*, where he invented a new type of scientific method, which we know today as empiricism. According to Voltaire (2007, pp. 37–39) Lord Bacon was the father of experimental philosophy just because

he identified what had already been keeping to be practiced for millennia, without realizing it; *"[He] did not yet understand nature"* said Voltaire, *"but he knew and pointed out all the paths that would lead to it"*. As suggested in *Organum*, Bacon's method was straightforward: philosophical induction. This system follows a three-step process: data are carefully collected from experiences and experiments; these data are generalized through inductive reasoning; and finally, they are transformed into a new system of knowledge (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 36). With such an introduction, Bacon had rescued humanity from the uncertain fate designed by Fortuna, made the individual the architect of their own destiny, and highlighted that "knowledge is power" (Gay, 1969, pp. 6–7).

John Locke had then carried Bacon's banner ahead. He was born in Wrington, England, in 1632. His father was a country lawyer and a veteran of the English Civil War. His father's former commander sponsored young John for his educational expenses. He attended Westminster School in 1647 and Christ Church, Oxford University, in 1652, where he received his master's degree in 1658. Afterward, he studied to become a physician. It was 1666 when he met Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, and became his private physician the following year, ultimately leading him to reside in London. Earl left the government in 1674 and was imprisoned twice, in 1676 and 1681, during a series of political turmoil. He escaped to Holland; he died there in 1683. Locke went to Holland in the same year, as an exile. He returned to England after the Glorious Revolution. He died in Essex in 1704 (Uzgalis, 2024). His philosophical work, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, utilized Lord Bacon's technique to approach the mind scientifically, as d'Alembert's earlier statement on the explanation of metaphysics, the same technique Newton applied to physics.[35] His close connection with scholarly circles and politics led Locke to develop political formulations, which he penned as treatises. The religious dissentions he witnessed led him to write on toleration. Perhaps the bulk of these experiences in his life led him to formulate his ideas about the mind based on the concepts of delight and uneasiness. According to him, any thought we produce comes from either of these situations; the mind feels itself within, because, without delight or uneasiness, our thoughts and actions would go astray (Losonsky, 2001, pp. 75–77). Locke's friendship with Thomas Sydenham, a physician titled with the epithet 'the English Hippocrates', taught Locke to approach philosophical concerns as meticulously as possible, like a physician, by putting away all the speculative thoughts (Gay, 1969, p. 14). We can also

[35] Voltaire claims that Bacon was the forefather of what Newton discovered; he envisioned celestial objects' mass gravity and advised conducting further examination (Voltaire, 2007, pp. 39–40).

observe this rigor in his formulation of the social contract, where he followed a step-by-step approach, similar to establishing a link between ideas and the mind, focusing on delight and uneasiness, and employing purely scientific methods, emphasizing inductive reasoning. It was liberty that was initially obtained; it brought private property, and eventually, people gave up their punishment rights to a higher authority for preserving their liberties. Even under this minimal example, one can see a chain of induction: liberty is the key element, and people came together by using their minds to find a solution to problems and created the government that is orchestrated by the people's laws, in short, positive law. Positive laws promote the common good; therefore, a tolerant environment is essential. A tolerant environment means individuals are free to think for themselves, which fosters individualism. Thus, religion should not control the state, and vice versa, thereby introducing the separation of church and state. Because Locke did not publish anything until 1689, the year he came back to England from his exile, and published all his writings in the last phase of his life, it is clear that he had followed the method of Lord Bacon, utilizing his experiences and experiments (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 350–351).

The favored method in Britain was empiricism, and the Scottish philosopher David Hume significantly contributed to this approach. However, before reviewing his impact, two additional contributors will be discussed, albeit briefly: Thomas Hobbes and George Berkeley. Hobbes (1588–1679) was an English philosopher known for his famous work *Leviathan*, published in 1651. He was the most influential philosopher in the pre-Lockean era and one of the founders of modern political science. Naturally, it could be expected from him to inherit Lord Bacon's inductive method during his tenure as his secretary, but he did not; he favored the deductive method and inherited the beneficiary importance of knowledge alone (Reilly, 2002, pp. 185–186): knowledge is valuable so long as it serves human welfare. In his social contract model, Hobbes starts with man and ultimately creates the Leviathan through a deconstruction that builds the political society. He favored the deductive method but did not abandon an empiricist tendency; he claimed that everything exists in material forms and that knowledge can only be acquired through the senses and experiences (Martinich, 2013, pp. 259–262). His whole life was spent under fear and terror, since he had witnessed the English Civil War and the negative responses towards *Leviathan* (Duncan, 2024). He rejected Aristotle's thesis that humans were innately social beings; in contrast, he firmly believed that they were egoists, greedy, and that their sole motivation came from the fear of experiencing a violent death (Reilly, 2002, p. 189). Indeed, in *Leviathan*, he describes 'fear' over individual and draws parallelism with being aware of the harm they may receive, while conceptualizing 'terror' over

society which he calls it a situation where individuals forget the awareness of harm, therefore the original cause of fear, and a hysterical terror surrounds them (Hobbes, 2007, pp. 50–51). In the same vein, in his posthumously published work, *Behemoth*, where he criticizes[36] the partakers of the English Civil War, he characterizes fear with *"[…] no other fear of danger, than such as any discreet and honest man might justly have of the designs of the Parliament itself, who were the greatest enemies to the peace of the kingdom that could possibly be"* (Hobbes, 1969, p. 98) words and describes terror over the members of House of Commons with *"[t]his method of bringing petitions in tumultuary manner, by great multitudes of clamorous people, was ordinary with the House of Commons, whose ambition could never have been served by way of prayer and request, without extraordinary terror"* words (Hobbes, 1969, p. 97). *Leviathan* portrayed a functioning society for Hobbes, and *Behemoth* is its opposite; it is full of terror, and the state is headless. Even here, empiricism kicks in for Hobbes; he had written what he had experienced.[37]

George Berkeley (1685–1753) was born in Dublin, and his family was royalist. He was recruited into the clergy and rose to the rank of bishop within the Anglican Church. In John Stuart Mill's account, Berkeley had three significant contributions to philosophy: the theory of vision, the critique of abstractions, and the importance of sensations in knowledge of reality as the sole provider (Whitlark, 2002, pp. 67–68). The last one is directly associated with empiricism and came in an extreme form in Berkeley's quill. His *A Treatise on Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, 1710, supports Locke's rejection of innate ideas, which are known from the Cartesian mode of thinking. However, he developed a new form of empiricism, which was later called subjective idealism. According to this, our sensory experiences of the world give rise to the ideas in our minds. Locke was firmly convinced that experiences in the independent outer world provided us with knowledge and true ideas. However, Berkeley rejected it due to the high probability that such a system would pave the way for skepticism (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 51). Although it may initially seem confusing, it can be simplified as follows: matters outside the world do not exist independently of our perception; only ideas exist, and objects are nothing more than perceptions in our minds. Such an understanding, naturally,

[36] *Behemoth* is written as a dialogue between A and B. A is an eyewitness to the English Civil War, and B is a young student who asks questions to uncover the motivation behind the War. Concerning the fact that Hobbes was an eyewitness to the War, A can be accepted as Hobbes himself. The quotes marked here were taken from A's answers.

[37] Ernst Cassirer (1951, p. 19) explains Hobbesian mode of empiricism in his works with the following words: *"The fundamental principle of his political theory, that the state is a body means just this: that the same process of thought which guides us to an exact insight into the nature of physical body is also applicable without reservation to the state"*.

posits Berkeley against the material worldview and makes him favor an immaterial philosophy. This philosophy evolved into idealism over time, making Berkeley an important idealist in the intellectual history. Because Berkeley was a theologian before anything else, since he earned his doctorate from the department of divinity in 1721, it was only normal for him to formulate his thoughts on immaterialist perspectives, since leaning on materialism would automatically cast the concept of god out (Whitlark, 2022, pp. 69–75).

Berkeley's fear of the Lockean method's potential to push people towards skepticism was realized in David Hume.[38] He was born in Edinburgh to a middle-income family in 1711. He attended the University of Edinburgh when he was 10 (or 11), received a good education, and lived in France. His early text, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, was published anonymously in 1739, with several parts self-censored. The chapters of this text were extended in the following years and published separately. His six-volume *History of England* (1754–1762) became a bestseller for decades, providing him with financial relief. He died in 1776 of intestinal cancer (Morris & Brown, 2023). Hume's starting point in philosophy was straightforward: he took the causality principle and rejected it since it cannot be shown rationally, and grounded his methodology on habits. He claimed that humans *want to* believe in the existence of an outer world; this is why we devise explanations parallel to our desperate desires. However, it is impossible to prove it. Naturally, such a radical rejection originated from religions and metaphysics, which he believed would be destroyed (Kroeker, 2021, pp. 219–225). Because, in Hume's account, philosophy should be rooted in the human experience alone; outer speculative entities like gods and spirits do not have any right or place within philosophy. This kind of thinking shifted him towards naturalistic traditions in addition to skepticism. He also rejected many rationalist morality theories inherited from Antiquity and focused on establishing a universal morality that he found in nature and sentiments. Accordingly, his philosophy became more secular and empirical, while retaining its skepticism, since the source of what we experienced was still nature, and we could never be entirely sure that the acquired knowledge was certain or not (Fosl, 2002, pp. 207–208). As can be seen here, empiricism has experienced a long journey from Lord Bacon to David Hume. Although it appears that empiricism received its most perfect and meaningful expression with Hume, in truth, it followed a linear path during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the assistance of the Newtonian school of science (Cassirer, 1951, pp. 59–60).

[38] *See* Mümin Köktaş (2019), *İskoç Aydınlanması: Bir sivil toplum perspektifi* (pp. 216-258, İz Yayıncılık) for further analyses on the thoughts of David Hume.

Numerous British philosophers followed the empiricist mode of science during the eighteenth century. Among the most notable ones are [the Scottish] Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746),[39] [the Scottish] Adam Smith (1723–1790),[40] [the English] Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), and [the English] Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797). The central theme of these figures was their natural stance towards the problems they faced, employing the doctrines of empiricism in their cases, experiments, and experiences. Hutcheson, for instance, was trained in moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow and came up with a unique theory titled the moral sense. In his account, the earlier philosophers delved into either egotism or voluntarism by seeking their sources in piety or virtue, which led them to lose their benevolent stances. He preferred to remain benevolent and examined human nature, concluding that human decisions within the domain of morality were shaped by benevolent motives (Martin, 2002, pp. 225–228). Adam Smith, too, had received similar training and employed similar benevolence when explaining his master contribution to the realm of economics: the free market. Smith observed French economics and politics while engaging with the French physiocrats during his two-year journey to France in the 1760s. They likened economics to a human body; each organ has a particular role, and blood represents capital. Building on such an allegorical idea, Smith produced his masterpiece, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, in 1776, quickly becoming a bestseller. His thesis can be summarized as follows: if a government wants to grow economically, it should interfere neither the financial barons nor the workers since their self-interests are capable enough to find the optimum point for themselves within the economy, which would then guarantee the interest of the market as well (Norlin, 2002: 337–338, 342–344). On the other hand, Joseph Priestley was more of a materialist than an empiricist. He is known for his contributions to the natural sciences, within the parameters of determinism, as well as his works on theology and political philosophy. He attempted to reconcile theism, materialism, and determinism throughout his life, due to his close connections with Paul-Henri Dietrich and Baron d'Holbach, although his own materialist formulations evolved. Because his French friends were using determinism against Christianity, while Priestley was using it for Christianity, he sought to employ it to understand the nature of the metaphysical world at the expense of concepts like the soul and free will (Tapper, 2002, pp. 313–316). Last but not least, we should mention Mary Wollstonecraft's role in the Enlightenment. Wollstonecraft was one

[39] *See* Mümin Köktaş (2019), *İskoç Aydınlanması: Bir sivil toplum perspektifi* (pp. 173-215, İz Yayıncılık) for further analyses on the thoughts of Francis Hutcheson.
[40] *See* Mümin Köktaş (2019), *İskoç Aydınlanması: Bir sivil toplum perspektifi* (pp. 259-318, İz Yayıncılık) for further analyses on the thoughts of Adam Smith.

of the most famous feminist philosophers of the eighteenth century. Her renowned work, *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects*, published in 1792, was built on her former experiences, which suggests that Wollstonecraft accepted British empiricism as her methodology. Her feminist ideas, as encapsulated in her *magnum opus*, originated from the double standards that society exercises on the sexes. She advocated for women's education, promoting the idea that they should enjoy the same natural rights as men, and criticized patriarchal family structures in society. She attached great importance to children's education, believing it to be a mother's primary duty. Although her last idea contradicts feminist principles by limiting the role of women within a society to maternal duties—in the modern sense, her primary agenda was to prepare children for life's challenges (Montgomery, 2002, pp. 368–369, 371–372).

While the Enlightenment was experiencing an empiricist life in Britain, the Americans across the Atlantic were carrying a completely different agenda for the worldview of the Enlightenment. According to Henry Steele Commager (1975, p. 3), what was theoretically envisioned in eighteenth-century Europe was practically realized with the American Enlightenment. Such an enlightenment was a natural outcome of the self-determination principle, which parallels the Enlightenment's most basic and constitutive elements: the dominance of reason, individual freedom, progress, and rejection of traditional authorities and dogmas (Ferguson, 1997, p. 22). This being the case, the philosophers of the American Enlightenment focused on the practical applications of Enlightenment tenets, which led them to become both politicians and founders of the United States of America.

The Columbian Exchange had made the Americas a favorite destination; numerous vessels had transported European settlers to the New World. However, the seventeenth century's crossings of the Atlantic were at their peak; the English people suffering from the political and religious authorities for their dissenting voices preferred to start a new life in North America. These new lands were also promising for the poor, as they would have their own fields to farm. This was why these people settled on the eastern shores of the continent. Besides, two entrepreneurial firms, the Plymouth Company and the London Company, received permission from King James I to establish permanent settlements in America at the beginning of the century. Jamestown was founded as the first permanent English settlement in mainland America in 1607. Many other English mainland colonies followed Jamestown in the following decades, leading to the founding of Georgia in 1732 (Berkin et al., 2011, pp. 50–60). The residents of the colonies were bound to Great Britain, even though these lands were named with New

England words as a whole; they lived a contented life, focusing on farming, crafting, and commerce, as long as they paid their taxes to the King. However, as the generations passed, the younger generations began to feel less loyal to the King; as he came to be seen *merely* as a distant ruler with little relevance to daily colonial life (Botta, 1826, pp. 14–15). At the same time, England's national debt increased from 75 million to 137 million pounds due to war expenses during the Seven Years' War, which ended in 1763. As a result, the young King George III introduced several new taxes on the American colonies, leading to a rise in smuggling activities in America. The Orders in Council of 1763 and the Royal Proclamation of 1763 restricted the residency statuses of Anglo-American colonists, while the Currency Act of 1764 limited the provincial governments' access to paper money. The Sugar (Revenue) Act of 1764 and the Stamp Act of 1765 laid a direct taxation burden on the colonists and hampered their liberties. Consequently, a growing spirit of resistance took root throughout the colonies; protests became violent and spread over time (Martin et al., 2000, pp. 81–92). Both taxation and protests continued for a decade, and the British Parliament passed the Tea Act of 1773, which aimed to sell 17 million pounds of stockpiled tea before it spoiled. The destination was America, where British merchants were to sell it without taxes, unbalancing the free-market competition in the colonies. This is why the colonial residents of Boston dressed as Indians, boarded the arriving ships, and dumped 46 tons of British tea into the sea in December 1773. This protest prompted the British government to take significant actions against the colonies. The Coercive Acts of 1774, also known as the Intolerable Acts to the Americans, imposed economic and political penalties on the people of Massachusetts. Naturally, tensions escalated. Many colonists began to arm themselves in anticipation of an armed conflict with British forces (Shi, 2019, pp. 188–190).

The tensions between the Americans and the British increased, and some armed conflicts took place; however, a small pamphlet written by Thomas Paine in 1776, *Common Sense*, offered the colonies a new perspective. This pamphlet was claiming that the British political system was favoring despotism (Paine, 2020, p. 5), monarchical systems were favoring the evil to pass from fathers to sons (Paine, 2020, pp. 10–14), monarchism causes bloodsheds (Paine, 2020, p. 19), the King challenged the Americans to fight in a war and they accepted the call which caused the politics to witness a new and unusual phase (Paine, 2020, pp. 21–22), the Americans were no longer to die for British prosperity (Paine, 2020, p. 26), and a separation from the dominance of the British was both necessary and imminent (Paine, 2020, p. 27). This is why, Paine suggested, the colonies should come together as a united force and dispose of

British rule (Paine, 2020, pp. 43–44). Paine's call for unconditional independence and establishment of a non-monarchical regime—namely, a republic—for America had resonated strongly amongst the people in colonies; *Common Sense* made 25 separate editions in a six-month-period from its publication of January, and thirteen colonies declared their independence on July 4 in the same year just as Paine had foreseen (Henretta & Brody, 2010, pp. 157–158). To fast-forward through the following events: the American Revolution took place between 1776 and 1783, fought against British forces by the Continental Army led by George Washington and supported by French allies and concluded with signing of Treaty of Paris (Berkin et.al., 2011, pp. 137–138), the United States of America was established as a confederation in November 1777 (Martin et.al., 2000, pp 138–139) but later the constitution was ratified by nine states to change the political system into federalism (Martin et.al., 2000, pp. 155–157). With the assistance of this process, the colonies of America transformed into states, enabling them to form a unified nation. In the broader sense, this period is known as the American Enlightenment, and two groups of people, leaving the individuals aside for the time being, played a pivotal role in this type of enlightenment: The Founding Fathers of the United States and the Federalists.

The concept of "founding fathers" was first used to refer to the first cadre that established the United States of America, coined by the 29th President of the US, Warren G. Harding, during his senatorial tenure in 1916. His motivation in coining the phrase was to draw American citizens' public attention to the rising threat to their liberties while underlining that these historical figures should not be considered superhumans. Still, this phrase was so widely welcomed by American society that numerous politicians and artists incorporated it into their remarks in the following years (Bernstein, 2015, pp. 1–3). Douglass Adair (1974, pp. 4–5) characterizes America's founding fathers as a revolutionary generation of men born between 1730 and 1760, who introduced independence to the Americans in 1776 while creating a nation for them in 1787 with the assistance of the Constitution. Adair's definition on this matter is valuable, as most scholars studying the birth of the USA follow a similar tendency by dividing the founding fathers into two sets: the co-signatories of the Declaration of Independence and the framers of the Constitution. These two sets include notable historical figures such as George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton (Bernstein, 2015, pp. 3–4). The last three names, however, are also known as the Federalists, who favored that the newly established state should be shaped under the form of a federalist state. This case came to the stage during the Constitution debates where

some of the leading figures like George Mason, Elbridge Gerry, and Richard Henry Lee, the anti-Federalists in short, were refusing such a constitutional draft for introducing a powerful central government type and for bringing a limited democracy and jeopardizing liberties while some others which we name them the Federalists were favoring the adoption of *that* Constitution. In order to explain the necessity of such a Constitution, Madison, Jay, and Hamilton had penned 85 separate articles in the newspapers of New York in 1787 and 1788. Here, Hamilton and Madison analyzed the structure of the newly established government, and Jay focused on foreign affairs. Though the primary purpose of these articles was to convince New York residents to put pressure on the state convention that rejected the Constitution, the bulk of the articles has been considered as the ultimate manifestation of the logic behind explaining why the states need a constitution, since then (Genovese, 2009, pp. 12–13).

The founding fathers term has an ambiguous scope; it sometimes includes 'mothers' like Abigail [Smith] Adams and Deborah Sampson as female figures or Thomas Paine as a pamphleteer. The eminent constitutional historian Richard B. Bernstein (2015, pp. 4, 131–133) employed a tripartite grouping for them, categorizing them as signers of the Declaration, framers of the Constitution, and others. This study adopts Bernstein's tripartite model but focuses specifically on seven key figures of the American Enlightenment: Washington, Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson as signers of the Declaration, and Madison, Jay, and Hamilton as framers of the Constitution. While the signers are considered individual figures, the framers—particularly the Federalists—are treated as a collective ideological movement rather than separate personalities.

George Washington, often referred to as the "Father of his country", was born in 1732 in the Virginia Colony. He served in the British Army for five years and later managed a tobacco plantation, engaging in commercial agriculture as a Virginia landowner. His political career began in 1758 as a deputy in the lower house of the Virginia legislature, a post he held until the American Revolution. In June 1775, he was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the American Continental Army. After securing independence in 1783, Washington disbanded his army and retired. He was unanimously elected as the nation's first president in both 1788 and 1792, setting enduring precedents for executive leadership. He died in 1799 (Hoff, 2010). Washington was not a man of theory but of action; that is, it may not be expected of him to formulate tenets based on Enlightenment principles. However, he did. His celebration of the Revolution included some vital discourses on the Enlightenment while naming the forthcoming state an empire. In his account, ignorance and superstitions were not welcomed in this new

empire, while individuals' rights would be expected to be underlined more than any other epoch had foreseen (May, 1976, p. 361). This closing of Washington is valuable in two respects: first, he kept seeing America as a new empire since his farewell addressing in 1796 right before his second term concluded, by claiming that the United States shall keep maintaining commercial relations with foreign nations while having as few political connections with them as possible (Kaplan, 2011, p. 139), and second, the Bill of Rights, which was added to the Constitution in 1791 during the presidency of Washington, was highlighting the rights of American citizens through ten amendments. In addition to this, although Washington was not counted among the Federalists, his letter to James Madison, penned on November 5, 1786, clearly states that he was also favoring federalism for the newly established state. According to him, the reason and free-thinking shall prevail against the local political interests and the new American state shall secure the achievements the Revolution had given; thus, a federal system shall be adopted to rescue the state from a possible anarchy showing itself on the horizon (Dunn, 2006, pp. 49–50). As a final note, Washington's stress on the word empire was not in vain; in contrast, it was accepted by the Americans that this new state was "the empire of reason". Though it is known that the American Enlightenment was aiming to enhance the practical sides of politics like of those we see in the struggles about the government type and constitution, the written works of founding fathers on the political thoughts and formulations had managed the American society to embrace this enlightenment as a whole (Bernstein, 2015, pp. 23–24). The role of George Washington in the American Enlightenment was more of an iconic than being philosophical; for Robert Darnton's (2003, pp. 21–24) observations on Washington as an American icon to be worshipped while his estate in Mount Vernon as a national shrine to be visited for his relics on display, this inference might vividly summarize Washington as a founding father.

John Adams (1735–1826), Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), and Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), on the other hand, were more closely affiliated with the Enlightenment mode of thinking, without setting their efforts in practical politics aside. Adams served as the vice president during Washington's tenure for eight years and gained victory over Jefferson in the 1796 presidential elections; he thus became the second president of the US. Adams was one of the pioneers leading the Revolution; his treatise, criticizing the Stamp Act of 1765, titled *A Dissertation on the Canon and Federal Law*, inspired the colonies. He became the leader of the First Continental Congress in 1774, and his 1776 pamphlet, *Thoughts on Government*, sowed the early seeds of the necessity of a constitution among the American people. Adams was the figure who nominated Washington to lead the Continental Army and Jefferson to write the

Declaration. He was competent in Greek and the philosophy of the European Enlightenment, and the thoughts of Montesquieu became dominant in his political formulations. The Sedition Act of 1798, which prohibited criticism of the Federalist Congress and the president, led to Adams being labeled a tyrant. This is why even the members of the Federalist Party refused to support him for a second term; as a result, Thomas Jefferson, the candidate of the Democratic-Republican Party, was elected the third president of the US in 1800. This transition of political power from one party to another was the first of its kind in the world to witness peacefully (Rocklin, 2010). As the third president, Jefferson initially rejected the idea of a centralized government; thus, he established the Democratic-Republican Party in opposition to the Federalists. He called his election a revolution and focused on decentralizing the government. He purchased Louisiana from Napoleon Bonaparte in 1803, effectively doubling the total American territory. This purchase, however, brought the situation of the Indians to the table: Shall they live with the Americans or be exiled? Jefferson picked the latter and exchanged their lands with virgin territories in the western part of the Mississippi River. Although he had seemed tolerant towards the natives, it is evident that this move paved the way for the removal of Indians from American territories, which reached its peak under Andrew Jackson, the seventh president of the US (Harvey, 2010). Jefferson was the person behind the first draft of the Declaration of Independence; he was known for his 'masterly pen' reputation and completed the draft in June 1776, which then received some minor revisions from Adams and Franklin before its announcement on 4 July (Kostyal, 2014, pp. 118–119). Though he had received numerous achievements in his political life, Douglass Adair (1974, pp. 336–337) claims that no other American leader was subject to as much hate as Jefferson. First, he was disliked by Federalist supporters for his atheistic and egalitarian views. Second, his thoughts on slavery abolition and 'free-soil' ideas led to him being labeled heterodox. Over time, his legacy as an icon in the Republican Party paved the way for Abraham Lincoln to take his place. Looking from this perspective, it is possible to say that Jefferson was putting the individual's and society's happiness at the center of his politics, similar to what he had put it with *"[…] pursuit of Happiness […]"* words in the beginning parts of the Declaration. This is why he might have commented on the religious thoughts in Locke's *Letter on Toleration* as incomplete and worth taking forward (Koch, 1967, pp. 23–24) while describing himself as *a* Christian just like Jesus would have wanted anyone to be, a sincere and uncorrupted Christian (Jefferson, 1995, p. 163). Similarly, the famous motto of "the pursuit of happiness" naturally encompasses constituting elements such as life, liberty, equality, and property. This might be the reason why Jefferson's approach to happiness was labeled unorthodox. Additionally, his approach to these elements

was not original; they were both introduced into the same set by Locke first and later by George Mason, another founding father, who aimed to direct property toward happiness (Darnton, 2003, pp. 96–98).

Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790) was a son of a candlemaker[41] in Boston, thus coming from a plebian origin who strived for a better life for himself and ended up as the most famous American in the world even before the year 1776 (Bernstein, 2015, pp. 7, 13; Adair, 1974, p. 9). He was not very interested in the candle-making business, and his father sent him to assist his brother in the newspaper printing industry. This is how Franklin's fall into devouring books with an immersive hunger for knowledge had begun (Morris, 1973, p. 8). He was only fifteen when he started anonymously writing essays in the same newspaper where he worked. He traveled to London in 1724, purchased printing equipment, and then traveled to Philadelphia to establish his own printing business. His keen belief in the vitality of knowledge circulation for societal development led him to found the first subscription library in America and the University of Pennsylvania, and he served as the postmaster in his colony (Ullian, 2011, pp. 41–42). Although he was the least doctrinaire among the founding fathers (Adair, 1974, p. 169), Franklin aimed for progress, perhaps more so than any of his contemporaries. Consequently, he focused on practical means of progress, such as illuminating streets with electricity, paving roads, devising a better-heating stove for indoor warmth, and, more importantly, developing good relationships with the Indians (Commager, 1975, pp. 26–27). Since the topic was practical progress for Franklin, that progress was also necessary for the colonies. It was 1754, a relatively early date that Franklin posted a political cartoon in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* titled "Join, or Die", the first-ever American political cartoon that depicts the colonies as a snake chopped up in pieces, criticizing colonies to be independent rather than being as united (Ullian, 2011, p. 44; Bernstein, 2015, p. 47). The impact of this cartoon and Franklin's persistent calls for unity planted the seeds of future independence; the colonies' delegates met in Albany to discuss unity in the same year (Kostyal, 2014, pp. 16–19). True that almost all of his essays and books were political, aiming to inject practical and empirical solutions to the problems in the minds of the American society, similar to the observable experiments he conducted throughout his life. His philosophy was practical, which may be the reason Jefferson did not hesitate to label him the father of American philosophy (Koch, 1967, pp. 20–22). His best-seller *Poor Richard* of 1732, for instance, where he was advising the readers on the ways to reach wealth, by following some

[41] Some claim Benjamin Franklin was the twelfth son of Mr. Josiah Franklin and Mrs. Abiah Folger Franklin (Ullian, 2011, p. 41) while others claim he was the tenth son (Bernstein, 2015, p. 7; Morris, 1973, p. 8).

practical methods like being lively, considering time management, eating less, acting with reason, and more (Ullian, 2011, p. 42; Franklin, 1904, pp. 27–38). This practical side of Franklin shows itself in numerous areas of his life; he celebrates arithmetic for being useful in various aspects of daily routines from commerce to calculating wealth (Franklin, 1904a, pp. 3–4), he celebrates an orderly life to receive true happiness (Franklin, 1904b, pp. 7–8) but claims an orderly life shall have a usefulness (Franklin, 1904c, pp. 23–24), and laboring to unveil the uncertain obscurities in life, even in religion. For example, the actual divine position of Jesus does not provide any practical use for man (Franklin, 1995).

Conversely, the Federalists are worth reviewing as a group, rather than inspecting them individually. Perhaps this group is best encapsulated by their collective work, *The Federalist Papers*, which consists of 85 separate articles written between October 1787 and May 1788 in various New York newspapers and compiled as a complete work for the first time in 1788, with numerous editions following later. Three separate founding fathers penned these articles; Alexander Hamilton (1957–1804) had penned 51 of them, James Madison (1751–1836) authored 29, and John Jay (1745–1829) had written five articles (Staloff, 2005, p. 47).[42] The aforementioned three people came together under the pen-name of Publius, with the incentive of Hamilton, whose main agenda was to ratify a Constitution for the American people; thus, propaganda was necessary to lead society in that direction (Koch, 1967, p. 64). *The Federalist* was designed for this purpose, and, understandably, the first spark came from Hamilton, given his complete admiration for the British Constitution (Bill of Rights). His fall from this admiration lay in the capability of a constitution to fully unite different societies (Ferguson, 1997, p. 3). The dominance of Franklin's *practical* philosophy in American life and politics also shows itself here. Because the Republic had long been established in the previous decade, early writings in American literature championed the practical aspects of Enlightenment tenets, rather than their speculative sides worth contemplating (Ferguson, 1997, p. 41). Hamilton's remark on the necessity for a Constitution was not an exception to this debate. Because *The Federalist Papers* can easily surpass all other documents in the political literature for being a reasonable text in Henry Steele Commager's account (1975, p. xiv), and the American political philosophers and practitioners were aware of the fact that this world is full of terror, crime and disasters as Voltaire highlighted in his *Candide*, these three comrades came together to prevent or at least reduce the number of these vices (Commager, 1975, p. 127). In short, the American

[42] Darren Staloff counted fourteen essays for Madison but it must be mistaken or a typo error. The genuine number for him has to be twenty-nine (Santoro, 2010, pp. 599-600).

intellectuals of the Enlightenment had distinct characteristics, and each of them posited a truth. Early twentieth-century scholars characterized them with progressive terms; some claimed they were Lockean liberals and/or republican liberals, while others likened them to the Scottish intellectuals, citing their influence. True that these are all valid, and the main reason for this validity arises from the nature of federalism in America (Köktaş, 2014, p. 134). Indeed, *The Federalist* played a central role in this narrative, as one must acknowledge.

1.2.2.2. Francophone Philosophers of the Enlightenment

The Anglophone philosophers of the Enlightenment were not limited to one geography; the English, Scottish, and American philosophers had to be discussed separately. However, the Francophone philosopher of the Enlightenment, or the *philosophes*, remained local regarding geography. That is why the participants of this climate varied. Hundreds of *philosophes* can be counted under this title, but it would exceed the intention of this section: a thematic grouping was preferred. In this framework, six figures were selected: Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Montesquieu, Helvétius, and d'Holbach. These individuals are valuable in their own right, but they collectively demonstrate the Francophone mode of thinking during the Enlightenment. This is why, instead of following a chronological order, a thematic approach is used. In this respect, Voltaire represents the critical facet of the Enlightenment by advocating freedom of speech against any fanaticism, Rousseau approaches to the individual-society relationship from a sentimental and naturalist aspect, Diderot's encyclopedic vision materializes his democratization of knowledge goal, Montesquieu rationally analyzed political institutions that laid foundational elements of the modern thought of law, Helvétius instituted moral and educational reforms by explaining human nature through a determinist fashion, and d'Holbach established a non-religious ethics through his materialist worldview. Moreover, these six figures were indeed contributors to the *Encyclopédie*.[43] A brief introduction to these six key figures could help make the panorama of the French Enlightenment visible through different aspects. Although their ideas are intensively discussed throughout the study, particularly in the

[43] Montesquieu contributed to only one article: *goût* (taste). This article was jointly written by Voltaire, Montesquieu, Diderot, and d'Alembert (Voltaire, et.al., 1757: 761-770). Helvétius does not have any signed articles in the *Encyclopédie*, but he is categorized under the "supposed Encyclopedists" by Frank Kafker (1963: 121), with which I humbly agree. Robert Darnton's claim is also important here. Montesquieu died in 1755 and left a fragment to be utilized in this article (Darnton, 1979, p. 10). That might be the reason three more people wrote this article using this fragment: Voltaire, Diderot, and d'Alembert.

third, fourth, and fifth chapters, the main intention here is to introduce these famous figures through the selected themes, highlighting the character of their philosophies.

François-Marie Arouet, or with his most well-known name, Voltaire (1694–1778), was "the iconic celebrity" of the 18th Century's Enlightenment.[44] He was able to direct the Enlightenment philosophy towards a reflective stance. He was born in Paris and came into contact with some freethinker circles at an early age. After experiencing an unjust treatment from the French justice system when he was young, he became mentally stressed and directed his entire effort to influence public consciousness through literature. His time in exile in England exposed him to the Newtonian mode of thinking, particularly the works of Locke and Newton, which influenced his perspective. His awe towards British institutions also shaped his criticisms of French public life after his return (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 618). Still, Voltaire's penmanship cannot be confined to his ability to *produce* fresh ideas; at the same time, he *truly* fought for the circulation of these ideas. His struggle with the censorship mechanism in France during his time can easily earn him a title as a cultural activist alongside his title as a philosopher. Most of his works were published without official permission and licenses; they were sometimes published in secrecy, and at other times through fictitious publishing houses he had created. This process, naturally, caused him to self-finance his works (Bachman, 1971, pp. 91-97). He had to leave France after publishing *Lettres Philosophiques* because, according to Voltaire, freedom of expression was not an innate right alone; it was an ethical responsibility at the same time —a responsibility that deserves to take risks for its exercise (Bachman, 1971, pp. 100-104). Such an ethical stance extends to religious authorities as well; it was not limited to political authorities alone. The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755, in this scene, served as *the* threshold in his intellectual world. Soon after the disaster, he penned his famous poem *Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne* (Poem on the Lisbon Disaster), in which he criticized religious figures. Afterwards, he penned one of his masterpieces, *Candide*. This novel had two veins: it questioned the notion of divine justice in the most radical fashion, and it satirically criticized Leibnizian optimism and religious dogmas (Pearson, 2005, pp. 252-253, 257-260). Voltaire advocates for the necessity of defending the truth both with reason and experience; both texts demonstrate how metaphysical systems fall short in providing explanations for *the pain*. This

[44] Voltaire was an iconic figure because he had a massive impact on the century. He became the personal advisor of Frederick II, and he corresponded with Tsarina Catherine II. His name surpassed his works; his portraits were in constant circulation in Europe. His works were censored, banned, and printed in secrecy, but the masses always read them. What was told about him was more than what he had penned. He was invited to palaces, sent into exile, and became the man known by all: a public figure of note. Voltaire was more than an intellectual; he was a phenomenon.

intellectual objection may best be read from his own pen, from the article on "fanaticism" in *Dictionnaire Philosophique*. Here, Voltaire clearly defined fanaticism as a mental illness; an illness that cannot be cured by either religion or the laws. Only a philosophically fortified mental climate can provide a social transformation. According to him, the most dangerous form of fanaticism is the delusion that leads the individual to engage in a practice where they take an action in the name of God; in such a scenario, that individual becomes a collective threat to society (Voltaire, 1802, pp. 162-164). In short, Voltaire's *unique* position within the Enlightenment can be characterized by his stance against any form of authority. His written works, his exiles, his clever tactics for evading censorship, and his involvement in public issues make him more than a mere philosopher; he was *the* moral embodiment of Enlightenment thought. That is why his formulations are still in circulation.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), the "wildflower" of the Enlightenment, was an Enlightenment thinker from Geneva. Among other contributions to the intellectual milieu of the Enlightenment, he is best known for his questioning stance towards the relationship between individual and society, in moral, natural, and sentimental aspects. His intellectual influence extended beyond politics; he had penned numerous texts in various domains, including music, education, novel literature, and autobiography (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 524). His approach to the individual-society relationship was one of disengagement from the rationalist framework of the Enlightenment; he did not fit in this bouquet. Because, according to him, human beings are innately good and *natural*; it is the artificial institutions of society that make them *corrupt*. Humans are capable of establishing a bond between nature and their inner intuitions, which enables them to make free moral choices (Hampson, 1983, p. 29). This is a natural form of purity, but the shadow of social structure falls upon this form; therefore, the individual loses their opportunity to contemplate upon themselves, which then drags them to fake desires and a flamboyant but empty lifestyle. In order to preserve this authentic form of individual, Rousseau adds, both education and politics shall be reshaped and recalibrated; however, this is a process, and this process shall be based on sensibility and intuition more than reason (O'Neal, 2003, pp. 478–479). This approach takes material form in his novel, *Émile*, where he concretizes the individual's self through a pedagogical model that leans on sentiment. According to this model, a child can only acquire their freedom under the guidance of feelings that are in harmony with nature, not through some rational strain (O'Neal, 2003, p. 479). A similar sensational approach can be observed in *La Nouvelle Héloïse* (The New Heloise), where Rousseau portrayed the individual who remains under the same umbrella of *moral purity* against the conceptual rain of

social classes and rational expectations. The society had a "visible order" for him; however, the sentimental *truth* of individuals gave way to creating a *true* humane community. That is to say, a Rousseauian style of social design not only focuses on transforming the individual but also seeks to awaken the natural and sentimental potential within them. Therefore, in his social contract formulation, the freedom of the individual can only be achieved by not obeying the *general will* but by internalizing it; that is, the individual transfers their internal bond with nature to the social structure (Hampson, 1983, pp. 27–30; Wokler, 2012, pp. 62–64). This might seem like a discrepancy situation, and it is; it *forces* the individual to be free. At first glance, it seems like collectivism; in truth, it is the institutionalized form of the effort to remain loyal to *oneself*. The gap between nature and culture can only be surpassed with a social order that prioritizes the sentimental intuition of the individual. That is why Rousseau's political suggestions differ from those of his contemporaries; nature and sentiment were highlighted. Transformation of society is the pretension of an individual's return to their nature. Such a return is only possible with establishing new institutions and repairing an individual's faculty of sensation. In short, for Rousseau, salvation can be achieved *inside* the society by reconciling with nature, once again (O'Neal, 2003, pp. 478–480).

Denis Diderot (1713–1784), as the "quill" of the Enlightenment, was one of the most prolific figures of the French Enlightenment, who had managed to influence the history of thought by the *Encyclopédie*, as its writer and editor. Still, seeing him as a writer would be an injustice to him; he was a "transitory figure" roaming between political and social realms with the knowledge he possessed. His intellectual practice was based on transforming intangible knowledge into a tangible praxis. That is, in addition to his efforts to produce knowledge, he concentrated on disseminating it as well, which positions him as a mediator between the ideas and how they are communicated to the public. This feature of his work renders the boundaries of knowledge insignificant due to its class-based, institutional, and epistemological characteristics. Therefore, the knowledge stored within the *Encyclopédie* becomes a public possession that anyone has access to (Rex, 2003, pp. 356–357). This approach can be paired with Diderot's materialist epistemology, where the source of knowledge is sought through experiences, senses, and the productive functions of the body (Simon, 1995, pp. 104–105). Such a systematic approach to knowledge can be observed in his works like *Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature* (Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature) and *Rêve de d'Alembert* (d'Alembert's Dream), which conceptualized the *thought* in a processual, vibrational, and even musical fashion: knowledge is not based on a constant content; it depends on transformation,

interpretation, and re-production (Simon, 1995, pp. 110–113). This process-oriented thinking also informs his political understanding; because, the general will of public [or, "the voice of nation"] is not a pure truth for him, it is a knowledge-production laboratory that can produce variable, debatable, but directive forms of knowledge (Suckling, 1973, pp. 278–285). With this, it can be said that Diderot's encyclopedic vision served as an instrument of criticism; it is akin to an intellectual workshop that aims to critique society, institutions, and authorities (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 158–159). This stance of his differs from the rest of Enlightenment thinkers: he was not a personal interventionist [or polemicist] like Voltaire, but a strategist who intended to transform the general structure of knowledge (Rex, 2003, pp. 356–357). In this scene, the *Encyclopédie* becomes a knowledge-politics practice; it is radical in content and horizontal in structure, bringing together philosophers with carpenters, the natural sciences with ethics, and aesthetics with politics. With this, Diderot democratized not the *content* of the script, but its existence. That is, knowledge is re-produced as it was consumed; each understanding transforms into a fresh production of knowledge (Simon, 1995, pp. 109–110). With this, Diderot becomes the quill of Enlightenment —the conveyor of knowledge, the architect of its circulation, and the instrument of intellectual equality. This closing encapsulates in the *"encyclopédie"* article he had penned for the *Encyclopédie* as follows:

> Indeed, the aim of an Encyclopedia is to gather together the scattered knowledge found across the surface of the earth; to present its general system to the people among whom we live, and to transmit it to those who will come after us—so that the labors of past centuries will not have been in vain for those to come; so that our descendants, becoming more knowledgeable, may at the same time become more virtuous and happier; and so that we may not die without having deserved well of humanity (Diderot, 1755a, p. 635).[45]

Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755), was one of the pioneering figures of the 18th century's Enlightenment, questioning the functionality of legal and political institutions through historical, social, and natural dynamics. With this, he was "the compass" for the French Enlightenment; as will be seen in numerous parts of the following chapters, he was *consistently* referenced by the authors, in addition to being called "the honor of France" by the *Encyclopédistes* (d'Alembert, 1753a, p. 534). His intellectual endeavor was to penetrate the universal thought of law by laying its groundwork; to do this, he analyzed different societies through comparative studies, in order to find a typical structure within. His

[45] *En effet, le but d'une Encyclopédie est de rassembler les connoissances éparses sur la surface de la terre ; d'en exposer le système général aux hommes avec qui nous vivons, & de le transmettre aux hommes qui viendront après nous ; afin que les travaux des siecles passés n'aient pas été des travaux inutiles pour les siecles qui succéderont ; que nos neveux5, devenant plus instruits, deviennent en même tems plus vertueux & plus heureux, & que nous ne mourions pas sans avoir bien mérité du genre humain.*

analyses in *De l'Esprit des Lois* centered on one conclusion: social institutions advance through several factors, including climate, economics, religious traditions, and government models (Berlin, 2016, pp. 215–216). Such an approach radically diverges from the abstract universality claims of some natural law theorists, like Grotius and von Pufendorf, because the primary intention of Montesquieu was to understand how positive law was shaped in different societies and which principles played a part in this process (Kingston, 2003, p. 85). He proposed evaluating political institutions in their historical contexts, rather than judging them through a particular model; that is, laws should not be evaluated by their contents, but also comprehended in the "spirit" they embody (Shklar, 2010, pp. 7–8). According to his political theory, freedom does not mean one's ability to do as one pleases; in contrast, freedom addresses a climate that fosters one's sense of security within the boundaries of the law. Naturally, such a definition gave way to the inception of the separation of powers principle, which constitutes the very essence of the modern state of law (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 398–399). England serves as a prime example of Montesquieu's doctrine, with a balance mechanism evident in its history. According to Montesquieu, a government style where the king and parliament jointly rule ensures that both the legitimacy of the monarchy and the freedom of citizens are secured (Kingston, 2003, p. 85). Montesquieu counts and compares different government models—republic, monarchy, despotism– through their "principles": the republic is based on virtue, the monarchy on honor, and the despotism on fear. Such a classification not only offers a normative distinction but also explains which model can function under specific social and psychological conditions (Berlin, 2016, pp. 216–217; Shklar, 2010, pp. 13–14). The validity of modern laws, however, can only be secured through the necessary relationship between these principles and the social structure, because the legitimate grounds of society would collapse if these laws became alien to the social spirit (Shklar, 2010, pp. 16–17). From this perspective, through the political formulations of Montesquieu, Émile Durkheim viewed him as the harbinger of sociology, if not its pioneer (Berlin, 2016, p. 231). Because the method used by Montesquieu was applicable to both Eastern and Western governments, the central tenet he offered—the separation of powers—is the precondition for human freedom, which shelters individuals from despotic tendencies (Sklar, 2010, pp. 16–18). That is, unlike his contemporaries, such as Rousseau and Helvétius, Montesquieu neither reduces republicanism to nostalgia nor a law to abstract rationality, which makes him a compass for the 18th century's political philosophy.

Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771), a very controversial figure of the French Enlightenment, was a radical philosopher who attempted to construct his educational and moral

reform upon a deterministic analysis of human nature. This study aims to approach him as the "educator" of the Enlightenment. One essential faith can be found at the center of his thought: the entirety of human behaviors is grounded upon sensory impressions and the pleasure-pain balance. Such a faith, therefore, underpinned his egalitarian claim to the capacity of human learning and the mechanisms he suggested for restructuring the political culture. In his *magnum opus* of 1758*, De l'Esprit* (On Mind), Helvétius claimed that all mental and moral orientations of a person were shaped by their interests; that is, both individual morality and political order deserve to be rethought. Because human beings *only* choose behaviors that please them, a perception of interest needs *to* be educated and directed towards a new social order, if society desires to maintain itself. Here, it is evident that education for Helvétius is not merely a transfer system of knowledge; he also utilized it as an instrument to intersect personal interests with social benefits. His contemporaries harshly criticized him due to this formulation, and both the Sorbonne and the *Parlement* of Paris burned copies of *De l'Esprit* (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 267). Still, his ideas attracted the attention of English philosophers. His moral formulations became a precursor to Bentham, who replaced the distinction between duty and interest with a balance based on utility. The central claim of Helvétius was that the intersection mentioned above *can* create virtuous individuals, a process that focuses on providing educational guidance to people from a very early age. This attempt was a bold one, as it shattered Helvétius's bonds with classical moral philosophy and laid the educational infrastructure for utilitarianism. According to him, the differences between individuals were not based on innate gifts, but rather on differences in education and access to resources (Wootton, 2000, pp. 312–316). That is, Helvétius rejected common anthropological and sociological assumptions of his time by positing that social regulations lie at the root of individual development. This is very clear in G. V. Plekhanov's writings: the first thing people should be aware of is that social conditions shape moral and cognitive behaviors—understanding this will pave the way for social progress. In this panorama, education becomes a regulatory device that produces both individual character and collective virtue. This is why, for Helvétius, values such as freedom, equality, and virtue directly emerge from the habits instilled by education (Plekhanov, 1987, pp. 102–106).[46] To conclude, for Helvétius, if all people *can be* educated in the same way, then moral virtue *can be* universalized.[47]

[46] *See* and compare with the EDUCATION line on Table 6.

[47] Helvétius has a two-volume philosophical novel titled *The Child of Nature, Improved by Chance*, in which he discusses these formulations in a didactic manner. This novel also focuses on the isolation of an individual, similar to Ibn Tufayl's *Hayy bin Yaqzan* (*see* and compare with the passages in Ch. 2.2.2.3 and Ch. 4.2.1). The *natural* progression of a child was evaluated through societal and environmental factors, as well as chance. That is why

Paul-Henri-Thiry [Baron] d'Holbach (1723–1789) was born in a town called Edesheim, in Germany. He spent his life in France, particularly in Paris, the intellectual center of the Enlightenment. He was the financial patron of the *Encyclopédie*, and he contributed to this work with several articles he had personally penned. Plus, through the *coterie d'Holbach* style of his intellectual circle, he represented the institutional focal point of the radical thought and atheism (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 276–277). If we speak of d'Holbach's status in Paris through some football terms, he can easily be characterized as the *trequartista*[48] of the Enlightenment, of which any of his philosophical comments on anything were immediately receiving a broad reception; he was the one who directed the intellectual debates in the direction he desired in France. Still, Baron's most unique contribution to the Enlightenment was his incentive to construct an ethical understanding that is non-religious, natural, and rational. He radically rejected the religious heritage of his time, which had corrupted philosophy with particular scholastic spiritualities that conditioned moral behavior through the promise of afterlife rewards. According to him, the man does not need celestial assistance to act virtuously; a well-organized society can easily fulfill this requirement. This is the key for d'Holbach's materialist worldview, because he considers morality as a *part* of nature, which then makes the soul an arranged version of the material —a piece of material with the capacity of sentience, not a separate substance. That is why morality must rely on reciprocal dependence derived from the nature of societal relations, rather than on a celestial reference (Plekhanov, 1987, pp. 15-17). In this scene, conscience becomes an ability that evaluates one's self-actions within the context of relationships with others, transcending the notion of a "godly auditor", which then makes it imperative at both the individual and social levels (Plekhanov, 1987, pp. 20-22). This approach

education was mandatory for Helvétius. A brief sentence taken from the English version of the first volume might clarify this closing: *To chance, more than to our reason, we are indebted for our success* (Helvétius, 1774, p. 268). This girl, without education, was exposed to external interventions, who then wasted her life at her twenty as follows, closing sentences of the second volume: *By the most unaccountable events, I found myself, before I was yet twenty years old, a "maid", "wife", and "widow"! To these characters I may add that of philosopher –That of an enemy to pride and flattery –That of a friend to men of genius and merit. What an alteration had fortune successively made in my mind, in my heart, in my circumstances! — "What become of my sensibility? Reader! Regulated by philosophy, it became the slave of my reason."* (Helvétius, 1774, p. 350) (Note: The quotation marks on maid, wife, and widow were put deliberately; these words were given in italic in the original text).

[48] *Trequartista* is a football term introduced by the Italian style of football mentality to describe a specific position within the eleven-member team structure. Its literal meaning is "three-quarters", which refers to a space between midfield and the forward line. This player has the utmost autonomy in the field; *he* "orchestrates" right behind the striker[s]. *His* ultimate goal is to shape the team's attack mentality. That is, wherever *he* directs the ball, the team has to follow. *He* does not have to be the "brain" of the team, but *he* is "the embodiment of intellectual capacity through physical labor in the form of an art". Some well-known figures in this position include Diego Maradona (Argentina), Johan Cruyff (The Netherlands), Alessandro Del Piero (Italy), Francesco Totti (Italy), Ronaldinho (Brazil), and Lefter Küçükandonyadis (Turkey). These people were known "not" with their contributions to the score, but with their visions on the field—the ability to anticipate, create, and make others move to an area *he* desired.

clearly rejects the essentialism of the scholastic mode of thinking, which renders an/y individual a passive subject, and the abstract morality conceptualization of idealism, which makes the entirety of ethical principles dependent on nature, social experiences, and reason. Indeed, from his pen, this sentence underlines his approach boldly: *"Whether there exists a God, or whether he exists not, our duties will be the same; and our nature, if consulted, will prove, that vice is an evil, and that virtue is a real and substantial good"* (d'Holbach, 1889, p. 310).

These words address the nature of the source of moral obligations, which transformed his system of ethics into the necessities of societal life, rather than some divine commands. Likewise, by claiming that people are dependent on each other in fair treatment, not because otherwise God would have been offended, but the individuals then *"[…] would violate the laws of equity"* (d'Holbach, 1889, p. 311), Baron highlights a reciprocal responsibility that arises from human nature. Lastly, according to d'Holbach, virtue is nothing more than a man's quest for searching his happiness within the social harmony he also becomes a partaker of it since *"[…] in order to be happy, he must make himself beloved"* (d'Holbach, 1889, p. 307). This piece of sentence serves as a manifestation that Baron's understanding of morality was a life-sustaining principle for the individual, which goes beyond being a mere theoretical claim.

1.2.2.3. Austro-Germanic Philosophers of the Enlightenment

The Austro-Germanic Enlightenment, often called the German Enlightenment *(Aufklärung)*, emerged in the 18th century; however, it developed relatively late in the century and cautiously—especially in contrast to its longer-lasting French and British counterparts. While the movement sought to liberate individuals through reason and education, it distinguished itself by focusing predominantly on philosophical and moral dimensions, rather than institutional or political reforms. This section aims to highlight the relatively brief but impactful period of the *Aufklärung* through five central figures: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz as the one who championed universal reason and laid the metaphysical ground of Enlightenment metaphysics, Immanuel Kant as the advocate of the limits of reason and autonomy of moral law, Johann Gottfried Herder as the one who linked culture, language, and history to each other against universal claims of the Enlightenment, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing as the highlighter of religion, tolerance, and the capacity of reason, and Moses Mendelssohn as the figure that claimed faith can live through secularism while highlighting the possibility of *Haskalah* (the Jewish Enlightenment).

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was a German intellectual born in Leipzig, Saxony, who is also known for his contributions as a mathematician, historian, diplomat, and lawyer. His philosophical originality stems from his accomplishment in reconciling rational knowledge with metaphysical thought within a universalist vision of order. The Leibnizian philosophy joins the same "modern quest for reason" league, similar to Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza; however, Leibniz preferred to go beyond attributing reason as a tool for explaining the order of phenomena, instead he aimed to ground reason upon a system of principles that would serve to explain the entirety of existence (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 337–338; Boutroux, 2017, pp. 39–41). In this sense, his vision of the universe is based on a particular principle: the principle of sufficient reason. This principle transcends the mechanical form of causality; it would not be enough to explain how things exist. A related question is also important: why do things exist in that way? (Boutroux, 2017, pp. 44–45). With this, it is clear that Leibniz had managed to combine both deductive reasoning and the role of metaphysics in understanding the proper form of reality. He had grounded these formulations upon some mathematical models; he wanted to discover a universal characteristic in reality. By this, he envisioned a philosophical language that would enable him to reduce all concepts to their primary elements, allowing him to calculate reality through different combinations of these elements (Boutroux, 2017, pp. 45–46). This tendency can be characterized as a geometry of the intellectual dynamics, because, according to Leibniz, science, just like mathematics, is a system of constructed integrities and principles (Randall Jr., 1970, pp. 8–10). Still, his quest for a *proper* system does not exclude experimentalism, because experiences are some external impulses which germinate the seeds of truth that reside idle in reason (Boutroux, 2017, pp. 41–42). In this context, Leibnizian metaphysics considers nature a domain of necessity and finality; that is, the laws that operate in the physical realm directly reflect "the best of all possible worlds" God has chosen. The theory of Monadology, in this sense, is the manifestation of such thinking. According to this, each entity in this universe—monads—has a *sui generis* characterization that reflects the entirety of the universe; they are the systematic form of inherent principles. They unite without causing conflict between themselves, because God established a harmonious order for them (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 339–340). This "pre-established harmony" notion is both a cosmological and epistemological basis, because only through this harmony can the universal principles of reason and multitude of existence co-exist in a continuous harmony (Randall Jr., 1970, pp. 21–22). Such continuity was embodied in his "nature makes no leaps" principle (Boutroux, 2017, p. 45), because any difference in nature is *merely* a difference in different levels—the universe is a continuous chain of becoming. To conclude, from where we stand, it

is possible to claim that the formulation Leibniz introduced does not limit reason but expands its extent, which makes it possible to comprehend both nature and freedom by looking through the same window.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), one of the most important figures of the Enlightenment, was born in Königsberg, Prussia, and shaped the intellectual orientations of the period through his formulations on reason and moral autonomy. He was trained in a Pietist school in his youth, which caused his authentic formulations to take a stance against this background (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 317). His intellectual legacy in the context of the Enlightenment had two distinct veins: his critical analysis of the limits of reason and his formulations on ethics, particularly through the concept of moral autonomy. Since his definition of "enlightenment" is *"the escape of men from their self-incurred tutelage"* (Kant, 1995, p. 6), which might seem like a "metaphor of maturation", in truth, it does deepen the ethical responsibility he charged to reason and freedom. Because this situation is not about ignorance; it is the incapability of courage that the individual cannot use *his* own mind without seeking *another's* guidance (Deligiorgi, 2005, p. 59). Man is a coward and lazy in utilizing his reason, according to Kant; that is why some external authorities do that in his stead. From this perspective, the essence of enlightenment is the individual's questioning of this dependency, which leads them to freely utilize reason in the public sphere (Clark, 2024, pp. 361–362). However, such a freedom is not an anarchical individualism. In contrast, "the public use of reason" concept refers to a cosmopolitan commonwealth that consists of people with pen and book, which then Kant asks them to declare their thoughts in this public realm openly (Deligiorgi, 2005, pp. 62–63). The normative stress here makes reason both an individual faculty and a collective criticism, and a process that is in harmony with universal law. This can be observed in Kant's distinction of reason as private and public: when an individual carries out *his* duty (like as a military officer or an ecclesiastical figure), he *might* use *his* reason limited within the "private" context; however, that very same individual *has to* express his critical thoughts in front of public –freely (Clark, 2024, pp. 362–363). From this perspective, enlightenment is more than *merely* "acquiring knowledge" for Kant; it is also the self-recognition of the authority of reason, and it grounds this authority in universal normativity. That is why the key to the enlightenment is to know the limits of reason, because, according to Kant, pure reason cannot comprehend the domain of metaphysics fully. That is, Kant gave a character to reason with that: reason is limited by certain boundaries, and it can only operate within these boundaries (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 318–319). Human reason, therefore, cannot grasp certain concepts, such as freedom or

immortality; however, these concepts are vital for a moral life. Here, a dilemma occurs, which Kant solved smoothly. According to him, reason *cannot* prove the existence of freedom theoretically; however, it is mandatory for practical reasons because the universality of moral law requires the "human agents" to behave autonomously (Deligiorgi, 2005, pp. 59–60). At this point, Kant's famous "categorical imperatives" kick in, which can be best explained as people can behave morally *only* when they can assume their wills as universal law (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 319). Such moral autonomy finds its source in the authority of pure reason; external rewards or punishments play no role in this scenario. This might be the reason that the Kantian mode of thinking evaluates the concept of revolution as a secondary consideration. Revolutions may overthrow tyrants, but they cannot reform the mentalities. That is why the *true* enlightenment can only live within the individual's mode of thinking—in the ones who recognize the autonomy of reason (Clark, 2024, pp. 362–363). This is why Kant emphasized the ongoing process by claiming that the era in which he lived was not an *enlightened age*. However, they were living in an *age of enlightenment* (Kant, 1995, p. 5). In short, according to Kant, a person may not know everything, but they can know what they do not know, which makes them the law-maker of their own moral codes in the eyes of Immanuel Kant.

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) was a German philosopher, historian, and theologian who was trained in Königsberg. He maintained a highly stable intellectual productivity level throughout his life by earning a living through teaching, preaching, and authorship in Weimar. The Enlightenment proposed a universal mode of thinking; however, Herder rejected this and sought to formulate a perspective encompassing culture, language, and history, making him one of the founding fathers of modern cultural relativism. His rejection of universalism was based on his claim that the human condition can only be understood in the local, historical, and cultural context. According to Herder, the culture *(Kultur)* is the totality of individuals' and people's *(Volk)* historical and linguistic experiences; this is why these cultural forms cannot be compared with, reduced to, and forced to become part of the notion of universal progress. Such an approach was an anthropological sensibility developed in response to the abstract reasoning practices of the Enlightenment. In his *Yet Another Philosophy of History* (1774), he criticizes reducing historical varieties to a single narrative for the sake of universalism. He rejects any universal formulation of happiness by claiming *"each form of human perfection is […] national and time-bound"* (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 267–268; Denby, 2005, pp. 57–59). This approach clarifies that Herder's understanding of culture is based on time and space. Naturally, his understanding of history follows the very same theme.

According to him, history is not a mechanical chain of events caused by external factors; instead, it is a process that unfolds through the internal teleology of human beings. That is, historical causality is so complex that it cannot be explained through laws of nature; some "quasi-transcendent energies" *(Kraft)* and teleology *(Teleologie)* shall be put into the equation (Barnard, 2003, pp. 112–113). This approach becomes visible in his *Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity* (1784–1791) where he claimed the progress of human history cannot be evaluated through a universal law but the process can be explained through *sui generis* conditions of the peoples (Barnard, 2003, pp. 110–111; Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 268). These conditions are often associated with language, according to Herder, because language is *the* innate instrument that enables a society to comprehend the world, how it operates, and what it contains. Even in this case, language cannot be evaluated through a universal lens; meaning-making processes are special forms for the examined people (Denby, 2005, pp. 58–59). The variety of languages reflects the variety of human thoughts and cultural productivity. This approach would then form the basis of modern cultural anthropology, as developed by intellectuals such as Humboldt and Boas (Denby, 2005, pp. 56–57). Naturally, these original thoughts of Herder were later expanded upon in the realm of politics, where they were used to criticize the political notions of the Enlightenment. The enlightened cosmopolitanism and its claims of colonizing progress were harshly criticized; Herder believed that people *can* advance by leaning on their own lands, traditions, and languages. It is evident that Herder utilized Montesquieu's interrelationships between climate and society here; however, he carried them further, noting that peoples *also* possess genetic and cultural distinctness alongside environmental authenticity (Denby, 2005, pp. 60–61). The well-known and widely circulated term *"Zeitgeist"*, meaning "spirit of the time," was coined by Herder. He intended to establish a stance of historical objectivity and neutrality through empathy, intuition, and imaginative apprehension (Barnard, 2003, pp. 108–109). That is to say, historiography was a cultural interpretation method for him. From this perspective, it can be said that the concept of humanity, for Herder, is not *the* universal progress of "one" reason but an organism that gradually advances via languages, histories, and imaginations of multiple cultures (Frank, 1990, pp. 256–257). In short, Herder was a part of the Enlightenment, but he rejected its *central* tenets.

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781), a German intellectual born in Saxony, is one of the most prolific authors of the German Enlightenment; his impact on literature, aesthetics, and religious matters is particularly significant (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 342). His position within the vast field of the Enlightenment particularly shines with his efforts in questioning the

link between religion, toleration, and reason. His contribution to religious toleration can be evaluated as a defense of intellectual liberty. Because he sought to move beyond the discussions between the Neologists (who advocated rationalizing Christian dogmas) and traditional Lutheran orthodoxy, to create an original approach (Yasukata, 2002, p. 8). On the question of whether faith and reason can be reconciled, his standpoint was close to Reimarusian radical rationalism; still, he was able to develop an empathetic stance towards the intuitive faith of the ordinary believer (Nisbet, 2013, p. 6). This tendency was actually a discrepancy; however, Lessing saw it as an opportunity, preferring to side with intellectual activity against dogmas. Because, according to him, the *truth* is an ongoing research process, not a formulation with an inevitable end (Yasukata, 2002, pp. 5-6); historical realities can never be evidence of imperative truths of reason. This is why Lessing evaluated the Bible as a historical text, not a direct revelation from God (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 342). He published this notion of himself in fragments, which created a fresh debate. These texts included pieces from Reimarus, which caused an inevitable and irreconcilable distinction between revelation and reason. Naturally, these fragments were banned; however, he penned *Nathan der Weise* (The Wise Nathan, 1779), which then became a symbolic text on interreligious tolerance. The *Nathan* was a play, and its central theme was universal fraternity of humanity, a concept that Lessing suggested as the central value against *any* dogma in *any* religion. Such an acceptance of the entire human race as brothers also signifies an ethical stance of Lessing (Nisbet, 2013, pp. 7–8; Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 342). Parallel to this approach, his *Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (The Education of the Human Race, 1780) proposes a more philosophical notion of historical progress and universal moral education. In this text, Lessing claims that religious systems served to human progress throughout history; still, their ultimate goal was to liberate reason. Although this is a bold closing, his thoughts on this matter did not follow a systematic methodology; they were primarily experimental and questioning. Because, instead of confining himself to *one* philosophical [or thought] system, Lessing had preferred to test different perspectives and uncover their internal tensions (Yasukata, 2002, pp. 9–10, 12–13). This might be the reason he was a fan of Spinoza; he sought to understand the connection between the notion that "free will is an illusion" and the unity of nature and reason (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 342–343). Because of his association with Spinoza, Lessing was accused of being an atheist, but he did not take it seriously; in fact, he shifted to Leibnizian perspectivism to argue that the truth can be viewed from different perspectives (Nisbet, 2013, pp. 7–8). To sum up, Lessing was a German intellectual who questioned the limits of reason regarding the concept of religious tolerance, never abandoning his questioning nature.

Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) was a German Jewish philosopher who was born in Dessau. His intellectual journey began with Talmudic studies, after which he self-taught himself the classical Western languages to deepen his intellectual capacity. That is, he is both at the center of the *Aufklärung* and the founding figure of the *Haskalah* (Jewish Enlightenment). One of his most significant contributions to the intellectual realm is his assertion that religion can also thrive in a secular order. The faith, therefore, can be experienced in a dogmatic and closed community in harmony with universal principles of reason. He borrowed the philosophical envisagement of God from the metaphysical formulations of Leibniz and Wolff, and he defended the existence of God with cosmological and ontological bases. Still, such a defense is not limited to some abstract principles of reason. For instance, with the original standpoint he discovered in the *Morning Hours* (1785), he proposed that "anything real *must be* thought", and this proposal led him to an eternal intellect as the source of this thought—God (Reill & Wilson, 2004, pp. 384–385; Arkush, 1994, pp. 39–41). Still, that does not mean that God is a metaphysical necessity; at the same time, this notion is in harmony with the moral orientations of human reason. Such a closing is an attempt to legitimize the existence of religion in a secular society. Because, for Mendelssohn, God is a "principle" that can be comprehended by both the believer and the rational. The *Jerusalem* (1783), his most controversial work, categorically divided religious authority from political authority; here, Mendelssohn categorized the state as the sole power that regulates external actions, while religion is the self-responsibility of a person towards their *internal* relationship with God. The state *cannot* intervene in human thought, because faith is the most private realm of freedom. In this context, congregations do not possess the authority to excommunicate individuals or force them to *have* faith. Here, Mendelssohn does not defend Judaism alone, but also introduces a universal understanding of religion: all the moral truths that can be achieved by reason with universal validity are joint possessions for the entire human race. From this perspective, Judaism was a contract signed between God and a historical group of people; however, the very essence of this contract cannot be found in some ritual codes of Judaism, but rather in an ethical foundation that can be comprehended through reason. This principle laid the foundation of *Haskalah*: a Jewish individual can remain loyal to his tradition and integrate into German public life simultaneously. With this formulation, Mendelssohn becomes a symbolic figure as in both "the Socrates of Berlin" and "the Moses of Dessau". Albeit this is the case, some tensions can be seen between these two personas. *Jerusalem* has a three-floor house allegory, where the lowest floor represents the universal principles of reason, the middle floor represents the laws that are open to change in historical and political contexts, and the upper floor represents some symbolic rituals, of which they are

known only to God. Still, Mendelssohn did not attach these floors with stairs (Greenberg, 2011, pp. 32–37). That is, the upper floor rituals *must be* seen as historical instruments that provide the persistence of Judaism's existence: they cannot be changed, but neither can they be reduced to superstitions that reason rejects; a mutual acceptance is required—the *Haskalah* in Hebrew, and the wisdom in English.

1.2.2.4. Concluding Remarks

In this section, the primary intention was to introduce the intellectuals who had a significant intellectual impact on the formulations in the *Encyclopédie*, either directly or indirectly through the concepts being discussed. Anglophone philosophers preferred to adopt empiricism in their pursuit of knowledge. From Bacon to Hume, they established a progressive, liberal, and individualistic intellectual framework by integrating reason into nature. The Francophones, on the other hand, aimed to institutionalize knowledge production and disseminate it to the public sphere. They valued critical thinking; they intended to merge the quest for freedom with philosophical actions, so that society could be transformed. The Austro-Germanic philosophers, however, approached the Enlightenment from a more ethical and philosophical perspective. They questioned the limits of reason and the internal world of the individual. Though their period was relatively shorter than the rest, these philosophers managed to evolve the Germanic mode of thinking into Romanticism afterwards.

1.2.3. The Fuel: Places That Kept the Fire Burning

The concept of the Enlightenment may be singular in its grammatical form, but it unmistakably refers to a plurality in its historical reality. It flourished through interpersonal interactions. One cannot come to one's own conclusions in this life; social interaction and exchanging ideas and thoughts are required. According to an eminent Turkish man of letters, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, this kind of realization is not something one can purchase and use—it requires effort:

> How difficult it is for a person to find an idea that can give direction to their own life… It is not like a pair of shoes that you can pick off the shelf, ready to wear. Until now, we have lived through words and events. Words intoxicated us; events jolted us awake by hitting us over the

> head. We failed to see the human being, history, and the actual needs of life. We need a lever. Nevertheless, what is it? (Tanpınar, 2014, p. 125).[49]

That lever, in the quest for direction and meaning in one's life within the parameters of the Enlightenment, took on various forms in different places. The social interactions people engaged in at these venues facilitated the continuous circulation of knowledge. The value of knowledge was elevated, whether it was "raw", like information, or refined through thought and became "cooked", akin to Peter Burke's classification (Burke, 2000, p. 11). This is how the values and formulations of the Enlightenment circulated in Europe: through social interactions in specific venues. Although these venues range from operas to theaters, from cabarets to social clubs, and from gardens to museums, this study specifically focuses on four types of establishments: salons, coffeehouses, taverns, and Freemason lodges. The *Encyclopédie*, in this scene, is also evaluated as a "place", a mobile place in truth—thoughts of the Enlightenment were stored here and could be easily transported.

1.2.3.1. Salons

The salons represent a distinctive form of public sphere in 18th-century Europe; yet, their roots extend back in history. According to Theodore Zeldin, the beginning of such a process dates back to a time when women revolted against the rude, imperious, and flamboyant lifestyle of the palaces. The courtly ladies grew tired of such an institutional style of communication, and a more gentle, elegant, and cultivated vision of social behavior emerged first in Italy, then in France, and throughout Europe. The symbolic figure of this transformation was Madame de Rambouillet; she preferred to host her guests, allowing them to showcase their intellectual enthusiasm and eloquence in the small and intimate settings she organized. That is, the salons become a scene, rather than just a social meeting place; the participants express their thoughts eloquently, and discussions favor a reciprocal understanding rather than a prevailing one (Zeldin, 2010, pp. 163–165). The salons were founded upon these principles and contributed to institutionalizing the Enlightenment project in Europe. These places first emerged as venues to meet women's own educational needs, which then evolved into serious intellectual institutions. The salons in Paris played a particularly significant role in developing women's careers; in an era without a rigid education system, women's opportunities for learning, guidance, and gaining

[49] "*İnsanın kendi hayatına istikamet verecek bir fikri bulması ne kadar güç... Ayakkabı değil ki, hazırını alayım. Şimdiye kadar hep kelimelerle ve bir de hadiselerle yaşadık. Kelimeler bizi sarhoş etti; hadiseler kafamıza vurarak uyandırdı. İnsanı, tarihi ve hayatın ihtiyaçlarını göremedik. Bize bir manivela lazım. Bu nedir?".*

social influence were provided through the salons.[50] Still, these places can be seen as the sum of socialization, circulation, and knowledge production. According to Abbé Morellet's (a venerated French economist) observations, Madame Geoffrin was so meticulous in organizing her salon that it facilitated the male guests' contributions to the Enlightenment project through their collective production of knowledge (Goodman, 2010, pp. 244–245). Antoine Lilti's closings, however, do not support romanticizing the role of salons; according to him, the salons were neither based on egalitarian utopias nor self-interested hypocrisies. The salons were shaped through asymmetrical patronage relationships, which can be seen as high-society structures; the salon owners provided financial and symbolic support to the authors, thereby affording them a form of protection. He also evaluated Mme. Geoffrin's organizational capabilities were based on these asymmetrical economic and social support mechanisms. (Lilti, 2010, pp. 215–216). With this brief introduction, it is safe to say that the salons were particularly under the authority of women. Considering that the following venues of the Enlightenment—coffeehouses, taverns, and Freemason lodges—were predominantly male-centric, this section aims to highlight the role of women during the Enlightenment through the lens of salons.

The main driving forces of salon culture were the hosts, also known as *salonnières*; their roles in the Enlightenment were vital. Among the early figures of these people, Mme. de Lambert stands out as the one who institutionalized the salon tradition. She hosted both literary figures and important individuals from high-society circles as early as 1710; this is why her salon was titled "Antichamber of the Academy", which significantly impacted Montesquieu's membership in the *Académie Française*. Mme. Tencin was recognized for three traits: her scandalous life,[51] her literary contributions, and her renowned salon. The circle she established in 1718 became the central hub for intellectual interaction and social influence; yet, she did not hesitate to refer to the members of her salon as "the beasts of my menagerie" (zoo, to some extent) words, which reflect the ironic distance between the *salonnière* and the guests. The famous *salonnière* mentioned above, Mme. Geoffrin was her *protégée*; she regularly organized two dinners each week—one for authors and one for artists—which helped to discipline and institutionalize salon culture. She provided financial assistance to her guests and was adept at steering conversations and directing the exchange of thoughts, which made her a respected figure in the Enlightenment world. Julie de Lespinasse, who received support from Mme.

[50] Salons are often associated with the French Enlightenment, which achieved its prominence in France's aristocratic society—though not limited to French society in Europe (Köktaş, 2017, p. 549).
[51] For instance, Jean le Rond d'Alembert, the co-editor of the *Encyclopédie*, was her illegitimate child (Blom, 2005, pp. 26–27).

Geoffrin began her *salonnière* career under the patronage of Mme. du Deffand and later established her own salon. She proposed a more modest model for daily evening meetings; according to Jean-François Marmontel (a famous French historian), she was the most passionate mind the world had seen since Sappho. Madame Helvétius' salon, on the other hand, had a different characteristic. Her salon managed to survive until the end of the century, witnessing both the Enlightenment and the Revolution. Her role as a *salonnière* stemmed from her ability to bring together people from diverse social classes, including aristocrats, the working class, and intellectuals from different generations. Considering the profiles of participants in the salons, some philosophers, such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, Diderot, Hume, and Adam Smith, as well as scientists like Blaise Pascal and Christiaan Huygens, and authors like Fontenelle and Walpole, can be added to the list (Catwright, 2024). As can be seen, the French salons were not only open to the French but also to people from various parts of the Enlightenment world. Additionally, some exotic guests were invited to salons. A Tahitian man named Aotourou, for instance, came to France with Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, a French explorer, and he was introduced to Parisian salons, where he had the opportunity to meet both *salonnières* and philosophers such as Diderot, d'Alembert, Buffon, Helvétius, and d'Holbach (Pagden, 2013, pp. 186–188). Although this was an extraordinary case, it was expected that the guests would be personally known to the *salonnières* or that a reference letter would be provided, in addition to demonstrating an elegant French wit. The authors were reading their unpublished works to gauge reactions, while the scientists entertained guests with some experiments (Catwright, 2024). These salons were established on one principle: an artificial sense of equality. It was expected of every guest to behave "as if they are equals"; still, that does not mean the differences between statuses were ignored. The *salonnières* both audited the discussions and maintained group harmony. This was a self-disciplined scene; it had its heroes and anti-heroes, which operated through a small allegiance system (Davetian, 2009, p. 117). Although they were different people, both men and women, they were able to come together under these controlled symbolic venues, which led to the emergence of an intellectually shaped paradigm.

Such a filtering mechanism was required for the salons; it was expected to create a harmonious environment and social coherence. This is why it served as a symbolic venue: a setting where social unequals acted as equals. Friedrich-Melchior Grimm (a journalist), for instance, described Mme. Geoffrin's salon with the words, *"all ranks are mixed: the noble, the official, the financier, the writer, the artist, all are treated the same, so that […] no rank remains except that of good society"* (Melton, 2004, p. 206). That emphasis on "good society" is key

here because the symbolic equality created by salon culture allowed discussions to be conducted as dialogues rather than monologues. Even the reasoning in the salons was considered an indicator of good manners in its own right (Im Hof, 1994, p. 115). The ritualistic order of the salons was enhancing these good manners. The meetings were typically held once or twice a week at specific times, often beginning with dinner, followed by lengthy conversation sessions (Melton, 2004, p. 206). Mme. Geoffrin advanced this ritual by reserving Mondays for artists and Wednesdays for authors, while Julie de Lespinasse kept her salon open every day from five to nine (Im Hof, 1994, p. 115). From this perspective, it is possible to argue that this structure functioned like a microsystem regulated by collective public reason. Because these salons served to circulate news and ideas within this microsystem. In Marie-Anne Legendre Doublet's salon, for instance, guests recorded the timely information they received, which was then read aloud to others and distributed to other venues via letters (Melton, 2004, p. 207). In other words, the salons functioned as a primitive media center. For social prestige, the salons offered high visibility to their guests while also carefully cultivating their sense of belonging. Participating in these salons was a certain privilege; therefore, an increase in knowledge, courtesy, mastery of language, and social elegance can be expected as the outcome of this process (Goodman, 2010, pp. 249–250). This process was organized carefully by the *salonnières*; they select the discussion topics, moderate the tone, and prevent hurtful polemics. To secure this systematically constructed authority, the *salonnières*, as exemplified by Suzanne Necker, study the topics a few days before the meeting, take notes, and prepare themselves for the discussions (Melton, 2004, p. 207). With this, the salon assumes the role of an academic institution. Indeed, Dena Goodman characterized the salon as the venue "sponsoring serious and productive intellectual activity", of which the discussions held here enhanced the participants' ability to think critically and prepared them for delivering public speeches afterward (Goodman, 2010, pp. 249–250). The connection between these two faculties is actually certain: it both enables the reproduction of ancient aristocracy and serves as a cultural transfer instrument between these newly established social layers (Kale, 2004, p. 9). This allows us to view the salons as symbolic fortresses of the ancient order, which transformed and functioned as transitional institutions that established a new intellectual order.

The role of *salonnières* in this context was undoubtedly to shape public opinion. This role becomes even more evident through the correspondence they maintained with various parts of the Enlightenment world. The letter, in this case, *"moved the Enlightenment out of the private world of the salon into the public world beyond it"*. For instance, Mme. du Deffand

corresponded with Horace Walpole in England, and the correspondence between Mme. d'Epinay and Abbé Galiani lasted for fifteen years; all letters were numbered and exchanged on a weekly basis. These letters played a dual role, serving both as a means of transferring thoughts and news and as a form of literary production. For example, Grimm's *Correspondance Littéraire* (Literary Newsletter) introduced the collective products of the salons and provided the literary community with a certain public identity (Goodman, 2010, pp. 251–253). Here, women were no longer mere intermediaries; they became agents in their own right, actively shaping the discourse of the Enlightenment. The *salonnière* figure reduced the woman of the pre-Enlightenment period to "nature", but the Enlightenment redefined woman as a "civilizing agent". Therefore, women were perceived as figures who temper men's destructive tendencies and compel them to become more elegant and sociable (Melton, 2004, pp. 202–203). This transformation positioned women as carriers of ethical progression, contributing to the redefinition of the public sphere. Because, in a realm of interactivity that is ethical rather than political, the women were legitimate actors. The critical debates evaluating women in the Enlightenment period were often shaped by the term "gallantry", which refers to a polite discourse dedicated to women, serving as a facade of glorification. In truth, this was a strategy aimed at re-establishing male dominance (Taylor, 2005, pp. 33–34). This is why it would be more accurate to view the influence of women in the salons as a space where they articulated their own subjectivity, rather than as places that offered courtesy to men. This is how the salon of Mme. Helvétius continued to operate even after her husband Claude-Adrien Helvétius's death, which remained a shining link in the "Republic of Letters" chain: because *"[i]t was her salon, not his"* (Goodman, 2010, p. 254). Indeed, by examining Mme. Geoffrin's response to Marmontel, conveyed through a letter that would be read to the audience at dinner (Goodman, 2010, p. 253), suggests that these letters were not perceived as objects for conversation, but rather as women's initiatives to assess them as a collective experience of thoughts. That is to say, while limited, the women of the Enlightenment were able to generate ideas within their own spheres. Because some texts, like Grimm's publications or the literary projects circulated in the salons, were often attributed to men, women frequently remained anonymous in their intellectual contributions (Goodman, 2010, pp. 253-254). That is, the social and discursive domain constructed by women was filled with content produced by men; women were seen not as creators of this content, but as mere curators of it.

Despite the central role women played in shaping Enlightenment discourse through their salons, their intellectual agency remained contested in the broader philosophical landscape,

which was dominated by male thinkers. Indeed, according to John Robertson, male Enlightenment thinkers approached women through Epicurean philosophy, highlighting the bodily differences between the sexes rather than focusing on the equality of reason. Mandeville, for example, in his *Fable*, approached the prostitution occupation not in moral terms but through a sociological inference: an "evil" that produces public benefit (Robertson, 2005, p. 698). Hume advocated for "gallantry" treatment of women, preferring that they remain readers rather than become writers (Robertson, 2005, pp. 696–697), while Rousseau favored confining women to the roles defined by family (Robertson, 2005, p. 698). Indeed, in *Émile* by Rousseau, Sophie was depicted with care and tenderness alone, which gave her a familial position (Outram, 2010, pp. 269–270). These were the general tendencies of male Enlightenment thinkers; however, some notable figures, such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Diderot, preferred to include "the women" in the same parentheses as men – they were also part of the universal set of humanity (Outram, 2010, p. 276). Even the role of salons could not disrupt this overall perspective. Women were idealized in a passive role; they were objects even in their own salons, not subjects. Indeed, even the concluding manifesto of the Enlightenment, *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* of 1789, was written, declared, and named by men. This is why Olympe de Gouges penned the *Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the Female Citizen* in 1791. In it, she stated that women are born free and equal to men (Gouges, 2019, p. 32), that sovereignty rests equally with men and women (Gouges, 2019, p. 34), that the general will includes women (Gouges, 2019, p. 37), that women and men are subject to the same law (Gouges, 2019, p. 38), that women have the right to express their thoughts freely (Gouges, 2019, p. 42), and that women shall awaken from their slumber to demand their rights from the system under the banner of philosophy (Gouges, 2019, pp. 49–52). Her bold words and demand for gender justice endured in various texts, ultimately leading her life to end at the guillotine. While she may be viewed as a radical political figure, the path she forged paved the way for the emergence of Mary Wollstonecraft, particularly her emphasis on philosophy, which proved invaluable. She argued that morality cannot be altered based on gender, that reason cannot be confined to men, that the lack of women's education was not the central issue of the Enlightenment, and that it hindered its progress. It is unacceptable to assert that women are naturally irrational (Outram, 2010, pp. 266-267). With these conclusions, Wollstonecraft theoretically established a moral and rational subject in women, demonstrating that women were just as rational as men. A passage from her *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* may accurately conclude this section as follows: *"My own sex, I hope, will excuse me, if I treat them like rational creatures, instead of flattering their fascinating graces, and viewing them as if*

they were in a state of perpetual childhood, unable to stand alone" (Wollstonecraft, 2014, p. 31).

1.2.3.2. Coffeehouses and Taverns

The emergence of coffeehouses in Europe dates back to the mid-17th century, when coffee, originating from the Ottoman world, was integrated into European urban life. The first coffeehouse opened in Venice in 1645; Oxford (1650) and London (1652) followed it. Drinking coffee in public places swiftly became an integral part of the European lifestyle. The French version of the story, however, was quite interesting. An Armenian immigrant established a stall to sell coffee in Saint-Germain in 1672, which later evolved into the *Procope Café* in 1686. This place represented elegance to the French, as it was well-decorated with mirrors, marble tables, and candelabras. It soon became a center for intellectual activity (Melton, 2004, p. 240). The perception of coffee can be traced through specific lines in the *Encyclopédie*. According to this, the French evaluated coffee as a beverage that clarifies the mind and motivates individuals to study more, particularly when combined with wine. A report from the Royal Academy of Sciences in 1713 verified this closing; the report added that coffee was as effective as *Nepenthe*,[52] which was praised by Homer (Diderot & Vandenesse, 1752, p. 529). Such a characterization of coffee was clearly a combination of its medical and moral traits, which enabled coffeehouses to distinguish themselves from the alcohol-centric tavern culture prevalent in Europe. True that, the English coffeehouses shone as the "places of sobriety" since they first initiated; these places did not value unreliable gossip coming from intoxicated minds. People discussed literary and political matters here; even the newspapers were read. The customers were often middle-class men and members of the aristocracy, and these individuals exchanged ideas and thoughts in these places, which contributed to the development of public reason in Europe. The coffeehouses in England and Germany in particular, were seen as the birthplaces of "bourgeois public sphere by Jürgen Habermas; private individuals were able to *produce* thoughts on public matters in these places, which created an early critical publicity by shattering the monopoly of state in this domain (Brennan, 2003, pp. 267–268). Bourgeois society was about to take shape during this period, and the coffeehouses played a significant role in this process. These places served as commercial information centers on the one hand.

[52] A mythical drink mentioned in Homer's works—rumored to wash sorrow and pain away.

On the other hand, they became the sites of political debates, literary discussions, and intellectual productions—all in the public eye (Melton, 2004, pp. 243–244).

Indeed, the Habermasian approach to the coffeehouses was proper. Because, particularly in England, the coffeehouses soon became places where people read newspapers and pamphlets; additionally, these were often read aloud to customers, which made these places some "communal reading rooms". Additionally, the coffeehouses not only consumed the news, but they also produced it. For instance, *The Guardian* newspaper, founded by Joseph Addison, had placed a mailbox inside Button's Coffeehouse in London—it was shaped like a lion's head—and asked people to share their *own* news with the newspaper. The circulation of the news was so intense that some coffeehouse owners even demanded monopoly rights on the newspaper business from Parliament in 1729. The French and German coffeehouses, on the other hand, were known for their tradition of "read aloud". Before the widespread adoption of newspaper reading, texts were read and discussed, facilitating the dissemination of knowledge to the public through these networks (Melton, 2004, pp. 245–247). The *nouvellistes* of Paris visited different cafés to collect news and gossip, which can be seen as a primitive form of public journalism (Brennan, 2003, pp. 268–269). Still, this method was in constant conflict with the censor mechanism. Austrian coffeehouses during Joseph II's reign were closely monitored by the police, for instance (Brennan, 2003, p. 268), a practice that was only eased after the lifting of the censorship mechanism in 1781, making journalism in Vienna more accessible (Melton, 2004, p. 245). The political nature of the news caused the public debates to be conducted in a semi-secret fashion in France; that is why the newspapers in France were primarily circulated in manuscript style, like *libelle* (political pamphlets) and *nouvelles à la main* (handwritten news sheets), that might have a chance to be printed abroad afterwards (Brennan, 2003, p. 269). As one may see, both the instruments and types of shared knowledge varied in the coffeehouses. Karl Mannheim (2003, pp. 139–140) claims that the salons were established upon the basis of a "consensus of views" while the coffeehouses leaned on an anonymous "variety of views", which he takes as a harbinger of the modern public sphere. True that, entrance to the salons required social capital. In contrast, coffeehouses were open to anyone as long as they could afford a cup of coffee, which made them the centers of individual views and daily politics. This might be the reason that Charles II of England condemned these places and attempted to close them entirely in 1675, which led to a public protest, and he was forced to revoke his decision within less than two weeks (Melton, 2004, p. 242).

The taverns of the 18th century, however, were mainly affiliated with the lower classes. These were public places where they stored their daily lives, sense of belonging, and collective memory of the laity and the poor. The *Encyclopédie* gave credit to Horace (65–8 B.C.E.) in defining the tavern word:

> *Nec vicina subest vinum præbere taverna,*
> *Quæ possit.*[53]

From this perspective, the tavern word referred to a place that served alcoholic beverages in France. Therefore, the term *"taverne"* in French carried a derogatory meaning in 18th-century France, which was often linked to the lower classes of society through the adjective "drunk" (Jaucourt, 1765aa). These people were living in small houses with unhealthy conditions, which caused them to deem public places physical and emotional sanctuaries. Because taverns of the 18th century provided warm, restful, and sheltering environments, they offered multifaceted socialization opportunities, such as finding employment, receiving news, trading goods, and even hosting religious ceremonies (Melton, 2004, p. 226). The multifaceted role of taverns made them the bearers of oral culture. These taverns were favorite places for the craftsmen, immigrant workers, servants, and casual laborers. They were sharing tales that remained outside the written culture, bursting into laughter with the courage provided by alcohol, celebrating weddings, spreading rumors, but most importantly, keeping the collective memory alive (Melton, 2004, pp. 227–228). Taverns were both intellectual (to some extent) and physical centers for socialization. Through the *authority* granted by the booze, men became immediate friends here. They chatted about almost anything—from serious conversations to cozy ones, in addition to stating their political criticisms with laughter. These exciting public realms provided both physical and emotional intimacy, making them the farthest places from official structures and being the most densely populated places in terms of social cohesion (Newman, 2019: 1–3). It is possible to claim that taverns typically offered spontaneity, exuberance, and emotional solidarity in contrast to the elitist and regulated culture of judgment prevalent in coffeehouses, though boundaries often blurred. That is, the Enlightenment does not have to be in contact only with reason; pleasure and belongingness were also some unusual instruments in the public sphere.

Indeed, taverns were often associated with laughter, gossip, profanity, and occasionally fistfights rather than reasoned debate within the parameters of the Enlightenment. A police

[53] Nor is there a nearby tavern to offer wine, / One that could.

report of 1771 indicates that a tavern in the Fleury district of Paris was known for profane cries at midnight, sound of fighting and broken windows, and "Murder!" cries, which reflect that daily exuberance of these people was more of a collective behavior than being individual (Brennan, 2011, pp. 72–73). This incident was a mere social one, and it received a complaint; however, when such exuberance turns into a political one, it becomes a threat to the police. For instance, according to a police report from 1775 in the town of Marfaux, a man named Jean Dugue was caught playing cards at midnight in a tavern. He did not care about the police, and challenged by *"I am not worried about that; I will do whatever it takes"* words (Brennan, 2011, p. 76), which reflects the roles of taverns as being at the intersection point of people (Mr. Dugue), political authority (playing cards at midnight was forbidden), and the administrative authority (the police). Edmund Burke, too, characterized French taverns in the same way in his *Reflections*: these were places where social joy and public opposition were intertwined; a bodily public sphere of which discussions were executed through words, gestures, mimics, laughter, sarcasm, and through some drinking rituals (Newman, 2013, pp. 136–137). Therefore, excesses in taverns were under the government's keen surveillance. For instance, another police report of 1771 includes some observations about midnight drinking in Paris. Accordingly, the report mentioned the dances Parisians preferred to perform, the games they played, and even a man named Charles who dressed like a girl while playing violin in order to by-pass the official permission, of which the report questioned the stretching tendency of social gender rules in taverns (Brennan, 2011, pp. 73–76). The intimacy between politics and people in taverns was not confined to France alone. Similarly, a record from an actual tavern discussion about the Lippe Principality in Germany in 1788 reveals how people were able to discuss politics in a critical tone. According to this record, the peasants were complaining about the taxes paid to Paderborn (a manorial officer) while criticizing regional justice and religious freedom sincerely (Kümin & Tlusty, 2011, pp. 350–352), which proves that even the plebian classes were able to raise their voices on political matters in taverns. Still, Burke's *Reflections* indicate that such exuberance was also experienced in elite taverns. After a couple of drinks, the middle and upper classes of France also discussed the same topics that the Lippean peasants discussed, with the same loudness (Newman, 2013, p. 137). In short, taverns became open to all layers of society over time. However, the lower classes preferred them more, and the same kind of knowledge was consumed and produced there, as in the rest of the Enlightenment places, albeit in a different tone.

1.2.3.3. Freemason Lodges

The Freemason organization had an intimate contact with the Enlightenment mode of thinking in England, particularly through its organizational structure and the values it disseminated. Numerous lodges in England were united under the name "Grand Lodge of England" in 1717, a pivotal moment in Freemasonry's history that marked the institutionalization of the movement in a modern sense. This was particularly important since Freemasonry evolved from being a tradition to a universal brotherhood that embraces both reason and rational members. This structure was hierarchical, which can be seen as an allegory of social organization. Still, through concepts such as freedom, humanity, fraternity, and civilization, Freemasonry had established an ethical vision compatible with European Enlightenment values to some extent. Freemasonry was respectful towards the English Constitution through social virtues, but it still carried a hierarchical tension within. Their lodges served as a beneficial ground for the Enlightenment thinkers in the dissemination of thoughts since Freemasonry was established upon an "oath of secrecy", which means radical ideas were not *told* to others outside the circle (Porter, 2000, pp. 37–38; Melton, 2004, pp. 252–253). Still, Freemasonry's ideological flexibility should be considered; it provided an institutional framework for various ideological and religious perspectives. It advocated secular, utopian, and universal values, which made the Freemasonry lodges an intellectual network of knowledge (Cohen, 1995, p. 175). On the other hand, some secret circles in the Netherlands, comprising exiles, hosted radical versions of the Enlightenment, gradually evolving into Masonic lodges over time. These circles criticized absolute monarchies and religious dogmas, influenced by freethinkers such as John Toland (Porter, 1990, pp. 45–46).

Indeed, the Masonic lodges were vital in disseminating Enlightenment thought in the 18th century. This importance stems from the actual stonemason lodges in England and Scotland, where these craftsmen went beyond their artisanal roles, and these lodges transformed into intellectual and social communities (Robertson, 2015, p. 88). Initially, these lodges were mere guilds; they began accepting new "companions" in the early 18th century, who often carried philosophical and scientific concerns within them. The Royal Society members were particularly affiliated with these lodges, and they became influential in these communities, which then led Freemasonry to drift away from its artisanal roots and become an intellectual circle. At 1730, for instance, there were no stonemasons left in the London lodges; merchants, physicians, lawyers, and others filled these positions. Merchants were excited here because, in an age where geographical mobility was at its peak through commercial activities, a merchant

with the Freemasonry membership was able to receive solidarity and assistance in any lodge of Europe (Melton, 2004, pp. 254–255). Freemasonry membership served as a passport for merchants in the 18th century (Robertson, 2015, pp. 89–90). Such a structure was related to social matters and hosted some cultural and political novelties. For example, the very first lodge in France was founded in 1725, and it had around six hundred members at the eve of the Revolution; there were approximately 10,000 Freemasons in Paris alone. Similarly, the Austro-Germanic part of the Enlightenment had founded around 450 lodges, the first of which was in Hamburg from 1737 to 1789 (Melton, 2004, p. 256). Such a rapid expansion of the lodges throughout Europe reflects the efficient reception of Freemasonry's "voluntary basis union" in the mental world of the Enlightenment (Jacob, 1991, p. 96). Albeit some philosophers—like Voltaire, Mandeville, and Hume—mocked this organization, it can be said that numerous intellectuals utilized this structure to disseminate Enlightenment values (Robertson, 2015, p. 90). Apart from these intellectual contributions of the Freemason lodges, their social and political roles will also be discussed.

These lodges functioned as some institutional embodiments that directly intervened in the social fabric of 18th-century Europe. For example, they were *symbolically* suspending one's status and class, which became efficient in making the aristocrat, artisan, cleric, and scientist sit at the same table—a dinner table of [and for] brotherhood. Its hierarchy was more closely aligned with a vision of moral development; a tripartite grouping was established: apprentices, journeymen, and masters – a hierarchy that permitted elevation. That is why these lodges hosted libraries, maintained correspondence with other lodges, and instilled a communal conscience among their members by assisting one another with financial and medical expenses. When a "brother" was arrested for his debt, for instance, the lodge immediately paid it, and the sick brothers were cured by the physicians the lodge hired without delay. These solidarity mechanisms made the lodges more socially functional than the rest of the socializing places of the Enlightenment. Besides, religious tolerance was a key aspect in these lodges; the Anglicans, Catholics, Jews, and many other confessional and religious groups were accepted as equals. Naturally, from a social interaction perspective, these structures addressed a diverse range of people, including royal circles, the business world, diplomats, and scientists. They came together under one principle: "trust your brother" (Im Hof, 1994, pp. 140–143). Still, the Masonic world was addressing the urbanites; traditional societal relations within local circles were abandoned, and a horizontal, city-based public network was established. Nevertheless, again, this network was not as inclusive as presented above. It mostly accepted people who

possessed properties, were educated, and were from metropolitan areas, which meant that a gender-based and stratum-based tendency was in effect in the membership. For instance, a lodge in Vienna in 1783 had an *interesting* variety proportions of its members: higher nobles were 15 percent, lower nobles were 40 percent, the educated bourgeoise were 32 percent, the clergy were 8 percent, and the remaining members were consisted of 5 percent alone (Melton, 2004, pp. 259–261).

Political roles of the Freemason lodges had two veins: a conduit for the revolutionary ideals and an instrument for negotiating with the *status-quo*. The very first constitution of Freemasonry, with the name of *Constitutions of the Free-Masons* of 1723, aimed to instill a constitutional thought and civic responsibility in the minds of its members, which then became a catalyst in the dissemination of the constitutional monarchy vision throughout the entire Europe (Jacob, 1991, p. 34; Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 209). True that, the Austrian Grand Lodge characterized itself with the "a democratic union" phrase in its charter of 1784. These "minor in style but major in effect" types of stresses in the Masonic worldview can be read as a practical reflection of the liberal political visions in the Habsburg political climate (Melton, 2004, p. 263). Still, this one alone cannot characterize the Freemasonry mode of political thinking. It sometimes followed a pro-absolutist path through its elite members, whereas at other times it preferred an oppositional fashion by sheltering pro-liberal factions. For example, the lodges under the patronage of Frederick II in Prussia were identifying themselves as "the first servant of the state", which led them to embrace the enlightened absolutism notion. On the other hand, during the same period, some Viennese lodges were disbanded due to serious suspicions about their mentality, which suggested that they did not favor the central authority's politics. Similarly, some of the Parisian lodges took a clear stance against the Revolution in the post-1789 period, while pro-Revolution figures transferred themselves to *explicitly* political associations (Melton, 2004, pp. 267–270). By looking through this window, the elastic form of masonry allowed it to host diverse individuals with various political visions, making the organization a "political laboratory" for further examination. That is, Freemasonry lodges cannot be characterized as a destructive force of Enlightenment politics nor as a guardian of the existing order; they were dynamic sociopolitical platforms that stood at the intersection of these opposing views.

1.2.3.4. The *Encyclopédie*

A comprehensive publication project was initiated in the mid-18th century in France under the name of *Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (Encyclopedia, or [a] Systematic Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Crafts). This work is a valuable text that reflects the mentality of the Enlightenment. Its first volume was issued in 1751, whereas the final volume was presented to the readers in 1772—its publication history was over twenty years. This work comprises 17 volumes of text-based articles and 11 volumes of plates, totaling 28 volumes—though the number of volumes stretched to 35 afterwards. The *Encyclopédie* covers around 72,000 articles, from one-sentence-long to almost booklet-sized. These articles cover a wide range of topics, from philosophy to botany, medicine to music, and metalworking to the printing industry (Birn, 2003, pp. 403–405). However, the *Encyclopédie* confined itself with a clear preference for topics: no historical figures—whether imaginary or genuine—would be reviewed in a separate article, nor would some famous battles, etc.; only the human capacity and capability were shown. Still, this strict tendency was stretched afterwards through Jaucourt (Blom, 2005, p. 144). Denis Diderot was the chief editor of the *Encyclopédie*, with Jean Le Rond d'Alembert assisting him in co-editing, who left afterwards, and Jaucourt took his place. Diderot is the main creative force behind the project; d'Alembert contributed to the scientific matters, particularly (Blom, 2005, p. 44). Diderot was able to request around 160 contributors for the *Encyclopédie*; amongst them were some well-known philosophers like Voltaire, Rousseau, Jaucourt, d'Holbach, Dumarsais, and Morellet, as well as some theologians like Abbé Yvon and Abbé Mallet, some famous lawyers like Boucher d'Argis, and some journalists like Baron Grimm (Kafker, 1963, pp. 108–116). Additionally, numerous artisans and craftsmen contributed to the text, either directly or indirectly, by allowing the main draughtsman, Louis-Jacques Goussier, to observe their work and draw the mechanisms they used in their businesses (Blom, 2005, pp. 46–47). Such a cooperation naturally made the *Encyclopédie* a public work, which explains the tendency of people in possession of the work, reaching more than 25,000 subscribers in the course of time, and with further editions (Birn, 2003, p. 403). The purpose of the *Encyclopédie* was to compile human knowledge and organize it (Diderot, 1755a, p. 635); such knowledge aimed to extend beyond academic circles and encompass a larger part of society. According to Diderot and his companions, knowledge should not be monopolized by the church or state; it must be free, open to questioning, and shared (Darnton, 1979, p. 9). This is why the *Encyclopédie* was not merely a book, but a compilation of thoughts. Reason, as one of the central principles of the

Enlightenment, plays the primary role in this work. Perhaps that is why the *Encyclopédie* attracted significant attention in both France and other European countries. Still, it received severe criticism, as did the *Encyclopédie*, which criticized the European mode of thinking (Roche, 2006, pp. 177–178) because some of its articles criticized religious dogmas, absolutist governments, and traditional institutions (Lough, 1971, pp. 159–161, 140–141, 227–228). That is why the *Encyclopédie* was sometimes banned, and its printing process was halted. Still, Diderot managed to complete his work despite these adverse conditions.

To understand why the philosophes felt the need to create such a monumental work, one must first grasp 18th-century France. As widely discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter, France was on the verge of a significant transformation; people were hungering for knowledge, and thinking through reason and experimentation had become widespread—it was truly the Age of Enlightenment. People had to think for themselves with their own reason, and some traditional authorities, such as the Church and monarchy, were questioned. People must go beyond religious explanations to understand nature, society, and humans. In this context, compiling knowledge and granting access to all was necessary, which was both an intellectual necessity and a social objective. To achieve this, the *Encyclopédistes* first established their methodology. Listing articles alphabetically was a well-established style, but it was not sufficient. That is why they invented the *Système figuré des connaissances humaines* (Figurative system of human knowledge) by reinterpreting Bacon's and Chambers' organization of knowledge (Darnton, 1999, p. 194). Here, this new organization, often known as "the tree", is actually a map of knowledge—organized through rational thinking and conceptual relationships. Knowledge, in this system, was divided into three categories: memory, reason, and imagination. Memory corresponds to history, reason corresponds to philosophy, and imagination corresponds to poetry, or art in the general sense. Other knowledge branches originate from these three main trunks. That is to say, the memory trunk can be categorized as follows:

MEMORY
History

- Sacred (history of prophets)
- Ecclesiastical
- Civil, ancient, and modern
    - Civil history
    - Literary history
        - Memoirs
        - Antiquities
        - Complete histories
- Natural

- Uniformity of nature
  - Celestial History
  - History of
    - Meteors
    - The Earth and the Sea
    - Minerals
    - Vegetables
    - Animals
    - The Elements
- Irregularities of Nature
  - Celestial Wonders
  - Unusual Meteors
  - Wonders of the Earth and the Sea
  - Monstrous Minerals
  - Monstrous Vegetables
  - Monstrous Animals
  - Wonders of the Elements
- Uses of Nature
  - Arts, Crafts, Manufactures
    - Working and Uses of Gold and Silver[54]
    - Working and Uses of Precious and Semiprecious Stones[55]
    - Working and Uses of Iron[56]
    - Working and Uses of Glass[57]
    - Working and Uses of Skin[58]
    - Working and Uses of Stone, Plaster, Slate, etc.[59]
    - Working and Uses of Silk[60]
    - Working and Uses of Wool[61]
    - Working and Uses, etc. (*Système figuré*, 1751; Darnton, 1999, pp. 210–211).

As one can see, the *Encyclopédistes* introduced a new system of knowledge; even this one, the history part of the *Système figuré*, is complex. However, the second part, known as reason, which relates to philosophy, is even more complex. This is why a trimmed version is to be given here, as follows:

REASON
Philosophy

- General Metaphysics, or Ontology, or Science of Being in General, of Possibility, of Existence, of Duration, etc.
- Knowledge of God
  - Natural Theology
  - Revealed Theology
  - Knowledge of Good and Evil Spirits

[54] Minter, Goldbeater, Gold Threader, Gold Roller, Gold and Silver Smith, Planisher, Setter, etc.
[55] Lapidary, Diamond Cutter, Jeweler.
[56] Heavy Forging, Locksmithing, Edge-Tool Making, Arms Manufacture, Arquebus (small arms) Manufacture.
[57] Glassmaking, Plate-Glass, Mirror-Worker, Optical Manufacturer, Glazier, etc.
[58] Tanner, Chamois Leather Dresser, Skinner, Glove Maker, etc.
[59] Practical Architecture, Practical Sculpture, Mason, Roofer, etc.
[60] Extraction, Throwing, Products, such as Velvet, Brocaded Fabrics, etc.
[61] Drapery, Hosiery, etc.

        - Divination
        - Black Magic
- Knowledge of the Soul
    - Rational
    - Sensory
- Pneumatology, or Knowledge of the Spirit, or Special Metaphysics
- Knowledge of Man
    - Logic
        - Art of Thinking
            - Perception
            - Judgment
            - Reasoning
            - Method
        - Art of Retaining
            - Memory
            - Supplement to Memory
        - Art of Communication
            - Knowledge of Oratorical Devices
            - Knowledge of Oratorical Qualities
    - Ethics
        - General
        - Particular
- Knowledge of Nature
    - Metaphysics of Bodies, or General Physics of Extension, Impenetrability, Movement, the Void, etc.
    - Mathematics
        - Pure
        - Applied
        - Physico-Mathematics
    - Physics (Natural Philosophy)
        - General
        - Particular (*Système figuré,* 1751; Darnton, 1999, pp. 210–211).

The final category, known as imagination and mainly deals with art, is relatively short, as follows:

IMAGINATION
Poetry

- Profane, Sacred
    - Narrative
        - Epic Poem
        - Madrigal
        - Epigram
        - Novel, etc.
    - Music
        - Theoretical
        - Practical
        - Instrumental
        - Vocal
    - Painting
    - Sculpture
    - Engraving

- Dramatic
  - Tragedy
  - Comedy
  - Opera
  - Pastoral, etc.
- Parabolic
  - Allegory (*Système figuré,* 1751; Darnton, 1999, p. 210).

Although this was a well-organized table, the authors were not required to follow this scheme. Diderot gave blank cheques to his comrades in being dissident from the beginning; still, they have to control themselves to avoid ending up in prison (Blom, 2005, p. 145; Roche, 2006, p. 176). Perhaps that is why the authors employed various techniques in the style of their articles; some, like Jaucourt, preferred to speak directly to the audience, while others, such as Diderot, used plain language, making the articles more accessible and more straightforward. Jaucourt, for instance, in an article he penned on cruelty *(cruauté)*, employed some phrases into the text like *"Je dis que…"* (I say that…) and *"Tirons le rideau sur…"* (Let us draw the curtain on…), which made his article more sincere since he was directly speaking to the reader (Jaucourt, 1754b); he made the reader a part of this interaction directly. Diderot, on the other hand, preferred a simple language when explaining complex concepts to the general public. For instance, in his article about dream *(rêve)*, he explained that all the objects in dreams were visibly games of our imagination (Diderot, 1765c). Drawing a parallel between games and a dream like this quite possibly entertained the educated circles while assisting the ordinary people in comprehending the philosophical explanation of the term thoroughly. Of course, these efforts were the visible aspects of the articles; however, by placing any religion under the umbrella of philosophy, as Robert Darnton highlighted, the Encyclopedists effectively dechristianized it (Darnton, 1999, p. 200). That is why numerous unsigned articles are in the *Encyclopédie*, as one may notice by checking the References part of this study. These unsigned articles are often attributed to Diderot; however, it is impossible to prove this attribution definitively. Numerous people have written about disputable concepts, particularly those related to religious and governmental issues. Abbé Yvon, d'Holbach, and Saint-Lambert, for example, had written on these disputed issues as well as on the matters within their areas of expertise, often anonymously, which can be detected through their style at times but cannot be generalized (Lough, 1971, pp. 39, 44, 49, 52). That is why these unsigned articles often host some invisible but existing ironies, sarcasms, or criticisms. For example, in the unsigned article on God *(Dieu)*, the author claims that God is natural and instilled *his* existence in the minds of humans, which makes *him* genuine. However, after this sentence, the author follows by taking

inspiration from the ancient Roman notion as *"Vox populi, vox Dei"* and claims that *"On peut bien dire ici que la voix du peuple est la voix de Dieu"* (It is fair to say that the voice of the people is the voice of God), which can be read through an irony that the author accepts God but claims that humans created *him*, not the opposite (*Dieu*, 1754, p. 976). This was the widely used technique of the Encyclopedists to evade the censor mechanism: planting seeds of suspicion in the readers' minds would be more effective than stating clearly.

The *Encyclopédie* did not have an easy journey during its publication period; several obstacles threatened its progress. Even the *Système figure* was enough for the ecclesiastics to be furious at the *Encyclopédie*. The Catholic clergy damned the work for its dare to put religion under the philosophy, where divination and black magic were placed in the same bucket (Blom, 2005, p. 84). The second volume, which arrived in 1752, was welcomed by the clergy because the authors were self-censoring themselves, and utilizing rhetoric and theology in their articles. The *abbé*s of the censor commission were unable to find anything contrary to the Catholic faith in the second volume (Blom, 2005, pp. 111, 115–116). However, this rhetorical language did not persuade the Versailles, and the first two volumes of the *Encyclopédie* were officially banned, and its editors were arrested. This was often characterized by the phrase "the first crisis" (Lough, 1971, pp. 21–22). Although the *Encyclopédie* continued to be published afterwards, the censorship mechanism exerted considerable pressure on it. On 1 January 1758, d'Alembert wrote a letter to one of the contributors to the work and resigned from all positions in the *Encyclopédie*, right before the publication of the seventh volume. Even Voltaire tried to persuade Diderot to follow his colleague's way, but Diderot refused, feeling himself responsible for [then] 4,000 subscribers and publishers. The eighth volume was published in the same year, and in the following year, the privilege to publish the *Encyclopédie* was revoked. This was the second crisis of the *Encyclopédie* (Lough, 1971, pp. 22–26). The origin of the second crisis was a combination of d'Alembert's article titled *Genève*, which was not approved by the censor mechanism, and *De l'Esprit*, the famous book by Helvétius, published in 1758, which went through twenty editions that same year. Helvétius was accused of reducing all human transactions to self-interest, which was mocked by Mme. du Deffand as he revealed the most notorious secret, making people upset. That is, Helvétius contributed to the institution with a stricter tendency towards censorship (Blom, 2005, pp. 226–228; Lough, 1971, p. 23). Jaucourt took the place of d'Alembert, and in about ten years, he contributed more than 14,000 articles to the *Encyclopédie* (Blom, 2005, pp. 239–241). In 1764, the remaining articles were ready to be printed (Blom, 2005, p. 283), and the original owner of the printing privilege devised a plan

to circumvent the censorship mechanism: printing the *Encyclopédie* in Neuchâtel, a principality in present-day Switzerland. In fact, these remaining volumes were printed in Paris, with Neuchâtel serving as the printing location, and Samuel Fauche's name was listed as the printer on the volumes (Blom, 2005, pp. 297–298). This is how the *Encyclopédie* completed its publication process. However, the original privilege mentioned here belonged to André François Le Breton, and he sold his rights to Charles-Joseph Pancoucke in 1768, thereby granting him all the rights to future editions of the work. Pancoucke was an aggressive publisher, and this tendency contributed to the *Encyclopédie*'s further editions in France reaching around 14,000 to 16,000 separate copies in the year of the Revolution (Robertson, 2015, pp. 95–96).[62] [63]

[62] Panckoucke (1736–1798) emerged as a mighty figure in the publishing industry during the Enlightenment, known as an aggressive publisher in the market, and achieved prominence from 1762 onward in Paris. In the early phase of his career, he printed works by notable figures such as Buffon, Voltaire, and Rousseau; he established himself as a key player in disseminating Enlightenment ideas (Darnton, 1979, pp. 17–18). Bolstered by close ties to the government, Panckoucke secured a printing privilege in France in 1768, which granted him rights for subsequent editions of the *Encyclopédie* within the same year. A decade later, he decided to reorganize the *Encyclopédie* thematically but abandoned the endeavor swiftly. Instead, he initiated the ambitious enterprise of creating his own encyclopedia, *Encyclopédie Méthodique* (Methodical Encyclopedia), in 1782. Diverging from the alphabetical format, this work adopted a subject-based approach (Darnton, 1979, p. 106). Although envisioned as 'the most complete encyclopedia' ever compiled, it failed to receive widespread attention, despite recruiting the contributions of renowned encyclopedists from the post-Diderot era (Darnton, 1979, p. 395). The project encountered frequent delays due to Panckoucke's prolonged negotiations with printing guilds, driven by his persistent pursuit of receiving more favorable terms (Darnton, 1979, pp. 381–383). Notably, the Swiss printing guild in Neuchâtel did not hesitate to characterize Panckoucke as extremely greedy while openly acknowledging that "money is the great driving force of all" (*l'argent, qui est le grand mobile de tout*); thereby, they paralleled Panckoucke's own confession in a way (Darnton, 1979, p. 533). Moreover, it is crucial to highlight that Diderot shared a similar dislike towards Panckoucke and his greed. In a letter written after Panckoucke offered Diderot the directorship of the *Supplément* project (additional volumes for the *Encyclopédie*), Diderot flamed up at Panckoucke's failure to fulfill their agreed-upon financial arrangements while not softening his cursing words in expressing his despise towards him (Darnton, 1979, p. 49).

[63] The significance of financial income for the publishing business in the eighteenth century cannot be overstated, as its consequences could have been detrimental to both renowned and obscure writers alike. Diderot, to exemplify such trouble, candidly complained about the situation in his article titled *Letter on the Book Trade* that authors of his era were compelled to give significant sums to booksellers through contracts, who were not the original masters of the texts, while authors themselves were receiving insufficient compensation. This practice, facilitated through state-controlled privileges granted to printing industrialists, he adds, inevitably condemned authors to such lives of impoverishment and obscurity. Diderot asserted that such circumstances led authors to perish without achieving acclaim during their lifetimes, with posthumous recognition of their works eventually becoming the criterion. Consequently, the legal heirs of these authors often fell into poverty over time, as the ownership of the texts remained unclear due to the privileges afforded to booksellers (Diderot, 2002). Despite the issuing of the French Copyright Act in 1793, which aimed to regulate the ownership status of written texts, Diderot, who passed away in 1784, did not witness these reforms. In the same vein, the term "Grub Street", which denoted an actual location in London, was also used to refer to the collective of obscure authors in eighteenth-century Western Europe. In the Enlightenment, authors were stratified into two categories, as noted by Robert Darnton, which also mirrored similar patterns observable in literary circles throughout history: the "high enlightenment" and the "low enlightenment". The former consisted of individuals producing esteemed works. At the same time, the latter, struggling with the greedy public demand for printed texts, often delved into low-literature *(basse littérature)* by imitating the ideas of their more esteemed colleagues. In contrast, some authors from the lower ranks aspired to elevate themselves to high-literature *(haute littérature)*. Those in the low-literature category, driven by the imperative of sustaining their livelihood, produced texts of varied genres, including pornographic works that circulated intensively among the general populace. True that, members of Grub Street did not hesitate to interpret,

The *Encyclopédie* project could only have been completed by Diderot's stubbornness. Initially, he was unsure whether to take the editorial lead of the project, as he had no name and was financially struggling. However, d'Alembert was a member of the *Académie*, carried noble blood (albeit he was a *natural son*), and was a member of the Prussian Academy sponsored by Frederick the Great (Blom, 2005, p. 53). According to Philipp Blom, he was forced to accept this duty by Chancellor Henri François d'Aguesseau, a pious man, who praised and recommended Diderot to Malesherbes, the Chief Censor; this is how Malesherbes balanced Diderot's freethinker reputation and d'Aguesseau's pious fame. Diderot's house became the office of the *Encyclopédie*, where he edited the manuscripts and sent them to printing houses (Blom, 2005, pp. 47–49). Still, these articles did not have similar stories. For instance, Buffon did not keep his promise on writing an article on "nature" (Lough, 1971, p. 55), Fontenelle's manuscript was rejected by Diderot (Kafker, 1963, p. 121), Mme. d'Épinay probably contributed some anonymous articles to the *Encyclopédie* (Blom, 2005, p. 143), Rousseau was given three months to write *all* musical articles and he had managed (Blom, 2005, pp. 44–45), and Voltaire regretted suggesting Diderot to withdraw from the editorship of the *Encyclopédie* and offered his labor again—Diderot happily accepted the offer coming from "his dearest friend" (Blom, 2005, pp. 217–218). Simply put, Diderot was the main driving force in transforming the *Encyclopédie* into a phenomenon of the Enlightenment.

1.2.3.5. Concluding Remarks

We often tend to characterize the Enlightenment through the contributions of some individual efforts of selected significant figures. However, this period was actually "an age of interaction", which can be read through its places. Knowledge production, sharing, and recirculation cannot be maintained solely through written text; reciprocal conversations, discussions, and mutual experiences are also crucial in this process. That is why these four places—the salons, coffeehouses, taverns, and Masonic lodges—alongside the *Encyclopédie*, constituted both the physical and symbolic infrastructure of the Enlightenment.

say, Voltaire's texts through the voices of some fabricated characters in their own writings as well (Darnton, 1982, pp. 15–21). To serve as a final remark, in emphasizing the pivotal role of financial gains for authors, it is noteworthy that Diderot's financial sorrows were alleviated only after Catherine the Great acquired his library in 1765 and appointed him as the librarian to the very same library. Diderot expressed his relief from financial burdens in the preface of the 6th volume of the *Encyclopédie* in 1768, offering sincere praises to Catherine for her support (Lough, 1971, p. 38).

Still, each of these places certainly had its *sui generis* traits. The salons, for instance, were places where women's dominance was palpable; elegance and intellectual discipline were mandatory in these establishments. They hosted the guest, directed the discussions, audited the production of thoughts, and regulated the debates' scholarly tone. A second place that made the woman as visible as this cannot be found in that period. The coffeehouses and taverns were simple places that could be enlightened via drinking. The coffeehouses provided places where people could read and discuss—a discipline was required. The taverns, however, were more of a scene for bodily display of "thoughts"; exuberance was the keyword in their characterization. The Mason lodges were the most organized, ritualistic, and ideological places among the rest. Anyone referred to this society could become a part of it; it offered a brotherhood to both conservatives and revolutionaries, aiming to enhance the Enlightenment mode of thinking. The *Encyclopédie*, finally, was not a physical space; however, it assisted the circulation of knowledge through the articles it hosted. The Enlightenment formulations were compiled here, making both the articles and the authors who penned them mobile. That is, knowledge was no longer a privilege for the elites; perhaps, a combination of the printing revolution and the Enlightenment could not have produced any better fruit—namely, the popularization of intellectual transformation.

In truth, these places reflect the multilayered characteristics of the Enlightenment: elitism, populism, reason, sentiment, organization, spontaneity, tradition, and revolution, all of which co-occurred. Today, the legacies of these places live on through social media platforms, university classes, podcast broadcasts, internet forums, and third-wave coffee shops; all of them offer one thing: enhancing knowledge through social interactions. That is why exploring the roots of these contemporary ideas in the Enlightenment could be beneficial in understanding the intellectual foundation we stand upon today.

1.3. Conclusion

The Enlightenment is a multifaceted process that resonated in different geographies through various individuals and locations. This chapter aimed to assess the Enlightenment through a fire metaphor: three elements were required to ignite the Enlightenment, much like fire. The oxygen represented the environment in which the Enlightenment was born, the heat represented the intellectuals who sparked the fire, and the fuel represented the venues of the Enlightenment where both intellectuals and ordinary people interacted with each other.

The environment in this scene was characterized by three themes: an atmosphere that fostered rational thinking, a critical approach to authority, and a social consciousness that sought progress. This environment represented a multi-centered Enlightenment experience that came in various forms. Each society evaluated this experience through its internal dynamics. That is why it would be more accurate to speak of multiple Enlightenment experiences than a single Enlightenment. These different Enlightenment practices were then reviewed through Anglophone, Francophone, and Austro-Germanic intellectuals. Although they differ in their formulations, they share three common goals: disseminating knowledge, liberating the mind, and creating a new world where the individual is at the center. That is to say, they differ in languages, but they met with the language of reason, which made them different sparks of the very same fire. Lastly, places of the Enlightenment were likened to the fuel element of fire; they helped the Enlightenment's fire to grow. What the intellectuals formulated was disseminated through salons, coffeehouses, taverns, and Mason lodges. However, this study endowed the *Encyclopédie* with a character as a venue. It evaluated it as a mobile venue where people can read it anytime, as if they were reciprocally discussing the article with the author. The "raw" knowledge became "cooked" with these places, and almost everyone tasted it.

In short, the Enlightenment was a process in which humans dared to rationalize their self-thoughts. This was the climate in which the *Encyclopédistes* were born. The following chapter aims to analyze the Golden Age of Islam.

CHAPTER 2

THE GOLDEN AGE OF ISLAM AND AL-RASA'IL

The Golden Age of Islam concept is a multifaceted historical phenomenon that cannot be adequately examined through a single analytical lens. A straightforward characterization like "an intense production in science and philosophy" might seem satisfactory and carries some wisdom; however, it goes beyond this depiction. The conceptual framework to be utilized here must possess a multilayered characteristic. In particular, it should focus on meaning-construction efforts, which contribute to knowledge production through institutional, logical, theological, philosophical, political, social, and linguistic practices that manifest in different shapes within the broader scope of the Muslim mode of thinking. Therefore, this chapter aims to identify these central nuances one by one: translation movements were not "mere" products of an intellectual curiosity, the rulers sought to establish enduring political legitimacy, and social interaction assisted people to come to a common understanding. The Ikhwan's al-Rasa'il were written during the zenith of the Golden Age of Islam; mapping the institutional and epistemological layers of that era in this chapter will help compare al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* and their contributions to later developments.

In short, the concept of "Golden Age" for the Islamic civilization addresses something more than a historical narrative of a "zenith" metaphor; it is like the "prime matter" of a novel epistemology that comes in different forms: the Muslim philosophers had various but thought-to-be sincere comments on this epistemological certainty.

This chapter aims to delve into their formulations in essence.

2.1. The Concept of Golden Age

The concept of the golden age is a widely used term to denote a specific period in the history of either a civilization or a nation, sometimes for a tribe or a society, even for families to some extent, which aims to romanticize a past period that symbolizes a zenith of radiant achievements. In Harold C. Baldry's notable research, it was revealed that not the term itself, but its attributed meaning dates back to Ancient Greeks, even before the era of Hesiod (*c.* 750-

650 B.C.E.).[1] This famous poet of this period characterized the ruling period of a well-known titan Kronos as "the good old days" without employing the golden age metaphor in his poem. He preferred to use the phrase "golden race" to identify the period. Greek poets enjoyed and embraced this metaphor; eventually, the Roman poets, such as Ovid, inherited this idiom with a slight modification, using the word *aureus* in Latin. The "golden race" metaphor was put into a metamorphosis with the efforts of eloquent Roman writers, such as Seneca, and the term turned into a "golden age" idiom. The ultimate version of this term has been in circulation since then; it still serves to designate any part/period in history which is often deemed glorious, particularly in the sense of wealth, prosperity, order, good governance, and advancements (Baldry, 1952).

From this angle, it is possible to characterize the Enlightenment period of the 18th Century's West as a golden age; however, it would be confusing since the West had experienced numerous [thematical] golden ages like the Renaissance or the Reformation. This might be why historians tend to denominate each of these golden ages with unique names. If we accept Kant's definition of enlightenment, without "the", as the utilization of one's own intellect in identifying solutions to the approaching challenges (Kant, 1995), then it would be possible to claim the existence of multiple enlightenment periods the world has experienced in different epochs and geographical locations, which often prioritized the exercise of reason against problems. For instance, in the Ancient Greek period, which is generally referred to as the "Golden Age of Greece", philosophy and science were interlocked, and the "natural philosophers" utilized these to overcome the problems as we read from the surviving texts of Ancient Greece (Sarton, 1952, pp. 238–239). In the same vein, the African advancements during the Kingdom of Kush *c.* 760 B.C.E. to 320 C.E. (Adams, 1995), and the Axial Age, which was coined by Karl Jaspers (1953, pp. 1–6) that covers a straight belt of regions from the Adriatic to China roughly between 800–200 B.C.E., societies residing on this belt exhibited various forms of philosophical thinking in this period. Additionally, the Islamic Gunpowder Empires, namely the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals from 16th to 18th centuries, commonly shared the Abbasid style of ruling while supplementing their administrative practices with philosophical justifications (Hodgson, 1977, pp. 3–4), which then jointly named with the "circle of justice" idiom (Streusand, 2011, pp. 11–14). Numerous separate enlightenment periods could be counted in this list. This list might

[1] Diderot (1751) claims that the term "golden age" originates from the poets of Ancient Greece, the contemporaries of Hesiod. They divided the life of humanity into four phases: the Age of Iron, the Age of Bronze, the Age of Silver, and the Age of Gold, which correspond to a line from the vilest to the most prosperous, respectively. The golden age metaphor, therefore, represents the ultimate accomplishment that a society can achieve.

initially seem heavily biased since they hold distant and incompatible understandings of enlightenment, which range from fine arts and philosophy to warfare tactics; however, each of these periods aligns with Kant's methodology of defining enlightenment within their own respective paradigms.

2.2. The Golden Age of Islam: How a Civilization Caught Fire

The Golden Age of Islam is often referred to as a period that covers a timeline between the 8th and 13th centuries, more or less.[2] Islam's egalitarian and universal messages in its early days had enabled the religion spread into adjacent regions of the Arabian Peninsula via the conquest mechanism; Islam was able to introduce a new transformation technique to the region in commerce, patronage, and diplomacy—which will be evaluated in detail in the following pages. Still, the residents of these newly Islamicized regions barely felt the adverse outcomes of the conquest. Islamization of these regions introduced the Arabization of language, and Arabic gradually became the *lingua franca*. With a combination of harmonization of language and living content in the urbanized areas of the conquered lands, the milieu became suitable for intellectuals to create an oriental civilization by utilizing the long-familiar knowledge of the previously contacted cultures that carry the residues of 'the Ancient World'; both from the West and the East. Therefore, an intellectually enlightened period initiated in the Muslim lands; numerous cities like Bukhara, Córdoba, Baghdad, and Basra stood out as intellectually prolific knowledge centers which hosted philosophers who studied in both natural and social sciences (Ahmed, 2021, pp. 23–25; Lombard, 2009, pp. 3–11).

This chapter follows the same methodology as Chapter 1, where the Enlightenment was reviewed. In this respect, a tripartite grouping will be followed as environment, intellectuals, and places of the Islamic Golden Age.

[2] The start of the Golden Age of Islam is often considered the rise of the Abbasids in the mid-7th century, with its symbolic end usually marked by their fall following the Mongol Invasions in the mid-13th century. Some scholars like Ahmad Dallal (2010), George Saliba (2007), and Fuat Sezgin (2008) extend this period into the late 15th century, and even further up to the peak of the Ottoman Empire, emphasizing the region's intellectual and scientific achievements and their influence on neighboring societies.

2.2.1. The Oxygen: Atmosphere That Fed the Flame

The environment of the Islamic Golden Age can be characterized as an interlocked situation where politics and philosophy mutually fed each other. This situation was both a blessing and a curse for the Muslim community. It was a blessing because it multiplied knowledge; it was a curse because it caused several irrevocable dissociations within the Muslim community. This is why—to explain this blessing and curse—the cornerstones of this section, namely the environment of the Golden Age of Islam, will be examined under three titles: the translation movements, the caliphate institution, and the theological and philosophical divisions in Islam.

2.2.1.1. Translation Movements

After the seventh-century Muslim conquest of Egypt, a remarkable intellectual transformation occurred. The Hellenistic manuscripts long preserved in the libraries of Alexandria were translated into Arabic, which ignited the beginning of a new academic process that grew under the patronage of Muslim rulers. This process was first initiated as individual efforts in the Umayyad era, but became an official state policy under the Abbasid rule. The Muslim intellectuals, therefore, gained access to the ancient methodological techniques of logic and analysis, which significantly impacted the alteration of their philosophies, particularly political philosophy. This alteration perhaps best showed itself in numerous authored treatises on logic; they expanded upon and annotated the existing texts of the ancients (Lewis, 1988, pp. 6–7; Macit, 2011). These freshly introduced texts, whether issued as stand-alone treatises or as chapters within larger compilations, were universally called “isagoge”. This word was derived from Ancient Greek and addresses “introduction”. That is, isagoge was seen as an introduction to logic and sciences in a broader sense. Muslim intellectuals, such as al-Farabi, mirrored Porphyry’s methodology in their works; they both enhanced this technique and expanded upon the methodology. As a vivid example, al-Farabi (2018, p. 62) remained loyal to Porphyry’s framework in classifying universal entities as genus, species, differences, properties, and accidents. However, he introduced a sensitive dimension: a relationship between *the* definition and *the* defined. Thus, he had established an important link between the object and its nomenclature (Farabi, 2018, pp. 86–88). This perspective gave way to some original debates and inquiries afterwards. For instance, Ikhwan al-Safa approached the concept of isagoge with a distinct perspective; it found its grassroots in speech. They hypothesized that the most unique

feature of human beings is their ability to speak; that is why utilizing logic is directly related to this ability. From their perspective, we give names to things that surround us because we can speak; thus, it is necessary to attach *the* denomination and *the* denominated to each other. However, they made this attachment in a very complex fashion. Words, the Ikhwan claimed, carry meanings attributed to them; yet, the correlation between the word and its meaning does not have to carry a uniformity: a single word can simultaneously carry multiple semantic layers (X, pp. 271–274).[3] Another example can be given through al-Abhari from the 13th century, a

[3] The correlation between words and their intended meanings in religions usually originates from the translation processes of holy texts like the Quran into other languages, which do not bear much resemblance to the original linguistic forms. This conclusion of the Ikhwan might have come to the stage due to this situation. A translation process is inherently limited in exhibiting nuances between the original language and the translated language. This reality is not a unique situation applied to the sacred texts alone, but to any text; its magnitude is often increased in poetry and literary works. For instance, the word *"gönül"* in Turkish, whose etymological roots go back to pure Turkish, finds its roots in a proto-Turkish word *"kön-"*, which originally means "candidness". This root word has no usage in contemporary Turkish, but it is so archaic that it can be traced back to the ancient Orkhon Inscriptions (Yaman, 2022). However, when the *"gönül"* word is put into a translation process, it becomes "the heart" in English, *"das Herz"* in German, *"el corazón"* in Spanish, *"le cœur"* in French, etc. These translations address the bodily organ responsible for pumping blood, *"kalp"* in Turkish. Alternatively, translators may prefer to follow a more intangible approach, putting a single noun [like heart] to use and expecting the reader to comprehend its underlying meaning, similar to the methodological structure of Esperanto, an artificial language. Still, in the Turkish lexicon, the *"gönül"* word refers to the center of feelings and desires, rather than the blood-pumping organ (Toven, 2023, pp. 220–221). Under the light of this explanation, achieving perfect accuracy in translations turns into a discouraging mission and an imperfect effort. Historically, the first Quranic translation from Arabic was made in the 8th century and translated into the Berber language. Salih ibn Tarif, a ruler from the Berber Burgwatah Dynasty who resided in present-day Morocco, was fascinated by the Quran's messages. This is why he had penned his very own text by following the linguistic fashion of the Quran, with no less than eighty surahs (Boulaouali, 2021). The multiplication of fresh translations gave rise to the natural differentiation of interpretations. Muslim scholars aimed to reconcile Quranic verses with Prophet Mohammad's *hadith*s through a discipline of what is known as *tafseer*, which is the Islamic counterpart of hermeneutics in the Christian theology. This branch of Islamic theology received a welcoming attention, and motivated Muslim scholars to distinguish false *hadith*s from the genuine ones. It was the 9th century when six specific texts came to the stage as the compilation of genuine *hadith*s; they received utmost respect from the Muslim populace and were named with *Kutub al-Sittah* idiom, or "the six books" with a direct translation to English (Kandemir, 2003; Birışık, 2011; Mertoğlu, 2011). In the broader perspective, Islam is often accepted to have blossomed within the household of Prophet Mohammad; these people were named with the *Ahl al-Bayt* phrase, "people of the house" in English, and Ali (the fourth caliph) was amongst them. During the Prophet's lifetime, Islam had only one interpretation since he was alive, but with his death, diverse interpretations emerged. With the assistance of political motivations, these interpretations created a schism in the religion, in the forms of Sunni Islam that follows the Prophet's path, and Shia Islam that follows Ali's path—both stemming from the very same house. However, such a schism did not remain constant but echoed through history; numerous interpretations of Islam had emerged in time. In truth, there is one text accepted as holy and one prophet for the guidance to salvation for each individual; however, this uniformity was shattered by diverse interpretations. At first, disseminating divine messages to the adjacent societies might have occurred as a genuine effort, which was expected to encompass humanity at some point. However, it seems the plan did not go as intended. Naturally, this situation gave rise to a situation like "creative destruction", which was coined by Joseph Schumpeter in the field of economics first, in order to underline the undesired but inescapable consequence of the capitalist system. This system placed the individual at the center of the market. It excluded the state (which can be read as a higher authority) from any intervention capability, but it remained in theory. Schumpeter claimed that novel market innovations will eventually replace outdated mechanisms, and society will eventually accept this transition. However, in time, this evolution turns into a suffering cycle that devours its very own acquisitions, akin to the ancient symbol of ouroboros, eating itself slowly. Consequently, metamorphosis emerges by consuming its "archaic" phases, either productive or destructive (Diamond Jr., 2006). This situation can be read as devouring the originality of the past to become better, similar to the "survival of the fittest". This is how the interpretations of the Quran and the Quranic texts in the form of *tafseer* had significantly diverged from the original intention in the course of time. Many commentaries on the Quran exist in the present day, ranging from individual to cultural and

notable Muslim philosopher who penned his own isagoge. Al-Abhari's stress on this isagoge was wording. He kept Porphyry's central elements for universal *things* and definitions intact, but preferred to introduce additional analytical layers alongside them: explanations, statements, comparisons, and confirmations (Ebherî, 2017, pp. 62–92). These additional layers contributed to the evolution of methodology in the domain of logic and paved the way for a deeper style in logical analysis techniques.

The strong emphasis on logic during the Golden Age of Islam was derived from Aristotle, whose teachings were then made more systematic with Avicenna. Before him, Aristotle's logic and some commentaries on this matter in Greek were widely translated by non-Muslim scholars, Christians in particular. In the tenth century, however, this Greek heritage was incorporated into Muslim intellectual understanding by al-Farabi, making it compatible with the Islamic mode of thinking. Avicenna's clear commentaries on Aristotle's logic, which developed as an original synthesis by merging logic and Islam, became the central source on this matter during the 11th century (Walbridge, 2011, pp. 124–125). Naturally, it would be absurd to expect these processes to bring a democratization of knowledge; in fact, the bulk of these efforts addressed a very limited intellectual elite called *'ulema*, the plural form of *'alim*, meaning scholar. These figures considered themselves as the guardians of Muslim intellectual life that was fortified with the teachings of Islam, the *sharia*, and the Muslim methodology of logic. However, these figures should not be confused with the clergy class that we see in the West; unlike them, they do not serve as mediators between God and people. Instead, they sought to gain worldly power through their knowledge; the authority of the "texts" made them essential to the Muslim community (Gilsenan, 1982, pp. 30–31). In the past, prior to the expansionist policies of the newly established Islamic State in the time of the Prophet Mohammad, to be exact, the Arabs were proud of their memorizing capabilities. However, this had changed with the encounter of many different texts in the 8th century onwards: it was time for the books and the texts, from which the 'ulema was taking their power (Rosenthal, 1995, pp. 35–36). This situation received its legitimacy by two distinct legitimate sources: some *hadith*s attributed to Prophet Mohammad that praise and encourage knowledge like "seek knowledge, even if it takes you to China" and "the ink of scholars is more precious than the blood of martyrs" (George,

regional, which makes them some sort of dominant apocrypha, like restricting believers to using their own minds in contemplating the verses. Though this argument is not directly related with the essence of this work, realizing the link between word and meaning as well as the creative destruction that came with them play a central role in understanding the intellectual differentiations in the Golden Age of Islam: a period stuck in-between "lost in translation" and "lost in interpretation" fallacies.

1998, p. 28), and the first command of God which is as clear as *iqra'*, that is "Recite!".[4] The command on reading had metamorphosed in time. It transformed into *teach what you read*, which eventually gave the teaching process a form of oral knowledge-transmitting, that introduced a master *(al-ustadh)* and pupils *(tullab)* form of intimacy in the academic circles (Nasr, 1995, p. 57). By taking up a position behind the bulwark of esoterism of the texts, and with oral transmission of knowledge, these scholars created a link between them and their students, which cannot be shattered. The authority of the texts passed into the authority of scholars, a continuous production of new texts through commentaries and the production of fresh scholars that follow the tradition, had become beneficial for both the academic system and the legitimacy of the political system (Gilsenan, 1982, pp. 31–32). This is why the Muslim philosophers deliberately speak and write with a more complex and difficult language, so that the knowledge remains within a small circle, with their pupils in particular. At the same time, for instance, equally true that al-Farabi's Ideal City *(al-Madina al-Fadila)*, of which considered as one of the most influential works in the Golden Age of Islam, had never found a place in the curriculum; in order to avoid harming the link between the master and pupil in the future (Nasr, 1995, pp. 58–60).

Muslim scholars relished their social and political roles, while politicians leveraged their ideological positions, strengthened by these intellectual efforts— though notable exceptions to this dynamic may have existed. The Umayyad and the Abbasid rule had seen a serious bureaucratic transformation as the reach of Islam extended to Iran; the caliphate institution had transformed itself into a monarchical dynasty. Earlier caliphs known as the Rashidun were accepted as the successors of God's messenger *(khalifat rasul Allah)*, but now, it had seen a profound alteration with the mentality of God's deputy *(khalifat Allah)*, which was an intense ideological change in Islam. Ibn al-Muqaffa', who was appointed as a secretary to both the Umayyad and the Abbasid caliphs, concluded in his epistle that people are not equal in the eyes of God, and people shall only obey caliphs so long as they follow the rules of the *sharia*. A combination of these two remarks gave caliphs some sort of superpower; they were then able to both administer the *sharia* and interpret it: the role of the *'ulema* was shadowed. The seventh Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun, son of Harun al-Rashid, gave an ideological basis to al-Muqaffa's formulation by establishing *Bayt al-Hikma* (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad in 830/832. He intended to store Greek texts and their translations here, to serve as a legitimacy provider to his post, by amalgamating the caliphate institution and the concept of enlightened monarch

[4] [Surah al-'Alaq (Clot), Verse 1] Read: In the Name of your Lord who created (Itani, 2015, p. 271).

(Jackson, 2013, pp. 51–52). Though that was his intention, al-Ma'mun was known for his hunger for knowledge; he had found numerous Hebrew, Syriac, and Greek books, translating them into Arabic (Bevilacqua, 2018, p. 126). Though this is the case, Baghdad was already a center for learning in natural sciences and metaphysics since al-Mansur, the second Abbasid caliph. At the same time, Kufa and Basra remained merely as centers to learn the *sharia* and Arabic (Hodgson, 1974, p. 298). Seeking legitimacy through texts and the philosophers was not limited to al-Ma'mun alone; Caliph Umar had utilized this technique once, according to Johann Jacob Reiske, an eminent precursor of Oriental sciences, who named this tendency with the "pious fraud" phrase. Accordingly, Caliph Umar had once conquered a city and bound the legitimacy of this action with a precious medicine book he recovered from that city, while al-Ma'mun claimed that he had seen a vision of Aristotle in his dream where Aristotle instructed him to make the Arabs familiar with philosophy. These frauds were necessary for Reiske, since the Arabs were not as enlightened as expected, and a new story needed to be told (Bevilacqua, 2018, pp. 150–151). Monopolization of knowledge with the consensus of the *'ulema* and the caliphate institution, naturally, created opposition, resulting in the initiation of anti-elitist learning chains (Gilsenan, 1982, p. 33). *Dar al-Hikma*, meaning House of Wisdom again, was established in Cairo in 1005, to counterbalance the dominance of Sunni *Bayt al-Hikma*, in order to teach the Ismaili doctrine to the masses with the assistance of missionaries named *da'i*,[5] who served as the mobile versions of the *'ulema*—as their roles will be discussed in the following pages, and consequently became successful in the transition of political power from the Abbasids to the Fatimids (Sourdel & Sourdel-Thomine, 2007, pp. 34–36).

2.2.1.2. The Caliphate as a Civilizational Institution

Prophet Mohammad was the sole leader of the religion and the state during his life. However, after he died in 632, the Islamic State became headless. Thus, a new institution was created under the name of caliphate. This word, caliphate, carries different meanings, such as taking someone's place after *him*, filling the post, and representing. The caliph word, therefore, means representative, to put it simply. As is evident, the role of caliph was limited only to state affairs; that is, representing the Prophet's authority only in worldly affairs. This role came with some responsibilities, like administering the commands of the religion on earth, fortifying the

[5] An Ismaili religious agent or missionary; their role in the broader *da'wa* (Ismaili missionary network) system will be examined in detail later in the text.

political unification of Muslims, and securing the social order. Though some *'ulema* were eager to attach some religious role to the institution, early caliphs had preferred to distinguish religious and worldly affairs—though the boundary between the two was not always rigid. For instance, Abu Bakr, the first caliph of the Islamic State, refused to be called God's Caliph *(Khalifat Allah)*, and insisted on being called the Prophet's Caliph *(Khalifat Rasul Allah)*. The Quran does not mention anything about how the leader of a state, caliph in this case, shall act; however, both the Prophet Mohammad's style of political conduct and the way his successors preferred made the Muslim scholars come to an understanding on the features that the caliphs shall possess. In this respect, it is expected from caliphs to accede to the office with merit and virtue, become just, remember to the responsibility towards both God and the people, realize that he will be questioned in the divine court, consult to his people, and show compassion to his subjects (Avcı, 1998, pp. 539–540).

Abu Bakr, one of the closest companions of the Prophet Mohammad, was elected as the first caliph in 632 and served for a little over two years. Umar succeeded him in 634 and held the post until his assassination in 644. Uthman followed him and held the position until 656, the year he was assassinated. During the first three caliphs, the principle of giving an oath of allegiance prevailed as the election method, though some nuances existed. For example, Abu Bakr was the "natural" candidate and received a consensus amongst the believers. Abu Bakr showed Umar, and he received no serious opposition. Umar pointed out a six-man council, including Uthman and Ali, to elect a new caliph. However, with Uthman's death, the allegiance method shattered. Muawiya, a close relative of Uthman, brought forward the claim that he was murdered unjustly by his political enemies through an uprising. Ali received allegiances of Muslims after Uthman's death, but Muawiya's claims remained stable. Since he was the governor of Syria, he had managed to underline his claims with his military capabilities, and he had fought with Ali in the Battle of Siffin in 657. After Ali was assassinated in 661 by a Kharijite, Muawiya became the caliph; thus, the Umayyad period of caliphate institution had started. Muawiya transformed the institution into a dynastical monarchy by appointing his son Yazid I as caliph and repressing all the opposition against this decision. The Umayyad period continued until 750, the date when the Abbasid Revolution claimed the caliphate institution, and with this, the Abbasid period was initiated (Holt, 1997, pp. 937–939; George, 1998, p. 18; Avcı, 1998, pp. 541–542). Though this is a concise history of the caliphate institution up to the Abbasid period, this period glowed in the sociopolitical domain. These advancements can be evaluated under political, social, and economic categories.

The political advancements of the Abbasid rule had perhaps best shown themselves in unifying vast territories. The existence of the caliphate institution and its nourishing characteristic from *the* religion were constituting the legitimacy source of the political power. This is how different people coming from different ethnic origins and believing in different religions became Muslims. Under normal circumstances, Islam is an Arab religion *(ad-din al-'Arab)*, and the Arabs were inclined to promote this religion in this way during the Umayyads—particularly through the early Umayyad policy that privileged the Arab tribal elites. However, as the non-Arabs became followers of Islam, the Arabs had to create a new status for these newly joined people to accommodate their long-standing tribal traditions and Islam. This new status was called *mawla*, which can be understood as introducing a non-Arab to an Arab tribe through some form of honorary membership. Raiding caravans was common in Arabia's economic life; however, it was strictly forbidden to attack a tribe's caravans or members if a non-aggression pact was in place. Therefore, this raiding culture had to shift toward non-Arabic lands, and with the help of two Islamic concepts—conquest and *jihad*—the economic restrictions gave way to territorial expansion for the Islamic State. People living under the Islamic realm were content, especially those who converted to Islam, as they gained several advantages in trade. The people of the Holy Scriptures (the Jews and Christians) also enjoyed the peaceful environment provided by the Caliphate; they only had to pay their taxes. Conversely, the political disputes among the Arabs over religion were ongoing. That is how the concept of Shi'ite emerged, defended Ali's right to the Caliphate institution, received an ideological and popular ground, and caused another group, named the Sunni movement, to be established as a counterbalance. Such a political rivalry had created its own factions in time, from both Sunni and Shi'ite sides, which caused the Umayyads to claim the Caliphate institution. Afterwards, the Abbasids claimed the Caliphate with the same propaganda methods and motives (Foltz, 2006, pp. 126–130). Similarly, the Fatimids had also created their "own" kind of Caliphate afterwards. These political conflicts became so intense that, at some point, a new Ismaili clan was established to organize assassinations towards some high-ranking officers within the Sunni hierarchy—including Nizam al-Mulk, the prime minister of the Seljuks, which were then named with "assassin" word by the Crusaders afterwards (Starr, 2013, pp. 401–402; 2006: Foltz, 2006, pp. 142–143). At this point, it is also worth noting that the Central Asian people, especially Turks, who initially joined the Caliphate institution as soldiers or merchants during the Abbasid era, eventually formed the military and officer class (Lewis, 1986, p. 18). This class first established their own states and later shifted the sovereignty rights of the Caliphate from the political realm to the religious one (Starr, 2013, pp. 385–387).

The concept of *ummah* is one of the most emphasized concepts in Islam. The term covers a meaning between rabble and community (Toven, 2023, p. 700); however, its address is larger than that. It was first used to address an ethnic community during the time of the Prophet, like those found in the Quran. However, it became an encompassing one that addresses the entire Muslim community, regardless of race, ethnicity, or nation (Saeed, 2004, pp. 705–706). The enlarging Muslim population during the Caliphate had instilled a consciousness in its members as part of a larger community. This community was established through religion; it was only natural to expect the very same religion to guide such a community. The totality of this guidance, which came under the shape of law, is called the *sharia*. The Quran and the *hadith*s, as the main sources of Islam, were brought together by the *'ulema*, who made interpretations on them and aimed to incorporate the religion's commands into daily life through legal rules. These rules bind everyone living under the Caliphate banner; they determine the social and individual transactions (Hodgson, 1974, pp. 73–74). The central principle of the *sharia* is the *al-Amru bi'l-Ma'rufi wa-n-nahyu ani'l-Munkari* of the Quran,[6] which means "enjoining good and forbidding wrong". Under this principle, the Caliphate institution needed to form an organization to administer the *sharia*. This organization comes in the form of *hisbah*. The *hisbah* organization was born from a dilemma of the aforementioned principle. According to the *'ulema*, a regular and reasonable Muslim would automatically enjoin the good in *his* life; however, forbidding the wrong might cause some physical harassment, which would then cause a conflict between Muslims. This is why the *hisbah* organization was established, a governmental organization which was operating under the Caliphate. The police force of this organization was called *muhtasib*; they were responsible for checking and regulating the transactions between Muslims in the public sphere, with the authority given to them by the *sharia*. The conflicts that the *muhtasib*s could not solve were sent to the *qadi*s, the judges, in short. However, this *sharia* system stretching from the *muhtasib*s to the *qadi*s originally came from some military courts the Arabs had utilized once, in their small towns serving as garrisons. Reminding how important the tribal honor was for the Arabs, some privileges were seen in these courts during the Abbasids. Accusations in the courts became harder and complicated, so some additional mechanisms were introduced, and fresh but meaningless commands and bans came to the stage. As the cities grow, the *shurtah* force, consisting of the men of the governor who audit the *muhtasib*s, was introduced. Thus, a duality in legal order was seen in Muslim cities in the administration of *sharia*; one based on *the* religion, another based on the politics

[6] [Surah Ali 'Imran (Family of Imran), Verse 104] And let there be among you a community calling to virtue, and advocating righteousness, and deterring from evil. These are the successful (Itani, 2015, p. 26).

(Kallek, 1998, pp. 133–134; Hodgson, 1974, pp. 345-348). Still, as the *sharia* grew, the cities grew, and the population in cities followed it; the Caliphate organization promoted it. The Abbasids, for instance, rebuilt Mecca and Medina, standardized the pilgrimage journeys (Lewis, 1986, p. 17), and established a new city to serve as the capital named Baghdad, which means "bestowed by God" in Persian (Foltz, 2006, p. 130). Baghdad was known as "the Round City" since it was built by putting a palace, mosque, governmental buildings, and barracks at the center, while the residences were growing outside. This plan was then copied in many cities, which was the Abbasid style of merging politics with religion (Gordon, 2004, p. 208). Still, bigger cities attracted larger populations. Though the Quran clearly states that only God is the provider to human beings,[7] the provided is not equal for everyone in terms of magnitude. This situation becomes a huge problem in cities; thus, the Islamic State has devised a taxation mechanism called *zakat*. Giving obligatory alms is one of the central principles of Islam; it is expected from each well-off Muslim to donate a varying ratio of *his* wealth to the needy. The State, instead, collected these donations as an organization, which was seen as the core principle of being a partaker of the Muslim community (Watt, 1973, p. 128). The Caliphate institution, however, encouraged another organized donation mechanism for the rich Muslims called *waqf*. According to this novel mechanism, a pious Muslim was *allowed to* transform *his* properties into a charitable trust by providing it with a legal entity. The owner "gives" the property rights to God permanently, be it may a house or a farm, with a single condition that the given property could never become a possession of a man. The *fiqh* determined some stringent rules for this mechanism since its roots were based on some hadiths, where the Prophet encouraged his companions to provide permanent relaxation to the needy by donating some of their properties to the public. Though *waqf*s can be established to secure the donator's further generations' well-beings, their essential rationale was to ease the life of the needy to receive God's blessing, especially in the populated cities, from establishing hospitals to public soup-kitchens for the benefit of the public (Kozlowski, 2004, pp. 730–731; Peters, 2002, pp. 59–60). In short, social progress in the Caliphate occurred mainly because of the value placed on the concept of *ummah*. This concept continued to hold significance, and many Muslim states shaped their policies by considering the *ummah* in their political decisions.

Here, it is evident that the *waqf*s and the Caliphate affected the economic life in the Golden Age of Islam. Richard C. Foltz claims that no other religious tradition has ever

[7] [Surah adh-Dhariyat (The Spreaders), Verse 58] God is the Provider, the One with Power, the Strong (Itani, 2015, p. 229).

supported trade more than Islam.[8] Indeed, with the simple consideration that Prophet Mohammad was essentially a merchant and that the concept of Islam means submission before anything else, this comment becomes valid. Because the conceptualization of submission, here, found its shape over the Arabic tribes that agreed to follow a pacifist path in their bilateral transactions. This is why tribes that paid allegiance to the Prophet declared their submission to the religion by becoming Muslim. By this, they received a form of liberty in trading (Foltz, 2006, pp. 125–127). The Caliphate organization tried to make these liberties extensive. First, a detailed taxation policy was established. The Umayyads were not particularly noted for their piety; rather, many of their rulers were associated with displays of wealth, luxury, and worldly indulgence, which drew criticism from more devout contemporaries. In order to finance this life, they were asking people to pay heavy taxes; the kingdoms in Central Asia were particularly unhappy with this situation, as well as the ill ruling style of the Umayyads. Thus, numerous cities announced that they accepted Islam as their religion, which undermined the taxation policy of the Umayyads. The accountants and governors of the Umayyads became so upset by this conversion that they did not hesitate to "control" whether these fresh Muslims were circumcised or not (Starr, 2013, pp. 113–114). Though Islam does not force anyone to convert to Islam,[9] non-Muslims of the conquered lands had to pay a poll tax (toleration tax) known as *jizya*, as in both the Quran's command and the Prophet's custom (Goldziher, 2009, pp. 39–40).[10] Therefore, with the people's economically motivated decisions on converting to Islam, and the sermons conducted by the charismatic Muslim preachers in these cities, the Central Asia cultures became Islamicized, which, in turn, gave the Trans-Asia trade routes under Muslim control. Over time, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia became culturally integrated into the Islamic civilization. Rather than being eradicated, their traditions adapted new Islamic interpretations (Foltz, 2006, pp. 133–135). Thus, the Caliphate institution's sphere of influence expanded, and the caliphs enhanced trading routes with new roads, caravan inns, and standardization of currency. For example, the Samanid coins *(dirham)* were so widely circulated that they were used in transactions in the markets of both North Africa and China (Starr, 2013, p. 231). Ibn Battuta (1304–1369) serves as a good example here—a Maghrebi

[8] Interestingly, and to support this comment, the first ever book that praises trading was written by a Muslim in the 12th century. This book, "The Beauty of Commerce", was written by Jafar bin Ali al-Dimashki (Zeldin, 2010, p. 158).

[9] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 256] There shall be no compulsion in religion: the right way has become distinct from the wrong way. Whoever renounces evil and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy handle, which does not break. God is Hearing and Knowing (Itani, 2015, p. 18).

[10] [Surah at-Tawbah (Repentance), Verse 29] Fight those who do not believe in God, nor in the Last Day, nor forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, nor abide by the religion of truth -from among those who received the Scripture- until they pay the due tax, willingly or unwillingly (Itani, 2015, p. 78).

traveler who used his Muslim identity as a modern-day passport within the Muslim community by enjoying this fascinating standardization. His journey had begun in Morocco (Battuta, 2020, p. 21). He moved to Alexandria (Battuta, 2020, p.27), Cairo (Battuta, 2020, p. 45), Jerusalem (Battuta, 2020, p. 63), Aleppo (Battuta, 2020, p. 77), Medinah (Battuta, 2020, p. 120), Mecca (Battuta, 2020, p. 135), Basra (Battuta, 2020, p. 184), Baghdad (Battuta, 2020, p. 217), Diyarbakir (Battuta, 2020, p. 228), Eastern Africa (Battuta, 2020, p. 245), Iran (Battuta, 2020, p. 264), Constantinople (Battuta, 2020, p. 330), Khorasan (Battuta, 2020, p. 365), Delhi (Battuta, 2020, p. 398), Sri Lanka (Battuta, 2020, p. 577), the Maldives (Battuta, 2020, p. 593), and China (Battuta, 2020, p. 612) in a single journey— all facilitated by the shared legal, linguistic, and monetary conventions rooted in the legacy of the Caliphate, which functioned as a kind of civilizational infrastructure across the Islamic world. The economic advancements the Golden Age of Islam introduced brought general welfare to the Muslim communities; they did not crave luxurious products throughout the entire geography alone, but they also invented new mechanisms to fortify the economic realm. For instance, an early system—what might be considered a proto-banking model—was introduced, allowing face-to-face transactions to evolve into long-distance trade. Through this mechanism, coin-based funds could be transferred and accessed across faraway cities. Naturally, this kind of speculative trading required continuous communication between cities, and a regular postal system was implemented between towns. The Muslims were so professional in this sector that the couriers continuously changed their horses on the route to their destination, making the communication rapid (Hodgson, 1974, pp. 301–302). Considering the fact that Arabic was the *lingua franca* in this world, not only was economy-related knowledge changing hands, but intellectual/academic knowledge was also taking its share from this transaction. Certain interpretations of theological debates like the *fiqh*, the *kalam*, the notions of different *madhhab*s, as well as some new scientific and philosophical concerns, were in circulation. Though the rapid spread of ideas was not receiving common acceptance, the interpretation of Islam, particularly the Quran and the *hadith*s, found a fertile ground to blossom and multiply.

2.2.1.3. Political and Theological Divisions in Islam

Islam, as a religion, rises upon three constitutive pillars mainly, [1] divinity *(uluhiyya')* as having faith in God's existence and oneness, [2] prophethood *(nubuwwa')* as having faith in the existence of God's messengers who are assigned by God *himself* to warn people, and [3] afterlife *(iman al-akhirah)* as having faith in a second resurrection in the afterlife where all

people are going to be judged by God (Şapolyo, 1964, p. 8). In this respect, it is possible to claim that the revelation came from divinity, the words and doings of the Prophet *(hadith-sunna)*, and the actions of men to be judged in the afterlife become natural products of these pillars. The Islamic discipline that inspects, reviews, and analyzes the bulk of these products is named *kalam*, and it is considered a science *(ilm al-kalam)*. Naturally, the *kalam* discipline focuses on interpreting Islamic principles, and numerous interpretations may exist since the human factor is on the stage. These interpretations varied in time, and each of them gained followers. Depending on varying contexts—political, psychological, cultural, regional, or practical—these fragmentations in *the* religion evolved into movements over time, generally referred to as sects *(madhhab)*. These sects are not a new type of Islam; they are merely new "forms" of it. A general tendency in the Islamic chronography was accepted that these sects can be categorized in a three-form fashion as political, theological, and practical (Üzüm, 2004, pp. 526–527; Yavuz, 2022, p. 196). Though the Quran calls on Muslims to remain united,[11] a widely circulated *hadith* from the Prophet Mohammad asserts that the Muslims would be fragmented into seventy-three different sects. This number became a motto for the Muslim historians then; they either tried to reduce the number to 73 or increase it to there in the light of this *hadith* (Gölpınarlı, 1969, pp. 10–11). Indeed, a brief survey of scholarly works on the concept of *madhhab* demonstrates that the Islamic legal tradition comprises several distinct schools. Since these cannot be evaluated here individually, a categorization is required. In this regard, this study initially excludes a detailed examination of practical sects such as the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali schools of Sunni interpretation of religion. While their philosophies mainly differ in minor nuances of religious rituals, these differences will still be addressed when discussing theological sects. Specifically, the political sects examined here are Sunni and Shi'ite, while the theological sects within the Sunni tradition include Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, and Maturidism. For the Shi'ite side, the focus is on Ja'fari School, Zaydism, Kaysanites, Ghulat, Twelve *Imam*s, and Ismailism.

As mentioned a few pages earlier, Muawiya's political and military campaign against Ali successfully acquired the political power. However, his legitimacy on the caliphate throne, considering it became a dynastical monarchy under him, was not secure. After Ali's death, his eldest son and Prophet Mohammad's grandson, Hasan, became the caliph and prepared an army

[11] [Surah Ali 'Imran (Family of Imran), Verse 103] And hold fast to the rope of God, altogether, and do not become divided. And remember God's blessing upon you; how you were enemies, and He reconciled your hearts, and by His grace you became brethren. And you were on the brink of a pit of fire, and He saved you from it. God thus clarifies His revelations for you, so that you may be guided (Itani, 2015, p. 26).

to advance upon Muawiya. However, his own soldiers desired to kill him; thus, he renounced war as well as abdicated from the caliphate. Muawiya is reported to have arranged for Hasan's death by poisoning—though this remains a subject of historical dispute—and later appointed his own son, Yazid I, as his successor, marking a significant shift from elective to dynastic rule. His relationship with the Prophet Muhammad's family grew increasingly antagonistic during this period. The Arabs paid allegiance to Husayn, brother of Hasan, and accepted him as the caliph. Soon, the residents of Kufa, where Ali was assassinated, sent countless letters to Husayn and invited him to Kufa. Though his close friends urged him to reject the invitation by reminding him of his father's fate, he decided to go. At a region close to Kufa—called Karbala, the governor sent a message to Husayn, asking him to pay allegiance to Yazid I as the sole caliph, warning him of war if he did not comply. Husayn accepted the call for a war, governor sent an army against him, army commander ordered his soldiers to block riverside of the Euphrates to restrict Husayn and his entourage from accessing clean water, battle started, Husayn's side lost the battle, everyone from his entourage were killed, Husayn was decapitated, and his head was taken as trophy (Şapolyo, 1964, pp. 17–21). This story is perhaps the most saddening one amongst the Muslims. The breaking point of the Sunni and Shi'ite split in the history of Islam finds its formation with this incident in Karbala. The martyrdom of Husayn in 680 caused some pious Muslims in Kufa to vow to take his revenge against the Umayyads, and thus, the *Tawwabun* (penitents) movement emerged. Yazid I died in 683, and this movement, which had remained in the shadows for three years, decided to take action. In the politically chaotic environment of Iraq, the movement went to the Karbala region, paid a visit to Husayn's tomb, fought with the Umayyad forces, and lost the battle (Denny, 2000). This movement constituted the backbone of Shi'ite Islam, and it became institutionalized when Muhtar al-Thaqafi, an Ali supporter, came up with a fresh idea that Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, Husayn's son, should be the caliph. With this introduction, the line following Ali as the first, Hasan as the second, and Husayn as the third caliph was institutionalized to counterbalance the Umayyad caliphs in the political domain of Islam (Üzüm, 2004, p. 529).

The Muslim community's Shi'ite sect is known for its open support of Ali and his lineage. According to them, after Prophet Mohammad's death, with his clear and/or hidden will, Ali *had to* come to the stage, not as a caliph but as an *imam* (the leader). Therefore, they believe, this leadership *(imamat)* cannot pass onto figures other than his lineage. The ideological ground of this notion rests within the main pillars of *the* religion: the leader cannot be elected or chosen by the laity; instead, they are appointed by God *himself*. That is, these *imam*s are considered as

infallible as prophets, both in terms of minor and great sins (Şehristani, 2013, pp. 121–122). Though this *imamat* institution was commonly accepted by numerous Shi'ite factions, each one attributes a different meaning to it. The well-known fraction of the Shia is the Twelve Imams *(Ithna-'Ashariyya)*, which can also explain the lineage the Shi'ites consider sacred. Accordingly, these twelve imams are [1] Ali, [2] Hasan, [3] Husayn, [4] Ali Zayn al-'Abidin, [5] Mohammad Baqir, [6] Ja'far as-Sadiq, [7] Musa al-Kazim, [8] Ali ar-Rida, [9], Mohammad at-Taqiy al-Jawwad, [10] Ali an-Naki al-Hadi, [11] Hasan ibn Ali al-'Askariy, [12] Mohammad al-Mahdi al-Muntazar. This faction believes that the twelfth *imam* disappeared by entering the cellar in their home after his father's death in 874, and his followers were expecting his return. This process, from his disappearance to reappearance, was named "period of *ghayba*" (occultation) in general, while the period between 874 and 941 was accepted as "the smaller occultation". In this period, specific individuals of varying rank—functioning as bureaucrats of this Shi'ite faction—carried out intermediary duties between the hidden *imam* and the broader community. The *imam* was expected to appear, and these bureaucrats were responsible for *preparing* the environment for his return. Nevertheless, he did not return. Therefore, they believed that the *imam* told one of these higher bureaucrats to get ready to die in six days; thus, to appoint a successor. With the appointment of a successor, "the greater occultation" had begun, which also covers the present day (Fığlalı, 2001, pp. 143–144). The *imam*s are considered the ones responsible for performing religious rites and preserving the Islamic faith. The expected features of an *imam* are as follows: has to be male, to have reached puberty, to be just, to be free, to have vast knowledge on religion, and most importantly, has to possess some transhuman virtues and merits within (Şapolyo, 1964, p. 31). With these features, the Shi'ite community did not remain shy about producing several sects out of the Shia. Al-Shahrastani (1086–1153), a Muslim historiographer/scholar and a partaker of the Golden Age of Islam, claims that the Shia had five main branches [in his time] as the Kaysanites, Zaydism, Imamate (Twelve Imams), Ghulat, and Ismailism (Şehristani, 2013, p. 122).

The Kaysanites follow Ali's servant Kaysan, who was regarded as a figure of extraordinary knowledge—believed to possess complete understanding of both the material and spiritual worlds. They believed Kaysan acquired this knowledge from Ali and his son Mohammad ibn al-Hanafiyya, who was born to Khawla al-Hanafiyya. This sect altered numerous provisions of Islam and abandoned several of them, such as prayer and fasting. According to the central principle of this sect, religion is nothing more than obeying one man

alone.[12] This sect had also produced its smaller versions; for example, the *Mukhtariyya* version blossomed during the *Tawwabun* movement, which altered the twelve *imam* line by claiming the fourth caliph was Mohammad ibn al-Hanafiyya (Şehristani, 2013, pp. 122–123). Another alteration of the *imamate* line can be seen in Zaydism. According to this sect, the *imamate* institution could only be attributed to the sons of Ali from his wife Fatima—the daughter of the Prophet Mohammad. Therefore, both the sons of Hasan and the sons of Husayn are suitable to fill the post. Given this context, two *imam*s could exist *simultaneously* in different parts of the Muslim world. The sect borrows its name from Zayd ibn Ali, the son of Ali Zayn al-'Abidin – the fourth *imam*, and the brother of Mohammad Baqir—the fifth *imam*. Though Zaydism was in the belief of *the* lineage alone while ignoring whether that *imam* was fit to rule or not, their followers had abandoned this conclusion gradually, and favored "an" *imamate* with merit afterwards (Şehristani, 2013, pp. 128–130). The Ghulat, by contrast, regard the *imam*s as transcending ordinary human status, often attributing to them divine or quasi-divine qualities. Their theological reasoning reflects a recurring pattern of oscillation—between anthropomorphizing God and, conversely, the divinization of specific exceptional human figures (Şehristani, 2013, p. 145).

Though these factions, namely, the Kaysanites, Zaydism, and Ghulat did not properly introduce anything philosophical to the Shi'ite sect of Islam, the Ja'fari school and Ismailism had contributed to the Shia mentality. The Ja'fari school constitutes the backbone of the Twelve *Imam*s doctrine. According to this, entire branches of the Shi'ite that detached from the Zaydism accepted the *imamate* of Ja'far as-Sadiq—the sixth *imam*. His knowledge of Islamic *kalam* and jurisdiction was vast, and he studied during the late Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, giving him some liberty to train his pupils and disseminate his Islamic formulations (Karaman, 1993, pp. 4–5). The Ja'fari school essentially considers four sources in establishing their formulations: the Quran, the *sunna*, the *ijma*, and the reason. The Quran is accepted as genuine for this school; as Verse 9 of Surah al-Hijr mentions,[13] God is its protector, which means no word was removed from it nor any sentence was attached to it afterwards. However, interpreting the Quran is reserved for the 'infallible ones', aside from the clear verses that anyone can understand; this group of infallibles includes Prophet Mohammad, his daughter Fatima, and the twelve *imam*s. The *sunna* also encompasses the reports and doings of these same infallibles. The *ijma*, on the

[12] *See* and compare with the Ikhwan's conceptualization of religion as "following a single leader" in the later paragraphs in Ch. 5.1.2.
[13] [Surah al-Hijr (the Rock), Verse 9] Surely We revealed the message, and We will surely preserve it (Itani, 2015, p. 108).

other hand, means the consensus on any subject that the *imam*s reached; since this consensus was reached unanimously by them, the Ja'fari school accepts these interpretations as genuine sources. Finally, when there is nothing to be found on a fresh problem in the Quran, the *sunna*, and the *ijma*, then, a Muslim shall follow *his* reason and reach a verdict by reasoning. However, not all are as capable of utilizing reason in reaching a verdict effectively; this is why the *ummah* consists of two groups: the interpreters of Islam and the imitators of what was interpreted by obeying the interpretation (Gölpınarlı, 1969, pp. 40–42). This system was established as a substitute and temporary solution in the absence of the disappeared *imam*. Until his arrival, people must follow this sequence in their doings. Still, in the absence of an interpreter in a remote place, a man can rely on personal reasoning with caution; his doings will not be deemed Islamically valid when the caution is ignored (Gölpınarlı, 1987, pp. 225–226).

Ismailism, too, directly relates to the list of *imam*s; however, this sect introduces another set of explanations to its formulation. Accordingly, when Ja'far as-Sadiq died in 765, his successor was not his younger son Musa al-Kazim but his elder son Ismail ibn Ja'far—as the seventh *imam*. This claim might seem understandable initially; however, it must be noted that Ismail died a few years earlier than his father. A debate had arisen between the followers of Ja'far; some claimed Ismail's son Mohammad shall fill the *imamate* post, while others claimed that Ismail was not actually dead, he would return one day as *Mahdi* (the messianic redeemer figure). The theses of the latter were accepted, and a new Shi'ite branch was then formed under the name of Ismailism. Ismailism had grown in shadows until the ninth century, in the form of a revolutionary secret organization; thus, very little is known about its followers and their techniques for this period (Madelung, 1997, p. 198). However, one individual can be named as the organizer of the entirety of this sect in the beginning: Abu'l Khattab. He served as a *da'i* to both Mohammad Baqir and Ja'far as-Sadiq; however, he went further of being a *da'i* and introduced several bold claims for himself during his travels as being a prophet or the successor of Ja'far alongside others. His philosophical explanations of *the religion* were also unusual: he introduced some heretical notions, normalized *taqiya* (concealing one's true beliefs in the face of persecution), championed secrecy, humanized Heaven and Hell instead of accepting them as "places", and introduced an afterlife system which might be generalized as reincarnation. Though he was crucified in 755 for his distorted views, these views later found a fertile ground to blossom within Ismailism (Lewis, 1940, pp. 32–33). Ismailism was established upon five principles: [1] the *imamate* passes onto Ismail and his sons, [2] whatever the *imam*s do, has to be true since they are infallible, [3] whatever the *imam*s say, it must be treated as a verse of the

Quran, [4] the *imam*s are God on earth, and [5] true faith and religion pass through accepting these canons (Şapolyo, 1964, p. 386). Abu'l Khattab and his followers introduced a form of *Batiniyya* (esoterism), and Ismailism was identified with this notion. However, depending on the geographical locations of its followers, Ismailism was also known by different names like *Ta'limiyya* and *Mulhidah*. The central theme of *Batiniyya* is its sincere belief that whatever is visible has an invisible part; each verse in the Quran has an inner, underlying, and invisible meaning other than what is evident to all. Since revealing the underlying meaning requires intellectual effort, Ismailism followed an eclectic methodology. The Ismaili interpreters studied various philosophers and created an unorthodox Shi'ite sect. Neo-Platonism became particularly effective in their understanding, which advocates a cosmology that God is beyond human comprehension. From this point, to serve as a good example, their definition of God is as follows: neither exists nor non-existing, neither wise nor ignorant, neither omnipotent nor impotent (Şehristani, 2013, pp. 160–161; Madelung, 1997, p. 203). Another example can be given from the Quranic example of the birth of Jesus;[14] it was mentioned that Jesus was born without a father, but the Ismaili interpreters claim that his father was Joseph the Carpenter. God *meant* in this verse that Jesus had no "educational" father, that is, no teacher or master (Lewis, 1940, p. 46). The Ismaili missionary movement through *da'i*s, referred to as *da'wa*, spread effectively, culminating in the establishment of the Fatimid Caliphate in the 10th century, which then developed into the Fatimid *da'wa* as a state institution. This latter version was in keen belief that the *imamate* passed through 'Abd-Allah, not Ismail—both are sons of Ja'far as-Sadiq. The central claim was that 'Abd-Allah's lineage was not restricted in number as the Ismaili doctrine limited it to seven hidden *imam*s after Mohammad bin Ismail. The first unveiled *imam* after these seven hidden ones was 'Abd-Allah al-Mahdi Billah, the founder of the Fatimid Caliphate. Thus, with these different legitimacy attempts, doctrines received a common ground and the original lineage of Ismailism was accepted in theory while al-Mahdi Billah was accepted as the first *imam* of the Fatimids (Madelung, 1997, p. 204; Gölpınarlı, 1987, pp. 89–90).

In light of the preceding analysis, Shiʿism may be concisely described as the belief that both political leadership and religious interpretation after the Prophet Muhammad rightly belong to his family, the *Ahl al-Bayt*. This perspective represents a focused doctrinal stance centered on the authority of the Prophet's family. However, another view, which was nourished

[14] [Surah Ali 'Imran (Family of Imran), Verse 59] The likeliness of Jesus in God's sight is that of Adam: He created him from dust, then said to him, "Be", and he was (Itani, 2015, p. 24).

from a broader spectrum by adding the Friends/Companions of the Prophet *(Ashab)* and the entire Muslim community to the equation, exists with the name of *Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'ah*, or as commonly known with the "Sunni Islam" words. This denomination addresses the people who accepted the spiritual path shown by the Prophet Mohammad. The early followers of this doctrine, before it became an institutionalized *madhhab*, tried to establish the community notion to some *hadith*s; some of them were genuine and meaningful, like the Prophet's recommendation of being together as one, while some of them were weak, as mirroring the paths of the Prophet and the Four Caliphs followed him afterwards. Regardless, the Muslim community had never been united after Mohammad's time; one of the earliest examples of this can be traced in the election processes of the caliphs. With the political competition between Ali and Muawiya in particular, the *Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'ah* (Followers of *Sunna* and Community) notion transformed itself into a meaning like the sum of "the common viewpoint of the Muslims" and "the political tendency of the majority" (Yavuz, 1994, pp. 525–526). Since then, Sunni Islam has been viewed as an orthodox view of Islam, while Shi'ite Islam has been addressed as a heterodox view of Islam (Brown, 1997, p. 878).[15] Receiving answers to the epistemological and ontological questions at the religious and/or cosmic levels was easy for the Muslims during the prophecy times of Mohammad; with his death, the orthodox view preferred to go back to the main sources alongside with the Quran by contemplating upon the question that "How would the Prophet solve this?". A consensus was required, thereby starting with the late seventh century that stretched to the eighth, the Prophet's sayings and doings were compiled with a methodological technique known as *isnad* (tracing a report back to its origin to verify its authenticity), which constituted the central pillar of *sunna* and *hadith*s. Afterwards, the Muslim scholars utilized these sources to find answers to the Muslim community's contemporary problems; this academic endeavor was named *fiqh* (deep comprehension), and these scholars were called *fuqaha*, derived from the *fiqh*. The *fiqh* has essentially three branches: [1] *fiqh* as a science/knowledge, that aims to *know* God and *his* features/abilities, [2] *fiqh* as the form of practical and procedural processes of worshipping and law, and [3] *fiqh* as the education of soul and conscience (Brown, 1997, p. 878; Şapolyo, 1964,

[15] Marshall Hodgson (1974, pp. 276–279) clearly stated that establishing two camps in Islam as Sunni and Shi'ite through the orthodoxy and heterodoxy approaches towards the religion is inappropriate—particularly the coinage and usage of the Sunni term. The Shi'ite concept is understandable since it addresses those who reject people who do not welcome Ali's right to the caliphate institution. However, the Sunni term, which impropriates the "community" term alongside the might of the *sunna* and *hadith*, is a wrong denomination for him since the Shi'ite accept them as well. His suggestion to address the Sunni community was *Jama'î*, and he utilized this word in pointing out the *Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'ah* concept while using the Sunni term in addressing the opposition towards the Shi'ite. Though that is a valuable observation, this study will adhere to the Sunni word to avoid further confusion.

p. 10). The third branch of the *fiqh* here, was articulated through Sufism[16] and religious orders, which fall outside the scope of this study. However, its first branch had separated itself from the broader concept of *fiqh*, and it became a particular Islamic discipline in its own right: *kalam*. This discipline interprets the main principles of Islam; therefore, it was regarded by *most* Sunni scholars as the most important *science* (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 81–84). However, the second branch of the *fiqh* remained largely intact since its inception, although some novel research areas were introduced *en route* to it, such as economics, politics, etc. (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 73–74). In this part of the work, Mu'tazilism, Maturidism, and Ash'arism will be discussed as the fundamental Sunni *madhhab*s of *kalam*, as well as four Sunni *madhhab*s of *fiqh*, namely Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali will be evaluated through this window.

The term *muʿtazila* is derived from a root meaning "to withdraw" or "to separate oneself", often interpreted as referring to those who chose to stand apart from dominant theological positions. The Muʿtazilite school of thought takes its name from this notion. Many discussions have been held about their tendency toward reclusiveness—setting aside contradictory interpretations, some argued they preferred not to take sides in the conflict between Ali and Muawiya, while others claimed they remained indifferent to Hasan's surrender of the caliphate to Muawiya. Considering the fact that the founder of this *kalam* school was Wasil ibn Ata (699–748), by abandoning Hasan of Basra's education circle—his master, some historians attribute the name to Wasil's *walking away* from his master (Çelebi, 2020, p. 391). Regardless of the name's etymological origin, Mu'tazilism became one of the most dominant sects of *kalam*. This movement began in the first half of the 8th century, starting at an intermediate stage. The early founders mainly followed a methodology compatible with the Quran in interpreting *the* religion. However, in the next century, with the translations of

[16] The Sufism *(at-Tasawwuf)* is a spiritual lifestyle based on the exoteric and esoteric provisions of Islam, which aims to purify *hearts* and educate souls. The Sufis, therefore, do not find ritual prayers enough for themselves; they tend to purify their spiritual worlds in order to *get closer* to God. This purification effort is a process; the individual, under the guidance of *al-murshid* (mentor), passes through some training methods regularly like *dhikr* (mentioning God's name continuously), *muraqaba* (awareness of God's constant surveillance), and wrestling with the egoism of soul, which are taken as a road towards spiritual maturation. The central purpose of Sufism is to balance the love of God and the fear of God; the servant/devotee *('abd)* internalizes this balance so that they can achieve divine peace. This journey mimics Prophet Mohammad's humble lifestyle and accepts the Quranic advices as provisions. Early Sufis like Hasan al-Basri and Rabia Basri determined the cornerstones of it, the Sufism became a deepened lifestyle in the circles like the ones in Khorasan and Baghdad, and it became an institutional one afterwards in the practices of different religious orders. Some grand Sufis like al-Ghazali, Ibn Arabi, and Rumi systematized it, which caused the doctrine to be disseminated to the entirety of the Muslim world. The emotional, intuitional, and experimental facets of Sufism are potent, which makes it an encompassing moral school; it aims to transform the individual into a mature one, so that they may live in peace and harmony with society. This is why the Sufis live in a *sui generis* life by following some practices like temporary isolation from worldly blessings and permanently keeping away from ostentation in any domain of life (Öngören, 2011).

Hellenistic texts, they were introduced to the concepts of logic and Greek ideas about God. As a result, a new interpretation of the Quran concerning ethics (good and evil) and justice became necessary. This is because the concepts of free will, predestination, and God's justice could no longer be satisfactorily explained within the original framework they had been taught. According to their explanation, God must be defined as absolute justice. Additionally, *his* anthropomorphic features like seeing, speaking, hearing, willing, etc., would jeopardize the Quran's orthodox status: Is it a *part* of God's features, or is it a creation? In response to this theological dilemma, the Mu'tazilite scholars incorporated reason and logic into the framework of *kalam* to reinforce their doctrinal claims (Gibb, 1966, pp. 110–115). After this clarification of their original intention, it can be said that the Mu'tazila school of *kalam* was grounded upon five pillars: [1] God is unique (not like Greek gods), [2] God is just, [3] God has both threats and promises, that is, a Muslim has always a chance to repent for his great sin in order to escape from eternal torments in Hell, [4] this man cannot be labeled as a believer *(mu'min)* or a non-believer *(kafir)* until his repentance, he remains at the middle of these two statuses as an impious *(fasiq)*, and finally, [5] all Muslims are obliged to "command good and forbid the evil" (Gimaret, 1993, pp. 786–787). The fall of the Umayyads and their replacement with the Abbasids made the concept of predestination less important within the realm of politics, and it was kept being discussed within the academic circles alone, often in the form of an opposition to this school (Gibb, 1966, p. 114). Still, it is possible to claim that the impact of Mu'tazilism on the religious and natural sciences in the Muslim world *was* effective. With the incorporation of rationalist approaches into religious thought and the gradual application of observation-based reasoning in natural sciences, some notable figures like Abu'l-Qasim al-Balkhi articulated the idea of a spherical earth, while thinkers such as Abu Ali and Abu Hashim speculated on concepts resembling gravitation (Çelebi, 2020, p. 397).

The Muʿtazilites prioritized God's oneness in their cosmic explanations; according to them, God's will and power are absolute and unbounded. However, these explanations did not have to depend on the Quran and/or the *hadith*s, which antagonized the scholars prioritizing the *hadith*s. Thus, two additional *kalam* schools had arisen in time: Ash'arism and Maturidism (Hodgson, 1974, pp. 438–439). Ash'arism was a theological school founded by Abu'l Hasan al-Ash'ari (874–936), who had spent a considerable amount of his life among the Mu'tazilites, which, by its nature, had some serious impacts on the Sunni formulations via his methodological approaches towards the *kalam* (Çelebi, 2020, p. 397). His departure from Mu'tazilism has been explained in various ways. In one story that establishes the legitimacy of Ash'arism, it was said

that al-Ash'ari had three different dreams during a Ramadan month where Prophet Mohammad asked him to defend his *hadith*s and *sunna*, showed him the way to do it, and became angry at him for not listening to his command, respectively (Watt, 1973, pp. 304–305). Regardless of the reason, al-Ash'ari's method became effective. According to that, Ash'arism did not prefer to attribute anthropomorphic features to God like those *he* created with ears, tongue, hands, etc.; instead, this school focused on spiritual features of God like knowledge, might, will, and eternity, which gave a moderate stance to this *madhhab*. Al-Ashʿari responded to post-Prophetic theological innovations by defending the core divine attributes through both rational and scriptural evidence. According to Ibn Khaldun, he rejected Muʿtazilite notions such as the idea that God only wills the best *(al-aṣlaḥ)* and that good and evil can be determined solely by human reason, instead affirming the traditional theological position on divine attributes and authority (Ibn Haldun, 1996, pp. 534–535).

These explanations within the domain of philosophy and theology can be categorized under three titles as knowledge of God, prophecy, and afterlife matters. Regarding the knowledge of God, Ash'arism holds that knowledge comes from three sources: senses, reason, and reports (transmitted knowledge). Senses provide limited knowledge, reason offers theoretical understanding, and reports can provide certain knowledge as long as their source can be verified, which makes revelation certain in this context. That's why Muslims know God; however, people can reach the same conclusion through reason. In this approach, God is not ascribed any physical characteristics; rather, *his* essence is understood through *his* attributes, such as knowledge, power, and will. While *his* essence remains ultimately unknowable, *his* existence is affirmed through both reason and revelation (Yavuz, 1995, pp. 449–450). For the prophecy, as the source of *certain* knowledge, Ash'arism believes that miracles are what distinguish ordinary men from prophets. Because miracles distort the laws of nature, which means a divine intervention exists here, and this proves the authenticity of prophets, since God would not approve such an extraordinary situation to be exercised through a liar. In addition to the miracles, Ash'arite scholars tried to find other proofs for the authenticity of the prophecy institution. For instance, al-Ghazali claimed that reason understands beyond what can be understood by the senses; similarly, prophecy enables us to understand metaphysical concepts that reason cannot comprehend (Yavuz, 1995, p. 451). Lastly, for the afterlife matters, believing in the afterlife and the period between death and final judgment in the grave *(barzakh)* are compulsory principles of Islam *(fard)* for Ash'arism. This is why the trial in the grave, torment or blessing in the grave, apocalypse, resurrection of the dead, final judgment, the bridge *(as-*

Sirat), Heaven, and Hell exist. Though the Ash'arite scholars did not possess a common understanding on whether souls die with the body or not, most of them deemed the soul the central substance of a man and preferred to accept its continuity after death (Yavuz, 1995, p. 452).

Maturidiyya is the final Sunni theological school that will be reviewed in this study. This school takes its name from its founder, Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (853–944), born and died in Samarkand. Samarkand's significance comes from its capacity to host many Hanafi scholars. These intellectuals' ideas reached the core of the Muslim world through the Turks starting in the 10th century and became dominant in the 11th century. The Turks were favoring the Hanafi school in their religious lives, whereas it was the Ash'arism for the resident Shafi'i Muslims. A theological clash between these two *madhhab*s emerged (Madelung, 1991, p. 847). Al-Maturidi, known as the "*Imam* of Guidance", was familiar with both Asian religions and various interpretations of Islam. Thus, particularly in response to the Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites, he composed extensive refutations, often expressing sharp disagreement with their theological positions. He openly condemned those who failed to apply reason in grasping the essential tenets of Islam, asserting their place in Hell (Starr, 2013, p. 154). This *kalam* school had always been associated with a single school of *fiqh*, that is, the Hanafi. Although its cosmic explanations may appear to share some similarities with Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism, the Maturidi school's stance on natural sciences was met with distinct criticisms (Madelung, 1991, p. 848). For example, Ash'arism adopts an atomist framework in which all substances are composed of similar atoms and accidents whose continued existence depends on God's constant act of creation (Yavuz, 1995, p. 449). In contrast, for the Maturidis, God created the universe out of nothingness *(ex nihilo)*, affirming that divine might is not dependent on any pre-existing matter. While they also accepted an atomistic view of nature, they maintained that change occurs not through intrinsic properties of matter—such as fire turning into water—but within the parameters of God's established order. Accordingly, God does not intervene in creation at every moment, but rather sustains a natural order *('adat Allah)* through which things behave in consistent, observable ways. For instance, while poison cannot harm someone without God's will, *he* has willed such an order, and thus poisons now cause illness (Yavuz, 2003, pp. 168–169). Since Maturities and Ash'arism are essentially rivals, understanding *Maturidiyya*'s *kalam* might become easier through comparing these two schools over their theological differences in three topics. First, Ash'arites believe that faith *('iman)* has two complementary sides: speech and action. The speech ("I believe in God") must be accompanied by what God commands

people to do. Maturities, on the other hand, argued that faith resides solely in the speech, which separates the roles of the soul (heart) and body in duties but unites them through the heart and tongue in the acceptance of God. Second, regarding predestination and free will, Ash'arism holds that God created our actions, and humans have no power to choose, while the Maturities believe that humans have the ability to choose between good and evil. Finally, Ash'arism states that major sinners will not be eternally in Hell if they are Muslims; at some point, the Prophet will seek God's mercy, and if *he* wills, these sinners will enter Heaven. The Maturities, however, drawing on Abu Hanifa's ideas, maintain that major sins do not render a Muslim an infidel; as long as a person has faith, they cannot be in Hell forever (Watt, 1973, pp. 315–316). In conclusion, it can be said that the Maturities utilized reason more than the rest; however, their explanations do not establish a causal link between the cause and effect; since the notion of 'anything is God's creation and everything operate with the system *he* willed' does not require a link, the scientific formulations of the Maturities were heavily criticized in the intellectual circles (Yavuz, 2003, p. 174).

Marshall Hodgson (1973, p. 335) mentions that *"[e]ach Muslim had to choose which madhhab school he would follow"* unless they were an outstanding scholar like al-Tabari, who founded his own *madhhab* called the Jariri school. These Muslims had chosen their *fiqh* schools according to their geographical location: the Maghribis and al-Andalusians were often Malikis, and people at the center of the Islamic world were usually Hanafis or Shafi'is. The Sunni interpretation of *fiqh* has four great schools: Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali. Each of these schools was named after its *imam*—the great Muslim jurists, Abu Hanifa (699–767), Al-Shafi'i (767–820), Malik ibn Anas (711–795), and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780–855), respectively. Before understanding these *madhhab*s and their roles in *fiqh*, it is crucial to know the concept of *ijtihad*. This concept literally means "exertion of effort" and addresses the process with which a Muslim scholar tries to interpret a legal matter by contemplating it and intuiting what kind of conclusion God would like to see in this matter (Stewart, 2013, p. 244). *Ijtihad* has essentially five provisions: [1] having a perfect capability in the Arabic language, [2] knowing all the exegeses *(tafseer)* of the Quran through the *hadith*s they were reported—verse by verse, [3] knowing all the genuine *hadith*s and the rationale they were told, alongside the milieu they were told, [4] knowing all the matters that the companions of the Prophet *(Ashab)*, their next generation that befriended them *(Tabi'un)*, and the further generation that befriended with this generation *(Tabi' at-Tabi'in)* were in consensus on Islamic legal matters, and [5] the *science* of *qiyas*, which roughly means a deductive analogy process (Şehristani, 2013, pp. 167–168). Naturally,

not many Muslim scholars could possess such a breadth of knowledge; thus, these four *imam*s were accepted as great. These people, alongside some of the Shi'ite scholars like the Twelve *Imam*s and Zaydi *imam*s, are called *mujtahid*. In contrast, the followers of these *mujtahid*s are called *muqallid*s, the ones who mimic their authority (Stewart, 2013, p. 244). These *mujtahid*s were [and still are] responsible for regulating Islam's unfinished legal and practical matters after the Prophet's death (Şapolyo, 1964, p. 34). The Hanafi school is based on Maturities, and the Shafi'i and Maliki schools follow Ash'arism in their *madhhab*s of the *fiqh*. All these schools are counted within the league of *Ahl as-Sunnah wa'l-Jama'ah,* and they differ with slight nuances in practices and understandings. The Hanbali school emerged slightly later, and its influence remained geographically limited. Additionally, unlike the Maliki and Shafi'i schools, which prioritize reported knowledge, and the Hanafi school, which values reason more, the Hanbali school was so fierce towards novelties; it is known that they even reject some *hadith*s like the one recommending cemetery visiting. Followers of this school considered these visits *haram* (forbidden by religion), in addition to suggesting the demolition of entire tombs. Regardless, these four great schools were in consensus on some central themes like God has features, the Quran is an outcome of *his* "word" *(kalam)*, God will be 'seen' by Muslims in the afterlife, the *Ashab* are sacred and they cannot be desacralized, the caliphate is based on the community's *(ummah)* common opinion, wearing a clean and waterproof sock after ablution will keep the feet clean and believers can just wet their sock for a second ablution as long as they do not remove the sock, and Muslims are allowed to pray behind any *imam* regardless of the moral status of that *imam* (Gölpınarlı, 1987, pp. 201–202, 211–212). Though this is the case, it should also be remembered that each of these schools creates its very own legitimacy through a straightforward comment: my school is the true one; the rest of these schools hold a *probability* of being wrong (Gölpınarlı, 1969, p. 90).

Some sects and movements—such as the Kharijites, known for their radical stance in religious and political matters; Ibadism, which emerged as a more moderate offshoot; and the proto-Salafi movement, which advocated returning to the early Islamic period for contemporary guidance—are not discussed here, as their role during the Golden Age of Islam was relatively marginal in theological, philosophical, and geographical terms.

2.2.1.4. Concluding Remarks

The Golden Age of Islam marks the peak of scientific progress and philosophical debate within the broader scope of Islamic civilization. This period can also be seen as a historical laboratory that shows how political power and intellectual activity can work together when desired. The section to follow aimed to illustrate this closeness through three related parts, with the goal of identifying the main pillars of the Age. This was a modest effort to establish a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between intellectual productivity and sources of legitimacy.

Before anything else, it would be a fair move to accept the translation movements as an epistemological revolution; simplifying it through a mere linguistic transformation would obscure their actual impact. Integrating the Hellenistic tradition into Arabic made methodical tools like logic, analysis, and definition part of Islamic thought. The Isagoge literature that was introduced to this thought transcended Porphyry's main intention; his original structure became deepened in the hands of some Muslim scholars like al-Farabi, al-Abhari, and Ikhwan al-Safa, which gave it a peculiar characteristic with fresh logical analyses. Centuries-long debates on the 'definition" and the "defined' generated a revolutionary conceptualization of philosophical anthropology and philosophy of knowledge. Naturally, political power utilized such a knowledge-production process; a fresh legitimacy agent was introduced by institutionalizing knowledge. Establishment of the *Bayt al-Hikma* can be read through this lens; it was a natural outcome of this quest. Still, depending on the observer's standpoint, this was a 'fixed' fight or a cooperation. Because a new social class with limited numbers in the population came to *the* stage: the *'ulema*. Unlike the Western tradition, these theology-based scholars did not prefer to mediate between God and men; instead, they served as a bridge between knowledge and power. However, one can sincerely accept that such a monopoly restricts access through the gates of knowledge.

A particularly interesting pattern is that the Caliphate institution initially started as a symbol of worldly authority, which then evolved into the idea of 'the deputy of God on earth'. This transformation strengthened political legitimacy by attaching religious references, but it never achieved an 'all-encompassing status'. Conversely, Shi'ite political views began as an alternative interpretation of Islam. The Battle of Karbala and the *Tawwabun* movement that followed it were the pivotal breakpoints for this opposition movement, in both emotional and theological aspects. Still, theological and philosophical dissociations in the Muslim world were not limited to the realm of faith; they also produced their unique oppositions within the domain

of knowledge-production *styles*. The central *kalam* schools like Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, and Maturidism, for instance, preferred to explain the relationship of God and men and the universe through *eccentric* principles, which assisted the Golden Age to be fed from different springs. Mu'tazilism put reason to the center, Ash'arism balanced reason and *the* script, and Maturidism established a whole novel system: their legacies can be traced in theology, philosophy of science, and the *discipline* of morality. Debates on 'the problem of evil' and 'predestination and free will', particularly, profoundly impacted theology, politics, and law. In the same vein, the authenticity of the Caliphate/*Imamate* discussions gave way to economic and institutional advancements. Some mechanisms that found their roots in *the* religion, like *zakat*, *waqf*, and trade routes, played significant roles in securing the socioeconomical justice and the establishment of social belonging, which—and a daring which—can be read as the precursors of the practices of a/any social state in the present day.

To conclude this section in one sentence, a proposal could be given as follows: The Age of Islam did not simply increase what was known; it also completely transformed the verb 'to know'.

2.2.2. The Heat: Thinkers Who Sparked the Fire

The Golden Age of Islam is often seen as a period when scientific and philosophical achievements in the Muslim world peaked. While this is an accurate summary, the human factor should also be emphasized. Because of this, the Islamic way of thinking varied across many sects, climates, and cultures—shaping the era through these differences. In this part of the study, the Muslim intellectuals will be examined based on the traditions they followed, the geographic locations they inhabited, and their sectarian affiliations. Therefore, they will be categorized as Sunni, Shi'ite, and Al-Andalusian intellectuals. This classification helps to present their ideas in a way that makes it easier to follow each contribution, identify their critiques, and compare them systematically. Additionally, since Ikhwan al-Safa are central to this study, a separate subchapter will be dedicated to them; even though they could have been discussed among Shi'ite intellectuals, they are given this special distinction. Their general character will be analyzed through the epistles they authored. Ultimately, this part of the study aims to introduce the philosophical contributions, epistemological tendencies, political visions, and metaphysical approaches of the key thinkers of the Golden Age of Islam, grouped by their affiliations.

4.2.2.1. Sunni Intellectuals

Sunni intellectuals of the Golden Age of Islam began their journey by interpreting the Quran—the sacred text. Relying on the Quran and the Prophet's *hadith*, they sought to reconcile divine revelation with the created order. Therefore, it is possible to claim that their original standpoint was based on the unity of knowledge. This section highlights five representative philosophers—al-Kindi, al-Farabi, al-Biruni, Ibn Sina, and al-Ghazali—whose diverse approaches illustrate the period's Sunni philosophical spectrum.

Al-Kindi, often called "the first philosopher of the Arabs", was born in Kufa in *c.* 801, with a full name of Abu Yusuf Ya'kub bin Ishak. He came from a noble family, and his family members served the Umayyad and the Abbasid dynasties. He was trained in the Quranic sciences and the Arabic language in his youth, both in Kufa and Basra. These cities were known for hosting institutionalized language schools; thus, he received a good education in linguistics and literature. He then moved to Baghdad to complete his education until his death in [approximately] 866. He became one of the first scholars assigned to *Bayt al-Hikma* during Caliph al-Ma'mun, befriended him, and this intimacy with al-Kindi and the sovereigns continued for eight more caliphs (Kaya, 2002, pp. 41–42).[17] He had grown a sympathy towards Mu'tazila approach, which detached the link between al-Kindi and the caliphs during the times of Caliph al-Mutawakkil. He studied diverse topics from astrology to perfume distillation, which can be traced in his texts, which come in almost 250 titles, but only forty exist. Still, the existing ones are deemed enough to understand al-Kindi's philosophical and scientific tendencies. Al-Kindi favored the cumulative advancement of knowledge; he welcomed any source so long as that source provided him with *the* truth. Therefore, the former contributions of philosophers were so valuable to him that he advocated the role of intellectuals to read and comment on their works, so that the truth can be completed. This eclectic characteristic of al-Kindi caused him to reconcile what the philosophers said—Aristotle in particular—and what the prophets' messages said; therefore, he rejected the idea that philosophy contradicts religion. In this respect, al-Kindi studied in different languages like Greek, Persian, and Indian, and tried to reconcile this knowledge with nature and the religion (Jolivet & Rashed, 1986). In a milieu where Arabs exalt *their* religion more than anything else as a rope to be held onto, some different thoughts coming from some aliens were not welcomed; in fact, these thoughts were approached suspiciously. Thus, al-Kindi had tried to approximate Ancient Greek thought with

[17] Al-Kindi was the only *pure* Arab philosopher in the circle of al-Ma'mun's *Bayt al-Hikma*; thus, his title as "the" Arab philosopher suits in addressing him accurately (Lewis, 2002, p. 149; Starr, 2013, pp. 146–147).

the Arabs by claiming *the* ancestor of Greeks was a brother of *the* ancestor of southern Arabs, Qahtan, but the community rejected his claims.[18] Nonetheless, he had considered revelation a reality and preferred to interpret it by stripping it of metaphors. For instance, in the Quranic saying on God's might as "*he* says BE, and it is",[19] al-Kindi considered this a metaphor, which he interpreted as God desires something and it becomes; *he* does not need to say "Be!". This is how al-Kindi's approach was deemed parallel to the Mu'tazilite thought. This argument has a value since al-Kindi had written treatises on what Mu'tazila delved into as well, like the atoms, essences of things, nature and composition of it, the ability to *do* action *from* thought, and more (Watt, 1973, pp. 205–208).

The second Sunni scholar of the Islamic Golden Age, al-Farabi, with his full name as Abu Nasr Muhammad Ibn Uzlugh al-Farabi, was born in a town called Farab in Transoxiana in 870. He was trained in Baghdad, where he befriended some Christian followers of Aristotle's methodology. He then migrated to Syria after Baghdad was invaded in 942. Under the patronage of Sayf al-Dawla, the ruler of Aleppo, he became occupied with his studies and died in Damascus in 950 (Marmura, 2008, p. 164). It is safe to say that the genuine reason he is known in today's world, both in the West and the East, originates from his sincere belief that Islam appeared as a philosophical religion at a time when philosophy was considered an outdated activity. According to al-Farabi, reason precedes faith, and people who are distant from philosophy prefer to think through symbols. This is why he put prophets in the same league with philosophers, who conveyed universal philosophical truths to their communities through symbolic religious language (Walzer, 1991, p.779). To remove symbolism from the sciences, he therefore divided the sciences into discrete categories. He maintained that anyone who studied this categorization could discern the underlying rationale of each science and may evaluate what they will receive from it while studying, alongside what virtue they will receive after this transaction. In this respect, al-Farabi divided the sciences into five: linguistics, logic, mathematics, physical and metaphysical sciences, and political science (Farabi, 2020, pp. 1–2). Considering the fact that al-Farabi was titled with the Second Master phrase, where Aristotle was deemed first, his fall on teaching to the Muslim community had to strip Greek linguistic and grammatical concepts from the teachings of Aristotle; he had to transform what was told earlier into Arabic. Thus, he attached a link between language and logic (Streetman, 2014, p. 231), while being *less* reconciliatory than al-Kindi, but more rational than he was. Al-Farabi,

[18] Al-Kindi also came from Qahtan's lineage, one of the oldest tribes of Southern Arabia (Kaya, 2002, p. 41).
[19] [Surah Ya-Seen (Ya-Seen), Verse 82] His command, when He wills a thing, is to say to it, "Be", and it comes to be (Itani, 2015, p. 192).

therefore, sought a gradual reform in politics with the assistance of logic and religion. Because, according to him, there has to be a reason that Islam was embraced by the masses almost instantly. That is, Islam has to be innately a *good* religion; it was then required to make the society as good as possible. Not all members of society have to be philosophers or scholars who inspect the true nature of God and religion, but all of them were born with reason. Akin to the revelation's symbolism, such as threatening with eternal fire *if* a subject wrongs God's commands, the members of the society had to treat each other with justice by utilizing their reason, so that they can understand the projection of Godly justice on earth. It would be best for a society to be ruled by philosophers; however, al-Farabi knew this notion was impossible to realize. Instead, the laws of that society can easily be formulated by following the philosophical principles, similar to what Prophet Mohammad did in his lifetime (Hodgson, 1974, pp. 433–436). This formulation constituted the backbone of al-Farabi's *The Ideal State*, and his fall on preparing society in a gradual way with the assistance of reason shows itself here vividly. According to him, one shall know God first and believe in *him*, then *his* angelic and celestial creations shall be recognized, and the knowledge of matter, form, and qualities of material creations shall follow these. Only by then can one understand that there is a cosmic justice, which mirrors in both the creation of man and woman, as well as their bodily organs, ranks, relationship patterns, and most importantly, the role of soul and intellect. When these were recognized, according to al-Farabi, people can understand the meaning of society, its participants, its ruling methodology, the virtue and ignorance within, and various roles of its participants which should operate in harmony in order to receive happiness in both this life and the next (Rosenthal, 1992, pp. 114–116).

Abu'l Rayhan Mohammad bin Ahmad (973–1048), or with his widely known name, al-Biruni, with the title of "the Master" *(al-Ustadh)*, who was born in the suburb *(birun)* of Kath—the capital of Khwarazm, is one of the greatest Muslim philosophers of the Golden Age of Islam (Boilot, 1986, p. 1236)—*the* greatest for Bernard Lewis (2002, p. 149). His greatness comes from his versatility in sciences—a complete polymath; he delved into numerous scientific fields like mathematics, astronomy, physical sciences, natural sciences, geography, history, chronology, linguistics, and, for the interest of this study, into anthropology (Boilot, 1986, p. 1236). When Mahmud of Ghaznavi conquered a considerable part of India after numerous conquest attempts between 1002 and 1026, al-Biruni had found a chance to examine the culture of this newly introduced region. He was familiar with Sanskrit, joining some of Mahmud's campaigns and with the Indian scholars who visited Ghazni (Tümer, 1992, p. 208). Thus, he

composed an eighty-chapter-long book titled the Book of India *(Kitab al-Hind)*, which examined through comparisons of the theological and practical differences of religions he had known: Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and the Greek polytheism. These comparisons revolved around afterlife beliefs, religious rituals, the concept of salvation, religious customs, religious practices and routines, and religious mode of law (Morewedge, 2014, p. 103). The fascinating aspect of al-Biruni's contribution to the scientific circles of the Golden Age of Islam was his methodology. He rejected purely syllogistic speculation, which was widely used in metaphysics; instead, his core approach focused on mathematical explanations supported by observations and experiments. However, this does not mean these were the only techniques he used in his studies; in fact, al-Biruni strongly believed that there were many ways to understand nature: reasoning and signals from revelation could also be included (Tümer, 1992, p. 209). His methodological eclecticism appears in two ways: first, although he did not shy away from using Aristotelian concepts in his work, he did not endorse philosophical dogmatism as most of his contemporaries did; second, as a devout Muslim, he rejected any ideas that conflicted with the Islamic faith (Tümer, 1992, pp. 210–211). This is why, in *Kitab al-Hind*, his most comprehensive study in social sciences, four distinct contributions to the social sciences can be identified. First, he underlined that the Indians possess a unique culture and have some bias towards foreigners, of which al-Biruni underlined that this is a regular tendency for all cultures. Second, he believed that the Muslim community was stuck with the Greek culture; however, they have the potential to create a universal culture that can transcend this discourse, which, then, can embrace all other cultures from Indian to Zoroastrian. Third, he claimed that the Muslim rulers shall be tolerant towards other religions and their sacred places after they conquer these lands. Moreover, finally, in al-Biruni's account, people from different cultures can learn a lot from each other; instead of approaching with a discriminative tendency to alien cultures, it would be more productive to follow an encompassing and welcoming introduction between different cultures (Morewedge, 2014, pp. 103–104). The last contribution resonated with Franz Rosenthal's remark. According to him, al-Biruni criticized the inadequacy of Arabic writing because it includes too many identical letters that can only be distinguished from their counterparts with some diacritical marks (dots). This is why texts could easily lose meaning during reading or convey something other than what was intended. Rosenthal states that this remark by al-Biruni is the central focus of the Islamic teaching that revolves around oral education. That is how Western civilization overshadowed Islamic civilization in producing written works first and in the printing industry later (Rosenthal, 2014, pp. 1052–1053).

Considering al-Biruni's inclination to learn from other cultures, Rosenthal's comment becomes more meaningful.

Ibn Sina, or with his full name as Abu Ali al-Husayn b. 'Abd-Allah b. Sina, known as Avicenna in the West, was born in 980/981 in a village near Bukhara and died in 1037 in Hamadan. His father, 'Abd-Allah, was a well-educated man; his home hosted numerous Ismaili *da'i*s to discuss philosophy.[20] Therefore, Ibn Sina became familiar with philosophy and studied Porphyry's *Isagoge* in his younger years. Alongside numerous texts he had read on various topics ranging from logic to medicine, he tried to read an Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, but he was puzzled because of the incompetent translation. However, after reading al-Farabi's comments on this text, his mind became clearer (Alper, 1999, pp. 319–320). This text became so important in Ibn Sina's life that it shaped his methodology. He met al-Biruni in Bukhara when he was only seventeen, and they became pen pals; Ibn Sina responded to the letters sent by al-Biruni from Khwarazm, in which their methodological differences became apparent: al-Biruni approached problems with a more mathematical method, while Ibn Sina tended to solve problems through psychology-based metaphysics (Tümer, 1992, p. 209). Ibn Sina followed the traditional Greek philosophy in his life; he preferred to explain the perfection of things through an amalgamation of knowledge and action, which had also shown itself in his very own life (Goichon, 1986, p. 941). His journeys began when he was only eighteen; he became the personal physician of Nuh b. Mansur, the ruler of the Samanid Empire, gained full access to his personal library. Since then, he has seen numerous patrons; jealousy or plots made him exiled, imprisoned, and labeled as *persona non grata* (Alper, 1999, pp. 320–321). However, these conditions made Ibn Sina dependent on his own mind alone, which is unanimously accepted as an outstanding mind, and he kept writing his treatises and *summa*s by quoting Aristotle without reading him for a second time. His works were more "original" than his contemporaries, whose works often came out as commentaries. Ibn Sina was a prolific writer; he wrote day and night, in prison, on the back of his horse, almost every time and everywhere (Goichon, 1986, p. 941). His knowledge and the number of his texts in circulation made Ibn Sina famous in the Muslim world, but also made him arrogant. In his autobiography, he wrote in his thirties, through a couplet, he confessed that the greater he became, the less countries desired to have him; that is, the more expensive he became, the fewer buyers he could find. Early fame made Ibn Sina stay far from modesty; thus, the biographers of Medieval Islam

[20] Although Ibn Sina was exposed to Ismaili propaganda in his early years, and did not stop being in touch with the Ismailis until his death, he had never converted to Ismailism (Alper, 1999, pp. 321–322).

tend to characterize him with "poisonous, and foul of speech, with an evil tongue" words (Starr, 2013, pp. 258–259). In truth, this arrogance is understandable because Ibn Sina is considered the most important intellectual in Islamic philosophy, within the school of al-Farabi. Al-Kindi secured the transformation from *kalam* to philosophy, al-Farabi systematized it, and Ibn Sina redefined and re-categorized what was told in an encyclopedic form. This effort was didactic, which is why Ibn Sina was referred to as "the Master Scholar" *(Sheikh al-Ra'is)* in Islamic philosophy. His famous works as The Canon of Medicine *(al-Kanun fi't-tibb)* and The Book of Healing *(Kitab al-Shifa)* follow an encyclopedic sense; Ibn Sina names the problem first, mentions the earlier views, brings out a criticism, and expresses his own view: the entirety of this writing technique made him famous since it makes easier for people to understand what he intends to say (Durusoy, 1999, p. 322). However, as one should remind oneself that Ibn Sina was a pious Muslim, the polytheist Greek approaches to the dogmas had found a fresh form in his hands: he aimed to amalgamate religious dogmas with his philosophical formulations (Goichon, 1986, pp. 942–943). Still, these Islamic dogmas did not cause the Western intellectuals to abstain from utilizing Ibn Sina's texts. The emergence of the first Renaissance in Southern Europe, which first began in Italy in the tenth century and moved to Spain and France in the 12th century, is often attributed to the Latin translation of these two famous books of Ibn Sina. His formulations on medicine, natural sciences, and philosophy were so influential in the West that numerous European philosophers had to learn Arabic to read his works from original language, in addition to many lectures given in the European universities until the 16th century, particularly in anatomy, were using Arabic terms that Ibn Sina introduced (Goichon, 1986, pp. 944–945).

Abu Hamid Mohammad b. Mohammad al-Tusi, widely known as al-Ghazali, was born in 1058 in Tus (Khorasan) and died in the same town in 1111. It was clear that the philosophers he studied followed a Greek tradition that aimed to merge logic and reason. Al-Ghazali's fame comes from breaking this link through his criticisms and establishing a new set of rules for religious studies. The attributed value towards al-Ghazali's intellectual capacity varies: H. A. R. Gibb (1963, p. 122) does not accept him as an original thinker, he instead highlights al-Ghazali's stubborn personality towards intellectual matters while Henry Corbin (2013, p. 319) considers him as having one of the best personalities and brains the Muslim world had ever seen. Al-Ghazali's personality can be exemplified by an incident he experienced. Accordingly, some bandits raided a caravan where al-Ghazali traveled; they took everything. Al-Ghazali chased after bandits, arrived at their hideout, and asked the bandit leader to give his lecture

notes back to him. The leader mocked al-Ghazali for not being able to store knowledge in his memory but leaving it on paper. After receiving his notes back, al-Ghazali memorized the entirety of his notes in only three years (Çağrıcı, 1996, p. 490). On the other hand, his intellectual side mostly leans toward rejecting the influence of philosophy over religion and acknowledging that the Quran and *sunnah* are sufficient to be considered a Muslim (Newby, 2002, p. 66). Al-Ghazali was first and foremost a notable professor in the Nizamiyyah *Madrasa* of Baghdad, assigned this duty by its founder, Nizam al-Mulk, in 1091. However, four years later, when he was 36, al-Ghazali experienced a mental illness and resigned from his duties at the university. He mentioned that he was afraid of going to Hell due to the distorted religious views of the *'ulema*. He wore a Sufi robe and traveled almost the entire Muslim world: Damascus, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Cairo, Mecca, Medina, and more (Watt, 1991, p. 1039; Corbin, 2013, p. 321). The main reason for al-Ghazali's fear was the connection established by Ibn Sina; he had logically proven the existence of God, described the role of prophets through the intuitive experiences they receive, and rationalized Islam through logic. Al-Ghazali directly challenged this connection (Starr, 2013, pp. 299–301). His famous work The Revival of Religious Sciences *(Ihya' Ulum al-Din)* deemphasizes purely formal logic and emphasizes spiritual cultivation more. In this work, al-Ghazali organizes the material into four major parts: acts of worship *('ibadat)*, social customs and manners *('adat)*, destructive vices *(muhlikat)*, and saving virtues *(munjiyat)*, each of which constitutes one of the book's four volumes. These four items determine the morality of a Muslim, according to al-Ghazali, who also states that morality comes with obligations. In this context, reason cannot determine the values humans hold or serve as the source of obligations. Otherwise, values cannot be considered absolute since they lack support from a higher authority, and the absence of such an authority would lead to an anarchic state where anyone could accuse others of obligations (Mir, 2014, p. 268; Çağrıcı, 1996, pp. 502–503). Such a formulation naturally brought a debate to the front about whether al-Ghazali murdered the philosophical interpretation tendency in the Muslim world, or at least in the case of Sunni Islam. These debates vary and go beyond the scope of this study. However, it must be noted that he had also utilized philosophy in his formulations; only one branch of philosophy was rejected first and ignored later by al-Ghazali: logic (Mir, 2014, pp. 268–269).

2.2.2.2. Shi'ite Intellectuals

As it was widely discussed earlier, Shiism in the Golden Age of Islam was an alternative movement within the general characteristics of Islam. If this movement were desired to be

characterized with one word, it would probably be the "against"; with one sentence on the other hand, it would probably be 'Shiism in the Golden Age of Islam was a struggle for legitimacy, but such a struggle was formalistically on a constant stance of opposition'. Therefore, the Shi'ite intellectuals of this age were *against* what was given to them. In this respect, four key intellectuals are to be reviewed here to represent four central doctrines of Shiism, respectively: Sheikh Mufid as the one who systematized the *imamate* doctrine, al-Kirmani as a prominent figure of Ismaili *da'wa* and its cosmology, Nasir al-Din Tusi as an important follower of the Twelver *madhhab*, and Suhrawardi as the founder of *Ishraqi* metaphysics and a notable introducer of mystic-philosophical symbolism.

Abu 'Abd-Allah Muhammad b. Muhammad b. al-Numan al-Harithi al-Ukbari al-Mufid, or with his common name Sheikh Mufid (d. 1022), is one of the most influential figures on the early *Imamate* Shi'ism since he gave this *madhhab* its shape by systematizing the *kalam*, *fiqh*, and *imamate* doctrine as a whole. He was trained in Baghdad and was closely in contact with the Mu'tazilite form of thought. He internalized the Nawbakhti[21] (a *kalam* scholar) mode of transferring knowledge, went beyond the traditional mode of report-recording, and established a reason-based approach (Madelung, 1993, p. 312). However, this does not mean that he had seen reason as an independent epistemological source; in contrast, it was a tool for interpreting the words of the Quran and *hadith*s. Thus, Sheikh Mufid rejected the *qiyas* and *ijtihad* methods. On the other hand, his most striking contribution is his success in re-establishing the *imamate* doctrine, the keystone of Shi'ite understanding, upon a rational and *kalam*-based ground, not on the traditional reports alone. Prior to his contribution, traditionally, the "necessity" of *imamate* was finding its legitimate ground via reports; however, Sheikh Mufid defended this necessity through rational proofs, which caused a pragmatic transformation to happen in the Shi'ite *kalam* methodology. According to him, the *imam* is not a political leader alone; at the same time, he is also an infallible guide equipped with divine knowledge, which makes this title a follow-up post of the prophecy. After the Major Occultation (*ghayba*, hiding of the *imam*), the twelfth *imam* remained hidden, and this was not a divine secret or a miracle; the *imam* did not prefer to reveal himself because people were mimicking what they heard alone—they were at an insufficient level of consciousness. Mufid explained this situation in a rational framework, by utilizing sociological and epistemological interpretations like these; he did not lean on the

[21] Al-Nawbakhti was a Muslim scholar who lived in the tenth century. He was known for his efforts to fuse Mu'tazilite theology and *imamate* doctrine. He rejected God's interference in human acts, the infallibility of the *imam*, and the acceptance of the miracles they exhibited. Through several polemicist texts he authored, he rejected extremist Shi'ism and highlighted the role of reason in theological and philosophical matters (Kraemer, 1993).

metaphysical explanations alone. He had also tried to explain the infallibility of *imam*s rationally. These efforts then turned into a "methodological" *(usuli)* Shi'ite understanding, evolved *en route* by the hands of his disciples, such as Sharif al-Murtaza and Sheikh Tusi, and extended to Ruhollah Khomeini's worldview, which made Mufid the founder of this approach (İlhan, 2020, p. 501). In the political realm, however, Mufid had followed a cautious cooperation with the authority during the *ghayba* period; he had established a consistent understanding between the Shi'ites and the Buyid rulers (Madelung, 1993, p. 312). He had penned around 200 texts in his life; *Kitab al-Irshad* (Book of Guidance) and *Al-Fusul al-Ashara fi al-Ghaybah* (The Ten Chapters on the Occultation) among them are considered as the classical texts for the Shi'ite *madhhab* entirely, for their explanation of the *imamate* doctrine in both historical and *kalam*-based perspectives (İlhan, 2020, p. 501).

Hamid al-Din Ahmad b. 'Abd Allah al-Kirmani, or shortly, al-Kirmani, was considered the most competent *da'i* of the Fatimid Ismailism. Very little is known about his life since he secretly operated his *da'wa* (invitation effort to Ismailism) quest. However, with his name, it can be said that he was born in Kirman, a province in Iran. Al-Kirmani's efforts on *da'wa* were mostly held in both sides of Iraq, as the Arabic Iraq and Persian Iraq; thus, he was known with the *hujjat-al-'Iraqayn* title, which means 'chief *da'i* of both Iraqs'. He was active in Baghdad and Basra, trying to weaken the Abbasids first and dethrone them second. That is why he established two separate councils in both cities to persuade local governors and Arabic tribe leaders through Ismailism. However, he was summoned to Cairo in the early 11th century, in order to settle some theological and political disputes between *da'i*s, about the status of the *imamate* of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, the sixth Fatimid caliph between 996 and 1021 (Daftary, 2007, p. 184; Daftary, 2002, p. 63). These disputes were about the divinity of al-Hakim; a group of *da'i*s believed he was a divine entity. Al-Kirmani had penned an epistle on this matter and explained al-Hakim's status. According to this epistle, al-Hakim was a legitimate *imam*; his legitimacy came from the same origin as his predecessors. God approved his *imamate*, but al-Hakim was not God himself (Daftary, 2007, p. 188). This epistle, alongside al-Kirmani's other writings as well as the texts produced by other *da'i*s, was written for the elite and the educated people, not for the masses, in order to familiarize them with the Ismaili doctrine (Daftary, 2018, p. 28). Therefore, the dissenting views of *da'i*s that made al-Kirmani write this epistle were also aimed at the same social strata. Most people who championed these new interpretations of Ismailism were called Druzes afterwards. Al-Kirmani had determined the theological and political cornerstones of the Ismaili *da'wa* by removing these views (Halm, 1997, p. 53). Al-

Kirmani could speak and read in Hebrew and Syriac languages, was familiar with both the Old Testament and the New, was competent in Aristotle's works and Neo-Platonism, and read al-Farabi and Ibn Sina.[22] Therefore, he could amalgamate the notions of these many philosophical explanations with the Ismaili thought. In his masterpiece, *Rahat al-'Aql* (Peace of Reason), he devised a systematically explained cosmology. Accordingly, there is no mediator *(wasita)* between God and the first creation in the form of divine word/command; otherwise, it would endanger the principle of *tawhid* (oneness of God). Besides, he underlined the same endangering probability by rejecting Ibn Sina's coinage of *wajib al-wujud*, which addresses the notion that accepting God's existence is necessary. In this work, al-Kirmani concludes that reason was the first creation *(al-'aql al-awwal)*, and it is directly related to the act of creation, which makes it perfect and stable. These features of reason make it tranquil *(rahat)*, and the cause *('illa)* of all other creations. In other words, al-Kirmani equated reason with 'one' in Neo-Platonism and the 'necessary existent' in the formulations of Muslim philosophers. He then ranked reason with ten levels, and gave each of them a creation capability and auditing responsibility. For instance, the third reason creates celestial objects and the Earth. The tenth reason, however, is the active reason *(al-'aql al-fa'al)*, which operates the material world as a demiurge. Afterwards, for al-Kirmani, four elements, minerals, plants, and animals follow this pattern, which ends up with the creation of humans—a micro version of this macro cosmos (Daftary, 2007, pp. 233–234).

Nasir al-Din Tusi (1201–1274), who was born in Tus (Khorasan), was among the most influential intellectuals in the 13th Century's Muslim world. His father gave him early education; he then went to Nishapur to be trained in philosophy, logic, mathematics, and *kalam* through some venerated Ibn Sinaist scholars like Ferid-ud-Din Damad (Şirinov, 2012, p. 437). Much of his life was spent under the shadow of the political turmoil caused by the Mongols; he lived in Kohistan and Alamut during this phase after the call of Ismaili rulers. Afterwards, Hulegu Khan became his patron, and he established the Maragheh Observatory. Tusi's original philosophical stance was that of Ibn Sinaist; however, he created a synthesis with his *kalam* understanding, trying to establish a constructive bridge between philosophy and *kalam*. He rejected the criticisms of philosophy, such as those seen by al-Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, and wrote numerous refutations of their arguments (Jackson, 2006, p. 118; Şirinov, 2012, p. 438). In his view, the 'existent' comes in two forms, as necessary and possible; thus, God is a necessary existent while the created are possible existents (Şirinov, 2012, p. 438). Under the

[22] Some authors also add al-Kindi to the list (Halm, 1997, p. 54), which could probably be taken as correct.

guidance of this primary principle, it can be said that this approach prevailed in his thoughts on other domains. For instance, Tusi's political thought was underpinned by moral philosophy; by this, he introduced three distinct levels of analysis: the individual, family, and society. In this framework, the factor that preserves social cohesion is governance exercised with wisdom, which is a synthesis of Aristotelian political theory and the Shi'ite doctrine of *imamate*. That is, the ideal mode of rule requires a wise ruler who guides his subjects following divine wisdom. Accordingly, Tusi attributed metaphysical authority to the *imam*—identifying him as the unique bearer of that divine wisdom (Jackson, 2006, p. 119). His religious stance, therefore, combined *kalam* with certain mystical features. Though he lived amongst the Ismailis, he then embraced Twelve *Imam* doctrine afterwards (Badakhchani, 2010, p. 3). His famous work, *Tecrid al-Itikad* (Isolation of Faith), was written during this transformation, becoming one of *Imamate* Shi'ism's central texts (Şirinov, 2012, p. 439). According to Tusi, externality of *the* religion is not sufficient, its internal *(batin)* meaning has to be understood as well; some theological concepts, for example, like apocalypse *(qiyama)* and afterlife should not be taken literally, they have to become subject to internal and spiritual interpretations simultaneously (Badakhchani, 2010, p. 20). Amongst his most famous works, *Rawda-yi Taslim* (Paradise of Submission) can be counted, where he explained the Ismaili understanding of apocalypse through a philosophical lens. Accordingly, for Tusi, apocalypse is not a mere physical death and resurrection process; instead, it addresses something larger than that: the resurrection of the individual's soul in this life. Anyone who could reach the divine truth had already experienced their own apocalypse in this world (Badakhchani, 2010, p. 14). As can be seen, Tusi was an original *'alim*, whose originality came from his methodology. According to him, philosophy, *kalam*, mathematics, and astronomy are not rival disciplines; in contrast, they complete each other. His intellectual integrity, therefore, made him an intellectual architect of his time, apart from being a scholar alone; his followers like Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi and al-Allama al-Hilli carried their master's banner ahead in the following centuries, which made an evolution in the Islamic mode of thinking (Şirinov, 2012, p. 439).

Shihab al-Din Yahya ibn Habash ibn Amirak Abu'l-Futuh Suhrawardi (1154–1191), known as *Sheikh al-Ishraq* (Master of Illumination), is renowned for founding a *sui generis* mystical-philosophical system. Born in Suhraward town, in the northwestern part of Iran, he pursued his education in major centers of learning such as Maragheh and Isfahan, where he studied logic, *kalam*, and philosophy; notably, he engaged with Ibn Sina's works (Ziai, 1997, p. 782; Kutluer, 2010, p. 34). However, Suhrawardi's most distinctive contribution was his

criticism of the traditional Aristotelian thought, both ontologically and epistemologically. Instead of this, he built an intuition-based epistemology, which found its origin in the concept of *ishraq*, that is, illumination. The sum of this methodology was called *Ishraqiyyun*. This system believes that knowledge does not produce itself via rational deductions alone; some internal experiences (with Suhrawardi's own words: peaceful knowledge) also produce it, which approximates the *Ishraqi* system with early Sufism (Corbin, 2013, pp. 355–362; Ziai, 1997, p. 783). This system is based on the ontology of light, and God ('one' in Neo-Platonism) is the 'Light of lights', which automatically makes all the entities in the universe to be hierarchically sorted on an axis between light and darkness (Jackson, 2006, pp. 108–109)—an outcome of a synthesis of what Platon and Zoroaster offered (Corbin, 2013, p. 360). The metaphysical extent of his philosophy was systematized in his work named *Hikmat al-Ishraq* (The Philosophy of Illumination). The authenticity of this work is not based on showing Suhrawardi's philosophical arrangements alone; this work also proposes a 'style' of existence. Because, according to him, the ideal human being has to be *al-hakim al-Muta'allih*, a wise person who heads for the knowledge of divinity (Kutluer, 2010, p. 38; Corbin, 2013, p. 373). This philosophical vision of Suhrawardi goes hand in hand with his political thoughts; akin to the Platonic formulation of philosopher-king, albeit an Islamic re-interpretation. He claimed that political authority has to be in the hands of rulers blessed by the divine light, which grants the ruler the necessary legitimacy. Therefore, this understanding can be seen as a synthesis of the Platonic state notion and Sufi-philosophical interpretation. This idea first flourished during his consultancy times to Ayyubid prince al-Malik al-Zahir, son of Saladin. As it became widespread in the prince's court, it provoked the hostility of local Sunni *'ulema*. Eventually, he was accused of heresy, and Suhrawardi was executed at a young age (Ziai, 1997, p. 782; Kutluer, 2010, p. 38). Though he died soon, his philosophical legacy influenced later Shi'ite philosophers; Mulla Sadra, for instance, an important *'alim* in the 17th century, incorporated Suhrawardi's epistemology into his very own philosophical system (Corbin, 2013, pp. 378–380).

2.2.2.3. Al-Andalusian Intellectuals

Although Al-Andalus was part of the Muslim commonwealth during the Golden Age of Islam; its geographical remoteness produced some *sui generis* challenges. Because of this, Al-Andalusian scholars developed their own solutions for these problems. This section makes it clear that these scholars are often regarded as either authentic or original. Four Al-Andalusian

scholars will be introduced here: Ibn Bajjah, identified as the 'creator' of the abstract individual; Ibn Tufayl, recognized as the founder of 'experimental discovery'; Ibn Rushd, a proponent of 'systematic reasoning'; and Ibn Hazm, known as the prophet of 'loyalty to the text'.

Ibn Bajjah (d. 1139), with his full name Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Yahya ibn al-Sa'igh al-Tujibi al-Saraqusti, who is known by the name Avempace in Western literature, is regarded as the first great Muslim philosopher of Al-Andalus. He is a prominent figure in the journey of Muslim philosophy on the western side of the Muslim world. Ibn Bajjah was born in Zaragoza; he pursued advanced studies in diverse fields like music, poetry, medicine, astronomy, and particularly in philosophy, which led him to produce works in parallel to Aristotle and al-Farabi (Calvo, 2014, p. 309; Aydınlı, 1999, p. 348). His philosophy is grounded upon a single notion: an individual should detach themselves from the influence of society, so that they can merge themselves with the demiurge *(al-'Aql al-Fa'al)*. Naturally, this notion requires a process that eventually grants the individual a certain happiness. However, for this, an individual should transcend beyond the knowledge provided by the senses and reach a rational consciousness phase that can grasp the knowledge of the universe (Dunlop, 1986, p. 728; Aydınlı, 1999, p. 350). This argument of Ibn Bajjah was clearly explained in his *Tadbir al-Mutawahhid* (Managing the solitary); accordingly, he claims that a wise man living in an unvirtuous society shall isolate himself from the society, develop an internal rhythm for himself, and reach happiness via his own maturity of reason (Calvo, 2014, p. 310). The most interesting part of such a formulation is not just about his fall concerning individual morality; it also plays a central role in Ibn Bajja's political philosophy. According to him, if we cannot discuss an ideal society, the philosopher should step in by taking on the role of *al-mutawahhid* (solitary), and he should establish a virtuous order for himself alone (Aydınlı, 1999, p. 351). This attitude is intimate with al-Farabi's thoughts, like a refutation of him and showing some egoistic symptoms; however, his effort was to produce a philosophical remedy to the chaotic political situation of Al-Andalus. The central pillar of Ibn Bajja's philosophy is the concept of *ittisal*, 'joining' or 'union', which might be the closest translation to English; however, a translation like 'epistemic integration with the active intellect' would be more accurate. This pillar aims to merge human reason with the universal demiurge, which will then, according to Ibn Bajja, create a sense of wholeness both epistemologically and ontologically. Such a union can only be established with the intuitional and rational cognizance of the absolute truth (Dunlop, 1986, p. 729; Aydınlı, 1999, pp. 350–351). Here, one can see that Ibn Bajja transforms the rational tradition he inherited from Ibn Sina, making it more individual-centric and dependent on inner progress.

Naturally, he had rejected any mystic explanation, like those seen in al-Ghazali's works; this tendency contributed to the rise of a climate of rational thinking in Al-Andalus (Aydınlı, 1999, p. 349). Truly, Ibn Bajja's influence can be traced in some Al-Andalusian philosophers like Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd, but not limited to them; his formulations had huge impacts on some Western philosophers like Albertus Magnus and Meister Eckhart, who *"shared his vision of man following an intellectual and speculative path toward God"* (Calvo, 2014, p. 311). In short, Ibn Bajja was an authentic philosopher who laid the foundations of philosophy in Al-Andalus, particularly with his explanations on individual reason, political solitude, and intellectual self-competence.

Abu Bakr Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Malik b. Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Tufayl al-Kaysi (d. 1185), known as Ibn Tufayl, is one of the most original philosophers of Al-Andalus. He was a multifaceted intellectual interested in medicine, astronomy, politics, and philosophy. A considerable amount of his life was lived in different cities like Granada, Ceuta *(Sebte)*, and Marrakesh; he became the chief physician of Abu Ya'kub Yusuf, the Almohad sultan, and through his patronage, Ibn Tufayl introduced Ibn Rushd to the palace (Kutluer, 1999, pp. 418–419; Vaux, 1986). The focal point of his philosophical legacy is his allegorical work, *Hayy ibn Yaqzan*. This book is about a kid who lived on a remote island alone, far from civilization, who then comprehends the physical reality first, and the metaphysical reality subsequently employing observation and experience (Naggar, 2014, p. 368). Here, Ibn Tufayl advocates that human reason is capable of comprehending the universe and God, without any external revelation. Therefore, intellectual competence is not an alternative to revelation that assists people in reaching *the truth*; it is only another path leading to the same destination. This kid's (Hayy) mental development is examined in seven-year phases (septenaries) one by one; through this, Ibn Tufayl aimed to explore a person's cognitive and spiritual growth systematically since the number seven holds religious significance in all Abrahamic faiths (Naggar, 2014, pp. 368–369).[23] For Hayy, knowledge acquisition begins with the senses, develops with experiments

[23] The sacred texts of the Abrahamic religious tradition often follow a repetitive remark on seven. For instance, Genesis (2:2–3) mentions that God created the heavens and the earth in six days and rested on the seventh day (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 8). In the Revelation, Verse 1:4 blessed seven churches (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 292), Verse 5:1 counted seven seals (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 296), Verse 8:2 mentioned seven angels and seven trumpets (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 298), and Verse 15:7 counted seven angels and seven golden bowls (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 304). Similarly, the Quran also attributed special emphasis to the number seven: Verses 2:29 (Itani, 2015, p. 2) and 67:3 (Itani, 2015, p. 249) mention seven heavens, and Verse 65:12 adds seven earthly layers to them (Itani, 2015, p. 248). In the same vein, the seven-branched candelabrum *(Menorah)* in Judaism, the seven sacraments of the Catholic Church (baptism, penance, eucharist, etc.), the seven circumambulations around the Ka'ba, and the seven travels between the Safa and Marwa hills *(Sa'ee)* during *Hajj* and *Umrah* in Islam can be read as the symbolic importance attached to the number seven.

and inductive reasoning, leaps to the realm of metaphysics with intuition, and eventually reaches God through a mystical conclusion. Such a system does not exclude these different methods; Ibn Tufayl prefers to include them all. Therefore, it would be safe to say that his epistemology combines Aristotelian theory of knowledge and post-Ghazali Sufi wisdom: observation, experiment, theory, and intuition are intertwined in the methodology of Ibn Tufayl. Because observation and experiment arouse our 'natural and innate' rational capabilities, we assist our spiritual experiences, which constitute the zenith of knowledge for a man (Kutluer, 199, pp. 420–421). From this perspective, *Hayy ibn Yaqzan* cannot be taken as a mere philosophical novel; at the very same time, it deserves to be categorized as a literary manifesto in the Islamic mode of thinking for its efforts on conciliating reason with spiritual realization (*kashf*, unveiling). Hayy represents a 'philosophical Sufi' here, who carries both features of al-Farabi's intellectual happiness and al-Ghazali's *ma'rifa*-centric wisdom (*ma'rifa*: a type of wisdom in experiential knowledge of God). With this, Ibn Tufayl synthesized the theoretical legacy he had received from peripatetic tradition[24] and mystical wisdom, which caused some notable philosophers to blossom after him, like Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi (Kutluer, 1999, p. 420; Naggar, 2014, p. 369). *Hayy ibn Yazqan* was not influential on the Muslim world alone; it had a huge impact on European intellectuals as well. Some influential Western philosophers like Locke, Hobbes, Newton, Kant, Hume, Berkeley, and even Karl Marx used different interpretations of this system in their ideas. Marx's theory of historical materialism, for example, finds its theoretical roots in *Hayy ibn Yazqan* (Naggar, 2014, p. 368). This work's influence on the Islamic philosophy will be discussed in the following chapters, per concept.

Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Rushd (1126–1198), who is known by the name Averroes in Western literature, stands out with the systematic link he had established between revelation and reason in Islamic thought. He was born in Córdoba and died in Marrakesh. Ibn Rushd annotated the Aristotelian philosophy and re-interpretated it within an Islamic philosophical framework (Leaman, 2014, p. 354). At the center of his thought, there is a clear principle: philosophy and religion convey the same truth, differing in expression. This principle was systematized in his *Fasl al-Makal* (The Decisive Treatise), *Tahafut al-Tahafut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), and *Kashf al-Manahidi* (The Exposition of the Proofs). According to him, philosophy and religion are two rivers that flow from the same spring; he viewed them as siblings who essentially complement each other (Karlığa, 1999, p. 270). Ibn Rushd asserted that philosophizing on things is a religious obligation because reason is an

[24] Peripatetic *(mashsha'i)* tradition embraces Aristotle's doctrines in the Islamic philosophy.

imperative tool in comprehending *the* religion (Leaman, 2014, p. 355). This is why, he claimed, revelation bears some symbols within that address the understanding of ordinary people; however, the role of a philosopher is to transform these rhetorical symbols into tangible proofs by utilizing *his* reason (Karlığa, 1999, pp. 259–260). Naturally, Ibn Rushd's defense of the balance between philosophy and religion, which gives philosophy a legitimate status, placed him in a position against al-Ghazali. His *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, for instance, was a refutation of al-Ghazali's *Tahafut al-Falasifa* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Here, Ibn Rushd followed a systematic explanation technique and claimed that reason does not stand against religion; in contrast, it serves as an explanatory tool that helps to reach the truth (Karlığa, 1999, p. 259). This claim addresses an epistemological approach alone and includes some political aspects. For example, according to Ibn Rushd, societies mature with reason, similar to individuals; this is why the central duty of a state is to establish an environment in which its citizens can live a virtuous life (Karlığa, 1999, p. 266). From this perspective, the ideal state is a wisdom-based governance entity; the laity shall be educated via persuasion, and the elites shall be educated with rational techniques. Though these are theoretical conclusions, Ibn Rushd had materialized them with an annotation he had penned to Plato's *Republic*, where he re-interpreted 'the philosophical state' and redefined the social role of the philosopher. This annotation was then translated into Latin and directly impacted the Renaissance. Indeed, Ibn Rushd's political philosophy influenced figures like Dante Alighieri, and they incorporated the 'intellectual happiness' concept into their formulations (Karlığa, 1999, pp. 269–270; Leaman, 2014, p. 356). Besides, Ibn Rushd's influence went beyond these circles and stretched to some Jewish and Christian philosophers like Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas. The latter, for instance, clearly embraced Ibn Rushd's formulations but never openly declared this (Karlığa, 1999, pp. 285–286). The radical Averroism, or Latin Averroism, is seen as a bridge that carried Aristotle's thoughts to Europe, which served as a precursor to epistemological rationalism and a secular mode of scientific thinking. Still, Ibn Rushd's ideas did not find a good reception in the Muslim world, which is often called 'the greatest tragedy in the history of philosophy' (Karlığa, 1999, p. 272).

Abu Muhammad Ali b. Ahmad b. Sa'id ibn Hazm was born in Córdoba in 944 and died in Manta Lisham in 1064. His originality comes from his authentic comments on *kalam*, *fiqh*, philosophy, and history, which makes him a pivotal figure in the Arabo-Muslim tradition of thought (Arnaldez, 1986, p. 790). Ibn Hazm is accepted as the one who systematized *Zahiriyyah* (Zahirism, literalism in Islamic law) *madhhab*, who rejected any methodology on reaching

knowledge other than senses, clear rational principles, and *khabar al-mutawatir* (a report that is transmitted by too many people that it makes an agreement on a lie impossible). Thus, he was not a rationalist but a radical supporter of an epistemology that relies solely on the text. This is how Ibn Hazm criticized *kalam* interpreters and the *qiyas* methodology. According to him, the *qiyas* is an invalid technique; the *fiqh* has to focus on the visible and certain bulk of *nass* (explicit and authoritative textual evidence from the Quran and/or *sunna*) (Yavuz, 1999, pp. 52–53). By this, Ibn Hazm made *Zahiriyyah* both a *madhhab* and an epistemology. From this perspective, he developed an *imamate* (also caliphate) explanation. According to this approach, the *imamate* is certain by the *nass*; it cannot be derived by rational reasoning or making it an occupation. That is, he rejected *Ahl as-Sunnah*'s approaches to the concept through political reality, and suggested the appointment of the *imam*s through the *nass* (Arnaldez, 1986, pp. 797–798). Especially in his *Al-Fisal fi al-Milal wa al-Nihal* (The Book of Sects and Creeds), this approach encompasses not the Shi'ite alone but all *madhhab* orientations; it follows a dogmatic structure and criticizes them all. According to Ibn Hazm, faith has one provision: unconditional submission to the visible meanings of God's verses. This principle is also valid for any religious authorities; therefore, the *imam*s have to be determined by God directly, not with some human-based consensus or *ijtihad* (Apaydın, 1999, p. 41). With this move, Ibn Hazm shifted the legitimacy of *imamate* and its connection to society into the realm of revelation, which requires redefining the *imam* as both a religious leader and a necessity of *kalam*. In addition to that, and also in parallel with this, Ibn Hazm's fall on the visible and direct meanings of verses make us to understand what God intended with them; that is, locating him on a unique place that is against both esoterism and interpretative authority of the *kalam* (Yavuz, 1999, pp. 55–56). Here, it is clear that Ibn Hazm faced significant issues with both political authorities, like being imprisoned constantly after political turmoil, and dominant *madhhab* structures throughout his life, like the close connection of the Maliki *madhhab* and its followers, who constantly support those in power. This is why he withdrew from society at the end of his life, focused on studying, and died in Manta Lisham—in his family residence (Arnaldez, 1986, p. 791).

2.2.2.4. Ikhwan al-Safa

In the late Abbasid period, when political instability, sectarian conflicts, and intellectual disintegration were at their peak—in the 10th century to be exact—a group of intellectuals gathered under the name of Ikhwan al-Safa. They were not just a group interested in philosophy; they were pursuing an ideal. This ideal aimed to restore Muslim society's moral and

epistemological foundations, so they used a systematic methodology in their formulations. The Ikhwan began their activities in Basra under the name of *Ikhwan as-Safa wa Khullan al-Wafa wa Ahl al-Hamd wa Abna al-Majd* (Brethren of Purity, Loyal Friends, People Worth Praising, and Sons of Glory). This name alone shows that this group did not focus only on theoretical knowledge—they also cared about moral and social integrity. Very little is known about the members of this society since they followed an intentional policy that prioritizes secrecy. Indeed, their works bear no name and are written by anonymous authors; however, their contemporaries mentioned a few names, like Zayd b. Rifa'a, Abu Suleiman Muhammad b. Ma'shar al-Busti al-Makdisi, Abu Hasan Ali b. Harun al-Zancani, Abu Ahmed al-Mihridzani, and Avfi (Uysal, 2000, p. 1). This anonymity stemmed from the fear they felt under the authoritarian political system of the time; it allowed them to share their thoughts freely while keeping their identities hidden. According to Farhad Daftary (2007, p. 237), this group aimed to develop a knowledge system that guides individuals toward spiritual salvation by offering philosophical education to purify their souls. In order to do this, the Ikhwan had managed to pen 52 epistles, which benefited from various cultural sources like Neo-Platonism,[25] Pythagoreanism, and Hermeticism, to establish a synthesis of *the* religion and philosophy. This was an original attempt; what is more, they were not only aiming to create a synthesis like that but also to realize a reform in morality by merging Islamic values and Ancient Greek philosophy (Marquet, 1986, p. 1075). There are several rumors on whether the Ikhwan were following a Shi'ite or, particularly, an Ismaili path directly; however, in the epistles, one can observe that they both supported and criticized Shiism. For instance, one of the central principles of Shi'ite theology, *ghaybah* of the *imam*, was rebuked by them, claiming people

[25] Neo-Platonism is the central theme of the Ikhwan. However, some cornerstones of this doctrine are to be mentioned throughout the entire text; a separate encyclopedic explanation at the outset might be helpful. Neo-Platonism is a philosophical doctrine that was found to have its shape in the teachings of Plotinus (d. 270 C.E.). Its central tenets are affiliated with Plato's thoughts but transcend them, and the doctrine establishes an authentic system with mystical and metaphysical elements. The philosophy goes beyond knowledge and ethics in this system; the primary purpose of philosophy is to live an internal experience to guarantee the soul's salvation. This purpose finds its resonance in finding the source of the soul, which was formulated with "the one". Such a process depends on intuition, internal contemplation, and apprehension beyond reason. Intuition is the necessary vehicle here because "the one" is a reality that cannot be reached via reason. From this perspective, naturally, Plotinus designed a three-phased understanding of *being*: "the one" (God), *nous* (reason), and soul. All *beings* emanated *from* these three hypostases. Therefore, the physical world is not an actual *being* but a mere reflection of the soul. Such a structure carries both an ontological and a psychological meaning; because, the human soul can experience all these levels: soul as the lowest level, reason as the middle level, and reaching to a same identity with "the one", which draws a parallelism with the order of *beings* and spiritual ascension. At this point, it must be noted that the characterization of God for Plotinus is based on a *negative theology*; God is above all positive attributes. The concept of *being* or rationality cannot be attached to *him*. God can *only* be defined through "what *he* is not". Plus, according to Plotinus, the universe emanates *from* God not at a particular "moment" of time, but it happened eternally. Such an emanation, however, was not an outcome of a will; it was necessary. In short, Neo-Platonism was designed to serve as a salvation recipe with some strong mystical elements, which comes in the form of an idealist and transcendentalist metaphysical system (Arslan, 2010, pp. 55–63).

who believe this concept were carrying a *corrupted* faith (Uysal, 2000, p. 1). Even this preference of the Ikhwan reflects that they aimed for a form of Muslim unity above and beyond the *madhhab*s, which is the central intention of their works.

It would be a fair and legitimate statement that the Ikhwan mean the epistles, and these epistles mean the Ikhwan—they cannot be thought separately. These epistles are called *al-Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa*, the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. The intellectual legacy of the Ikhwan carries an authentic meaning on two sides: their thoughts were original, and these thoughts were presented in a well-organized structure. This corpus, which consisted of 52 epistles, was then summarized in a separate epistle under the name of *al-Risalat al-Jami'a* (The Summary). The original epistles were classified under four main groups: mathematical sciences, which consist of fourteen epistles; natural sciences, with seventeen epistles; psychological-rational sciences, with ten epistles; and theological sciences, with eleven epistles (Netton, 1991, p. 2). Such a classification reflects both the period's scientific paradigm and the Ikhwan's holistic approach to knowledge. Therefore, it was not a didactical organization of sciences; at the very same time, it is a systematic sequence of sciences like stairs, which was expected to grant salvation to the individual's soul (Callataÿ, 2005, pp. 59–61). Each group targets different individual aspects: mathematical sciences sharpen the mind, natural sciences help people understand the universe, psychological sciences analyze the soul, and theological sciences bring individuals closer to the *truth* and God. Still, this theoretical categorization given in the Epistle No. 7 and the actual sequence of the epistles have some apparent differences (Callataÿ, 2005, pp. 70-72). These differences indicate that al-Rasa'il might have been compiled at different times by different people. Because, as Netton (1991, p. 2) believes, such a categorization and reaching 52 as the number of epistles originates from the Ikhwan's fascination with Pythagorean symbolism of numbers. They aimed to reach 51, which is three times 17, and according to the alchemist Jabir b. Hayyan's formulation was an *important* number in both its religious symbolism (like *basmala* consisting of 17 letters) and its reflection in nature (four main elements, four central qualities, and nine celestial objects). Because all sciences and systems of thought are for treating the soul, al-Rasa'il's main intention was the same for the Ikhwan (Netton, 1991, p. 6). By looking through this window, such a conclusion automatically makes the knowledge a part of the mental and spiritual treatment process. Indeed, their classification of sciences is more original than al-Farabi's and Ibn Sina's (Callataÿ, 2005, pp. 61–62). Interestingly, both Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali were familiar with the Ikhwan; the former's father used to read al-Rasa'il as well as himself from time to time, and the latter

criticized the Ikhwan in his book titled *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal* (Deliverance from Error) for being under the influence of the *corrupted* philosophy of Pythagoras. Additionally, Ibn Hazm had also criticized the Ikhwan for their tendency to attribute the impact of the celestial objects to the earth, and accused them of attributing a partner to God's role *(shirk)* (Uysal, 2000, p. 5).

Although this is the case, whether the original intention was 51 epistles or 52, there is an index epistle that can be regarded as the preliminary or zeroth epistle, where the Ikhwan claimed that the epistles as a whole are like medicines for people; if they cannot be medicines, then they should be considered as diseases (*Fihrist*, 29). This dichotomy is valuable because they recognized that the benefit derived from al-Rasa'il depends on the level of knowledge the reader possesses. Therefore, it would be helpful to identify the epistles by their self-explanatory names. The mathematical sciences include fourteen epistles, listed as follows:

I	On numbers
II	On geometry
III	On astronomy and astrology
IV	On geography
V	On music
VI	On numeric and geometric proportions in morality
VII	On scientific arts
VIII	On practical arts and crafts
IX	On morality
X	On Isagoge
XI	On Categories (Aristotle)
XII	On *Peri Hermeneias* (Aristotle)
XIII	On *Analytica Priora* (Aristotle)
XIV	On *Analytica Posteriora* (Aristotle)

Natural sciences have seventeen epistles, as follows:

XV	On matter, aspect, motion, time, and space
XVI	On soul and morality
XVII	On Generation and Corruption (Aristotle)
XVIII	On meteorology
XIX	On minerals
XX	On nature
XXI	On botany
XXII	On zoology
XXIII	On generation of body
XXIV	On sense and the sensible
XXV	On sperm and where it falls
XXVI	On "man is a microcosm"
XXVII	On particular souls
XXVIII	On the human capacity for the sciences
XXIX	On life and death
XXX	On worldly and otherworldly pleasures
XXXI	On languages and alphabets

The psychological-rational sciences have ten epistles, as follows:

XXXII	On the rational principles of beings according to the Pythagoreans
XXXIII	On the rational principles of beings according to the Ikhwan al-Safa
XXXIV	On "the cosmos is a great man"
XXXV	On intellect and the intelligible
XXXVI	On cycles and celestial revolutions
XXXVII	On love
XXXVIII	On resurrection and the day of judgment
XXXIX	On the quantity of the kinds of motion
XL	On causes and effects
XLI	On definitions and descriptions

The theological sciences have eleven epistles, as follows:

XLII	On sects and religions
XLIII	On the path to God
XLIV	On the faith of the Ikhwan al-Safa
XLV	On the Ikhwan al-Safa
XLVI	On faith and the qualities of the investigative believers
XLVII	On divine law and the conditions of prophethood
XLVIII	On calling to God
IL	On the spiritual beings
L	On politics
LI	On the order of the entire cosmos
LII	On magic, sorcery, and the evil eye

These epistles provide a basis for analyzing the Ikhwan in three dimensions: philosophical concerns, religious doctrines, and socio-political programs.

The philosophical thought of the Ikhwan is an unprecedented example of intellectual syncretism for the Muslim world. This intellectual framework finds its innate shape by the legacy inherited from the Ancient Greeks, particularly from Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus; still, it carries an Islamic and Ismaili character within, all blended to constitute an original philosophy of life. According to the Ikhwan, the universe was created via the light flooded *from* God; thus, a pyramid-like hierarchy of entities existed, from top to bottom: hierarchical hypostases like God, reason *('aql)*, soul *(nafs)*, and prime matter *(hayula)* both reflect a Neo-Platonist emanation doctrine, and present the universe to the reader as a rationally organized system. Such a cosmic order is grounded upon the mathematical and moral harmony principle, which is guided by a cosmic reason and universal spirit. The Pythagorean tradition inspired the cosmic meaning of numbers, and with some terminologies like 'the celestial music', the Ikhwan deemed the universe a system in harmony (Netton, 2014, p. 374). In parallel, cooperative harmony is mandatory in their epistemology between reason and intuition. Accordingly, when reason cooperates with intuition, the emerging situation purifies the soul,

making the soul closer to God. In this process, philosophy is instrumental in the soul's progress (Marquet, 1986, p. 1074). On the other hand, scientific knowledge not only helps one's worldly success but also helps one attain metaphysical salvation. That is why the epistles do not give mere technical knowledge to the reader; they also aim at spiritual and moral improvements. As one may see, the sequence of epistles dictates not only a pedagogic order—as from easier to harder, but also follows an ontological order—as from tangible to intangible, from physical to metaphysical (Netton, 2014, p. 374; Marquet, 1986, p. 1075). Such a holistic structure reflects the 'philosophy is the essence of religion' motto of the Ikhwan: philosophical knowledge unveils the invisible truth stored inside the visible shell of *the* religion (Marquet, 1986: 1074). Still, this philosophical system is not rigid and dogmatic but open to moral and rational pursuit. This is why the Ikhwan do not find some concepts like the *imamate* rational, although they are more affiliated with the Ismaili tradition. Perhaps this is why Netton (1991, pp. 102–103) adds that they replaced what the *imamate* proposed with the concept of *ukhuwwa*—brotherhood, which rises upon reason and virtue. Consequently, the Ikhwan's philosophy is loose and cannot be put inside a certain set; they are neither fully Aristotelians nor Neo-Platonists, nor welcome the classical Ismaili doctrine as a whole. Instead, it would be better to characterize them as eclecticists and saviors of an 'intellectual project' which finds its roots in moral purification, universal union, and spiritual ascension.

The Ikhwan's views on *the* religion conform to the central tenets of Islam; however, they are showing some eclecticist symptoms related to philosophical, esoteric, and cosmic elements within. According to the Ikhwan, religion is an indispensable tool for both individual purification and social order; still, the ultimate goal of this tool is to enable *man* to get closer to God and perfect *his* soul. Commands and prohibitions of *the* religion are the tools of spiritual maturation, not mere external rules; that is, *the* religion has both external (practical) and internal (mysterious) facets. Such a dualistic structure approximates the well-known body-soul dichotomy: the body can only be purified by the *sharia*, and the soul's purifier is the *truth*. This understanding caused the Ikhwan to develop an esoteric perspective on the interpretation of *the* religion. For example, they refuse a strictly literal reading of angel, genie, and devil; instead, they explain these through symbolic and analogical statements, distracting them from the traditional comprehension (Uysal, 2000, p. 5). However, this esoteric tendency does not lead to the Ikhwan committing to a specific *madhhab*. It is certain from what we read from al-Rasa'il that they were following the Shi'ite path; however, they were not hesitant in rejecting the hidden *imam* doctrine, which makes them have loose Shi'ite loyalty. In a dilemma where they were

following Shi'ite faith but criticizing it, it is possible to say that they were championing a supra-sectarian motif of universal unity, which identifies Islam as a universal system of wisdom. Naturally, such an all-encompassing characterization led them to accept any divine knowledge as sacred; the Ikhwan referenced the Quran, the Old Testament, and the New Testament, which means they consider these historical variations of the same divine messages to be equal at the cosmic level (Uysal, 2000, p. 2). The Ikhwan described prophets as 'the physicians of the inner self'; such a characterization charges the prophets with duties not for the afterlife alone, but also with some responsibilities for rehabilitating this life. Verily, the Ikhwan explained the status of prophets within the *ummah* with a decimal number system; prophets represent 1, and the people who follow them are sorted as 10s, 100s, and 1000s: a Pythagorean mode of thinking penetrates into the religious comments of the Ikhwan (Uysal, 2000, p. 6). Such a penetration is only natural for the Ikhwan; it demonstrates they could interpret *the* religion symbolically and rationally. After all, the Ikhwan do not see *the* religion as a set of dogmas; instead, they view it as a path of truth designed for individual and social salvation. Such an approach elevates the Ikhwan to a place where they represent the ideal of synthesizing *the* religion with wisdom (Netton, 2014, p. 374). Still, one should remember that the ultimate goal of this wisdom, strengthened with knowledge, serves one purpose: seeing God's face in the afterlife *(ru'yat Allah)*. This is why the 'friends of God' *(awliya'llah)* can easily reach *ru'yat Allah* with their 'eye of the heart' *('ayn al-qalb)*, which means they have so intense faith and submission to God that some unknown things to regular people, even to the intellectuals, are 'known' to these people. That is, according to the Ikhwan, knowledge can be acquired through faith as well; the role of reason does not have to be regarded as indispensable since *ru'yat Allah* occupies the zenith point of scientific curriculum for human beings (Baffioni, 1998, pp. 225–228).

The political and social thought of Ikhwan al-Safa intersect with the traditional political philosophy of Islam, but transcends it by grounding themselves upon some unorthodox moral and epistemological foundations. Instead of following an open clash with the then-present Abbasid administration, the Ikhwan had preferred to target it with some indirect criticisms; they advocated re-establishing a virtuous society against a corrupted authority. Societies have some phases, akin to the individuals, according to the Ikhwan: they are born, they grow up, they mature, and eventually they decay because of corruption (Netton, 1991, p. 98). The Ikhwanian solution to such corruption is straightforward: a rebirth process through wisdom and morality. The vanguard of this process was entrusted to the hands of fraternity societies that consisted of wise individuals (Uysal, 2000, pp. 2–3). This is why, for the Ikhwan, reorganization of society

cannot be done with political power alone; a moral education and developing a philosophical consciousness are deemed mandatory. They criticized systems that absolutize differences in social strata; the Ikhwan defended a social order in which it posits people based on their merits and capabilities (Uysal, 2000, pp. 1–2). The key to such an order is not innately-acquired nobility but the wisdom that is acquired via training and education of the soul. In this context, the Ikhwan preferred to conceptualize politics as an 'art of regulating morality'; they rejected being a part of it. Therefore, the ruler *has to* represent justice and wisdom; *his* duty cannot be confined to commanding *his* subjects. It is clear that the Ikhwanian fashion of sociopolitical system resembles al-Farabi's 'virtuous city'; however, the Ikhwan went beyond this and transformed it into a societal pattern that is organized under the banner of universal fraternity (Uysal, 2000, p. 3). Thus, their 'kind' of *imam* was characterized as someone between a moral guide and a wise leader; hierarchy was conceptualized over spiritual purification and knowledge, not through wealth and power. The Ikhwan proposed neither a theocratic order [in the classical sense] nor an aristocratic political structure. They suggested a 'collective knowledge society' where rulers and people seek wisdom. Naturally, the Ikhwan was the vanguard of establishing such a society; that is why they operated in secrecy, penned epistles, accepted members through invitation alone, and maintained regular discussions alive—to put intellectual activity forward. Still, this political ideal can only be realized by the self-governance abilities of individuals; a man shall repress his ambitions first, then step in to establish a just authority over others because one cannot be deemed competent to rule others if one cannot control oneself (Netton, 1991, pp. 100–103; Marquet, 1986, p. 334). The majority of these morality-centered political visions are not just philosophical suggestions; they are utopian ideals. Therefore, the Ikhwan removed political philosophy from the realm of political power and assigned it the role of a habitual spiritual and political tool.

As İsmail Hakkı İzmirli (1995, p. 105) clearly stated, the Ikhwan's al-Rasa'il significantly impacted the Muslim philosophy. They opened a new page in this realm with transforming logic-based philosophy to morality-based philosophy: the *kalam* scholars went to pen on morality, the concept of evolution remained a topic worth discussing, the *sharia* was questioned through philosophy, a new philosophical system named *Ishraqiyyun* was introduced, Al-Andalus met with philosophy, and the laity became interested in reading philosophical texts. Though this section was an entry-level introduction to the Ikhwan, the following chapters will delve deeply into their formulations.

2.2.2.5. Concluding Remarks

The Golden Age of Islam intellectuals can be reviewed as the architects of thoughts that regarded knowledge as a tool to carry both the individual and society into a *brighter* phase. That is, the texts they produced in a vast array of disciplines, from philosophy to theology, and from cosmology to political philosophy, can be seen as the natural products of their existential concerns, alongside their scientific intentions. Each of them had tried to find answers to some tough questions that arose within their traditional way of thinking. This can be seen as a challenge for them, which aims to address these problems either by explaining them or by turning them into a new set of problems. Sunni philosophers tried to establish a bridge between the Ancient Greek legacy and *the* religion. Their differences became visible only in their epistemological, theological, and political methodologies. Al-Ghazali's critical approach, for instance, re-identified the borders of utilizing reason. However, the Shi'ite philosophers often preferred to verify, validate, and interpret the *imamate* concept, which presented the Muslim mode of thinking as an alternative system of knowledge: once a religiopolitical concept, the *imamate*, became an epistemological tool in time. Al-Andalusian philosophers, on the other hand, *were nourished by* their geographical distance from the centrality of the Muslim population and geographical closeness to Christian Europe; unique problems had arisen, and unique answers were given to them. Same climate but diverse formulations: Ibn Bajja turned into the inner-self, Ibn Tufayl explained through allegories, Ibn Rushd synthesized reason and revelation, and Ibn Hazm remained loyal to the text. True that these philosophers, all of them, touched upon some philosophical questions which are even discussed today: How to accommodate reason and revelation? On what basis do the individual and society find a common ground? Can knowledge provide emancipation of the individual?

Still, the Ikhwan stand out as a different figure from the rest. Because they were a group of intellectuals that shared the same knowledge and the same ideal, they were in consensus on things that were discussed—that is to say, they shared a collective hive mind. This consensus considered knowledge a ladder, and the soul was an adventurer who climbed it. By its nature, such an approach deems philosophy the very essence of *the* religion. Their system, therefore, reflects a desire for unity, which is above and beyond the *madhhab*s: knowledge and fraternity are at the center in this system. Hence, the *imam* transfers *his* role to a guide, who embodies knowledge and morality. Such a formulation can easily be read as a social transformation project. Today, analyzing such a profound intellectual legacy provides some serious

opportunities worth delving into; their multifaceted formulations can be seen as a polyphonic orchestra that plays the same note continuously: seeking the truth.

2.2.3. The Fuel: Places That Kept It Burning

In the Golden Age of Islam, spanning from the 8th to the 13th century, the Islamic civilization experienced numerous advancements across different fields: political expansion, economic vitality, and perhaps most importantly, intellectual productivity. The connection between thought and place was especially significant during this period; it acted as a hub for producing, circulating, and institutionalizing knowledge. In this context, mosques, learning circles, educational centers, and libraries played vital roles in transmitting knowledge. Moreover, these places were key in shaping social hierarchies, religiopolitical legitimacy, and intellectual perspectives throughout the vast Muslim world. This subchapter aims to explore these sites within their historical context and institutional functions, aligned with the epistemological and sociopolitical dynamics of the Golden Age.

2.2.3.1. Mosques

The mosque *(masjid)* is Islam's central communal praying place. *Masjid* is an Arabic word that means "the place where people put their foreheads on the ground". One of the central tenets of Islam argues that God is everywhere[26] and the earth is a *masjid* alone, which means anyone can pray anywhere (Newby, 2002, p. 143). Even if this is the case, it is known that Prophet Mohammad had established the very first mosque of Islam in a village on the route to Medinah during his immigration from Mecca. The Prophet was aware of the functionalities of praying places from Christianity; they were designed to pray, socialize, and educate the believers (Stanton, 1990, p. 18). As the Muslim community grew, the Prophet ordered several mosques to be established; it was reported that approximately ten mosques were ready during his time in Medinah (Önkal & Bozkurt, 1993, p. 48), while that number was around 30,000 in Baghdad alone in the tenth century (Stanton, 1990, p. 18). Because Prophet Mohammad saw himself as a teacher first and foremost, it is understandable that he utilized mosques as learning chambers outside the praying times. Early mosques were places to teach people the Quran and

[26] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 115] To God belongs the East and the West. Whichever way you turn, there is God's presence. God is Omnipresent and Omniscient (Itani, 2015, p. 7).

literacy; the Prophet himself and his companions were the teachers. The Prophet's education method was straightforward: he was sitting in the middle of the mosque, and his companions and the newly converted Muslims surrounded him in circles, listening to him (Önkal & Bozkurt, 1993, p. 50). These circles, *halqa*, had continued for decades after the Prophet's death. This time, an educated man named *shaikh* was at the center. He lectured the people around him in his lessons, explained the religion, orchestrated discussions, and answered questions. This status had then become popular; mosques gave jobs to *shaikh*s permanently. It was a reciprocal benefit: mosques strengthened the faith of Muslims, and Muslims could get religious answers to their worldly problems from a respected believer. This system developed over time; initially, these circles became places for studying the Quran and *hadith*s, and later they also served as places for higher learning (Stanton, 1990, pp. 18–19).

The role of mosques was not limited to these education/learning circles alone, but also, they possess some roles as social and political alongside their religious function (Gaffney, 2004, p. 438). For instance, traditionally, the orchestration of Friday prayers in mosques was within the responsibility of the Caliph; these leading figures used to stand on a higher platform called *minbar*, and deliver a speech there which begins with praising God and the Prophet, and continues with some social and religious advice and warnings. These speeches are called *khutba* and serve as a means of introduction and legitimacy for the caliphs. Similarly, the governors and state rulers utilized this method, particularly in the Friday prayers in which the mosques are more populated than regular prayers (Pedersen, 1991, pp. 695–696). Though these practices could also be circumscribed with a different version of information, therefore, knowledge for the people, the *halqa* tradition was the central method for transmitting academic knowledge. As the Muslim community grew and conquered new lands outside Arabia, they encountered Christian colleges but initially hesitated to enroll in them. Albeit the Greek influence on the Muslim philosophy existed, under the name of *falsafa*, which is an encompassing one that was not interested in philosophy alone but also sciences and theology, most of the Arabs were skeptical towards 'anything non-Arab' and this kind of amalgamation of knowledge with what belongs to them and not because *the* truth had already revealed to them by God (Watt, 1973, pp. 205–206). Thus, early *halqa*s remained on the dissemination and discussion of the *hadith*s alone. These *halqa*s had an egalitarian characteristic; the *mawla*, slaves, and concubines had also participated in these *hadith halqa*s in the 8th century (Juda, 2020, pp. 128–129). However, their involvement made some Arabs so unhappy that some *hadith 'ulema* rejected transferring *hadith*s from them, regardless of their authenticity (Juda, 2020, p. 133). Still, we learn from Ibn

Battuta's travelogue that the learned concubines who could educate other women became so precious in the following centuries that, even in Mali, Ibn Battuta's intention of purchasing one was rejected by the slave dealer (Battuta, 2020, p. 682).

The *halqa* style of education can be reviewed under three practices: the Sunni *halqa*s, Shi'ite *halqa*s, and Ibadi *halqa*s. The Sunni *halqa*s, as discussed above, supplied much of the oral material that eventually crystallized into the six canonical Sunni collections—the six major *hadith* books; however, the Shi'ite *halqa*s were more organized and comprehensive. The education given in these *halqa*s involved both the Prophet's *hadith*s and the Shi'ite *imams'* sayings *(akhbar)* (Moazzen, 2020, p. 818). These sayings were then compiled as Four Books *(al-Kutub al-arba'a)*, which were kept being studied in these circles (Moazzen, 2020, p. 824). The Ibadi *halqa*s, on the other hand, were not formed in the mosques since Ibadism valued the secrecy of its members.[27] These circles were practiced as meetings in cellars, caves, or inside the houses of the Ibadi *'ulema*, which aimed to indoctrinate young Ibadis. Indeed, these *halqa*s can be categorized into three types when it comes to the method of indoctrination and the addressee: the *halqa*s that are open to all Ibadis, the *halqa*s that are open to the leading figures alone to discuss the central tenets of Ibadism, and the *halqa*s that the Ibadi missionaries were trained for five years before they initiate their missionary activities (Newiger, 2020, pp. 787–788).

The *halqa* activity soon spilled beyond theology into diverse disciplines, initially on an informal basis: a well-known scholar would go to a mosque, sit next to a pillar, and people—if they wanted—would gather around him to listen to what he said. It was that straightforward (Watt, 1973, p. 206). This practice became widespread in time, and the scholars determined their own area of expertise in knowledge. Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi (927–1023), a contemporary of the Ikhwan, criticized this tendency and claimed that separating *falsafa* and religion in the *halqa*s only to exalt their 'own' discipline was a bad move (Alshaar, 2020, pp. 670–671). Still, such a diversification was also valid in the theological disciplines. As Ibn Battuta writes his observations in Damascus, the Great Umayyad Mosque had thirteen separate *imam*s to perform rituals by following different *madhhab*s one by one—Shafi, Maliki, Hanafi, and Hanbali, following different practices of various regions and religious figures. Since the practice of religion was so diversified, it would be naïve to assume the theological *halqa*s would remain as

[27] The Ibadis lost their wars against the Ismailis in the early 10th century, and lost their hopes to establish an *imamate*. Thus, their "advent phase" was ended, and they went to the "secrecy phase" *(kitman)* afterwards, in order to regain a probable strength (Öz, 1997, p. 359).

a whole. Even in this mosque, education was diversified into different branches. The *'ulema* was divided: masters who teach reading, writing, chanting the Quran, memorizing the Quran, and studying the *hadith*s separately (Battuta, 2020, pp. 102–103). People who joined these *halqa*s could then leave their masters and establish their own *halqa*s; this practice could be best seen in Wasil ibn Ata's practice, the founder of Mu'tazila *kalam* methodology, who left Hasan of Basra's circle. The *falsafa* training had continued by following this line; several important figures like Amr ibn Ubayd, who discussed a lot with Abu Hanifa, Gaylan of Damascus, who was a son of Calip Uthman's slave, and Jahm bin Safwan, who was one of the pioneers of abstract thought in the Muslim *falsafa* under the name of Jahmiyya (Açıkgenç, 2015, pp. 30–31). These fresh *halqa*s then caused the emergence of competing *'ulema*, who tended to exalt their thoughts against others (Alshaar, 2020, p. 677). Education in the *halqa*s was not standardized at this time; it was a mutual transaction between the master and pupil: masters were travelling to well-known mosques to disseminate their thoughts, and pupils were travelling to these mosques to learn directly from the author of the books or treatises they read. Naturally, the diversification of expertise attracted both sides, and different circles were established by these wandering scholars, from philosophy to sciences, and from theology to humanities. A combination of settled knowledge and contributions of wandering scholars—particularly the Central Asians—made the disciplines more visible. The certification system *(ijaza)*, which addresses the master's approval to a pupil that he may also become a master to teach others, has both maintained the tradition in learning and given way to fresh thoughts in disciplines (Abdel-Latif, 2020, pp. 640–642; Starr, 2013, pp. 158–161). As we learn from Ibn Battuta's notes, *ijaza* could be an intense training. Also, it could involve several masters since he had received his *hadith* certification in fourteen days with fourteen classes in Damascus, from ten male and two female masters (Battuta, 2020, pp. 115–116). Though this was the case, the *halqa* tradition was dependent on a single person; however, with the donations of the wealthy Muslims through *waqf*s, like of those merchants or politicians, different scholars from different disciplines were united under a single roof where these disciplines were united through a specific curriculum: the *madrasa*s (Moazzen, 2020, p. 829).

2.2.3.2. *Madrasa*s

The term, *madrasa*, shares the same radical root with the entire Semitic languages, *d-r-s*, which addresses close meanings like reading, understanding through reading, and repeating to learn and to memorize a text. Thus, *madrasa* means the building where these activities are

conducted (Bozkurt, 2003, pp. 323–324). The *halqa* type of learning varied; they served both children and adults and could be utilized as elementary schools and higher learning, while the *madrasa*s were designed for higher learning alone. The birth of the *madrasa* had followed a linear path. First, the *masjid*s played a central role in disseminating knowledge; second, the *masjid-khan* institutions were established, which served as boarding schools for students; and finally, the *madrasa*s were institutionalized, which were supported by the *waqf* system (Pedersen & Makdisi, 1986, p. 1123). According to Adam Mez (1937, p. 179), the Islamic mode of education was more inclined to follow a disputation method *(munazarah)* between the students and teachers; this is why, mosques were deemed unfit for such an education system: the birth of a new compound attributed to this duty alone became necessary. Additionally, he claimed that the very first *madrasa* was founded in Nishapur in the 10th century (Mez, 1937, p. 180), while most historians accept that Nizam al-Mulk established the first *madrasa* in the mid-11th century (Zeydan, 2015, p. 175). Regardless of their original history, the *d-r-s* root had received another meaning before the establishment of *madrasa*s, which was 'teaching law'. This meaning created a fresh denomination for the teachers, such as *mudarris*, translated as 'the professor of law'. These people were considered amongst the *'ulema*, and only the accomplished *fakih*s (doctors of the *fiqh*) were able to become *mudarris*, after defending their theses successfully in *munazarah*s (Pedersen & Makdisi, 1986, p. 1124). As the Seljuks had risen as political authorities from Central Asia, they preferred to accept the Caliphate institution as the sovereign in religious affairs while creating a new sultanate post for themselves. Nizam al-Mulk, the mighty vizier of the Seljuks, fortified this fresh post by establishing numerous law schools which followed the Shafi'i *madhhab* in *fiqh* (Stanton, 1990, pp. 37–38). The *'ulema* were deemed 'right hand' of the caliphs before the Seljuks; they were filling a highly respected social status. However, with the emergence of the Seljuks as a counterweight in the Muslim political life, the role of the caliphate waned. From this point on, newly introduced non-Arab Muslim rulers tried to create their legitimacy by leaning on the *'ulema* of the cities they conquered. Ahmad ibn Tulun of the Tulunid Dynasty, Nur al-Din Zengi of the Zengid Dynasty, Saladin of the Ayyubid Dynasty, and many others followed this approach by giving importance to the *'ulema* (Zeydan, 2015, p. 177). Saladin, for instance, established numerous *madrasa*s in Egypt that promoted Sunni Islam in their curriculum against Shi'ite *da'i*s, of which he aimed to train new bureaucrats for his government (Newby, 2002, p. 135).

Ibn Jema'a (d. 1333), a venerated *mudarris* of the *madrasa* tradition, who might be labeled as a well-rounded pedagogue for higher learning, claimed that *madrasa* education was

for enhancing morality; thus, both the *mudarris* and the student are obliged to follow specific rules. For example, education should be pursued for the love of God and the pursuit of knowledge, not for worldly gains. The *mudarris* must be pious, humble, and have dignity; he must understand that his words and actions will serve as examples for the students. A gradual approach should be adopted in education, and students should be tested periodically to help them overcome their shyness. Students, on the other hand, should prioritize dignity in their interactions. They should respect their professors and be aware of their positive and negative qualities, which will help them choose their own circles for attending the *madrasa*s (Rosenthal, 2004, pp. 319–320). Though these advices of Ibn Jema'a through morality are promising, by the very nature of the concept of morality, the *madrasa* tradition was not limited to the Shafi'i *madhhab* alone; Hanafi and Hanbali *madrasa*s were established in time. The Malikis, however, who mainly were in the Al-Andalus region, preferred to follow the *halqa* tradition in mosques; the very first *madrasa* was established as late as the 13th century in Spain (Pedersen & Makdisi, 1986, p. 1129). The Sunni tradition in *madrasa*s followed some central courses in the curriculum, such as the *fiqh*, the *tafsir*, the *hadith*, the *nahw* (Arabic grammar), the *balagha* (rhetoric), the *riyada* (simple mathematics), and logic (Hartmann, 2020, p. 728). Still, the weight of these courses was not equal; the *madrasa* teaching style prioritized knowledge that everyone should know first. Therefore, Islam's rituals and laws were given more attention, rhetoric followed it, and logic and mathematics came last (Hodgson, 1993, p. 158). For instance, anything about world history was not in the curriculum in any *madrasa*; the Prophet's life was studied instead (Rosenthal, 1968, p. 42). Indeed, this tendency to prioritize Islamic *sciences* can be observed in the establishing document of the *waqf* that founded Nizamiyyah *Madrasa*. According to the articles in this document, this *madrasa* was built to teach the Shafi'i doctrine in both *fiqh* and *kalam*, the staff must be the Shafiites, the Quranic *sciences* must be taught, the Arabic grammar must be taught, and the staff must receive a portion of the *waqf*'s revenue (Stanton, 1990, pp. 40–41). The staff consisted of teachers of different ranks. The master teachers were named *sheikh*, and a label was added to their titles showing their area of expertise, like *sheikh al-hadith* and *sheikh al-qira'a* (master of reading). However, the *fiqh* professors were not called *sheik al-fiqh*; instead, they were called *mudarris*. Additionally, the *ra'is* title given to the topmost scholar of a scholarly branch in a region showed the character of the *madrasa* he was teaching. This title was so important that the *madrasa*s were called with the names of these figures (Pedersen & Makdisi, 1986, pp. 1131–1132). Naturally, these professors were attracting a good number of students. For instance, al-Farabi had tens of thousands of students. Similarly, Abu Bakr al-Razi's students were so many that his seasoned pupils were

creating their own *halqa*s around al-Razi; they were trying to conclude *munazarah*s in their own circles, and consult with al-Razi if they were unable to conclude the debate (Zeydan, 2015, pp. 182–183).

Such characterizations of the *madrasa*s above were mainly attributed to the Sunni understanding of Islam. However, the Shi'ite versions of *madrasa* existed as well. These places differ from their Sunni counterparts. The Sunni *madrasa*s were focusing on the education of Islamic knowledge, while the Shi'ite ones were trying to legitimize and materialize their story by fortifying the Shi'ite identity through education. Naturally, their curricula differed from the Sunni *madrasa*s but not as much as one might expect; the Shi'ite *mudarris*es had once trained in the *halqa*s of the Sunni professors. Though these Shi'ite *madrasa*s trained their students the same way as the Sunni ones, like following the very same courses in the teaching process, the main difference between these two was teaching the Shi'ite *imams'* sayings *(akhbar)*. Indeed, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, for example, as a prominent Shi'ite scholar, discussed little differently from Ibn Jema'a in his book titled *Rules of Conduct for Students*, which promoted a didactic method in the *madrasa* style of teaching. The teaching approach should be based on morality, aesthetics, and salvation through religion; therefore, knowledge was viewed as a virtue, and he demonstrated the methodology for achieving this virtue through education (Moazzen, 2020, pp. 829–831). Still, a general characterization of the curriculum in the *madrasa* life was deftly summarized by Friedrich Dieterici, who reviewed the Ikhwan's al-Rasa'il, by following their classification of studies. In this respect, the *madrasa* style of education was focusing on mainly three branches: daily studies like writing, grammar, basic mathematics, magic, commerce, agriculture, etc., religious studies like the Quranic *sciences*, the *hadith*, mysticism, asceticism, etc., and philosophical studies like logic, geometry, astronomy, music, cosmogony, botany, zoology, etc. (Stanton, 1990, pp. 45–46). On the other side of the *madrasa* system, students, who are the recipients of education, had the freedom to join any *halqa* of any professor. Since *madrasa* education was free, thanks to the *waqf*s, students did not pay for their accommodation or food; in fact, they received certain allowances. This aspect of the *madrasa* system was both a blessing and a curse for students. Many students left their professors at any time, knowing they could continue at another *madrasa* without charge; consequently, they traveled from one city to another well into old age. Nevertheless, these experienced students, who were between students and teachers, also contributed to transmitting knowledge. They formed an important part of the education system in the Muslim world (Pedersen & Makdisi, 1986, p. 1134). That is, no *ijaza* was required for being a wandering scholar, or in this case, a wandering student.

2.2.3.3. Libraries

As Peter Burke (2000, pp. 55–56) deftly summarized, libraries are traditional knowledge repositories and centers of informational communication. These library features were also true for Muslim communities during the Golden Age of Islam. The precursors of libraries in the Muslim world were mosques; the books stored there mainly consisted of various copies of the Quran. Since multiplying this sacred text and donating its copies was considered a pious act, early Muslims were eager to copy it (Walbridge, 2004, p. 414). Until the last quarter of the 8th century, sciences were mainly limited to the Islamic *sciences*. They gradually encompassed other knowledge domains; the very first books focused on poetry, historical events and narratives, proverbs, and aphorisms (Zeydan, 2015, p. 185). The first library that included these types of books was established in Damascus during the reign of the Umayyads, with the name of *Bayt al-Hikma*, akin to the one that was established by the Abbasids later (Erünsal, 2014, p. 471). Many reasons can explain the rise of libraries in Muslim lands: the introduction of paper production technology from Central Asia in the 8th century, the ease of writing quickly with Arabic cursive, the widespread literacy among the middle and upper classes, the concerns of Muslim rulers about securing their legitimacy which led them to invest in the *'ulema* and books, the importance of recording orally transmitted knowledge, and the allowance of *waqf*s to donate books (Walbridge, 2004, p. 414). Based on these reasons, it is possible to categorize libraries during the Golden Age of Islam as private libraries, royal libraries, and public libraries.

The Quran exalted knowledge above all; thus, the Muslims 'loved' the books—in the literal sense (Stanton, 1990, p. 128).[28] Wealthy Muslims, in particular, considered possessing many books to indicate high social prestige. For instance, it was reported that a Muslim scholar was looking for a particular book in Córdoba, which he found at an auction. However, a wealthy man kept increasing the price, and the scholar could not buy it. He then learned that this wealthy man loved the size and the ornaments on the spine of the book, and he wanted to buy it for a competition to possess books within his own social circle, not to read it. That is, the wealthy Muslims were inclined to establish libraries in their homes, only to be exalted by the community with this move (Zeydan, 2015, pp. 190–191). Indeed, possession of a grand library turned into

[28] Though Charles Michael Stanton did not reference this comment, these two verses from the Quran might be helpful to elucidate the statement: [Surah Ta-Ha (Ta-Ha), Verse 114] Exalted is God, the True King. Do not be hasty with the Quran before its inspiration to you is concluded, and say, "My Lord, increase me in knowledge" (Itani, 2015, p. 136), and [Surah az-Zumar (Throngs), Verse 9] Is he who worships devoutly during the watches of the night, prostrating himself and standing up, mindful of the Hereafter, and placing his hope in the mercy of his Lord? Say, "Are those who know and those who do not know equal?" Only those possessed of reason will remember (Itani, 2015, p. 200).

a fashion in Al-Andalus in time; therefore, and naturally, a commercial activity was initiated by the merchants: carrying books from the eastern parts of the Muslim world to its western part (Erünsal, 2014, p. 472). With the simple fact that if there is a demand, there has to be a supply, numerous bookshops were established in the populated cities of the Muslim world. For example, Baghdad had more than one hundred separate bookstores just before the Mongolian invasion destroyed the city. These stores were the copy centers of the translated works. As the demand multiplied, bookstore owners expanded their business by binding books with leather first, and decorating them with some ornaments later, which caused a new art form to emerge and created a fresh market that addresses human desire for possession. Besides these, bookstores served as places that brought scholars and the laity together, in the form of learning centers, which can be seen as an early advertisement technique (Stanton, 1990, pp. 127–128). Still, having a personal library cannot be attributed to having a high prestige within society alone; many scholars had thousands of books at their disposal. It was said that Sahib ibn Abbad had a library that could only be carried by 400 camels, an Egyptian physician had 20 thousand volumes, and Ibn Qudama had 10,000 books (Zeydan, 2015, pp. 197–198). Though these look like some serious numbers to possess, even though it was said that some particular people had over 100,000 books, in fact, many of them consisted of multiple copies of the same book (Stanton, 1990, p. 129).

The Muslim rulers had shown a similar pattern in establishing private libraries. Al-Aziz Billah, for instance, the second Fatimid caliph, initiated scientific and cultural studies in Egypt and established a great library in his palace, which was called 'Treasure of the Books' *(Khazinat al-Kutub)* (Zeydan, 2015, p. 192). Similarly, Adud al-Dawla of the Buyid dynasty established a monumental library in his palace (Erünsal, 2014, p. 473). This library and several others, like the one established by al-Hakam II in Córdoba, were not open to public access. The Samanid ruler Nuh b. Mansur's library, for example, was utilized by Ibn Sina only after he became the ruler's personal physician. Besides, some privileged scholars who gained access to royal libraries were monitored strictly. It was known that al-Kindi was expelled from the Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil's library after being accused of confiscating a book. Though there are some rumors that this accusation happened because of an academic competition with another scholar, as well as his Mu'tazilite tendencies, it is clear that these libraries were restricted to the public. Similarly, al-Biruni flourished only when he had access to the royal library of Abu Nasr Mansur when he was only seventeen years old (Stowasser, 2020, pp. 573–574). With a simple fact that Nuh b. Mansur had established his library (the one Ibn Sina used) for Nasir al-Din al-

Tusi alone, by paying the Tatars who stole books from Baghdad, Damascus, and al-Jazira (Zeydan, 2015, p. 197), it can be asserted that royal libraries were both serving as prestige tools for the rulers and places that link one scholar to another.

When a ruler wants his subjects to enhance their intellectual abilities, *he* often establishes a public library. Because, unlike manuscripts, which were inexpensive, full-fledged books were costly products (Zeydan, 2015, p. 194; Walbridge, 2004, p. 414). These public libraries can be traced all over Muslim geography, with more or less similar features within. For instance, these libraries were well-decorated, with carpets installed and desks ready for the comfort of the researchers. Additionally, ink and paper were free of charge. These features of public libraries were also similar to those of the semi-public libraries. Public library books were also cataloged so that researchers could access them easily. The Nizamiya *Madrasa*, for instance, had six thousand titles in its catalogue while the grand library in Cairo had a forty-four-volume catalogue alone. Naturally, a vast operation like this required a populous organization. Some grand public libraries hosted around one hundred employees, assigned to different tasks like cataloging, translation, and copying. Indeed, *Bayt al-Hikma* of Baghdad had different chambers assigned for specific roles, like the library itself, a salon for reading, numerous chambers assigned to *halqa* training, and a separate observatory sponsored by the caliph alone (Stanton, 1990, pp. 130–131). Some notable works were stored with multiple copies in these libraries; al-Tabari's famous history book, for example, became an inclination to store at least twenty separate copies in each library (Gibb, 1963, pp. 79–80). Apart from the ruler and/or caliph's sponsorship of the libraries, the *waqf* system was the main patron of sustaining them. Still, they were established to promote unorthodox notions, like philosophy, which ecclesiastics did not enjoy, or the Shi'ite ideology, which the Sunnis challenged (Crone, 2007, pp. 468–469). Indeed, *Dar al-Hikma* of Cairo, which was established to promote the Fatimid ideology, containing no less than 100,000 separate volumes, was destroyed by Saladin for this purpose; he then established a *madrasa* on its ground, which followed a Shafi curriculum in its teaching (Zeydan, 2015, pp. 194–195). This section might be concluded by touching upon two distinct fates of the public libraries concerning what the last sentence told: the number of books in their zenith times, and how they were destroyed. Both *Bayt al-Hikma* of Baghdad and *Dar al-Hikma* of Cairo hosted 100,000 volumes, Maragheh library in Iran had 400,000 volumes, and the Tripoli library of Lebanon had three million volumes (Zeydan, 2015, p. 198). Similarly, in the Merv of the Seljuks, there were twelve separate libraries, and according to Yaqut al-Hamawi, a Muslim scholar with expertise in geography and history, each

of these libraries had twelve thousand volumes (Starr, 2013, p. 396). Akin to Saladin's destruction of *Dar al-Hikma* with religiopolitical motives, the rest of many public libraries experienced the very same fate. Hulegu Khan of the Ilkhanate burned *Bayt al-Hikma* of Baghdad in 1258, the Crusaders burned the library in Tripoli in the early 12th century, al-Aziz Billah's library was destroyed during a political upheaval, which resulted in a significant number of volumes being thrown into the Nile, and the rest was scattered in the desert. With the assistance of intense winds, it was reported by the locals that the pages of these books piled up some great hills in the desert, which they then named 'book hills'. Apart from these tragic destructions, the history had witnessed some serious insults towards these precious books: slaves made shoes out of the leather bindings of them, and the Mongols utilized same bindings as equipment for their horses (Stanton, 1990, p. 132; Zeydan, 2015, pp. 193, 196; Erünsal, 2014, p. 472).

2.2.3.4. Concluding Remarks

Perhaps the most remarkable reason for the achievements the Muslim world attained during the Golden Age is its ability to foster an intellectual ecosystem. This ecosystem enabled intellectuals and their philosophical and scientific ideas to circulate continuously through social spaces: mosques, colleges, and libraries. Knowledge production became institutionalized in these places; they developed their own legitimacy and appeared in different forms. These forms manifested in various realms; some served as propaganda centers, but all helped reproduce social bonds, sectarian differences, and political authority. As a result, these places acted as stages illustrating the connections between knowledge and power, tradition and reform, individual effort, and institutional structures.

With this respect, the *halqa* tradition's inherent master-disciple structure played the role of authenticity, pluralism, and multiplication of places in transmitting knowledge. That is, both the master and disciple became mobile repositories of knowledge; this system made the concept of curriculum a passive thing, and intellectual mobility allowed numerous interdisciplinary intellectuals to flourish. The *madrasa* tradition, however, played the role of institutionalized continuity in transmitting knowledge. Still, the wandering scholars and scholar candidates were in play; however, the *madrasa* had managed to establish a bidirectional flow of knowledge between the classical and the novel. On the other hand, libraries directly played the role of concretizing collective memory. The link between sanctity of *the* book and prestige of *the*

merchandise elevated the book's status, giving it a new character that was shaped over ownership; from that point on, books were not deemed mere bulks of paper compiled for the purpose of reading. The ownership framework here can be read as an individual ambition and a cultural presence. That is to say, *the* book *ipso facto* created a new culture in the Muslim world.

2.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, the Golden Age of Islam is viewed both as a period of rich cultural and scientific activity in the Muslim world and as a complex process of meaning-making. This is why the conceptual framework aims to present the Age beyond just highlighting specific achievements; it offers a comprehensive narrative that includes the institutional, political, and linguistic sources of knowledge production. Consequently, the Age is characterized as a Kantian-style period of enlightenment. However, what makes it unique is how participants of the Age integrated theology with their own epistemologies. Many of these epistemologies were based on Ancient Greek ideas; nonetheless, some leading Muslim intellectuals succeeded in Islamizing these concepts, leading to the emergence of several original yet eclectic methodologies. Since God's first command was "Recite!", Muslims first read, then produced based on what they read. In this process, knowledge became a treasured and respected possession. With the rise of the *'ulema*, knowledge was transmitted orally, but with the advent of books, it became accessible to everyone who could afford them. Reverence for knowledge led to the creation of institutions like *madrasa*s, and the Islamic worldview prompted a mental transformation driven by both Islamic sciences and the reinterpretation of Greek heritage.

Still, the Age's success cannot be attributed to the efforts of philosophers alone; political and institutional structures played an important role in this period. The Caliphate institution, in particular, initially represented a political notion and transformed itself into a monarchical structure by blending with a theological legitimacy. That transformation was a mere outcome of a long-running political strategy; however, it triggered a central problem, which questioned the status of knowledge: Which knowledge is legitimate? That is how some learning institutions like *Bayt al-Hikma* and *Dar al-Hikma* were established; the knowledge produced in these places aimed to reflect the political ruler as being in an 'enlightened' status. That is, knowledge found a new arena to struggle for itself, after the epistemological battles: the political arena. Such a struggle was mentioned as 'pious fraud' and 'ideological legitimacy' phrases throughout the

text; similarly, an example like obtaining *ijaza* from Aristotle in sleep can be put in the same set. Production of knowledge in the Age was a bilateral process between the philosophers and politicians; their organic interaction created a multilayered and multifaceted intellectual environment. Indeed, even the emergence of Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, and Maturidism alongside numerous sects can verify this argument. "The Golden Age of Islam flourished through conflicts and struggles" could be the central theme of this chapter.

The following chapters, namely, the third, the fourth, and the fifth, explore the main problem of this study. Numerous references given in this chapter can be traced there.

CHAPTER 3

A COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL TENETS

The main goal of this chapter is to explore the role and significance of the individual in the world through the texts titled al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* by examining two concepts centered on the individual: freedom and rights. The outline will proceed as follows: first, the concept will be defined in its lexical meaning. Then, two sets will be established; these are typically chosen based on a simple principle—one covering the internal aspects of the concept, and the other addressing its external effects. Afterward, a conceptual framework for the chosen concept will be presented historically and contextually. It is crucial to understand what these two texts [and their authors] knew about the development of the concept, both before their times and during their specific periods. Following this, the Ikhwan's interpretations of the concept will be discussed first, then followed by evaluations of the Encyclopedists. A comparison between these two texts will be made, highlighting both their similarities and differences. Next, a 'concluding remarks' section will underline these texts' impact on future generations. Although this section tends to be more straightforward, some foundational points will be provided to maintain a comprehensive overview. This sequence will be repeated for all concepts—freedom and rights in this chapter, morality and equality in the fourth, and sovereignty and justice in the fifth—more or less. At the end of this chapter, a broad conclusion will compare these two concepts through some selected, inclusive themes under the overarching idea of "individual". The following chapters, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, will employ the same methodology, though their focus areas are social and political, respectively.

3.1. Freedom

The Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines freedom as *"the condition or right of being able or allowed to, say, think, etc. whatever you want to, without being controlled or limited"* (Procter, 1995, p. 562) while defining liberty as *"the freedom to live as you wish or go where you want"* (Procter, 1995, p. 816). We can observe two remarks here with the assistance of these definitions: first, freedom becomes the essence of liberty, and second, freedom is considered a factual condition and/or a normative right. Therefore, freedom

essentially constitutes a concept defined within the individual realm. However, the *"being controlled or limited"* nuance in the definition of freedom brings at least one *other* subject, other than the primary individual, to the stage, a subject who restricts the practice of freedom. Therefore, by applying a simple deconstruction process to the concept of freedom, we can reach out to two *arche*s: the ability to act as pleased and an authority that aims to restrict that ability. If we consider these two *arche*s as fuzzy sets, it would be possible to put some elements within them. Therefore, the first set that could be named 'ability to act as pleased' will naturally involve individual features such as the desire of the soul, act of will, faculty of motion, certainty of determination, etc. The second set, however, will include some elements that limit the ability to act freely, involving internal and external authorities. That is, this second fuzzy set we discuss here will host some social traditions, religious rules, the existence of political authority, individual conscience, legitimate laws, etc. This set could then be easily named 'authorities that limit freedom'. This subchapter examines the concept of freedom and attributed values and comments on it in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* over the characteristics of these two sets.

3.1.1. Conceptual Framework of Freedom

Freedom did not refer to the same thing we know today until modern times; the term has undergone several changes and fluctuations in its meanings. This subchapter aims to touch upon the cornerstones of these changes and to explain the general characteristics of freedom before and during the publication of al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie.*

The Ancient Greeks had conceptualized freedom *(eleutheria)* through property, that is, to become independent from others by remaining autonomous in their lives. This conception of freedom brought people together and imposed civic duties such as military service and participation in the assembly. However, such a nature would also cause a chaotic environment to emerge. Since no superior authority desired to take charge in the fashion of an autocrat, the status of justice at the political level became problematic. This is how the political thought emerged in Ancient Greece, aiming to reconcile freedom and communal order. Such a reconciliation process brought division of social errands following their functions (Meier, 2012, pp. 11–13). This is why Benjamin Constant (2010, p. 311) concisely summarized ancient conceptualization of liberty with the functions of government, claiming that liberty carried different meanings for ancients, like discussions about war, peace, and alliances, voting laws, evaluating magistrates, etc., which are directly related to politics. Indeed, Plato also treated

liberty primarily as political freedom. His conceptualization of a functioning society criticizes democracy; accordingly, the poor will kill or exile the rich, and share the state equally by drawing lots to assign offices. However, since everyone is perfectly free in democracies, they cannot be forced to govern the society. Besides, such an environment of freedom might cause people to initiate some undeserved authorizations for themselves (Plato, 2007, pp. 254–256). Thus, Plato was hesitant towards practicing freedom limitlessly, at least within the parameters of political freedom. To serve as a good example of the practice of such a limited freedom, Aristotle draws attention to Plato's remark on limiting freedom to acquire property with five times more than the smallest property a citizen holds in his hands, at most (Aristotle, 1998, p. 42). Though the rich constitute a minority in a/any society, Aristotle claims, in his best suggestion of a political system called *politeia* (polity), both the rich and the poor share freedom that comes with it (Aristotle, 1998, pp. 78–79). Nature designed free people and slaves differently (Aristotle, 1998, p. 9); thus, governing free people and slaves differs (Aristotle, 1998, p. 12). Because their virtues differ, but it must not be forgotten that slaves are human beings as well (Aristotle, 1998, p. 22). Still, if the ultimate goal is securing the welfare of the citizens, then the freemen should only be governed by the freemen (Aristotle, 1998, pp. 72–73). This brings Aristotle to the conclusion that the city-state is nothing but a community of free people (Aristotle, 1998, p. 77); it aims to establish a life worth living for its citizens. If that were not the case, it would be possible to form a state of slaves or animals. However, they are not free entities and do not take their shares from happiness (Aristotle, 1998, p. 80).

Benjamin Constant's lecture addressed not only the ancient Greeks alone but also the Romans. They also placed the concept of freedom inside the political domain. The Roman society was built upon a slavery system, which was codified into the Twelve Tablets, that is, their first written code, and the Romans did not consider liberty within the reach of human dignity. Thus, the society was divided into slaves *(servus)* and free people *(liber)*. The Roman laws defined freedom as a natural power that gives the holder the ability to act as they please while placing the concept of slavery within the law of nations *(ius gentium)* by claiming slaves were against nature; thus, acknowledging them as mere property (Atkins, 2018, pp. 40–41). Cicero approaches the concept of freedom from where Plato left off, but within the practice of the Republic. He says freedom is the *sweetest thing* one can experience, which is also valid for animals. However, being slaves to a monarch or an aristocrat will cause people to lose their freedom (Cicero, 2021, p. 34). Besides, experiencing *too much* freedom will cause the society to become headless; tyrants will emerge within the society, and the difference between the

slaves and free people will become blurry (Cicero, 2021, pp. 41–43). Cicero concludes his remarks on the link between political regime and freedom by claiming a society ruled by a 'king' lacks freedom, because freedom does not mean having a *just* master but having *no* master at all (Cicero, 2021, p. 61). Though it was like a custom to evaluate freedom within the political sphere, especially linking freedom with worldly situation of ability to act as pleased or lacking from this ability, Seneca, as a Stoic philosopher, brought the concept of freedom into a different paradigm. According to him, true freedom can *only* be received by being a slave to philosophy (Seneca, 1969, p. 46). The people, he says, love this life; however, this love serves as a chain that holds them. If a man completes the rehearsal of his death in this life, he becomes completely free; nothing in this life becomes an obstacle in front of him (Seneca, 1969, pp. 71–72). Therefore, philosophy frees souls and aids in completing rehearsal for reaching a better world, a heavenly world. If everything in this world consists of matter and God, says Seneca, death is either a transition or an end. Thus, since the soul has long been trapped inside the body, spiritual freedom will prevail over bodily freedom (Seneca, 1969, pp. 122–124). Freedom in an immaterial domain, specifically the soul, can also be traced in Augustine's writings. As a pious Christian and living in the late Roman world, Augustine conceptualized freedom through the concept of sin, and he situated the idea squarely within a theological framework. As a young student, he argued that committing evil was a natural cause of free will; living beings desire *things* with their own wills (Augustine, 1953, pp. 165–166). He later refined his thoughts on this matter and approached the concept of freedom from two complementary angles: first, the relationship between God's foreknowledge and human free will, and second, spiritual freedom. According to Augustine, a *necessity* does not invalidate one's ability to choose good over evil. Although God knows in advance what will happen, people still suffer—or flourish—because of the choices made freely. God, being omnipotent, exercises *his* own will without suffering; humans, by contrast, bear the consequences of their decisions. Augustine adopts a moderate approach here, that reconciles divine foreknowledge with human responsibility: as a theologian, he affirms God's omniscience, while as a philosopher, he insists on human agency and the moral imperative of leading a responsible life (Augustine, 2008, pp. 262–265). Blaming divine providence for worldly evil, he warns, would alienate humanity from the *true* nature of God (Augustine, 2008, p. 160). *True* freedom, therefore, requires abandoning false gods and embracing spiritual liberation (Augustine, 2008, p. 126). Augustine concludes that unwavering hope and trust in God render a person spiritually free, thereby preparing the believer to receive even greater freedom in God's kingdom (Augustine, 2008, p. 160).

Augustine's ideas profoundly influenced Medieval Europe. Yet, the Biblical roots of his ideas reveal an even earlier connection between religion and freedom. The Old and New Testaments evaluate freedom in three ways: physical liberation, the covenant between God and men, and spiritual freedom. The physical liberation is exemplified in the Exodus chapter of the Old Testament, where God liberated the Israelites from slavery in Egypt (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 91).[1] Here, freedom is simply the opposite of slavery. The Jubilee legislation likewise mandates the manumission of slaves and the restoration of ancestral lands every fiftieth year, embedding freedom within a social justice program (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, pp. 150–151).[2] The New Testament reprises this motif but reconfigures it Christologically: liberation from bondage is now achieved through Christ's redemptive grace, appropriated by faith rather than communal effort (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 234).[3] The covenant with God is the second understanding of freedom for the Old Testament, and it is a restrictive one: it restricts liberty. God had given *the Law* to Moses on Mount Sinai, which restricts the freedom of God's followers; in other words, it draws the borders of their freedom (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 706).[4] Therefore, freedom is not a license in the eyes of the Bible; it has a relation with God. Indeed, this relationship was formed between men and God through Christ in the New Testament. Accordingly, Jesus Christ was either considered the liberator of people (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 129)[5] or he advised people to use their liberties for serving others with love, not for self-pleasures (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 235).[6] Lastly, similar to Augustine's complete trust in God's reality, the Old Testament parallels spiritual freedom. This means freedom from sin will lead people to eternal freedom (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 73).[7] The New Testament also draws attention to an afterlife freedom—an eternal one, by following the Holy

[1] [Exodus 20:2] I am Jehovah thy God, who have brought thee out from the land of Egypt, from the house of bondage.
[2] [Leviticus 25:10] And ye shall sanctify the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty in all the land to all the inhabitants thereof. It shall be a jubilee to you, and ye shall return each man to his possession, and each man to his family ye shall return.
[3] [Galatians 5:1] With freedom did Christ make us free; stand fast therefore, and be not held again with a yoke of bondage.
[4] [Psalm 119:44-45] [44] And I will keep thy law continually, Forever and ever. [45] And I shall walk at large; For thy precepts have I sought. (Note: Here, "walk at large" means "walking in liberty").
[5] [John 8:36] The Son abides forever; if then the Son makes you free, ye will be freemen indeed.
[6] [Galatians 5:13] For ye were called to freedom, brethren; only use not your freedom for an occasion to the flesh, but through love ser one another.
[7] [Exodus 6:6-7] [6] Therefore say to the sons of Israel, I am Jehovah; and I will bring you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians, and I will deliver you from their service, and I will redeem you with an arm stretched forth and with great judgments, [7] and I will take you to be my people, and I will be your God. And ye shall know that I Jehovah am your God, who brings you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians.

Spirit in this life (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 223)[8] and receiving an ultimate form of freedom in the afterlife where there are no such evil things as sin, suffering, death, slavery, etc. (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 197).[9]

The Quran also followed the same approach as the Old and New Testaments; it addresses freedom as physical and social freedom, eternal liberation, and a liberated worldly life within the boundaries set by God. The physical and social freedoms show themselves in the guise of being liberated from cruelty *(zulm)*, which is also directly related to the justice understanding of the Quran, as well as the slavery institution. The link between seeking freedom from cruelty and oppression may be best reviewed in Surah an-Nisa', where God reproaches the believers who hesitate to fight against the oppressors despite the prayers of those seeking freedom (Itani, 2015, p. 36).[10] Similarly, the Quran acknowledges the existence of an ill social practice known as slavery. It highlights the fair and just treatment of slaves (Itani, 2015, p. 34)[11] while advising people to free them (Itani, 2015, p. 269).[12] The Quran also conceptualizes freedom in the fashion of an eternal liberation, similar to the Jewish and Christian traditions, either by highlighting the beauty of the afterlife in which people will not suffer from struggles, limitations, and injustices (Itani, 2015, p. 109)[13] or by emphasizing to refrain from Hell and to qualify for Heaven (Itani, 2015, p. 128).[14] Finally, though human beings were created as free entities whose earthly doings will secure their places in Heaven or Hell in the afterlife, such liberty was restricted by God in the Quranic sense. God expects human beings to worship *him* before anything else (Itani, 2015, p. 229),[15] and the practice of freedom does not come as a self-authorization but must be exercised within the parameters of the rules in divine understanding

[8] [II Corinthians 3:17] Now the Lord is the Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom.
[9] [Romans 8:21] that creation itself also will be set free from the bondage of corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God.
[10] [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 75] And why would you not fight in the cause of God, and the helpless men, and women, and children, cry out, "Our lord, deliver us from this town whose people are oppressive, and appoint for us from Your Presence a Protector, and appoint for us from Your Presence a Victor".
[11] [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 36] Worship God, and ascribe no partners to Him, and be good to the parents, and the relatives, and the orphans, and the poor, and the neighbor next door, and the distant neighbor, and the close associate, and the traveler, and your servants. God does not love the arrogant showoff.
[12] [Surah al-Balad (The Land), Verses 12-13] [12] And what will explain to you what the ascent is? [13] The freeing of a slave.
[13] [Surah al-Hijr (The Rock), Verses 46-48] [46] "Enter it in peace and security". [47] And We will remove all ill-feelings from their hearts -brothers and sisters, on couches facing one another. [48] No fatigue will ever touch them therein, nor will they be asked to leave it.
[14] [Surah al-Kahf (The Cave), Verses 106-107] [106] That is their requital -Hell- on account of their disbelief, and their taking My revelations and My messengers in mockery. [107] As for those believe and do righteous deeds, they will have the Gardens of Paradise for hospitality.
[15] [Surah adh-Dhariyat (The Spreaders), Verse 56] I did not create the jinn and the humans except to worship Me.

of morality (Itani, 2015, p. 60).[16] With these remarks put by the same Abrahamic deity in three different texts, it is possible to circumscribe the Abrahamic religious understanding of freedom as being in a status of slavery and/or oppression, receiving divine liberty in the afterlife, acting within the boundaries of divine law, and practicing freedom within divine moral rules.

Arabs, both before and after the arrival of Islam, understood freedom in a way that was not entirely different from what the Quran suggested, but they expressed it differently. The Arabic word for freedom is *hurriya*, but this term is not mentioned in the Quran in that form; instead, the phrase *al-hurr wa-l'abd* is used, which means 'the free and the slave' (El-Kaisy-Friemuth, 2019, p. 102). The most archaic conceptualization of freedom in the Near East that the Arabs *came into contact with* dates back to around 800 B.C.E., and it was conceptualized within the parameters of free will (Rosenthal, 1960, p. 14). Since this free will requires acting as pleased, the ancient poems of Bedouin Arabs highlighted the love of freedom, which Montgomery Watt (1993, pp. 28–29) describes as a deliberate return to *the* desert's harsh but liberating environment. The word *'abd*, as mentioned above, which means slave, was not referring to a negative meaning; instead, the pre-Islamic Arabs considered it an honorable situation to become slaves of a powerful man, and believed that they were all slaves to their gods (El-Kaisy-Friemuth, 2019, p. 102).[17] Hence, the central theme in Islam has always considered freedom according to the Muslim jurists; however, several limitations were sanctioned for human beings since they are weak entities in their wills. In a dualistic way, these limitations were set per human nature on both body and soul (Gibb, 1966, pp. 99–100). Prophet Mohammad, titled *"the prophet armed"* by Marshall Hodgson, traded a piece of the Arabic sense of freedom to create a new confessional community, the *ummah* (Hodgson, 1974, p. 185). This kind of trading shows similarities with a well-known principle of the early Arabs, as freedom can be sacrificed for the collective welfare of the tribe (El-Kaisy-Friemuth, 2019, p. 104). Thus, for the establishment of a new society, notable archaic practices of freedom that aim both body and soul, such as seeking revenge, relationships with women, drinking alcoholic

[16] [Surah al-An'am (Livestock), Verse 151] Say, "Come, let me tell you what your Lord has forbidden you: that you associate nothing with Him; that you honor your parents; that you do not kill your children because of poverty -We provide for you and for them; that you do not come near indecencies, whether outward or inward; and that you do not kill the soul which God has sanctified –except in the course of justice. All this He has enjoined upon you, so that you may understand".

[17] Some clear examples of the utilization of *'abd* word can be seen in Prophet Mohammad's ascendants, as their names were *'Abd-al-Lah* (Slave of Lah), the father of the Prophet (Topaloğlu, 1988), *'Abd-al-Muttalib* (Slave of Muttalib), the grandfather of the Prophet (Sezikli, 1988), and *Hashim b. 'Abd-al-Manaf* (Slave of Manaf), the great-grandfather of the Prophet (Sarıçam, 1997). This usage of the word in naming babies continues in the present day, and it is very common to meet Muslims who carry *Abdallah*, *Abdalqader*, *Abdaljabbar*, etc. names, for addressing different adjectives of the Muslim God and expressing obedience to *him*.

beverages, etc., were restricted by Prophet Mohammad, either directly or by warning the Muslims (Watt, 1993, p. 244; Goldziher, 2009, pp. 64–67). Though this was the case for the Muslims, concerning the Quranic understanding of religious tolerance[18] towards people outside of the Islamic circle, it granted non-Muslims a form of liberty on different practices of their religions, both in the Arabic lands and in the conquered territories, with a small tax imposed on them named *jizya* (Goldziher, 2009, pp. 39–40; Barthold, 1984, pp. 107–108). This practice continued for centuries in different versions of the Islamic reign; however, the Arabs carried a common tendency to consider non-Arabs *(mawla)* as socially inferior beings, equalizing them with slaves, even though they became Muslims afterwards. The rise of Muslim cities and the spread of Islam led Arabs to complain about the tax status of these non-Arabs, and this hatred toward them escalated during the Umayyad period. It was after the Abbasid reign that the Arab and non-Arab Muslims became equal, as well as equalizing freed black slaves with the rest of the Muslim community. This new practice was so intense that the records mention a freed black Muslim slave[19] who ruled Egypt as a semi-independent governor for twenty years (Mantran, 1981, pp. 194–196).[20]

Islam spread via conquests, and accessing new lands brought immense mobility to the Muslims, allowing even ordinary Muslims to travel across vast Muslim territories governed by the same set of Islamic laws, the *sharia*—albeit some minor regional differences existed in this law. Such a felicity enhanced the individual liberties of Muslims (Hodgson, 1993, p. 152). Other than being relatively tolerant to non-Muslims in the course of history, this individual liberty was so respected in the Muslim community that Marshall Hodgson (1993, p. 159) claimed it was far more extensive than in the West; so vast that *"Diogenes and his tub would have been more readily tolerated in the Islamicate society than in the Occidental"*. Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall (2011, pp. 32–33) claimed that the totality of attitudes towards the non-Muslims in the freshly conquered territories, respecting their liberties as well as treating them with justice, the existing Muslims created a new type of civilization, in which intellectual liberties accompanied individual liberties.

[18] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 256] "There shall be no compulsion in religion: the right way has become distinct from the wrong way. Whoever renounces evil and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy handle, which does not break. God is Hearing and Knowing" (Itani, 2015, p. 18).

[19] This former slave, named Abu al-Misk Kafur, ruled Egypt between 946 and 968.

[20] The rise of cities and returning to cities after a military conquest created social unrest amongst some Arabs who enjoyed their sense of freedom like Bedouin nomads. These people believed the hierarchy and order in cities were restricting their liberties. The sincerity of Islam within small groups during the early times of Islam was what they yearned for. This feeling developed into a vision first and an ideology second; it transformed into an Islamic heterodox movement whose members were known as Kharijites since the 8th century (Watt, 1993, pp. 147–150).

Since then, numerous proposals have been developed on freedom; the Muslim intellectuals have spent years explaining the relationship between freedom, fate, and reason. Though it would be a difficult task to evaluate each of them here, and also it would be out of this work's original purpose, two main cornerstones of these debates can be reviewed: the Mutazilite and the Ash'arite approaches. Mutazilites believe that human beings can choose; they have free wills within themselves that cause them to act or refrain from doing so freely (El-Kaisy-Friemuth, 2019, p. 107). This group of intellectuals introduced the *kalam* method into Islamic thought, employing rational arguments to interpret revelation and challenge dogmatic views. According to their doctrine, reason assists in understanding the Quran in detail. This reason, therefore, is a type of measurement that evaluates the level of good and evil. Moving from the Qadariyah school of thought, which accepts the might of free will as shaping the fate of human beings, the Mutazilites tied free will with reason and claimed that human beings are innately free to act and think as they please; the consequence of their choices determines their fates. God is absolutely free, but *his* justice is designed so that a predetermined ending would not suit *him*; there has to be a correlation between will and *his* law so that the punishment could be just. The concept of time is meaningless for God; *before* and *after* words are valid for human beings alone. Thus, divine fate focuses on the creation and beings, not the link between free will and responsibility (Mantran, 1981, pp. 174–175; Gibb, 1966, pp. 116–117; Corbin, 2013, pp. 214–216). On the other hand, the Ash'arites leaned on a theory they came up with titled *kasb*, which literally means to acquire, to possess. This theory highlights that the ability to act comes from God; humans can only act when God bestows this ability. Thus, humans are entirely free to think, but we depend on God's will to act or do. So, pairing themselves with the Jabriyya school, which aims to explain all *that happens* in the universe with the *force* of God, the Ash'arite school preferred to accept God *as* 'will'. At the same time, the Mutazilite approach had seen God *as* 'reason'. Thus, whatever people do cannot be labeled as good or bad, since they were pre-labeled as good or bad by God, which concludes that God's will surpasses human will, and this makes God *the* sole free entity in the universe (Arslan, 1999, pp. 18–20; El-Kaisy-Friemuth, 2019, p. 110; Corbin, 2013, pp. 223–224). Since then, Muslim philosophers have preferred to explain their thoughts on freedom by picking either side. For instance, al-Kindi conceptualized freedom over desires by claiming *"[…] free men are slaves as long as they desire things"* (Rosenthal, 1960, p. 86), Ibn Rushd believed excessive practicing of freedom would ruin both man and state while al-Farabi had seen the community state as the provider of freedom (Rosenthal, 1960, pp. 99–100). On the other hand, Ibn Arabi rejected

absolute freedom for humans; he conceptualized freedom as *the* true servitude to God, since it is impossible to speak of 'freedom *from* God' (Rosenthal, 1960, p. 115).

Leaving the Muslim conceptualization of freedom aside for the time being, it is safe to say that liberty was conceptualized within the parameters of the republic in early-modern Europe. As correlated with individual property, this approach stressed the inequality between the citizens in a society whose level of wealth determines one's ability to practice freedom (Dijn, 2008, pp. 11–12). Machiavelli divided liberty into individual and state-centric categories. He was aware that some people enjoy seeking honor and glory; therefore, their individual liberty understandings lean on dominating others, while the majority of society conceptualizes such a liberty as being free to follow their own goals in security. On the other hand, state-centric liberty was shaped around the concept of 'self-governing republic', in which the government can secure individual liberties of its citizens. But, what about the honor and glory seekers who aim to overshadow the common good and desire to dictate their own understandings of freedom? Machiavelli claims that people's evil nature pushes them to maximize their liberties, which causes them to become corrupted (Skinner, 1990, pp. 301–306). Evidently, such an evaluation of liberty in both categories is related to an anti-authoritarian tendency. Such a conception had shown itself in individual works afterwards. The famous writing style of early-modern Europe, known as essays *(essai)*, of which we are familiar with Montaigne's *magnum opus* bearing the same name, was utilized to prove the capability of individual liberty. Man can only write by himself; he is innately independent and free. Only his morality restricts him from freely penning his thoughts (Green, 2012, pp. 13–15). Contrary to these understandings on individual liberty and its republican commentaries, Jean Bodin conceptualized freedom within the realm of sovereignty, with the existence of a strong and centralized government, which he titled the sovereign, who can maintain order and security to maintain individual liberties. According to Bodin, natural liberty permits man to remain free from being anyone's subject, except for God, and this brings being self-master of his own; reason commands it. Thus, the sovereign should follow this same code, and only this approach would bring happiness to the commonwealth, not the man-made laws. That is, the sovereign's will has to be in harmony with reason, limiting the exercise of power. Besides, 'the images of God', as Bodin's denomination for kings and princes deemed lieutenants of God, are obliged to serve men's welfare (Lewis, 2006, pp. 3, 6, 9, 16). However, as Bodin conceptualized it, all these limitations harm the 'indivisible' character of sovereignty. However, he explained that these limitations arise from the sovereign's bond with natural law, which commands him to respect individual freedom and

property rights (Franklin, 2006, pp. 28–31). Moving from here, it could be safe to say that Thomas Hobbes carried the role of sovereign and the concept of freedom to an entirely different level. According to Hobbes, true freedom is the ability to move bodies as individuals without any outside restraints (Skinner, 2018, pp. 137–138). Thus, if a man in a sinking ship decides to throw his cargo to the sea, he should be deemed a free man for the fear of sinking with the ship. He had decided to act as he thought, freely (Skinner, 2018, pp. 145–146). The link between decision and acting freely here can be compromised, Hobbes believed, and man can easily do as he pleases, even decide to murder others. This kind of freedom demonstrates that people are innately free, but such freedom might cause chaos. Thus, Hobbes claimed, people came together, abandoned their absolute autonomies in the guise of freedom, and created a sovereign called *Leviathan*, responsible for maintaining peace and harmony amongst people (Duignan, 2013, pp. 73–76).

Abandoning the autonomous characteristic was not the ideal option for John Locke; instead, he emphasized the value of liberty while conceptualizing the term in various domains. Intrinsic characteristics of human beings and their status without having an established political authority were the representatives of true freedom for Locke (Locke, 2012, pp. 9–12). Natural freedom, as well as private property were considered divine blessings of God upon mankind (Locke, 2012, pp. 23–27); thus, people came together and created a joint society to protect these blessings, so that each part of this community respects the freedom to another (Locke, 2012, pp. 98–99). Thus, this community, as designed to become a commonwealth (state), only to promote and protect civil interests, which were counted as *"life, liberty, health, and indolence of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, land, houses, furniture and the like"* (Locke, 1991, p. 17). These interests include people's liberties to choose to attend any religious society they desire and leave the same society freely (Locke, 1991, p. 20). Thus, not a single ecclesiastical authority has the right to imprison people for their free choices of religion or seize their properties (Locke, 1991, p. 26). Locke introduced the concept to a new ground by adding a tolerance comment on liberty. Such tolerance found a 'canonical' place in Spinoza's writings. According to him, desire is the essence of human beings (Balibar, 2010, p. 131). If a man becomes sinful, God's mercy upon him is the only salvation mentioned in religions (Balibar, 2010, p. 25). Because religions turned into superstitious beliefs with the assistance of the self-interested dogmatism of the ecclesiastics, these figures shaped the desires of people (Balibar, 2010, p. 16). Theologies, therefore, inject conflicts into the religions (Balibar, 2010, p. 24). However, they neglect a single point that the will of God equals the nature, of which,

according to Spinoza, God is the sum of nature's constant laws (Balibar, 2010, pp. 27–29). Thus, religion's true dogma must be God's love, and salvation does not come after the 'correct' decision between good and evil, but with obedience (Balibar, 2010, p. 26). Moving from this corridor, Spinoza comments on the soul and body, and the relationship between these two. Accordingly, everything strives to maintain its existence within the reach of its capabilities. Thus, it is impossible to speak about a hierarchy between the soul and body; their relationship is based on an equal activity and passivity situation. In a sense, the soul is an idea of the body, where it affirms its existence with this notion (Balibar, 2010, pp. 131–133).[21] Spinoza was aware of the concept of the state's sovereignty and its absolute characteristic (Balibar, 2010: 41); at the same time, he was aware that such a sovereign entity should not dominate the soul of its people, unless it desires to turn into a tyrant (Kriegel, 2010, p. 85). The basis of such sovereignty was a social contract for Spinoza; however, people did not abandon their freedoms completely in forming this contract; instead, they abandoned acting freely against the consensus (Balibar, 2010, p. 42). Thus, this newly formed state serves a purpose: freedom (Kriegel, 2010, p. 88). Naturally, practicing freedom does not find its domain of obedience in its motives, but in causing a proper action under the contract. This is why any freely practiced action is legal as long as they are not against the state; the state has to determine the borders of freedom (Balibar, 2010, p. 43). So, in a non-tyrant state mechanism, people are free to think as they please and speak as they think (Kriegel, 2010, p. 85). The state must realize that opposed ideas arise from different temperaments people carry within *(ingenium)*, which were recorded in their bodies and souls. When the state ensures the broadest freedom of speech, these varied temperaments will automatically support the sovereign by transforming the imperative of obedience into the

[21] The *Encyclopédie* criticizes Spinoza for being a fatalist. Spinoza claims a rolling stone thinks it keeps moving because it believes it is, because it is determined to do so. Similarly, human beings believe they can develop an appetite towards things; in fact, they are unaware that their fates cause this appetite. Thus, God is a necessity, and it is impossible for things to exist that do not currently exist. The *Encyclopédie* summarizes Spinoza's and his followers' thoughts on individual liberty in four separate items and criticizes these with three separate responses. Accordingly, if an effect requires a cause, A's movement happens because of B's cause, and B's movement happens because of C's cause, then humans' decisions must happen out of an external cause. Therefore, the existence of free will is a fantasy. Second, thoughts are qualities of matter; that is, there is no such thing as we call free will. Because the matter does not possess the power to move itself, let alone to decide such a movement. Third, whatever we become in the future depends on whatever we are in the present; it is impossible to think otherwise metaphysically. Lastly, does man consist of soul, body, or both? If it is body or soul, then the "necessity" determines his actions. If both soul and body are involved, it depends on whether it is a spiritual or material determination, or is entirely independent. If it is dependent, then human actions were predetermined. This is an inconsistent reasoning if it is sometimes dependent and sometimes independent. We tend to approach the problem by not aiming to search for the truth but by explaining it in an easier way. The *Encyclopédie* criticizes these closings via three refutations: first, if the effect depends on an external cause, there must be an independent power at the first point of movement. This power must not require a former effect. Such a power exists, and human beings possess this power: the soul. Second, thought and will cannot be qualities of matter. Finally, even if the soul were not a substance at all, and we accept that thought and will are qualities of matter, such a situation would not prove Spinoza's central thesis, which claims it is impossible for free will to exist (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, pp. 462–464).

most rational choice for their own benefit (Balibar, 2010, pp. 45–47). That is, a pro-freedom state, which respects the conscience of its people, will become the most powerful state (Kriegel, 2010, pp. 84–85).

As seen in the examples above, the idea of freedom was assessed within the context of either philosophical trends or its connection to the state. Conceptualizations in the eighteenth century were not different than this tendency. Though it is very possible to review numerous approaches one by one, this study aims to introduce three approaches as Voltaire's philosophical addressing, Montesquieu's legal technique, and Rousseau's harmony of them. Surprisingly, Voltaire (1802, pp. 229–233) preferred to explain liberty via a mini dialogue between A and B, in a Socratic style, in his famous *Philosophical Dictionary*. Here, A represents Voltaire himself, and B is a young adult who represents someone with a more traditional, or popular, stance towards freedom. B claims liberty originates from having free will. Voltaire rejects it by giving a simple example of being aimed at by a cannonball, where any individual's free will would make them escape from its range. However, some external conditions, like being paralytic, would make such liberty futile. Similarly, B claims that animals and humans share common impulses that trigger their ability to act freely. However, Voltaire rejects this idea for humans possess a rational mind and complex thinking systems, which make humans *freer* than animals. These rational and complex thinking faculties of humans determine their ideas and reasons for them; it is so clear that, in a case where someone was asked to pick an odd or even number in mind, even that selection would involve some reason behind the choice, without the individual's immediate recognition of such a situation. Thus, a notion like 'freedom of indifference', which defines willing without reason, becomes nonsensical. This is why, for Voltaire, liberty is not related to freedom of the will itself, but freedom to act: the ability to perform actions with the assistance of external circumstances and reason. Montesquieu, on the other hand, put some flesh on the bones of that ability; he conceptualized freedom as an ability to do as one pleases within the limits of the law. According to him, the concept of freedom is directly related to obedience, and the relation between these two concepts has been conceptualized differently over time. However, all these different understandings were shaped by either traditions or tendencies of the relevant society's governing models; this is why people often confuse democracy with freedom, equating these two concepts. In truth, liberty does not mean one's ability to do as one pleases; in contrast, liberty means not forcing people to do what they do not want to do and not restricting people from what they want to do. This restriction, and therefore force, allows liberty to do anything as long as the law permits

(Montesquieu, 2020, pp. 195–197). If we choose to retain the same analogy, we can say that Rousseau characterized both the bone and the flesh. Bone, in this case, represents the innate character of freedom, while flesh is its limiter. According to his social contract theory, before forming a functioning society, people were free to do as they pleased, since Rousseau believed all people were born free, without any restrictions. Rousseau characterizes this kind of freedom as natural. He equates abandoning freedom with losing rights to become human; thus, people had come together to form a society in which they neither abandoned their liberties nor lived with a threat to their freedoms. A kind of civil liberty, where the common promise defines the limits of liberty; thus, they lose an endless form of freedom in the former state of nature, but preserve what they possess with such a contract (Rousseau, 2020, pp. 4–5, 8–9, 13–14, 18).

Depending on the historical period in which they lived, the authors of al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* were aware of these various formulations and conceptualizations of freedom.

3.1.2. Freedom in al-Rasa'il

The Ikhwan claimed that they penned their epistles for the people who enjoy liberty; thus, it is within their understanding that whoever desires to become liberated and matured should read these texts (*Fihrist*, p. 28). These claims are bold for them, considering they attribute the concept of liberty to God alone, claiming *he* is the sole and absolute free entity and a free agent within the parameters of having the ability to do anything (XXXIX, pp. 276–277). This is why one of *his* mightiest names is considered *al-Bari'*, covering a meaning like 'creator of everything out of nothing' (XVIII, p. 68); that is, *he* is *the* reason of everything, *the* cause of entire existence, *the* creator of the created, thus, *the* generator of the universe as complete and perfect (XLI, p. 316). However, this creation does not mean *his* creations are parts of God, similar to the universe, for not being a part of *him* (XXXIX, p. 276); *he* created the universe for the sole purpose that *he* wanted to be known by *his* creations (XL, p. 291). Therefore, every creation is a slave of God (XXII, p. 255). Additionally, the Ikhwan claim that everything happens in this universe via the will of God, and give evidence from different verses of the

Quran to prove their claim, such as Verses 8:17,[22] 56:58–59,[23] and 56:63–64[24] (XIX, pp. 100-101). After such an argument, how can we expect human beings to be free? If everything was codified in the beginning as Islam emphasizes and God is interfering with our doings, can we speak of liberty in this life for humans? The Ikhwan's assertion in this debate is positive, though they strived hard to constitute their theses.

Al-Rasa'il claimed that God does not intervene directly in *his* natural creations and their works; it would be beneath *his* supremacy (XXI, p. 123). Instead, *he* regulates the time cycles *he* created initially, and all subsequent events unfold according to that. There is a cycle of process in the Ikhwan's account, a continuous routine of becoming first and decaying later for things, as this process was also mentioned in the Quran (XXII, p. 210).[25] The cycle we live in at the time is the cycle of the Quran; still, its time will end at some point, it will perish, and another cycle will be established by God *himself* via new creations (XXII, p. 173). Similarly, the current cycle has its own time cycles within itself; a slave can become a king within this cycle (XXII, p. 162). God's will antedates creation, and a similar will also shows itself in human doings (XLIX, p. 156). Human beings are free creatures in their doings (XXXIX, p. 277), and this is how Prophet Adam practiced this freedom in his rebellion against the clear order of God, as it was mentioned in the Quran (XXII, p. 223).[26] A further instance of freedom appears in Azazel's (Satan's original name, back in *his* angelic times) disobedience to God, for refusing to obey Adam's newly elevated status (XXII, p. 170). Thus, for the Ikhwan, human beings have the perfect capability of practicing freedom, even when rejecting God's orders (XXII, p. 224). However, the fall of Adam created another opportunity for humans to access perfect freedom, a freedom that will be experienced in the afterlife. Because, as God highlighted in numerous verses of the Quran,[27] this life is a temporary one, but the afterlife is the eternal (XXIX, pp. 44–

[22] [Surah al-Anfal (The Spoils), Verse 17] It was not you who killed them, but it was God who killed them. And it was not you who launched when you launched, but it was God who launched. That He may bestow upon the believers an excellent reward. God is Hearing and Knowing (Itani, 2015, p. 73).
[23] [Surah al-Waqi'ah (The Inevitable), Verses 58-59] [58] Have you seen what you ejaculate? [59] Is it you who create it, or are We the Creator? (Itani, 2015, p. 237).
[24] [Surah al-Waqi'ah (The Inevitable), Verses 63-64] [63] Have you seen what you cultivate? [64] Is it you who make it grow, or are We the Grower? (Itani, 2015, p. 237).
[25] [Surah Ali 'Imran (Family of Imran), Verse 140] If a wound afflicts you, a similar wound has afflicted the others. Such days We alternate between the people, that God may know those who believe, and take martyrs from among you. God does not love the evildoers (Itani, 2015, p. 28).
[26] [Surah Ta-Ha (Ta-Ha), Verse 121] And so they ate from it; whereupon their bodies became visible to them, and they started covering themselves with the leaves of the Garden. Thus, Adam disobeyed his Lord, and fell (Itani, 2015, p. 136).
[27] These are the Quranic verses the Ikhwan cited for proof: [Surah Ali 'Imran (Family of Imran), Verse 185] "Every soul will have a taste of death, and you will receive your recompense on the Day of Resurrection. Whoever is swayed from the Fire, and admitted to Paradise, has won. The life of this world is merely enjoyment of delusion" (Itani, 2015, p. 31), [Surah al-Hadid' (Iron), Verse 20] "Know that the worldly life is only play, and distraction,

45), and people should focus on liberating themselves from this life to access eternal freedom in the afterlife (XXV, pp. 313–314). Therefore, the Ikhwan define liberty as the will of the people utilized in their freedom of choices; that is, they are entirely free in their doings in both this life and the afterlife. Freedom endures only until an action's purpose is fulfilled; liberty lapses once that telos is reached (XXXIX, p. 276). The Ikhwan describe the features of free men over a parable where humans and animals talk to each other and complain about the status between them; animals claim that they should be the masters and humans should be slaves to them, not vice versa, since humans find some animal wastes valuable, as seen in the attributed value to honey and silk. The Ikhwan count the features of free men through the statements of animals as valor, virtue, grace, generosity, and munificence while highlighting that animals are self-sufficient but humans are dependent on them. Additionally, animals do not have to make an effort for sowing, harvesting, threshing, milling, baking, cooking, and frying; they do not have doors and locks in their homes, they do not see ingratitude from their juveniles, they do not seek for medication when they get sick, and they do not have any desires for this world (XXII, pp. 220, 222, 235, 246, 248). A promising resemblance shows itself here, as such a situation resembles Heaven, the afterlife world in the Abrahamic religious tradition, where the rewarded ones enjoy their lives eternally, without showing any effort or labor. Indeed, this resemblance was what the Ikhwan endeavored to explain: this life is a temporary one, but the afterlife is eternal; thus, liberty in this life is temporary, but there is perfect freedom in the afterlife. In short, dying and getting rid of this life is the sole way to reach genuine liberty, and resurrection in the afterlife is the sole provider of it (XXXVIII, pp. 249–251). Humans have devised two methods for reaching this state of absolute freedom: improving wisdom and knowledge for the better and restricting evil with orders and prohibitions.

Al-Rasa'il's tendency to highlight the superiority of *the* religion and the role of its messengers is evident, and this inclination will also function as a cornerstone in the following chapters. Hence, it is not surprising for us to witness the Ikhwan's quotation from Prophet Jesus,

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and glitter, and boasting among you, and rivalry in wealth and children. It is like a rainfall that produces plants, and delights the disbelievers. But then it withers, and you see it yellowing, and then it becomes debris. While in the Hereafter there is severe agony, and forgiveness from God, and acceptance. The life of this world is nothing but enjoyment of vanity" (Itani, 2015, p. 239), [Surah ar-Rum (The Romans), Verse 7] "They know an outer aspect of the worldly life, but they are heedless of the Hereafter" (Itani, 2015, p. 174), [Surah al-Anfal (The Spoils), Verse 67] "It is not for a prophet to take prisoners before he has subdued the land. You desire the materials of this world, but God desires the Hereafter. God is Strong and Wise" (Itani, 2015, p. 76), [Surah al-A'la (The Most High), Verse 15] "Though the Hereafter is better, and more lasting" (Itani, 2015, p. 268), [Surah Yusuf (Joseph), Verse 57] "But the reward of the Hereafter is better for those who believe and are pious" (Itani, 2015, p. 100), and [Surah al-'Ankabut (The Spider), Verse 64] "The life of this world is nothing but diversion and play, and the Home of the Hereafter is the Life, if they only knew" (Itani, 2015, p. 174).

as they narrated, Jesus argued that it is very natural for someone to become a slave if they have an ignorant, evil, irreligious, morally bad, jealous, stingy, and lustful character; that is, if their soul was corrupted (XLIV, p. 29). What the Ikhwan emphasized here is the ability of prophets to be aware of the conditions within the communities they were sent to enlighten (XLVII, p. 105). Because, amongst many other duties, one of the most notable responsibilities of the prophets is to liberate people in their communities (XLIV, p. 28). This liberation can only be achieved via enhancing knowledge and wisdom; even so, a slave can become free by acquiring competent expertise on this matter (IX, p. 237). Here, two elements came to the stage, wisdom and knowledge, and these two items should be evaluated by looking at them through the lens of the Ikhwan. They conceptualize knowledge as a mental form of what is known, and knowledge transforms into wisdom via this mental process, which becomes a spiritual gain (VII, p. 178; X, p. 274). These two closely connected concepts were distributed to the entire humanity; it is required for humans to choose the best one out of them (XLII, p. 345). The opposite of wisdom is ignorance, which is likened to darkness in the Ikhwan's account (IX, p. 246). One's soul can only be liberated from this ignorance via enhancing wisdom (X, p. 274), since knowledge and wisdom are the *fruited gardens* the souls enjoy being inside them (XI, p. 287). However, the primary type of wisdom for a person is to know one's self soul—its status and capabilities (XXIX, p. 41), while the most honorable type is to know God (XLII, p. 408). Since human beings have different levels of cognitive capabilities (V, p. 156) and doubt is the prime disease for souls (XXVII, p. 18), humans should consult others with better wisdom when they have suspicions about the route for enhancing their *own* knowledge and wisdom (XXVIII, p. 34). People with better wisdom were introduced with the word *saleh*, which covers a meaning between righteous and pious people. The Ikhwan believe that most of these people constitute the genuine set, including people who experience perfect freedom (XXXVIII, p. 255).

Living entities bear two innate mechanisms that shape their actions, claimed by the Ikhwan; they either seek a benefit or refrain from possible harm (XXVI, p. 331). As the natural duty of a religion and some provisions come with it like generosity, devotion, modesty, etc. are to keep people away from evil (XLII, p. 364); that is, the second part of humans' actions, as to refrain from harm, can be secured via following these rules and conducts of *the* religion. This is why the officials observe their communities (VIII, p. 192), and orders and prohibitions from them benefit the members of society in enhancing the virtues of their souls (XXV, p. 314). The word 'religion' in Arabic, as *ad-dīn* (الدين), has the meaning of a community's obedience to a single leader, and this obedience shows itself by the hand of orders and restrictions (XLII, pp.

388–389).[28] Orders and prohibitions cannot be implemented in a society unless these were followed by some rewards and punishments (XLVI, p. 68), because even God adopted a similar strategy for *his* religion, so that each verse about a promise or reward was followed by a verse of threat (XXII, p. 256). Because the primary purpose of politics is to keep society on the track of religion (VIII, p. 198), and the kings are the representatives of God on earth (XXVI, p. 322), societies must obey their kings (IX, p. 242). The kings' orders resemble God's orders (IX, p. 229), and these orders and prohibitions aim to improve the conditions of souls (IX, p. 209), guaranteeing a specific liberty to their people in the Ikhwanian fashion.

A conclusion on this matter *may* be implemented by touching upon separate arguments of the Ikhwan in the case of freedom and liberty: their tendency on the role of the officials and some correlations between liberty and cosmos, at both the micro and macro levels. The Ikhwan claimed that the afterlife is the actual world and is alive; this world is nothing but a universe of things, objects (IX, p. 225). However, this is not a bad situation for human beings; the objects and things surrounding people serve as tools for their souls (XVIII, p. 60). In the same vein, human beings are God's tools for elevating and exalting the status of religion (IX, p. 219). Still, having the capability to access the majority of these earthly tools can sometimes bring arrogance to souls, the arrogance which was counted amongst the bad morals. Nevertheless, having a piece of arrogance in the soul, that is, having an arrogant soul, can sometimes become useful for humans' liberty in their actions and doings (IX, pp. 240–241). Humans were created as limited entities in several aspects (XXVIII, p. 36), but they are also the absolute masters of this world (XLII, p. 346). This is why people with such a high soul do not yield or submit since they have free personalities (XXXI, p. 107), and they become the leaders and officials of their communities, a position which slaves cannot reach (XXXI, p. 143). Still, it must be highlighted that the orders and prohibitions from them do not have to be similar; in contrast, they vary according to the status of these officers (XLII, p. 365). On the other hand, the role of ordinary human beings against these orders and prohibitions depends on these officers' status. The Ikhwan underline that people are innately born free and obey these orders and prohibitions willingly or out of fear (XLII, p. 417).

[28] Though this term corresponds to religion in the present day, the Ikhwan might be right with this closing. Because the Arabic language had many meanings for the word *ad-dīn*: obedience, punishment, reckoning, judgment, custom, governance, domination, and worship were the most circulated meanings. Numerous orientalists and Muslim scholars have reflected deeply on this matter; al-Zabidi, for instance, a Muslim scholar known for his Arabic dictionary called *Taj al-ʿArus* (The Crown of the Bride), counted more than twenty meanings of this word (Tümer, 1994: 312). That is, it is very likely that one of them matches with the meaning given by the Ikhwan here.

On the other hand, establishing a correlation between the concept of liberty and the Ikhwan's cosmology requires a delicate explanation. Human beings are smaller copies of the universe, and the universe is a larger copy of humans (XXXIV, p. 173): a sample of anything humans experience in this world can be found in the universe. This is why the Ikhwan claim that the universe hosts some free souls living between celestial objects. These souls had their bodies once, but then they became free entities by getting rid of their bodies. Angelic souls are responsible for protecting the universe and its order, while demonic ones are suffering in purgatory. The former could leave their bodies via contemplation and purging, while the latter used to enjoy material gains, and this is how they left their bodies, as a punishment (III, pp. 101–102). Additionally, at the cosmic level, with the assistance of astrology and magic, it is possible to grant someone their freedom. For instance, if a fondness/love magic is performed during the specific phases of moon, like the time of Antares (heart of the scorpion, a phase of Scorpio) or *neâim* (a phase of Sagittarius) or *batn-ı hût* (belly of the fish, final phase of Pisces), the targeted slave will receive their freedom (LII, pp. 305–307). Similarly, in a situation where a theft had happened, calculating astrospatial positions of some celestial objects can assist the scholar to identify whether the thief was a freeman or a slave (LII, p. 282). On the other hand, the Ikhwan emphasize the role of sleep and dream within the topic of liberty at the micro-cosmic level. By utilizing the authority of some Quranic verses and *hadith*s,[29] the Ikhwan conceptualized sleeping as a partial freedom while underlining the mental experiences human beings witness during sleep—that is, dreams, are genuine and valid. They did not hesitate to produce witnesses on this matter via several verses from the Quran (XLVI, p. 75).[30] Sleeping is a process where humans cannot use their senses (VIII, p. 195); the soul leaves the body then. This phase resembles a city at night where all the residents and shopkeepers leave the streets and become silent (XXII, p. 271). Because receiving revelation during sleep is one of the

[29] This authority arises from both some Quranic verses like [Surah az-Zumar (Throngs), Verse 42] "God takes the souls at the time of their death, and those that have not died during their sleep. He retains those for which He has decreed death, and He releases the others until a predetermined time. In that are signs for people who reflect" (Itani, 2015, p. 201), and some *hadith*s, actually, like "Sleep is the brother of death" (Soysaldı, 2018, p. 89).

[30] Verses the Ikhwan utilized here are as follows: [Surah al-Fath (Victory), Verse 27] God has fulfilled His Messenger's vision in truth: You will enter the Sacred Mosque, God willing, in security, heads shaven, or hair cut short, not fearing. He knew what you did not know, has and granted besides that an imminent victory (Itani, 2015, p. 225), [Surah Yusuf (Joseph), Verse 100] And he elevated his parents on the throne, and they fell prostrate before him. He said, Father, this is the fulfillment of my vision of long ago. My Lord has made it come true. He has blessed me, when he released me from prison, and brought you out of the wilderness, after the devil had sown conflict between me and my brothers. My Lord is Most Kind towards whomever He wills. He is the All-knowing, the Most Wise (Itani, 2015, p. 102), and [Surah as-Saffat (The Aligners), Verse 102] Then, when he was old enough to accompany him, he said, O My son, I see in a dream that I am sacrificing you; see what you think. He said, O my Father, do as you are commanded; you will find me, God willing, one of the steadfast (Itani, 2015, p. 194).

methods God has chosen to instruct *his* prophets (XLVI, p. 72) and dream constitutes one forty-sixth (1/46)[31] of the entire prophethood business (XLVII, p. 99), it is possible for them to define dream as *"the soul's intellectual power to envision the images of sensible things in its own being during sleep, when the senses are stilled, and to envision things before they happen"* (XLVI, p. 73). The Ikhwan counted six sources of dream as [1] complex and intertwined thoughts of soul, [2] difference in body liquids, [3] astrology, [4] devil's injection of anxiety and misgiving, [5] angel's injection of inspiration, and [6] God's support and revelation (XLVI, p. 85). To sum up, the Ikhwan believe that, regardless of the source, the soul leaves the body during sleep and experiences perfect liberty during its dreams.

3.1.3. Freedom in the *Encyclopédie*

The *Encyclopédie* defines the concept of *franc*, 'free' in English, over individuals who are considered free people, individuals who are not in slavery (Boucher d'Argis, 1757b). This word, *franc*, originally comes from the independent Franks who assisted El Cid during his campaign towards recapturing Toledo in the 11th century, which resulted in settling these Franks in Toledo and granting them some privileges (Voltaire, 1757a). On the other hand, freedom was defined as the power of an intelligent being to do anything they desire, following their own determination (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 462). The stress on being intelligent and own determination is the key here, since the *Encyclopédie* counts two essences of freedom as intelligence, which is the source of knowledge (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 471), and determination, since there is no freedom if humans are not the arbiters of their choices, which makes them the masters of their determination. Because human beings are only truly free when they have the power to suspend at will the action they have started (*Prémotion Physique*, 1765, p. 293). These two elements, intelligence and determination, are worth delving into in detail.

Encyclopedists believe that imagination, which is a natural faculty of human intelligence, is a perfect example of freedom. For instance, a man can imagine a scenario where a magnet pulls a piece of iron, without having an actual magnet or iron at his disposal. At any point in his imagination, he can stop this image in his mind and start imagining a completely different scenario. This power brings people to a simple understanding that individuals cannot

[31] This belief is not original to the Ikhwan. However, it was accepted to be said by Prophet Mohammad as [Bukhari, Volume IX, The Book of the Interpretation of Dreams, *Hadith* No: 6987] Bukhari mentioned *"[...] A (good) dream of a faithful believer is a part of the forty-six parts of an-Nubuwwa (Prophethood)"* (Bukhari, 1997a, p. 87).

act more freely, but can imagine limitlessly. Therefore, there is a 'superior cause' within individuals that can govern thoughts that give birth to them, dismiss them, or recall them instantly, which has a free characteristic; that is, the soul (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 464). Because brain is the organ where human thoughts are located and thoughts are produced by the vibrations of the fibers of brain, akin to the wires of a musical instrument, the philosophers had shown a tendency to locate the soul into the brain, without explaining the exact position it seats in that brain (Tarin, 1752, pp. 863–864). Regardless of the precise position of the soul, the *Encyclopédie* claimed that two separate authorities exist within the concept of freedom: the soul and the brain. Generally, the soul is reliant on the brain. For instance, the soul of an individual may desire to do something immoral, but the brain will show a tendency to stop doing that action. The result of this process will cause others to deem that individual virtuous. Looking through the same lens makes it impossible for a fool to be deemed virtuous. This is how the link between brain and freedom operates; thus, it is possible to become *freer* by enhancing knowledge and wisdom (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 465). Therefore, it is possible to claim that the brain limits the power of the soul. It is equally valid that the brain is a tool in the soul's disposal that is being utilized to fulfill its functions. This is why an underdeveloped brain causes the freedom of the soul to function unsteadily. Just as the existence of the concept of illness proves the existence of the concept of health, the existence of freedom is the health of the soul (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, pp. 466–467).

However, there are some cases where the link between the brain and the soul does not function properly, and the soul does not feel completely free. Because the choices a soul makes as it desires depend on the existing situation of the brain; otherwise, humans were supposed to consider the thoughts of people free in the cases of high fever, lunacy, or childness (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 465). For the *Encyclopédistes*, the most evident example of these cases shows itself during sleep. A sleeping brain includes *less* soul within; the soul is *freer* when an individual is asleep. Because the brain decelerates its functioning pace during sleep, humans may, say, dream about murdering one of their friends during sleep, and determine to realize this plan in real life. However, as soon as they wake up, they give in to such a decision because the brain starts to function correctly (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, pp. 465–466). Sleeping does not have to depend on regular routines; it could be forced by some external interferences like drinking fermented liquors, eating excessive food, taking medicines, exposure to extreme cold or extreme heat, etc. However, one must note that all of these external interventions cause the fibers of the brain to either loosen or tighten. Thus, the mutual dependence between body and

soul shatters, and the soul's passions become more visible during sleep (Jaucourt, 1765i, p. 333). Dreams of an awake man and an asleep one are similar regarding the signals being sent to the brain; however, humans can manipulate these signals while awake. The *Encyclopédie* claims that humans always see dreams in sleep, which are directly related to the animalistic, the most primitive characteristic of their souls; this animalistic character takes over the rule of the brain. However, a balance is required here, because if this animalistic hunger is too severe, the brain suffers from a chaotic environment; if it is milder than usual, the fibers do not respond. Indeed, dreams often start with a sense and proceed with a series of imaginary actions. This is why many absurdities occur in our dreams, defying the laws of nature: humans often find themselves starting in the midst of a story, unable to remember or care about how they arrived at this point in their dreams (*Songe*, 1765). That animalistic character of the soul mimics what they were affected by during their daily errands; the reflections of these experiences transform into dreams while they rest (Diderot, 1765c).

Though the soul is entirely free in dreams, people's motives grant them freedom more than any other. If one has no motive or interest, speaking about freedom in that scenario is impossible. Because such a scenario becomes a reference to a state of indifference, a form of apathy to some extent, which causes the soul's decisions to become randomized, a set of fortuitous determinations. Naturally, such a state of soul will lack any good or bad intentions; that is, it will lack any practice of freedom. This is why motives constitute the central essence of freedom (Quesnay, 1756, p. 157). In other words, such a scenario undermines the essence of freedom, as it contradicts its core principles by hesitating to openly declare what was once thought, thereby hindering the independence that comes with acting freely (Voltaire, 1757a). In the same vein, if one obliterates the concept of freedom, the concepts of good and evil will become meaningless. If *a* necessity, which does not have to carry a particular name, becomes the authentic reason of one's wants, then the concept of will becomes unnecessary to contemplate. Besides, reward and punishment will turn into some obsolete concepts. People, therefore, play the roles cast for them in the most exact sense. Eventually, since the concept of morality will leave the stage, some nauseating acts of what might be called vileness as a whole today would not only be normalized then, but they would only happen. The *Encyclopédie* claims that eradicating freedom is so delicate that the judges shall imprison people who talk about it immediately, let alone be discussed in academic circles. Because such a debate would obliterate the concept of humanity (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 469), meaning that if humans are not free and the decision-making process for oneself originates from something external other than the

soul alone, nothing in this world can be tagged as good or bad. This also reflects how people confuse freedom with will (Diderot, 1755, p. 115). Because people always want something about something, which is often about the physical world, they either feel an attraction or a repulsion towards it at this point in their wants. That is, a healthy man's will would not be different from an ill one's, or a lunatic's from a sane's, because they all focus on their wants. The *Encyclopédie* gives an example of an ordinary scale on this debate. Accordingly, the arms of this scale are innately balanced before seeing *that* something, and depending on the attraction or repellency, one atom falls on one arm and one's decision becomes fully-formed (Diderot, 1765b). That is, people are not free entities; they believe that they are. In truth, people can command some movements they are unaware of how they perform, like desiring to move an arm and moving it. Alternatively, they want to remain silent, and they remain silent. These faculties they have are not practices of freedom but will's doings. In other words, if they are something like a machine and this machine inherently has a master to operate it, they deem themselves free just because they *own* this master; that is, the soul (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 464).

At this point, for the capabilities of determination within the conceptual framework of freedom, people have soul in one hand and, concerning the example above, the atom on an arm of a scale at another; here, what comes to the stage is God's intention or intervention, or to simply put, fate. The *Encyclopédie* claims that the Scholastics keenly believed that God intervenes in the actions of this world in two ways: directly and indirectly. A good example of this debate was given by explaining the link between a grandfather and his grandchild. Grandfather's contribution to the birth of a grandchild rests upon transmitting the faculty of making a baby to the father; grandfather's role is indirect here, while the father's contribution to having a child is direct. However, Pierre Bayle criticizes such an approach. Because if God's intervention is indirect, there has to be a continuous creation at any given time. If it is a direct intervention, then such a situation automatically removes the concept of freedom from the equation, eventually eradicating the concepts of good deed and sin. This situation would transform human beings into some passive automatons. The *Encyclopédistes* hesitated to get involved in this debate; instead, they highlighted the omnipotence characteristic of God and claimed humans are free entities (*Concours*, 1753). Additionally, a long-known Christian doctrine titled 'physical promotion', which underlines one straightforward notion that the will of God and the wills of *his* creations cannot contradict, had found its reception in the *Encyclopédie*. The Thomists championed this doctrine more than any other party. They claimed

that such a contradiction would be impossible to exist, because, in such a scenario, God, who has a mightier will than *his* creations, must intervene in one's doings. Three arguments support their thesis: first, God is the universal cause and the first *mover* of everything, second, if God does not care of *his* creations, *he* would be an indifferent deity, and third, if the creation would have the ability to behave against the will of God, this situation would be improper for the glory of *him*. However, these three reasonings did not satisfy the *Encyclopédie,* and it did not hesitate to assert that embracing such a doctrine would automatically make God *himself* the author of people's sins (*Prémotion Physique*, 1765, pp. 292, 294). On the other hand, it is known that the will of the Christian God wishes to bring salvation to all human beings, *his* very own creations with separate wills, and the status of these two kinds of will as well as the existence of the concept of sin contradict. The *Encyclopédie* does not go into this debate; it prefers to give a simple reference to a decree of the Council of Trent (1545–1563) that, although Jesus Christ, as the savior of humanity, died for all, this sacrifice does not mean his salvation will reach to all (*Volonté*, 1765, p. 455). Still, the *Encyclopédie* had managed to smoothly summarize the link between fate and freedom with a simple sentence, by taking inspiration from the explanations of Stoics and Islam on this debate: *We do not act because we want to, but we want because we act* (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 462).

Though the *Encyclopédie* hesitated to investigate the relationship between fate and freedom in detail within religious parameters and preferred to reference other texts and opinions about it, the Encyclopedists preferred to build a bridge between freedom and reason through society. In this respect, humans have passions and needs and want to experience happiness. However, they carry an ill tendency to do to others what they do not want to be done to them. Nevertheless, what would happen if an individual does not feel free to upset others, but this motive was injected into them externally? The *Encyclopédie* claims that an individual's happiness is paramount, and an individual may annihilate a greater part of the human race for the sake of their own happiness: reason commands it. Following this command is valid in all scenarios because humans are reasoning animals. When someone abandons seeking the truth via reasoning, they lose their place amongst humanity and deserve to be treated like an ordinary animal. The *Encyclopédie* characterizes such an individual with violent reasoner *(raisonneur violent)* words, and claims that this individual seeks to be both happy and just. By leaning on that reason so much, they try to remove the wicked title from themselves. However, as the Encyclopedists ask, if we remove the authority of determining what is just and what is unjust from an individual's faculty, what should we put in its place? The answer for them is

straightforward: general will. Individual wills are dubious to trust, while general wills are certain and cannot be cheated. Still, this will only apply to human beings, who inherently possess the qualities of freedom and reason; if animals shared similar reasoning abilities with humans, they too would become a part of this grand will (Diderot, 1755). Even if this is the scene, the leading operator in practicing freedom is still the soul, and the soul rarely consults the brain in some cases while practicing freedom, because it was pre-informed about some rules. Legitimate social traditions, orders of religion, codes that promise rewards or punishments, debt to humanity, etc., can be counted amongst these rules (Quesnay, 1756, p. 157). These rules the soul innately possesses show similarities with the sources of general will in the eyes of the *Encyclopédie*. Accordingly, general will has four different sources as follows: [1] Written law of all civilized nations, [2] social actions of savage and barbarian people, [3] tacit agreements of humanity's enemies, and [4] indignation and resentment (Diderot, 1755, p. 116). Though one of the sources of general will was found in the written law by the Encyclopedists, they also underline that overusing freedom against the general will engenders crime and this crime will require a punishment; however, these very same codes do not favor any reward for free actions within the parameters of general will, that is, being virtuous (Diderot, 1765d). These punishments, at least for the case of Europe in the age of the *Encyclopédie*, increase or decrease per the obedience level of the general will; in other words, they change by moving closer to or further away from freedom. On the other hand, the Romans established this link between general will and freedom over the concept of probity. Therefore, the laws showed them the good and expected people to honestly obey them. These laws functioned as mere advice in practicing freedom (Jaucourt, 1765j, p. 248).

Albeit the *Encyclopédie*'s philosophical explanations of freedom would suffice for the time being, speaking of the Romans and practicing freedom will naturally bring another debate to the stage, which reflects a situation of people who cannot exercise freedom. These people, for the history of Europe and within the reach of the Encyclopedists, were categorized under two social groups: slaves and serfs. Slave was defined as someone who is deprived of freedom and who is under the power of a master (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, p. 939) in the *Encyclopédie* while putting serfs in a position between complete freedom and slavery (Boucher d'Argis, 1765m, p. 82) as well as claiming this term was sometimes used as opposite to free people in France just because slavery was not being experienced there in their times (Boucher d'Argis, 1757b). According to the Encyclopedists, natural law claims that all men are born free, but international law created slavery. Rulers of the past had preferred to take prisoners after their

victories in wars, and enslaved them instead of using their innate rights to kill them (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, p. 939). Though slavery violates all the laws of nature (Jaucourt, 1765k), this practice had turned into a commercial activity in time. Free people are aware that the slave trade is a nasty business and it is against natural law; however, they justify their actions by claiming that they take the freedom of slaves in exchange for their souls' salvation (*Negres*, 1765, p. 79). What the *Encyclopédie* pointed out by highlighting slave trading was that the bulk of African black slaves were heavily used in the American colonies. These African slaves were classified under four categories: healthy ones after the arrival of colonies constituted the 'perfect' slaves, the old and sick ones made the second-class slaves, older children were considered as third class, and little kids as the last category (Diderot & Mallet, 1751, p. 769). Black slaves from 17 to 30 years were sold for approximately 30–32 French Livres worth of goods specific to the region they were sold in, such as alcoholic spirits, iron, canvas, paper, etc., while the price of some handsome Africans could double the price, reaching 100 Livres. On the other hand, these slaves were not forced to lose their freedoms on many occasions; they tended to sell themselves or their family members to avoid famine and poverty. Indeed, these black people who sold themselves often sell and resell their family members on a ship on the route to the New World as well, mainly for a bottle of clean water or two (*Negres*, 1765, p. 80).

African slaves, as being black people, were described harshly by the *Encyclopédie*; discriminatory and even racist to some extent within today's parameters. Accordingly, these black people were not differentiated from 'other men' with the color of their skin alone. However, their ugliness, wide and flat noses, large lips, and wool on top of their head instead of hair contribute to this difference, which makes them a new species of humankind (Formey, 1765, p. 76). They were considered to be idolaters in religion by the *Encyclopédie*, while some of them were following Islam. Their languages were challenging to pronounce, like striving hard to bring out some sounds from the throat (Romain, 1765, p. 81). Interestingly, the Encyclopedists placed a special emphasis on the albino blacks, calling them white blacks *(negres blancs)*, and described them in a sentimental state which might be placed between awe and admiration. It was mentioned that these albino blacks were originally from Loango (present-day Congo) and came from black parents. Though they share similar physical appearances with the regular African blacks, they are as white as a European. Since their eyes were sensitive to sunlight, they prefer to live at night—akin to owls—and this situation causes these albino people to be labeled as cursed, and a war between ordinary blacks and albinos continues. Black people attack them during the day, and the albinos respond to these attacks at

night. The Portuguese, claimed the *Encyclopédie*, enslaved them and carried them to their mines in America, but albino blacks refused to become slaves; they did not work and preferred to die of hunger rather than submit to their kidnappers (*Negres Blancs*, 1765).

Moving from such differences, the Encyclopedists wondered why, in the Potosi mines of Peru, a good variety of people exist, both free people and slaves, of all shades of white and black skin colors. They wondered why all these people could come from the same parents at some point in history. Their answer to this debate was formed through a simple egg allegory; different eggs produce different kinds of birds, but the shape and color of eggs have changed throughout history. That is how variations happened. The reason black people are black, therefore, is relevant to their development of extra black bile in their bodies throughout history, which was fed into their vessels and caused their bodies to be filled with mucus (Formey, 1765, p. 77). The French government had seen the same allegory with the Encyclopedists. It issued an edict named The Black Code *(Le Code Noir)* in 1685, with a single purpose of *freeing* black slaves in French colonies of the Americas through Christianity (Boucher d'Argis, 1765n, p. 63). This code, which consisted of sixty separate articles, brought some revolutionary perspectives to the status of slavery; the following articles are particularly significant: the first article ordered masters to instruct their slaves in the Catholic religion, while the second one abolished arbitrary punishment. The sixth article granted slaves a rest day per week, and the ninth article regulated the master-concubine relations as well as the rights of children born from this relationship. Tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth articles regulated marriage statuses between slave-slave, slave-free person, and slaves with different masters, as well as children born from these marriages. Articles from 22 to 25 ordered masters to clearly provide routine provisions to their slaves, from how many pots of flour to be given to them to what type of meat shall be provided weekly. The twenty-seventh article favors slaves in the cases of illness or being crippled; ordering masters to direct them to hospitals and paying their treatment expenses until they get better (Romain, 1765, pp. 82–83). The revised version of this edict was given in March 1724, aiming to regulate the justice, police, discipline, and trade mechanisms of black slaves in Louisiana, the major French colony (*Negres*, 1765, p. 80). This is why the *Encyclopédistes* claim that all people were free in France in their time, and when a slave entered France by any chance, s/he was baptized immediately, thus receiving his/her freedom. Though this practice was not issued in any code, the practical usage of The Black Code provided this alternative method to the ecclesiastics by transforming the first article of the code into a tradition (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, pp. 940–941;

1765n, p. 63). This may explain how slave traders justified their actions by claiming to offer the salvation of black people's souls, as mentioned earlier.

On the other hand, being in service to another is a situation where the freedom of a human being is restricted via laws and traditions for a specific time, and it originates from serving another via a contract. The servants sell their services to their masters for a definite period, in exchange for a certain salary. Though these people live under the strict restrictions and discipline of their masters until the contract ends, they also share the same house with their masters; unlike slaves who face absolute domination and the arbitrary power of their masters (Jaucourt, 1765k). Still, servants were slaves in the Hebrew tradition once, as the Bible clearly states that Hagar and Ishmael represented the slaves within the Hebrew social structure while Sarah and Isaac were considered as members of the free (*Serviteur*, 1765). This tradition was followed by Christianity afterwards, as the Gospel does not abolish slavery, but people had altered slavery and servitude. Poland, for instance, considered peasants as natural slaves to gentlemen, while France transformed slavery into serfdom thanks to the initiation and incentives of Louis the Fat[32] onwards (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, p. 940). Serfdom is directly related to the concept of duty; one's obligation of one or several duties towards another person, which is often called lord (Boucher d'Argis, 1765o, pp. 123–124). The sum of these obligations is called chores, and this word carries an amalgamated meaning of pain and labor in the old Lyon language (Boucher d'Argis, 1754g, p. 280). Though we often consider serfdom about land and farming, some specific versions of it also existed, like those who are obliged to drive wheeled carts, transport goods and/or war munitions, and maintain the roads and towns (Boucher d'Argis, 1753b). Serfs must often obey their lords for a lifetime (Boucher d'Argis, 1765p). When they hold some properties to fulfill their obligations, they could only sell or lease these properties to people of the same social status as them and be subject to the same lord (Boucher d'Argis, 1765q). Though these serfs had to provide their own tools and instruments necessary to perform their chores and feed themselves, lords did not have the right to abuse them. Plus, some off-days were traditionally granted to them; Polish serfs were free to do their own errands on Sundays and Mondays, for instance, where they can work for themselves if they wish to do so (Boucher d'Argis, 1754g, p. 282). The *Encyclopédie* claims that people carry a virtue within themselves which we call humanity, a feeling of benevolence for all men, which aims to abolish the institution of slavery (Saint-Lambert, 1765). This might be the reason that

[32] Louis the Fat, or Louis VI of France from Capetian Dynasty, ruled France from 1108/1109 to 1137 (English, 2005, p. 766).

slavery was abolished in France, but soon serfdom was replaced by it. Although it has a considerably better number of advantages than slavery when it comes to limitations of freedom, its earlier practices were not compatible with the dignity of humanity. For instance, before its complete abolishment by the bishop of Liege named Albero/Adalbero, who died in 1142, a custom was in effect, which was being practiced by chopping the right hand of a serf who died, to present to the lord, referring that he can no longer serve their lord. Besides, if that dead serf was the head of his family, then the lord had all the rights to confiscate the best tools and furniture of the deceased (Boucher d'Argis, 1765r, pp. 877–878), which again highlights the fact that serfdom was a lifetime status.

3.1.4. A Comparison of Freedom in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

The Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists share some profound similarities within their understandings of freedom; still, some small nuances exist. These nuances show themselves not in the essence of freedom but in the interpretation of it. Similarities can be evaluated in five topics as follows: [1] the notion that human beings are innately free, [2] the relationship between freedom and soul, [3] the conviction that God does not interfere actions of human beings, [4] the relationship between freedom and general will, and [5] the ability to acquire *more* freedom by enhancing knowledge and wisdom. On the other hand, differences arise within the domain of epistemological approaches of these two author parties.

It would be illuminating to begin the comparison task by clarifying that both parties wholeheartedly believe that humans are born free. According to the Ikhwan, although all the living entities are considered slaves of God within the Islamic parameters (XXII, p. 255), people are both born free (XLII, p. 417) and they have absolute freedom in their doings (XXXIX, p. 277). The *Encyclopédie,* too, places its stress on the very same topic over the concept of natural law and claims that people are innately free (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, p. 939). Freedom was defined within the scope of intelligence as the ability of an intelligent entity capable of doing anything with his/her own determination (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 462). In addition, it would be an accurate closing to claim that both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes* yearned for the people to reach a higher level of freedom, for the sake of humanity. This situation originates from the belief that human beings are the absolute masters of this world (XLII, p. 346) and they were created as smaller copies of the universe (XXXIV, p. 173) for al-Rasa'il. For the *Encyclopédie*, on the other hand, removing the idea of freedom from the equation will

completely destroy the concept of humanity (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 469). Human beings aim to receive happiness in this life, claims the *Encyclopédie* (Diderot, 1755), and the existence of freedom is a vital indicator of a healthy soul (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 467). With the assistance of this notion that people focused on granting liberty to others like Louis the Fat who abolished slavery in France in the twelfth century (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, p. 940) and the Christian ecclesiastics granted immediate freedom to slaves by simply baptizing them (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, pp. 940–941; 1765n, p. 63). In the same vein, the French government issued the Black Code of 1685 and regulated the existence of the slavery institution in its colonies in the Americas; besides, further amendments of this code provided a more humane rights to the remaining slaves in these colonies (Boucher d'Argis, 1765n, p. 63; *Negres*, 1765, p. 80). Similar attempts by some historical figures to liberate people or give them a higher status of freedom can also be traced in the Ikhwan's words. Al-Rasa'il claimed that the prophets were assigned to liberate the people in their communities (XLIV, p. 28) and following the path of some righteous and pious people, which the Ikhwan identified with the word of *saleh*, was highlighted as being a contributor to achieving *more* freedom (XXVIII, p. 34; XXXVIII, p. 255).

It is a striking resemblance that both texts spotlight the relationship between freedom and the soul. Al-Rasa'il referred to the words of Prophet Jesus and claimed that freedom can only be lost when the soul of an individual becomes rotten (XLIV, p. 29). Everything that surrounds people serves as tools for the soul of human beings, said the Ikhwan (XVIII, p. 60), and carrying an arrogant soul within was not deemed a bad thing. Because such a possession would bring freedom to that person in their actions and doings (IX, pp. 240–241). The *Encyclopédie* too advocates the role of the soul in freedom by claiming it was the source of the faculty in doing anything as pleased, which is also one of the definitions of freedom (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 464). Fundamentally, the motives direct the soul, constituting the basis of freedom (Quesnay, 1756, p. 157). Thus, freedom is exercised through the will behind people's motives, and exists only in their ability to terminate an action they once initiated, which is guided by their own desires (*Prémotion Physique*, 1765, p. 293). These desires, as their ability to act as they please, were attributed to the animalistic character of their souls (*Songe*, 1765). The inclination of the animalistic character of their souls in the *Encyclopédie* can also be observed in al-Rasa'il. The ability to do anything as people please is the ability of will, relevant to the intentions and consequences of their doings, making the freedom a reflection of this will (XXXIX, p. 276). In the cases of the absence of will, in other words, the cases where the soul cannot control the will, like the cases of sleep and dream, provide a different type of freedom

in the arguments of both texts. The Ikhwan indicated that humans cannot use their senses during sleep (VIII, p. 195) and underlined that the dreams they see during sleep provide the perfect examples of practicing freedom. Besides, these dreams are harbingers of future events they will experience for the Ikhwan (XLVI, p. 73). They claim that a part of the revelations to the prophets was attributed to dreams (XLVI, p. 72). If we exclude the Ikhwan's tendency towards foresight and prophecies from this set, we can also trace the same approach towards sleep and dreams in the *Encyclopédie*. Accordingly, the soul is *freer* during sleep because the brain is *less* filled with soul (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, pp. 465–466). The soul is free to do anything it wishes during sleep; this is why dreams ignore the laws of physics. People find themselves in the middle of a scenario the soul desired to experience, without remembering how that scenario was essentially composed (*Songe*, 1765).

Contrary to the concept of freedom, which is highly valued in both texts, is the question of fate as being a nemesis of it, or in other words, whether God intervenes in humans' free will. The Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists are on the same page in this debate, and this consensus was shaped over the notion that God does not interfere in humans' doings. Al-Rasa'il claims that God does not intervene in our doings directly because it would be beneath *his* glory (XXI, p. 123). The *Encyclopédie*, however, accepts God as an omnipotent being (*Concours*, 1753). From this point of view, a simple move might bring to consideration that *he* can intervene if *he* desires to do so. Though the *Encyclopédistes* did not prefer to become a side of this debate, they chose to follow the principles and doctrine of Thomists about it, and interpreted the case similarly to the Ikhwan: it would not befit *his* dignity (*Prémotion Physique*, 1765, pp. 292, 294). Likewise, the *Encyclopédie* attracted attention to Pierre Bayle's commentaries on this debate, and claimed that the concepts of good deed and sin would be meaningless if *he* preferred to interfere in humans' actions; therefore, we, the humans, would be nothing more than simple automatons (*Concours*, 1753). This approach shows parallelism with the Ikhwan's understanding. Because, in the Ikhwan's closing, both Prophet Adam, who was expelled from Heaven by breaking God's clear order, and Satan, who refused to accept the supremacy of mankind, were experiencing the perfect freedom with these actions (XXII, pp. 170, 223). Though the Ikhwan's pointing of afterlife for the true liberation of soul (XXVIII, pp. 249–251) differs from the *Encyclopédie*'s comments on this debate, their stress on receiving a divine judgment per the sum of good deeds and sins in this life, which started to be counted with the fall of Adam, that is the ultimate evaluation of what an individual freely did in this life with *his* own determination (XXV, pp. 313–314) is compatible with what was shared by the Encyclopedists.

When the debate touches on the concepts of good deeds and sins, the idea of general will arises as a principle that limits absolute freedom by preventing individuals from acting with unlimited freedom in the social sphere. This restriction is enforced through a shared conviction, in which individuals participate voluntarily. The *Encyclopédie* considers human beings as intelligent animals. This is why, with the assistance of their intelligence, people directed their faces towards the general will, which is certain and uncheatable, by abandoning their wills aside to practice their freedoms. Still, this kind of general will and the freedom practiced via obeying this will belong to human beings alone. If the animals were as intelligent as human beings, it would then be mandatory to incorporate them into this set (Diderot, 1755). Surprisingly, we witness the very same approach, incorporating animals into the same general will agreement in al-Rasa'il as well. In a very long parable where animals were demanding their freedom by equalizing themselves with the human beings and discussing this intention with them, the king, who was supervising the debate decided to acknowledge the animals as intelligent beings, and integrated them into the general will which was once limited to human beings alone (XXII, pp. 168, 220, 222, 235, 246, 248). The *Encyclopédie* claims that the general will, which was accepted by people at the beginning and being taken into consideration while practicing individual freedoms, brings some foreknowledge infused into people's souls (Quesnay, 1756, p. 157), and people who act under these pre-installed codes are deemed virtuous by society (Diderot, 1765d). A similar relationship can be seen in al-Rasa'il. Although the *Encyclopédie* counted several types of these pre-installed codes like social traditions, religious rules, laws that bring rewards and punishments, debt to humanity, etc. (Quesnay, 1756, p. 157), the Ikhwan's stress on religious and political rules is more vivid than the rest. They claim that people are obliged to obey the orders of rulers (IX, p. 242) because these rules resemble the rules of God (IX, p. 229). Such obedience ameliorates the soul, which is innately free (IX, p. 209). The practiced freedom within the borders of these rules will cause individuals to become *more* virtuous in the eyes of society (XXV, p. 314).

The emphasis on the word 'more' points to the fifth and final similarity between the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes*, which is centered around the concept of freedom: can human beings become *freer*? Both parties acknowledge the possibility of enhancing freedom and believe in the sole path that leads to this possibility: enhancing knowledge and wisdom. The *Encyclopédie* considers intelligence as the source of knowledge (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 471), and regards our faculty of imagination as the most successful example of what intelligence practices. It emphasizes that human beings can visualize a scenario in their own minds in which

they do not need to interact with their senses at all, with the ability to conclude this scenario at any time they like. Humans may not act *more* freely but can imagine *more* freely, even illimitably (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 464). According to the *Encyclopédie*, which attributes such a power of freedom to the authority of the brain (Tarin, 1752, pp. 863–864), improving the capacity of intelligence with the assistance of knowledge and wisdom will cause an individual to experience *more* freedom (Naigeon & Yvon, 1765, p. 465). In the same vein, the Ikhwan, too, believe that enhancing knowledge and wisdom will bring more freedom to an individual, inasmuch that even a slave can become liberated with this method (IX, p. 237). Based on the Ikhwan's understanding of knowledge as a mental form of what is known, knowledge can only be transformed into wisdom through a mental process (VII, p. 178; X, p. 274). The opposite of wisdom is ignorance, which was equated with darkness by the Ikhwan (X, p. 246). Human beings can receive help from others during this journey (XXVIII, p. 34); thus, they can elevate to the status of *saleh*s, who experience the perfect freedom (XXXVIII, p. 255).

The differences between al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* rest within the epistemological understandings of these two texts. As it will be mentioned in numerous places of this study continuously, the Ikhwan welcome entire human knowledge and deem them sacred (XLV, p. 39) while the *Encyclopédistes* clearly stated that the sources of knowledge are only two as senses and reason; thus, the metaphysical subjects beyond human reasoning are not concerns of the *Encyclopédie*, and these should be left to metaphysicians (d'Alembert, 1751, pp. i–ii). Thus, the Ikhwan's remarks on astrology and magic, and the relationship between these concepts and freedom, are incompatible with the understanding of the Encyclopedists. The Ikhwan's closings on the free souls roaming in the sky to protect the universe (III, pp. 101–102) or granting someone his freedom back by performing some magical rituals in specific astrological periods (LII, pp. 305–307) cannot receive a positive reception from the *Encyclopédistes*. Because they not only considered astrology as an obsolete and outdated discipline alone (d'Alembert, 1755b) but also labeled magic with *"the daughter of ignorance and pride"* words (Polier de Bottens, 1765, p. 852).[33] However, the *Encyclopédie* acknowledges the attributed power of magic utilized in different shaped talismans, often for medical purposes alone. According to this, people wore these with their own free will, and one must admit that even if they do not help, they do not harm (Jaucourt, 1755, p. 618). On the other hand, the *Encyclopédie*'s explanation of serfdom cannot be found in al-Rasa'il since this concept is

[33] *"[…] fille de l'ignorance & de l'orgueil"*.

unique to European history. Nonetheless, a comparison of both parties' perspectives on slavery can be made. Still, a brief explanation is required for distinguishing the status of slavery within their distinct paradigms and different attributed meanings to the term. Freedom was conceptualized through a juridical approach during Islamic history; it often addresses a status opposite to slavery. Similarly, Muslim philosophers approached the concept through government types, either a bad government or a good one. Thus, the concept of freedom in the political sphere falls between equality and justice within the parameters of the Islamic discourse, which is directly relevant to the status of the government. That is, *"the converse of freedom was not tyranny but legal and personal slavery"* for the Muslim philosophers (Lewis, 1993, p. 232; Lewis, 1992, pp. 101–102). This is why the same concept, slavery, is reviewed in the liberty subchapter for the *Encyclopédie* and in the equality subchapter for al-Rasa'il in this study. However, comparing these two might be helpful in understanding where both parties stand in the case of the slavery institution.

Al-Rasa'il divides society into two parts: the elites and the general public; the elites are few, but the rest are many. They count another social group next to these two, that is the slavery institution. The Ikhwan do not see another option for slaves other than wholeheartedly obeying their masters (XXXVII, p. 229). However, as the Ikhwan claimed, slaves hate their masters (XXXVIII, pp. 257–258). This situation is unacceptable for the Ikhwan as they keep advising them to favor their masters (XLVI, p. 63). The celestial orbits *(falak)* reserve a special place for slaves within their circles, where actions and doings of slaves were overseen from there (LII, p. 259). Nevertheless, slaves shall keep in mind that even their overseer would not accept a scenario where a slave desires or tries to break *his* bond with the master (LII, p. 247). Thus, slavery is not a temporary but a permanent status in this world. Such an argument is incompatible with the *Encyclopédie*'s comments on slavery, at least within the experiences of French history. Because the Black Code of 1685 regulated having a slave, its further amendments shaped the conditions of black society residing in the French colonies in the Americas (Boucher d'Argis, 1765n, p. 63; *Negres*, 1765, p. 80). Besides, as we have reviewed earlier, the Christian ecclesiastics were in favor of obliterating the slavery institution via some practical measures they invented: they were converting slaves to Christianity (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, pp. 940–941; 1765n, p. 63). To mention the final point, the Ikhwan acknowledge the status of the institution of slavery and do not promote anything about its abolishment. At the same time, the *Encyclopédistes* welcome both its abolishment and the practical steps taken towards an ideal of freedom for all.

A summarizing table on their similarities and differences on the concept of freedom can be given as follows:

TABLE 1. A comparison of freedom in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

FREEDOM FOR AL-RASA'IL AND THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE		
THEMES	**SIMILARITIES**	**DIFFERENCES**
Freedom and Birth	Humans are born as free entities.	Freedom within the borders of divine servitude vs. natural right
Freedom and Soul	Orientations of the soul determine freedom; dreaming in sleep is a form of freedom.	Purification of soul vs. nature of soul
Divine Intervention and Fate	God does not intervene in human affairs.	Stress on divine judgment vs. moral autonomy
General Will and Social Boundaries	The general will notion limits individual freedom with social harmony; both texts discussed adding animals to this community.	Harmony with divine code vs. secular rationality
Knowledge and Wisdom	Freedom can be enhanced through increasing knowledge and wisdom.	Metaphysical knowledge vs. reason and experience

3.1.5. Concluding Remarks

The concept of freedom was being treated in the same fashion after the Ikhwan, more or less; it was often linked to the usage and utilization of knowledge and reason, often through philosophy. However, a breaking point happened with al-Ghazali; he changed the innate intellectual characteristic of the concept. The revelation became superior in his comments against philosophy's questioning and liberating might; he redefined the boundaries of freedom, only possible *between* the borders drawn by the revelation. In other words, a man's freedom is only possible within the borders set by God (Çetin, 2011, pp. 85–86). True that, in the seventeenth chapter of his famous *Tahafut al-Falasifa* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), al-Ghazali clearly mentioned that if a piece of cotton *does* burn after being brought closer to fire, it *does* happen because God willed so. However, the philosophers do not *want to* accept this *certainty* (Gazzâli, 2002, pp. 181–182). His impact on Sufism from this perspective, limiting the possibility of reason, caused this religious practice to redefine the concept of freedom. Accordingly, true freedom for Sufism is being free of the soul's desires and earthly passions, which is characterized by the soul's ascension to God. Here, freedom was not conceptualized within some political or philosophical contexts; it is more of an inner struggle and spiritual purification practice. The *freest* men in this context were those called *khawass*,

who can be seen as intellectual elites within this Sufi understanding and who managed to reach God (Öngören, 2011, p. 122). The final conceptualization of freedom came from Ibn Khaldun, who, again, carried the concept to the social framework with the coinage of one comprehensive but straightforward term: *'umran*. This term's most extensive meaning is civilization; however, social organization might be the most relevant. With this term, Ibn Khaldun turned the concept of freedom into a practice that shows itself in economic and social domains. According to him, the *badawi* (nomadic/Bedouin) and *hadari* (sedentary/urban) are two types of sociological status of human beings. The *badawi* people are free people, who are only bound by their own limits in freedom; however, the *hadari* people live in cities, where social and economic interdependencies are high, which limit their freedom (İbn Haldun, 1997, pp. 307–309, 314–315; 1996, pp. 280–281). These three conditions of freedom constitute the basis of the understanding of freedom in Muslim communities, even in the present day.

Although these concept transformations happened in the intellectual domain, some political changes of the attributed meaning to freedom and its practices can be reviewed in the political domain in a very general sense. It would not be wrong—though it would fall short, three historical event chains had changed the fate of freedom: Genghis invasions, Timurid invasions, and the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry. In particular, the Genghis invasions during the 13th century were so fierce that death was equated with liberty. It was reported from a local historian that, according to Frederick Starr (2013, pp. 447–448), the Mongolian soldiers did not abandon Nishapur before being certain that the decapitated heads reached at least two separate hills high. At Herat, for instance, sixteen people went into hiding in a mountain where they had to practice cannibalism by eating each other, at some point. Tamerlane (Timur the Lame) was no different than his ancestor. He was also a fan of what we might call *head-hills* or *head-towers*. His commander, Miranshah, for instance, performed the same exhibition in Herat in the 14th century (Marozzi, 2006, p. 135), of which Tamerlane ordered his soldiers to bring him a certain number of severed heads during his invasion of Isfahan. Muslim soldiers refrained from murdering their fellow believers, and severed heads were sold for 20 dinars per head to fill the quota by the soldiers who did not share the same sensibility. The situation escalated beyond control; 70,000 people were butchered, and the price per head dropped to half a *dinar* (Marozzi, 2006, p. 170). Because Tamerlane was seeing himself 'the Shadow of God' as carved to a wall of his palace, *Ak Serai* (White Palace) (Starr, 2013, pp. 483–484) and 'the Sword of Islam' (Marozzi, 2006, p. 113), it can be said that freedom was executed through the permission of sword alone. The laity and intellectuals here, as well as the Muslim scholars, were 'not free' or had time to

contemplate the concept of freedom. Indeed, the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry in the 16th century was at its peak. The Ottoman ruling elite was championing Sunni Islam, while it was the Shi'ite understanding for the Safavids. These two untitled, separate, and *rich in symbolism* stanzas of Shah Ismail I, the mighty ruler of the Safavids, who was also a poet known by the pen-name *Khata'i*, who preferred to write his poems in the Turkish language, *may* explain this rivalry between the lines:

> I am a servant of Mohammad Ali[34]
> From the lineage of *Khaydar*,[35] of the noble *Ahl al-Aba*[36]
> I follow the path of *Imam* Ja'far's creed[37]
> I am anguished *Khata'i,* here I come for remedy (Hatayî, 2013, p. 120).[38]

Coupling this stanza with this one *might* be helpful in clarification:

> I am Ali Ismail,[39] now I have arrived
> I wander, watching all the world unfold
> *Zulfiqar*[40] does not rest within its sheath
> A thousand times a day, I make blood flow (Hatayî, 2013, p. 146).[41]

It is unclear where to draw the line to determine which side is which; however, this rivalry has undoubtedly caused the social fragmentation in the Muslim community to deepen. Bloody incidents happened before and after the Battle of Chaldiran of 1514, which caused the Sunni-Shi'ite divide to intensify. As one may see, freedom in the Muslim lands was something

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[34] Prophet Mohammad and Caliph Ali, combined, addressing the Shah's acceptance of both figures.

[35] *Khaydar*, meaning "lion" in Arabic, is the most common epithet of Caliph Ali that symbolizes his bravery and valor in the [both Sunni and Shi'ite] Islamic traditions. The Battle of Khaybar (628) against the Jews mostly, where Ali's courage was materialized *when* he used a gate piece of the castle as *a* shield during the charge -in the chronicles, is one of the most known narratives the Muslim children have been told for generations to exemplify bravery, strength, and steadfastness in faith -the Sunni and Shi'ite children both (*Khaydar* and Khaybar similarity in prose—not with the same "h" sound though since the Arabic language possesses three separate "h" sounds within, is a vivid example of Arabic rhythmic tendency).

[36] In the Muslim historiography of events during the revelation process of Quran, according to both the Shi'ite and Sunni *hadith* recordings, one day a revelation arrived to Mohammad, the Verse 33:33 to be exact, as follows: [Surah al-Ahzab (The Confederates), Verse 33] And settle in your homes; and do not display yourselves, as in the former days of ignorance. And perform the prayer, and give regular charity, and obey God and His Messenger. God desires to remove all impurity from you, O People of the Household, and to purify you thoroughly (Itani, 2015, p. 182). Mohammad was at his home during this revelation. He cloaked [future Caliph] Ali, Fatima (his daughter and wife *to* Ali), and Hasan and Huseyn (his grandsons, sons of Ali and Fatima) with his mantle. He replied to God that these were "his" *Ahl al-Bayt* (People of the Household) alone by requesting complete purification for these people. This *hadith* was accepted by the Sunni scholars as genuine (Bukhari's book does not report it). However, the Shi'ite tradition overemphasized the importance of *hadith* in time that even the *Batiniyya* followers had to "deconstruct" the verse and *hadith* (Uludağ, 1989).

[37] *see* Ch. 2.2.1.3. for Ja'far as-Sadiq, the sixth *Imam* and *Ithna-'Ashariyya* (the Twelvers) in a detailed explanation.

[38] *Muhammed Ali'nin kullarındanım / Âl-i abâ nesl-i Hayderîdenim / İmâm-ı Ca'fer'in mezhebindenim / Derdimend Hatayî dermana geldim.*

[39] Shah Ismail mentions here that he is "the representative of Caliph Ali", or with the traditional Shi'ite preference of this phrase as an idiom, "manifested in Ali's garment".

[40] Caliph Ali's legendary double-bladed sword with a bifurcated tip.

[41] *Ali İsmail'im geldim / Âlemi seyran eylerim / Zülfekar durmaz kınında / Günde bin kez kan eylerim.*

given and taken by the rulers in this period, at the tip of a sword; however, it transformed into something *demanded from* the rulers in the 19th century. With the Young Ottoman movement in the Ottoman lands, particularly through Namik Kemal's (1840–1888) key ideals as liberty and *the* nation (Mardin, 2000, p. 79), the constitutionalism notion became ingrained in the minds of Ottoman intellectuals, which transformed into an ideal as limiting the sultan's authority and expanding freedoms by the Young Turks then (Hanioğlu, 1989, pp. 69–70). They made the sultan promulgate a constitution named *Kanun-i Esasi* (The Fundamental Law) in 1876, making it one of the earliest constitutions the Muslim world had ever seen (excluding the Constitution of Medina in 622).

Soon after the publication of the *Encyclopédie* was finalized (1772), the French Revolution happened (1789). A terror-based liberty was put in action. Alexis de Tocqueville evaluated the liberty introduced between two sides of an axis: determinateness and choice. In this sense, freedom was neither a self-created obtainment nor a natural result of historical requirements; revolutionary liberties are constantly threatened since they might be the first victim of democratic revolutions (Mitchell, 1990, pp. 242–243). *The Communist Manifesto*, on the other hand, criticizes the French Revolution. Although the Revolution seemed to expand liberties, it introduced a type of freedom that only degraded the concept to some bourgeois-related benefits like free trade, free selling and buying, free possession of properties, etc. These are functional for a minor group of any society, based on labor exploitation. True freedom can only become possible via abolishing property relations and class exploitation (Marx & Engels, 2002, pp. 235–238). These conceptualizations of freedom were thematic; however, John Stuart Mill gave the concept its most visible form in its relationship with the individual, society, and state. According to him, even democratic forms of governance can become restrictive entities in the hands of the people. This situation may cause a new form to emerge as the tyranny of the majority, which limits the liberties of individuals (Mill, 2009, pp. 47–48). This social pressure can be experienced through law, public opinion, and social norms. Still, liberty is for the rationally advanced individuals alone; it is a rational move to establish a forcing authority over uncivilized societies. In civilized societies, however, individual liberties are paramount; the state and society can only intervene in this status when the individual harms another. Individual liberties like freedom of thought, lifestyle, and association are necessary for a society to be called *truly* free (Mill, 2009, pp. 55–62).

The Twentieth Century is perhaps best characterized by the phrase 'the century of global wars'. That is why the rise of states redefined the concept of freedom. Against this, numerous

scholars contemplated the concept and introduced new formulations. Three of them *may* be sufficient in explaining these formulations: Isaiah Berlin for individual freedom, Hannah Arendt for individual-public relations, and Michel Foucault for individual and power relations. Isaiah Berlin introduced the concepts of negative liberty and positive liberty. Here, the former addresses a condition where *others* do not intervene in the *doings* of an individual (Berlin, 2008, pp. 53–57) while the latter addresses a condition where the *individual* can *do* as *he* pleases with *his* own reason and will (Berlin, 2008, pp. 63–67). For Arendt (1994, pp. 24–31), on the other hand, freedom is the capacity of *doing* together as individuals in the public sphere and the ability to create fresh starts. Freedom is not an internal thing for Arendt; it is a visible *action* in the plurality of individuals. Its main reflection is its ability to transform the world through unpredictable and incalculable political initiatives. Lastly, Foucault's conceptualization of freedom moves on two levels. At the first level, he conceptualized it through an individual with 'the undefined work freedom' notion, which was characterized by an experimental process that the individual searches for the probabilities of thinking differently and *being* differently within the parameters of what was presented to *him*. That is, freedom is not a passive resistance against the *norms* but an active work on the self *on itself* (Foucault, 2020, pp. 45–47). On the second level, according to Foucault (1982, p. 790), power relations do not always address a pressure; in contrast, freedom cannot exist without them: *"[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free"*. In other words, freedom is the ability of an individual to create a *field of action* for themselves, which becomes complete by developing a counter-strategy. Where power exists, resistance exists; the relationship between these is *a* practice of freedom.

In the 21st Century, however, the concept of freedom became multifaceted and multilayered. Today, we have countless fresh conceptualizations of freedom in almost any field: digital freedom, bodily autonomy, ecological [or planetary] freedom, identity-based freedoms, temporal freedom, and many more. Since the concept itself is abstract, many more conceptualizations will arrive in the future.

3.2. Rights

The term right is defined as *"[…] the claim which a person or animal has to be treated in a fair, morally acceptable or legal way, or to have the things that are necessary for life"* (Procter, 1995, p. 1223) in its dictionary meaning, while the 'claim' word placed in the

definition of right was outlined with *"to ask for (something of value) because you think it belongs to you or because you think you have a right to it"* (Procter, 1995, p. 235) words. Two fuzzy sets can be constructed from these lexical definitions: 'possession of entitlement' and 'recognition and enforcement of this entitlement'. The first set represents the widely-circulated motto [or notion] of 'rights cannot be granted; they exist at birth', which can be taken as an ethical and ontological set. From this perspective, the elements of the first set can easily be counted as natural rights, divine rights, innate dignity, moral intuition, life's sacral status, philosophical anthropology (humans as right-bearing entities), etc. The second set, however, is political and historical, remarkably grounded upon the understanding that 'rights do not exist alone; they *have to* be in a constant reconstruction process'; because the definition of 'claim' above highlights this feature: you have to ask for it; you have to remind its existence. This set can essentially contain legal systems, social contracts, political authority, institutions of justice, historical struggles for recognition, public morality, civic discourse, and many other notions that embrace this understanding. This subchapter examines the concept of rights and its attributed values, and comments on it in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* over the characteristics of these two sets.

3.2.1. Conceptual Framework of Rights

Contemporary political theorists like Alasdair MacIntyre, Michel Villey, and Leo Strauss believe that it would be a futile attempt to search for the concept of right in the texts inherited from the ancients; a general tendency prevails that this effort is some sort of anachronism (Miller, 1995, p. 89; Atkins, 2018, p. 45). Though this argument seems valid at first glance, it is equally true that the very essence of rights, as the precursors of the concept, can be traced. For instance, it is known that Plato's ideal society is an *ipso facto* society; a society in which people do not need the existence of some concepts like the state and laws. However, human beings come with some flaws. This is why the establishment of an ideal society should consider these flaws. The central flaw for Plato is the primary division of society, which comes in the form of the rulers and the ruled. In this play, the rulers have two categories: the enactors of laws and the enforcers of laws (Arslan, 2006, pp. 408–409). In this order, the enactors should be the philosophers for Plato, because reason guides their souls; a combination of state power and reason sets their duties while ruling becomes their right (Plato, 2007, pp. 169–170). The enforcers of laws, or the guardians with Plato's preferred name, are the defenders of society. They should be as valiant as watchdogs and know the difference between

friend and foe. Thus, their rights in this society are shaped around distinguishing good and evil, while their duties are mainly involved in protecting society (Plato, 2007, pp. 66–68). Plato believes that people were created with different traits, so living by observing these traits is people's primary duty. People who lack the ruling traits should naturally become peasants and workers (Plato, 2007, p. 109). According to Plato, the main reason for creating a society is that humans cannot be self-sufficient. Thus, societies were established upon the principles of cooperation and mutualism. These principles arise from an inevitable fact that some people are good at doing this while others are good at doing that (Plato, 2007, pp. 60–62).[42] Concerning this comment, it would be safe to say that rights and obligations are not individualistic but communal in the view of Plato. On the other hand, Aristotle considers the central purpose of 'life' as reaching *eudemonia*—the happiness. However, he does not focus on the journey much; he evaluates the outcome concerning what an action has brought (Arslan, 2007, p. 246). Therefore, Aristotle equated happiness with the soul's proper activities with virtue; that is, whatever an individual has in their soul, they should act on it via virtue to reach happiness (Arslan, 2007, pp. 272–273). From this point, Aristotle categorized the layers of a society in his ideal state: peasants, artisans, soldiers, rich people, priests, and magistrates. Rights and obligations are born from these societal roles (Arslan, 2007, pp. 319–320). Fred D. Miller (1995, pp. 106–107) claims that there is no single word that corresponds right as a modern term in Aristotle's works, and by giving reference to Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld—an American jurist, he categorizes four elements that can be considered as rights in the Aristotelian fashion: claim *(dikaion)*, liberty and/or privilege *(exousia)*, authority and/or power *(kurios)*, and immunity *(akuros/adeia)*. Indeed, for example, Aristotle believes that some people fall apart from the rest of society in ruling; few were born with the right to rule, while many were born with the right to be ruled (Aristotle, 1998, p. 7). Therefore, the rights of the ruler and the ruled differ; following their *natural* virtues, like the right to access necessary education (Aristotle, 1998, pp. 71–72). In the same vein, for the loss of rights and privileges possessed only by being a citizen was characterized with *atimia* word by Aristotle; for instance, he claimed that committing adultery is a shameful and unvirtuous action, and when a man was found out being part of such an ill action, the necessary punishment should be stripping him from his honor, that is, *atimia* (Aristotle, 1998, p. 223).

[42] This argument is also valid for knowledge and the right to possess knowledge for Plato. In the well-known cave allegory, he clearly states that the right to possess knowledge (education) and enlightenment comes with the fact that it is not suitable for everyone (Plato, 2007, pp. 213–215). Even this example alone verifies that Plato championed the principle of division of labor in his conceptualization of rights and obligations.

The Stoic mode of thinking values virtue more than anything, and only a virtuous life can bring happiness. Since the soul determines one's character and its most venerated minister is reason, virtue directly relates to knowledge. However, such a link between virtue and knowledge was not established practically like Plato and/or Aristotle did; in contrast, the Stoics render knowledge as a tool for reason (Arslan, 2008, pp. 399–400). Therefore, they believe that individuals of the entire humanity take their shares from the universal reason; thus, they believe that these individuals are entitled to basic dignity and respect in being deemed equals and treated justly (Arslan, 2008, pp. 416–419). Cicero claims that virtue has three primary sources: [1] comprehension of causal link, [2] restraining desires and motives with reason, and [3] fulfilling needs with moderation in society (Cicero, 2020, p. 77). The rights people carry within naturally come with some obligations, according to Cicero; these obligations, however, are not equal; they follow a hierarchy to maintain rights. In this respect, an individual's obligations follow a sequence to be fulfilled in the right order: to gods, to homeland, to family, and others (Cicero, 2020, pp. 27, 69). Seneca, on the other hand, correlates a happy life with one's innate right to possess it and living in harmony with one's very own nature. He brings a formulation to happiness which can be summarized as the sum of knowing good and evil, valuing morality, being virtuous, and being fortunate (Seneca, 2020, pp. 7–8). The Romans had conceptualized the concept of right in these formulations of the Stoic approach, converged rights and obligations in civic life with the *ius* word—that is law, often partnered with the *potestas* word, meaning power. In this sense, the closest conceptualization of right finds its meaning like that in the Roman practice, often addressing the ideas referring to ownership or the ability to control. This is how the civic rights of an individual had some intimate relations with their liberty; when ownership and control vanish, in the sense of rights, they will undoubtedly lose their liberty in society. This is the central paradigm that the famous Roman law understanding was established upon (Atkins, 2018, pp. 44–46). The Roman laws focused on protecting people's rights; for instance, the guardianship institution in Rome was put into practice in two ways: to protect the rights of lunatics and the rights of spendthrifts. Though fourteen was the legal age to possess all rights in Rome, the Roman laws protected the latter subjects' rights until twenty-five, considering them minors. That is, it would not be a false comment to claim that this practice was an *ad hoc* remedy which shields not only the rights of minors but also other adults, by preventing the emergence of some possible disadvantages in the conducted deals between parties (Johnston, 1999, pp. 41–42). Augustine applauds the Roman approach to rights and obligations. He gives reference to Scipio's (a Roman statesman) definition of people as it includes mutual recognition of rights, which has a mutual cooperation theme within, for the

common good. This respect brings welfare to the individuals, but the ruler's status is the key here: an unjust ruler will destroy both rights and welfare (Augustine, 2008, p. 108). Still, his acclaim to the Roman laws does not specifically mean that he did not criticize them; in contrast, Augustine claimed that the Romans inherited these civic rights from immoral pagan gods of Greece,[43] of which, he believes, it is time for them to turn their faces to the *true* God (Augustine, 2008, p. 126).

The god that Augustine pointed out is the God of Christianity, and *his* comments on the concepts of rights and obligations can be reviewed to understand what Augustine wanted the Romans to see. For example, the Old Testament issues protecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable in Exodus 22:21–24—particularly the foreigners, widows, and orphans (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 94),[44] and underlines it in Leviticus 19:9–10 once again (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 143).[45] In the same vein with the Roman categorization of rights as ownership, the Leviticus 25:23–24 approaches to the right of having property from a divine perspective, by claiming God is the owner of the lands but men have the right to hold them as possessions (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 151).[46] Interestingly, but drawing a parallelism with God's preference for resting, the Old Testament acts as a harbinger to the labor and animal rights that will come to the stage many centuries later. In Exodus 23:12, God clearly instructs that a rest day for restoration after a six-day-long working period is an inherent right for both men, animals, and even slaves (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 95).[47] The New Testament mimics these conceptualizations. For instance, in 1 Timothy 5:18, it was said that animals have the right to be relaxed while doing certain errands, and the workers have the right to ask for their wages (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 256).[48] In addition to that, it was mentioned in both Acts 10:34–35 and Galatians 3:28 that God sees all people from all nations as equal, and everyone has the right to expect to be treateded with

[43] *"[…] performers of Olympian scandals […]"* is Augustine's preferred phrase for this description.
[44] [Exodus 22:21-24] [21] Thou shalt not maltreat a sojourner, nor afflict him; for ye were sojourners in the land of Egypt. [22] Ye shall not oppress any widow, or fatherless child. [25] If thou oppress them at all, surely if they cry to me, I will certainly hear their cry, [24] and my anger shall burn, and I will slay you with the sword, and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless.
[45] [Leviticus 19:9-10] [9] And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not completely reap the corners of the field, neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvest. [10] And thou shalt not glean thy vineyard, neither shalt thou glean the scattered grapes of thy vineyard; thou shalt leave them for the poor and the sojourner. I am Jehovah your God.
[46] [Leviticus 25:23-24] [23] And the land shall not be sold in perpetuity; for the land is mine; for sojourners and dwellers are ye with me. [24] And in all the land of your possession ye shall grant a redemption for the land.
[47] [Exodus 23:12] Six days thou shalt do thy work, and on the seventh thou shalt rest; that thy ox and thy ass may rest, and that the son of thy handmaid and the stranger may be refreshed.
[48] [1 Timothy 5:18] For the Scripture says, Thou shalt not muzzle an ox while treading out the grain; and, The workman is worthy of his wages.

respect and dignity (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, pp. 163, 233). On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas materialized the concept of right, which he retrieved from Augustine and the Bible. For example, he referenced Augustine and interpreted the rights of husbands over their wives. According to this, love is a movement urge towards the beloved thing; however, an intense love destroys everything in its path. This is why husbands are jealous of their wives. The primary reason for this jealousy is the husband's fear of losing his rights over his wife, which stems from constant thinking of his wife in a relationship with another man (Aquinas, n.d., p. 953). Aquinas believes that everything was common at the beginning in accordance with the laws of nature, and human beings received their natural rights by dominating animals. However, at some point in life, the population of humans geometrically multiplied, and sovereignty over animals had to be redefined and redivided amongst the people. Otherwise, it was inevitable to witness some problems concerning rights, in property and ruling rights (Aquinas, n.d., pp. 657–658). In the present day, claims Aquinas, the notion of citizen is conceptualized with the rights of citizenship like possessing the rights of debating and voting (Aquinas, n.d., p. 1473); thus, these closings on civic rights that are generated by man-made laws cannot be the source of virtues. On the contrary, virtues are the end of laws, which aim to provide the common good (Aquinas, n.d., pp. 1364–1365).

Abrahamic monotheist tradition was followed with the Quran as well; the Quran had also conceptualized rights over the vulnerable, protection of life, protection of property, and transactions between individuals. For instance, Surah al-Baqarah clearly states in Verse 177 that Muslims should remember that vulnerable people consist of the needy, the homeless, the orphans, the beggars, etc. have their rights to expect the wealthy to aid them; the wealthy who believes in God shall observe rights of the vulnerable (Itani, 2015, p. 11).[49] In addition, the Quran considers the right to live and the protection of life in both ways. In Surah al-Ma'idah, Verse 32 to be exact, God asserts that *he* values the sanctity of human life, and considers living as an innate human right. Because, in *his* closing, killing one person is equal to killing entire humanity, while saving one means saving whole mankind (Itani, 2015, pp. 45–46).[50] God of

[49] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 177] Righteousness does not consist of turning your faces towards the East and the West. But righteous is he who believes in God, and the Last Day, and the angels, and the Scripture, and the prophets. Who gives money, though dear, to near relatives, and orphans, and the needy, and the homeless, and the beggars, and for the freeing of slaves; those who perform the prayers, and pay the obligatory charity, and fulfill their promise when they promise, and patiently persevere in the face of persecution, hardship, and in the time of conflict. These are the sincere; these are the pious.

[50] [Surah al-Ma'idah (The Table), Verse 32] Because of that We ordained for the Children of Israel - that whoever kills a person - unless it is for murder or corruption on earth – it is as if he killed the whole of mankind; and whoever saves a person, it is as if he saved the whole of mankind. Our messengers came to them with clarifications, but even after that, many of them continue to commit excesses in the land.

Islam did not allow killing, unless justice requires it. Even in this case, one should not exceed the limits of killing since all *his* creations have the right to live (Itani, 2015, p. 119).[51] The Quran counted property rights in its verses over the inheritance by claiming both men and women have the right to receive their shares from it; that is, this right was protected by God *himself* (Itani, 2015, p. 32).[52] The rights of individuals in their transactions were also accepted in the Quran, and several pieces of advice were given to protect them. For example, in the opening sentences of the longest verse of entire Quran—Verse 282 of Surah al-Baqarah (*Ayat al-Dayn*, Verse of Debt), God advises people to write down their arrangements when they establish a debtor-creditor relationship, in order to protect their rights, under the witnessing of a scribe, of which he should remind that God is watching (Itani, 2015, p. 20).[53]

Muslim scholars preferred to approach the concept of rights that Islam acknowledged in different aspects. Al-Kindi, for instance, evaluated the concept of rights in their violation and acquisition, within the parameters of property rights, and gave it an astrological character. According to him, stealing property violates that right, and the Sun and the Moon's positions in the sky can tell us whether that stolen item will be recovered (Kindi, 2011, p. 127). In addition, if the Moon shares the same pivot with the Earth, or is below/above it, it is possible to identify whether there was one thief or many and whether the thief was a man or a woman (Kindi, 2011, pp. 128–129). The rights granted by wealth also have some close relations with the planets, according to al-Kindi; Jupiter is responsible for acquiring wealth and the rights that come with it. Depending on whether it is in the second house of its pivotal position or tenth or eleven, it is certain that an individual will receive wealth: second house will provide wealth over their own labor or profit of money, tenth house will provide them wealth via royal donations, and eleventh will provide by the hand of lower officers or friends of the king (Kindi, 2011, p. 193). Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, on the other hand, preferred to conceptualize rights via parables, poetry, Quranic verses, and *hadith*s. He claimed that the concept of *haram* (forbidden things and doings by Islam) essentially focuses on abusing and/or stretching one's rights. That is, the very essence of the concept of right is moderation (Abdirabbih, 2021a, p. 227). This

[51] [Surah al-Isra' (The Night Journey), Verse 32] And do not kill the soul which God has made sacred, except in the course of justice. If someone is killed unjustly, We have given his next of kin certain authority. But he should not be excessive in killing, for he will be supported.

[52] [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 7] Men receive a share of what their parents and relatives leave, and women receive a share of what their parents and relatives leave, be it little or much -a legal share.

[53] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 282] O you who believe! When you incur debt among yourselves for a certain period of time, write it down. And have a scribe write in your presence, in all fairness. And let no scribe refuse to write, as God has taught him. So let him write, and let the debtor dictate. And let him fear God, his Lord, and diminish nothing from it […].

moderation feature of rights was instilled in the creatures; not even expanding knowledge with education can enhance one's rights or multiply them (Abdirabbih, 2021a, pp. 101–103). He narrated a story about a Persian prince, who was bragging about teaching some cats to carry candles around the dinner hall; thus, considering these cats to be elevated in status from the ordinary cats. However, when a scholar brought a mouse and let it loose during dinner, the cats dropped candles and chased after the mouse. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih claims that education cannot provide *more* rights to someone; their character will eventually prevail to return to the original point (Abdirabbih, 2021a, p. 344). This comment is also valid for rabbles, an incident where a disorganized bulk of people come together to claim more rights than they have. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih explains that the Arabic counterpart for the rabble word is الغوغاء *(al-ghawghā)*, which initially comes from the flight of locusts. Caliph Umar hated these people, and Ibn Abbas, one of the most venerated interpreters of the Quran, claimed participants of rabbles would be more useful for both preserving their original rights and being beneficial to society if they were dissolved and went back to being occupied with their original errands (Abdirabbih, 2021a, p. 169). Though the arguments of al-Kindi and Ibn 'Abd Rabbih took a different approach in conceptualizing rights, al-Farabi put it on the same track as the ancients by leaning on the concept of virtue. According to him, a society in which its constituent people assist each other to achieve ultimate happiness is a virtuous and perfect society, and this is also valid for cities; that is the essence of the perfect city *(al-madina al-fadila)*. Individuals of this city are likened to the parts of the body; everyone has a role here concerning their rights and duties. Since everyone differs from one another in traits and abilities, it is only natural to expect these roles to differ in such a society, as well as the rights that come with these roles (Farabi, 2017, pp. 98–100). The ruler's *most perfect* right in this city is ruling; similar to the heart as being the most superior organ in the body, and the rest of the organs follow it in their rankings, the governing authorities have natural rights to command (Farabi, 2017, pp. 101–102). The opposite of a virtuous city, for al-Farabi, comes in different forms: the ignorant city, the sinner city, the characterless city, the twisted city, the aberrant city, and more. Citizens of these cities do not know anything about happiness; they value physical wealth more than spiritual peace. Thus, they abuse their rights to achieve these worldly blessings (Farabi, 2017, pp. 111–113, 123–125). However, citizens of the virtuous city are aware of the existence of God, the might of reason, the necessity of a virtuous ruler, and the meaning of happiness. Though religions of the virtuous cities vary, their citizens are aware that they possess their civic rights with a mutual understanding of their fellow countrymen: reaching happiness (Farabi, 2017, pp. 127–128).

The Renaissance had witnessed two forms of conceptualization of rights: Machiavellian and humanistic. Machiavelli had lived in Florence, which was a republic. That is, rights and republic were going side by side in his times; citizens were able to possess their rights from the concept of citizenship alone, while citizenship was asking them to participate in the republic, which can also be seen as a privilege (Van Gelderen, 1990, pp. 221–222). However, Machiavelli never had full citizenship rights in Florence, even though he came from a family that held high-status government positions in the 14th century. That is, he was neither a part of the aristocracy nor a part of the general population, which means it would be impossible for him to be elected as a civic magistrate (Guarini, 1990, p. 20). This might be why Machiavelli approached the concept of rights from a political aspect. According to him, the Turkish sultan and the king of France represented the contemporary government styles of monarchies. Sultan was ruling alone, and the rest of the society was seen as his servants; thus, the rights of people were based on whatever he had given. However, the French government consisted of a king and lords, with some serious vested rights that even the king could not ignore. This is why conquering the Turkish state would be harder, but it would be easier to maintain it once it is conquered. France, on the other hand, is easy to conquer but hard to maintain. Because the vested rights of the French people are inherited by their local lords, they will strive hard to maintain these. The Turkish people, however, will resist the conquest because of their fear of the sultan; yet, his fall will bring the society back to its original point, and there will be social acceptance of the new ruler (Machiavelli, 2020, pp. 50-51). On the other hand, the famous satirical essay of Erasmus titled *The Praise of Folly* could serve as a beneficial guide for the humanistic view of rights. He emphasized that the right to have fun in this life is a divine gift, mocking the rigid scholastic mindset, which seems suitable for the humanist mode of thinking (Erasmus, 1992, p. 5). Additionally, he claimed that it was God who had granted human beings their rights while charging them with some duties; *he* established a balance between man and woman in their rights. Erasmus, as he distinguished gender roles with satirical intent, claimed that God had given reason to man and beauty to woman (Erasmus, 1992, pp. 29–31). These two elements Erasmus brought forward constitute the main pillars of humanism since they put the individual at the center of things; this is why their synthesis shows itself best in another humanist philosopher, Boccaccio, and his masterpiece *Decameron*. This work consists of one hundred stories told by ten figures—women and men. The purpose of an intention to trade stories had arisen from the burden of the Black Plague, and they decided to move to the countryside for ten days. The inventor of the storytelling game in this work, Pampinea, explained the necessity of such a change in their lives over the concept of right. According to

her, human beings can utilize their rights so long as they do not cause harm to another; the right to persevere in life is the most natural. Thus, even killing someone else is accepted in the eyes of the law if it is based on self-defense. The rights of human beings aim at their well-being; that is, caring for health is as vital a right as having fun for the individuals (Boccaccio, 1996, pp. 34–36).

At this point, for Western philosophy, the early modern thinkers had two approaches towards the concept of right: definitions made over virtue, and the value of the individual. They merged these two and created the precursor formulations for the modern rights thought. Jean Bodin, for instance, while *discovering* the concept of sovereignty in the modern sense, had to distinguish the rights of the sovereign from earlier rights of superiors; thus, he had to determine the privileges of the sovereign first. This is how he had compared almost all the known laws to men to ground the concept of rights in a universally accepted legal science. By studying on rights in democracies, aristocracies, and monarchies, he clarified the rights of the sovereign under five items: [1] appointing magistrates, [2] enacting and repelling laws, [3] initiating and concluding wars, [4] serving as an appellate institution in the ultimate resort, and [5] deciding the fate of individuals by the hand of laws (Franklin, 2006, pp. 23–25). It is clear that rights are approximated to laws in Bodin's view, and by defining the rights of the sovereign, he gave authority to decide the rights of the rest to the sovereign alone. However, though he had touched upon sovereign rights, Hugo Grotius tried to establish a universal doctrine of rights for humanity. In order to do this, he preferred to explain the concept over the property. He said God had given this world to men entirely, along with its creations. As people utilize its benefits, their shares become their private property. However, at some point in life, this innate right of man collided with the rights of others. Therefore, Grotius claims, property rights must be grounded in agreement or consent among people. However, some blessings on this earth cannot become subject to private ownership, like seas or rivers. Sailing on the sea, fishing from it, etc., are common rights for the individuals of all nations. Likewise, wastelands, arid lands, wild animals, lakes, forests, etc., become private only by first occupancy—whether by kings or ordinary men; before occupation, they remain common, and after it, they no longer 'barren' or 'wild'. This right is given by nature. Nevertheless, people should also value common usage of these private properties; for instance, claiming a river as private property by people or a sovereign cannot limit other people's and nations' rights to drink water from there (Grotius, 2016, pp. 54–61). These are common rights to things for Grotius, and he also posits a common right to certain actions, grounded in a general agreement of humankind. The principle of

convenience is the key here; survival is its essence. Each man has the right to do some actions for his survival in this life, and these actions do not violate others' rights so long as a mutual agreement is constituted. People have the right to purchase goods from others unless they are scarce; in a scarcity of corn, he says, the seller has the right to refuse to sell, which cannot be deemed unjust since no agreement was constituted. Similarly, people have the right to choose what they want to purchase for survival; that is the essence of mutual understanding (Grotius, 2016, pp. 65–66).

Though Grotius had presented an opaque form of natural rights, two social contract theorists, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, had given them a transparent characteristic; one with a negative characteristic, and the other with a positive characteristic, respectively. Thomas Hobbes accepts the existence of natural rights and defines the concept as one's ability to use their power as they please to protect their own nature, that is, their life. It is a form of freedom for Hobbes, which finds its proper technique amongst numerous options with the assistance of reason. In the state of nature, everyone has the right to do anything; however, individuals must remember that others possess the same right. Hence, at the verge of a possible conflict, people may prefer to abandon some of their natural rights, limiting their inherent freedoms. People renounce some of their rights in exchange for gaining new rights to preserve the balance they had at the original point—to avoid injustice, which can also be read as 'death'. Though not all rights are transferable, like resisting against an assault, people seek benefits by renouncing some of their rights (Hobbes, 2007, pp. 96–99). This is how Hobbes explained the birth of the commonwealth by renouncing some natural rights and transferring them to a higher authority, which was expected to guarantee the security of individuals. Because, in his argument, it is impossible to provide security to individuals with natural laws; human-made laws are needed (Hobbes, 2007, pp. 127–128). However, Lockean natural rights possess more positive and untransferable characteristics than the Hobbesian. According to Locke, humans have rights acquired with birth: life, freedom, and property. These rights are even valid in the state of nature, and no legitimate authority can arbitrarily violate them (Locke, 2012, pp. 9–16). That is, his state of nature is not as chaotic as Hobbes'; people can learn to respect the rights of each other through reason. Still, people established the social contract to prevent violations and enhance these rights. For Locke, the ultimate purpose of this contract is to guarantee the rights people possess (Locke, 2012, pp. 64–68). That is why legitimate authority exists to protect these rights. If the state fails or violates this duty, people can resist and change the government

(Locke, 2012, pp. 139–140). That is how Locke placed the rights at the center of politics and identified these above and beyond the state.

3.2.2. Rights in al-Rasa'il

The Ikhwan's understanding of rights, obligations, and responsibilities can be categorized into three sections: natural, legal, and political—all will be discussed in harmony. Here, the natural category emphasizes reason and knowledge, the legal category deals with religion and its codified laws under the name of *sharia*, and the political category investigates rulers' status.

The Ikhwan's conceptualization of right is very clear: right is a purpose without a certain end; people strive hard in this world to maximize their shares of what life brings to them, or enhance them at the very least (XLVI, p. 68). The stress on purpose here is the key since people seek happiness in this life; that is, they believe that the best thing this life brings people is happiness (XLV, p. 45), and all people take their shares from this happiness, more or less, without any deficit (XXXIX, p. 279). Therefore, the volume of happiness depends on the prevalence of pleasure or pain, and these two have two individual types: material and spiritual. Material pleasures arise at the very moment material pains end, similar to the working mechanism of the stomach. When its fuel is empty, akin to a lamp tank without oil, it stops working, and this situation gives pain to the individual. As soon as the fuel is added, its new status will bring pleasure to the same person. Spiritual pleasures, on the other hand, are directly related to one's character and mood. Smelling pleasant fragrances, hearing captivating melodies, touching smooth surfaces, etc., vary with people's character, which is directly related to the soul's status. This is why spiritual pain originates from not the absence of pleasure but dealing with some situations which are not by the subject's character (XXX, pp. 57–59). So, the happiness people try to maximize by holding their rights at a certain level or enhancing them depends on their 'good' situations. Concerning the Ikhwan's definition of good as *"any action that remains as customary"* and evil as *"any act that does not proceed according to custom"* (XLI, p. 320), and these concepts are valid for souls that live under the authority of several orders and prohibitions which determine their happiness levels in both this world and hereafter (XLII, p. 379), the Ikhwan believe that the 'good' brings happiness to people (IX, p. 217). These souls have some potential to learn better to enhance their happiness levels (XL, p. 304).

God created humans as free entities in their actions (XXXIX, p. 277) and made them the most precious creations (X, p. 269); *he* made them responsible with only one assignment: searching for the truth (XLII, p. 360). By leaning on this assignment, the Ikhwan claimed that even the religions and sects become subjects to this quest; a person *shall* search all the religions and sects within their reach and choose the best among them (XLII, p. 400). Because reason is a judge (XXXVIII, p. 248), and God has full support for the reason (XXXII, p. 154). Considering that God did not equalize the ones who know and those who do not (XL, p. 285),[54] *he* also knows that human beings are not equal in reason (XLII, p. 346). Since the Ikhwan believe that talking about divinity is the most supreme purpose in this life (XLII, p. 329) and religion is an area of research for people, it means religious scholars are the most intelligent people within a society (XLII, p. 363). At this very moment, we have three items in our hands: right was a purpose without a certain end for the Ikhwan, researching religion was the most supreme purpose, and people were not equal in the utilization capabilities of reason. A combination of these three situations shows itself in the possibility that the level of utilization of reason can be elevated by researching, which then, for the Ikhwan, will enhance the rights of people, both in quantity and quality. Indeed, as God promised that *he* elevates the people with knowledge by granting them more rights in both this life and the hereafter (XLVI, p. 59),[55] people can reach enlightenment via education (XXVII, p. 104). Souls can only be illuminated by the light of reason, and this reason covers a double meaning: first, it refers to the first creation of God, a substance that encompasses the entire universe, and second, the power of the human soul that shows itself in humans' thoughts and doings. According to this second meaning of the reason, the Ikhwan claim, it can be educated by enhancing its knowledge (XXXV, pp. 187–189). Human beings must comply with two separate but relevant provisions: knowing God and praising *him*. People with this awareness are responsible for carrying this liability until the end of their days; however, this is valid only for those with knowledge. God does not charge people without *this* knowledge; they are immune to it because he guides only those he wants to salvation (XXII, p. 142; XXXVIII, pp. 247–248).[56] This is why *he* promised that *he* would only

[54] [Surah az-Zumar (Throngs), Verse 9] […] Say, Are those who know and those who do not know equal? […] (Itani, 2015, p. 200).
[55] [Surah al-Mujadilah (The Argument), Verse 11] […] God elevates those among you who believe, and those given knowledge, many steps […] (Itani, 2015, p. 241).
[56] [Surah ar-Ra'd (Thunder), Verse 27] […] Say, God leads astray whomever He wills, and He guides to Himself whoever repents (Itani, 2015, p. 104).

elevate the ones who are aware of their responsibilities (XXXVIII, pp. 253, 254, 256, 261),[57] and *he* holds people responsible to the best of their abilities (IX, pp. 234, 254, 263).[58]

Such a situation brings a dilemma to the stage. On the one hand, being unaware of things causes a person to dodge responsibility while having fewer rights; on the other hand, enhanced knowledge brings more rights alongside specific responsibilities. Soul is responsible for the body (XXIII, p. 262), and some bodily responsibilities might bring some troubles to the soul, like unhappiness—naturally (XXIX, pp. 52–53). However, one *should* also remember that God and the Prophet unanimously agree that every soul is responsible for itself (XLII, p. 425).[59] This is why individuals need to save their own souls and enhance their rights, and the route that leads here passes through enhancing knowledge. Though this path promises a better life, better rights, and happiness, the journey requires some restrictions to be imposed to the passenger, as the Ikhwan counted them under seven headlines: [1] remaining silent, [2] listening, [3] contemplating, [4] practicing with what was learned, [5] craving for righteousness, [6] acknowledging wisdom comes from God, and [7] not to brag about doing good deeds (IX, p. 237). These are crucially important for the Ikhwan because, as they claim, if one approves what was told to them, it means they can be held responsible for what they approved (XII, p. 292). This comment parallels what God says about holding people responsible. There are people amongst the members of society, the Ikhwan claim, who serve as the guides for the rest (XLII, p. 388), trying to approximate erudite and ignorant (XXXI, p. 85); it is important to follow their route, either by mimicking their doings or reading what was written by them (V, p. 153). Considering the fact that Prophet Mohammad demanded his followers to wish for others what they want for themselves (L, p. 195), these guides had shared their knowledge with others via the books they penned; they speak to further generations for the enhancement of these young souls' knowledge and wisdom (XXXVI, p. 196). This is why an ignorant person cannot enter the sultan's court, for instance (XXVII, p. 12), or sophisticated *mujtahid*s (interpreters of Islamic law) were held responsible for commenting on practices of Islam (XLII, pp. 390–391).

[57] [Surah az-Zumar (Throngs), Verse 73] And those who feared their Lord will be led to Paradise in throngs. Until, when they have reached it, and its gates are opened, its keepers will say to them, Peace be upon you, you have been good, so enter it, to abide therein eternally (Itani, 2015, p. 203), [Surah az-Zumar (Throngs), Verse 61] And God will save those who maintained righteousness to their place of salvation. No harm will touch them, nor will they grieve (Itani, 2015, p. 202), [Surah Maryam (Mary), Verse 72] Then We will rescue those who were devout, and leave the wrongdoers in it, on their knees (Itani, 2015, p. 131), [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 197] […] And whatever good you do, God knows it. And take provisions, but the best provision is righteousness. And be mindful of Me, O people of understanding (Itani, 2015, p. 13).

[58] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 286] God does not burden any soul beyond its capacity. To its credit is what it earns, and against it is what it commits […] (Itani, 2015, p. 20).

[59] [Surah al-Ma'idah (The Table), Verse 105] O you who believe! You are responsible for your own souls […] (Itani, 2015, p. 50).

To sum up, it is safe to say that every right comes with an obligation and responsibility for the Ikhwan, and the precise status of one's rights is determined by the level of knowledge and wisdom an individual possesses.

Legal rights in the Ikhwanian sense focus on the laws of religion and their codified or practiced fashion, that is, the *sharia*. According to the Ikhwan, since God is the absolute owner of both worlds, *he* wishes both this world and the afterlife to prosper together; that is why the most irritating subjects for God are the ones who try to ruin one or both of them. This might be the reason that the Ikhwan claimed *he* had issued an order to execute one of the most painful deaths for these figures, such as amputating hands and feet crossways (XIX, p. 98).[60] The Quranic verse in which this punishment was announced highlights the role of prophets, and the Ikhwan consider them necessary for a single purpose: they play the role of transmitter in transferring the knowledge and wisdom they received from God to human beings (XXVIII, p. 30). Prophets are like doctors of the soul; just as only ill people seek the assistance of doctors, people require their medicines for curing their souls (XXII, p. 226). Human beings are under several restrictions in this world; these originate either because of the command of their very own reason or because of some legal procedures. These are necessary for enhancing the morality of human beings. God is the supreme legislator; since *he* is aware that human beings cannot live long enough to enhance their moralities by their own efforts in their lifetimes, *he* preferred to bind them by some divine rules while declaring them through *his* prophets. These rules shall be obeyed (XXV, pp. 314–315). Considering the fact that these rules, as coming in a bulk of revelations, aim to grant human beings salvation and to rescue them from eternal fire in the afterlife (XXVIII, p. 35), it is important for the Ikhwan to remember that both the revelation and invitation of the prophets address entire humanity (XXX, p. 75). The receivers of this call, the true believers, are the heirs and disciples of the prophets (XLVI, p. 58); this is why it was reported that Prophet Mohammad told Ali that they are the parents of the *ummah*, the religious community of Islam (V, p. 146).

The sum of revelations, advice, and prohibitions of the prophets constitutes *sharia*, and it comes in various types. However, such a variety does not invalidate its worth, since only one religion exists. The main reason for this variety lies in the differences of communities and generations: God, for instance, mentioned in the Quran that *he* issued different rules for the

[60] [Surah al-Ma'idah (The Table), Verse 33] The punishment for those who fight God and His messenger, and strive to spread corruption on earth, is that they be killed, or crucified, or have their hands and feet cut off on opposite sides, or be banished from the land. That is to disgrace them in this life; and in the Hereafter they will have a terrible punishment (Itani, 2015, p. 46).

communities of Prophet Noah and Prophet Mohammad, but the source of these various rules was the same: the *very same* religion (XLII, pp. 389–390).[61] Still, as being the ultimate version of *the* religion and final edition of the *sharia*, the path of Islam is the most perfected and complete *sharia* for today (XL, p. 307). This *sharia*, as envisaged under the prophecy of Mohammad, carries ten rules within, which make the subjects bound by these. Accordingly, [1] the universe has a supreme creator, [2] the non-material entities we call angels exist, [3] some high souls that assist the operation of the universe exist, [4] these souls lose their importance neither by residing in a body or leaving it, [5] the substance of all living entities are same, [6] not all entities listen to the commands of God, [7] God has the ability to reward and punish, [8] rewards and punishments come with a future resurrection, [9] prayers grant the most supreme rewards, and [10] the inviters to God's call are the highest people among their societies (XLVII, pp. 103–104). The Ikhwan claim that each type of *sharia* charges its subjects with different obligations (XXVI, p. 329) as well as God had held *his* prophets responsible for these obligations differently, concerning both their statuses in their communities and their abilities and capabilities (IX, p. 234). Because both the prophets and subjects are human beings and they have different characteristics, their obligations and responsibilities differ in the eyes of *sharia* but show exact similarities within the parameters of *the* religion. These differences, at least in the Ikhwan's closing, resemble paths that lead to Ka'ba or turning faces towards it during prayers, regardless of the geographic locations of believers (XXVIII, p. 35). The laws of God and the *sharia* present some rights and obligations to people, but these rights and obligations differ. Some people are obliged to establish tangible forms of laws and wisdom by interpreting God's will, while others are responsible (XLII, p. 347). The Ikhwan believe that experts shall make these interpretations, and only then can these interpretations turn into canons. People without competent knowledge can easily declare others as unbelievers, which destroys the very foundations of *the* religion (IX, p. 255).[62] These people, the Ikhwan claimed, are the reason for the establishment of numerous sects in Islam. They interpreted God's words and the Prophet's *hadith*s wrong, causing parting amongst the Muslims first and bloodshed later, while

[61] [Surah ash-Shura (Consultation), Verse 13] He prescribed for you the same religion He enjoined upon Noah, and what We inspired to you, and what We enjoined upon Abraham, and Moses, and Jesus: You shall uphold the religion, and be not divided therein. As for the idolaters, what you call them to is outrageous to them. God chooses to Himself whom He wills, and He guides to Himself whoever repents (Itani, 2015, p. 211).

[62] The Ikhwan address the *Hashewiyyah* sect with this accusation. This sect, also known as *Mucassimah*s and *Mushabbihah*s, is known for their fall in describing the image of God, as anthropomorphic as possible. Some *hadith*s like "God created humanity in *his* own image" and "The Believer's heart rests within two fingers of God" made this sect flourish. The Islamic scholars claim that they rejected contemplating upon some Quranic verses and *hadith*s and failed in utilizing reason on their meanings; instead, they had taken the most direct meaning of words (Şehristani, 2013, pp. 88–92; Yurdagür, 1997).

legitimizing these incidents as they had happened by the will of God, since *he* is aware of everything. The Ikhwan's thought on this matter is particular: blaming God for the sins and wrongs done in this world by hiding behind the fact that God is all-hearing and all-seeing will normalize these evil deeds, eventually lifting the notion of responsibility from the entire humanity. It will lead to wickedness (XXXI, pp. 136–137).

Political rights revolve around the rights and obligations of the ruler and *his* subjects. According to the Ikhwan, happiness comes in two forms: interior and exterior. The latter, exterior happiness, depends on the king's goodness; if your king is good, you will reach worldly happiness (XLV, p. 45). Because such goodness will bring out a good state, it is important to know that a good state requires an alliance initially; a community has to have a consensus on virtues and kindness, which requires an alliance on the same religion and sect. Their solidarity and acting as one will create a good state (XLVIII, p. 143). Such an alliance, which can be read as a social contract, grants both some rights and obligations to the participants of this alliance. Kings, in this debate, have different rights than their subjects; they resemble to the sun, and separate from their subjects in having different rights as the ability to retain the right to rule, wear the most elegant clothes, outranking others (XXVI, p. 326), listening to good music (XXXI, p. 90), speaking with other kings[63] (XXII, p. 217), and annihilating their rivals (XXXI, p. 133). In the same vein, these kings are obligated to obey some rules; these were counted by the Ikhwan as follows: governing different opinions, consulting the erudite, conducting good politics, being fair in justice, supervising affairs of their subjects, and ranking their officers accordingly (XXII, pp. 177, 211). The Ikhwan gave credit to *a* holy scripture, but did not specify which one it was, and claimed that God does not like depraved kings; *he* forbids them to pile up gold, exploit their privileged status, and focus on lust and pleasures. Because, as the Ikhwan asserted, these doings are forcing the subjects of kings to turn away from praying to God (XXII, p. 169). The Ikhwan believe that the scholars are obliged to advise kings to keep sultans out of these vices, but it must also be remembered by these wise people that scholars shall not brag about their knowledge and wisdom and dream about wearing a crown (IX, p. 237). Following the Ikhwan's way on this matter is all these scholars needed: wishing the kings well and advising them alone (XLVIII, p. 130).

[63] The Ikhwan raise the social barriers between kings and subjects so high that they resemble reaching out to the kings to reaching out to God or angels by establishing a link between them via some chosen middlemen (XLII, p. 386; XLVIII, pp. 145–146).

God cannot be held responsible for *his* doings, but kings can, since they are the caliphs of God on earth (XXII, p. 212). This responsibility has two aspects, as divine responsibility and earthly responsibility. Divine one is simple; God holds the kings responsible for their subjects. A cruel sultan *will* witness *his* divine punishment (XLVIII, p. 141). On the other hand, the earthly responsibility requires a reciprocal and mutual understanding between the king and *his* subjects. Since *the* religion is one and only, and the kings are the banner-bearers of religion, the subjects shall obey their rulers (XLII, p. 389). People often follow the same religion as their kings (XLII, p. 396). If a society has a king, and a prophet is assigned to them, the combination of these two figures elevates the status of that society (XXII, p. 205). Therefore, people must obey their kings (IX, pp. 241–242). However, these subjects have every right in the world to think differently and represent an opposed stance, because if there were no opposition, everyone would think, act, and behave similarly. Still, such an opposition rests within small nuances for the subjects; yet, rulers had preferred to alter the rules of the *sharia* by inventing some fresh and biased practices. They became cruel rulers (XXXI, pp. 127–128). It is mandatory to obey the rules of just kings, but it is equally acceptable to rise against a cruel one (XLII, p. 368). However, again, it would be best in the Ikhwan's understanding to track a moderate approach in politics when defending rights and following obligations; one should neither frown at the king nor over-flatter *him* (XXXI, p. 107).

3.2.3. Rights in the *Encyclopédie*

The *Encylopédie* believes that since the concept of rights is a very familiar term for people, they do not bother to define it clearly, let alone build a consensus on it (Diderot, 1755, p. 115). The term signifies having the authority to do something or having due benefit from something tangible or intangible (*Droit*, 1755). By conceptualizing rights in the fashion of law, the *Encyclopédistes* preferred to examine the concept under two categories: natural and positive law.

If we define justice as the obligation to give everyone what belongs to them, then the concept of rights is the first cause of justice, says the *Encyclopédie*. Besides, by asking some legitimate questions *like "In a scenario where anything belongs to everyone and the notion of obligation was in no use yet, how could we determine something belongs to A more than B?"*, and *"If someone gives everything without expecting anything from others, what does he owe to society?"* (Diderot, 1755, p. 115), the concept of rights turns into a debate to be discussed within

the realm of morality. Nevertheless, in the same vein, natural law is above and beyond morality, entirely different from the ultimate evaluation of good or evil. In truth, natural law is a science of customs. We tend to evaluate the concept within the domain of morality because the ancients had preferred to do so, which was a wrong step in the eyes of the *Encyclopédie*. Pythagoras conceptualized natural law via virtue, while Socrates engraved virtue in it; that is the reason we label Socrates as 'the father of moral philosophy'. Plato approached the concept from the political side, while Aristotle attached the concept of duty to it, which concerns citizens (Boucher d'Argis, 1755e, p. 132). However, all of these conceptualizations neglect a single necessity: freedom. If a man is not free, that means his ideas and actions originate from something external other than his soul; that is, it would be impossible to talk about good, bad, right, wrong, in addition to rights and obligations (Diderot, 1755, p. 115). Thus, it is not the concept of rights that shall be evaluated via virtue; in contrast, justice is a virtue. It consists of rendering everyone what belongs to them; right, on the other hand, is a mere practice of such virtue (Boucher d'Argis, 1755f, p. 116). Moving from this approach, the *Encyclopédie* highlights Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui's review of natural rights to provide a witness to this debate. According to him, to properly understand natural law, one must first understand the obligation in general. We know that several rights and obligations come with them; some are natural, and others are acquired. The rights that belong to us can be named liberty, property, and the authority of disposition over what belongs to us. God imposed natural law on us all essentially; human beings discover its provisions with their reason. This means it is necessary to distinguish what is fair from what is unfair—natural law dictates this. There are three separate ways to consult when it comes to such a distinction: the instinct that directs us to act or restrains us from such an action (soul), the reason that affirms the choice of that instinct, and the will of God (Boucher d'Argis, 1755e, pp. 133–134).

Though this is the case, it should be remembered that human beings are poor, contentious, and worried entities; they have needs and passions that direct them to do things to others that they would not want to be done to themselves. The *Encyclopédie* claims a man would not hesitate to annihilate the majority of humanity in exchange for the extension of his own life, if he were certain that he would not face any penalties, because reason commands it. This is how human beings discover the truth about their rights, with their reasons. Once that truth is discovered, it is mandatory to obey it; else, they do not deserve their places amongst humanity, and should be treated as animals (Diderot, 1755, pp. 115-116). Although natural laws are certain principles that originate from nature itself, the 'natural law' denomination is wrong because it

also has to include animals. However, animals do not possess reasoning; therefore, they cannot know anything about rights granted by nature. It is clear that human beings share some common rights with animals like of those we observe in the union of the male and the female, the procreation of children, the care of their education, the love of freedom, the conservation of individuals, and the self-defense but human beings' understanding of natural law is equity and justice in their rights. Such an understanding was pre-recorded in human beings, which can also be understood as God's doing, giving us this understanding. By looking through this lens, three fundamental principles of rights and justice can be named: to live honestly, to offend no one, and to give back to everyone what belongs to them. Humanity had devised countless rules under the guidance of these principles (Boucher d'Argis, 1755e, p. 131).

At this very moment, one can see that the *Encyclopédie* determined the borders of rights within the parameters of natural law: natural rights are not related to ethics but people's capability of turning their desires into interests with the assistance of reason, rights come with obligations, and rights concern not the owner of them alone but others as well. Thus, the scenario above where *that* individual had seen a rightful act to murder the majority of people for personal interest only shows that that *they* have to realize either *they* do not want to become victim of such a massacre or *they* have to comply with a simple understanding that everyone has to have such authority to become perpetrator of *that* massacre for a simple fact: one who wants to live has the same right with another who wants to die. Thus, the *Encyclopédie* concludes that human beings share a common notion that shows itself in being in a good situation. However, the intense effort to improve this situation may lead individuals to become over-reliant on their own willpower, which is a troubling form of autonomy, as shown by the violent reasoner's choice earlier, who rationalized committing a mass-murder. That is why individuals must consult a higher authority, which determines the limits of their rights, obligations, and duties while categorizing their statuses under the common notion pre-recorded as being in a good situation: the general will. The harmony between individual and society determines the social status of that individual; whether they are to be categorized, say, as a father or as a son, and such (Diderot, 1755, p. 116). This natural law, therefore, transformed into a law of humanity with the general will; natural reason has established natural law on certain matters between all men, and it has turned into a general opinion in a way. Natural law is based on the light of reason alone, and this kind of reason is as old as humanity, which shows itself under primitive law. Some practices of the rights that come with it have become subject to changes in time, but their essences remain intact; the religious ceremonies, for instance, may

change, but the right to believe in a god and worship *them* does not change. Similarly, obligations of children towards their parents as well as duties of citizens to their fatherlands change in practice alone but not in essence (Boucher d'Argis, 1755g, pp. 126–127). That means, these natural rights are so perpetual and invariable that they can neither be abolished nor suspended by any agreement or code, which makes natural rights different from man-made laws (Boucher d'Argis, 1755e, pp. 131–132). In addition to these, natural rights cannot be transferred since they are the rights of humanity. Therefore, the general will, which secures rights of people involves nine indispensable features within: [1] whomever listens to *their* will alone is the enemy of humanity, [2] general will regulates individual demands and interests at social level, [3] general will regulates behavior patterns in society, [4] general will is the binding force of individuals, even valid for bandits hiding in their caves, [5] legislation should be for everyone, not for the interest of an individual, [6] general will never fails, [7] statuses may change, however, the nature of natural law does not change, since it always depends on common desire and general will, [8] justice is both the cause and effect of equity in rights, and [9] whomever rejects these principles commanded by the reason should be treated as a distorted being (Diderot, 1755, p. 116).

Albeit the *Encyclopédie* deftly designed the framework of the relationship between natural rights and general will, the very same human beings did not hesitate to invent new statuses for some minorities that overshadow the rights of the majority: privileges. Privilege was defined as an advantage granted to one man over another; any privilege other than the nature granted is considered illegitimate by the Encyclopedists, as they are nothing but unjust practices made to all men in favor of one (Diderot, 1765e). The origin of privileges can be traced back to the subordination or relationships people have developed. Their primary purpose is to acquire an interest or to seek a function (Jaucourt, 1765l). Three types of privilege can be observed in any given society: privilege granted at birth, privilege granted by the ruler, and privilege given by necessity. Though the privilege gained at birth does not have any dignity within at all, it has a wider social acceptance and carries a sort of reputation within other than the rest, since it was designed and put into wide use at an uncertain point of time; thus, people had developed an accustomedness towards it—if not an affinity. Privilege granted by the ruler, however, has two types: honorable and financial. Honorable privilege is granted to appreciate and recognize certain services of certain people, which materializes best with the granted nobility titles to some people that come with exceptional privileges. Financial privilege granted by the ruler is a reciprocal understanding; the ruler grants privilege to some individuals for their

efforts to fund the crown. Lastly, privilege granted by necessity, in truth, is a security mechanism and directly related to governmental services; it aims to grant a secure status to specific government officials while they are running their errands. The most typical example of these officials is taxmen, who have some immunity-related privileges that shield them against the rage and assault of the laity. These privileges exist, according to the *Encyclopédie*, but society has to pay attention to two criteria here: the rights given by privileges should not be abused, and society would become unstable if these privileges multiply (*Privilege*, 1765, p. 389; Diderot, 1765e). As it is realized here, the concept of privilege serves as a bridge between natural law and positive law, thus transcending the debate over rights.

According to the *Encyclopédie*, the positive law is positioned just on the opposite side of natural law. Its main characteristic originates from a single will; thus, positive law varies while natural law is fixed. This is how the rights granted by positive law vary. Additionally, it is possible to divide positive law into two as fed by divine knowledge and fed by human knowledge. Divine positive rights are based on certain revealed commands, which do not have to carry any reason within. On the other hand, human-based positive rights have to be in accord with both divine and natural law, and have to be produced by human knowledge. This type of right, akin to the divine positive rights, does not have to depend on reason, but its observation during practice dresses it in reasonable clothing. Naturally, it is possible to divide human positive laws into two, regarding the rights they grant to individuals and societies, as one internal and one external. External category deals with different societies, which we can call the law of nations in bulk, depending on the consent of several nations, including examples like rights on commerce, navigation, and war. Internal category focuses on people in a society, often named as civil laws and established by public authority, which have a unique characteristic and bind everyone. The rights granted by this category can be exemplified as the ones concerning marriage, inheritance, and judgments (Boucher d'Argis, 1755h). Human-made laws may sometimes contradict natural law; justification of wars is a clear example of this (Boucher d'Argis, 1755e, p. 132). Similarly, these laws can be abused or may grant some privileges to some selected people. The abused laws were titled with *droits abusifs* by the *Encyclopédie*; they grant some abusive rights to some favored people, which are against reason, equity, and general decorum. One of the most famous examples of such laws is the 'first night right' practiced in feudal times, which was claimed by the bishop of Amiens first, granting the right to lords sleeping with the newlywed bride or forcing the couple to pay compensation. This right was abolished entirely on 19 May 1409 by the parliament in France. Such rights are not considered

contrary to decency by the Encyclopedists, but are also considered ridiculous (Boucher d'Argis, 1755i). The privileges granted by the human-made laws best show themselves in the nobility titles. These laws are designed to determine the rights of some specific invented positions and statuses; they grant holders privileges and higher statuses. Nobility titles like prince, lord, duke, etc., the session order in the parliament, some titles and rights granted to royal advisors, the right to wear a red robe assigned to high-ranking officials, and knight and squire titles are well-known examples of this debate (Boucher d'Argis, 1755j). These titles given to the nobility and the rights coming with them also pass onto the following generations; still, there is a hierarchy in utilizing these rights. For example, first-born male children in a noble family cannot be restricted from their birth rights, as they are the heirs of their families, unless they prefer to renounce their rights. However, the rest of the children's rights can be arranged and rearranged by their parents, as the female children do not have stable rights in this nobility structure, where they constantly become subject to fresh arrangements (Toussaint, 1751b). On a different note, some restrictions towards limiting the privileged rights of these exclusive people can be imposed by the very same minority. For instance, as the *Encyclopédie* claims, kings and nobles may prefer to dissociate their non-heir princes/children from their innate rights of family legacies; thus, they choose to transfer some revocable lands in which these children can enjoy income coming with them but not the title granted by the land (Mallet & Toussaint, 1751). This practice serves as a clear example of how privileges can be inverted.

The divine law, which finds its granted rights in the Ten Commandments and other passages in the Gospel, becomes the foundation for some privileges in the ecclesiastical and canonical laws. Some people believe that the latter examples are misinterpretations [or deliberate interpretations] of divine law, which found an earthly basis in time (Boucher d'Argis, 1755k). *Dixme* legal tradition, for instance, where one tenth of the agricultural product after harvest has to go to ecclesiastical authorities, was a secular interpretation of some verses found

in the Old Testament's chapters like Genesis 14[64] and 28,[65] Exodus 22,[66] and Leviticus 28[67] (Boucher d'Argis, 1754h, pp. 1090–1091).[68] Similarly, some privileges can be observed in churches, where practices in religious ceremonies have created their very own distinct statuses within the community, and these statuses have transformed into rights over time. The *Encyclopédie* divides these privileges into two, as higher and lower. Higher privileges are directly related to the donations and/or services that some specific people contributed to the church. These efforts eventually grant people rights to have funeral palls, have their names mentioned during prayers, have their seats reserved, use incense, be buried in a special place within the church premises, and so on. Depending on social dignity, rank, titles, and possessions, some lower privileges also exist: receiving holy water first, getting ahead of others in the offering queue, receiving the kiss of peace first, receiving blessed bread first, leading the church procession on some occasions, and more (Boucher d'Argis, 1755). Though these privileges grant specific honor to their recipients, like lords and officers, the *Encyclopédie* does not find them helpful. On the other hand, useful rights and/or privileges bring some profit or emolument to their receivers; still, lords and officers possess both privileges (Boucher d'Argis, 1755m). In addition to these privileges, depending on divine law and its secular interpretations

[64] This chapter narrates a war between coalitions of kings. Abraham rescues his nephew, Lot, and returns with the war spoils. He gives Melchizedek, king of Salem, a tenth of spoils: [Genesis 14:20] "And blessed be the most high God who delivered thine enemies into thy hand. And he gave him a tenth of all" (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 20).

[65] This chapter narrates Jacob's dream during his rest while he was fleeing from his brother, Esau, and his doings afterwards. God reaffirms *the* promises made to Abraham and Isaac in his dream and promises Jacob to be blessed. After awakening, Jacob realizes the place he slept was holy; thus, sets up the stone he used as pillow earlier as a sacred pillar, and vows God: [Genesis 28:22] "and this stone, which I set for a pillar, shall be house of God, and of all that thou givest me I will surely give the tenth to thee" (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, pp. 37–38).

[66] This chapter clearly mentions the penal law of God, as *he* instructs them to Moses: [Exodus 22:29] "Thou shalt not keep back the abundance of thy threshing floor and of thy press" (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 94).

[67] There is a mistake here. The *Encyclopédie* mentioned Leviticus 28 in its example, but the Leviticus book of the Old Testament has 27 chapters; the genuine intention must have been Chapter. 27. Leviticus 27 mainly focuses on vows and God's shares in specific ratios and certain prices of products and sacrifices: [Leviticus 27:30-32] "[30] And all the tithe of the land, of the seed of the land, and of the fruit of the trees, is Jehovah's. [31] And if a man shall indeed redeem any of his tithes, he shall add its fifth to it. [32] And all the tithe of the herd, or of the flock, of all that passes under the rod, the tenth shall be holy to Jehovah" (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, pp. 155–156).

[68] This tithe tradition has its counterpart in the Islamic law, named *ushr*, with some similar origins that were found in a holy text: the Quran. By interpreting the Quranic verses such as 2:267 and 6:141, the Muslim jurists had either counted tithe tradition within the domain of *zakat* (obligatory alms) or categorized it under secular payments/taxes reserved to the religiopolitical authority, by interpreting some worldly practices executed by Prophet Mohammad (Erkal, 2007, p. 97). The mentioned Quranic verses are as follows, respectively: [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 267] O you who believe! Gove of the good things you have earned, and from what We have produced for you from the earth. And do not pick the inferior things to give away, when you yourselves would not accept it except with eyes closed. And know that God is Sufficient and Praiseworthy (Itani, 2015, p. 19), and [Surah al-An'am (Livestock), Verse 141] It is He who produces gardens, both cultivated and wild, and date-palms, and crops of diverse tastes, and olives and pomegranates, similar and dissimilar. Eat of its fruit when it yields, and give its due on the day of its harvest, and do not waste. He does not love the wasteful (Itani, 2015, p. 60).

as well as the intimacy between these and the state officers, the *Encyclopédie* claims that such a relationship created the French law. French kings in the distant past, namely in the eighth century, cooperated with ecclesiastics and laity to determine both civil and canonical rights and privileges. Although these rights and privileges seem arbitrary, the *Encyclopédie* gives reference to Montesquieu that he believes lords and bishops were responsible for turning a society into a nation since there was no such a thing existed as participating in assemblies for the laity; only after these ordinary people became part of governments that they were able to regulate the rights and privileges of the ecclesiastics through capitulary laws. As the feudal laws became widespread, the jurisdictional authority of ecclesiastics faded. Thus, the clergy put a distance between themselves and the secular laws, and depended more on the canons of Church councils and Decretals (roughly, Papal laws), which caused their rights and privileges to be reformulated (Mallet & d'Alembert, 1752). At this point, two relevant subjects and their rights and privileges can be mentioned: the sovereign's and the lord's. Sovereign's rights and privileges as a king were counted by the *Encyclopédie* as administering justice, making laws, declaring war and peace, minting coins, imposing taxes, creating offices, etc. (Boucher d'Argis, 1755n). In contrast, a lord's privileges were named as being recognized as a lord in his territory, hunting freely in his fief, receiving regular payments from the peasants residing on his land, and numerous other financial privileges on his land that grant him income in various types (Boucher d'Argis, 1755o).

"Quem sequuntur commode, debent sequi & incommode" say the *Encyclopédistes* (Boucher d'Argis & Diderot, 1753), which could be translated with a contextual meaning to *"whoever enjoys benefits, must also consider the losses"*. All these rights and privileges mentioned by the *Encyclopédie* come with some obligations and duties. Accordingly, obligation is a restriction of natural freedom produced by reason. Reason, therefore, is a justification that motivates human beings to act in a specific way. Such justifications direct people to act more favorably among all other acting options. Naturally, obligations vary in strength; however, the greater the impact of justifications on our will, the more likely we are to obey these obligations (Jaucourt, 1765m: 303). This is why obligations have a close connection with rights and equity. Considering the fact that *"obligation is the mother of [legal] action"*,[69] it would be right to claim every action happens with an obligation; that is, if there is no obligation—there is no action. However, some obligations do not have to carry an action in the legal sense (Boucher d'Argis, 1765s). For instance, some natural obligations like a son's obligation towards his

[69] *"[…] l'obligation est la mere de l'action […]".*

family do not produce any action in the legal sense; such an obligation is a natural one, and that individual cannot be forced to comply (*Obligation Naturelle*, 1765). Natural law claims that human beings are obliged towards other people, and this obligation arises from their promises. Promising is a voluntary act and can be given freely; nature commands people to keep their promises unless given by external forces, which do not impose anything on the individual. Promise, as both a natural right and a contract, was designed as an obligation by nature; if it were not classified as an obligation, trust between human beings could have never been established (Jaucourt, 1755b). As seen here, the *Encyclopédie* conceptualized obligation in two ways: within the parameters of natural law that comes with rights, and within the parameters of civil laws attributed to the judicial system. Two intellectuals of their times, Jean Barbeyrac and Richard Cumberland, illuminated the path towards the concept of obligation for the Encyclopedists. Accordingly, Barbeyrac claims the will of a supreme being makes human beings feel dependent on that will; so, people feel obliged. We, the people as rational beings, are free to act with our wills; thus, it would be impossible for us to impose some obligations upon ourselves, our reason will not allow it. This is why a supreme being imposes these obligations upon us, and reason approves them. However, the *Encyclopédie* rejects such a comment. Because the will of a higher authority would automatically cast human consent and will out of the equation, therefore, an external force shadows the status of the reason. However, if the reason gives consent to such an obligation of its own will, that would mean it will obey that obligation with its free choice, which also makes the choice moral. That is, the internal obligation would bring the concept of good and evil to the table, while the fate of the external one would be concluded with a reward or punishment. Cumberland approaches the morality of obligation from the side of legislators. In his account, the legislator warns people to act according to law while utilizing their rights; balancing that utilization and obedience is necessary to reach happiness. This means that the obligation imposed upon an action serves the happiness of human beings. Therefore, people seek the common good that would bring common happiness by obeying these obligations: reason commands it. The *Encyclopédie* agrees. Nature has charged human beings with an obligation to treat one another with kindness, and any morally conscious individual should comply with this duty. Happiness is a necessity for humans, and using reason and acting with it would bring comfort to society; this is why reasoning for happiness is a natural obligation for all (Jaucourt, 1765m).

"Any obligation without a cause is zero" (*Obligation Causée*, 1765)[70] says the *Encyclopédie*, and these obligations charge people with some duties. Duty is a human action that aligns with the obligations imposed on us by laws. Natural law is the primary source of all duties, and natural religion arises from natural law. Though human beings live as a society of their own kind, even a man who is alone in this world should practice these natural duties (Jaucourt, 1754, p. 915). Duties arising from kinship links or the feeling towards humanity, like reciprocal duties of marriage, parents' duties towards their children, children's duties towards their parents, etc., are considered natural duties (Boucher d'Argis, 1755p, p. 676). The second duty that nature expects us to obey is caring for ourselves. God had given us a soul and a body with some important faculties attached to them, and instructed us to become happy. This happiness passes through self-conservation first, and to cultivate our abilities second. The final natural duty focuses on other people. God created everyone equally and injected an inclination to live in society into us. Our duty is to maintain this society and to make elements of this society pleasant to each other (Jaucourt, 1754, p. 915). There are also some religious duties, which can be counted as praying to God in a manner worthy of *him*, respecting *his* servants, helping the poor and needy, etc. (Boucher d'Argis, 1755p, p. 676). In addition to these, the *Encyclopédie* highlights a hierarchy among these duties: man's duties to God prevails all, deciding the most useful duty first if a hesitation occurs between two personal duties, and choosing duties to ourselves when we are stuck between duties to ourselves and duties to our society if there is an equality in advantages (Jaucourt, 1754, p. 915). The civil laws, conversely, concern obligations and duties between the sovereign and his subjects, and deal with various interests in society, either favoring the public good or the benefit of someone in particular (Boucher d'Argis, 1755, p. 676). The threat of punishments to society imposes these duties and obligations; though punishment is the last resort, it aims to enhance the security and prosperity of society. The *Encyclopédie* claims that punishments bring people sorrow; interestingly, we are unsure whether this life has more pleasure than sorrow. Counting each punishment type one by one that causes sorrow is possible. However, humans cannot count the number of pleasures diametrically opposite to sorrows. That is, the codes of civil laws that require punishment for not obeying obligations and duties presuppose the happening of disobedience. The consequence of disobedience comes in two forms: punishment or compensation. The right to punish is a privilege granted to magistrates alone in civil societies; he also has the right to ease the

[70] *"[…] mais toute obligation sans cause est nulle".*

punishment or completely revoke it, while he has no privilege to intervene in the compensation, which is a privilege attributed to the victim alone (Diderot, 1765f; Jaucourt, 1765n, p. 246).

3.2.4. A Comparison on Rights in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

The Ikhwan's understanding of rights was divided into three sections: natural, legal, and political, to make their approaches towards the concept more straightforward. In fact, these three categories can be considered as intertwined, rendering a more holistic approach. On the other hand, the *Encyclopédie*'s approach has a specific division of two as natural and positive rights. Still, this division is also their own invention and akin to al-Rasa'il, the Encyclopedists prefer to read the concept through natural law. This being the case, it is safe to say that both texts base the concept of rights upon nature, with respect to either equating nature with god or considering it as a creation of *his*. After this clarification, a similarity comparison of al-Rasa'il's and the *Encyclopédie*'s formulations on rights can be examined in three parts: source of the rights, practices of the rights, and social echoes of the rights.

The role of God has a specific place in both texts; both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes* give credit to *his* doings for granting rights to human beings. In this debate, the Ikhwan claims that God is the sole owner of this life and the next. *He* expects human beings to keep these in harmony in their lives (XIX, p. 98). Thus, as the owner of both worlds and anything that comes with it, *he* is the provider of natural rights; *he* only expects human beings to know *him* and praise *him* (XXXVIII, pp. 247–248). The *Encyclopédie*, too, has an identical approach to this debate. Accordingly, it was claimed that natural rights and natural religion have a close connection with each other (Jaucourt, 1754, p. 915), and God had granted some pre-recorded understandings to human beings by enhancing their rights with equity and justice feelings (Boucher d'Argis, 1755e, p. 131). As given by God, these rights come with obligations within the religious domain, such as praying to *him*, respecting *his* servants, aiding the poor, etc. (Boucher d'Argis, 1755p, p. 676). The given natural rights, however, are not given to be used arbitrarily; in contrast, they are apt to be calculated in detail, and the reason was deemed solely responsible here, in both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*. Human beings are the most precious creations in the eyes of God (X, p. 269), claim the Ikhwan; *he* expects human beings to confer with reason while evaluating the given rights to them (XXXII, p. 154) since reason is considered the ultimate judge (XXXVIII, p. 248). Similarly, the *Encyclopédie* highlights the role of reason in determining natural rights. In this respect, God had given all the natural rights

to human beings alongside reason; it is our responsibility to distinguish what is fair from unfair with our reason, and determine our rights in this world in accordance with the will of God (Boucher d'Argis, 1755e, pp. 133–134).

Practicing the rights shows notable similarities between the Ikhwan's words and the *Encyclopédie*'s. Both texts circumscribe the role of happiness, freedom, and morality while directly or indirectly incorporating these concepts into the rights. The Ikhwan, for instance, value happiness with a specific claim that it is the best thing one can achieve in this life, and no individual is put aside from this blessing, though the level of their happiness varies (XLV, p. 45; XXXIX, p. 279). By defining good as something that has harmony with customs and bad as the opposite of those customs, obligations, and responsibilities, while practicing the rights is to preserve the status of good for the people, which brings happiness (XLI, p. 320; XLII, p. 379). The *Encyclopédie*, too, counts happiness as a requirement for human beings. Additionally, it highlights the role of obligations and responsibilities in practicing the rights; these conditions, which we can put in bulk as restrictions, require a certain obedience to reach and preserve happiness both at individual and social levels (Jaucourt, 1765m). Level of happiness and also the rights that are bound to it, have a chance to be improved for the Encyclopedists; a man should only protect his body and soul first and seek an enhancement for the abilities that come with these constitutive elements of being a human (Jaucourt, 1754, p. 915). Albeit the Ikhwan acknowledge that the severity of bodily obligations might cause some troubles to the soul (XXIX, pp. 52–53), it is evident that such an improvement in the possibility of happiness and the rights was attributed to education and enhancing knowledge in al-Rasa'il (XLVI, p. 59; XXVII, p. 104). In addition to that similarity, both the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists underlined the importance of freedom while practicing the rights. For the Ikhwan, both the rights and the obligations coming with them are the determinants of our sins and good deeds. They admit the will of God but also highlight a divine trial imposed on human beings, which focuses on obeying people's responsibilities with their free will (XXXI, pp. 136–137). The same approach can be read in the *Encyclopédie* as well. The rights and obligations originating from natural law dictate the use of personal free will. Because removing free thinking and deciding from the equation would essentially nullify the existence of the rights and obligations, they would happen after some simple external interventions, which harm the notion of the rights and obligations (Diderot, 1755, p. 115). Lastly, the *Encyclopédie* initially rejects the causality between the rights and morality but realizes their effect afterwards. Ancient philosophers equated rights with virtue in their various interpretations; however, the

Encyclopédistes reject such an approximation and claim that virtues are only relevant with justice, not rights. Meaning, practicing the rights per responsibilities and obligations as well as free will makes the outcome morally good; without any external interferences that seek any reward or punishment (Boucher d'Argis, 1755e, p. 132; 1755f, p. 116; Jaucourt, 1765m).

Al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* highlight some social repercussions of the rights and obligations; their recognition and practices within given societies, and are directly related to the notion of social contract. The Ikhwan believe that the concept of state emerged from a consensus between the ruler and the laity. Such a consensus was first derived from some moral understandings like virtue and kindness towards one another, in the form of an alliance, and the rights dedicated to individuals within this alliance were enclosed with reciprocal happiness (XLV, p. 45; XLVIII, p. 143). The *Encyclopédie*, too, underlined a similar mutual understanding between the rulers and different layers of society. It was claimed that earlier French kings had cooperated with the ecclesiastics and laity, and shaped the rights framework in both civil and canonical sense; thus, they transformed their society into a nation (Mallet & d'Alembert, 1752). Suppose we consider these closings as earlier interpretations of the social contract, in the obvious fashion of the general will. In that case, some principles must be attributed to the concept when evaluating the rights and obligations. These principles generally relate to *the* religion in the Ikhwanian fashion, while they carry more secular characteristics in the *Encyclopédie*. The Ikhwan summarize them with a simple word as *sharia*, in which the roles and statuses of God, *his* messengers, and the rest of the society were explained (XLVII, pp. 103–104). On the other hand, the Encyclopedists determine the roles and statuses of the people within society via general will, which they believe is certain and infallible, and takes its origins from natural law (Diderot, 1755, p. 116). Though both sides differ in their commentaries on their social contract formulations, they share the same view on the essence of the contract and the possibility of its alterations *en route*. That essence is the religion for the Ikhwan; they claim there is only one religion, and God had instructed its different interpretations to different societies via *his* messengers. The *sharia* of Noah, Moses, and Mohammad differ, but their primary essence is constant: the religion (XLII, pp. 389–390). In the same vein, *Encyclopédie* believes that natural law comes in different interpretations, but its essence is fixed; it was valid in primitive ages and still prevails. The granted rights and imposed obligations do not change; their interpretation changes, which takes effect in practicing these rights and obligations (Boucher d'Argis, 1755g, pp. 126–127). On the other hand, the concept of privileges we observe within the paradigm of the social contract is more inclusive for the Encyclopedists than

the Ikhwan. Al-Rasa'il attributes most privileged rights and obligations to the kings, with some obscure mentions of the erudite and jurists. However, *Encylopédie* highlights the rights and obligations of the kings, the nobility, the ecclesiastics, and the rich. Though such a categorization looks confusing, in truth, the Encyclopedists allocated the privileges mentioned to a broader audience; the essence of similarities remains intact. For instance, the kings have the right to rule, wear exquisite clothes, outranking others in politics, killing his rivals, ranking his officers, making laws, observing affairs of his subjects, etc. according to the Ikhwan (XXVI, p. 326; XXXI, p. 133; XXII, p. 211) while the *Encyclopédie* counted these privileged rights as administering justice, making laws, declaration of war and peace, minting coins, imposing taxes, creating offices, etc. (Boucher d'Argis, 1755n). Wearing flamboyant clothes—in red color in particular—was seen as a privilege attributed to high-ranking officials by the Encyclopedists (Boucher d'Argis, 1755j). However, it would not be an inaccurate comment to claim that the kings hold the privilege to exceed these officers in clothing well. In addition, the *Encyclopédie* claims that the ecclesiastics had preferred to misinterpret the holy texts to acquire some privileged status for themselves (Boucher d'Argis, 1755k). A similar approach can be observed in the Ikhwan's comments, where they claim that some Muslim scholars had preferred to misinterpret the sacred texts and create their own sects in time, undermining the religion's very essence (IX, p. 255).

The differences between al-Rasa'il's and the *Encyclopédie*'s commentaries on the rights and obligations, on the other hand, mainly revolve around two central problems: the defense of the rights against the ruler, and the addressee of the responsibility. The Ikhwan believe that the rulers can be held responsible for their doings, in both this world and the afterlife. According to them, their judgments in the afterlife will be simple: God will punish. However, subjects have the right to think differently from their kings. In the case of witnessing a cruelty, which means abusing the rights of the public, the Ikhwan acknowledge the laity's right to rise against the ruler (XXXI, pp. 127–128; XLII, p. 368). The *Encyclopédistes*, though they were aware of the possibility of abusing the rights of the laity, like the first night right of the lords as we had seen earlier, and calling these ridiculous (Boucher d'Argis, 1755i), they did not mention anything about defending rights with an uprising. Instead, they paraphrased François Fénelon's thoughts on revolting from his masterpiece *Les Aventures de Télémaque* (The Adventures of Telemachus)[71] directly, attributing the reasons for uprisings to abusing the privileged rights of

[71] Telemachus is the son of Ulysses.

the rulers and the officials, and the distress those caused in the laity (Jaucourt, 1765o).[72] Thus, it would be hard to claim the *Encyclopédie* had shown a direction in defending the rights. Another difference can be reviewed in the addressee of the responsibility, positioned across the rights. In the closings of the Ikhwan, it is very clear that responsibility binds the individual alone, not the society. The individual will answer to God in the afterlife for neglecting responsibilities; thus, every soul is responsible for itself (XLII, p. 425). On the other hand, the Encyclopedists prefer to read these responsibilities over civil laws, which bind everyone in the society with the authority derived from natural law; therefore, human beings are responsible to each other at the social level, not to themselves alone. This responsibility turns into a duty at the social level, and people have to consider their responsibilities to maintain society (Boucher d'Argis, 1755h; Jaucourt, 1755b; 1754, p. 915). This approach, as placing the individual on one hand and society on the other, constitutes the backbone of the central diversity in both texts. It was shaped in flesh and bones in their closings on morality, as it was widely discussed in the next chapter.

A summarizing table on their similarities and differences on the concept of equality can be given as follows:

[72] English translation of the paraphrased section is as follows: "Rebellions are occasioned by the intrigues and ambition of the grandees, when their passions and licentiousness are not duly restrained; by the great numbers, both high and low, who live in sloth, luxury, and idleness; by too great a proportion of military men, who, in time of peace, apply themselves to no kind of useful employment; lastly, by the despair of an oppressed people, the pride and insensibility of kings, together with their indolence, which makes them incapable of that vigilance that is necessary to prevent commotions in a state. These are the true causes of revolts, and not the allowing the peasant to eat in peace the bread that he hath earned with the sweat of his brow" (Fénelon, 2014: 166-167).

TABLE 2. A comparison of rights in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

RIGHTS FOR AL-RASA'IL AND THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE		
THEMES	**SIMILARITIES**	**DIFFERENCES**
Source of Rights	Natural rights primarily come from God and are to be understood with reason.	Divine wisdom vs. natural law
Usage and Limits of Rights	Rights are limited with responsibilities and obligations; they shall be used with reason and free will.	Individual afterlife trial vs. social balance
Happiness and Advancing through Education	Rights are related to knowledge and happiness; education can enhance one's rights.	Advancement through purification of the soul vs. expansion of reason
Social Contract and Legitimacy	Government-society relations are based on reciprocal rights and obligations.	*Sharia*-based structure vs. secular general will
Privileges and Social Status	Social privileges are legitimate, but were criticized. The ruling class was highlighted.	King-centric privileges vs. multilayered privileges
Defending Rights and Responsibility	Violation of rights requires resistance.	Resisting rulers vs. passive criticism

3.2.5. Concluding Remarks

Rights remained a form of righteousness and duty system that sought a harmony with God's order in the post-Ikhwanian period of a grandiose Muslim climate. Indeed, *al-Haqq* is one of the names of God, which can be reviewed in three forms: ontological, moral, and legal. For instance, in Surah Ta-Ha (20:114), God is characterized with these words: *Fa-ta ala Allahu al-Maliku al-Haqq(u). Wa-la ta'jal bi'l-Qur'ani min qabli an yuqda ilayka Wahyuh(u). Wa-qul: Rabbi zidni 'ilman.*[73] Here, the *al-Haqq* addressing of God points out *his* ontological authenticity, which can be interpreted as 'God exists, and this is a fact'. Combining it with *his al-Malik* (sovereign) name in this verse would then together make *him* both true and a ruler: a true ruler. Besides, in Surah al-Hajj (22:6), this name was highlighted again: *Dhalika bi-anna Allaha huwa al-Haqq(u) wa-annahu yuhyi al-mawta wa-annahu 'ala kulli shay'in Qadir(un).*[74] This verse also addresses the authenticity of God: *he* is true. Besides, *he* can *do* anything, even resurrecting the dead, which gives him a trans-human power. Surah Luqman (31:30) concludes

[73] [Surah Ta-Ha (Ta-Ha), Verse 114] Exalted is God, the True King. Do not be hasty with the Quran before its inspiration to you is concluded, and say, "My Lord, increase me in knowledge" (Itani, 2015, p. 136).
[74] [Surah al-Hajj (The Pilgrimage), Verse 6] That is because God is truth, and because He gives life to the dead, and because He is Capable of everything (Itani, 2015, p. 141).

the debate: *Dhalika bi-anna Allaha huwa al-Haqq(u) wa-anna ma yad'una min dunihi al-batil(u) wa-anna Allaha huwa al-'Aliyyu al-Kabir(u).*[75]

This final verse highlights two features of God: *he* is real, and anything other than *him* is false. By contemplating these three verses, the Muslim jurists came to an understanding. Accordingly, God is real *(haqq)*, each of the other deities is false, and God will resurrect humans and interrogate them. With the concept of *haqq*, which means accepting whatever belongs to one as *his* share, the Muslim jurists conceptualized the term right in this way. That is to say, the concept of right was evaluated through the form of truth, an earthly reflection of divine truth. For instance, al-Ghazali, as an eminent representative of Ash'arism, mentions in his *Ihya 'Ulum al-Din* through a couplet from the *Layla and Majnun Saga* that Majnun was roaming around Layla's town, only for the love he felt for her truth. That is how the truth between God and man shall be distributed, according to al-Ghazali, because one can only love another for one of these five purposes: [1] for physical appearance, [2] for mental harmony, [3] for personal advantage, [4] for seeking assistance to achieve Heaven, and [5] for the sake of God. The opposite of this is also valid for al-Ghazali: hating another for the love of God, which means the concept of right has to be divided into two categories: God's right and man's right (Gazzâli, 2002a, pp. 170–171). This comment is very similar to the famous Biblical idiom that can be found in Mark 12:17 as *"[…] give to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's […]"* (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 66).[76] This verse makes the divisions of the concept of right for al-Ghazali clearer. That is, what Ash'arism advocated was that a minor truth comes from a major truth. Maturidism accepts this argument but attaches a simple element to it: reason. Akin to justice, faith, blessings, and more, the rights were created by God; still, human reason has the capacity to understand whether something is a right or not. For instance, God commanded the Devil to prostrate to Adam *(sajada)*, but *he* refused. In the same vein, God commanded Adam not to eat *that* apple, but he ate. According to one of the most venerated *kalam* jurists of Maturidism, Abu al-Mu'in Maymun ibn Mohammad al-Nasafi, both subjects refused to obey. Because they had reason and free will, they could determine their own rights with their reason; God had created rights, but human beings can distinguish between them (Nesefî, 2010, pp. 21–25). This comment can be the most complete summary of Maturidism: there is one God, and rational and free servants of *his* exist. Many of the Muslim scholars

[75] [Surah Luqman (Luqman), Verse 30] That is because God is the Reality, and what they worship beside Him is falsehood, and because God is the Exalted, the Supreme (Itani, 2015, p. 178).
[76] [Mark 12:17] And Jesus said to them, Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's. And they wondered exceedingly at him.

evaluated the concept of right from one of these perspectives. Ibn Khaldun, for instance, shares almost the same direction as Maturidism; however, his formulations were more secular. That is, according to him, the concept of right finds its shape through social order, legitimacy of authority, and justice. For example, the birth of the state forced people to live in cities (İbn Haldun, 1996, pp. 226–227), and this situation led people to establish a communal life, where people had the right to possess luxurious items in a gradual fashion. With this, inflation happens, and the price of commodities increases; a social corruption follows this scene since each community member determines their rights by themselves (İbn Haldun, 1996, pp. 297-300). In this panorama, the ruler (state, with his preferred context) represents justice, and justice places rights in their *proper* place (İbn Haldun, 1997, pp. 472-474). As one may see, Ibn Khaldun's formulation is very close to Maturidism: it replaced God with the state, and human will and reason remained intact. Ibrahim Hakkı Erzurumî, for instance, a Sufi who sought *al-Sirr al-Ilahi* (the Divine Secret), which makes him an esoteric *'alim*, searched the truth with *heart*, not reason. That is, 'wisdom' and *ma'rifa* (gnosis) of the *'arif*s (gnostic/s) were highlighted more; the fall on legitimacy and justice of we see in the *kalam* jurists does not work on him. In Chapter 5, Section 8 of *Ma'rifetnama* (The Book of Gnosis), Erzurumî mentions his *sheikh*. In Subsection 2, he clearly stated that his *sheikh* was *akin to* Prophet Joseph *(Yusuf: the Prophet of divine beauty and purity through trial)* since he had seen the 'light' *(nour)* of God in a well, which makes him the *possessor* of divine truth (Hakkı, 1999, pp. 1042–1044). That is, 'The Truth *(al-Haqq)* is a secret of God; yet that secret becomes visible in my *sheikh*' could be the best summary of his thoughts: for him, the notion of truth/right was, simply but ultimately, what his *sheikh* declared and embodied.

These comments, however, were later challenged—particularly by the [modern] Muslim *'ulema* after the 19th century, who were to introduce a common ground between God's *truth* and human rights. They sought a reconciliation with the Western way of thinking on the concept and the rights God created, albeit in a somewhat eclectic fashion. Mohammad Abduh (1849–1905) for instance, a Muslim reformer on several aspects, who went in-between advocating an enlightened despotism and championing freedom and political rights by questioning: but, why did that happen? Because it happened through a straightforward but extensive command of Islam: *al-amr bi'l-ma'ruf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar*, that is, commanding right and forbidding wrong. The concept of right, within his reach, is grounded upon God's justice, which then found its ultimate shape through the believer's reason and the collective responsibility of the *ummah*. In this picture, the folks have the legitimate rights to intervene and audit *the* government (*i.e.*,

the state). That is why *al-shura* (consultation) was the key for Abduh—that was not only divine but also a historical obligation. Only with this can the right concept mature with the religious and political process (Scharbrodt, 2022, pp. 87–89). True that, in a letter he had sent to Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the figure he had followed—mostly, Abduh mentioned these words: *"I have been given by you a will so powerful as to move the immovable, deal blows to the greatest obstacles, and remain firm in the right (haqq) until truth (haqq) is satisfied […]"* (Kedourie, 1966, p. 10).[77]

Still, these efforts in the guise of a mediator failed in the language; a more radical discourse prevailed for a brief time. That is why Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) came to the stage. His call was simple: the concept of right is NOT *a status* given by human-centric systems. The *truth* (right) belongs to God, and the right on earth HAS TO BE[78] a servant mirroring *the truth (haqq)* attributed to God alone (Qutb, 2006, pp. 29–35). While some Muslim scholars prefer to follow an 'apologetic' mentality by leaning on the Quranic verse where it reminds that religion cannot be forced on anyone,[79] Qutb claims, *the* religion is a universal declaration of no man shall serve another; all rights belong to God, and sovereignty is among these rights. That is, the *Jihad* is mandatory until everyone understands that the dominion of God on earth is certain (Qutb, 2006, pp. 66–68). Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988), an eminent Muslim scholar of modern times, rejects the political aspect of *Jihad*; instead, he highlights that the concept of *Jihad* had to be practiced at intellectual and moral levels (Rahman, 1982, pp. 7–8). Because, the concept of *haqq* is not a constant declaration of a divine authority; it is a perpetual and moral struggle that puts some Godly values like mercy and justice at the center: *"The central concern of the Qur'an is the conduct of man"* (Rahman, 1982, pp. 13–14).

In the post-*Encyclopédie* period, the first essential characterization of the rights concept came from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789. Here, the concept found its basis in human nature, not a transcendent authority. The first article of the Declaration

[77] These two concepts of right here cannot be explained better. The Muslim thinking mode is simple: 'God granted; period'. If that does not embody Sufism in modern times, how are these words interpreted? This piece of letter made Afghani a master, and Abduh a pupil. In the Muslim mode of education, pupils are obliged to transmit what they have learned (*see* the *halqa* tradition in Ch. 2.2.3.1).

[78] The capitalized letters here were put on purpose since they are mandatory. These words alone constituted the very essence of the Jihadist mode of thinking that flourished in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Qutb's last words in the court after he was sentenced to the death penalty underline the robustness of this ideological stance: *"'Alhamdulillah (all praise is for God) I performed Jihad for fifteen years until I earned this Shahadah (martyrdom)"* (retrieved from earlier unnumbered pages of Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, 2006).

[79] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 256] There shall be no compulsion in religion: the right way has become distinct from the wrong way. Whoever renounces evil and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy handle, which does not break. God is Hearing and Knowing (Itani, 2015, p. 18).

(1995a, p. 467) mentioned that people are born with innate rights, which means the concept of rights antedates the concept of law. The rights serve as a shelter for the individual against the state, making the individual a participant in sovereignty through political participation. It can be said that this notion became the constitutive principle of constitutional order in the modern sense. The second article of the Declaration mentions, *"The aim of every political association in the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man; these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression"* (Declaration, 1995a, p. 467). Jeremy Bentham harshly criticized this. According to him, this framework was simply *"nonsense"* because Bentham accepted no 'natural rights'. The rights individuals possess come from the government. Establishing the concept of right upon some natural foundations would eventually lead to an anarchical order resembling the lifestyles of some 'savages' who the world equally hosts, like the ones in New South Wales (addressing the Aboriginal Australians). In short, for Bentham, *"[n]atural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, –nonsense upon stilts"* (Bentham, 1843, pp. 500–501). Naturally, not everyone maintained a hostile and aggressive stance against the natural rights; Thomas Paine, for instance, advocated their existence in the literal sense. According to Paine, the rights come before governments; they are the integral parts of human nature. These rights are given by nature to man at birth; they cannot be transferred and possess a universal character. In this scenario, the government's role is to protect these rights; its legitimacy depends on this principle alone. By quoting from Lafayette as *"May this great monument, raised to Liberty, serve as a lesson to the oppressor, and an example to the oppressed!"*, Paine concludes his thoughts on the Declaration (Paine, 1979, pp. 113–115). Such a stance originates from Paine's sincere thoughts on the dichotomy between society and government: *"Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil […]"* (Paine, 1953, p. 4). That is to say, the concept of right is natural for Paine, and the government is obligated to protect these natural blessings.

Indeed, until the 20th century, the concept of rights was often evaluated based on its nature and protection; however, in this century, approaches towards the concept varied. For instance, H. L. A. Hart (2019 [1955]) argued that the origin of rights should not be evaluated through a divine or supernatural source; the concept should be understood through the individual's protected authorities and legitimate demands within the social and legal domains. That is, Hart reinterpreted the concept with moral and legal instruments. On the other hand, Ronald M. Dworkin (2019 [1973]) does not limit rights to mere concepts to be defined within

the realm of law; in contrast, they are the moral principles that *determine* the limits of law. Because the rights are primary assurances to an individual against the decisions of majority: *"[…] the general benefit cannot be a good ground for abridging rights, even when the benefit in question is a heightened respect for law"*, which makes rights as the inviolable boundaries of constitutional order—a normative aegis that protects individual liberties. However, Baroness Onora O'Neill (2019 [2005]) situates the concept of rights concerning the concept of obligations, which helps to concretize the abstract nature of the concept. Certain rights, such as the right to receive food and healthcare, must be redefined along with clearly specified duties. Otherwise, these will remain mere expressions of wishful thinking. It harms the normativity of human rights and degrades them to an ideological and/or symbolic discourse. Will Kymlicka's (2019 [1995]) closings regarding the concept of rights follow a pluralist path. According to him, some social groups [particularly national minorities and indigenous peoples] are systematically disadvantaged. This is why some *group-differentiated* rights are necessary for these individuals. With this method, members of these groups can preserve their cultural identity and genuinely embrace the notion of equal citizenship. Such an environment can indeed be established by emphasizing historical agreements, the value of cultural diversity, and the principles of liberal justice. These interpretations draw a clear parallel with Hannah Arendt's formulation of what we might call 'the right to have rights'. However, one notable figure, Giorgio Agamben (2017, pp. 105–112), reverses this notion. According to him, the concept of human rights is essentially an interwoven *construct* under the dome of the modern state's understanding of power. In his *Homo Sacer*, Agamben clearly states that the subject of the notion of natural rights is not the human but *the* citizen. From this perspective, refugees, displaced persons, and stateless people become dehumanized in terms of rights; from this point on, they live a mere *"bare life"*: unprotected and unrepresented, but they can be killed easily. That is, the modern biopolitical structure does not deem human rights as a universal assurance; they are the *perfect* instruments for sovereignty in defining the limits of a man.

In the contemporary world, we have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a theoretically *mighty* text, and constitutions that states bind themselves to the protection of the rights of their citizens. However, as time passes, modernity introduced some fresh necessities that intersect with the broader notion of rights. That is, rights have diversified. Today, we have countless new thematic rights like animal rights, digital privacy, environmental rights, rights to access clean water, rights to access cultural heritages, intergenerational justice, and many more. In this panorama, for example, both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes* could probably but

immediately be astonished if they ever heard of some thematic rights like same-sex marriage, drug use, or the conflicts between pro-life and pro-choice stances on abortion, as we observe in some countries in the contemporary world. Since the concept of rights has experienced many changes, alterations, and interpretations since its inception, it is only natural to expect some fresh rights to arrive in the future, which we may not even be able to envisage from where we stand today.

3.3. Conclusion

The main intention of this chapter was to analyze the concepts of freedom and rights under the broader umbrella of political conceptualizations with the Ikhwanian and Encyclopedic fashions, separately first, and comparatively second. These concepts can be evaluated with a common touch by selecting joint themes like origin, autonomy, responsibility, authority, knowledge, and status. Their exhibition on a table can be given as follows:

TABLE 3. A comparison of freedom and rights (combined) in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

	FREEDOM		RIGHTS		SUMMARY
	SIMILARITY	**DIFFERENCE**	**SIMILARITY**	**DIFFERENCE**	
ORIGIN	Linking freedom to an innate human nature and divine design.	Divine submission vs. natural autonomy	God-given and rooted in nature	Divine origin vs. natural law rationalism	The source of rights and freedoms is seen as transcendent, but with diverse interpretations.
AUTONOMY	Emphasizing individual will as central to practicing freedom.	Divine trial through free will vs. moral reasoning through autonomy	Autonomous will is required to exercise rights responsibly.	Individual soul vs. civic social contract	Human action is meaningful only when freely chosen within one's value framework.
RESPONSIBILITY	Moral responsibility is personal, rooted in free will.	Afterlife accountability vs. social duty	Imposed duties with rights.	Soul before God vs. citizen before law	Freedom and rights require a simultaneous embrace of responsibility, albeit in different frameworks.
AUTHORITY	Limiting freedom with broader moral/legal structures.	Prophetic and moral order vs. general will	Defines boundaries of rightful action.	Religiously ordained vs. legislatively derived	Authority is legitimized differently, but always restricts the individual's space.
KNOWLEDGE	Knowledge and wisdom can increase the capacity for one's freedom.	Metaphysical knowledge vs. empirical rationalism	Learning refines awareness and usage of rights.	Sacred wisdom vs. secular education	Epistemology determines the depth and direction of freedom-rights advancement.
STATUS	Recognition of social hierarchies, but allowing moral agencies.	Accepted slavery vs. condemned slavery	Privileges are discussed for rulers and elites.	Monarch-centered vs. broader class inclusion	Social status affects freedom and rights, but reform ideals differ.

In Table 3, the first row, titled ORIGIN, explains the sources of freedom and rights as they were discussed in both texts. Both traditions accepted the notion that "human beings are born free". The Ikhwan accept that human beings are servants of God but are tested in this world through their free will. For instance, the expulsion of Adam from heaven was a direct

consequence of such a will. In the same vein, the *Encyclopédistes* highlight the same notion by constructing their ideas around the natural law, which puts reason at the center of freedom. A similar parallelism can be drawn on the concept of rights. The Ikhwan emphasized that God directly granted these rights, which then made *his* servants obligated to recognize and fulfill these. From the view of *Encyclopédie*, God codified senses of justice and equality into men's nature, which makes the rights to be recognized through the principles God integrated into nature. That is, both texts acknowledge an understanding that freedom and rights originated from a natural and transcendent source, but they come in a divine blessing and trial for al-Rasa'il and based on reason and laws of nature for the *Encyclopédie*.

The second row, as AUTONOMY, reflects how much the individuals depend on their *own* wills while exercising their rights and freedoms, and how these wills gain meaning. Both parties accept that one's actions must be exercised through free will; only then will they become meaningful and valuable. For the Ikhwan, humans act with their free will while carrying out the God-given responsibilities, because that is a divine trial. For example, *true* exercise of the rights is all about utilizing reason; reason enables man to evaluate what is rightful and correct. A similar approach can be observed in the *Encyclopédie*. Freedom is the ability to determine actions via reason; however, a moral trait was also attached. That is, the individual must consider *his* consciousness and rational judgment while exercising the rights; considering external rules alone does not suffice. From this point of view, it is possible to say that the Ikhwan see the individual as a responsible agent to God, while the Encyclopedists considered *him* as a part of collective reason; still, both of them stressed that the individual is an autonomous subject that *is able to* act.

The third theme that came to this table is RESPONSIBILITY, which addresses how individuals exercise their freedoms and rights regarding moral and social responsibilities. According to al-Rasa'il, responsibility is personal and directly to God; human beings will only be held responsible for their *doings* in the afterlife. Each individual will be questioned through *their* spiritual development, exercising rights, and obedience to divine commands. Such a characterization enhances their notion that freedom is simultaneously a trial. The *Encyclopédie*, on the other hand, preferred to approach the notion of responsibility within a secular and social context. The existence of rights is evaluated through the relationship between the individual and society, which automatically gives the responsibility a social character. That is to say, freedom transforms into a sense of duty through reason, which is grounded upon the notion of sustainability of the society. Both understandings accept the individual as a free agent; however,

their epistemological contexts differ: the Ikhwan subject *him* to an accountability of the divine order while the Encyclopedists position *him* as a responsible actor within the broader legal and social norms framework.

The fourth theme is AUTHORITY; here, this row examines the types of authority the individual faces while exercising *his* freedom and rights, and questions their source of legitimacy. None of these texts accepts an absolute freedom; the concept is defined within *certain* boundaries. Al-Rasa'il attributed these boundaries to divine authority; God, the prophets, and the *sharia* types they introduced are the highest authorities. The individuals are obliged to obey these authorities; however, they will experience a spiritual purification. The *Encyclopédie*, on the other hand, approaches the authority concept in a secular context; the notion of general will *(volonté générale)* is crucial. Due to the introduction of the social contract, the individual subordinates *his* own will to the general will, which originates from the collective reason of society. Such a structure both limits *his* freedom and grants it legitimacy. In short, both texts acknowledge the existence of a *higher* structure that limits the exercise of freedom and rights against the individual; however, the Ikhwan ground it upon divine law and the *sharia*, while the Encyclopedists preferred to explain its nature through natural law and social consensus.

The fifth theme, under the title of KNOWLEDGE, emphasizes the decisive role of knowledge and wisdom in developing the freedom and rights of an individual. Al-Rasa'il characterizes knowledge as a power that can save a man from the darkness of ignorance and lead him to wisdom. That is, knowledge is not a mere external learning process; at the same time, it is an internal transformation coupled with spiritual maturation. This being the case, an individual equipped with knowledge can become *freer*; even a slave can achieve freedom with knowledge and wisdom. The *Encyclopédistes*, however, evaluate knowledge in a rationalist fashion. The knowledge acquired via reason and experience enables an individual to realize *his* rights better and deepen *his* freedom. For instance, an individual with a higher knowledge level can easily create some *free* scenarios in *his* head, without being dependent on *his* senses. That is to say, an individual might be limited in this world, but *he* can mentally construct a limitless sphere of liberty for *himself*. These examples indicate how knowledge serves liberty. However, an important nuance arises here: the Ikhwan put metaphysical knowledge (even astrology) into the grandiose category of knowledge, but the *Encyclopédie* deemed these types "non-knowledge".

The final row, under the theme of STATUS, examines how one's social position (across class, moral, and legal domains) shapes the meaning and exercise of freedom and rights. Both texts divide society into different classes, like rulers, laity, privileged groups, etc. The Ikhwan determine one's social status through a divine structure; for instance, slavery is a legal institution for them, and obedience of a slave to *his* master is a normal process. Still, anyone, including slaves, can receive moral freedom through *true* knowledge and *beautiful* morality, making *him* a *saleh* person: a spiritual form of equality. The *Encyclopédie,* however, criticizes the slavery institution directly; it rejects slavery practices in the French colonies, and supports that freedom shall be valid for everyone. At the same time, it identifies the privileges bestowed upon the nobles, clergy, and wealthy individually, and advocates a limitation upon these. Both texts acknowledge that social statuses affect freedoms and rights; the Ikhwan deemed it a legitimate and immutable structure, while the Encyclopedists considered it critical and mutable.

This chapter examined and evaluated how al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* approached the concepts of freedom and rights, and concluded their formulations and thoughts under six themes. Both parties characterized the individual's position in this world as unique; *he* is either a subject of a divine trial or an autonomous agent engaging with society through reason. Still, the sources of freedom and rights, their limitations, and the types of responsibilities are grounded upon different ontological bases.

After the multilayered construction of the individual through the eyes of al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* in this way, the next chapter will delve into society through the concepts of morality and equality.

CHAPTER 4

A COMPARISON OF SOCIAL TENETS

This chapter mainly focuses on two interconnected concepts, ‘morality’ and ‘equality’, to explore the philosophical roots of social life from the perspectives of the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes*. Here, morality is regarded as a normative framework that governs individual-to-individual and individual-to-society relationships. At the same time, equality is considered a fundamental principle that questions whether these relationships are fair and balanced. The social visions of Al-Rasa’il and the *Encyclopédie* are primarily based on these concepts. In this context, the concepts are defined separately, and different conceptualizations are presented first to clarify any potential confusion. Next, their historical and philosophical understandings of each concept are explained. After analyzing what these two intellectual groups said about these concepts, a comparison section will be provided for each concept individually. This chapter concludes with an overall assessment of these two concepts and how the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists viewed them.

4.1. Morality

Although morality and ethics are two concepts that are often confused with each other, in truth, they are two separate phenomena that have sprung from the same origin: human beings. This might be the reason that the concept of morality is called with the word الأخلاق *(al-akhlaq)* in Arabic, addressing the plural form of خُلُق *(khulq)*, which covers a meaning between ‘habit’ and ‘character’. Thus, the morality term in Arabic refers to a concept that may be concisely summarized as ‘one’s character routine’. Because human beings were characterized as ‘rational animals’, such an address would automatically refer to the utilization of the mind; therefore, placing mankind above the rest of the animals. However, the stress here does not point out the character routines since animals also have them, albeit in the form of natural instincts. Instead, the character routines underlined here for mankind had become behavioral patterns throughout history, particularly for the people living *within* various societies and cultures (Heimsoeth, 1978, pp. 9–13). From this point of view, it is possible to conceptualize morality in the most general way as the interaction network of beliefs, values, norms, commands and prohibitions

that guide actions of individuals living in a specific social bulk over a definite period (Özlem, 2004, p. 17). Regardless of the preferred language, be it as it may Arabic or a/any Western language, the desired address for the concept of morality highlights the innate dichotomies the human behavior includes within, as good and evil or right and wrong, while employing these qualities in bilateral relations between individual and individual as well as between individual and society (Şenel, 2014, p. 15). Such dichotomies can be taken as Derrida's *arche*, as the atoms of morality in this case; thus, the totality of entire criteria that determine the social relations, which include good-bad and right-wrong qualities within, can be circumscribed under the fuzzy set titled morality. At this very moment, we can broadly evaluate the concept of morality via two sets. The first set would include certain value judgments like keeping promises, helping each other, acting with solidarity, etc., concerning behaviors alone and containing some definite features of one's character/personality like honesty, altruism, sincerity, etc. On the other hand, the second set can be called a 'set of rules and principles', and some cultural rules of conduct and comparably more general regulations can be put within (Kuçuradi, 1994, p. 30). A rough characterization of these two sets is possible. Each element of the first set is directly related to and the sum of all inevitable socially-valued dichotomies a/any individual bears within, while the second set is the sum of all imposed dichotomies upon that very same individual from outside. The first set includes fragments of the theoretical side of morality, while the second one refers to its practical side (Hançerlioğlu, 1975, pp. 317–318). Regardless of how we name these sets, it is possible to philosophize on all the values and principles that found their places within them. This being the case, at least for the concept of ethics, it is safe to say that ethics is a branch of philosophy that examines the elements and determinants of actions and behaviors that arise in interpersonal relations; it produces knowledge on/with them and its primary source is morality, or, to simply put, ethics is *the* moral philosophy (Kuçuradi, 1994, p. 34).

4.1.1. Conceptual Framework of Morality

The concepts of morality and ethics were not as separated in the Golden Age of Islam and the Enlightenment. Still, in the modern sense, ethics is more inclusive than morality. Morality, as a substantial concern worth philosophizing upon, had experienced three phases until it transformed itself into a society-relevant form. Regardless of the primary origin, morality is closely connected with the concept of the social contract. First, some genetic mutations in the human brain resulted in the formation of what we call character later, and different types of characters in any society eventually established a social unity of emotion.

Second, a relatively intricate social cooperation phase occurred, including norms like keeping promises and empathizing with others. Finally, socially-positive attitudes were institutionalized through culture and/or laws; this institution aimed to determine human behaviors over dichotomies as good-bad and right-wrong to prevent some people within society from seeking to undermine the [established] social cooperation within (Harris, 2016, pp. 94–95). Indeed, any sociopolitical, religious, psychological, anthropological, etc. explanation of the concept of morality contains a social contract explanation in it. However, it would be a speculative comment to make a specific assessment on which caused which; it is reminiscent of the famous causality dilemma known as the chicken or the egg. Even though the moral norms created such a contract in the distant past, the same contract became subject to several revisions by utilizing the same tools that the contract had once provided. For the Islamic faith, for instance, a covenant was established between God and *his* subjects after the point where souls, all the souls, even the ones that are waiting to be sent to earth someday, were created. It is titled with *bazm-i alast* (roughly, conversation assemblage) words (Yavuz, 1992), and as it was mentioned in Verse 7:172 of the Quran,[1] it became binding on humanity until the end of the days. A religion-based moral framework was put into effect here, underlining what was good and what was evil, taking its legitimacy from the covenant with God.

An identical religion-centered moral framework can be traced in Christianity as well. As the Gospel of Matthew highlights in Verses 22:34–40, a group of Jewish scholars visited Jesus to put him to the test and asked him what was the most excellent command in his religious law. His reply, as to love the God and people (neighbors) in the same way as they love themselves (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, pp. 37–38),[2] did not only bind the Christians with a covenant over a definition of the good and bad but also defined the moral borders of *this* religion. The framework designed by Jesus received its flesh and bones from Augustine of Hippo afterwards. Since Augustine (2008, pp. 18–20) was an eyewitness to the Sack of Rome in 410 C.E. by the barbarians, he had seen how the Roman community behaved during this chaotic incident. According to him, the Christian folk put the pagans under the aegis of their solidarity and hid them in the shrines of martyrs and basilicas of apostles. Still, the

[1] [Surah al-A'raf (The Elevations), Verse 172] And when Your Lord summoned the descendants of Adam, and made them testify about themselves. "Am I not your Lord?" They said, "Yes, we testify." Thus you cannot say on the Day of Resurrection, "We were unaware of this." (Itani, 2015, p. 71).

[2] [Matthew 22:34–40] [34] But the Pharisees, hearing that he had silenced the Sadducees, collected together; [35] and one of them, a lawyer, asked, trying him [36] Teacher, what commandment is great in the law? [37] And he said to him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. [38] This is the great and first commandment. [39] A second is like it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. [40] On these two commandments hang all the law, and the prophets.

pagans did not hesitate to blame the legacy of Jesus and his followers for what Rome was exposed to; thus, Augustine despised them for being haughty, aberrant, and infidel while applauding the Christians for their virtuous and exemplary behaviors, and for their choosing of the city of Jesus, that is Heaven, instead of men, that is Rome. Nevertheless, Rome did not collapse overnight, as it was not built in a day; it lived. Anthony the Great and Pachomius the Great invented the monastery life based on the Christian morals (Herrin, 2021, pp. 59–62), Benedict of Nursia formulated the codes of monastery life and transformed it into an institutionalized system, unbeknownst to him sowing the seeds of human capital for the Church (Roberts, 1997, pp. 96–98), and eventually the unquestionable legitimacy of the Roman Church—thanks to the buried bones of Paul of Tarsus and Peter of Bethsaida, as the apostles of Jesus, under the church compound, the contract of Christianity was emanated from Rome (MacCulloch, 2009, pp. 289–290). This contract did not create the European Middle Ages alone (Davis, 2013, p. 72) but also designed the moral codes of the period as well. The general population knew that this moral system had long been corrupted and even the men of God were not following the codes of such morality which were canonized by their very own predecessors in the Middle Ages, as we can observe in Giovanni Boccaccio's (1996, pp. 78–83)[3] and Dante Alighieri's (2018, pp. 186–192)[4] masterpieces, there had to be a way to regulate the Christian moral rules following the contemporary needs. This is how a Catholic monk named Martin Luther stepped in, criticized the ecclesiastics, highlighted the forgiving characteristic of God, and introduced a new [and an alternative] set of good-evil and right-wrong concepts for the long-prevailing Christian moral contract (Roberts, 1997, pp. 256–260).[5]

A similar contract constituted upon the wrong and right dichotomy can also be traced in Judaism. After God had helped the Jewish community to leave Egypt, it was mentioned in the Book of Exodus that *he* asked them to obey the contract in which this obedience would eventually turn them into a supreme society in *his* eyes (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913,

[3] *See* [Any complete edition of] Decameron: Day One, Story Seven.
[4] *See* [Any complete edition of] Divine Comedy: Inferno, Canto XIX.
[5] When we look at the concept of morality from this angle, it is very possible to alter the title of Max Weber's famous work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism *(Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist der Kapitalismus)* as "The Protestant *Contract* and the Spirit of Capitalism" or "The Protestant *Sets of Good and Bad* and the Spirit of Capitalism" or "The Protestant *Religious Law* and the Spirit of Capitalism". Because, in Weber's account, the Catholic belief exalts the "other life" concept to its followers, while indoctrinating them with remaining indifferent to "this worldly" felicities. This being the case, one cannot expect a pious Catholic to strive to earn money; in contrast, it is expected of *that* Catholic to live a calm life with minimal earnings and expenses. It is just the opposite for the Protestants. Because the Protestant religious law commands its followers to enjoy earthly joys, the Protestants prefer to eat well, while the Catholics opt for having a peaceful sleep at night (Weber, 1999, pp. 29–36). Two interpretations of the same religion, Christianity, serve as a vivid model for the morality contract that grounds itself upon the dichotomies of good-bad and right-wrong.

p. 90).[6] Similarly, God reminds Moses the very same and archaic contract and asks his people to obey *his* words in the Book of Deuteronomy (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 247)[7] while reminding the prophet what was right and wrong in the Book of Micah and demanding him to remain loyal to the contract and not to hesitate proceeding on *his* path (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 1058).[8] These pieces of the Old Testament reflect that the God of Judaism had also established *his* contract over these aspects of morality, in addition to the one and sole strict provision: honoring the covenant. In fact, this provision is not confined to the Abrahamic religions alone; Shinto religion, which has little to no similarity with the Abrahamic religious traditions, underlines such a contract instituted upon morality. Shintoism theorizes that religious morality is a constitutive part of political morality; that is, the people are religiously expected to obey the Imperial Dynasty and the Emperor unquestioningly. Akin to the role of God in the Abrahamic religions, *Amaterasu Omikami* is the supreme deity here, the Sun-Goddess who draws up the contract and determines rights and wrongs. The Emperor, on the other hand, is the materialized form of the *Amaterasu* lineage; thus, followers of Shintoism accept the will of the Emperor as the highest degree of morality and strive to imitate his morality. The official course book with *Shūshin-sho* title for example, which was one of the core books for elementary schools until 1945, was indoctrinating children that the Emperor was the primary source of Japanese morality, he was the sole authority for identifying good-bad and right-wrong concepts for the members of his society; a community where he loved each of them as his own children. The citizenship pattern generated over a moral contract here reflects the fact that it would be a rightful act for the Japanese to remain loyal to the Emperor, as in both *right* behavior and duty, and it would be *right* behavior and duty for the Emperor to embrace his citizens as a whole and take care of their happiness and prosperity (Hourani, 1956, pp. 192–199). This is why the irreducible prestige of the Sun-Goddess and her generational offspring, the Emperor, automatically obliged the Japanese War Council to remember their moral duties, and the Japanese refused to submit the Emperor to the U.S. forces for a probable trial at the end of WWII. The U.S. guaranteed Emperor's judicial immunity, nullified his administrative authorizations, granted him a symbolic position (this can indirectly be read as accepting his

[6] [Exodus 19:5] And now, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be my special possession out of all the peoples; for all the earth is mine.

[7] [Deuteronomy 30:19-20] [19] I call to witness against you to-day the heavens and the earth that I have set before you the life and the death, the blessing and the cursing; and thou mayest live, thou and thy seed; [20] to love Jehovah thy God, to obey his voice, and to cleave to him; for this will be thy life, and thy length of days, to dwell upon the land which Jehovah swore to thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac and to Jacob, to give to them.

[8] [Micah 6:8] He has told thee, O man, what is good; And what does Jehovah require of thee, But to do justly, and to love mercy, And to walk humbly with thy God?

divine status), and eternalized this status of his in the first part of the Japanese Constitution written by the pen of the Americans (Feis, 1961, pp. 151–155).

Though the Japanese morality merges politics and religion, some other forms of moral formulations establish the contract through secular sociopolitical provisions. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, as a cornerstone of his thoughts, claims that the basic instinct of humans is fear. He bases his social contract on the notion that people are considered free in a state of nature. He suggests that it is very likely to acknowledge a situation where one can easily kill another. This is why these free people came together, submitted their rights to punish others, that is to murder, to a higher authority, which he named *Leviathan*. This process was designed as a contract, and its natural outcome was forming a political community (Duignan, 2013, pp. 73–76). What Hobbes did here was no different from what the religions did: distinguishing right and wrong and determining good and evil. In the same vein, John Locke's contract theory, formulated via the concept of private property, which he deemed one of the most basic natural rights (Anchor, 1967, p. 9), considered the state of nature as the realm of perfect liberty. The problem arises when the status of private property, which was directly acquired by one's very own labor, remained undetermined (Locke, 2012, pp. 23–27). Lockean contract manifested that it was a *right* thing to respect the private properties of others; when this respect achieved a general acceptance, the individuals were united and they established a contract to secure this *right* manner (Locke, 2012, pp. 98–99). Jean-Jacques Rousseau too, designed his social contract upon the provisions of morals and long before coming to this conclusion, he first acknowledged that the elements in a society do not share the same good or bad and right or wrong ideas on concepts; in addition to that, he claimed, such a divergency was at the peak between the administrators and the laity. His solution to such a problem was to determine the rules jointly, with all sectors of a society involved (Rousseau, 1990, pp. 66–69), since individuals had always been free since their birth (Rousseau, 2020, p. 4). It was a right to resist against the political practitioners who prefer to *insist on being wrong*. His contract's main argument suggests that such a unity in a society would bind each individual to another; thus, the people would then be bound to nobody but to a greater *good* (Rousseau, 2020, pp. 13–14). As can be seen here, these three well-known social contracts were too grounded upon a social agreement that takes shape by determining right and wrong as well as good and evil, stressing the moral understanding of *a* society.

The debate on the conceptual framework of morality *may* now be concluded by highlighting the relationship between its psychological and duty-oriented dimensions. The main

agenda of morality has always been to achieve the greatest happiness, and it has been like that throughout history, from Aristotle to Epicurus and from divine religions to contract-based political formulations. Indeed, a pious person who follows the moral teachings of their religion would believe that the ultimate reward is heaven, which they consider the highest form of happiness. Similarly, when a person behaves according to socially accepted moral norms in the realm of politics, this situation would make him/her be assured of the life they live within, that is, it would make them happy. Still, all these arguments have either a periodic or a partial characteristic. On the other hand, Immanuel Kant strived to formulate a morality that would universally fit all societies; that would be timeless and non-spatial. His solution was simple: duty. According to Kant, evaluating morality over an outcome like happiness would be a mistake. Our knowledge is being shaped over some *a priori* prepositions; similarly, the morals *shall* be shaped over a constant principle. He theorized this constant as an imperative by claiming that humans are not as autonomous entities as it was presupposed; instead, they remain stuck with the limits of nature, making them non-sovereign entities that can be characterized as heteronomous. Accordingly, the moral imperative was supposed to show some parallelism in dependency on the outside world; this has to become a *categorical imperative*, which would strip the concept of morality of its purpose and put it inside the set of duties. So, any behavior executed by an individual in a society should be exercised so keenly that both this very same person and other elements of the society should consider this behavior as it has already been accepted as a part of natural law (Özlem, 2004, pp. 68–78). With such an interpretation, Kant removed the concept of morality from the realm of the individual and granted it a trans-individual characteristic (Durkheim, 2016, p. 53). By this, he determined *how* moral behavior should be instead of what it was, while introducing the world to a new pattern that could be utilized for judging the moral levels of human behaviors (Kuçuradi, 1994, pp. 31–32).

4.1.2. Morality in al-Rasa'il

Since the Ikhwan acknowledges all types of knowledge as sacred (XLV, p. 39), this situation gives the community's epistemology an eclectic character. They were influenced by Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras, and preferred to give references to their works. However, if there were a single philosophical school that could best describe the Ikhwan's worldview, it would be Neo-Platonism. Additionally, they preferred to use Aristotle's cosmology and reasoning process when presenting their ideas (Netton, 1991, pp. 19–22). This philosophical insight grants the individual a *salvation* recipe; its central theme is the philosophy's primary

function, which allows the individual to utilize it while striving to receive the essence of existence and the knowledge about it. That is, the rest of the branches related to philosophy are mere vehicles that are used for this purpose. In the order of things within the universe, the essence of existence is God *himself*, and even reason comes after *him*. This is why the Neo-Platonist philosophy portrays man through a mystical lens: a pious entity seeking *salvation* (Arslan, 2010, pp. 55–57). The Ikhwan exactly copied this explanation and tailored it to their own philosophy. According to them, the source of numbers is '1' because the disappearance of other numbers does not invalidate 1, but if 1 disappears, the rest of the numbers will no longer exist (I, p. 38). The Ikhwan remained loyal to this monist reasoning in both claiming that everything emerged from God (I, p. 33) and asserting that everything emerged from 1 and will return to it one day (IV, p. 113) in addition to another claim that dot (.) is the 1 of the geometry and triangle is the 1 of two-dimensional shapes (II, pp. 54, 63). God is the reason for the universe's existence, and humans do philosophy, intending to mimic God within their own capabilities (XXVIII, pp. 34–35). The mimic verb here addresses the ability to transfer what is known in arts and sciences to others (XIII, p. 196) and follow God's path in methodology (V, p. 152). By quoting Prophet Mohammad's *hadith* as *"This world is a prison for the believers but paradise for the infidels"* (XXX, p. 67), the Ikhwan highlight that death is a precious gift of God to *his* subjects since everyone will return to *him* eventually (XXIX, p. 46). This return has to be magnificent for *his* subjects, and having a beautiful morality[9] within is the key to this debate. The Ikhwan proficiently explained the link between such magnificence and morality; however, it would be beneficial to touch upon some earlier explanations and interpretations on morality and ethics, which might have impacted the Ikhwan's formulations on this debate.

We know that with the conquest of Egypt in the seventh century, the Greek works in the Library of Alexandria were translated into Arabic; this effort was accelerated at the end of the Umayyad reign, and it became an official state policy during the Abbasids, so that the Muslim philosophers received an access to ancient methods of logic and techniques of analysis, and they enriched these translations with their commentaries on the texts (Lewis, 1988, pp. 6–7; Macit, 2011). Some passages from Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* as a whole, which were translated by Hunayn ibn Ishaq, constitute primary sources for Muslim formulations on morality and ethics (Aydın, 1989). Though Aristotle had never considered

[9] When viewed through the central perspective of morality, it has two aspects, good and bad (evil). Though the phrase "good morality" sounds meaningful in its intended meaning, it becomes problematic within the semantic form of the phrase. Perhaps that is why the employment of the "beautiful morality" *(husn al-khuluq*) phrase in the texts by Muslim authors intensifies. Reading this phrase as "positive" morality for society's general perception would make the phrase more straightforward.

ethics as a science, he preferred to conceptualize it through the concept of virtue while approaching the concept of 'good' teleologically. Such an approach makes ethical behavior beneficial for the man; that is, a good thing must have a purpose. These purposes are specified by the hand of politics, and because politics is a science in the sense of Aristotle, and ethics consists of dichotomies, politics as a science is responsible for warning the people which of these dichotomies are ethical (Akarsu, 1982, pp. 98–99). Additionally, the Ikhwan might have heard of some Muslim philosophers within their historical reach and their thoughts on morals. It is very possible that they were aware of Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, an Arabic poet and philosopher in Al-Andalus, and his masterpiece *Al-'Iqd al-Farīd* (The Unique Necklace), since al-Rasa'il carries several similarities with this work throughout the entire text. For instance, 'Abd Rabbih explains *how* to speak to the kings through parables and metaphors, claiming that the erudite people *must* advise the kings (Abdirabbih, 2021, pp. 66–69). Al-Rasa'il has an identical approach to warning the kings, written in a separate chapter (XLVIII, pp. 145–146). In addition, Ian Netton (1991, pp. 29–30) claims that the Ikhwan had made some additional contributions to classical Greek logic, and it is within his guess that there is a satisfactory chance that they borrowed these perspectives from al-Kindi, the father of Arabic philosophy. Indeed, such a philosophical impact can be traced; for instance, the soul *(nafs)* was the source of moral behavior, claimed al-Kindi, and philosophy aimed to bring about death. It is possible to count another example of al-Kindi's thoughts that the positions of celestial objects and the climates people live within directly impact their moral understandings (Kayaalp, 2015, pp. 52–58). As seen in the following pages, these four elements constitute the cornerstones of Ikhwan's understanding of ethics and morality.

It would be absurd not to touch upon the stupendous influence of the Quranic verses on shaping the central understanding and eventual formulations of the Ikhwan's morality. With the assistance of the very same verses, it is possible to categorize the Quranic morality under five articles: justice and righteousness, patience and tolerance, honesty, humbleness and modesty, and enjoining good and forbidding wrong. Indeed, for justice and righteousness, Verse 16:90[10] mentions *"God commands justice, and goodness, and generosity towards relatives […]"*, for patience and tolerance, Verse 2:153[11] mentions *"[…] God is with the steadfast"*, for honesty,

[10] [Surah an-Nahl (The Bee), Verse 90] God commands justice, and goodness, and generosity towards relatives. And He forbids immorality, and injustice, and oppression. He advises you, so that you may take heed (Itani, 2015, p. 115).
[11] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 153] O you who believe! Seek help through patience and prayers. God is with the steadfast (Itani, 2015, p. 10).

Verse 9:119[12] mentions *"[…] be with the sincere"*, for humbleness and modesty, Verse 17:37[13] mentions *"And do not walk proudly on earth […]"*, and for enjoining good and forbidding wrong, Verse 3:110[14] mentions *"[…] you advocate what is moral, and forbid what is immoral […]"* can be given as specific examples within the parameters of Islamic teachings. Verily, it is common for the Ikhwan to support each of their theses with a verse or a *hadith* throughout the entire corpus; for instance, in a chapter where they explain the nature of a *good* behavior, they address to Verse 9:91[15] and claim the God does not task the morally well-behaving people, while citing a *hadith* which resembles *a* good behavior to praying God in such an incident where one would pray to *him* as if seeing *him* directly (XLII, p. 421).[16] Though it is non-negotiable for the Muslims of when the Ikhwan had given direct credentials to Quranic verses in their explanations, the references based upon some *hadith*s occasionally falter within the grandiose framework of 'logical enlightenment'. Some *hadith*s they gave references to, i.e., *"I am the Aristotle of this community (—ummah)"* (L, p. 198) or *"If he (Aristotle) had lived to know what I have introduced, he would have followed my religion"* (IIL, p. 138) are deemed fabricated by the Ikhwan (Netton, 1991, p. 19).[17]

The Ikhwan's perspective believes that morality is the sum of body and soul *(nafs)* (XXIII, p. 262).[18] The body is the governed one, and the soul is the governor; the logic underlying such a division of labor originates from the reason that the body produces all the *nasty* things like foul odor and feces (XXIX, p. 51). The body is a blend of four constitutive liquids: blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and dark bile. The four elements known as *anasir al-arba'a* (the elements of the four) consist of fire, water, air, and earth, which feed into these four liquids

[12] [Surah at-Tawbah (Repentance), Verse 119] O you who believe! Be conscious of God, and be with the sincere (Itani, 2015, p. 84).
[13] [Surah al-Isra' (The Night Journey), Verse 37] And do not walk proudly on earth. You can neither pierce the earth, nor can you match the mountains in height (Itani, 2015, p. 119).
[14] [Surah Ali 'Imran (Family of Imran), Verse 110] You are the best community that ever emerged for humanity: you advocate what is moral, and forbid what is immoral, and believe in God. Had the People of the Scripture believed, it would have been better for them. Among them are the believers, but most of them are sinners (Itani, 2015, p. 26).
[15] [Surah at-Tawbah (Repentance), Verse 91] There is no blame on the weak, nor on the sick, nor on those who have nothing to give, provided they are true to God and His Messenger. In no way can the righteous be blamed. God is Forgiving and Merciful (Itani, 2015, p. 82).
[16] [Bukhari, Volume I, The Book of Belief (Faith), *Hadith* No: 50] Narrated Abû Hurairah: One day while Prophet was sitting out for the people (a man—the angel) Jibril (Gabriel) came to him and asked, "What is faith?". […] Then he further asked, "What is *ihsan* (perfection)?". Allah's Messenger replied, "To worship Allah as if you see Him, and if you cannot achieve this state of devotion, then you must consider that He is looking at you". […] (Bukhari, 1997, pp. 81–82). This *hadith* is a relatively long one; I preferred to employ its relevant piece here.
[17] Before the Translation Movements, it was hardly possible to know Aristotle. Perhaps his name was heard in Arabia through his radical influence on Greek society. The Arabs quite probably heard his name through merchants. Interestingly, some people deemed Aristotle a prophet, and the Ikhwan as a whole was one of them.
[18] What the Ikhwan address by *nafs* is actually the soul. For the text's integrity, this work will employ the word "soul" to the Ikhwan's preferred word, *nafs*, throughout this section unless it is inevitably necessary to use it.

as warmth, coldness, dryness, and wetness (XXIII, p. 263). The ratio and volume of these mixtures are the first factor that determines the morality of an individual (IX, p. 204). The Ikhwan accept that the body consists of these four liquids, which aim for vile and mischief; it behaves like an ignorant person who does not know about God, even behaves like a demon. The body is nothing more than a coffin in the eyes of the soul, carrying its pressure; it is required to bury the body in the ground first for disposing of such a burden (XXIX, p. 52). Still, it is required to protect the body until death, and such protection is provided over the pleasures and pains the body keeps reacting to. Protection is imperative since the soul needs the assistance of the body in doing good deeds worthy of beautiful moralities (XXX, pp. 61–62). On the other hand, the soul is a substance, an ethereal essence; invisible (XVIII, p. 60). This soul can only receive salvation after getting rid of evil moralities. As it was clearly stated in Verse 29:64[19] that the genuine life is God's afterlife (XXVII, p. 14) and arriving in God's realm can only be achieved by purifying the soul in *this* life (XLIII, p. 11). The Ikhwan's commentaries on body and soul within the domain of morality can be summarized in this way. Considering the source of morality as body and soul, this approach would naturally remind us that at least two separate sources nourish these sources. This comment is valuable since the Ikhwan claimed that there are 92,160 different types of individual morality on earth, concerning the sources they were fed (XXV, p. 291).

The Ikhwan's calculation on reaching this number is as follows: astronomy (equal to astrology for the Ikhwan) principally deals with three subjects: stars, constellations, and orbital spheres *(falak)*. According to them, there are 1029 stars in the sky, and seven are called planets: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury, and Moon. Each of these planets has its own orbital sphere and rotates around the Sun by following its own path. These spheres mount on each other, akin to the layers of an onion; the ground of a sphere serves as the sky for another (III, pp. 83–84; XVI, p. 29). The exact positions of planets in the sky at an individual's birth and their angles with the Earth impact the four mixtures and determine their character. Mars, for instance, where the element of fire is dominant, the feature of warmth and volume of bile would have an impact here. In contrast, it would be water's dominance for Venus, and its impact on individuals born in it would create a wet and phlegmy character (IX, p. 208). The Ikhwan developed their theses from such data and claimed that each star has four astro-situations for its

[19] [Surah al-'Ankabut (The Spider), Verse 64] The life of this world is nothing but diversion and play, and the Home of the Hereafter is the Life, if they only knew (Itani, 2015, p. 174).

orbital location.[20] These four situations have their counterparts for the Sun, the orbit of Aries, and the constellational orbits, which makes a total of sixteen different astrological circumstances. Their bilateral correlations with each other are [16x16=] 256, and when we multiply these relations by 360 degrees, we reach out [256x360=] 92,160 different types of character (XXV, p. 291). Therefore, it is possible to assert that the second element that determines morality, after the blend of body liquids, is the astrospatial positions of the planets for the Ikhwan. They count two more origins as the sources of morality: the impacts of climate/geography and the education the individuals acquire; thus, they consider four elements for the essentials of morals (XLII, p. 329).

The Ikhwan suggest that God had created [ethnic] communities differently, and each of them bears some divergent features and faculties (V, p. 149); Turks do not incline to be homosexuals, for instance (XXXVII, p. 224), or Arabs develop vindictive feelings towards their kin (V, p. 132). Each community has a star in the sky that watches over its members (XX, p. 110). Every community bears some features others praise or despise; this comes forward because of moral variations (XXXI, p. 118). The earth has around 17,000 separate cities that host these distinct communities, and these cities are governed by around 1000 separate kings (IV, p. 117). These cities were scattered in seven different climates; their locations diversify their meteorological conditions and vary their situations against constellations and orbital spheres (IX, p. 207). The fourth climate starts from the steppes of Central Asia and stretches towards the Strait of Gibraltar as a belt; it remains in the middle, and with three northern and three southern belts of climate, it completes seven. Since it is in the middle of climates, this belt has been regarded as the climate of the wise, and the communities residing here are the most superior in terms of morality (IV, pp. 123–124). Even in this case, it must not be forgotten that humans are cruel and ignorant (XXVIII, p. 223).[21] Regardless of the climate they live within, the world's communities think they have the only righteous path; they envy each other, thus several partings occur—these were followed by the jealousy of the kings and eventually the outbreak of the wars (XXXI, pp. 33–37). God sends a prophet amongst the members of such wild communities so that these chosen individuals could warn his people and give some advice to them in their own languages (XLVIII, pp. 126–127). The goal here is to fix the moralities of these vile communities, because evil traditions and habits cause wicked morals (XLV, p. 41).

[20] These four situations can be taken as three-dimensional locational equivalents of two-dimensional determinants: east, west, north, and south.

[21] The Ikhwan refer to Quranic Verse 33:72 [Surah al-Ahzab (The Confederates), Verse 72] here: We offered the Trust to the heavens, and the earth, and the mountains; but they refused to bear it and were apprehensive of it; but the human being accepted it. He was unfair and ignorant (Itani, 2015, p. 184).

Prophets are necessary here because, as mentioned in Verse 68:4, their moralities show some exquisite characteristics (XLII, p. 396).[22] The Ikhwan resembled prophets to trees; their followers constitute their branches, leaves, and fruits, so they copy their prophets' morality. In the same vein, the most superior individual in a community deserves to be the leader of that group; however, if a prophet exists in such a community, he would be the natural leader and carry the executive authority with him (XLVII, p. 107). However, the morals of the kings and laity do not show similarities (IX, p. 229). This is why the primary duty and responsibility of the ruler of a community is to disseminate the superior morality he had inherited from the prophet to his compatriots (VII, p. 185). Since the kings are khalifs of God on earth (XIX, p. 100), they should follow the same method with their religious laws in such a dissemination duty and enhance the morality of their community with the assistance of prohibitions and threats (IX, p. 209). Because all the prohibitions and threats people became subject to in the public sphere are put in place to improve their morals (XXV, p. 314). The cognizance and reaction times differ from one society to another (III, pp. 105–106), and the rulers should consider this situation, so that the harmony in the society can remain intact; teaching tenets of the religion to people would provide an amplified harmony. No society can receive salvation without religion, because nonbelievers are the worst of any human (XLII, p. 364), they are even beneath the animals (XLII, p. 426), and even worse than the pagans. Because even the pagans carry a religion, albeit it is a wrong one (XLII, p. 387). With this respect, it is important to hold onto the religion and spread the morality of prophets to society since the followers of a prophet have better morals by their nature (XXV, pp. 314–315).

Next to their formulation on the divine assignment to the prophets and rulers by God for enhancing the morality of the society, the Ikhwan believe that the same God created human beings as mediocre entities in all aspects (XVII, p. 27) which sets up a degree of normality within that parameter, and humans seek to reach to that level when their mediocrity drop beneath the line of normality (XXIV, p. 286). Therefore, it is possible for the Ikhwan to alter the level of this line; it could be positioned at a higher level via education. As it was mentioned earlier, the ultimate purpose of mankind is to be likened to God, and this can only be achieved by death. Like a fruit has to die to fulfil its duty, humans should die and allow their souls *(nafs)* to be born (XXVIII, p. 37). With the birth of soul, the humans will reach to the floor of angels (XXIX, p. 48) and copy the most unique and mighty feature of God to themselves in the

[22] [Surah al-Qalam (The Pen), Verse 4] And you are of a great moral character (Itani, 2015, p. 251).

afterlife: *"be, and it is"* (IX, p. 204);[23] that is, the soul will transform into the most superior condition after the death of the body (XL, p. 306). However, to reach such a god-like power, it is required to enhance the morality in this world since good morals serve as the food rations in the eternal life (XV, p. 50). God expects *his* subjects to carry seven separate good morals within as forgiving the cruel, donating to the stingy, keep talking to the ones you offended, return kindness for evil, advise the trickster, beg forgiveness from God for the gossiper, and be kind towards the ones that make you angry (IX, p. 227). Though these demands seem troublesome and laborious, the Ikhwan have the keenest belief that any moral disease can be cured with its opposite (IX, p. 206), and such therapy sessions should be transformed into regular daily routines (IX, p. 209). Routines can only be achieved by education and training because God can only be known through moral education (XIII, p. 302), and the primary purpose of education is to mature morality (VII, p. 175). In the Ikhwan's account, the human soul bears the potential to evolve into both an angel and a demon (XLVI, p. 96); thus, morality can be embellished via endeavor (XXVII, p. 12). This endeavor can be realized by being a disciple of a tutor, since students inherit moralities from their teacher (XL, p. 291) or donating what they acquire from their professions to the needy, that is to say, transmuting material earnings into moral gains (VIII, p. 194). Likewise, it is known that some types of music have the potential to invert one's morality, to better or worse (V, p. 132); listening to some music types in the rhythm of *sakeel al-awwal* or such[24] in feasts, weddings, and gatherings would be helpful for the humans in maturing their morality (V, p. 156). Now that doing good deeds brings happiness (IX, p. 217) and *zuhd* (asceticism, deliberately ignoring this-worldly blessings) is both the key to every good deed (IX, p. 262) and the morality of exquisite people (IX, p. 244), it would be beneficial to follow this path in maturing morals, or to befriend with this kind of people at the very least since befriending with morally good people will bring happiness (XXX, p. 71). To

[23] This power of the God within the Islamic terminology is known as *kun fa-yakūnu* words; its direct translation is "be, and it is," and it gives God the power to create anything as *he* desires with a simple wish and a direct order. Several Verses in the Quran address this power; [Surah Maryam (Mary), Verse 35] It is not for God to have a child -glory be to Him. To have anything done, He says to it, "Be", and it becomes" (Itani, 2015, p. 129) or [Surah an-Nahl (The Bee), Verse 40] When We intend for something to happen, We say to it, "Be", and it becomes (Itani, 2015, p. 113) can exemplify this idiom.

[24] Here, *the word "sakeel"* corresponds to "heavy" in rhythm, and *awwal* means "first". Therefore, here, the Ikhwan tried to address the original version of *sakeel*. The oriental melodies, as seen in Arabic-Turkish musical tradition, have two parts: *maqam* and style *(usul)*. *Maqam* refers to a mathematical system of melodies, while *usul* refers to the rhythm, that is, the gaps between two beats *(darb)*. *Sakeel* type of rhythm dates back to ancient Arabic times, and *sakeel al-awwal* was classified as one of the six primary rhythms in both al-Farabi and Avicenna's texts; it is one of the 48-beats rhythmic cycle, which was 16-beats back in the Ikhwan's time. This style has long been used for major-volumed lyrics, and to experience what was suggested by the Ikhwan. However, it is Turkified in every inch; some of its samples can be found online. They can be listened to via music/video sharing programs by searching *"Numan Ağa'nın Şevkefzâ Peşrevi"*, *"Benli Hasan Ağa'nın Rast Peşrevi"*, or *"Sadık Ağa'nın Arazbar Peşrevi"* (Erdoğru, 1994, pp. 1–7; Özkan, 2009).

sum up, one can notice that morality has the capability to change from the perspective of the Ikhwan (IX, p. 203), and it is inevitable to reach salvation for the soul as long as it keeps striving to get rid of evil morals (XVII, p. 14).

4.1.3. Morality in the *Encyclopédie*

Since the former subchapter above begins with explaining what was known by the Ikhwan in the realm of morality and ethics prior to the compilation of their *magnum opus*, and only then does it start explaining their thoughts upon these concepts, an identical technique can be employed here for the *philosophe*s. Classical texts have been translated into European languages since Francesco Petrarca ignited the flame of humanism. The philosophers in the following centuries started to look at concepts through different lenses since then (English, 2005, p. 356), and morality and ethics constitute no exception to this debate. Naturally, it can be assumed that the *philosophe*s were also acquainted with antique philosophy, akin to the Ikhwan. What is more, though Isaac Newton had managed to reconcile these two, it is known that the Francophone thinkers were more inclined to inject a rationalist mode of thinking in their works, one of two knowledge acquisition methods, alongside empiricism (Cassirer, 1951, pp. 6–8). For this reason, it would be fair to begin with the moral understanding of René Descartes for his status as the architect of rationalism. Descartes believes that good morality leads to a happy life; that is, only people with common sense would prefer to behave in moderation and comply with the social rules he/she was born into. Still, it would be better to reevaluate the final decision once more before taking action, even for the most perilous convictions; only then should one stick with the ultimate judgment and be loyal to it. In addition to that, since it would be an impossible task for humans to intervene in every transaction they witness happening in the outside world, they must first contemplate upon what they consider right and good with their minds and then have to come to an understanding that there is nothing they can do about if the outcome of their actions were not to be concluded as they wished. Because one can give shape to their moral choices only in their minds, embracing this fact and improving this technique would assist them in making better moral analyses and becoming happier (Descartes, 2020, pp. 27–35). A keen eye would not miss that what Descartes did here as an analysis of morality is not different than the method he invented: he leaves everything that he is unsure of aside first, then chops the problems into smaller pieces, later he contemplates upon these smaller pieces one by one, and finally brings the pieces together once more to give his final verdict on the problem while completely having an indifferent stance towards outside

interventions (Descartes, 2020, pp. 22–23). A similar, if not identical, rational approach can be traced in Baruch Spinoza's understanding of morality. Spinoza's position towards religion was characterized as Spinozism by Jonathan Israel, a proto-atheism to some extent; he preferred to equate God with nature or to substitute them with each other at the very least (Israel, 2001, pp. 3–7). He challenged the historical burdens we carry on our backs, the obligations that compel us to comply with them, either to make them or refrain from them. At this point, it is clear that he abandoned the traditional moral codes; so, for someone in such a state of denial, it is necessary to behave morally to provide inner peace, an internal therapy. That is to say, if one has a plan to live a good life, they have to have the knowledge first, intellectualize the very same knowledge second, and finally realize their happiness with the mental might they acquired via this process (Balibar, 2010, pp. 104–107). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose well-known thesis is that we live within the best of all possible worlds and received serious criticisms for this argument—from Voltaire in particular, where he *almost* mocked his thesis in about every chapter of his best-seller *Candide* without exception, explained the concept of morality in the opposite direction of Descartes and Spinoza, even though he was a militant rationalist like these two. Rational analysis of Leibniz aims to create a rational order for this world, which he called the 'alphabet of human thought'; his efforts in this formulation strived to deconstruct every complex type of thought into its elements and sort them in a novel order. From this perspective, his original starting point is identical to Descartes. Indeed, he came up with a justification called 'principle of sufficient reason' and claimed that thoughts will not disappear when they are in harmony or disharmony with each other, similar to the continuity of objects in the physical world (Cassirer, 1951, pp. 28–30). For this reason, he claimed that what we call happiness was a spiritual (almost heavenly) status that resulted from mutual contemplation of the soul and divine harmony, a harmony of which human beings are a part. Harmony is a status of excellence in Leibnizian philosophy and holds the cosmology and morality together. Therefore, if we live in the best of all possible worlds, two pillars of morality as the good and evil [even the sin] deserve to take their parts within the harmony; besides, they are mandatorily required to partake within the perspective of 'principle of sufficient reason' (Hunter, 2001, pp. 116–118).

Though all these rationalist approaches of morality existed in/prior to the Enlightenment, some Encyclopedist contemporaries favored looking at the concept from a different window; the Scots had made some groundbreaking contributions to the debate in particular. Francis Hutcheson, for instance, rejected the Hobbesian egoist explanation of the malign characteristics of human beings, where he guaranteed good morality with a contract at

the beginning, and defined morality as the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. To create such a 'great happiness', he identified the concept of morality as a type of knowledge that can be self-acquired; thus, he did not only liberate the morality from the God-centric and/or revelation-based realm but also removed the concept from rationality while putting it within the set of sentiment and passion (Carey, 2005, pp. 153–156, 162–165). Hume took the debate from where Hutcheson left off; he highlighted the impossibility of assuming that a single individual's behavior can shape the behavior of a whole society, even if that individual were the perfect candidate. He rejected the idea that champions a constant form of morality. People are different; this is how rights and wrongs differ. Philosophers tend to divide the source of morality into two: reason and sentiment. However, they miss two central defects within their formulations: reason-centrics forget the unique sentimental conditions of each human, while sentiment-centric ones neglect the fact that it is impossible to attach adjectives to things beforehand (Hume, 1998, pp. 3–7). In that case, Hume needed to follow a *more* scientific approach and develop an objective point of view for morality, which has long been viewed as subjective. In parallel to this tendency, he did not devise a morality recipe; instead, he investigated the *raison d'être* of morality. At the end of his investigation, he concluded that morality is for us but does not originate from us; we only face some pleasures and pains in this life, and these provide some pride or humility to us in our social life. Meaning, the basic principle of morality is both the benefit that the first-person obtains and the then-status of the very same benefit; this benefit is produced by the reactions from the third-person/parties as a consequence of the behavior of the first-person (Hume, 1998, pp. 13–16, 44–46).

These formulations and explanations of morality endowed the Encyclopedists. They preferred to define morality as *"the free actions of human beings, natural or acquired, good or bad, open to be directed and managed"* (*Mœurs*, 1765) while approving the concept we know as *ethics* today as a science but conceptualized it as *morality* (*Ethique*, 1756)[25] and mentioned that it imposes the people how the behaviors and actions would be conducted wisely (Jaucourt, 1765, p. 699). If the series of actions is consistent, the behavior is good; if not, it is evil. The genuine matter here is not morality but the appearance of behavior because there is no purpose at the heart of the matter; there is only decision and action. In order to evaluate an action as good or evil, it is necessary to check whether the purpose was sincere or fake. In some cases, the action might be good, but its appearance might seem evil; the opposite of this case is also

[25] In the same article, *Encyclopédie* claims that the word ethics *(ethique)* was no longer in circulation but was only used to refer to some works of former philosophers, such as Spinoza's.

valid (Diderot, 1753). As seen here, the *Encyclopédistes* preferred to assess morality over the purpose and consequence of a behavior, and purpose was conceptualized over virtue by them. Virtue emphasizes the abstract world of humans and the human created it; thus, it puts the concept of virtue inside the morality set while making the human both the producer and consumer. This is why virtue becomes subject to several subjective and arbitrary meanings attached. No behavior bears apparent certainty as to which one is virtuous and which one is not; the relative meaning of virtue is based on the prejudices and sentiments the people carry within while attaching a value to it. The sum of attached individual perceptions to the concept in a society evolves into a consensus at a certain point in time, transforming the meaning of virtue into a common one. However, these agreed-upon virtues could be evaluated mistakenly occasionally; for instance, mercy is often put into the set of virtues, but in certain cases, being merciful could jeopardize the status of society. Therefore, to evaluate virtue accurately, it is necessary to judge the actions with the reasons they carry within: the purer the intentions, the more genuine the virtues will be (Romilly & Seguiran, 1765, p. 176).

The *Encyclopédistes* highlight that societies trust virtuous people but not those without character, since humans practice character by being inclined to do specific actions. The central reason for this situation is our innate guiding mechanism that steers us not with a fixed tendency but a customary one. An unbalanced character shows itself with failures and even stupidity in behaviors; known for his unmatched wisdom, Cicero, for example, was a perfect rhetorician but an average statesman. The *Encyclopédie* claims that people with unbalanced characters are morally harmful to society since they are unpredictable, and the precise example of this shows itself in Solon's aphorism on claiming that there is no man in this world more frightening than the one who does not support any side in the days of insurrection (d'Alembert, 1752). The generation of character is based on the proportional balance in the body liquids according to the *Encyclopédie*, similar to Hippocrates and Galen; if the red cells in the blood exceed, a more pleasant character will be formed, while their insufficiency will create an irritable person. Such a person's character was titled with a phlegmatic word in ancient times, and a high fever and lots of bile characterized this type of character. Moreover, the *foreign* particles that settle in the blood and the body's accustomedness to living with them create various characteristics, such as sulfurous, salty, hot, cold, and more (*Sang*, 1765, pp. 614–615).

Virtues and characters differ from one society to another; moralities, too, vary in the same vein as being dependent on their climate, religion, laws, rulers, needs, education, manners, and so on. These criteria are not equal in power in each society; sometimes one prevails over

others, and morality finds its then-valid form following *that* criterion (*Mœurs*, 1765). The ancients had classified the habitable parts of the world into seven categories and titled these climates; two more were added to these seven climates over time: the Volga region and the Crimea-Caspian region. The *Encyclopédie* accepts this classification and claims that the climate has direct influence over people's morality and characters; this work refers to Montesquieu, who is also one of the many contributors to the *Encyclopédie*, and his masterpiece, *The Spirit of Law*, while applauding him and his work for bringing honor to France. According to this, hot climates give people weak bodies and a vivid imagination; physically weak individuals tend to be lazy, so they prefer sticking to traditions rather than seeking novelties. The text shows this debate: some static life preferences like *dervishism* emerged in hot climates. This is why the rulers in such climates should determine rights and wrongs clearly and encourage their people to become industrious through the laws they enact. This is also valid for other societies and climates; England, for instance, a country where suicide rates are high because the people despise their lives. However, it would be absurd for a ruler to ban committing suicide. Likewise, the rulers in Japan should not enact very rigid laws, as it is known that the Japanese are famous with their quick temper; laws might backfire. Thus, it is vital to remember that all the moral norms are by the climates they manifest themselves within (d'Alembert, 1753a). Still, it would be *immoral* [within the parameters of evil and wrong] and seem like cutting corners if claiming climate was the sole responsibility in shaping morality; other factors should be considered.

Religion is one of the sturdiest factors here since it is based upon either a god or a supernatural power and the rules specified by them, which is also *a* type of morality (*Religion*, 1765). However, it must be noted that religion has two types as natural and revealed. The *Encyclopédistes* are critical of revealed religion, even being contemptuous from time to time; they think that it was an absurdity for *such* a god to notify *his* rights and wrongs to humanity through prophets, piece by piece over a relatively long period, from Abraham to Mohammad. The same God reflects having an inconsistent character in revelation for determining the moral rules valid for Jewish society alone by the mouth of Moses first, and deeming these rules universal with Jesus afterwards. Then again, no matter how absurd such a divine-morality rule would look, these are based on some premises; questioning the rules would be treated as questioning God's moral doctrine (*Révélation*, 1765). Nevertheless, natural religion does not emphasize a god with a name but divinity; reaching out to such a divinity has three ways: love, respect, and recognition. Love is a reciprocal concept according to the *Encyclopédie*; humans love God, and God loves them back. In the same vein, humans do not respect God for being an

immense and omnipotent entity, but for being the master of the entire universe. Kings receive credit from the communities residing in their lands, but God receives it from the universe. People worship God for knowing and recognizing *him*, but these prayers should not be conducted via some rituals that were instilled into us by various religious traditions; instead, these prayers should be practiced out of our admiration to *his* immensity, over gratitude we feel towards him with our souls, which is the only way of worshipping that honors *him*. Now that God created us as wise beings and gave us the ability to love, then *he* has to be pleased with us; this is how the duty of love, respect, and recognition was assigned, and it will become a law for all of humanity. This duty will transform into a kind of piety within the parameters of natural religion; since piety is a type of virtue within its own league, such a virtuousness will show itself in the public sphere, and the meanings of good-evil and right-wrong could then be redefined. Because, considering that human beings consist of two parts as body and soul, if religion only rests within the mental domain and the body does not participate, then the body's character will come to the forefront: the religion of people with cold and phlegmatic characters will turn into apathy and aversion, respectively, while the religion of the irritable and optimistic will turn into fanaticism and enthusiasm (*Religion Naturelle*, 1765).

Lastly, it would be beneficial to touch upon the relationship between morality and astrology, as well as education, in the pages of the *Encyclopédie*. Astrology was considered a despicable discipline in contemporary times, according to the Encyclopedists (d'Alembert, 1755), while defining it as an art form that aims to make predictions on future events by inspecting directions, positions, and forces of celestial objects. All meteorological conditions, like humidity, hotness, and coldness, are based on the movements of celestial objects. For instance, the sun emits light, warming up planets and giving them different colors. The angle of rays influences materials located on both the planets and Earth. However, the *Encyclopédistes* categorically reject the idea that these celestial objects have various impacts on the morality of human beings. Moral incidents are based on human beings' free will and actions alone (Mallet & d'Alembert, 1751, pp. 780–781). On the other hand, education has three distinct purposes: to build a healthy and well-shaped body, to improve the sharpness of mind, and to embellish morality. Today's children will constitute the society they live in in the near future; a good education they receive will give them a prestigious situation in society and benefit their families, societies, and states. For instance, a judge who improved his moral standards in his youth will be a blessing for the state he serves. The Encyclopedists persistently underline the role of military schools for this kind of moral training; according to them, these

schools are distant from some ill pastimes that would disturb children's training, and these institutions involve morally developed exemplary personnel for the students to take as examples. Naturally, such institutions will consolidate children's characters; what is more, the moral principles they learn *en route* will turn into habits for them at some point, and the concepts like good-evil and right-wrong would already be fed into their souls (Marsais, 1755).

4.1.4. A Comparison of Morality in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

As was widely discussed above, al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* have a consensus on some approaches towards ethics and morality. At the same time, they drift apart in some cases. This is why discussing the planned comparison over similarities and differences would be beneficial. For similarities, the definition of morality, the impact of climate and geography on morality, the relationship between the body liquids and character, and the role of education can be put inside the same set. On the other hand, the set of differences would include the purpose of morality, the relationship between the celestial objects and morality, and the role of rulers.

Beginning with definitions of ethics and morality would seem fitting. In the Ikhwan's account, morality consists of body and soul (XXIII, p. 262) and soul uses body similar to how a captain sails his vessel (XXX, pp. 61–62). The *Encyclopédie*, too, defines morality as a set of man's free actions (*Mœurs*, 1765) while stressing the dual composition of man as body and soul (*Religion Naturelle*, 1765). The Encyclopedists point out the same thing with the Ikhwan: the soul ponders and decides, the body executes this decision—the Ikhwan have an ontological-dualistic stance while the Encyclopedists follow a methodological/analytical explanation. Similarly, both texts dwelt on the impact of climate and geography on people's morality. Seven climates mentioned by the Ikhwan (IX, p. 207) find identical resonance in the *Encyclopédie*, where even two more are added to the list; certain features of climate and geography seriously affect both people's body and soul. Thus, climate and geography directly influence people's consideration and evaluation of good-evil and right-wrong concepts (d'Alembert, 1753a). Al-Rasa'il too, akin to the *Encyclopédie*, examined each climate one by one and underlined the higher morality of people living in the fourth climate, as its mellow characteristic provides the residents of this climate a perfect soul and body combination (IV, pp. 123–124). In addition, both the Ikhwan (IX, p. 204) and the *Encyclopédie* (*Sang*, 1765, pp. 614–615) accepted the role of blood in having a direct impact on people's character; the difference between their formulations is so minor that it can be ignored. Namely, the body liquids were openly named

in al-Rasa'il as blood, phlegm, yellow and dark bile (XXIII, p. 263). However, the *Encyclopédie* considered blood as the central liquid and accepted the rest as the particles that take part in blood (*Sang*, 1765, pp. 614–615). Besides, both texts emphasize the possibility of reaching a higher moral level with education. The Ikhwan believe that people were created as mediocre entities (XVII, p. 27), and morality is no exception to this matter. Nevertheless, it can be improved via education (VII, p. 175) since the good moral deeds will become a habit, a routine with the assistance of education (IX, p. 209). A similar correlation between education and routine can be observed in the *Encyclopédie*; the education given to children in schools, particularly military schools, aims to transmute such education into routines (Marsais, 1755).

Even if we manage to put a significant similarity in the same set by ignoring a minor difference, like those we see in the effect of body liquids on human character by ignoring differences in their naming-processes, the differences between two texts on the concepts of ethics and morals requires a new set to be formed beyond such a toleration. For instance, these two texts have different expectations of ethics and morality. For starters, the ultimate goal of improving morality is to grant the soul a god-like status after death in the Ikhwan's account; to achieve an infinite power that gives the bearer the ability to copy God's might (IX, p. 204). The *Encyclopédistes*, on the other hand, support following a virtuous life (Romilly & Seguiran, 1765, pp. 176–177), which will eventually provide the individual a prestigious status in society as well as become beneficial for his family, society, and state (Marsais, 1755, p. 397). After these two different comments, it is possible to say that the Ikhwan's understanding of morality depends on religion and the afterlife. At the same time, the Encyclopedists enjoy the fruits of moral behaviors in this life. Another sharp difference shows itself in the relationship between celestial objects and morality. Al-Rasa'il openly admitted that the planets and the angles they make with each other and the earth have effects on people's morality and character (III, pp. 83–84); so much effect that the Ikhwan did not hesitate calculating these angles and eventually reached out that there were 92,160 different types of character for human beings (IX, p. 208). The *Encyclopédie* on the other hand, not only counted astrology as an archaic and absurd teaching (d'Alembert, 1755) but also emphasized that the positions of celestial objects have impact on the physical form of matters; the moral behaviors and actions are dependent on the human willpower alone (Mallet & d'Alembert, 1751, pp. 780–781). The final difference, and perhaps the most striking one, is the role of rulers in improving society's morality; this debate is directly related to religion. The Ikhwan accepted that the morality of prophets is the supreme (XLII, p. 396) and that society, rulers in particular, have to take such morality as an example in

their lives. Rulers are obliged to enhance the morality of their societies (IX, p. 209) so long as there is no prophet around; if there is one, he outranks the rest of the rulers, and this obligation will pass onto him by its nature (XLVII, p. 107). The *Encyclopédie*, too, emphasizes the role of rulers in enhancing the morality of their communities and regards this as a necessity; its authors acclaim the efforts of the kings for opening new schools (Marsais, 1755). The Encyclopedists accept that a piece of morality rests within religion; however, they reject the existence of religious authorities and claim that individuals *per se* spread such a morality to the public with their own behaviors and actions (*Religion Naturelle*, 1765, pp. 81–82). What they focus on here is natural religion, which is why they reject the roles of prophets in society when it comes to enhancing morality. In addition to that, they consider oriental prophets like Zoroaster and Mohammad imposters (*Révélation*, 1765, p. 225).

A summarizing table on their similarities and differences on the concept of morality can be given as follows:

TABLE 4. A comparison of morality in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

MORALITY FOR AL-RASA'IL AND THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE		
THEMES	**SIMILARITIES**	**DIFFERENCES**
Ontological Framework of Morality	Morality = Soul + Body	Morality metaphor as the soul governs the body vs. Morality depends on free actions
Normative Source of Morality	No evident similarity	Revelation/The *Sharia* vs. Reason/natural law/general will
Purpose of Morality	Amelioration of the individual and society	Religious and spiritual ascension vs. Worldly prestige and social benefit
Impact of Climate and Geography	Acceptance of such an impact	7 climates, brief vs. 7+2 climates, detailed
Body Liquids and Character	Acceptance of their impact, particularly the blood	Blood, phlegm, yellow, and black bile vs. Blood is the primary; the rest are secondary
Role of Education	Education can enhance morality and turn it into a routine.	Spiritual context vs. Social and military context
Role of Administrators and Rulers	Responsible for enhancing the morality of society	Attached to prophets and prophet-sultan chain vs. Rejecting religious authorities, natural religion, and individual cases are important

4.1.5. Concluding Remarks

This subchapter discusses morality and ethics in two encyclopedic texts of two separate enlightenment periods: al-Rasa'il of the Golden Age of Islam and *Encyclopédie* of the 18th Century Western Enlightenment. Comparison of these texts showed that they have some identical approaches towards the concept of morality and some diametrically opposed interpretations on the same topic. By utilizing Rudyard Kipling's method on six questions once more, it is possible to say that such a comparison could answer the majority of questions. As a reminder, the questions were what, where, when, why, who, and how. Here, except for the *how*, the answers given by the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists can be circumscribed within the same league. Answers to these questions can be given as, respectively, 'good- evil and right-wrong', 'within society', 'for a lifetime', 'for order and happiness', and 'individual and community'. However, for the *how* question, it is impossible to reach a consensus like the rest of the questions. The main reason lies beneath this problem in their mastery of knowledge types. As mentioned, the Ikhwan utilize all human knowledge, including religious knowledge. However, the *Encyclopédistes* rejected metaphysical knowledge at the beginning of their journey and adopted a secular (independent of institutionalized religions) epistemological guidance for their work.

The concept of morality remained merely constant for the Muslim world since the times of the Ikhwan. Al-Farabi evaluated right and wrong actions, such as virtuous or ill behaviors. He claimed that an individual should seek a moderate approach in *his* doings; both sides of any action, that is, an extremist tendency, would cause an individual to drift apart from morality. This is why the Muslim philosophers considered morality a science that needs to be examined in detail. Kınalızâde Ali Çelebi, for instance, likened the science of morality to medicine for souls. On the other hand, Ibn Khaldun characterized morality as a pattern of behavior, and, akin to the Ikhwan, he had also accepted the existence of climate belts and their impact on the moralities of the residents. Thus, it is safe to say that morality converges with virtues in the Islamic philosophy, and such a convergence is valid both for the ruler and the ruled. The ruled should consider how they behave in their routines and act following the virtues. The ruler should merge *his* morality with mildness *(hilm)* while observing justice, wisdom, generosity, and courage in *his* doings (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 300–307). Next to these interpretations, the Ikhwan's conceptualizations of morality prevailed for centuries. For instance, Nizam al-Mulk of 11th century warned the rulers not to be hasty in their judgments, so that their perceptions on right and wrong do not falter in terms of morality (Nizamü'l-mülk, 2022, pp. 195–197), and to confer

with scholars, whose levels of knowledge on right and wrong, and good and evil surpass ordinary people, since they know better and deeper (Nizamü'l-mülk, 2022, pp. 127–128). A venerated scholar of the Muslim community in the 18th century, Ibrahim Hakkı Erzurumî, for instance, mirrored what the Ikhwan said on the link between the level of morality and the impact of geographical climates. Impact of the Sun on people—depending on the angle its rays make with different geographical positions of the Earth, he claimed, determines the morality level of that society. This is why, Erzurumî asserted, since the rays fall at a right angle, people of the first climate have black skins, they have thinner bodies, they have weaker minds, and their moralities show some narrower symptoms than the rest, concerning two sides of morality as good and evil. In the same vein, people of the seventh climate are far from receiving sufficient rays of the Sun; thus, both their natures and moralities remain at short levels, similar to what the cattle and the sheep possess within (Hakkı, 1999, pp. 142–143). A final example of this can be found in Mehmet Akif Ersoy, one of the most influential Muslim poets and politicians of the first quarter of the 20th century. According to him, the central source of higher morality is neither insight nor conscience, but the fear of God (Ersoy, 2013, p. 267); a society can only prevail or perish with the morality it possesses, and if the Muslim communities wish to prevail and receive a worldly salvation, they should enhance morality of their societies altogether (Ersoy, 2013, pp. 273-274).

The morality formulations of the *Encyclopédie*, or the Enlightenment in general, received various receptions in the West. Alasdair MacIntyre, an eminent Scottish professor of moral philosophy, claims that the Enlightenment was a project of justification of *its* morality, which had to fail (MacIntyre, 2001, pp. 85–87). Such a justification found its grassroots in the rational thinking, which eventually transformed human behavior, therefore, the concept of morality into a mechanical *thing* (MacIntyre, 2001, pp. 129–130). This mechanicalistic morality had perhaps found its first rejection by Edmund Burke, who is often accepted as the founding father of modern conservatism. In his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* of 1790, he openly criticized the Enlightenment thinkers of France—like Rousseau, Voltaire, and Helvétius—for imposing their formulations on rights and wrongs on their society. He claimed that human beings cannot instantly discover new moralities; their roots stretch to the times when we were not even born; changes happen *en route*. These thinkers had certain prejudices on morality, and instead of gradually confuting them by utilizing their reason, they preferred to topple these and replace them with fresh ones; this was a different form of philosophical dogmatism for him (Burke, 2016, pp. 127–131). Burke's rejection was to the societal

determination of morality; however, others, whom we know as Romanticists in bulk, emphasized the human factor and its subjectivity when it comes to the determination of morality as we have seen earlier with his introduction *amour-propre* concept (*see* Ch. 1.2.1.2) to the scene, which means self-esteem, Rousseau is often considered as the first Romanticist (Moggach, 2016, p. 665). Hegel, in parallel with Rousseau's coinage of this term, claims that the *happening* of the Enlightenment made the individual 'important' afterwards, and the subjectivity that comes with it became more and more visible (Moggach, 2016, pp. 661–662). Examples of such universal morality claims of the Enlightenment can be multiplied. Friedrich von Schiller for example, a partaker of German *Sturm und Drang* literary movement, openly criticized Kant's conceptualization of morality for being too technical, and converges morality with aesthetic, as both being occupied with individual's own taste, through the sense of 'beautiful' (Schiller, 2009, p. 3). As another participant in this literary movement and a close friend of von Schiller, Goethe perhaps introduced the most biting criticism towards universal morality in his masterpiece, *Faust*. Here, it is impossible to say that Faust was portrayed as a universally good character, he was an evil one; he seduced Margarete (Gretchen), and made her to kill her own mother with a sleeping pill (Goethe, 2015, pp. 184–185), and caused her to become insane and to kill her own child (Goethe, 2015, pp. 238–239). Naturally, by looking from the Enlightenment window, it can be expected from von Goethe to finalize this play with the absolute victory of Mephisto (the Devil) since Faust is an evil person; however, the play concludes with the intervention of celestial beings to prevent Faust's fall to Hell (Goethe, 2015, pp. 565-573). Margarete, in the form of a spirit, liberates him from the contract he had made with the Devil (Goethe, 2015, p. 574). Thus, universal codes of morality did not function here; individuals' self-choices constituted morality. At this point, a well-constructed criticism of the morality of the Enlightenment that came from Nietzsche can be highlighted. Instead of approximating or distancing universal morality and the role of the individual, Nietzsche preferred to *deconstruct* the concept of morality. According to him, power makes morality, not the opposite; whatever the powerful construct is, it is good and right, and that thing becomes good and right. Therefore, whatever remains opposite to them, as evil and wrong, experiences a re-definition process in the hands of the weak, which finds a new definition. This new definition inverts the dominant morality with the innate ressentiment of the weak, and takes the name of "slave morality" for Nietzsche (2013, pp. 51–54). Thus, for him, the Enlightenment morality was a desperate construction of the weak. As it was mentioned before, criticism towards the Enlightenment morality can be multiplied: feminist discourse finds it too malestream, postmodernism finds it too positivist, postcolonial texts find its understanding of

‘right’ as the central reason of colonial activities, and many more. However, delving into these debates would exceed the scope of this work.

4.2. Equality

Let us begin this section with a hypothetical question: could we have explained what equality means within the realm of humanity to Adam, since he is accepted as the first human ever created? It seems a fair assessment that the answer would be certain “No.”. He has to wait for Eve to be created, and he would need some time to be spent with her; even the ‘realm of humanity’ concept has to wait for this second creation for its very own coinage. That is, equality needs a second subject, at least in the beginning. Such a question can be followed by employing fraternity and solidarity concepts; still, the answer will be in need of a second subject. Sociologists had also contemplated this puzzle for decades, because Eve’s creation, obviously within the parameters of the Abrahamic religious tradition in this hypothetical example, was required for a society to be formed. Thus, how *few* people are required to speak of a society? Ferdinand Tönnies (2001, pp. 52–54) approaches this question with a ‘common ground’ filter, claiming that the totality of shared wills will become unified, and two people would suffice for such an institution to be created. Similarly, Erving Goffman (1959, pp. 2–3) characterizes social interaction in two activities: the one Subject A *gives to* Subject B, and the one Subject A *receives from* Subject B. That is, a dyadic society, again. Georg Simmel’s (1971, pp. 173–175) approach on this matter, however, was shaped around the concepts of ownership and *giving*. The human beings, have three interactions with this concept: they either give, exchange, or steal. These actions address three motivations: altruism, egoism, and objective norms. So, in this respect, this tripartite interaction requires a tree-membered society, which we may call a triadic one. Such atomic societies within the parameters of equality could be as follows: the dyadic societies are apt to be fragile since discord seems more possible than a consensus, and triadic societies might create a polarization but also have a good chance to practice a proto-democracy. The Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes* had lived in their own crowded, multifaceted, and complex societies. That is how they innately faced the concept of equality and became obliged to comment on it.

4.2.1. Conceptual Framework of Equality

Defining the concept and reviewing its links could be beneficial before going deeper into the formulations on equality of the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists. The Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines equal as *"the same amount, number or size, or the same in importance and deserving the same treatment"* (Procter, 1995, p. 464) while defining equality with *"[e]quality often refers to the right of different groups of people to have similar social position and receive the same treatment, regardless of their apparent differences"* words (Procter, 1995, p. 465). Therefore, a historical review of how equality resonated in different sources, forming the cumulative knowledge of the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists, could be beneficial.

The Ancient Greeks did not show the features of a homogeneous society, but they were in harmony. Considering the fact that society was divided into several fragments, such as men, women, children, slaves, and non-citizen residents of the polis *(metic)*, it would be hard to claim the existence of social equality in Ancient Greece. However, in the early 5th century B.C.E., a new concept was circulated as *isonomia*, which can be translated as "order of equality" or "equality under the law". The primary purpose of this term was to approximate the wealthy and the poor, as well as the people who do not have time for other errands, that is, laborers, and the people with more leisure time under the umbrella of politics. Giving these 'citizens' rights to partake in politics was expected to maintain an orderly society (Meier, 2012, pp. 115–117). This understanding had become the precursor of future political formulations of equality in Ancient Greek philosophy. For instance, Plato preferred dividing society into three classes: rulers, warriors, and producers, of which he introduced an organized social hierarchy (Arslan, 2006, pp. 408–409; Plato, 2007, pp. 66–68, 109). Similarly, Aristotle divided society into categories while establishing a hierarchical system as peasants, artisans, soldiers, the rich, priests, and magistrates, claiming each group has a societal role (Arslan, 2007, pp. 319–320). In the same vein, where he believed polity was the best form of government, Aristotle introduced an egalitarian system, but this government style was suitable for free men who owned property, which was land in his time; that is, equality for equals (Aristotle, 1998, pp. 77–82). Though Aristotle is thankful to Solon for putting an end to slavery for the ordinary people due to their lack of abilities for paying debt (Aristotle, 1998, p. 61), he equally brings forward an idea that the people in Asia, of which they have wit and skill but lack spirit, deserve to be enslaved. On the other hand, the residents of the northern parts of Europe have spirit but lack wit and skill; thus, they cannot rule others. The Greeks, however, for Aristotle, remain

between these two regions; thus, they are better than the rest in politics and abilities (Aristotle, 1998, p. 202). In short, it can be easily asserted that the Ancient Greeks were aware that equality is not something that posits and treats people equally. This argument is also valid for the Ancient Romans. The slavery institution was seen as natural in their times; so, they did not bother leaning on science and engineering. Because they had so many slaves, they could put more slaves in the field whenever they required extra energy. The *Romanitas* notion considered every citizen as equal in the legal sense, but the slavery institution established the foundation of *Pax Romana* through its utilization (Roberts, 1997, pp. 66, 69–70). Such an inequality between men had also shown itself in Roman stoicism, not only for humans but for everything, which we may call a different form of animism. In this respect, the entirety of entities in nature can be divided into three categories via hierarchical status of their spirits as *heksis* (disposition), *physis* (nature), and *psyche* (soul or mind); that is, even living entities have specific hierarchies (Arslan, 2008, pp. 320–321). From this perspective, it would be absurd to expect the Stoics to value social equality within the domain of politics (Arslan, 2008, p. 417). Indeed, Cicero, for example, does not spot a problem with an inequality of wealth, so long as it does not harm society (Cicero, 2020, p. 13), and evaluates society with different ranks by claiming even the lowest should be treated with justice (Cicero, 2020, p. 21). Similarly, Seneca does not believe in equality in any given society; however, he approached this inequality with friendship, or what we might say, with fraternity. According to him, people were born with the feeling of friendship, and our nature urges us to seek friends in society. Thus, a wise man does not care about the rank of his friends after such a bond is created, and he is willing to devote himself to this bond, because happiness via friendship prevails over equality in this scenario (Seneca, 1969, pp. 51–53).

The Old Testament approximates social respect and love with social equality; that is, a communal love is in effect. For example, in Leviticus 19:18, God commands people to love each other and abandon any vengeance within the community (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 143).[26] In the same vein, in Leviticus 24:22, God commands people to treat natives and foreigners equally in judgments and to establish a just society in particular (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 150).[27] Such a stress on fair and equal judgment in front of the law also shows itself in Deuteronomy 1:17, where God commands people not to take a biased stance in the administration of justice, but to treat others equally without considering their

[26] [Leviticus 19:18] Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor keep anger against the sons of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. I am Jehovah.
[27] [Leviticus 24:22] Ye shall have one judgment, the sojourner shall be as the native; for I am Jehovah your God.

worldly statuses (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 209).[28] The New Testament also approached the concept of equality from the same angle as the Old Testament, and mimicked what was told earlier. For instance, Matthew 22:37–39 clearly states that people should consider others as equals. They should love each other, which is the second command of God after *his* command to love *him* first (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 38).[29] Such an equality conceptualization through love of God alongside humans also shows itself in Mark 12:41–44, which concludes the well-known parable of a poor widow, who donated whatever she had to Jesus; thus, Jesus elevates her among the rest, who gave him only some pieces of their wealth. That is, Jesus considered the poor widow better than the rest; in this respect, this situation creates a hierarchy amongst people in the eyes of God (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 67).[30] Still, Jesus claims in John 13:34–35 that such a spiritual hierarchy will be eradicated if people love each other as he loves them. Entire humanity will be equalized in the eyes of God, since they became disciples of Jesus (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 137).[31] Thus, it can be said that equality in the Christian tradition was reviewed based on the merits people hold. For example, Augustine, whom we may be assured knew these verses very well, approached the concept of equality by highlighting its merits. In this respect, he inspects two phenomena: the comments of Hippocrates on twins, and the claims of astrologists on people born at the exact moment. According to Hippocrates, twins share equal body functions, both negatively and positively, and astrologists tend to believe people born under the same constellation share equal moral functions in their lives. Augustine criticizes these comments and claims that such arguments equalize people's fates. However, a fixed destiny is against God's intention and humans' reason, let alone its neglect towards the capabilities of individuals in utilizing their free wills (Augustine, 2008, pp. 248–250). Though Augustine's comments on equality seem more intangible, Thomas Aquinas's comments are tangible. According to him, God created everything to be equal in *his* eyes; inequalities arise from *his* divine justice

[28] [Deuteronomy 1:17] Ye shall not recognize faces in the judgment; and ye shall hear the small and the great alike; ye shall not be afraid of a man; for the judgment is God's; and the case that is too hard for you ye shall bring to me, and I will hear it.

[29] [Matthew 22:37-39] [37] And he said to him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. [38] This is the great and first commandment. [39] A second is like it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

[30] [Mark 12:41-44] [41] And sitting over against the treasury, he was beholding how the people cast money into the treasury; and many that were rich were casting in much. [42] And there came one poor widow, and cast in two mites, that is, a farthing. [43] And calling to him his disciples, he said to them, Verily I say to you, This poor widow cast in more than all who are casting into the treasury. [44] For they all cast in out of their superfluity; but she out of her want, cast in all that she had, her whole living.

[31] [John 13:34-35] [34] A new commandment I give to you, that ye love one another; as I loved you, that ye also love one another. [35] By this shall all know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one toward another.

(Aquinas, n.d., p. 328). Aquinas divided such justice into two: before the Fall of Adam and after. Before the Fall, everything, including the animals, was deemed equal in the state of innocence. However, when the Fall happened, in the primitive state, to be exact, inequality was necessary for the administration of divine justice. Therefore, human beings are unequal since then; even the sexes are not equal (Aquinas, n.d., p. 651), in addition to the virtues they possess within (Aquinas, n.d., p. 1161). Only the original sin applies to all equally because it does not possess any ranking. It is a divine gift of original justice (Aquinas, n.d., p. 1284). Baptism is its antidote, according to Aquinas; it equalizes all people in the eyes of God (Aquinas, n.d., p. 3218). However, one must admit that equality is not a monolithic notion; it comes in two ways: quantity and proportion. The husband and wife, for instance, are not equal in quality during their marriages, because the husband provides, which makes him superior to his wife. In contrast, the wife takes care of the house, which makes her the ruler in this case, while making her husband 'the ruled'. In proportional equality, Aquinas follows the same example, claiming that the husband and wife are equal. Because their vows towards each other are the same, they are obliged to uphold their marriage under the mandatory elements of this vow (Aquinas, n.d., p. 3736).

The Quran also has some very similar comments towards the concept of equality. For instance, in Verse 13 of Surah al-Hujurat, God claims that *he* had created people as male and female, and in the form of ethnic tribes and races; that is all equal in *his* eyes, but they differ with their doings on earth (Itani, 2015, p. 226).[32] In the same vein, in Verse 32 of Surah an-Nisa' specifically, God claims that *he* had distributed all *his* blessings equally. Both men and women should be aware of such equality in their earnings (Itani, 2015, p. 34).[33] This stress on men and women is not actually that narrow; in contrast, it was mentioned in Verse 35 of Surah al-Ahzab that God intends to grant salvation to the entirety of men and women, so long as they remain loyal to the covenant they established with God (Itani, 2015, p. 182).[34] The Quranic approach does not consider believers as equals alone, but treats infidels in the same way by

[32] [Surah al-Hujurat (The Chambers), Verse 13] O people! We created you from a male and a female, and made you races and tribes, that you may know one another. The best among you in the sight of God is the most righteous. God is All-Knowing, Well-Experienced.
[33] [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 32] Do not covet what God has given to some of you in preference to others. For men is a share of what they have earned, and for women is a share of what they have earned. And ask God of his bounty. God has knowledge of everything.
[34] [Surah al-Ahzab (The Confederates), Verse 35] Muslim men and Muslim women, believing men and believing women, obedient men and obedient women, truthful men and truthful women, patient men and patient women, humble men and humble women, charitable men and charitable women, fasting men and fasting women, men who guard their chastity and women who guard, men who remember God frequently and women who remember -God has prepared for them a pardon, and an immense reward.

pairing equality and justice. For example, in Verses 8–9 of Surah al-Mumtahina, God claims that even non-Muslims should be treated as equal humans so long as they are not enemies of Islam, by respecting their rights with justice; however, the Muslims should not befriend any of the non-Muslims (Itani, 2015, p. 244).[35] In this respect, it can be asserted that the God of Islam claims that *he* had created every human being as equal entities to each other, but both Muslims and non-Muslims have unequal status between them. This might be the reason that *he* claimed the Muslims, who received the favor of God, have their ranks amongst themselves, in the eyes of God. Because, as Verse 11 of Surah al-Mujadila mentions, the Muslim people can elevate by enhancing their knowledge; thus, they can become favorite subjects of God (Itani, 2015, p. 241).[36]

Though these explanations of the Quran are deemed unquestionable for the Muslim scholars, they preferred to attach some tangible elements to the Islamic conceptualizations of equality; these elements varied from astrological explanations to some exemplifications through parables. Al-Kindi, for instance, interpreted the concept of equality in terms of the impact of celestial bodies. In some situations where equality is seen necessary, like marrying with additional women which might introduce a competition between equal wives (Kindi, 2011, p. 222), establishing a friendship or partnership where both parties should be in equal status by its nature (Kindi, 2011, p. 227), and purchasing a slave which is a contract that is established on unequal terms (Kindi, 2011, pp. 216–217), al-Kindi evaluated the angles that celestial objects make with each other—the Moon and Venus in particular, and gave the concept of equality a very unique perspective. On the other hand, Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih approached the concept of equality with a more down-to-earth style while enhancing his thoughts with parables and poems. According to him, Arabs are superior to the rest of the nations, and as God mentioned in Surah al-Hujurat, *he* created human beings as communities. These communities allow people to trace back their ancestors, which comes in the form of genealogy, one of the most venerated sciences, which Prophet Mohammad underlined. He claims through a narrative that Prophet Noah had three sons named Ham, Shem, and Japteth, whose lineages re-created humanity. Shem’s lineage made the Arabs, Persians, and Greeks, Ham’s lineage constituted the Berbers,

[35] [Surah al-Mumtahina (The Woman Tested), Verses 8-9] [8] As for those who have not fought against you for your religion, nor expelled you from your homes, God does not prohibit you from dealing with them kindly and equitably. God loves equitable. [9] But God prohibits you from befriending those who fight against you over your religion, and expelled you from your homes, and aided in your expulsion. Whoever takes them for friends –these are the wrongdoers.

[36] [Surah al-Mujadilah (The Argument), Verse 11] O you who believe! When you are told to make room in your gatherings, make room; God will make room for you. And when you are told to disperse, disperse. God elevates those among you who believe, and those given knowledge, many steps. God is Aware of what you do.

blacks, and Nabataeans, and Japteth's lineage created the Turks, Slavs *(sakālibe),* and Gog and Magog *(Ya'juj wa Ma'juj)* people (Abdirabbih, 2021b, p. 279). This stress on the superiority of the Arabs had transformed itself into the superiority of Quraysh, Prophet Mohammad's tribe, of which the Prophet highlighted its superiority in various *hadith*s (Abdirabbih, 2021b, p. 287). However, as 'Abd Rabbih underlined, the Shu'ubiyya Movement that took its form in the early periods of Islam, which championed a certain equality between Arabs and non-Arabs, gives evidence to Prophet Mohammad's *hadith*s that emphasize the creation had happened through one man, that is Adam; thus, there is no superiority of an Arab to a Persian, except for *his* piety (Abdirabbih, 2021b, p. 365). In fact, such an objection to the Movement was grounded in some concrete tendencies of the Arabs. For instance, the Arabs were not enslaving their own people but others, and in order to underline the difference between them and the Arabs, they were not even calling them with the *bin/ibn* title, which shows a person's lineage by calling both *him* and *his* father by his name. Instead, they call their slaves by their first names, or they prefer to call them by nicknames. This is why the Arabs tend to believe that, for instance, only a donkey, a dog, or a slave would invalidate the worth of a Muslim's prayer (Abdirabbih, 2021b, p. 375).

The essences of equality and inequality were not examined in [what we might call] academic works or sacred texts alone; in truth, a good collection of literary works that question the nature of equality was known by both the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists. These works often address a utopic society with some fantastic elements attached to it. For instance, Avicenna, in his philosophical story-booklet titled *Hayy ibn Yaqdhan*, claims that humans are not equal (İbn Sina, 2023, pp. 35–37), and different climates create different types of people, which makes the inequality between human beings natural (İbn Sina, 2023, pp. 41–44). In the same vein, Ibn Tufayl's novel with the same name as Avicenna, *Hayy ibn Yaqdhan*, claims that there are two theories on Hayy's birth: he was either born from a tree, or he was an abandoned child who came out of a forbidden love. A gazelle adopted and raised him on a remote island (İbn Tufeyl, 2023, pp. 82–84). Throughout the story, the reader understands that Hayy discovers everything by himself and becomes a philosopher. One day, a man named Absal arrived on the island (İbn Tufeyl, 2023, p. 155), befriended Hayy (İbn Tufeyl, 2023, p. 162), and took him to his city, where Hayy became a professor there (İbn Tufeyl, 2023, p. 165). Hayy then discovers that people are unequal, and most people lack comprehension and use their minds like animals. Hayy and Absal return to their island (İbn Tufeyl, 2023, pp. 167–168). In *The Golden Ass*, the fantastic novel of Apuleius, which narrates the story of a young man named Lucius, the author explains the inequalities of this world through some side stories. For instance, Lucius wants to

transform into a bird to travel around easily. The magical ointment he applied for this purpose transforms him into a donkey instead. It is easy to return to his regular form; he only needs to eat some petals of any rose. First, he visits his own stable, but his donkeys try to kill him; then he moves to eat roses from his garden, but his slave beats him. At the same time, some bandits pillage his mansion and load what they have stolen onto Lucius, where he had first realized the inequality between human beings (Apuleius, 2007, pp. 61–64). His journey continued seeking any rose to eat, and he witnessed numerous inequalities between humans until Goddess Isis pities him and gives him his original form.

These fantastic approaches to explaining philosophical and political concepts via stories have transformed into utopian novels. Thomas More's *Utopia*, for instance, created a country where equality between human beings was the key. All the properties were common (More, 1997, p. 53), all citizens were considered equals, and wealth was distributed equally (More, 1997, pp. 55–56). That equality was so ingrained in the society that families with more children than 'necessary' willingly gave their 'extra' children to families having fewer or no children (More, 1997, pp. 79–80). In the same vein, Tommaso Campanella, in his *The City of the Sun*, another utopian novel, claims that everything in this city is common, and equality between humans is being evaluated through two classes the society innately bears within, over the ages of individuals. A citizen below twenty-two years old is an equal partaker of his class, which is the class of 'sons', and a citizen above this age is a part of the class of 'fathers'. They are considered equals within their classes, and the members of these classes call their comrades 'brothers' (Campanella, 1985, pp. 25–27). Both of these utopic texts grounded their evaluation of equality upon fraternity. Similarly, Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* enhanced such fraternity with what we might call the precursor of the social state notion. According to him, the nucleus of this utopic society was the family, and the leaders of families, who had witnessed at least thirty living members of their family above the age of three, had the right to organize a ritualistic feast. Family leaders check the welfare status of their members here and provide wealth to the needy, so that equality can be enhanced in the family. The governor also legally supervises this process (Bacon, 2021, pp. 28–29).

The Enlightenment thinkers preferred to approximate equality in society with fraternity, similar to how these utopian novels did. *Cyclopædia* of Ephraim Chambers, for example, defines fraternity through the equal statuses between people in an organization, from societies

to guilds (Chambers, 1728, p. F-93)[37] while evaluating equality through proportional approximation of two comparable and measurable things in different domains like astronomy or algebra (Chambers, 1728, pp. E-330–331). Indeed, various Enlightenment thinkers' well-known social contract formulations are apt to define equality over social fraternity. Spinoza for instance, believes that the social relations arise from the contract are grounded upon the equality of rights, which were not subject to an obligation before but transformed themselves into a double-faced powerplay, an inequal relation to some extent with the sovereign and the subjects, but an equal relation between the subjects (Balibar, 2010, pp. 82–83). When Spinoza applies this scheme to the political mechanism, he claims that the ruler—the king in this scenario—cannot be considered a leader but an approving authority who shares his power with public assemblies. Therefore, even the political body is not equal within its branches; people consist of the 'brain' of the body, while the king constitutes its 'soul'. However, in his time, there was an aristocratic social system that inherently put equality aside. What Spinoza suggested was straightforward: unequal classes within any given society should participate in politics equally, consider themselves as a part of the state, and a consensus should be provided among these classes in the parliament, of which, eventually, will transform the unequal into equal (Balibar, 2010, pp. 93–96). Thus, it can be said that equality was formed *after* the contract for Spinoza, while it naturally existed before the contract for others, those we know as social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke. The Hobbesian contract was based on the belief that people were equal in killing each other, so they had to submit this equal right to the Leviathan (Duignan, 2013, pp. 73–76). Lockean contract was also highlighting an equality in both power and the jurisdiction authority human beings possess (Locke, 2012, pp. 9–12); but then the concept of private property came to the stage, and people had stopped being both judge, jury, and the executioner of themselves, and transferred the equal rights to punish to the sovereign (Locke, 2012, pp. 98–99). Rousseau, too, believed that all people were born free (Rousseau, 2020, p. 4). However, the existence of *very* powerful people within a society harms the notion of equality within the realm of society (Rousseau, 2020, p. 6). His formulation was different; he urged people to come together, form a type of unity, and resist against such inequality (Rousseau, 2020, p. 13). By this, people would not be able to compare their equality status with each other but with the relationship between themselves and the unity, which would

[37] *Cyclopædia* has a different page number system. The preface section, naturally, includes Roman numerals. The first article of letter A begins with number 1 and ends with 184. The first article of letter B starts with number 75 as a page number, continues with letters C, D, and E, and finalizes with page number 380. The first article of letter F begins with page number 1; this section encompasses letters F, G, and H, and concludes with page number 282, and so forth. This is why the letter section was mentioned while referencing the articles here.

automatically make everyone equal under this umbrella (Rousseau, 1995, p. 433). That is, Rousseau's equality was in-between *before* and *after* situations: people were equal in the beginning, equality was disrupted, and they became equal again by the hand of the social contract.

These formulations of equality were the cornerstones of what the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists were aware of regarding their own timelines.

4.2.2. Equality in al-Rasa'il

The Ikhwan's approach towards equality can be examined under three separate groups: social, religious, and academic. Before reviewing these three groups in detail, it is important to note at the outset that the Ikhwan do not believe in such equality in its lexical meaning. This view will be explored throughout the text as we proceed.

The Ikhwan consider equality as being valuable; according to them, a lute (oud, *ud*, عود) has four strings, each representing a natural element as water, air, fire, and earth. These strings and the ratios between them are all based on equality, but a proportional one. The more their mathematical proportions become equal, the more valuable they become (V, pp. 146–148). This mathematical ratio also shows itself in other domains, and if something is not equal to another, it means it is the *opposite* of it. This is how all creatures were created; some are superior to others (VI, pp. 170–171). Creatures in this world are either simple or complex; simple ones are known by four elements, and complex creatures are minerals, plants, and animals (XX, p. 105). Moreover, the Ikhwan bind these complex creatures to each other with a chain; for instance, the plant league's highest level converges to the animal league's lowest level (XXI, p. 121). To elaborate on this approach with an example, the lowest member of the animal kingdom is the snail because it has just one sense: touch. On the other hand, the highest member of the plant league is date palm, since there are certain differences between the feminine and masculine types of it, and male ones are responsible for insemination (XXI, pp. 132–133). Human beings are no exception to this chain; they are the most honorable creatures of mobile creatures (XXXI, p. 96) and the masters of the universe (XLII, p. 346). However, the lowest form of human beings resembles a snail; they know only what they can sense, ignore wisdom, aim for worldly pleasures, and desire to live forever. On the other hand, the highest is one step shy of being an angel, a potential angel to some extent; s/he abandons evil habits, focuses on good deeds, enjoys science and wisdom, and listens to wise and genuine voices from others (XXI, p. 135).

Still, humans were created differently; that is, unequal in creation but equal in humanity (XI, p. 282; XLVI, p. 84). In the Ikhwan's account, not only humans but also humans' senses (V, p. 158) and nations that humans formed (V, p. 149) are different. Eyes are the most supreme organ among sense organs (XLII, p. 335), and the heart is more valuable than the brain (XLII, p. 333); each organ has its own rank. All nations and sects are different than others, as we have seen earlier about Turks and Arabs in their different moral understandings; still, they become equal in their worldly and otherworldly transactions during the Hajj season, in God's holy ground, Mecca (XX, p. 109). Some people are incapable of being an artist, for instance, they only have the inequality of learning and practicing it (VIII, p. 197). Even the imaginative power of humans is not equal; not many people can portray an imaginary entity in their minds. For example, it is not easy for a non-artist individual to imagine a horse with two wings[38] or a donkey with a human head attached[39] (XLII, p. 339). These differences and inequalities originate from the fact that all creatures were designed to be ranked hierarchically (XXIX, p. 42). For instance, the stars (planets) were created to be hierarchical and have their own ranks amongst each other. Sun is the king, Saturn is the *sheikh*, Jupiter is the judge, Mars is the military commander, Venus is the sister, Mercury is the little brother, and Moon is the mother within this hierarchy (XXXVIII, pp. 259–260). After getting a general sense of the Ikhwan's view on equality and how it relates to various ranking systems, it would be naïve to think that humans lack any kind of rank within themselves; in fact, there are seven.

In this respect, entire humanity can be put into seven groups as [1] artists, careerist, and employers, [2] merchants, servicemen, and property possessors, [3] landlords and building owners, [4] kings, sultans, soldiers, and politicians, [5] freelancers and daily-wagers, [6] chronic patients, slackers, and unemployed, [7] and religious experts, scholars, and servants of religion (IX, p. 219). As seen here, the Ikhwan divide humanity into seven professions, or at least sort them following the benefits they provide to humanity. Indeed, it was assumed that humanity was divided into layers, and these layers assist each other in creating a fully functioning society. Each of them is responsible for a certain task, while remaining aware of the inequality in such a system. Thus, these layers have some check and balance mechanisms within, and members of each layer have the chance to outrank their comrades (XLII, pp. 347–348). However, these inequalities surface with the supremacies and inferiorities the professions naturally bear within; people are equal in running some regular errands, say, using a public bathhouse can be counted

[38] Probably referring to Pegasus, a mythical creature.
[39] Probably referring to a centaur, a mythical creature.

among these routines that are off-topic in any equality debate (VIII, p. 195). By bringing debate to professions and the benefits that come with them, the Ikhwan focused on the inequality of wealth within societies. According to them, the poor are enemies of the rich; they wish the rich to suffer some hardships (XXXI, p. 133). The reason for such hostility comes from their jealousy towards the rich, which was also highlighted by God *himself* (XXXI, p. 137).[40] Nevertheless, that does not mean the poor do not carry some virtue within themselves; God did not create them for no reason. For instance, they had always constituted the first adopters of the call of prophets, and their religious faith has been more sincere than that of the rich (XLII, p. 348). Besides, such a situation was accepted by God in a parable of the Prophet Noah, where the poor and the needy were the ones who accepted his call first (XLII, p. 355).[41]

Speaking of the poor, it would be illuminating to check on the Ikhwan's comments about the slavery institution since it is directly related to equality and inequality debates. The Ikhwan acknowledge the existence of such an institution within society and aim to explain its details while reaching out to some formulations about the balance between slaves and masters. According to them, society has two elements: the educated/sophisticated class *(havass,* خَواس*)* and mass laity—that is, the general public *(avam,* عامّة*)*, the majority of any society (XXXVII, p. 229). Next to these two, the Ikhwan accepted another class-alike group consisting of slaves. Though it is generally accepted in the Islamic sense that all creatures are slaves to God (XXII, p. 255), the legitimacy of the slavery institution in a society was conceptualized through a parable that the Ikhwan attributed to Jesus. Here, the Ikhwan claimed that if one's soul becomes filthy and impure, it is inevitable for them to fall into the profound misery of slavery (XLIV, p. 29), and there is no chance for them to be free from their masters (XXXVII, p. 229). Because they are full of hatred towards their masters and aim to undermine their status (XXXVIII, pp. 257–258), but sometimes, as we learn from a parable related to Caliph Uthman, slaves might favor their masters and even risk their lives for them (XLVI, p. 66). Therefore, the Ikhwan underline that slaves should favor their masters, underlining that a slave who serves their master to avoid getting beaten or expecting a favor back is considered a horrible slave (XLVI, p. 63). Still, al-Rasa'il did not ignore the status of slaves on earth and placed them in a special triangle within the parameters of the celestial sphere, that is, the sky in short *(falak,* فَلَك*)*. According to

[40] [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 54] Or do they envy the people for what God has given them of His grace? We have given the family of Abraham the Book and wisdom, and We have given them a great kingdom (Itani, 2015, p. 35).

[41] [Surah Hud (Hud), Verse 27] The notables who disbelieved among his people said, 'We see in you nothing but a man like us, and we see that only the worst among us have followed you, those of immature judgment. And we see that you have no advantage over us. In fact, we think you are liars' (Itani, 2015, p. 92).

them, the sky surrounding the earth has twelve chambers, and the sixth one was called the chamber of disease. The second triangle of this chamber, as each chamber was divided into three triangles (10° arcs), was attributed to slaves; thus, even slaves have their very own celestial supervisors (LII, p. 259). However, if a slave breaks this celestial contract and tries to escape from their master, neither their celestial supervisors nor the stars in the sky would assist them (LII, p. 247).

Social equality from the perspective of the Ikhwan might be concluded with their thoughts on the link between equality and bloodline. According to them, Islam is a religion of Hashemites, the tribal organization in which the Prophet Mohammad was born (L, p. 204). Therefore, and also by addressing a *hadith (O Hashemites! People will not come to Judgment Day with their deeds but bloodlines. There, I cannot protect you in any way)*, al-Rasa'il noted that people will be judged per their kinship (XLVIII, p. 119). In a few epistles later, however, the Ikhwan use this very same *hadith* by altering it. This time, Prophet Mohammad rejects the idea of granting favor to his kin on Judgment Day but stresses the importance of good deeds (L, p. 196). These deeds found their resonance in the Ikhwan's account; they claimed that people have various ranks in the eyes of God (XLII, p. 402), which is why God's blessings do not visit every subject equally (IX, p. 234). This might be the reason that the Ikhwan highlighted a well-known *hadith* which resembles the Prophet's close companions/apostles to stars in the sky, who were allowed to be followed by Muslims since each and every one of them will lead their followers to salvation (XLII, pp. 387–388). These two examples, as well as the importance of bloodline and the elites in society, highlight that the Ikhwan's perspective towards social equality is not an encompassing one but a primitive one. However, Islam was introduced to establish an equal community through the concept of *ummah*; it seems this theoretical agenda did not find practical use even in the Golden Age of Islam.

As we have preferred to divide the Ikhwan's understanding of equality into three sections and extensively mentioned most of their characterizations above, the existence of some small nuances in religious and academic equalities deserves to be reviewed separately. For religious equality, it will not be a problem to claim that the Ikhwan place a special emphasis on religious figures and consider them above the rest of Muslims, creating an inequality in this respect. For instance, al-Rasa'il clearly states that Prophet Adam emerged as the master of all creatures (XXXI, p. 119) while Prophet Mohammad had been fulfilling his prophethood duty even long before his birth; that timeline was historically going so back that he stated *"I was a prophet even when Adam was in a stage between water and clay"* (XII, p. 293). The Ikhwan

did not confine themselves to prophets alone; in truth, they underscored people within societies that are above the rest; some spiritual doctors who cure people's souls—the guides (XLII, p. 388). Akin to the saint word in Christianity, these chosen people (XXXVIII, p. 325) take different adjectives like pious *(saleh*, صالح*)*, honest *(siddiq*, صديق*)*, and friend[s] of God *(auliyā*, أولياء*)* and their notable features were described as being patient, understanding God's intentions, showing efforts for helping God's message to be disseminated, and carrying some risks while executing these trades (XLVII, p. 104). These people, in addition to martyrs next to them, are so important for the Ikhwan that they did not hesitate to encourage people for utilizing these names as proxies in seeking salvation from the God *himself*; consecrating sacrifices in their tombs, fasting in their honor, paying alms in their stead, and several other worship-related activities were advised to be followed in this encouragement (XLVI, pp. 89–90).

On the other hand, academic equality for the Ikhwan has an altruistic side—it must be recognized, and it also includes some utopian and optimistic elements; however, it still divides people with knowledge from those without. The Ikhwan's route for this debate begins with a clear verse of the Quran, Verse 39:9, where God did not favor equalizing these two groups; *he* separated the erudite from the ignorant (XL, p. 285).[42] The route follows a straightforward path since then; they first claimed that reason and knowledge emerge from God as the source of enlightenment, and they graded people with different ranks (XV, pp. 14–15). Still, they knew that humans are limited creatures in their knowledge capabilities (XXVIII, p. 31) and a single soul cannot know everything (XLII, p. 331). However, an individual can advance to a higher rank with a sincere dedication on getting to know; because, whomever educates oneself to possess knowledge, that one will become superior to others (XXXVIII, p. 325), and this is a promise of the God, openly declared by *himself* in the Verse 58:11 (XLVI, p. 59).[43] Looking through this window and with the fact that prophets are the most supreme creatures and positioned above other human beings for the Ikhwan, it is understandable that they consider prophets as teachers and accepting believers as their pupils (XLVI, p. 58).[44] Besides, the Ikhwan

[42] [Surah az-Zumar (Throngs), Verse 9] Is he worships devoutly during the watches of the night, prostrating himself and standing up, mindful of the Hereafter, and placing his hope in the mercy of his Lord? Say, 'Are those who know and those who do not know equal?' Only those possessed of reason will remember (Itani, 2015, p. 200).

[43] [Surah al-Mujadilah (The Argument), Verse 11] O you who believe! When you are told to make room in your gatherings, make room; God will make room for you. And when you are told to disperse, disperse. God elevates those among you who believe, and those given knowledge, many steps. God is Aware of what you do (Itani, 2015, p. 241).

[44] The Abrahamic religious tradition might inspire this teacher metaphor since Jewish religious leaders were called with the same word, *rabbi*, and Prophet Jesus was called teacher by their disciples. For instance, in Mark 10:17 it was stated as *"[…] Good Teacher, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?"* (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 63), and in John 13:13–14 as *"[13] Ye call me the Teacher, and the Lord; and ye say well,*

claimed that scholars are the heirs of prophets (XL, p. 285), and this heredity requires competency as it is mandatory for each branch of sciences (L, p. 195).[45] For example, the Ikhwan accept magic as a branch of science and underline that even this type of science should be performed by competent people alone (LII, p. 229). This paragraph illustrates that the Ikhwan obtained their legitimacy as an erudite community from their humble and altruistic efforts to enlighten the masses by enhancing fraternity among the Muslims in exchange for utilizing the academic inequality in the society, as we will analyze in detail in the following sentences.

The concept of fraternity carries a dualistic meaning within; one corresponds to *"a group of people who have the same job or interest"*, while the other signals a social organization that often consists of male participants (Procter, 1995, p. 559). Regardless of such duality, both meanings refer to an equal acceptance among their shareholders, and the Ikhwan came up with different evaluations in both cases. According to al-Rasa'il, language is the key to establishing a friendship, which will evolve into a fellowship and comradeship (XXXI, p. 125); that is also a type of fraternity. However, people cannot speak many languages and read with them (XLII, p. 337); thus, God preferred sending his orders and books to earth via prophets who speak the same language as their communities (XLVIII, p. 127). In the same vein, the Quran, for instance, was sent to earth in the language of Mohammad, Arabic (XLIX, p. 179). God preferred to do so to establish a fellowship between the believers and enhance this fraternity by dictating some communal religious practices like festivals *(bairam)* and Friday prayers, so that people can come together, see each other, and gradually develop a habituation among themselves (XXII, p. 227). This is why a well-known *hadith* underlines the fraternity of Muslims with *"wish for your brother what you wish for yourself"* words—roughly (L, p. 195), emphasizing the communal dimension of salvation. According to the Ikhwan, this *hadith* draws a parallel with what the Quran said, as people will curse their brothers in Hell, for not providing a chance of salvation to them (XXX, p. 77).[46] This is why the contributors to the fraternity, not participants alone, should not envy the blessings their brothers received (IX, p. 242) but strive to mimic the

for so I am. [14] If I then, the Lord and the Teacher, washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet" (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 137),

[45] Though no reference was given here by the Ikhwan, this statement clearly origins from the Quranic Verse 4:58 as follows: [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 58] God instructs you to give back things entrusted to you to their owners. And when you judge between people, judge with justice. God's instructions to you are excellent. God is All-Hearing, All-Seeing (Itani, 2015, pp. 35–36).

[46] [Surah al-A'raf (The Elevations), Verse 38] He will say, 'Join the crowds of jinn and humans who have gone into the Fire before you.' Every time a crowd enters, it will curse its sister-crowd. Until, when they are all in it, the last of them will say to the first of them, 'Our Lord, these are the ones who misled us, so inflict on them a double punishment in the Fire.' He will say, 'Each will have a double, but you do not know' (Itani, 2015 p. 63).

enlightenment they received by taking their good brothers as vivid examples (XVI, p. 45). Because the brothers in such a brotherhood resemble the organs of a body, they must be aware that they complete each other (XLV, p. 48). On the other hand, if such a friendship were somehow incapable of being constituted, there has to be either a reason that is absent for the time being or a reason that has not disappeared from the picture yet. The Ikhwan gave a fixing recipe for both reasons. In this respect, if an existing reason is aimed to be removed, then people should know that this reason arises from one/some of these four problems: bad affairs, evil thoughts, evil morals, and accrued ignorance. If the reason is not there yet, then it happens since there is a lack of knowledge between parties and this absence have four sources: they do not know the difference between body and soul, relationship between these two, the causality between this relationship, and the lack of knowledge on how soul leaves body (XLVIII, p. 133). As evident here, the duality of body and soul is mandatory for the Ikhwan to be considered for establishing a functioning fraternity in society. This is why they preferred to expand fellowship in society by focusing on its primary constituent, the individual, and gave advice to people who desire to establish a friendship with a newly met person, their features that should be verified first. In this respect, such an individual should check this new person's social condition, try to get to know them, test their morality, question their religious faith, and ask about their sect *(madhhab)* so that they can be evaluated whether they are worthy of friendship, pure love, and true fraternity. If these features do not match, such a friendship will likely be over even before its establishment (XLV, pp. 40–42).

The Ikhwan expect people to question their [potential] comrades, as we can see here; this advice arises from their sincere belief that friendship cannot exist in a bipolar environment since hatred and grudge rest at the opposite poles of friendship (XLV, p. 43). This is how the Ikhwan came together as a united organization, which we may easily liken to a private club. This club focuses on cooperation on this earth for the salvation in the next one (XLVIII, p. 132). This organization can be likened to a club—a men's club, since Enver Behnan Şapolyo (1964, p. 253), an eminent Turkish historian, preferred to describe the Ikhwan as a secret society that strived hard to transform into an Islamic sect but failed to become one. This is why he preferred to posit the Ikhwan under the section of Islamic guilds alongside the *Ahi Brotherhood* in his research rather than categorizing them alongside Sunni, Shi'ite, or Alawite sects. The Ikhwan, as if they craved to affirm what Şapolyo said, invited people to come to them and become brothers with them to guarantee their salvation in the afterlife by emulating their lifestyles in this life (XXXVIII, p. 254). In the Ikhwan's account, their brotherhood represents the perfect

community in many domains one could ever witness (L, p. 201). The Ikhwan claim that they bear a mystery within that would lead to salvation. However, this mystery has to remain secret[47] concerning the advice of Jesus Christ, who told his disciples that sharing wisdom with the stupid would categorically be unfair to the concept of wisdom itself (XLVIII, p. 130). The heaviest problem for the competent is being exposed to listening to the remarks of the incompetent (XLII, p. 354); thus, the Ikhwan's duty is to explicate if they are asked, and learn from the wise if they do not know (XLVIII, p. 131). That is, the Ikhwan's advice is vital (XLVII, p. 100), and whoever is against the Ikhwan shares the morality of the devil (XLII, p. 428). When someone comes to the Ikhwan's door to join this brotherhood, they expect the candidate to carry four wisdoms within: accepting the truth of the Ikhwan, contemplating upon the truth, approving the truth wholeheartedly, and analyzing the essence of the truth with their own actions (XLV, p. 52). The bulk of 'wisdoms' naturally raises a question: What is *this* truth? From their perspective, the truth is the roadmap to salvation, and the Ikhwan guide people who desire to follow the *true* path (L, p. 191). This is why, as they claim, the Ikhwan had composed al-Rasa'il to satisfy the needs of their potential brothers (XLVIII, p. 134), to serve as the Noah's Ark for these brothers, that would lead the passengers to a certain salvation (XLIV, p. 21). In short, it was advised by the Ikhwan to read al-Rasa'il to become one of them—to become a club member (XLV, p. 40). From where we stand, Ikhwan's organizational structure does not show a monolithic characteristic; in fact, it is divided into three sections: wise people, stupid people, and the in-betweens. The Ikhwan's text, al-Rasa'il, was designed to elevate the second and third groups to the level of the first one; thus, when the desired manifestation become visible as the Ikhwan show up in society with their flesh and bones, the society would then already be ready to become participants of the intended salvation (XLVIII, pp. 117–118).[48]

The Ikhwan believe that humans are limited creatures in possessing all the knowledge in the universe, and this is why they intended to pen these epistles to warn and guide people (XXVIII, p. 31), by explaining each branch of science to the masses as brief as possible in order to encourage their audience to research further (LII, p. 256). By this, they automatically accept that some people are superior to others (III, p. 108); even such superiority causes innate differences between all human beings (XI, p. 282). Humans are the most precious creatures (X,

[47] The Ikhwan claim that their followers should have a secret place to gather, meet, and discuss, where no outsider should set foot in (XLV, p. 39).

[48] The Ikhwan believed their fraternity was considered illegal, and the governments were searching for them for persecution. This is why they went underground and tried to illuminate the masses in the shadows, preparing the society for their arrival. They deem that day a social uprising, and consider the day when the first *brother* ignites the flame of uprising as a festival day (L, p. 202).

p. 269), and this feature of them, and the fear of losing such a feature, caused people to come together and form a bond of solidarity over cooperation, since humans cannot live in solitude (XL, p. 305). A human in isolation would suffer a lot because they cannot provide items that would bring them a beautiful life, or carry all types of arts and crafts. Because, as one will admit, life is short, but the types of these skills are excessive. This is how people came together and established cities to help each other in solidarity (II, p. 69). It is logical to follow such a method since even the thinnest tree branches cannot be broken if they were tied together (XXXI, p. 144), and both Prophet Mohammad's *hadith* as *"Muslims are equal to each other with bloods and commodities as if they were one person, and they unite similar to one hand against another"* (XLVII, pp. 100–101), and the Quran's advice as to become and remain united for a guaranteed salvation (XX, p. 110), the Ikhwan recommend people to execute solidarity in their societies. Because the term world[49] shares an etymological background with 'being close to a certain time' in Arabic, and the end of *that* time will initiate a happy afterlife (IX, p. 224; XXXVIII, p. 240), that happiness should be secured in this life first. Happiness comes with beneficence (IX, p. 217), and beneficence is the sum of habitually continuous good deeds (XLI, p. 320). Thus, there is no better way than solidarity to turn good deeds into habits since they are put into action not for another reason but because it is a good thing to do (L, p. 195). Therefore, the innate *raison d'être* of cities is to follow this principle and enhance solidarity. For the Ikhwan, cities should be established upon virtue; solidarity among their people in these cities should seek salvation for the afterlife in their affairs. Essence of cooperation in these cities should be hierarchical, and society should be divided into four categories, from lower to higher, as follows: artisans and craftsmen, governors and administrators, kings and sultans, and metaphysicians and scholars (XLVIII, pp. 133–134). It is not unorthodox to witness such a ranking from the Ikhwan, yet it is surprising to see a layer exclusively reserved for artisans in the society. Nevertheless, by looking through another lens, it is understandable, as we have seen a few sentences earlier, that their conceptualization of solidarity rests upon the knowledge people possess, which brings the concept of artisanship to the table. Since it is impossible to have them all, and craftsmanship was divided within society, cooperation was imperative for the Ikhwan, and this is how they highlight such cooperation.

[49] The world term in Arabic has different versions as *dunya* (الدنيا), *ālem* (العالم), etc., but the Ikhwan refer to *dunya* here. This world comes from an Arabic root of *dunuvv* (دنيوي) word, which corresponds to "the closest" in English, referring to the ephemeral characteristic of this life and emphasizing the eternity of the afterlife (Uludağ, 1994, p. 22).

4.2.3. Equality in the *Encyclopédie*

The *Encyclopédistes* had several formulations on the concept of equality, and similar to al-Rasa'il, these approaches can be reviewed in three separate categories: social equality, religious equality, and academic equality.

The *Encyclopédie* considers equality a mental reasoning that operates under resemblance and similarity for *at least* two measurable situations (Jaucourt, 1755a). This process depends on the comparison of and relationship between two chosen subjects, which has been orchestrated by the mind (Jaucourt, 1765a; 1765b). Therefore, the definition of equal corresponds to two *things* that can be replaced with each other, so long as they bear the same qualities for this replacement within, without any alterations (d'Alembert, 1755). From a different perspective, what we consider valuable in this world is simply something with a 'decent worth' (Diderot, 1765); that is, it is a condition of what we attribute a worth to it and expect it to remain in that way. This procedure will bring equality in a situation where we may treat similar cases with similar worth. Music, for example, the composition of equal sounds forms such a condition of equality. The periods between sounds and the respect shown to these periods create a harmony of music (Rousseau, 1765, pp. 838–839). By looking from the same window, one can say that the equality of souls creates humanity (Yvon & Diderot, 1751, p. 341), similar to how the equality of sounds and intervals creates music. The human soul is indivisible; a human's soul will not be divided into pieces if another chops their arm or leg. This is how equality works; it is also indivisible (Yvon & Diderot, 1751, pp. 333–334). Since the power and ability of the soul are indivisible, and judgment—our innate capacity to establish relationships between things and conditions via comparisons—depends on the soul's assistance, therefore, the concept of equality arises from this inseparable nature of the soul (Jaucourt, 1765c, p. 17). On the other hand, certain evidence in this life and their certainties are so evident that the mind can certainly not deny them after its judgment processes (Quesnay, 1756, p. 146). The *Encyclopédie* highlights here that the verdicts we reach out in the physical world via our judgments are often identical and objective for material things and conditions; however, the immaterial conclusions tend to be subjective. Thus, human beings are objectively equal but subjectively unequal entities. Our imaginative power for instance, which the Encyclopedists claim we are inequal within this domain for the fact that the artists are more capable than the general population on depicting imaginary entities by attaching different limbs to different

creatures, like those we see in portrayals of sphynxes,[50] centaurs,[51] satyrs,[52] nymphs,[53] etc. (Quesnay, 1756, p. 150).

Human beings consist of body and soul, which is the first reason that created the soul and gave it animation (*Personne*, 1765; Quesnay, 1756, p. 155). However, such a body and soul duality does not mean humans have two personalities. Even Prophet Jesus himself, who carried both humanistic and deistic characters simultaneously within, did not consist of two *persons* in bulk (*Personne*, 1765). His humanistic and deistic affairs were separate, beyond the concept of equality. In the parable where Jesus gave the blind man of Bethsaida his sight back, for instance, application of saliva to the eyes was a humanistic operation. In contrast, the opening of the eyes was divine (*Théandrique*, 1765).[54] In practice, inequality here shows itself in a humanistic versus deistic dichotomy, which is beyond this research's area. However, there are some subjective inequalities in this world, devised by humans alone. Tolerance might be one of the most evident examples of such inequalities. When we delve deep into the core of the concept, we see that tolerance can be defined as a virtue of the weak. The mighty do not need tolerance; they have strength instead. Similarly, what is evident for one may be obscure for another (Romilly, 1765, p. 390), because using reason does not function equally for all humanity (*Justice*, 1765, p. 88). Even in such a case, it must be remembered that violence—as the opposite of reason, is the most unnecessary procedure to be chosen for following (Romilly, 1765, p. 391) just because of the possibility that if this technique receives a universal acceptance by employing intolerance to the equation of human relations, then it would be only natural for it to initiate wars between nations (Romilly, 1765, p. 393). This is why one of the pivotal obligations of states should be fostering a climate of equality in their societies to prevent intolerance (Romilly, 1765, pp. 393–394). Though tolerance was conceptualized as a virtue of the weak, states prefer a tolerant stance towards these weak people in some cases, to enhance

[50] A mythological creature depicted as a mixture of a human head and a lion's body. The Great Sphinx of Giza is a competent illustration of such an imaginary creature.
[51] A mythological creature depicted as a mixture of a human upper body and a horse's lower body.
[52] A mythological creature depicted as a mixture of a human upper body with horns and a goat's lower body with two feet.
[53] A mythological creature depicted as a young woman with some natural items like leaves, flowers, etc. attached to different parts of her body, often in the shape of a wreath of laurels or flowers. Nymphs are usually imagined with light green-toned skin and two pairs of lacewings attached to their backs. They are believed to carry some divine natural powers with them since they were considered natural goddesses, or spirits at the very least.
[54] [Mark 8:22–26] [22] And they come to Bethsaida. And they bring to him a blind man, and beseech him to touch him. [23] And taking the blind man by the hand, he brought him out of the village; and spitting in his eyes, and putting his hands on him, he asked him, Seest thou anything? [24] And looking up he said, I see men; because I see them as trees walking. [25] Then again he put his hands on his eyes; and he looked fixedly, and was restored, and saw all things clearly. [26] And he sent him away to his home, saying, Do not even go into the village (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 60).

equality within their societies. For example, the public hotels, designed and initiated for the poor to dine and reside, aim to serve as shelter for the needy and alleviate economic hardships they suffer due to evident financial inequalities. However, some able-bodied young people perched on these institutions, constituting the *vermin* layer of society. Such people should be removed from these hotels, and *Encyclopédie* claims that the existence and promotion of laziness within a society will eventually create a social class of which the states should fear them most (Diderot, 1765a).

The *Encyclopédie* stresses the conceptualization of the social contract we reviewed in various parts of this study. Accordingly, individuals bound by this contract are considered citizens of that state, and the citizenship pattern has shown itself in two styles throughout history: native and naturalized. Native ones represent the original people born as citizens, and the latter consists of people who gained some rights and privileges from the same society over time. The state's primary duty for the Encyclopedists is to secure equality in wealth and rights for both categories within society, eventually bringing peace to the state. It is understandable that not even the perfect democracies can reach a *perfect* equality level because, to reach such a level, it is mandatory to eliminate all unjust practices within societies, which is next to impossible (Diderot, 1753). Indeed, societies have long been experiencing inequalities in various forms throughout history, and they either infected the contract directly or their residues remain intact between the provisions of the contract. For instance, societies favor different age limits for different practices; it is twenty for purchasing or selling, say, furniture in Paris but twenty-five for selling buildings (*Age*, 1751), Romans prohibited the marriage of a woman over 50 and a man over 60 to get married until Justinian abolished this law (Boucher d'Argis, 1765, p. 108), and, interestingly, it was 14 years required in France for a boy to become a king since 1374 (Boucher d'Argis, 1765a, p. 545; *Majorité*, 1765). Historically originated inequalities can be elaborated with the acceptance that women cannot inherit fiefs (Boucher d'Argis, 1756, p. 695), and it was historically normalized that a *minor* husband has every right to dominate his *adult* wife (Boucher d'Argis, 1765a, p. 545).

Such historical practices get involved in the lawmaking processes over time and gain legitimacy. For example, the concept of bastard has a fixed meaning in every language on earth, and it can be defined as follows, more or less: *"[a] person born to parents who are not married to each other; an illegitimate child"* (Procter, 1995, p. 103). However, in the European tradition, even bastards are not equal among each other; according to *Encyclopédie*, they have different ranks within. One category for instance, includes bastards born of two free people,

corresponding the familiarized-meaning of the term; however, there are other types like adulterous and incestuous ones, which mean one parent was married but another was not, for the former, and marriage of mother and father was prohibited by the canons since subjects were related, for the latter (Toussaint, 1752, p. 138). Moreover, in some cases, it is possible to legally accept these bastards as legitimate children and grant them some titles with the assistance of royal pardons (*Légitimation*, 1765). Similarly, by keeping the same track on the debate about husband-wife relations, marriage resembles a contract since the latter bears mutual agreement and consent within (Boucher d'Argis, 1754, p. 122). However, marriage includes additional elements as voluntariness and reciprocity. Though it fundamentally depends on free consent, this dependence does not always find its equal usage for society's top and bottom layers. For example, slaves cannot get married without the consent of their masters (Boucher d'Argis, 1757), and princes must receive the king's consent for a marriage (Boucher d'Argis, 1765, p. 107). A similar inequality can be observed in the case of legitimate children; though they are not bastards at all, they cannot stake out a claim on their parents' dowries until their death (Boucher d'Argis, 1757a, p. 425). Also, the wife and husband are not considered equal in marriage, though the contract is established through consent. Husband's status in marriage is a master status, one of the most ancient canons: wife shall obey her husband, akin to a slave to their master or subjects to the king. A simple practice like this can portray such an inequality so vividly that the husband does not have to wear a mourning dress when his wife passes away, but the wife has to wear it if her husband dies (Boucher d'Argis, 1765b, p. 103; Mallet & Fresnoy, 1754). Though couples lose some of their social equalities after marriage and many of them were put as written law to be obeyed, like the disposal of properties and a woman's status in the courts (Conjoints, 1753), they are equal to get married to another after a possible divorce. Nevertheless, the Bible did not enjoy this situation (Boucher d'Argis, 1754a, p. 1083).[55] In the same vein, the celibacy institution, which is considered as old as history itself (Diderot, 1752, p. 801) was put under a ban in some cases (Boucher d'Argis, 1765, p. 107), or, sometimes marriages were prevented directly by the hand of law (Boucher d'Argis, 1755, p. 573). However, it must not be forgotten that laws and canons are apt to be relaxed in some cases, favoring one side against another or the entire community (Boucher d'Argis, 1754b), and the

[55] [Matthew 19:3–6] "[3] And there came to him Pharisees, trying him and saying, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? [4] And he answering said to them, Have you not read, that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female, [5] and said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh? [6] So that they are no longer two, but one flesh. What therefore God joined together, let not man put asunder" (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 32).

outcome of such a practice receives a general acceptance over time, though it openly violates the principle of social equality. For example, societies welcome kings' rights to remit pardons towards criminals as something normal (de Jaucourt, 1753) or some civilians may receive a copy of the police force's authorization, which transforms their status into an official position in time (Boucher d'Argis, 1765c, p. 349). Similarly, princes had the right to give chancery letters to anyone they saw fit without any conditions, which absolves all crimes of the receiver (Boucher d'Argis, 1765d). This kind of authority comes from categorical immunity of princes from becoming participants in any disputes (Boucher d'Argis, 1754c). It is evident with these examples that the contract we are speaking of creates a variety of *domestic* rules of law that the cooperation of canons and codes has shaped, but most importantly, the arbitrariness.

Such a legal order is unequal because the balance in the distribution of authority and responsibility is unequal. Relaxation of codes for favoring one party has never become a practice for religious and natural law, claims *Encyclopédie*, but it has long been normalized for church and royal codes to follow an arbitrary path in law (Boucher d'Argis, 1754b). Royal codes, for instance, created a post of what we call magistracy and bestowed a supreme power on this post (Jaucourt, 1765d). An unequal situation was created within society over the fees paid by people to these artificial posts (Boucher d'Argis, 1755a).[56] Additionally, the creation of such a highly privileged post had caused another post to be created in order to represent the chair in its owner's absence, the lieutenancy post (Boucher d'Argis, 1765e, p. 503). The existence of such posts caused the individuals who are bound by the contract not to fear the rule of law that comes with it (Boucher d'Argis, 1754d) but to fear these invented posts. This is a socially unequal situation. The contract issues various obligations to its participants, and these obligations can be likened to the mother of their future actions (Boucher d'Argis, 1765f). Some faults or deficiencies might cause obligations to falter, and crime happens. In such a scenario, people might lose some of their contract-based rights via punishments (Boucher d'Argis, 1754f; 1754e, p. 468). Yet again, these rights can be reinstated to them afterwards, so long as some conditions are met (Boucher d'Argis, 1765g, p. 194).[57] All these processes are executed by the

[56] Though participants in the judicial cases paid these fees, the governments also paid several benefits to the judges. For instance, apart from some bulky provisions from royalty to cover their travel expenses when appointed to another city, these judges also received some physical payments other than money, such as clothes, furniture, and even slaves (*Viatique*, 1765). Additionally, the invention of such posts automatically introduced some ill concepts to society, like abusing the post's authority for personal gains (Boucher d'Argis, 1753). Resorting to such an ill practice can be conceptualized within the parameters of fraud; that is, it is a vile practice at the outset that is against the social faith in justice and equality (Diderot, 1757).

[57] Among these conditions, post-punishment, appeal (Toussaint, 1752a), and compensation (Boucher d'Argis, 1765h) can be counted.

hand of some invented posts, which benefit from social inequality while encouraging it. However, in some cases, the contract itself causes some inequalities. Adultery, for instance, is an action depending on free will more than anything else and can happen within an equal society; yet, it is often considered to be the most punishable felony for a society—coming right after homicide, and has unpleasant impacts on the same society. This constitutes an unequal situation. Therefore, the real question to be asked, at least for the Encyclopedists, is as follows: Who does more harm to society with this action, woman or man, married or single? Regardless of the answer they provided, they underlined that adultery is the cruelest type of theft for a society that would have no eventual effect on it other than undermining the social equality (Yvon et al., 1751).[58] In some cases, however, the contract and posts prefer to cooperate for creating an equal situation out of an inequality; receiving an illegitimate child's custody on a deathbed is considered a legitimate move and constitutes a clear example of this matter (Boucher d'Argis, 1765i).

Nevertheless, everything has a reason to exist (*Modes*, 1765, p. 590) and nothing is made of nothing (*Création*, 1754, p. 443). For the planets, for instance, their movements around the Sun show several inequalities, and the elements they represent are not equal to each other within the domain of chemistry. Saturn has around a 30 years span in its rotation and represents lead, Jupiter's period is approximately twelve years and representing tin, it is around two years for Mars and representing iron, Venus rotates around the Sun for about seven months and copper characterized it, and Mercury's rotation takes around three months and it symbolizes mercury, as one may guess, or in other words, quicksilver (d'Alembert, 1765, pp. 703–704). We can further discuss the reasons for other entities we have not comprehended. Mind/reason, for instance, though we acknowledge its excellence, it operates imperfectly occasionally. We name these imperfect times with dreams, delusions, madness, imbecility, etc., words (Quesnay, 1756, p. 150). That is why we tend to accept some qualities around us as divine gifts;[59] some artists are more gifted in elegance than others, for example (Voltaire, 1755), or some people are more capable of delivering rhetorical speeches than the rest of the community (Voltaire, 1755a, p.

[58] Their bitter opinions on this matter can be observed in an article where they explained the punishment they saw fit for a woman who committed adultery. In such a situation, it was required to strip her of her dowry and matrimonial conventions, to shave her hair, and lock her up in a monastery for two years. If her husband does not want her back, she will remain there indefinitely as a veiled woman. The only escape options from this punishment, other than the husband's remission, are the death of the husband within this two-year-long period so that the woman can request her freedom from officials or another man's desire to marry her, which again requires permission from magisterial courts (Toussaint, 1751).

[59] Such a gift does not have to originate from some supernatural entities like gods, spirits, demons, djinns, celestial objects, etc. However, it is equally probable to consider its provider as nature. Voltaire's signal here points out the nature.

529). Such inequalities are natural and compatible with the essence of nature. Now that languages refer to some human-made inventions created by numerous different folks consisted of equal individuals within (Beauzée, 1765, p. 249) and also, say, we are all equal in catching illnesses (d'Aumont, 1755, p. 657), then why did these folks approve to invent some social positions amongst themselves which harm their status of equality? Perhaps this is why nobles were referred to by an *authentic* word in their communities back in the day as a whole, elevating them to the true representatives of the people (Toussaint, 1751). Although this was not the preferred term for identifying nobles in 18th-century Europe, a well-established and even institutionalized inequality was still in effect within society regarding family and bloodline, that is, nobility. The *Encyclopédie* evaluates nobility in two ways by taking inspiration from Francis Bacon: as a section of the state and as a condition of individuals. The *Encyclopédie* claims that if a monarchical country has no nobility in politics, that country's regime will turn into despotism, akin to the Ottoman Empire. However, nobility is required to balance and counter-balance the sovereign's arbitrariness, serving as a bridge between the public and the monarch. The removal of nobility, then, will only cause the regime to become either despotic or popular. Additionally, the population of nobles tends to be crowded; thus, they often force the political system to adopt a senate-like mechanism. By its nature, this mechanism becomes a repressing machine for the aristocracy in time; aristocrats in the state gain the upper hand over aristocrats with titles alone. Though the existence of aristocracy is, *per se*, an unequal condition within society, another chapter of inequality arises within the aristocracy. The Encyclopedists claim that society can only be recovered from this situation by choosing one of two options: either nobles should consider themselves equal with people, by showing a great virtue, that is a form of republican regime, or nobles should consider themselves equal with each other, by showing a lesser virtue, that is a form of aristocratic regime (Jaucourt, 1765f). Hence, it is understandable that the *Encyclopédie* accepts the existence of an unequal situation within society that was shaped over bloodlines; yet, it still brings some proposals to the table that could be helpful to solve such a problem—if that is a problem itself. This can indeed be taken as a problem for the *Encyclopédistes* era, since it was not enough to carry a noble bloodline to accede to many religious/political institutions. In Spain, for instance, it was mandatory for a noble to prove that their lineage was pure from Jewish, Berber, and heretic blood if they aimed to become a part of the Knights Hospitaller or the Order of the Holy Spirit (Jaucourt, 1765g).

The *Encyclopédie* put a catchy remark on both the Olympics of the Ancient Greece, where people were completely equal in participating games (Jaucourt, 1765e, p. 456), and as

we will see its usage in the following paragraphs in detail that anyone was able to assign anyone as their champion in the following centuries, for duels which were designed upon the principle of equality (Mallet et al., 1753). If we consider the institution of marriage and the theme of championship as situations where people share a common fate during these contracts, which are in effect, and by imagining a reversal of this united fate into a parting situation, then it would be inevitable to expect this new situation's conditions to carry the principle of equality within. Indeed, when contracts were established on utilizing jointly used items with their co-owners—be as it may portable items like furniture and money or immovable ones like buildings, the agreement is established upon equality and good faith. Similarly, when this contract is to be terminated, the newly emerged division and sharing situation is based on these principles (Boucher d'Argis, 1765j, p. 85). If termination of the former contract is designed to be executed not via a division but a transfer, that is, if an exchange is in effect, which is one of the most ancient canons, then the principle of consent comes to the stage next to equality and good faith (Boucher d'Argis, 1765k, p. 24). For all these examples given for pages, it is safe to say that the *Encyclopédie* preferred to conceptualize social equality over the concept of social contract, in addition to laws that come with it and residues of traditional practices nested in its core.

For religious equality, the *Encyclopédie* embarks on the debate with the concept of God. According to ancient philosophers, this concept is so intertwined that the more one examines this matter, the more they find it beyond their understanding. Because divinity is inaccessible to our eyes, it can only be conceptualized as Augustine did: God is a being that we talk about without being able to say anything about it; we only accept its superiority (*Dieu*, 1754, p. 976). On the other hand, such an acceptance goes beyond nature, if we accept nature as 'the machine of the universe', akin to some unnatural concepts like miracles, as surpassing nature (d'Alembert, 1765, p. 40). Pierre Bayle, said the *Encyclopédie*, conceptualized God out of this mechanism and claimed that the idea of God was injected into the minds of people and nations in an uncertain time in history, and people are showing consent to acknowledge this entity without questioning its nature (*Dieu*, 1754, pp. 976–977). The concept of the church complicated matters. The Christian interpretation of the Abrahamic religious tradition injected the belief that all people were born as sinners, equal in this matter, for Adam's disobedience to God's clear order not to eat the forbidden fruit. Anselm of Canterbury, for instance, conceptualizes this sin as God's justice towards Adam's fault, but cannot clearly explain why it remains in effect for the irrelevant people (*Originel*, 1765). Adam's fall shattered the link between divinity and humanity, and Jesus Christ's task was to reconcile these two. It is believed

that Jesus came to this world to guarantee salvation to humanity; thus, it was only normal for him to absolve people from their original sins. The chosen method was baptism, which the Church practiced. Though it was not practiced by some notorious people in the early times of Christianity, and there was no consensus amongst the Church fathers at the beginning, this practice became common *en route*, and the execution of the practice fell to the professionals of the Church (Mallet, 1752). The Church's self-assignment to baptism elevated its status among the Christian society, and the Catholic theologians injected the idea that the infallibility of Jesus was transferred to the Church's organizational body (*Infaillibilite*, 1765). The origin of inequality in 18th-century Christianity rests upon this evolution of religious interpretation.

Such an inequality followed other inequalities in religious dogmas. For instance, Christian philosophers claimed three types of spirits: God, angels, and the spirit of human beings (*Esprit*, 1755). However, the eucharist practice, also known as the Thanksgiving sacrament, blurred the spiritual difference between God and humans, and the professionals of the Church benefited from this situation in time, and the ranks in religious institutions varied. This ceremonial practice was first executed by bishops alone, claim the Encyclopedists; however, it transferred to deacons in time (Mallet, 1756, pp. 131–132). This situation emerges because human beings prefer to wander away from the principles of natural law; it applies to everyone equally, but people enjoy interpreting its canons differently. Because it would be easier to fix these interpretations to specific rules, determining behaviors under these rules makes people feel less obliged to contemplate (Quesnay, 1756, p. 157). The Catholic Church's doctrine considers people who do the same thing as united—though Protestants reject the necessity of leading figures in these communities (*Unité*, 1765), and focuses on a uniform belief that these united people shall follow the same leader (*Communion*, 1753). After such an idea was instilled in society, it was easier for the Church to establish an unequal environment. Still, this inequality was first and foremost established upon earthly gains, even secular to some extent; each participant within the Church hierarchy had taken their share from the profit: bishops, provosts, deans, archdeacons, chancellors, chantry personnel, theologs, treasurers, chieftains, canonicates, abbes, monastery personnel, chamber keepers, chaplains, hospitalists, sacristans, and many others were participants of this inequality—the privileges of ecclesiastics (*Bénéfice*, 1752). Naturally, such a powerful organization had stripped itself of the commonality and established its own law and right to judge in time; so the jurisdiction authority of courts often does not apply to ecclesiastics (Boucher d'Argis, 1753a). The Church's authority to judge people perhaps best shows itself in the Inquisition, which was conceptualized around the 1200s

and practiced in Europe for centuries. Montesquieu claims that, cited by Jaucourt, people tend to believe 18th-century Europeans are civilized; however, they are mere barbarians for carrying the unforgivable sins of the Inquisition in their baggage. True that the Church had become so mighty in its judicial authority that it would not be wrong to attribute a motto for this period as *"anyone can be judged, everyone shall testify"* (Jaucourt, 1765h, pp. 775–776). Such a practice found resonance in other domains as well. The ecclesiastics, for instance, claimed the right to excommunicate people from Christianity. However, the concept was a pagan tradition, and when people refused to conduct relations or trade with some inappropriate individuals, the Church did not hesitate to internalize this practice (Mallet & Jaucourt, 1756, p. 222). In the same vein, though the absolution term, as forgiving sins which should be attributed within the God's faculty alone, was executed by the hands of priests as well; claiming to be inherited from Jesus Christ himself directly and gives authorization to ecclesiastics for releasing people from their sins free after their confessions, with a simple idiom: *ego te absolvo à peccatis tuis* (I absolve you from your sins) (Mallet, 1751), which is incompatible with the nature of equality. Last but not least, although it is categorically forbidden to have private prisons for capturing and punishing people (Boucher d'Argis, 1765l, p. 386), it is known that monasteries carry the privileges to have their own prisons in their institutional premises, even several inhumane punishments like mutilation were performed there once (*Prison*, 1765).

Speaking of monasteries and ecclesiastical understanding of justice and equality, two more items can be discussed before concluding this debate: secular equality in monasteries and divine equality in duels. Monasteries are based on seclusion and piety; thus, everyone shares the same equality in participating in monasteries as monks or nuns, people from all conditions, social classes, and ages (*Moine*, 1765, p. 616). Besides, all monks and nuns are considered equal within the monastery complex (*Ascetes*, 1751), at least in theory. However, we come across two exemptions to equality in practice: age and money. Children, for instance, cannot become monks unless their parents allow them to be so, and nuns have to pay money to monasteries to be accepted into the institution (Boucher d'Argis & Jaucourt, 1765). Though the demanded money was absolutely forbidden in the monastic tradition and can only be received voluntarily, in the course of history, it became a mandatory tradition to pay the monastery from a piece from girl's dowry as periodic pensions or as sum to be paid once; still, she has right to claim paid money back if she is released from her vows (Boucher d'Argis, 1755b). This practice over monasteries constitutes the secular example of equality in the eyes of the Church, and there is another: divine equality. Albeit the Church held a mighty status in jurisdiction, there were some

cases amongst equals where the ecclesiastics hesitated to intervene. In some disputes between parties, except for theft and when the facts are apparent to the public, parties can prefer to solve the problem by directly fighting with each other. This barbaric practice is called a duel, and its history can be traced back to the Nordic people after the Fall of Rome, which then passed into Germany first, and followed a route into Burgundy, France, and throughout Europe. The main characteristic of these duels is the acceptance of both parties as equals. It is not unlikely that a duel between a noble and a commoner will be witnessed, since there is no exception to this matter: everyone is equal. Ecclesiastics, priests, monks, etc., cannot escape from this duty since it was accepted as a divine intervention in the dispute, and the Church had injected this idea into the concept of duel on its road to spreading into Europe. It was supposed that God would favor the righteous and make his hand strong so that he could prevail. The employed pronoun here, as *he* is not put arbitrarily but on purpose, because women cannot take part in these duels. Still, they have all the rights to assign a champion to prove their innocence by combat (Boucher d'Argis, 1755c, pp. 160–161; Mallet et al., 1753; Mallet, 1753).

Regarding academic equality, on the other hand, the *Encyclopédie* claims that this world had numerous clever and erudite people. However, even these people cannot comprehend that the human mind cannot know everything (*Philosophe*, 1765, pp. 509–510). Because we often acquire knowledge from our experiences, we eat something for the first time and evaluate whether it is beneficial or harmful. That is, we tend to assign our experiences as mentors (d'Aumont, 1765, pp. 221–222, 224). Such a preference resembles the knowledge systems of animals. They utilize three faculties simultaneously in producing knowledge: senses, instincts, and experiences. This is how they know where they can find well-fed grass or under which oak they will find acorns. Wolves, for instance, follow their noses against the wind to catch the smell of their prey because their experiences taught them to do so (Roy, 1765, pp. 795–796). Human beings do the same thing; we produce our knowledge through experiences and produce a will towards the object we see. We either develop an attraction towards that object or repel its existence. This scenario shows similarities with an ordinary scale; its pans are often remaining balanced; however, if we change our attraction or repellency towards this object, there has to be something new put on one pan, that is, we learned something new (Diderot, 1765b, p. 454). Nevertheless, this learning process is often stuck in denominations and generalizations. Though humans are abandoned to ignorance after the original sin was committed, their passion for *knowing things* was not forsaken. Still, what we do *to know* is to give names to our types of knowledge. We want to know until we know *its* name; we lose our curiosity afterwards. Pagans

did this to the feelings they could not comprehend fully, like love, fear, health, etc., and attributed these feelings to gods. We, too, have several feelings, and we tend to give them names first and generalize them later (Marsais, 1751, p. 46). Though the process of thinking covers all the operations of the soul, we assume that we think via concepts; in fact, we do not. We tend to think via shadows of the concepts, that is, via perceptions of the concepts. We do not think of white when we hear white as a color, but we think of the perception of white, which was once injected into our souls (*Pensée*, 1765). To eliminate this inequality in knowledge, it is necessary to comprehend the process of knowledge production and its genealogy first; this comprehension is vital in expanding knowledge, for the abstract concepts in particular (Formey, 1754, p. 748).

At this very moment, two separate subjects step in: philosophers and dictionaries. Philosophers love their societies; they strive hard to benefit their communities. Their motto comes from Roman playwright Terence as *homo sum, humani to me nihil alienum puto*, that is, *"I am a human, I think nothing about human is alien to me"*. The essence of philosophers is their love of their society; they are honest, and they follow reason. A true philosopher's thoughts consist of the combination of moral and social values; that is, they care about the enlightenment of their society (*Philosophe*, 1765, pp. 510–511). Their books are vital in this enlightenment process; people learn their conclusions from their books—knowledge in short (d'Alembert, 1755a, p. 914). Dictionaries in this respect have several versions but often focus on languages; however, when they focus on things and become a dictionary of things, this work would be *very* philosophical (d'Alembert, 1754). However, such a dictionary is not a perfect place for people to be enlightened; it merely gives some superficial insight to its readers. Dictionaries serve to diminish actual knowledge with this superficial erudition they provide and create an inequality in knowledge, and for this reason, they share the same category with newspapers. However, topics of newspapers are often the same, while dictionaries have a wide array of topics to delve into (d'Alembert, 1754a, p. 968). Though we owe a lot to dictionaries for the general enlightenment in society, say the Encyclopedists, some journals, newspapers, and dictionaries are so poorly designed that they do not only abuse philosophy but also extinguish people's taste for research and study, for a simple fact that they multiplied in quantity but diminished in quality (d'Alembert, 1751, p. xxxiv). Modern academics, however, abhor philosophers and accuse them of usurping the title of wise, for failing to acknowledge every type of knowledge beneficial and its utilization for enlightening societies (d'Alembert, 1755a, p. 918). Such an attack might come from the fact that these academics are being paid with fixed wages by royalty since 1719 for their university duties; they were academically more independent before, since they were

getting paid by their own students (*Professeur*, 1765). Still, the *Encyclopédie* does not abhor their roles in schools, for education is required to remove the obstacles to intellectual equality. In their account, it is mandatory to teach young people arts, literature, and science; however, the children must be approached carefully, and knowledge should be presented as simply as possible at the beginning. Utilizing dialogues and examples would be beneficial to prepare them for society. Health issues, for instance, are vital for children to be learned and important to possess such knowledge for their futures; a child with a competent education would not prefer to seek healing from charlatans and herbalists in their citizenship times (Marsais, 1755, pp. 398–399). Still, students do not share the same capacity for knowledge, so schools tend to distribute them in different classes according to their capacities. These capacities often draw parallelism with college classes; students are placed in rhetoric, logic, physics, theology, law, medicine, etc., classes (Marsais, 1753). On the other hand, some fortunate students begin their academic journeys way younger in their homes; this age can be as early as seven, but such a situation often remains an exception for princes. Wealthy children receive their education from their teachers in the form of humanitarian equality between the master and pupil; teachers treat students as potential equals and teach them with insinuation and utilization of reason, allowing them to imbibe knowledge from them rather than pouring it all at once (Lefèvre, 1757, p. 792). The same method is also valid for tutoresses; some fortunate children receive their first education from them even before the age of seven. Some claim children should not be constrained in their early years; bothering a child could disturb their happiness and break their mentality apart. However, a disciplined child would be happier than a spoiled one. Besides, such a discipline will lead them to recognize what they owe to their society, making them good citizens (Lefèvre, 1757a, pp. 783–784). Perhaps this is how the *Encyclopédistes* had seen *an* intellectual inequality within society over economic conditions—since hiring a personal tutor bears no odds to happen a cheap transaction, and decided to intervene by coming up with a monumental work, the *Encyclopédie*, to enhance the knowledge of general population and fill *the* gap of knowledge between social layers.

4.2.4. A Comparison of Equality in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

The Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes* share similar aspects regarding their evaluation of the concept of equality; however, some differences set them apart. Similarities include the essence of equality, acceptance of inequality among humans, and the need to remove obstacles

facing unequal humanity. Differences mainly revolve around their ontological and epistemological understandings of each philosophical group.

The Ikhwan argued that the core of equality lies within the concept of value; being valuable determines equality. This value varies in proportion, and as these proportions come closer mathematically, they become increasingly equal with each change in ratios. That is why four different lute strings were designed based on this proportional ratio, making them mathematically equal (V, pp. 146–148). The *Encyclopédie* presents a similar idea. It states that the concept of value is closely connected to the idea of worth (Diderot, 1765), and equality can only be understood by comparing at least two things through their values, with the help of reason (Jaucourt, 1765a; Jaucourt, 1765b). Interestingly, just as the Ikhwan illustrate equality with a musical instrument, the *Encyclopédie* chooses to demonstrate it through music, where harmony of sounds arises from the equality and inequality of musical notes (Rousseau, 1765, pp. 838–839). This fundamental idea of equality also applies to humans. Both texts believe people are born equal, but certain processes make us unequal over time. The Ikhwan claim that humans are inherently equal in humanity but individually unequal (XI, p. 282; XLVI, p. 84). Conversely, the *Encyclopédie* holds that humans are objectively equal but subjectively unequal (Quesnay, 1756, p. 150). Therefore, both texts acknowledge that inequality exists in the universe, not only among humans but also among planets. The Ikhwan believe the universe was created on a hierarchy (XXIX, p. 42), assigning specific roles to celestial bodies, which place them in a hierarchical order. For example, they see the Sun as the king and the Moon as the mother, with other planets occupying their roles within this hierarchy (XXXVIII, pp. 259–260). The *Encyclopédie* also comments on planetary inequality, but in a more scientific or 'astronomical' manner, rather than the Ikhwan's more fantastical or 'astrological' approach. It focuses on differences in planets' rotation times around the Sun and the elements they represent on Earth (d'Alembert, 1765, pp. 703–704).

Both texts emphasize the existence of natural inequality; the Ikhwan believe this situation results from God's preference in creation, assigning different hierarchical ranks (XLII, p. 402), which naturally makes people unequal in knowledge (XXVIII, p. 31). The *Encyclopédie* also highlights this natural inequality, asserting that people are not equal in their ability to use reason, even though nature has given everyone the same potential (Justice, 1765, p. 88). Some individuals lack the imagination to create various unnatural images, according to the *Encyclopédistes*, who describe this as taking different limbs from various creatures to imagine a completely unorthodox creature like centaurs or sphinxes (Quesnay, 1756, p. 150).

A similar idea is found in al-Rasa'il, where it was lamented that people unable to imagine things cannot picture imaginary entities in their minds; for example, they cannot attach a human head to a donkey (XLII, p. 339). The Ikhwan emphasized different types of inequality present in the world, such as unequal nations (V, p. 149), unequal wealth among people (XXXI, p. 133), disparities in social status (III, p. 108), bloodlines (L, p. 204), differences in religious practice (XLII, p. 388), and variations in knowledge and wisdom (XL, p. 285). Similarly, the *Encyclopédie* discusses various inequalities, including norms based on age (Age, 1751), disparities among types of bastard children (Toussaint, 1752, p. 138), inequality between parties in marriage (Boucher d'Argis, 1765b, p. 103), societal hierarchies established by man (Boucher d'Argis, 1755a), bloodline inequalities (Toussaint, 1751), the inequality created by intermediaries between God and people (Mallet, 1756, pp. 131–132), and disparities in knowledge (Formey, 1754, p. 748). Particular attention should be given to inequalities stemming from social status, bloodlines, and religion, as these are especially suitable for a detailed comparison.

The Ikhwan divided society into seven groups, which we might call classes (IX, p. 219), and believe that the existence of social layers within a society is necessary because, according to them, these layers are beneficial for the society's functioning (XLII, pp. 347–348). The *Encyclopédie*, on the other hand, reaches the same conclusion through the concept of citizenship. Citizenship, therefore, comes in two forms: being a native member or a naturalized member. While it is impossible to create a perfect society solely through the establishment of a citizenship institution, recognizing equality among society members by considering justice and respecting people's rights would help create a functioning society (Diderot, 1753). Still, the *Encyclopédie* believes that the requirement of nobility within this structure—established through bloodlines—serves an important role. This social class acts as a middleman between the sovereign and the people, serving as a check and balance mechanism against the sovereign's arbitrary decisions (Jaucourt, 1765f). Therefore, both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes* acknowledge the necessity of social classes in any society. The status based on bloodlines, however, finds an unusual resonance in al-Rasa'il. Islam was first introduced to the Prophet Mohammad's tribe (L, p. 204), and the Ikhwan believe that people will be evaluated based on their bloodlines in the afterlife (XLVIII, p. 119). Furthermore, the friends and companions of Mohammad constitute the elite class of Muslim society, serving as the vehicles that lead people to salvation (XLII, pp. 387–388). Given this, it would not be inaccurate to claim that the Ikhwan valued social equality within the community.

Both texts emphasize the importance of equality in the eyes of religion. The main difference lies in their views on the roles of religious figures; the Ikhwan welcomed them, while the *Encyclopédie* criticized them harshly. The Ikhwan believe that religion must have some superior individuals within, whom they call religious elites, to guide people. Prophets, including Adam himself, are considered the highest individuals (XXXI, p. 119), while some devout members of society are regarded as the chosen ones (XXXVIII, p. 325). These individuals, along with prophets, are so important to the Ikhwan that they recommended praying to them, fasting for them, and even sacrificing animals at their tombs to enhance prayers to God—believing these figures serve as mediators between God and humans (XLVI, pp. 89–90). From this perspective, it's fair to say that a religious hierarchy in Islam was seen as natural within the Ikhwan's view. Conversely, the *Encyclopédistes* observed that such a hierarchy existed in Christianity too; however, they regarded it as artificial, created by the Church. It was accepted that people were born with original sin, meaning all were equal as sinners (*Originel*, 1765). Yet, Prophet Jesus was believed by the Church to have intervened and opened a path to salvation, which led to the invention of baptism (Mallet, 1752). This justified the Church's claim to be the sole successor of Jesus (*Infaillibilite*, 1765), and new ranks such as bishops and deacons were established (Mallet, 1756, pp. 131–132). Over time, these ranks evolved, and the Church's authority became institutionalized, according to the *Encyclopédistes*, creating an unequal environment within Christianity (*Bénéfice*, 1752).

Although both groups of philosophers accept inequality within societies, they propose unique approaches to eliminate or at least lessen its severity. The Ikhwan, for example, argued that God does not see people as equals based on their knowledge (XL, p. 285). However, they also acknowledge that social hierarchy can be elevated through the improvement of knowledge (XXXVIII, p. 325). That is why the Ikhwan collaborated to share knowledge with their potential brothers, aiming to make them equal in wisdom and understanding (XLVIII, p. 134). In essence, the Ikhwan built a vision of equality founded on the principle of fraternity in knowledge. A similar approach can also be seen in the intentions behind the *Encyclopédie*. The Encyclopedists believed that societal inequality stems from a lack of knowledge (Formey, 1754, p. 748). There are many ways to improve knowledge among the general public, such as through the dictionaries available on the market; however, these were designed to impart superficial wisdom to readers, similar to newspapers and magazines (d'Alembert, 1751, p. xxxiv). Some enlightened thinkers, expected to share their knowledge with the masses, such as academicians, preferred to maintain a barrier between themselves and society (d'Alembert, 1755a, p. 918). As

a result, a fraternity based on knowledge struggles to form within society. Furthermore, unequal economic conditions limit access to quality education; wealthy children often have an advantageous start in life, such as being homeschooled from an early age (Lefëvre, 1757, p. 792). This is why the authors of the *Encyclopédie* sought to foster an intellectual fraternity with society through this work, aiming to promote some level of equality and to democratize knowledge. Alongside efforts to elevate individuals' intellectual capacities to a standard level, both texts emphasize the importance of establishing a social contract aimed at creating an equitable society. The Ikhwan attributed this contract to the founding of cities built on virtue, maintaining their status through the solidarity of their members. Although this solidarity naturally creates some social classes—such as artisans, governors, rulers, and scholars—it was accepted that the functioning of society is the key (XLVIII, pp. 133–134). The Encyclopedists, however, approached the social contract in its original sense; the contract was created to preserve equality among members through laws. While some easing of laws exists in society, leading to certain inequalities (Jaucourt, 1753), legal regulations regarding adultery (Yvon et al., 1751) and the right to challenge certain disputes through duels (Mallet et al., 1753) demonstrate the existence of such a contract that enforces equality through legislation. Additionally, this contract has also allowed some privileges for less privileged members to maintain social equality—what could be called practices of the social state—such as the establishment of public hotels where the needy can stay (Diderot, 1765a).

Even though they found their receptions in different parts of this study, equality debates on the slavery institution and genders can receive their comparisons in this section. Conditions of slavery were discussed in the equality subchapter for the Ikhwan, while it was discussed in the freedom subchapter for the *Encyclopédie*. Though this might seem an arbitrary preference at first glance, in truth, it conforms with what the authors of both texts know of the paradigm towards slavery institutions in their own periods. Islam, for instance, did not abolish slavery but paved a path towards it. The slaves in the Muslim communities are not restricted from liberties like those we see in the Western communities; thus, the institution of slavery is directly related to equality here. Because slaves carry all the liberties within themselves when it comes to spiritual/religious matters, inequality arises in civic and legal matters, like possessing property or establishing contracts. This inequality arises from the fact that the slavery institution grounds itself upon prisoners of war; thus, it is natural to expect them not to be deemed equal to the Muslim folk (Aydın & Hamîdullah, 2002, pp. 237–239). Therefore, a slave in Muslim community can always expect to be equal with the rest of the community, and such reinstation

of rights can occur with various methods: they can be voluntarily set free by their masters, which the Quran also recommends,[60] or they can be set free as a compensation to repentance, which is a unique method to Islam alone that shows itself in different ways like murdering someone by mistake, breaking an oath, committing adultery by mistake, etc. As a third method, the slave and the master can arrange a contract for a definite time; that is, the slaves can purchase their liberty at a certain point in time with a certain amount of payment, which the Quran also advises.[61] The fourth method is also promising; in this respect, slaves can become free by the order of Islamic law in some cases, like establishing a kinship link with the lineage of the slave via marriage. Additionally, a female slave who gives birth to a child from her master *ipso facto* gains her freedom; besides, the master can always speak his last will to set his slaves free after his death (Aydın & Hamîdullah, 2002, pp. 241–243). That is, the institution of slavery in the Muslim world must be differentiated from its counterpart in the West. In this mechanism, a slave can become *wala'*, that is, a royal vassal chosen from freed slaves, *mawali*, who address the local rulers of the periphery of the Muslim world, chosen by the non-Arab slaves who receive their liberties after converting to Islam, and *mamluk*, who were slave-warriors at the beginning and turned into a military elite in time (Crone, 1980, pp. 74–81). In this respect, each slave in the Muslim community has the potential to become equal with the rest of the community at some point in their life, and this mechanism was what the Ikhwan were aware of. The slavery institution in the West, however, particularly during the times of the *Encyclopédie*, was formulated upon freedom; that is, slaves were deemed living properties like horses, cows, chickens, etc. For instance, in the early 18th century, the number of black slaves multiplied the number of white colonists many times in various colonies of America (*i.e.*, 32,000 slaves for 14,000 colonists in Jamaica in 1724). In order to prevent rebellions that might lead freedom, the colonists had preferred to execute an article from *"Act to Regulate the Negroes on the British Plantations"* that was passed in 1667. This article was known as *"the law of the whip"*, and its main intention was to discourage slaves from remembering that they are also human beings. This article granted masters so much sovereignty on their 'living properties' that an unintentional murder by whipping a slave brought no legal responsibility to them, that is, no punishment, since there is no crime. Similar laws can be observed in the Spanish, Portuguese,

[60] [Surah al-Balad (The Land), Verses 12–13] [12] And what will explain to you what the ascent is? [13] The freeing of a slave (Itani, 2015, p. 269).

[61] [Surah an-Nur (The Light), Verse 33] And let those who do not find the means to marry abstain, until God enriches them from His bounty. If any of your servants wish to be freed, grant them their wish, if you recognize some good in them. And give them of God's wealth which he has given you. And do not compel your girls to prostitution, seeking the materials of this life, if they desire to remain chaste. Should anyone compel them –after their compulsion, God is Forgiving and Merciful (Itani, 2015, p. 151).

and French colonies as well; whipping slaves was such an ordinary but cruel punishment that some minor offenses like stealing something worthless required at least one hundred lashes (Sylvester, 2000, pp. 93–95). In this respect, it would not be wrong to assert that the *Encyclopédie* had conceptualized the institution of slavery through freedom.

After this detailed clarification, a comparison can be made between al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* regarding their views on slavery. The Ikhwan divided society into two groups, often called the elites and the laity (XXXVII, p. 229), in line with the common Islamic approach to political thought (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 322–323). However, the Ikhwan preferred to include another social class between these two: slaves. By quoting Prophet Jesus, who characterized slaves as having an impure soul (XLIV, p. 29), believing that slaves could become free by gaining knowledge and wisdom—thus purifying their souls (IX, p. 237)—and recognizing that even slaves can become kings in this life (XXII, p. 162), it is clear that slavery is seen as a temporary state rather than a permanent one. That is why the Ikhwan advised slaves to carry out their duties without protest so they would not be considered horrible slaves (XLVI, p. 63). Similarly, while acknowledging the existence of slavery, the Ikhwan assigned a special position for slaves in their astrological chart, which aims to seek their well-being and aid them (LII, p. 259), except when a slave wishes to leave his master (LII: 247). Conversely, the *Encyclopédie* defines a free person as someone not in slavery (Boucher d'Argis, 1757b) and describes a slave as someone deprived of freedom and under a master's control (Boucher d'Argis, 1755d, p. 939). Slavery was considered against natural law (Jaucourt, 1765k); however, Europeans treated it as a commercial enterprise, capturing people from Africa and selling them to the American colonies (Diderot & Mallet, 1751, p. 769). At this point, it is easy to equate slaves with animals, as they could be bought and sold. In fact, the *Encyclopédie* viewed black slaves as inferior to white people (Formey, 1765, p. 76), which may have served to justify the slave trade by their contemporaries. Thus, both the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists accepted the existence of slavery, but the former saw it as a temporary situation, whereas the latter—whether intentionally or not—acknowledged its permanence.

In the Quran's thirteenth verse of Surah al-Hujurat, God claims that *he* had created humans as equal individuals in the form of males and females, so they may know each other.[62] The Ikhwan acknowledged this explanation and praised God for such a creation (XXII, p. 157).

[62] [Surah al-Hujurat (The Chambers), Verse 13] O people! We created you from a male and a female, and made you races and tribes, that you may know one another. The best among you in the sight of God is the most righteous. God is All-Knowing, Well-Experienced (Itani, 2015, p. 226).

However, a keen eye can easily grasp that there is an inevitable inequality between men and women from the perspective of the Ikhwan; this inclination shows itself in different parts of the entire text. For example, in a story told by the Ikhwan, the king asked a visitor from Khorasan to describe his country. After counting several geographical features of his country, the visitor's reply continued with praising the prolificacy and might of his countrymen; he said that their women were as strong as men, their men were as strong as camels, and their camels were as strong as mountains (XXII, p. 206). The ratio between men and women cannot be equal in this analogy, and that is why Ikhwan highlighted the role of women with God's words as *"women are croplands for men"*, which charges the existence of women with reproducing alone in the sense of the Ikhwan (XXIX, p. 49).[63] Women are cowardly, lowly in personality, seekers of low targets, and inclined to face a contemptuous and valueless fate (XXV, p. 303). In numerous passages of al-Rasa'il, women were equalized with the children, ignorant, fools, drunken, sinners, lunatics, etc., in addition to demons (XXII, p. 167; XXIII, p. 267; XXIX, pp. 52–53; XXX, p. 74; XXXI, p. 106). Women have weak cognizance, said the Ikhwan (VIII, p. 197), and they are apt to confuse men (XXXI, p. 142). This is why male children whom women raise show tendencies in their future lives to resemble women (IX, p. 210). The Ikhwan highlighted that this is why women should be corrected in their doings, especially for a peaceful family life; women are inclined to *"change their colors easily"* and are often excited. Men should govern their families with a specific custom they prefer and remain loyal to it. Women can realize that custom while treating their women with clemency so that they may not face moral corruption (L, p. 195).

Though the *Encyclopédie* has some mismatched thoughts on gender equality with the Ikhwan, its tone is milder. The Encyclopedists claimed that men and women are not equals in essence, but nature granted them equal advantages. For instance, men's traits were summarized with strength, majesty, courage, and reason, while women's traits were listed as grace, beauty, finesse, and sentiment (Desmahis, 1756, p. 472). This equality is also valid in the composition of bodies. By citing Louis Jean-Marie Daubenton's work, the *Encyclopédie* claimed that men's and women's bodies are alike except for the genital parts and volumes of some body parts, and Galen also approves of this. He claimed that the woman's womb finds its counterpart in men's scrotum; what is inside is now outside (Barthez, 1756, pp. 468–469). The *Encyclopédie* questions the status of women then, if everything is so equal, what might be the purpose of the

[63] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 223] Your women are cultivation for you; so approach your cultivation whenever you like, and send ahead of yourselves. And fear God, and know that you will meet Him. And give good news to the believers (Itani, 2015, p. 15).

ingrained notion that makes women inferior to men? The given answer revolves around the historical understandings and practices. Accordingly, societies had tailored a dress for women, and expected them to wear it; the more they wore it, the more secretive and mystic they became. Thus, men had preferred to generalize 'women' as one, instead of realizing they consist of different individuals; the cumulative social knowledge altered the nature of women (Desmahis, 1756, p. 472). That is, the notion shaped around the 'superiority' of men was a sum of people's customs, political systems, and religions (Barthez, 1756, p. 469). Women cannot succeed to the crown in some monarchies like France, or their testimonies in courts would not seem sufficient—extra women are needed to accept testimony as valid (Boucher d'Argis, 1756a). Women are considered vindictive creatures because they are weak, and the law of nature confirms that the weak shall be cruel (Desmahis, 1756, p. 472). A Hebrew proverb tells that the distaff shapes the entirety of a woman's skills, and Sophocles claimed that the most beautiful ornament of a woman is to remain silent (Barthez, 1756, p. 469). The *Encyclopédie* rejects these archaic comments; it is asserted that women are the principal ornaments of this life (Jaucourt, 1765z). However, positive laws of civilized nations, and the laws and customs of Europe tend to appoint men as the leader of families by considering them stronger in both body and mind; it is expected from women to obey men in domestic affairs, which was also mentioned in the Frederick [the Great's] Code of 1750 as well as in the Holy Bible where wife is seen as subject and husband is seen as master (Jaucourt, 1756d, p. 471). According to Plato's remark that men and women can do the same work equally well in numerous ways (Barthez, 1756, p. 469), the *Encyclopédie* supports Plato's stance and rejects general acceptance in Europe. Because such a master-subject relationship is against the equality principle of nature, making a generalization that men will always be stronger in body and mind is impossible, and the Bible's comments were practiced as positive law earlier, which are now replaced by civil law (Jaucourt, 1756d, p. 471). Women's minds form and develop earlier than men's minds (Boucher d'Argis, 1756a, p. 475), and as Christian Wolff had shown in his catalogue about famous women, they can produce intellectual works as proficient as men alongside other errands (Barthez, 1756, p. 469). Since marriage is essentially a contract, says the *Encyclopédie*, man and woman can mutually determine their reciprocal rights; no social or legal intervention is necessary. Gorgo of Lacedaemonians (niece of and wife to Leonidas), Mary I of England, Catherine the Great, and Isabella I of Castille prove that women can even rule entire countries, let alone families, either alone or jointly, and either in the form of moderate or despotic governments (Jaucourt, 1756d, p. 471). Concerning these comments, as well as because the *Encyclopédie* had both male and female audience and also authors, of which we understand that from the editorial remarks at the

beginning of Volume 6, saying *"[a] woman whom we do not have the honor of knowing sent us the articles falbala, fontange, and others"* (*Avertissement*, 1756, p. vi),[64] it is clear that the *Encyclopédie* had followed an egalitarian approach towards genders, in both theoretical and practical levels.

A summarizing table on their similarities and differences on the concept of equality can be given as follows:

TABLE 5. A comparison of equality in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

EQUALITY FOR AL-RASA'IL AND THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE		
THEMES	**SIMILARITIES**	**DIFFERENCES**
Essence and Value of Equality	Identified equality through value, exemplified through music	Mathematical explanation through ratio and proportion vs. Mental comparison
Equality at Birth	People are born as equals; inequality arises afterwards.	Equal in universal humanity, unequal in creation vs. Objective equality and subjective inequality
Natural Inequality	Natural inequality exists.	"God willed this way." vs. "Nature provided different skills in utilizing reason."
Social Classes and Bloodline	Social classes are required and functional.	Exalting bloodline and the lineage of prophets vs. Seeing nobility as an element for social balance, justice, and rights for equality
Slavery Institution	The institution of slavery exists.	A temporary situation for spiritual salvation vs. A permanent situation essentially against nature
Gender Equality	Questioned gender equality.	"Women are lower entities than men; they need to be controlled by men." vs. "Men and women are equals in nature; history created inequality between genders."

4.2.5. Concluding Remarks

With the formulations and comments above regarding the concept of equality, it would not be inaccurate to claim that neither the Ikhwan nor the Encyclopedists believe in the existence of equality among humankind. This idea becomes even clearer within the Islamic understanding. M. M. Pickthall's assessment of such an understanding—one that values all individuals as equals—is a futile effort that would automatically hinder the concept of

[64] *"Une Femme que nous n'avons pas l'honneur de connoître, nous a envoyé les articles FALBALA, FONTANGE, & autres"*. Here, *falbala* (1756) addresses pleated and scalloped strips of fabric, often used in women's clothes as ornaments, and *fontange* (1757) is a type of woman's headwear that was popular in the 17th century. According to Philipp Blom, these two articles were written by the sister-in-law of Jaucourt (Blom, 2005, p. 143).

humanity. That is why, instead of placing all hopes on interconnected concepts like equality, liberty, and fraternity, Islam prioritized fraternity more than the others. Since the Farewell Sermon of Prophet Muhammad in 632 C.E. emphasized fraternity among Muslims above all, and his focus on universal fraternity became the backbone of Islam over time, the Muslim intellectuals have placed special importance on this issue. Social inequalities persisted in the Muslim societies, and social hierarchies endured; however, these unfortunate but natural conditions were mitigated through Muslim fraternity (Pickthall, 2011, pp. 55–63). Still, most of these conclusions remain *wishful thinking*; they have little to no influence on politics. As Ibn Khaldun noted, as Muslim communities moved from primitive groups toward civilized societies, they favored their kin more than others. They established a fraternity within very narrow circles. Even in the Muslim cities, people seldom treat each other as equals or brothers; instead, they plot—mainly through marriages—to expand their familial circles, gaining influence naturally. As these circles grew, they focused on claiming political power, and eventually, the idea of fraternity's value disintegrated (İbn Haldun, 1996, pp. 311–315). This pattern is also evident in the Islamic sects; for example, ignoring divisions within the Shi'ite and Sunni groups for a moment, does it seem possible to speak of any equality or fraternity? Throughout history—covering not only the Medieval period but also modern times—bloody conflicts like the Ottoman-Safavid wars of the 16th–18th centuries, the 1987 Mecca Incident, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, and the 2014 Yemen civil war show that Ibn Khaldun's comments were not the whole story. His insights also influenced countries in the Muslim world. While claiming that establishing a constitutional foundation alone would end conflicts and ensure equality and fraternity is naïve, constitutions did give a sense of identity to fractured, complex Muslim communities by providing citizenship status. For example, the Turkish Republic's Constitution—in its Article 66—states that anyone holding Turkish citizenship is considered a Turk (*Anayasa*, 2019, p. 359). This inclusive citizenship model became a foundation for establishing equality and fraternity, despite the Turkish Republic being a secular state (*Anayasa,* 2019, p. 18). Conversely, the Islamic Republic of Iran—a theocratic state, established equality and fraternity through exclusionary articles in its constitution. Article 1 notes that Ayatollah al-Uzma Imam Khomeini was elected with 98.2% of the vote, and Article 2 states that God is the supreme sovereign. The inherent dignity of individuals can only be protected by an *imam,* and Article 3 rejects all forms of imperialism. Only collective cooperation can maintain Islamic fraternity (Constitutional Council, 2021). Biased interpretations of these arbitrary constitutional articles led to the execution of 497 Iranian citizens between February 1979 and June 1981 on anti-revolutionary charges, with the total rising to 8,000 between June 1981 and June 1985

(Abrahamian, 2020, p. 235); thus, fraternity was forcibly established. As a final example, Lebanon—a predominantly Arab country that is neither Muslim nor secular—formed its constitution based on the principle of equality among Christian, Muslim, and various ethnic groups. Article 24 of the Lebanese Constitution clearly states that Christians and Muslims will share governmental power equally and receive proportional political representation, along with other confessional and ethnic groups (Lebanese, 1995), which reflects the establishment of equality in the political realm by the hand of a constitution.

The constitutional movements served as anchors to define equality among individuals in politics, and the origins of these movements in the modern era can be traced back to two key declarations: the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, which recognized human beings as equal entities (Declaration, 1995, pp. 448–449), and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, which affirmed that people are equal in rights (Declaration, 1995a, p. 467). While individual equality was secured through constitutional laws on paper, social equality eventually came into focus. Given that no society has ever fully managed to establish a common ground between the ruler and the ruled by eradicating distinctions, regardless of how egalitarian the discourse may be (Singer, 2013, p. 127), Marx and Engels (2002, pp. 231–233) simplified this difference to the classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat, based on the inequalities related to wealth and labor, and argued that the proletariat was a revolutionary class. It was expected that this class would initiate a revolution to overthrow bourgeois dominance and ensure ultimate social equality. Although their predictions did not fully materialize in history, as seen in the October Revolution, this conceptualization of equality brought the ruler and the ruled closer together in terms of wealth distribution. Later, the idea of a social state emerged, where the sovereign is responsible for addressing the negative impacts of socioeconomic regulations, and citizens develop social solidarity with their fellow citizens. Its purpose is to determine each individual's position concerning equality and to maintain that position through social consensus based on practical benefits (Castel, 2017, p. 200). Since then, after these two landmark declarations, equality has extended beyond wealth and labor, encompassing various themes. In modern times, the concept of equality is often viewed as a spectrum, acknowledging that perfect equality is unachievable; thus, topics such as equal rights for citizens, anti-nepotism movements, equal access to healthcare and education, legal protections, post-colonial equality, access to clean water and food, environmental justice, digital equality, marriage equality for LGBTQ+ individuals, gender equality, and many others are included.

This section perhaps best concluded with a short poem from Melih Cevdet Anday, an eminent Turkish man of letters, who claimed that human beings can only be equal in their sleep in his poem titled "Equality" *(Eşitlik)*:

> When we sleep, we become equal
> No passion, no pride, no hope
> If you're cold, it warms you.
> Many have likened it to death
> "To dream, perhaps", said Hamlet,
> And what did Don Quixote mean:
> Dying isn't death, living isn't life (Anday, 1988).[65]

4.3. Conclusion

The main goal of this chapter was to analyze the concepts of morality and equality within the broad scope of societal ideas, using the Ikhwanian and Encyclopedic approaches; first separately, then comparatively. However, these concepts can often be summarized through key themes like definition, education, nature, hierarchy, will, and authority. Their presentation can be outlined as follows:

[65] *Uyuduk mu eşit oluruz / Ne tutku, ne gurur, ne umut / Üşüyorsan ısıtır seni. / Bir çoğu [sic.] ölüme benzetti / Belki de rüya görmek, dedi Hamlet, / Ya Don Quijote ne demek istedi: / Ölsen ölünmüyor, yaşasan yaşanmıyor.*

TABLE 6. A comparison of morality and equality (combined) in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

	MORALITY		EQUALITY		SUMMARY
	SIMILARITY	**DIFFERENCE**	**SIMILARITY**	**DIFFERENCE**	
DEFINITION	Unity of soul-body analogy, freedom in action	Religious and afterlife benefits vs. Secular and social benefits	Mathematical evaluation of equality through 'value'	God created as unequal vs. Socially constructed	The central structure of the 'human' is similar, but the purposes differ.
EDUCATION	Morality can be enhanced by education, turning behaviors into habits.	Spiritual purposes vs. Societal and practical purposes	Can be enhanced via knowledge and intellectual fraternity	Can elevate in religious hierarchy vs. Can provide social equality and democratization	Morality and equality can both be provided and enhanced through education
NATURE	Climate and geography have a direct impact on morality and character.	Astrological impacts vs. Physical and natural impacts	Acceptance of natural inequality between people	Astrological hierarchy vs. Scientific/physical hierarchy	Both accept the impact of nature on morality; they differ in their interpretations.
HIERARCHY	Acceptance of the natural existence of different levels of morality	Hierarchy through sacred statuses vs. Natural and social hierarchy	Social classes are functional necessities.	Bloodline and religious status vs. Social status and citizenship	Both texts highlight the necessity of hierarchy; their sources differ.
WILL	Moral behaviors are structured via choices.	Fate and astrology vs. Individual will	Humans are innately equal; the nature of life makes them unequal.	Rational and fatalist vs. Rational and human-centric	Both texts highlight the importance of human will; their focal points differ.
AUTHORITY	Acceptance of the role of leaders and rulers in ameliorating the morality level of society	Differ in attributing the role to prophets and religious authorities	They are responsible for providing equality and justice.	Religious elites are important figures vs. Criticizing religious elites	The role of authority is grounded upon different philosophical bases in both texts.

In Table 6, in the first row titled DEFINITION, the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédistes* discuss similar concepts of morality and equality. The Ikhwan define morality as the unity of soul and body: the soul decides, the body executes. The *Encyclopédie* follows a similar approach; morality is the sum of actions humans perform with free will, which addresses the integrity of the soul and body. Regarding equality, both texts focus on value; this concept has an innate and close relationship with the larger structure of mathematical proportion. The Ikhwan illustrate this proportionality through the strings of a lute, while the *Encyclopédistes*

view equality as a mental process, emphasizing this idea through the notion of 'harmony' in music. Nevertheless, the two texts diverge in their central purposes. From the perspective of al-Rasa'il, the ideas of morality and equality are primarily situated within a religious, spiritual, and post-death (afterlife) framework; the Ikhwan emphasize this view. Conversely, the *Encyclopédie* aims to improve everyday life and social status through a more secular and societal perspective. Both texts agree that humans are fundamentally similar in structure but differ in their objectives, which leads to similar definitions but distinct descriptions in each text.

The theme of EDUCATION is authentic; both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* highlighted the role of education in shaping the ideals of morality and equality within the larger welcoming fabric of society. The Ikhwan believed that human beings are born with an average moral standard; however, this can be elevated through education: education transforms virtuous behaviors into habits. Likewise, the *Encyclopédie* emphasized the importance of basic education; it advocated the view that education can shape a person's morality: youth, in particular, can raise the moral standards of society through education. In this scenario, education is vital for harmonizing individuals with social practices and routines. Regarding the concept of equality, the Ikhwan discussed knowledge as a means to reduce inequalities within society—sharing knowledge would make human beings equal, at least to some degree. The Encyclopedists focused on the democratizing role of education; providing the masses access to education could eliminate intellectual inequalities within society. In summary, both texts saw education as a fundamental tool for raising morality and promoting societal equality; their approaches differ. The Ikhwan emphasized spiritual growth, while the *Encyclopédistes* prioritized practical benefits and democratization.

We live in NATURE, and so did the *Encyclopédistes* and the Ikhwan. What these two groups of thinkers did was to evaluate the concepts of morality and equality within the framework of nature. Both texts advocated that geography and climate directly impact human character and moral attitude. The Ikhwan, for example, strongly supported the idea of seven climates, with the best ones residing in the fourth, where body and soul are in the most harmonious state. The *Encyclopédie* agrees by adding two more climates, which intensified the debate. Despite this, the influence of nature varies in both texts. For the Ikhwan, astrological influences shape human character and equality, giving meaning to nature within a spiritual and astrological framework. The *Encyclopédistes*, however, dismiss this, viewing it as an 'outdated and irrational' discipline that cannot replace a scientific, physical, and rational foundation. To sum up, both texts fully recognize nature's impact on human character and social structure;

however, they differ in their interpretation of nature: the Ikhwan emphasize spiritual and astrological elements, while the *Encyclopédistes* evaluate these concepts through a physical and scientific lens.

In the HIERARCHY row, the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists viewed central elements of social structure through hierarchy. Both groups accepted that societies consist of various classes, which is inevitable; however, they believe these classes are essential for maintaining order and stability. The Ikhwan believed that social hierarchy aligns with the natural order of creation, which makes its source divine; different moral and social classes represent a divine arrangement. The *Encyclopédie*, on the other hand, argued that class differences are shaped by social contracts and the concept of citizenship; the proper functioning of these classes is explained through laws and social norms. At this point, the texts diverge: the Ikhwan support their views on hierarchy with references to religious status, bloodline, and spiritual supremacy, while the *Encyclopédie*'s explanation relies on citizenship patterns and social agreements. Both texts recognize hierarchy as a necessary element for social order; however, their origins differ: al-Rasa'il emphasizes divine and spiritual sources, whereas the *Encyclopédie* emphasizes social order and citizenship.

In the theme of WILL, both texts emphasize human will and freedom of choice as central to human actions within the broader context of morality and equality; human will is regarded as a crucial factor in shaping behaviors and social situations. The Ikhwan pointed out that moral behaviors are formed through conscious choices; however, they also note that these choices are closely linked to fate and astrological influences. The Encyclopedists, on the other hand, clearly rejected this view; according to them, will is attributed solely to human reason, making it a product of an individual and human-centric process. A similar perspective is seen in their approach to the concept of equality. The Ikhwan evaluated equality and social statuses in society based on knowledge and spiritual competence, though fatalist elements still play a role. The *Encyclopédie* associated equality with people's capacity to use knowledge; instead of fatalism, the text emphasized human reason. In essence, both texts valued human will but differed in their methodology: The Ikhwan integrated will with fate and some astrological factors. At the same time, the Encyclopedists favored a human-centered and rational explanation of will.

Lastly, in the AUTHORITY row, the Ikhwan and *Encyclopédistes* highlighted the role of authority in shaping morality and societal equality. However, the Ikhwan particularly emphasized religious leaders and prophets in shaping people's morality; the political authorities

should improve their morality under spiritual and divine guidance. Conversely, the *Encyclopédie* viewed the sources of authority in secular governance methods, social contracts, and educational institutions. Naturally, morality and equality in society can only be achieved and strengthened through these secular figures; the authority of religious elites is often questioned and criticized. From this perspective, it can be said that both texts preferred to explain the role of authority through different philosophical lenses. The Ikhwan attributed this role to religious leaders, while the Encyclopedists relied on rational and legal institutions.

In summary, both texts viewed human nature similarly, which was evident in how they described morality and equality. Although they started from an everyday basis, their perspectives and conclusions differed. The Ikhwan interpreted these ideas through religious, astrological, and fatalist lenses, while the Encyclopedists favored a more secular, rationalist, and human-centered approach. Essentially, these two widely recognized concepts, morality and equality, were understood through their distinct philosophical and cultural backgrounds.

The next chapter will discuss political tenets such as sovereign[ty] and justice through al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* texts.

CHAPTER 5

A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL TENETS

The political principles examined and analyzed in this chapter are directly related to the concept of the state. In this regard, two closely connected political tenets at the state level—the broader concept of 'sovereign' and the concept of 'justice', in their both psychological, philosophical, and administrative aspects—are discussed. This chapter follows the same structure as the previous two, addressing each concept, sovereign and justice: lexicographical definitions are provided to identify the fuzzy sets, followed by a chronologically organized section of comments and formulations that reveal what the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists knew about these concepts from their predecessors. The concluding statements of the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédie* on these concepts are discussed extensively but separately, a comparison section highlights their similarities and differences, and the influence of their ideas on subsequent generations is briefly examined. A general assessment of the entire chapter concludes these debates in the final section.

5.1. Sovereign

It would not be wrong to assert that the world has been experiencing various types of sovereignty since the emergence of political entities. Therefore, both the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists had heard of concepts related to sovereignty, such as democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, tyranny, republic, etc. However, one should *ipso facto* bear in mind that both of these intellectual groups lived under the governance of 'one' sovereign man. The title of that sole sovereign varies, from monarch to autocrat, from sultan to king, from tyrant to despot; the nature of their ruling style and the established customs in naming shape the attributed titles. The term of rule, in this sense, is characterized as to control and/or to be in charge of a country in its lexical meaning (Procter, 1995, p. 1239) while ruler is seen as someone who has this authority in their hands (Procter, 1995, p. 1240). Moving from this point, authority was defined as *"the moral or legal right or ability to control"* words, accrediting this ability to one person or people (Procter, 1995, p. 80). Sovereign, therefore, is identified as *one* person with the highest power in a country, which might embody as a king or queen, whereas sovereignty is

characterized with ruling independently (Procter, 1995, p. 1381). King, then, is defined with *"a male ruler of a country, who holds this position because of his royal birth"* (Procter, 1995, p. 780), and queen—apart from an exclusive definition over her marriage to king, was characterized with exact words, except for its beginning with *"a woman"* phrase (Procter, 1995, p. 1161). Similarly, the 'govern' verb is equated with 'rule', and government is defined as *"[…] the group of people who control a country"* (Procter, 1995, p. 614).

As is evident, three elements come forward: the ruler, the ruled, and the country. These three items represent the political unity since Max Weber (1946, p. 78) made the definition of state with them as follows: *"[…] monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory"*. It might be a risky but nonetheless an enlightening attempt to make an analogy on these elements by resembling the country to a horse, the ruler to a rider, and the ruled to a carriage. In this respect, the ruler often chooses to assess whether s/he desires to hitch the carriage to the horse or ride it individually. Over such an analogy, another question arises: Who gave the horse to the rider? With the assistance of this analogy, and by remaining within the context, three separate fuzzy sets can be determined. The first set concerns the source of sovereignty; therefore, interpretations like divine bestowing, public transfer, usurpation, conquest, and other related comments can be put inside this set. The second set, on the other hand, focuses on how the ruler prefers to utilize the horse, which examines their style of governance. Thus, this set includes terms like sultan, king, tyrant, despot, dictator, cruel ruler, philosopher-king, etc. The main interest of the final set is to review the status of the carriage, that is, how well it was maintained and how happy its passengers are. This set, *per se*, contains both internal and external factors that have an influence on the ruled, from being oppressed to the taxation policies they face.

These three sets, in addition to earlier explanations, guide both the Ikhwan's and the *Encyclopédie*'s approaches to the concept of sovereign.

5.1.1. Conceptual Framework of Sovereign

The concepts of sovereign and sovereignty have seen various changes over time; several definitions and formulations have been made. Plato, for instance, though he did not address sovereign in its original meaning, divided the concept into two: the lawgiver and the ruler. The responsibility of a lawgiver is to establish a state (city) and the laws that constitute it. He claimed that Apollo is the sole deity who made the first, the most important, and the most

beautiful laws. Lawgivers mirror what Apollo did in his laws, follow the path of the ancients, and legislate with the light of these two subjects. That is how the state was founded (Plato, 2007, pp. 124–125). After that, the philosophers have to be the rulers according to Plato, if it is desired that the state should persevere (Plato, 2007, pp. 169–170). Because philosophers know better and more, unite ideas and knowledge in the form of sciences, they love things as a whole without favoring one piece over another, and are honest. This is why Plato preferred the philosophers to become the guardians of states (Plato, 2007, pp. 179–181). Though these individuals are the most intelligent beings in their societies, states do not utilize them in politics. Plato compares this situation to the relationship between the shipowner and sailors. Accordingly, sailors beg the shipowner one by one to make them declare themselves as the captain; sadly, none of them possesses the ability to sail a ship. Thus, a dilemma occurs, because whoever was declared as the rest of the crew immediately attacked the captain. Therefore, the ship, representing the state, cannot proceed in such a chaotic scenario. However, the job should be given to the right person, says Plato; the right person never asks for it (Plato, 2007, pp. 183–185). Aristotle, on the other hand, claims that the state is a natural entity while human beings are innately social and political animals. His fall on the necessity of the state even prioritizes it against the individual and family. However, this inclination does not mean that Aristotle favors a totalitarian state which puts the interests and rights of the state first, opposite to the interests and rights of the individual (Arslan, 2007, pp. 278–280). This is why Aristotle approximated the concept of sovereignty to the state, and evaluated the characteristics of it over the number of people who hold the authority to govern. In this case, these types were categorized as one ruler, a few rulers, and the multitude of society. The government type with one ruler has two forms: monarchy and tyranny; the monarchy's ruling method aims for the common benefit of society, while tyranny looks for the interest of the ruler alone. The government type that focuses on ruling authority of a few people comes in two forms as aristocracy and oligarchy; aristocracy values the merit and virtue of the 'best' people in a given society by shifting them the right to rule while oligarchy is its corrupted version which seeks maximizing interests of its members alone—the rich in particular. The government type that focuses on the majority of a society shows itself in two forms in the perspective of Aristotle as democracy and polity; democracy is the government style of the poor according to him while polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, because, it brings the rich of oligarchy and the poor of democracy together (Aristotle, 1998, pp. 77–79, 114–116). From this perspective, Aristotle claimed that monarchy, aristocracy, and polity are the best government types, depending on the number of rulers. Therefore, for Aristotle, societies that can create a superior family amongst themselves should

opt for monarchy, virtuous societies that can produce free people that possess the ability to rule should be governed by aristocracy, and societies that carry warrior features with which have the characteristic of both to rule and to be ruled within should favor the polity government type (Aristotle, 1998, p. 99).

The Stoic philosophy greatly influenced the Roman way of ruling, as seen in the works of well-known Stoic philosophers like Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and many others known for their personal connections to the state mechanism. The primary component of Stoicism is common nature, of which followers of this philosophy believed that common nature shows itself in the form of reason, and every human being takes their share from this reason. Thus, the rational way of living is to live harmoniously with nature. In this respect, societies follow the same laws of nature, be as they may divine or rational laws; this is why it would be better for the entire humanity to be governed by one universal state, which comes as a universal society that can even find a proper place for the gods within (Arslan, 2008, pp. 414–416).[1] That is how Seneca characterized the Golden Age of Greece, where wise men ruled at the beginning; their duty was to rule the society alone, not to turn into kings. However, corruption prevailed, and tyrants emerged; people with wisdom had to intervene in the situation, and Solon managed to secure harmony with the laws he legislated (Seneca, 1969, p. 163). He claimed that the twenty-seven-year-long Peloponnesian War had caused Athens to yield to the rule of thirty tyrants, and this ruling system did not hesitate to kill Socrates, whose life had always been in hardships (Seneca, 1969, p. 192). What Seneca did here by giving these historical examples is to remark on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Similarly, Cicero highlighted that the rulers are simply custodians of the ruling authority; thus, their job is to prioritize people's interests in their actions (Cicero, 2020, p. 39). This is why the first thing a ruler should be aware of is knowing their authority rights and not abusing them. Because, Cicero adds, it is known that the most ill trait of a ruler is greed (Cicero, 2020, pp. 102–104). As can be seen, the Stoics saw the ruling business as an essential interaction with the people, and this understanding prevailed after Rome turned into an empire. It is often seen that the greatest contribution Rome had made to humanity is the inception of the concept of empire, and its ruling system was devised by Octavius, who then changed his name to Caesar Augustus (Roberts, 1997, p. 65). Augustus had preferred to transform the republic into an imperial monarchy; however, such a concentration of power in the hands of one person did not wipe out the institutions inherited

[1]. This *Weltanschauung* of the Stoics alone may explain the centuries-long Roman stubbornness in controlling the known and worthy world, going so far as to instill *Pax Romana* around the Mediterranean in particular.

from the republic. It was a pragmatic transformation for Augustus, but then, the emperor was still considered a servant to his people; that is why Augustus considered himself *princeps civitatis*, the first citizen. Though the emperors were sacralized after Caesar's death in 44 B.C.E., and this situation had become the imperial reflection of the Roman religious life in time, Roman political life had managed to keep the voting rights of citizens intact (Reux, 2006, pp. 21–23).

Although establishing a connection between the emperor and Roman religion was the main goal, several emperors converted to Christianity after Constantine the Great. Augustine praised their decisions and called them blessed. These blessings did not come in the form of long-lasting reigns, peaceful deaths, conquering enemies, or efficiently suppressing revolts. Pagan emperors also received these graces; however, the Christian emperors of Rome received God's mercy in *his* kingdom and these earthly benefits. Augustine sincerely believed that God is the sole sovereign, and rulers are mortal. They rule on behalf of God in this world, as ministers, with their attentive focus on administering justice, being merciful, not seeking revenge, and being generous (Augustine, 2008, pp. 296–297). Considering the fact that Augustine had taken his inspiration for penning these words from the Bible, his comments can indeed be verified within this paradigm by inspecting some verses. For instance, the Old Testament claims that God has a kingdom in the heavens (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 693),[2] and *he* is the sole owner of both Earth and Heaven; thus, everything belongs to *him* and everything comes from *him* as being the absolute ruler (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 503).[3] Indeed, as mentioned in the Psalms, God owns the kingdoms and is the ruler of all nations (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 641).[4] Therefore, the kings on earth rule only by the approval of God (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 730),[5] and only God can assign kings to rule as well as *he* has the ability to remove them from their thrones if *he* desires to (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 1008).[6] As it was clearly stated in the twelfth chapter of 1 Samuel, the Israelites asked God to transform them into a nation like those they saw in their lives, and therefore, God appointed Saul as a king over them (Holy Bible

[2] [Psalms 103:19] Jehovah has established his throne in the heavens, And his kingdom rules over all.
[3] [1 Chronicles 29:11–12] [11] Thine, O Jehovah, is the greatness and the power and the glory and the victory and the majesty; for all that is in the heavens and in the earth [is thine]; thine is the kingdom, O Jehovah, and thou art exalted as head above all. [12] Both riches and honor come of thee, and thou rulest over all; and in thy hand is power and might; and in thy hand it is to make great, and to give strength to all.
[4] [Psalms 22:28] For the kingdom is Jehovah's, And he is ruler among the nations.
[5] [Proverbs 8:15–16] [15] By me kings reign, And princes decree justice. [16] By me princes rule, And nobles, all the judges of the earth.
[6] [Daniel 2:21] […] and he changes the times and the seasons; he removes kings, and sets up kings; he gives wisdom to the wise, and knowledge to the intelligent.

[The Old Testament], 1913, p. 331).[7] The supremacy of God's traits as being the utmost sovereign had also found its resonance in the New Testament, albeit the role of Prophet Jesus was underlined occasionally, if not constantly. For example, it was mentioned that God, Christ's father, gave him the entire authority of Heaven and Earth (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 48).[8] In the same vein, the New Testament openly declares that everything, including thrones and crowns, was created by God alone (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 245).[9] Therefore, it is only natural to expect the right to rule is bestowed upon sovereigns by God, and this argument shows itself in two forms: first, God claims that rulers on earth are *his* proxies who are charged with implementing *his* will on earth, and second, they have all the authorities in the world for enforcing justice in God's stead (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 202).[10]

The Quran does not favor one governance style over another, nor recommends one. However, Muslim jurists and scholars believe that there has to be a ruler above society; it was seen as a prime necessity. That necessity had become mandatory in time; so intense that, having a ruler was considered as *fard al-kifayah* upon the Muslims, meaning, when a sufficient number of people perform the divine task structured by God, the entire society is regarded as fulfilling that duty (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 128). Bernard Lewis (1988, pp. 43–44) quotes a *hadith* which he believes is a false one, as *"After me, there will be caliphs; and after the caliphs, amīrs;*[11] *and after the amīrs, kings; and after the kings, tyrants…"*. Though it is a forged one, he values the ranking of sovereigns in this *hadith*, of which the caliph has always been placed at the top in the Muslim community. This word, caliph, first emerged in a text in the 6th Century's Arabia in terms of a sovereign, which initially addressed a viceroyship post, and transformed into a meaning of 'successor' in time, It was employed in two different places in the Quran,

[7] [1 Samuel 12:13] And now behold the king whom ye have chosen, whom ye demanded; and, behold, Jehovah has set a king over you.
[8] [Matthew 28:18] And Jesus came to them and spoke to them saying, All authority was given to me in heaven and on earth.
[9] [Colossians 1:16] […] because in him were all things created, in the heavens, and on the earth, the visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominions, or rulers, or authorities; all things have been created through him, and for him.
[10] [Romans 13:1-4] [1] Let every soul submit himself to the [civil] authorities that are over him. For there is no authority but from God; and those that exist have been appointed by God. [2] So that he that sets himself against the authority, resists the ordinance of God; and they that resist will receive to themselves condemnation. [3] For rulers are not terror to the good work, but to the evil. And dost thou wish not to fear the authority? Do that which is good, and thou wilt have praise from him; [4] for he is God's minister do thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, fear, for he bears, not the sword in vain; for he is God's minister, an avenger for wrath to him that does evil.
[11] The corresponding word for *amīr* in English falls in-between commander and prince. "Leader" word would probably be the most convenient choice.

referencing Prophet Adam[12] and Prophet David *(Dawud)*[13] separately. The caliph word used to address the sovereign is not a spiritual but a political tenure (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 136), similar to *imam*; both are employed to identify the topmost ruler of the state in the Islamic sense of politics (Bağdatlı, 2018, p. 143). Because the Islam accepts God as the ultimate sovereign and ruler of both worlds, which was mentioned as early as the second verse of the entire Quran—the first, if we exclude *basmala* (Itani, 2015, p. 1),[14] and also bolsters this closing with one of the longest, most venerated, and most exalted verses in the Quran titled *Ayat al-Kursi* (Verse of Throne) that indicates God's throne encompasses everything. *He* owns everything (Itani, 2015, p. 18).[15] Concerning these features of God, it would only be normal to estimate that the sovereigns on earth receive their rights to rule from *him*, similar to what the former versions of Abrahamic monotheism asserted in both the Old Testament and the New Testament. Indeed, as it was openly declared in the Surah Ali 'Imran that God is the owner of sovereignty, and only *he* is capable of giving it to anyone *he* desires, as well as taking it back (Itani, 2015, p. 22).[16] That is why the Quran mentions that God expects people to obey *him*, *his* prophets, and rulers in their lives, if they wish to receive salvation (Itani, 2015, p. 36). These verses were interpreted as attributing a divine characteristic to the sovereigns on earth, and this comment had transformed itself into *Zillullah fī'l-'Ālam* (God's shadow on earth) title, which was attributed to the rulers afterwards. Such a metaphor in naming came out of a fusion of the Quranic verses and some mythological narratives: God's preference of creating human beings in *his* image, and the belief that *huma* bird will bring luck and authority to the ones its shadow falls upon created this title. Therefore, calling rulers with the title *"God's shadow on earth"* addresses a divine transfer of

[12] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 30] When Lord said to the angels, "I am placing a successor on earth". They said, "Will You place in it someone who will cause corruption in it and shed blood, while we declare Your praises and sanctify You?". He said, "I know what you do not know" (Itani, 2015, p. 2). Bernard Lewis had given the wrong verse here as if it were Verse 28; however, that verse does not include anything about the word caliph (*khalifah*, خَلِيفَة), neither in wording nor in meaning. The intended verse has to be Verse 30.

[13] [Surah Saad (Saad), Verse 26] O David, We made you a ruler in the land, so judge between the people with justice, and do not follow desire, lest it diverts you from God's path. Those who stray from God's path will have a painful punishment, for having ignored the Day of Account (Itani, 2015, p. 197). The word "ruler" here is *khalifah* in the original text of the Quran. Lewis, however, had given this verse as Verse 257. Surah Saad, on the other hand, possesses only 88 verses. It has to be a typo; the intended verse has to be Verse 26. Besides, Lewis was mistaken in mentioning that the word *khalifah* was mentioned in two places in the Quran. The same word in closer meanings can be traced in like 6:165 (Surah al-An'am) and 27:62 (Surah an-Naml) as well (Uludağ, 1997, p. 299).

[14] [Surah al-Fatihah (The Opening), Verse 2] Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds.

[15] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 255] God! There is no except He, the Living, the Everlasting. Neither slumber overtakes Him, nor sleep. To Him belongs everything in the heavens and everything on earth. Who is he that can intercede with Him except with His permission? He knows what is before them, and what is behind them; and they cannot grasp any of His knowledge, except as He wills. His Throne extends over the heavens and the earth, and their preservation does not burden Him. He is the Most High, the Great.

[16] [Surah Ali 'Imran (Family of Imran), Verse 26] Say, "O God, Owner of Sovereignty. You grant sovereignty to whom You will, and You strip sovereignty from whom you will. You honor whom you will, and You humiliate whom you will. In your hand is all goodness. You are Capable of all things".

sovereignty, in which they are expected to follow God's rules in the Islamic political understanding (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 162–163).

The archaic stress on the virtue of a sovereign had experienced a redefinition process with Niccolò Machiavelli; he invented a new identification of what a sovereign should possess within: *virtù*. According to this, the ancients valued the luck of sovereigns in coming to rule; Christianity, on the other hand, closed the doors for those who sought to enhance their luck (Skinner, 2017, pp. 46–47). Thus, Machiavelli tried to reconcile luck and right to rule for the sovereigns (Skinner, 2017, pp. 51–52). He claimed that the source of luck—that is, Fortuna, the goddess—is a woman; thus, the prince has to force her, even to beat her, to assert domination over his fortune (Machiavelli, 2020, p. 132). This is how the concept of *virtù* comes to the stage: a prince who seeks to become sovereign should create his own luck; that is the essence of sovereignty (Skinner, 2017, p. 44). Machiavelli advises princes to claim sovereignty, essentially inverting the concept of morality within the realm of politics. According to this, humans are innately evil and self-interested entities; thus, a prince has to follow a pragmatic path in his dealings if he desires to claim sovereignty or to maintain his ruler status (Skinner, 2017, pp. 71–73). A prince's mind should always be occupied with the forthcoming battles (Machiavelli, 2020, p. 90), and he should not be worried about being loved by his people; being feared is a better option for a sovereign, but it should not turn into being despised by his subjects (Machiavelli, 2020, pp. 98–99). Prince should consult to his advisors but only when he asks their opinion (Machiavelli, 2020, p. 126), he should make people to believe he is wise (Machiavelli, 2020, p. 120), he should do injustices immediately but do favors slowly and gradually (Machiavelli, 2020, p. 71), he should make certain regulations that slide in-between rewarding and punishing for preventing his officers to receive bribes (Machiavelli, 2017, p. 158), he should not hesitate cheating in his battles when necessary (Machiavelli, 2017, p. 499). He should remember that if Fortuna does not favor him, he can always create his own fortune by cheating (Machiavelli, 2017, pp. 264–265).[17] Giovanni Botero, on the other hand, rejected Machiavelli's comments, redefined the concept of *virtù*, and introduced morality and virtue to the sovereign once again. He claims that conserving sovereignty is more important than seeking an expansionist policy; it is easier to acquire it by force, but wisdom is needed to preserve it, which is an excellent *virtù* according to Botero (2017, p. 7). Both love and reputation are the

[17] The medieval European tradition of monarchy valued two types of kings: the king as a mortal individual who holds political power, and the kingship as an office—representing the monarchy itself. The well-known motto of *"King is dead! Long live the king!"* perfectly illustrates this concept: the previous king is gone, but the kingship continues with a new king (Kantorowicz, 1957, pp. 411–413). Machiavelli's advice here addresses the mortal king (or prince, in truth) who seeks to claim the kingship—essentially, the throne.

*virtù*s a king has to have, but reputation surpasses love since love is a mediocre *virtù* while reputation requires excellence in it (Botero, 2017, p. 14). Because it is the reputation that subjects look for in the sovereign so that they can obey him. This is also valid for the celestial objects; inferior ones mimic the movements of the superiors. Not a single entity in nature obeys something inferior in reputation, and Pope Dionysius, Titus Livius, and Aristotle agree with this notion. According to Botero, excellence in *virtù* of a prince comes in two forms as absolute and partial; the mediocrity level determines their status. Love as a *virtù*, in this sense, can be acquired only by being useful to others; well-known traits like being kind and merciful grant this. Reputation, on the other hand—as a *virtù* once more, requires a high soul and strong body, bravery, excellence in military and politics, perseverance, sharp mind, common sense, and valor (Botero, 2017, pp. 15–18). Though these two ideas commonly shaped the notion of sovereignty during the Renaissance, it was Jean Bodin who evaluated the concept of sovereignty as the precursor of their modern identifications. Bodin believes that anarchy is worse than being ruled by a tyrant, and he had penned his *Six Books of the Commonweale* to save France; thus, he was looking for a practical solution, and his main methodology was implementing a natural and legal approach to the concept of sovereignty. He thought that society was a creation of nature, and God had given us reason. *He* expects us to love each other, and this is the central theme of being a good individual, consequently, a good citizen (Lewis, 2006, pp. 7–9). Thus, there has to be a king above all other interest groups within a society to maintain peace by loving each other in the form of *national* unity (Lewis, 2006, p. 10). It is understandable since France was witnessing some serious violent activities in the 16th century, either in the form of civil wars or some religious and sectarian massacres like the one carried out against Huguenots in 1572 (King, 1974, pp. 52–53). Thus, Bodin explained the concept of sovereign with a deductive method, and attached the concept of sovereignty to the state with *a* sovereign, which made him an absolutist nonetheless, for the sake of restoring order (King, 1974, pp. 54–55). Though Machiavelli had accepted sovereigns manifested either as republics or princes (Machiavelli, 2020, p. 39), Bodin claimed that sovereignty is certain and indivisible (Franklin, 2006, p. 21). However, the prince, in his argument, is subject to the laws he enacted as well as the natural ones, of which such a limitation cannot be seen in the nature (Lewis, 2006, pp. 10–11); thus, princes are nothing more than mere rulers under the sovereignty of God, the creator of nature and human beings (Lewis, 2006, p. 13).

Thomas Hobbes disagreed with Bodin on society as being a natural creation; in contrast, he claimed it was an artificial institution. Moving from the same problem as witnessing chaos

in his own country, Hobbes solved the problem of sovereignty by creating a mortal god. According to him, people were living in a chaotic environment freely where the strong had the right to kill the weak, and they decided to come together by submitting their rights to punish others to a higher authority, that is sovereign, or with his preferred name, *Leviathan* (Duignan, 2013, pp. 73–76). Thus, this sovereign became superior to the others and had an indivisible authority; therefore, sharing *his* power with no other political entity, which means an absolute sovereign. With this formulation, Hobbes had shifted the source of sovereignty from God[s] to human beings, which makes it secular in this sense (Reill & Wilson, 2004, p. 274). The superiority of the sovereign is certain in his comments; the sovereign has no obligation to another, which makes the consent of society and the force of the sovereign equally valuable. The existence of one does not *ipso facto* introduce another; a master-servant relationship is required between the sovereign and subjects. This relationship, in the formulations of Hobbes, goes by a mutual understanding and obligation: the sovereign provides the sustainability of lives, and subjects obey the commands of this secular god (King, 1974, pp. 230–232). Baruch Spinoza, on the other hand, does not follow an absolutist tendency in his formulations. Though the rights of sovereign are always absolute by the very nature of sovereignty, it must be remembered that *the* social contract, which was established by the common will of individuals is not based upon giving all the rights they initially possess; people had submitted their rights to do as they please alone, which is liberty in its original sense. Thus, the sovereign should set the boundaries at the outset, especially on the limitations of individual freedom, so that people can know what kind of acts are seen as problematic in the eyes of the sovereign. Still, these are only valid for the 'ordinary' sovereigns; the corrupted ones are out of this context for Spinoza. He believes that arbitrary decisions made by the hand of a sovereign's absolute power make him corrupt, which would eventually cause a state to collapse entirely (Balibar, 2010, pp. 41–45). John Locke, another champion of social contract theory, established his contract on the concept of private property. It was a realm where perfect liberty was being experienced before the contract. Still, when private property came to the stage, a necessity arose to establish a sovereign entity to protect the private property (Locke, 2012, pp. 81–82). The sovereign, in this scenario, *may* be in different forms like democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy; making laws is the central theme here (Locke, 2012, pp. 85–86). This legislative power, therefore, whether it consists of one or many, does not have the right to harm its people's lives or wealth arbitrarily. Because a sovereign does not claim more than what *he* had before the initiation of the contract, including *his* rights, which introduces some limitations to the sovereign in the Lockean sense—limitations set by the natural law concerning public benefit. Therefore, a sovereign cannot

become a judge; *he* may legislate, but there are magistrates who administer justice within the parameters of institutionalized jurisdiction (Locke, 2012, pp. 88–90). In addition to these, a sovereign cannot transfer *his* right to legislate to a third party (Locke, 2012, p. 93). This shows that Locke recommended an early version of the separation of powers while restricting the sovereign's authority through laws of nature.

David Hume's approach to the concept of sovereign is more practical than theoretical; he explained the idea based on his observations in Britain. According to him, laws are the foundations of security and happiness for a society; however, the origin of sovereigns predates the laws. Still, once they are established in a society, they cannot be eliminated unless that society is destroyed. This is how the art of ruling first emerged in free cities and was maintained in monarchies. This art provides mutual security and benefits both the sovereign and the people. In civil monarchies, the prince has unlimited authority; people entrust him with ruling powers to protect their property, and he assigns the administration of justice to magistrates (Hume, 1987, pp. 124–125). Therefore, for Hume, it is safe to say that governments are constituted upon three principles: public interest, ruling right, and property rights. Some additional pillars could be seen as suitable, but their impact would be secondary in importance; the prince's virtue and public love towards him can be counted amongst them, but they do not emerge at the beginning; instead, they are some traits that are acquired *en route* (Hume, 1987, p. 34). Philosophers tend to claim that everyone is born equally, but people develop an obligation and allegiance towards the prince for the promise he had given. It is claimed that breaking this promise shatters the allegiance link; however, that is an imaginary situation for Hume. Because princes see their subjects as properties, it is people's consideration of themselves that they know they were born into an obligation (Hume, 1987, pp. 469–470). This is how, Tory supporters tried to legitimize sovereignty by claiming it comes from God while Whig supporters claimed its essence rests within a social contract (Hume, 1987, pp. 466–467); however, Hume adds, even the limited sovereignty in Britain, which has a separation of powers principle in effect, carries three vital problems in it: [1] jurisdiction is unable to solve the conflicts between the sovereign and people—only softens them, [2] the crown has enormous influence over the government, and [3] military power is at the disposal of the crown entirely (Hume, 1987, p. 527). However, Voltaire praises the system that Hume criticized. Still, according to him, this harmony between the king, aristocrats, and laity was not always like this. William the Conqueror, for instance, was a tyrant; he ruled with an iron fist. He was so cruel that lighting a fire or a candle at homes after nightfall was punished by death. Nevertheless, time passed, and

the fights between petty tyrants under the name of lords and barons had forced the crown to become dependent on them with the declaration of *Magna Carta*. Though its articles did not mention anything about the House of Commons, it gradually became more powerful over time. Voltaire adds that it is inferior in dignity to the upper house, but it is more powerful in exercising sovereignty over laws. When a bill passes from the lower house and moves to the upper, the House of Lords has no right to alter its content; it is either accepted or rejected. If it is accepted, the king has to sign it. This is why, Voltaire claims, this switch from tyranny to division of sovereignty brought peace and welfare to the British laity: peasants do not wear wooden sandals anymore, they eat white bread, they can dress well, they can cover the expenses of the maintenance of their homes, and they can easily increase the number of livestock they possess (Voltaire, 1995, pp. 32–36). In truth, Voltaire resembles sovereignty to a glittering chain, which ties the sovereign and the happiness of the people. The glitters coming from this chain are often confused with the perception that they radiate from the sovereign *himself*; however, and even if *he* carries some good traits and abilities within *himself, he* must remember that these glittering features do not belong to *him* but some entrusted virtues (Voltaire, 1802, p. 133). Therefore, a sovereign must act in accordance with this clarification and must not fall into the pit of atheism, nor should *his* ministers (Voltaire, 1802, p. 27). Because a sovereign cannot usurp God's sovereignty, especially the authority to take life, which is solely God's unquestionable right (Voltaire, 1802, p. 213). Just as a physician cannot kill *his* patient for not listening to advice about following the prescribed diet, a prince has no right to kill *his* subjects simply because they do not think as the way *he* does (Voltaire, 1802, p. 51). The European people had seen these practices after the barbaric invasion from the Baltic; whoever conquered anywhere, butchered people, and declared *himself* a ruler. Hundreds of petty tyrants emerged under the names of margrave, baron, and lord. Former druids of these barbarians, who were positioned in-between their gods and men, were not making and administering laws as tyrannical as these newly emerged rulers; but then, the bishops claimed their positions, and with the unquestionable authority of the Pope, they became so powerful that they were able to depose or assassinate kings easily (Voltaire, 1995, pp. 32–33). Therefore, enduring the arbitrariness of one tyrant might be possible, but hundreds of them existed in Europe at the time of Voltaire, a situation that made a man keep his forehead to the ground constantly, since saluting them was mandatory—practices depended on the customs of that country. Voltaire states that this situation is getting worse as time passes, and shortly, Europeans will eventually divide into two: either as hammers or anvils (Voltaire, 1802, pp. 342–343).

These comments form the foundation of what the Ikhwan and the authors of the *Encyclopédie* knew or had heard about the concepts of sovereign and sovereignty, considering their specific historical context.

5.1.2. Sovereign in al-Rasa'il

The Ikhwan's ultimate goal in politics was to replace the Abbasid rule with a virtuous regime, which needed support from a righteous society and the wisdom of the elites together (Çetinkaya, 2003, p. 239). This is why they went into hiding, operated in shadows, and waited for the uprising days—which they exalted them as festival days (L, pp. 202–203). Their central theme on this debate revolved around an understanding that states[18] follow a natural advancement scheme; they have a particular origin time, they have an objective desired to be reached, and an end that concludes their role with a collapse. This collapse signals a power shift, where the weakening of a state leads to the strengthening of its successor: the laws of time dictate it. Akin to days following nights, and summers following winters, a good state will naturally follow an evil one (IV, p. 127). Under the light of this knowledge, the Ikhwan claim that royalty and state pass through one community *(ummah)* to another, one dynasty to another, and one country to another (XLVIII, p. 143). The key here is to live in a state that encourages goodness. Such a state, in the Ikhwanian way, can only be achieved with the will of a community that unites in a specific opinion, religion, and sect, aided by the wise, learned, and deserving individuals. Their agreement is based on avoiding conflict and supporting each other. Therefore, members of such a community start acting in harmony (IV, p. 128). To attain such a blessing that causes the entire society to think and act as one, it is essential for individuals to understand their abilities. Some people are more capable of ruling than others, while the rest are obliged to follow their leaders (XLII, p. 347). This competency comes from the duality of body and soul. The soul is the ruler, and the body is the ruled; if the soul can govern the body well, it will extend its rule to the family, servants, and slaves first, then to the tribe, the city, and ultimately the entire community (XXIX, p. 51). This is the core understanding of politics for the Ikhwan; that is why they see politicians as individuals with high souls, meaning they must carry self-love and pride within themselves (IX, p. 241). For the Ikhwan, such a soul resembles an animalistic soul; a politician must have a desire to lead *his* pack to maintain prosperity and elevate welfare (IX, p. 215). Both prophets and scholars emphasize in their writings that, as the

[18] The concept of state can also be read as government in this scenario.

Ikhwan suggest, politicians must value their moral superiority (XLII, p. 425); this is how they stand out from their communities, along with their superiority in using reason, which encompasses multiple social layers (XLII, pp. 347–348).

The Ikhwan's categorization of sciences shows itself in three leagues: practical, religious, and philosophical. Mathematical sciences lean on daily living routines; they include writing, reading, linguistics, accounting, poetry, fortunetelling, sorcery, artisanship, agriculture, trade, and history. Religious sciences focus on religious texts, their interpretations, religious rituals, the interpretation of dreams, and so on. On the other hand, the Ikhwan examined philosophical sciences under four categories: mathematical, logical, natural, and metaphysical sciences. Metaphysical sciences had a separate subcategory titled political sciences. This subcategory deals mainly with governing various multitudes, from governing families to states. In this regard, ruling a kingdom requires some knowledge that one must possess first. This body of knowledge can be summarized as protecting the dominance of religion over the community *(ummah)*, endorsing goodness, avoiding wickedness, implementing God's law on earth, rejecting cruelty, countering enemies, assisting good people, and dispensing justice (VII, pp. 181–185). God created humans into different classes, and each class serves as a tool to promote God's laws. Politicians, in this sense, serve as servants of God, whose primary purpose is to protect the law of the religion (IX, pp. 219–221). As a result, all kings on earth are regarded as the caliphs of God in the Ikhwan's conclusion (XXII, p. 212), and their understanding of kings includes several original formulations.

The Ikhwan divide leadership in politics into two, as material leadership, which has the authority over material entities like bodies of people, often dictates dominance with pressure and cruelty, and spiritual leadership, which conquers souls of people with justice and benevolence (XLVII, p. 101). There is an inevitable fact for the Ikhwan that God wishes to merge the earthly and afterworldly affairs into one; still, *his* central intention of such a wish is embodied in religion. Therefore, governance is a *mere* auxiliary errand; it is mainly based on this world (XLII pp. 396–397). However, it is also known that every community must have a ruler from within the same community (XLVII, p. 107). The reason behind the need for many rulers on earth was explained through a metaphor. In this context, humans have many kings because people carry different desires, characteristics, and opinions. It is easier for animals to assign a king to themselves by simply considering their size and physical strength. However, human rulers do not need to be gigantic; in fact, many are of modest size compared to their subjects. Their influence does not come from their physical appearance but from their ability to

guide their assistants and officers on delegating various tasks (XXII, p. 211). Considering the fact that the moralities of the kings and subjects differ (IX, p. 229) and only morally good and honorable people can take part in the courts of kings (IX, p. 246; XXVI, p. 322), kings consult these distinguished people before finalizing their decisions (XXII, p. 158). The Ikhwan narrate a historical story on this debate, where a Persian king was about to suffer a certain annihilation on the battlefield, consulted his advisors, and a scholar devised a clever plan which saved the king's life. Still, the scholar became permanently disabled (XLIV, pp. 22–24). Though they admit there are several kings on earth, the Ikhwan claim that there can only be one ruler in any given community while there are many slaves (XXII, p. 251). This situation resembles a Quranic clarification[19] for the Ikhwan, where God was seen as the most supreme king of human beings (IX, p. 249). The kings provide, so that they should be generous towards their subjects, by mimicking God's generosity and mercy (XXII, p. 235); this is why subjects depend on their kings, similar to slaves depend on their masters (XLVI, p. 62). Cruel kings, on the other hand, behave against these good traits; they become jealous and oppressive towards their subjects, which causes their times on earth to become shorter, because God hates them (XXXI, pp. 135, 141). At this point, after specifying cornerstones of the Ikhwan's understanding of the concept of ruler, reviewing their comments on evil and good kings may enrich the debate.

The Ikhwan claim that the term 'king' *(melik)* shares the same etymological root as 'angel' *(malak/malaik)*, and the essential reason of this lexical intimacy correlates with God's assignment of an angel to each of *his* creations, to watch and protect their well-beings (XXII, p. 236); thus, kings' roles resemble to angels'. Because all living entities either seek benefit or avoid harm in their doings, kings prefer to assert dominance for the benefit of good (XXVI, p. 331), and their goodness brings goodness to their societies (XLV, p. 45). Nevertheless, there are other kings as well, who prefer to ignore such goodness and turn into evil kings; the majority of evil things happening to people arise from the love of this world and the ambition to lead others (IX, p. 243), and human beings aim to resemble to their kings (V, p. 144). The Ikhwan name these types as cruel kings; their dominance depends on oppression and destroying their societies either with tyranny or threat, they utilize justice mechanism arbitrarily, favoring the ones who applaud their cruelty while vilifying the ones who take an opposition stance, and torturing people who [so-called] betray them to death (XXXVIII, p. 252). These kings drink alcohol, become arrogant, brag about themselves, enjoy their lustfulness, love ruling and self-

[19] [Surah an-Nas (Mankind), Verses 1–3] [1] Say, I seek refuge in the Lord of mankind. [2] The King of mankind. [3] The God of mankind (Itani, 2015, p. 275).

prestige, seek self-comfort, and remain following a conservative path rather than being open to changes (XLVIII, p. 122). Good kings, on the other hand, resemble philosophers in the Ikhwan's formulation; they seek to fix the faltering parts of society and to move away from evil ruling methods (IX, p. 229). From this point, the Ikhwan preferred to identify ten features of a good kingcraft, ten features of a good man, and ten features of a good sovereign; paying attention to these, a total of thirty features, would turn a man into a philosopher-king. Ten features of a good kingcraft include [1] acknowledging God's oneness and praying *him*, [2] affirming the existence of *his* prophets, [3] approving the existence of *his* holy texts, [4] protecting the *sharia* and ruling people, [5] being humble and abandoning to brag about luxury, [6] abandoning cruelty and torture, [7] abandoning listening to women's advices, [8] abandoning drinking alcoholic beverages, [9] being generous and benevolent, and [10] being truthful in speaking and perceiving good and evil. The following ten features of a good man help a person flourish in the Ikhwanian fashion. These features comprise [1] regarding good morals, [2] acting with decency, [3] keeping promises, [4] forgiving the weak, [5] abandoning jealousy, [6] endeavoring not to have enemies, [7] abandoning the habit of wasting God's blessings on this world, [8] overcoming earthy desires with valor, [9] preferring afterlife to this life, and [10] abandoning the [ill] habit of thinking about things that are of no consequence. Ten features of a good sovereign take their sources from the God; *he* rules *his* subjects with these features and a good sovereign should imitate them: [1] monitoring subjects, [2] responding subjects by their efforts, [3] establishing an all-encompassing justice for society, [4] not tyrannizing subjects, [5] not equating the erudite with the ignorant in salary and status, [6] assigning the officers amongst free and good men, [7] not assigning people with deviant religious beliefs to official posts, [8] selecting the right-hand/vizier amongst the most superior people within society, [9] protecting rights of the oppressed from the oppressor, and finally [10] returning rights to their original holders (XXXI, pp. 142–143).

Although the Ikhwan counted the characteristics of the good and cruel kings individually, they also admitted the existence of both types in this world. According to them, the right to rule is not something to be acquired but given; thus, one cannot become a king without deserving it (XLII, p. 368). Such a deserve can be reviewed under three distinguished sources: reason, religion, and celestial bodies. Reason is deemed the invisible and internal caliph of God by the Ikhwan (XXXI, p. 142), and the central principle of a sovereign's governance method is reason (XLVII, p. 101). Brain, as the palace of the reason, is the king of whole body (XXII, p. 148), or, in other words, if is it possible to consider a human being as a

city, reason is the king of that city (XXIV, p. 275); the rest of all other organs serve brain as soldiers, ministers, servants, and citizens (XXXV, p. 194). This is why it is only with the assistance of reason that human beings become the rulers and the animals become the ruled (XXII, p. 141). These analogies affirm that the Ikhwan had placed a special emphasis on reason for deserving the right to rule. Because they claim that kingcraft is an art form, it would be meaningless to expect people to excel at all arts; some individuals are simply incompetent in certain arts. This is why reason guides children to follow their fathers' occupations; therefore, a prince's rational choice is to follow his father's path in ruling, to avoid a potential fight for the throne (VIII, pp. 197–198). For this reason, the king raises the brightest prince with careful education in both academic and moral fields; he forbids him from everything that conflicts with reason and guides him toward the virtues of morally good people (IX, pp. 229–230). Sovereigns of the past—even the evil ones like pharaohs—were top-tier individuals in using their reason (IX, p. 238); therefore, the Ikhwan claim, a rational ruler would practice moderation in politics (XXXI, p. 107), consult his advisors (XXII, p. 167), and decree and forbid with his innate awareness of being the head of the body (XXII, p. 177). Children and the ignorant are not concerned about how politics operates, because they do not utilize their reason (III, p. 103). Similarly, some ignorant rulers among societies do not use their reason and dare to alter the *sharia*'s commands for their own prosperity (XXXI, p. 128). On the other hand, the scholars and erudites can use their reasons and they should advise the kings, without seeking any opportunity to become a ruler, though, which was counted as one of the curses of *high* knowledge by the Ikhwan (IX, p. 237).

The Ikhwan attributed the most supreme sovereignty to God alone through a Quranic verse,[20] and called him with *"the sultan of sultans"* phrase by summarizing a passage taken from a holy text which remains unnamed (XLVI, p. 67; XXXI, p. 141). The Ikhwan resemble kings to God in several places throughout the text (IV, p. 119; XIX, p. 99) while equating the commands of the kings with God's commands (IX: 229). This tendency arises from their keen belief in the notions that *"religion and kingdom are twin brothers"* (XXII, p. 252; XLII, p. 395) and *"state is the brother of prophethood"* (XXVIII, p. 34). This is why the Ikhwan consider kings as the emissaries of God (III, p. 103; XIX, p. 100; XXVI, p. 322). Considering the understanding that the main purpose of politics is to uphold and strengthen people's

[20] [Surah an-Nahl (The Bee), Verse 50] They fear their Lord above them, and they do what they are commanded (Itani, 2015, p. 113). As a side note, the phrase "above them" was translated here by Talal Itani using its most direct meaning, written initially as (فَوْقِهِمْ, *fawqihim*) in the Quran. However, the original usage of the word addresses not something above them physically, but the supremacy and sovereignty of God. The root word (فوق, *fawq*) addresses "a feature of being supreme" rather than a simple positional meaning such as "above".

commitment to *the* religion (VIII, p. 198), and since this duty is given to prophets during their lives, their admirable qualities in prophethood are passed on to their communities after they die, serving as their legacy. This heritage might be embodied in one person for the Ikhwan, who would then be convenient to inherit the role of prophet in politics, with a consensus of *his* community if they wish their worldly state to be maintained and their otherworldly fate to prosper (XLVII, pp. 99–100, 107). Thus, the religious communities *(ummah)* are in need of a ruler at any given time, who protects and preserves the *sharia*, rejuvenates *the* religion and the Prophet's legacy, enjoins good and forbids evil, directs *ummah* with *his* judgments, and reconciles religious disputes among the religious scholars (XLII, p. 394). Some communities enjoy this life, claim the Ikhwan, and reject the afterlife, even though they need a ruler to be directed towards the *true* path (XLIV, pp. 20–21). Therefore, after inheriting the Prophet's legacy and representing God, the sovereign has to seek allegiance from *his* people. Then, *he* has to clarify the statuses of the elites and the laity within society, collect taxes, allocate livelihood shares to military and the rest of the social classes, protect borders, positively respond to calls for truce and peace offering, conciliate diverse feelings and opinions, and give presents to people to prevent disorganization (XLII, p. 395). Considering the Ikhwan's claim that the 'religion' term covers a meaning of obedience of a community to a single leader in Arabic, it is mandatory to know there is only one religion and it is mandatory to obey its leader (XLI, p. 320; XLII, pp. 388–389).

Lastly, the Ikhwan believe that celestial objects in space and their astrological and astronomical relationships with Earth significantly influence a sovereign's right to rule. Drawing an analogy similar to how the brain is considered the king of the body, the Ikhwan see the Sun as the sovereign of all planets (III, p. 106). Their sincere focus on establishing a hierarchy among things is also reflected here; they prefer to assign a specific role to each known planet. Accordingly, the rest of planets are servants to the Sun in accordance with what we observe in a kingdom: Mars is the military commander of the Sun, Jupiter is the magistrate, Saturn is the treasurer, Mercury is the vizier, Venus is the queen, the Moon is the crown prince, and the rest of the stars have different roles like military members, servants, and subjects (XXII, pp. 215–216). These planets and stars are angels of God; they were created to regulate the politics on earth (LII, p. 216). For instance, the Sun's spiritual power radiates on earth, regulates life, and Raphael *(Israfil)* is one of the members of this spiritual power. Similarly, Saturn's radiation helps the forms existing on Earth become visible, and *Munkar* and *Nakir*, the angels responsible for interrogating the deceased in the grave, are attributed to this spiritual power. On

the other hand, Mars regulates desires, particularly the political ones; hellish angels are its assistants. Jupiter adjusts the opposite natures of things and thoughts; heavenly angels are counted within this power. Venus, too, has a role in this system; it regulates beauty, love, and pleasure and has heavenly beautiful ladies *(houri)* at its disposal. Mercury is the master of knowledge and wisdom; several important heavenly angels benefit from its spiritual power. Lastly, the Moon's radiation on Earth determines the status of the soul; some angelic deities that guard the Earth day and night are the Moon's servants (XX, pp. 114–115). Movements of these celestial objects influence political events; for instance, the movement of Mars through the twelve constellations can lead to the formation of new states, boost the power of kings, trigger rebellions, replace governments with new ones, and so on, depending on its current connection with the constellation (XXXVI, p. 212). Similarly, when such a celestial entity's rays that bring good fortune to people fall on a prince, he will indeed ascend to the throne soon (III, p. 105). Rays of the Sun, in particular, directly influence a person's destiny by filling them with all the necessary qualities a ruler would need, such as egotism, strength, high ambitions, glory, violence, etc. (XXV, p. 304). According to the Ikhwan, planetary conjunctions that trigger these political effects occur once every 240 years; they transfer the ruling right from one community, city, or dynasty to another (XXXVI, p. 213). This is why astrological positions of constellations and the angle they make with the Moon determine the fate of a sovereign; an angle with Leo grants *him* a long-lasting reign, for instance (LII, p. 266). Likewise, Sagittarius is the constellation of kings (LII, p. 248), while the tenth house of celestial orbits was attributed to them (LII, p. 260). Therefore, it is important to know astrospatial positions of the celestial objects in determining whether *that* king deserves to have the right to rule or not, for the Ikhwan; even their birth times tell their chances to us: being born in the times of the Sun or the Mars will cause a wrathful soul to be formed; thus, that prince would seek to oppress, dominate, and rule in his life (XXXVII, p. 221).

5.1.3. Sovereign in the *Encyclopédie*

The birth of the state is a natural process according to the *Encyclopédie*; it follows a linear path. The concept of family, as the first domestic community established by nature, is both the eldest and the most natural civil society (Jaucourt, 1756, p. 390). In the beginning, the father was the sovereign of his family; it would be difficult to live with children without any governance at his disposal. That is why, to put it simply, the father applied natural law to his family. That father, then, became the political monarch of his family, and this succession

followed to his children afterwards. In some cases, the new candidates of such a monarchy did not have the talent to govern the family they inherited from their father; they lacked the right age, wisdom, prudence, courage, etc. Families then, with their natural freedoms and free will, preferred to unite with other families by accepting the fathers of these families as the sovereign or chose to select a new one among them. Native governments in Peru and Mexico, according to the *Encyclopédie*, were established by following this method. People elect a sovereign with their own free will, who will rule the entire community (Jaucourt, 1757, p. 788). This is how the families constitute the foundation of national societies, because, with a more generalized naming, people essentially compose of several families (Jaucourt, 1756, p. 390). Therefore, it is possible to claim that the very first attachment *en route* to establishing a state is the family (Jaucourt, 1756a). With this clarification, the *Encyclopédie* defines the state as *"a civil society, in which a multitude of men are united together under the dependence on a sovereign, in order to enjoy the safety and happiness that lack in the state of nature, with his protection and care"* (Jaucourt, 1756b).[21] This definition reveals several concepts to explore, such as a multitude of men, dependency, sovereignty, protection, and happiness. In this respect, the *Encyclopédistes* believe that these words belong to human beings and the status of these concepts varies with time; no certain stability can be expected from anything that belongs to the concept of humanity. The sole constant in nature is God *himself*; thus, any state, even if it was established as the most perfect way, is determined to fade away, akin to the carcasses of animals. The states, therefore, grow, expand, collapse, and dissolve. It is inevitable, but there is only one way to postpone this fate: to turn the state back to its establishment principles whenever it is possible (Jaucourt, 1757, p. 791). This is why the *Encyclopédie* considers politics, which deals with these concepts and aims to teach men to behave with caution in any size of governance type—be as it may a family or a state—a branch of science. Accordingly, the world has experienced numerous revolutions in its history; many changes have been experienced in political customs since the days of Aristotle. This is why political science is one of the most constantly evolving and improving fields, in addition to an endless number of texts analyzing these changes (*Politique*, 1765, p. 917).

The *Encyclopédie* claims the right to command is the last resort in civil societies, citing Samuel von Pufendorf, and this command is guaranteed by sovereignty, which aims to guarantee people's happiness and natural freedom to be maintained under the protection of this

[21] *"[…] une société civile, par laquelle une multitude d'hommes sont unis ensemble sous la dépendance d'un souverain, pour joüir par sa protection & par ses soins, de la sureté & du bonheur qui manquent dans l'état de nature".*

supreme set of rights. Therefore, the very nature of sovereignty consists of two elements: the right to command the members of society, and this right should be granted to one or more people, but not to all. This right has to grant superior power to the holder[s]; else, order and security cannot be provided (Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 425). Such a power comes from the consent of people in any given society; people establish societies by renouncing some of the independence granted to them by nature. Thus, this given power still retains its original right to claim against the sovereign because no one has given this communal right to another to become unhappy (*Pouvoir*, 1765). Humans have only placed themselves in a society to become happier, claims the *Encyclopédie*; the unity of humans, therefore, chooses the sovereign to ensure this happiness and strive to maintain it (*Souverains*, 1765, p. 424). Happiness differs from the joy of desires; it is a status and lasts longer. Nature directs us to be happy; therefore, anything other than bringing happiness to us is inherently alien to us (*Pestré*, 1752, p. 322). Still, happiness is not a permanent status but a long-lasting one. Felicity, on the other hand, is permanent. An event can achieve happiness and can remain for some time; however, felicity is a lasting, more profound sense of contentment and fulfillment, which is more of an idealized but seldom achieved status (Voltaire, 1756). With this philosophical clarification, it is possible to say that the Encyclopedists were well aware that the happiness provided and secured by the sovereign cannot persevere forever. This is why they preferred to divide the state, the mechanism that the sovereign utilizes, into two, as happy and unhappy (Jaucourt, 1756b).

The *Encyclopédie* claims that the ultimate sovereign of this world is God (Jaucourt, 1756c, p. 18), and *his* authority is boundless, and *his* power is eternal (Diderot, 1751a). This is why, as the *Encyclopédie* quoted from François de La Mothe Le Vayer—a state councilor in France, that a sovereign's will shall mirror God's will, but *he* must know that *he* is accountable to God for *his* actions. For this reason, the king's authority is seen as divine and unchallengeable throughout history (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 889). This is why people should refuse unfair orders of the sovereign with noble courage; they should resist injustice. Because it is better to obey the laws of God, whether natural or revealed, than a man, regardless of the rank he carries with him (Jaucourt, 1765r). However, as the *Encyclopédie* emphasized, Hobbes claimed that subjects must obey the sovereign's unfair commands. Because the responsibility of such a command rests with the sovereign, still, that subject should not abuse that command and act as they please. That is, Hobbes distinguishes the sovereign's command from an individual's own will. For instance, a soldier must execute his king's command because he serves as an instrument of the sovereign here. However, he cannot do an unfair action in his own name (Jaucourt, 1765r, p.

643). The most beautiful present that God can give to humans is a king who loves his people and who is loved, claimed the *Encyclopédie*, who is confident with his neighbors and they are confident with him, who cares for justice, and who makes his subjects happy (*Roi*, 1765). The sovereign in this case resembles the soul, which gives movement and life to the body—the state; the use or abuse of power determines whether that body is weak or strong (*Puissance*, 1765, p. 557). The *Encyclopédie* criticizes von Pufendorf, claiming he confuses the state with the sovereign. In this regard, by resembling this duality to a man, the sovereign plays the role of the head while the rest of the society comprises the rest of the elements of that man. The state, therefore, which consists of the body other than the head, unites different interests within its elements, that is, individuals, with the assistance of the head. Then, such unity becomes a soul, transforming the community into a happy state—a state *par excellence* (Jaucourt, 1756b). This soul, manifested within the sovereign's authority, comes with duties and responsibilities. Citing from an unnamed Brahmin, the *Encyclopédie* claims that true authority is not just about the symbols of power like throne, crown, or scepter, but about the duty and responsibility that comes with it, aiming to make the state good (*Roi*, 1765, p. 321). However, the sovereign must know that such a power cannot be multiplied forever; it has to stop at a certain point. That point determines a situation where the sovereign knows no other superior power than *himself* (Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 425). This point defines natural limitations of sovereignty and is directly related to the very essence of its establishment principles. Therefore, according to these limits, the sovereign cannot violate the constituent laws of the state, cannot alter the form of government, cannot change the order of succession, and should be bound with justice and reason (*Souverains*, 1765, p. 424). The *Encyclopédie* believes that sovereignty substantially resides in the people. Romulus, for instance, received a right he did not possess earlier, after the Romans gave him the sovereignty with their consent (Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 425).

The *Encyclopédie* argues that these lines below must be engraved on the palaces of the kings:

> Kings have this:
> A magnificent and great [power], which no day takes away [from him],
> To benefit the miserable, to protect the humble with a faithful hearth (*Roi*, 1765).[22]

As is evident here, the sovereign's duty is to make the country a safe place for *his* people and protect the people living here. The *Encyclopédie* claims that the kings are obliged to protect

[22] *"Hoc reges habent / Magnificum & ingens, nulla quòd rapit dies / Prodesse miseris, supplices fido lare protegere"* (Translation is mine, with added clarifications in square brackets to ease the meaning).

their subjects; otherwise, the link between the sovereign and the people shatters. The British, for example, obeyed the Romans for centuries. However, when they saw that the Romans could not protect them against the barbarians, they preferred to choose a new sovereign among themselves, for themselves. According to the *Encyclopédie*, this situation is legitimate (*Protection*, 1765). Still, the power submitted to the sovereigns by the people is not to the same extent; it differs from one society to another. This situation depends on how much the people value their liberties. Naturally, such diversity leads to the emergence of different government styles around the world. In England, for example, legislative power is shared between the king and Parliament. The German emperor legislates with the states. However, a balance must be maintained in limiting power; a sovereign should have a designated area to exercise authority. Otherwise, a poor government style occurs, as the *Encyclopédie* asserts, similar to the experiences in Sweden and Poland (*Souverains,* 1765, p. 424). Yet again, people's general interest shall be subject to the political body; a check and balance mechanism is required. Because the interests of political leaders are often not in harmony with the majority of people, they occasionally contradict each other. For example, summoning the German diet, a right exercised by the emperor before, was shared with the electors afterwards, the representatives of different interest groups within the society, like archbishops, princes, dukes, etc. These latter exercisers of such right did not have to seek the emperor's consent for such a calling (d'Holbach, 1754, 792–793).

The power of a state has five determinants according to the *Encyclopédie*; these are [1] the number of its subjects, [2] the extent of its geographical limits, [3] the nature of its productions, [4] the industry of its inhabitants, and [5] the goodness of its sovereign (*Puissance*, 1765, p. 557). Two elements strike out here: the people and the goodness of the sovereign. The Encyclopedists concluded that people were the most general class of the French nation before; they were regarded as the most useful, precious, and respectable part of the nation. They had a natural place in the parliament and were faithful to their sovereigns. However, kings no longer have such loyal subjects; they do not have these 'best friends'. Public love replaced this loyalty; people love their sovereigns and respect them, even if they are financially poor. They think that the sovereign provides security and peace to them; this is why no adverse economic situation of the society has ever caused a decline in obedience to the sovereign throughout history (Jaucourt, 1765s, p. 476). Because the link between the subject and the sovereign had been established in the distant past, either through an open agreement or a tacit agreement. This contract was established via a reciprocal consent; thus, when a sovereign became recognized at

some point in history, *he* did not need to either establish fresh contracts with the newly joining individuals to the state or take their oath of loyalty (Jaucourt, 1765r, p. 643). On the other hand, the goodness of the sovereign indicates that some vice sovereigns might also exist, which signals that the vice ones abuse the purpose of the sovereignty. Accordingly, the *Encyclopédie* highlights six fundamental principles of sovereignty. The first aspect of these purposes is exercising legislative power through authority. People learn to use their natural rights with the help of legislation, without disturbing the rest of the public. Second, a coercive power must be established so that those who disturb the public will face consequences; the existence of civil society and laws would be meaningless without this power. The fear instilled in society through punishments should be significant; in some cases, it should include death penalties. Otherwise, the fear of pain cannot prevail over the force of passion. This is how the individuals of a society observe laws and cannot violate them. Third, the balance between obedience and punishment should be established via judicial power; its main aim is to resolve disputes among the people to maintain peace in a state. Fourth, sovereignty mimics religion; it includes everything related to religion within itself—in terms of influence over individuals, and it aims to enhance the advantage and tranquility of the society. Fifth, the existence of sovereignty is not limited to internal security alone; it also has external purposes. It makes the state safe from external dangers, especially against other sovereigns. This is why the sovereign arms the subjects, raises troops, makes public engagements, makes war and peace, treaties, and alliances with foreign states. In the final purpose of the sovereignty, the *Encyclopédie* claims that minting money and issuing its circulation provide ease for public necessities in the state (Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 426).

The *Encyclopédie* considers the sovereigns who obey these purposes as good ones, and approves them to have pride within themselves—a noble and dignified pride. Writers, for instance, praised Louis XIV's pride, which showed itself in his approaches to the matters (Voltaire, 1756a). However, such pride should not contradict the conformity of an action with time, place, and people. It should remain within a balance between social decorum and power dynamics; else, the sovereign might fall into the hands of awkwardness (Diderot, 1752a). This balance was attributed to the philosophers, or at least to the erudite in the sense of the *Encyclopédie*; in parallel to Plato's comments and directly citing from him, a state where its king is a philosopher is a happy state (*Politique*, 1765, p. 919). Therefore, when sovereigns possess these three elements within, it is accurate to label them with 'Great' titles since they represent a sovereign type highlighted by Plato: obeyed by their subjects, obeys the law, and laws are designed as just and aim for the public good. (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 889). However, it

would be unrealistic to expect all the sovereigns to be philosopher-kings; that is why they are in need of some advisors. Counsellors of the kings exist to warn and advise them; that is why they keep them close. They are expected to express their opinions freely in the courts of the kings (d'Alembert, 1754b). By referencing Charles Loyseau, the *Encyclopédie* claims that these advisors to the kings turn into state councilors in time. They were part of the king's council earlier and had the right to govern provinces and administer justice on behalf of the king when necessary. It was 1551 when this alteration was implemented, and these advisors had preferred to call themselves *conseillers-présidiaux* (presidential counselors) since then. They abhor the royal advisor title because it has lost its honor since these titles could easily be passed into other hands in exchange for money. This is why these new advisors to the king consist of people from different domains like justice, military, finance, etc., and men of letters (Boucher d'Argis, 1754i, p. 31). The *Encyclopédie* is thankful to the philosophers who advise the sovereigns, for saving society from the morally low people and absurd fanatics who try to influence the sovereign against the enlightenment ideas (Voltaire, 1765, pp. 195–196).

Under the light of these explanations and comments, it is possible to summarize a good sovereign's traits as follows: sovereigns arise with a necessity, and they were established with 'sufficient' power; the stress on the word 'sufficient' is the key here. It was established like this because it is impossible to predict different circumstances that will occur in that society. This is why the Romans, back in the republican times, were enhancing the power of a chosen one for a definite period, elevating him to the status of a dictator in order to solve an unpredictable problem rapidly. Even in this case, that sovereign was bound by the law. Therefore, a sovereign, even having unlimited power, cannot violate laws, oppress people, and ignore reason and equity. By giving an example of the case of Denmark, the *Encyclopédie* claims that the Danish were exhausted from the tyranny of nobility a century ago and granted boundless power to King Frederick III. Though that was a desperate measure and leaving the people at the king's mercy, the king did not abuse his power and chose to govern his people with laws (*Pouvoir*, 1765). So, a good sovereign is someone who enjoys justice, makes *his* people happy, whose power source is zeal and love of *his* subjects, and whose ministers do not seek to enhance their power and authority (Diderot, 1751a). However, some other sovereigns do not follow such a path of virtue; the *Encyclopédistes* call them tyrants. Citing from François Fénelon's comments, the *Encyclopédie* claims that a sovereign can do anything to *his* people, but laws can do anything to *him* as well; a sovereign has an infinite power to *do* good, but *his* hands are tied when *he* desires to *do* evil. Akin to how God governs the earth by following the laws of nature, a

sovereign should govern *his* people under the laws of state; *he* should rarely intervene in the course of things, similar to God, by using *his* omnipotence (*Roi*, 1765). However, a tyrant does not respect that. *He* abuses *his* power to violate laws, oppresses *his* people, and makes subjects the victims of *his* passions and unjust wishes, which replace the laws. The *Encyclopédie* underlines that tyranny is the most lethal plague humanity has ever experienced. The edicts *he* issued are dictated by *his* interests and fantasies alone; this practice is completed with cruelty. When *he* is not able to execute *his* cruelty alone and oppress people with the yoke of *his* degenerated desires, *he* cooperates with corrupt ministers. These appointed ministers violate justice, deem virtue an insult, and consider laws to be avoided (*Tyran*, 1765). The *Encyclopédie* reviews the psychological condition of a tyrant over the Ottoman emperors. According to that, the sultan of the Ottoman Empire is the unhappiest man. He lacks faith in the Christians, he indulges his viziers with fancy gifts, he murders his brothers and dumps them in the Black Sea, and ravages countries for his glory. His *mufti* (chief religious jurist) justifies and legitimizes his actions; cruelty and immorality are permitted, even encouraged. He feels no guilt for his actions because he was not raised as a happy child (Voltaire, 1765, p. 195).

This type of governance style can be seen almost all over Asia, like Mongolia, Japan, Persia, not limited to Turkey alone, says the *Encyclopédie*, and adds this couplet:

> Knowledge, talents, public freedom,
> Everything died under the yoke of despotic power (Jaucourt, 1754a, pp. 886–887).[23]

The Encyclopedists did not distinguish despotism and tyranny in a clear sense; despotism was defined as *"tyrannical, arbitrary & absolute government of a single man"* (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 886).[24] The *Encyclopédie* claims that, parallel to the poetry above, everything revolves around a few ideas in despotic regimes. Education is limited to instilling fear in the hearts, knowledge is deemed dangerous and can have fatal consequences, utilizing reason is noxious—regardless of whether the reasoning is good or evil, and the primary intention is not to make good subjects but good slaves. The sovereign has countless concubines and children, but he has no affection for them or his brothers. He becomes a foolish man in time, a prisoner of his own, because he does not leave his palace, where artifice, wickedness, and cunning reign in silence. He rejects listening to the requests of his subjects unless they arrive with presents. The main idea behind such a governance style is that the superior owes nothing to the inferior (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 887). The *Encyclopédistes* mention a Latin phrase,

[23] *"Le savoir, les talens, la liberté publique, / Tout est mort sous le joug du pouvoir despotique"*.
[24] *"[…] gouvernement tyrannique, arbitraire & absolu d'un seul homme […]"*.

"Boni quam mali suspectiores sunt, semperque his aliena virtus formidolosa est", which means, roughly, *"good men are more suspicious than the bad ones, and alien virtues are always frightening to them"* (*Tyran*, 1765). The *Encyclopédie* suggests that tyrants believe they are doing good and trying to govern justly; they feel like their preferred methods make their subjects happy. However, Socrates was the happiest man among all the Greeks; still, some unhappy men legally poisoned him to death at the age of seventy (Voltaire, 1765, p. 195). This situation resembled Montesquieu's metaphor, where he made an analogy over the savages of Louisiana, who prefer to cut down a whole tree to eat a few fruits (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 887). The *Encyclopédie* claims that a just and benevolent man is loved by all those who approach him: morality commands it (*Plaisir*, 1765, p. 690). However, such arbitrary actions and decisions of a tyrant are considered an abuse of sovereign power, which causes the state to become a sick one (Jaucourt, 1756b). This situation causes a permanent war to break out between the sovereign and *his* subjects. Tyrant focuses only on protecting *himself*, and violence is the only solution *he* comes up with. *His* ministers become *his* vile hands; *his* people's lives and properties are left to their mercies; thus, *he* trades all the virtues of society for the protection of *his* throne. However, the *Encyclopédie* adds, *he* is aware that *he* should not trust corrupt people. *He* is full of suspicion, remorse, and terror. *He* has no friends but accomplices. People are disgusted with the tyrant, whose corrupted laws cannot help *him—he* is alone. This is why, as the Encyclopedists claim, there is nothing more surprising to witness than a tyrant who dies on *his* deathbed with a happy smile on *his* face (*Tyran*, 1765). Though the *Encyclopédie* did not mention anything about people's rights to uprise against such a government style other than copying Fénelon's thoughts from his work (Jaucourt, 1765o), and held the sovereign as the sole responsible for a possible public uprising against *his* arbitrary governance style (Jaucourt, 1757, p. 791), it was mentioned that people have natural rights to abandon that state and move to another one if they are not happy with the governance method of the sovereign (Jaucourt, 1765r, p. 643). It was claimed that unhappiness is unsurprising under such a despotic government, because poverty and uncertainty of fortune are normalized. People ask high interest for loaning money, injustice is a regular practice, and the whole country turns into a wasteland, a desert, since people do not sow; they are aware that the despot owns both the land and the harvest (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 887). This is against the natural law, and even Louis XIV was aware that a sovereign cannot act contrary to it, as well as the fundamental state laws, claimed the *Encyclopédie*. In the *Traité des Droits de la Reine de France* (Treatise on the Rights of the

Queen of France)[25] of 1667, which was published by the order of Louis XIV, it was written that the king is an impotent character against the laws, and this is a blessing. Submitting the laws should not be seen as a weakness; in contrast, it is the primary necessity to do good and secure justice. According to Philo of Alexandria, the treatise says, even God cannot go further against natural law; thus, the sovereigns, as the images of God on earth, must imitate *his* doings in their states (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 889).

In conclusion to the *Encyclopédie*'s commentary on the sovereign, it can be argued that four different reasons contributed to the dissolution of the sovereign's power. First, it happens when legislative power is altered. According to the Encyclopedists, this type of power is the soul of the political body, and it exists for the unity, happiness, and conservation of the society. Therefore, if this power is ruined, the whole political body, including the sovereign's might, perishes. Second, if the sovereign abandons *his* executive power by altering the laws for *himself*. If this happens, justice cannot be secured, laws become meaningless, and people's rights cannot be guaranteed. Since it would be absurd to speak of the existence of a government without laws, it would be a fantasy to expect the sovereign's power to persist. Third, if the legislative or executive parts of the sovereign's power were exercised with excessive force than necessary, *he* would then be arbitrarily invading what belongs to the people: life, freedom, wealth, etc. It must be remembered by the sovereigns that individuals entered political society to protect these properties. Finally, the sovereign's power can be dissolved by the hand of a foreign power. Because such a power destroys the political society entirely, and the governments have no right to command and govern afterwards (Jaucourt, 1757, p. 791). Though the first three elements were examined in detail throughout the entire subchapter here, particularly in the cases of despotism and tyranny, reviewing the last element, the conquest mechanism, could be helpful. The *Encyclopédie* defines conquest as the acquisition of sovereignty by the superiority of the weapons of a foreign prince. Conquest was reviewed as a right within the realm of rulers; however, its consequence will leave an immense debt to human nature. Conquest, according to the *Encyclopédie*, is a natural consequence of wars; the conqueror follows four different types of law towards the society *he* conquered: law of nature, law of reason, law of forming new political societies, and law chosen fit to conqueror's arbitrariness. Moving from these laws, the Encyclopedists assert that the conqueror chooses to treat the defeated people with one of these

[25] Louis XIV was a "king"; thus, it might be surprising that he preferred to name the treatise without mentioning the word "queen". However, France has a *"la"* article before its name, making France a feminine noun. It would be better to approach the chosen naming here as "the royalty/governance of France". This feminine symbolization may perhaps best be observed in Eugène Delacroix's famous 1830 painting, *La Liberté Guidant le Peuple* (Liberty Leading the People), in which he illustrated the French/July Revolution of 1830.

four: permit them to continue to be governed by their original laws, give the society a new political and civil government, destroy the political society and scatter its people, or exterminate all the citizens. Still, the conqueror should be aware of one central principle that 'might does not make right'; the conquest mechanism cannot be justified alone via the law of the strongest—it needs a rightful cause. Therefore, even the conqueror should seek the consent of the conquered society to establish *his* sovereignty over them. As von Pufendorf stressed, according to the *Encyclopédie*, violence does not create a legitimate right, and an unjust conquest makes the conqueror a usurper (Jaucourt, 1753a). Usurpation is an unjust invasion of sovereignty, and its foreign form comes with the conquest mechanism. On the other hand, domestic usurpation occurs when the throne is seized by an internal power. An external conqueror can justify their illegal actions; however, the actions of a domestic usurper must comply with the country's laws to avoid infringing on the rights of fellow citizens. Otherwise, especially if they extend their power beyond law and justice, they risk becoming a tyrant (Jaucourt, 1765t).

5.1.4. A Comparison of Sovereign in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

The Ikhwan's approach to concepts like the state, the sovereign, and their relationship, as well as their connection with the public, bears notable similarities to ideas discussed in the *Encyclopédie*. These similarities can be examined under four categories: the features of sovereignty, the relationship between sovereignty and God, the traits of a good sovereign, and the concepts of tyranny and its evaluation.

The Ikhwan believe that states follow a cyclical period in their lifetimes; they come into existence at a certain point of time, grow in time by following their original desire to be formed, reach their peak points, and collapse (IV, p. 127). A similar comment can be seen in the *Encyclopédie*; accordingly, though the original formation of a state follows a linear path as from families to family groups, and then to the state (Jaucourt, 1756, p. 360), it is in its fate to grow, expand, collapse and dissolve (Jaucourt, 1757, p. 791). States, in this case, are essentially natural outcomes of social agreements, and both the Ikhwan (IV, p. 128) and the *Encyclopédie* (Jaucourt, 1765r, p. 643) acknowledge this argument. Besides, states are established on a straightforward principle that shows itself in the use of power. The Ikhwan emphasize this principle in various ways, such as recognizing people's roles in society, a ruler's son following his father's path in governance, and the idea that governing a state is not a right for everyone; some should rule, and others should obey (XLII, p. 347; VIII, pp. 197–198). The *Encyclopédie*

reaches a similar conclusion on this debate, though its preferred language was more certain than the Ikhwan's. In this respect, it was accepted that the sovereignty inherently rests within the society (Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 425), and some people might not be suitable for ruling due to a lack of some traits like the right age, wisdom, courage, etc. (Jaucourt, 1757, p. 788). This is why the *Encyclopédistes* also believe that the governance rights do not encompass all; some should command and others should obey (Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 425). Another similarity can be traced in the analogy of soul and body, representing the sovereign and the state, respectively. The Ikhwan openly declared that the sovereign is the soul of the state; that is, the sovereign, like the soul, rules the state and everything within it, just as body parts obey the mind (XXIX, p. 51). Likewise, the *Encyclopédie* resembled the sovereign as the soul of the state, which can give it motion by using or abusing such a capability (*Puissance*, 1765, p. 557). The stress on use and abuse here brings another similarity to the scene: the definition of a good state. The Ikhwan's definition of a good state involves a unity in different sects, religions, and opinions within the society by a wise ruler in the office; because, the human beings essentially seek good and avoid evil in their doings, that is, such a unity with a ruler that promotes good is essential for a good state (IV, p. 128; XXVI, p. 331). The *Encyclopédie*, on the other hand, approaches the concept of a good state with the adjective of 'happy'; according to that, in order to become a happy state, the soul of the state, that is sovereign, should unite different interests within its society (Jaucourt, 1756b). In this parameter, such a sovereign is considered the most holy blessing for that society (*Roi*, 1765). Lastly, both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédie* accept the field that examines these concepts and the relations with each other, in other words, politics, as a science. The Ikhwan preferred to put political science under the upper category of theology and metaphysics by relating this area of research to the religion (VII, pp. 184–185). At the same time, the Encyclopedists deemed politics a science for its analytical and pedagogical techniques in examining the ruler and the ruled, which have been constantly developed since Aristotle (*Politique*, 1765, p. 917).

Although this final similarity might cause some early implications to arise after reading Ikhwan's emphasis on the metaphysics of politics, both texts reserve a special place for the connection between the ruler and religion, or shortly, God. First, the Ikhwan claimed that God is the sovereign of the sovereigns, the most supreme king of the people, and this characteristic of God is also supported by the Quranic sense, in addition to references in other sacred texts (IX, p. 249; XLVI, p. 67; XXXI, p. 141). The *Encyclopédie* mirrors this argument and accepts God as the ultimate sovereign of this world; *he* is the sole constant of the universe, *he* has the

boundless authority, and *he* has the eternal power (Jaucourt, 1757, p. 791; 1756c, p. 18; Diderot, 1751a). Building on the harmony in both texts, connecting earthly sovereignty with divine authority is common. Indeed, the Ikhwan viewed earthly rulers as God's caliphs, comparing kings to God, whose commands imitate God's commands, and they act as God's messengers (XXII, p. 212; IV, p. 119; XIX, pp. 99–100; III, p. 103; XXVI, p. 322). The Encyclopedists also came to a similar position where they quoted from Philo of Alexandria, who resembled sovereigns to the images of God on earth, and from Le Vayer, who had seen the king's authority as divine (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 889). Finally, the Ikhwan believed the purpose of politics is to keep the society on the track of religion (VIII, p. 198), and attributed the right to rule to the prophets in their lifetimes, where the rulers should copy their ruling styles after their death (XLVII, pp. 99–100). The *Encyclopédie* had also commented on this argument where it was accepted that the concept of sovereignty mimics the religion (Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 426), and the sovereign's will should imitate God's will by realizing that such will is responsible to God (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 889).

A good sovereign has to carry some innate features within, and both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédie* acknowledge this verdict. Accordingly, a good sovereign has to have some degree of pride and egotism within *himself*, so that *he* may carry the weight of ruling with dignity (IX, p. 241; XXV, p. 304; Voltaire, 1756a; Diderot, 1752a). Second, the sovereign has a different kind of morality than the rest of society, and *he* should act in accordance with what morality, decorum, and virtuous command (XLII, p. 425; IX, p. 229; XXXI, p. 142; Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 426; Diderot, 1751a). Third, it was expected of the sovereigns to remain loyal to the superiority of reason in their doings. The Ikhwan considered the politicians as the best utilizers of reason (XLII, p. 347), deemed reason the primary principle of a sovereign's governance method (XLVII, p. 101), and confessed that even evil sovereigns like pharaohs were following the path of reason (IX, p. 238). In the same vein, the *Encyclopédie* had also counted reason among the primary traits of a good sovereign (*Souverains*, 1765, p. 424) while claiming that *he* cannot ignore it in *his* doings, no matter how powerful *he* is (*Pouvoir*, 1765). Though these features successfully unveil a silhouette of a good sovereign, essentially, as the fourth item, it is possible to say that both texts valued the role of advisors to the sovereign. The Ikhwan claim there are honorable people in the court of kings, who consist of erudite scholars, and they serve the kings as advisors, in which a rational ruler shall listen to their advice before reaching a decision (XXII, pp. 158, 167; IX, p. 237). Equally, the *Encyclopédie* had also valued these advisors, and deemed them indispensable to the kings' courts where they could speak freely, and became thankful to

these people for their advices which assisted the kings to follow the path of enlightenment instead of ignorance (d'Alembert, 1754b; Voltaire, 1765, pp. 195–196). Finally, both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* regarded these good sovereigns as philosopher-kings, although there are some minor differences in how they conclude their discussion on being a philosopher-king. The Ikhwan had counted thirty different features of a philosopher-king, with a grouping of three categories as ten features in the art of governance, ten features in being a good man, and ten features of being a good sovereign. The first category can be summarized as traits required to become a good Muslim, the second category focuses on traits that enable a man to flourish completely, and the final category outlines what God has and how these traits should be mimicked by the sovereign. Combining these three categories was sufficient for the Ikhwan to become a philosopher-king (XXXI, pp. 142–143). The *Encyclopédie,* on the other hand, approached the process of being a philosopher-king through the essential purposes of sovereignty. In this regard, sovereignty has six indispensable purposes: legislation, judiciary, establishment of the police force, aiming to enhance the tranquility of society—akin to religion, establishment of international relations, and minting coins. A sovereign who considers these purposes would make his state a happy state, says the *Encyclopédie*, and then *he* will become a philosopher-king and can be called with a 'Great' title afterwards (Jaucourt, 1765p, p. 426; 1754a, p. 889; *Politique,* 1765, p. 919).

However, both the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists were aware of such a situation that the world does not only include philosopher-kings; there are evil ones as well. These rulers are introduced to the readers with their cruelties and their arbitrary doings without any consideration of laws in both texts. The Ikhwan, for instance, believed that these evil kings love this world more than the hereafter, and they are ambitious. They tend to impose dominance on their people with oppression and cruelty, ignore justice and laws, favor people who praise their cruelties, punish opposition members, and torture people to death. They ignore both God's and Islam's orders, as well as the decorum and dignity of being human. They prioritize comfort and reject changes in their lives or governance style (IX, p. 243; XXXVIII, p. 252; XLVIII, p. 122). The *Encyclopédie* reviews the evil kings with similar characteristics; only they prefer to name them tyrants. In this respect, they reject mimicking God's governance style as *he* seldom intervenes in the laws of nature, while tyrants regularly do that against the laws of the state. They abuse their power in violating laws, oppress their people, and replace laws with their unjust desires. They enjoy cruelty, assign their ministers as accomplices of these cruelties, and abandon justice and virtue (*Roi,* 1765; *Tyran*, 1765). The Ikhwan are confident that these evil

kings cannot survive for long because God despises their governance style and cruelty (XXXI, pp. 135, 141). The *Encyclopédie* also addresses the concept from the perspective of their lifetimes; it was claimed that a tyrant cannot die as a happy man in his bed (*Tyran*, 1765). Regarding the final words on the evil kings, the Ikhwan believe that people living under tyrannical rule have the right to defend themselves through uprising, and these ideas were reviewed in the third chapter (XXXI, pp. 127–128; XLII, p. 368) as well as mentioned in the beginning of their comments on the sovereign in this chapter (L, pp. 202–203). However, the *Encyclopédie* tracks a reluctant path on this matter; the responsibility of such an uprising was attributed to the sovereign alone (Jaucourt, 1765r, p. 643), and the Encyclopedists acknowledge the rights of the oppressed to leave the state with an evil ruler to go somewhere else where they would feel happier (Jaucourt, 1765r, p. 643).

Though their arguments on the debate of sovereign share certain and evident similarities, there are some cases where al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* diverge. For instance, to highlight a notable difference, the Ikhwan mention that after obtaining the people's consent, ranking society, and reconciling differing opinions, the ruler should give presents to the people to prevent potential government dissolution (XLII, p. 395); that is, a form of bribery that was justified in the Ikhwanian way. The *Encyclopédie,* on the other hand, approaches this kind of bribery executed over presents in two ways, both of which were deemed vile. First, it was claimed that the evil sovereigns expect presents from their subjects to listen to their problems (Jaucourt, 1754a, p. 887). Second, where the *Encyclopédie* analyzed the psychological condition of a tyrant over the example of an Ottoman sultan, it was claimed that the sultan was indulging his viziers with the gifts he gave away, and this process was also welcomed by the Muslim scholars (Voltaire, 1765, p. 195). Besides, the Ikhwan mentioned that sovereignty was something given, not something acquired, and the ruler had to deserve it (XLII, p. 368). However, the *Encyclopédie* does not share this idea with the Ikhwan since it was mentioned that both internal and external usurpations by using force were considered rightful, so long as the conqueror may receive people's consent (Jaucourt, 1757, p. 791; 1765t). This hesitation of the Ikhwan on not touching the conquest mechanism and the replacement of the sovereign by force might have arisen from their preference for doing politics, since they preferred to utilize propaganda tools, as al-Rasa'il constitutes the most vivid example of such a preference, rather than resorting to brute force. Finally, the Ikhwan had reserved an extensive place for the celestial objects and their astrological impacts on the ruler; however, as it was vastly explained

in the comparison section of morality, the *Encyclopédie* does not appreciate anything about astrology.

A summarizing table of their similarities and differences on the concept of sovereign can be given as follows:

TABLE 7. A comparison of the sovereign in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

SOVEREIGN FOR AL-RASA'IL AND THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE		
THEMES	**SIMILARITIES**	**DIFFERENCES**
Features of sovereignty	Cyclical states: rise, peak, collapse. Ruling rights are not universal.	Divinely granted vs. Through force and consent
Sovereignty and God	Sovereign reflects God; rulers are God's earthly representatives in essence.	Emerging point is similar, ending differs: God's will vs. People's consent
Characteristics of a good ruler	Pride, unique morality, supremacy of reason, importance of advisors, philosopher-king.	30 traits of a philosopher-king vs. six key duties of a philosopher-king
Tyranny and evil rulers	Cruelty, arbitrariness, injustice, disregard for law	"Emigration allowed; only the ruler holds rights to change his method if he desires" vs. "Popular uprising is permitted."

5.1.5. Concluding Remarks

One can observe that the concepts of sovereign, ruler, king, sultan, etc., were used interchangeably by both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédie*, a mix-and-match to some extent; although the latter was aware of the separation of powers concept from Montesquieu and both parties of the concept of republic, at least from the works of Ancient Greeks. The central theme of sovereignty revolved around power and its just use or unjust abuse. While it is possible to claim that both parties were essentially in favor of the indivisible character of sovereignty, they also did not hesitate to mention some limitations exercised on sovereignty; these limitations differ, as God, parliament, people, laws, etc. Still, it is possible to argue that, despite the geographical, cultural, and chronological differences between these two texts, the use of reason seemed to prevail, allowing them to identify similar ideas, conceptualizations, and issues.

The sovereign concept had seen some profound alterations afterwards. The French Revolution of 1789 made the concept's essence shift from monarchs to people with the establishment of the National Convention; the concept of republic was reintroduced to the world, and the principle of democracy found its place within this new paradigm (Hampson, 1963, pp. 155–156). Later, in the 19th Century, the world experienced a new phase where the

concept of nation found its true meaning. The states followed a long-forgotten principle and became the true sovereigns in the international arena. This principle is often named with Westphalian sovereignty, and its central characteristic is giving sovereignty to the state alone, which makes the state the sole actor in international relations, as if it were a living entity, and makes it immune to any external interference while solidifying its internal power. Still, this system caused states to exercise their new types of sovereignties upon other states, either via aggressive ways or while under the influence of another (Krasner, 1999, pp. 152–154). Naturally, such an understanding of sovereignty had caused long-lasting empires to dissolve. It produced two world wars, and several international organizations were established to limit or regulate the sovereign's rights. Today, for example, in our global world, sovereignty remains stuck between the concepts of state, nation, and international organizations. When the debate revolves around the state and its sovereignty, the question of its capabilities to exercise control over the nation and globalization comes to the fore. When the nation and its sovereignty are discussed, new allegiance formulations are being evaluated, by-passing the concept of the state. That is, it is safe to say that the nation-state's role as the absolute sovereign in global politics is being continuously redefined in the global age (Özkırımlı, 2005, pp. 131–135).

This concise summary of the shift in sovereignty above is also valid for the Muslim world, albeit it has experienced a slow process. The Ikhwanian fashion of advising the sovereigns had received a loud echo in the following centuries, and several political treatises were kept being penned. Nizam al-Mulk's famous political treatise titled *Siyasatnama* of the 11th century, for instance, which consists of fifty-one separate chapters, both explains how politics operate, and criticizes the faltering parts of the sovereign, as well as advising some remedies for their recovery. As a vivid example, in the thirty-sixth chapter, which covers the cuisine and table manners of the sultan, Nizam al-Mulk advises the sultan to prepare his table for guests, to consider his entourage's food during hunting sessions, and to be generous toward his subjects, while reinforcing these suggestions with some *hadith*s and stories (Nizamü'l-mülk, 2022, pp. 185–188). Similarly, Ibn Khaldun offered several warnings to the sultans from the 14th century. For instance, in a chapter of his *Muqaddimah*, where he advises kings to be merciful to their subjects, he emphasizes that subjects do not care about how the kings look but how they are treated. A tendency of the king to punish his subjects arbitrarily would eventually corrupt the society, and make people liars and cheaters. In contrast, when the king becomes merciful towards his subjects and protects them, they willingly sacrifice their lives for their sultan (İbn Haldun, 1997, pp. 474–478). Though publications of these treatises and the

acceptance of sovereignty in the form of a sultan had continued several centuries after the Ikhwan, the Muslim world eventually came to a similar understanding of the sovereign with the West in time, in the 19th century in particular. The *sharia*'s power of legislation was redefined and attributed to the parliament in the Ottoman Empire, for instance, which was defended as the *teşrî* (legislate) word—sharing the exact etymological origin with the *sharia*, and the legitimacy of the parliament was secured (Tunaya, 2007, pp. 92–93). The promulgation of the constitution and the establishment of the parliament first limited the sultan's sovereignty in 1878 and later in 1908 in the Ottoman Empire. This tradition continued with its successor state, the Turkish Republic, from 1923 onward. Today, most Muslim communities that the Ikhwan had once addressed with their epistles share sovereignty with the nation, state, and ruler. Though it is possible to observe that some rentier states in the Muslim world choose to bypass the nation element of sovereignty, it would not be incorrect to draw a parallel between what the Ikhwan stated and what the *Encyclopédie* presented about sovereignty, as they both approximated to each other in the global world.

5.2. Justice

In the second volume of his famous science fiction series which include several absurdities within, *The Hitchiker's Guide to the Galaxy*, titled *The Restaurant at the End of the Universe*, Douglas Adams (2009, p. 1) preferred to begin his words with a few sentences whose fame probably surpassed both the author and the series: *"The story so far: In the beginning the Universe was created. This had made a lot of people very angry and been widely regarded as a bad move"*. That frustration is understandable because that creation was unfair; some creatures genuinely believed they came into existence from a cosmic sneeze, while others think it was some god's action. This might be why justice has more intimacy of being a feeling rather than a notion. However, in dictionaries, the concept of justice was conceptualized as a situation: *"a fair situation [that] has been achieved"* (Procter, 1995, p. 774). Similarly, just word as an adjective was defined as *"fair, morally correct"* (Procter, 1995, p. 774). Therefore, the first set of justice can be conceptualized as involving good and evil, right and wrong, fair and unfair, desirable and undesirable elements within: the moral justice. On the other hand, we use another noun in the law realm, which executes itself with *"the putting of the law into action"* (Procter, 1995, p. 774). This definition addresses a system involving a legal decision to be put into action that produces a result, either in the form of punishment or reward. In this respect, the second justice set can include concepts like reward, punishment, judge, law, peace, society, etc.: the

legal justice. However, at this point, considering Douglas Adams' creation statement and the numerous references to religions and God's roles in developing the concepts discussed throughout this work, the 'divine' attribute of justice warrants further clarification. This third set would then naturally include elements like religion, God, sin, good deed, creation, the order of the universe, and many more: the divine justice. This subchapter aims to review the political conceptualizations of justice in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* over these three distinctive fuzzy sets: moral justice, legal justice, and divine justice.

5.2.1. Conceptual Framework of Justice

The concept of justice has seen various fluctuations in its evaluations throughout history; therefore, both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédie* have taken their shares from these different interpretations made before their times. For instance, Ancient Greeks put the cosmos at the center of their thoughts, involving nature, human beings, and sites within. They tend to understand human beings by looking through this window. Since everything is part of the cosmos, they believe, there has to be a relation between an individual's fate and society's destiny; this relation also encompasses justice. To serve as a clear example of this matter, Plato's famous dialogue-based book titled *The Republic* was also known as *'On Justice'* since its first publication. Plato conceptualized justice over individual virtues and accepted justice as a moral notion. That is why he preferred to evaluate justice in various definitions over individual like doing one's part, choosing the most suitable occupation with one's nature, giving one their due, and doing a favor to friends while doing evil to enemies. The reason lying beneath such a tendency is Plato's equalization of morality and politics and his consideration of justice as a necessity of this equalization (Arslan, 2006, pp. 396–401). Aristotle, too, evaluates justice within the framework of virtues. He considers justice inclusive as it carries all the virtues within, claiming it is the most self-sufficient virtue. Because all other virtues are based on the individual essentially, justice deals with the self and another individual. Therefore, justice is the perfect virtue for Aristotle because it requires both active practice and social and political virtue. He defined justice as convenience with laws, because laws have to be right and just by their essence. This is Aristotle's universal definition of justice. However, a private version of justice finds its shape through fairness and equity. Its primary domain concerns not doing wrong to another and giving one their due. He evaluates this version of justice in two ways: distributive and corrective. Distributive justice prioritizes some *things* that can be distributed within a society, like honor and wealth; statesmen are responsible for this distribution. If he distributes

justly, he is considered a just man. However, such a distribution does not mean it has to be done equally; in contrast, it has to follow a proportional path, where merit and worthiness should be considered. On the other hand, corrective justice is responsible for restoring situations to their original positions when an injustice happens between transactions within a society; magistrates are responsible for this type of justice. Corrective justice is not relative like distributive justice; its provisions are fixed and absolute. A magistrate can be called a just man if he obeys these provisions. However, Aristotle adds, there are some cases where it is impossible to restore the situation to its original position—like murder; magistrates prefer to choose a punishment option in these cases. Finally, Aristotle mentions a type of justice that deals with societal exchanges. Accordingly, neither statesmen nor magistrates are responsible for it; the needs and demands within a society determine this type of justice. People cannot craft everything; they have limited possessions at their disposal, but their needs vary. Thus, an exchange is inevitable, where proportional equity comes to the scene—like one hundred shoes are a suitable payment for a house to be built. Aristotle claims that it is hard to claim justice in its original meaning; reconciling different needs and demands is the question here, which is the innate reason for establishing society in the first place (Arslan, 2007, pp. 263–270).

The Stoics, whose thoughts have some serious influence over Roman philosophy afterwards, equate justice with virtue. They reject any in-between status of being virtuous and being unvirtuous; a person is either virtuous or unvirtuous. That is, by looking at the same lens, there is no in-between status between justice and cruelty. Like a straight or curved wooden stick, a person is either just or cruel. In the same vein, there is no difference between drowning one foot ahead of the water surface or one mile; in other words, a person either drowns or does not, similar to whether they are virtuous or not (Arslan, 2008, pp. 402–403). Cicero, for instance, claims that each action has to follow three principles: reason should control motive, the importance of purpose should be taken into consideration, and moderation should be in effect (Cicero, 2020, p. 61). Thus, people cannot do injustice to others for their own benefit, and if a community desires to become a society, the benefits of individuals should be the benefits of society (Cicero, 2020, pp. 119–121). Because injustice is immoral, and morally evil things cannot be beneficial (Cicero, 2020, p. 130)—separating benefit from morality shatters the central principle of nature (Cicero, 2020, p. 153). These ideas became influential in the Roman administration, and by moving from Cicero's conceptualizations of justice, justice was considered a civic virtue in Roman culture. Aside from not harming anyone and promoting good in society, justice was championed as being kind to others in a society (Atkins, 2018, p.

77). These comments on justice enabled the Romans to flourish in the practical side of justice and rhetoric. Roman bureaucrats, who became successful in these fields, were elevated to magistrates and lawyers. Their central focus was to protect and preserve *Pax Romana*; this is why Pontius Pilate (the Roman governor of the Judaea region) did not hesitate to trade the life of Prophet Jesus with the social order (Roberts, 1997, pp. 69–70). Roman governors acted as magistrates and were responsible for hearing the cases in the courts. The Republican times did not allow the verdicts of the governors to become subject to an appeal, but in the Empire times, the cases were open to appeal to the Caesars (Richardson, 2015, pp. 51–52). Though this judicial approach had seen numerous changes in the course of time while preserving its essence, it is possible to say that the fathers of Christianity imitated the Roman conceptualization of justice as a civic virtue. Augustine, for instance, did not believe that the Romans respected justice in its most straightforward definition as giving someone what is due; in contrast, these pagans hesitated to give what belongs to God to *him*. According to Augustine, the Roman society was built upon justice and religion, which turned into civil virtue in time. However, the Romans forgot that true justice lies within God that passes through the love of Christ (Atkins, 2018, p. 88). Therefore, in the view of Augustine, sovereignty without justice is a mere organized brigandage. Alexander the Great, for instance, enlarged his band of criminals and planned to conquer the entire world. However, an ordinary pirate he caught managed to explain that they both perform their actions similarly without justice; he was labelled a pirate while Alexander was titled commander. Similarly, the empire that Romulus had once established was based on the same principle, but a few gladiators from Campania could tremble Italy. If the Romans were keenly believing that their gods had given them this unjust sovereignty, they must equally believe that the same gods had favored gladiators during their insurgence (Augustine, 2008, pp. 195–197).

Augustine's fall in attributing justice to God is not an individual tendency; both the Old and New Testaments have numerous verses on this matter. Psalms, a book of the Old Testament, for instance, claims that God loves righteousness (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 635)[26] while mentioning that God's throne is rising on top of justice and righteousness (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 685).[27] In the same vein, God openly counts *himself* as just (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913: 248)[28] and *he* is responsible for the dispense of justice

[26] [Psalms 11:7] For righteous is Jehovah, he loves righteousness; His countenance beholds the upright.
[27] [Psalms 89:14] Righteousness and judgment are the foundation of thy throne.
[28] [Deuteronomy 32:4] The Rock, perfect is his work; For all his ways are judgment; A God of faithfulness, and without iniquity, Righteous and upright is he.

on earth as well as being the judge of entire world (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, pp. 23–24, 1068–1069).[29] God of the Old Testament had also asked the people on earth to embrace justice in their dealings. For instance, in Micah 6:8, God says that *he* had shown the people what was good and asks them to be just in their actions as well as following *his* path proudly (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 1058)[30] while highlighting in Isaiah 1:17 that people should act right and seek justice (Holy Bible [The Old Testament], 1913, p. 779).[31] Almost identical arguments can be traced in the New Testament as well. In Romans 3:26, for example, God is not only seen as just alone but also has mercy on the sinners (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 193).[32] God was seen as a righteous judge in *his* verdicts (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 259),[33] and it was also underlined that *he* will give each person what is due (Holy Bible [The New Testament], 1913, p. 191).[34] God of the New Testament asks people to prioritize justice and faith in their lives, even in their religious rituals (Holy Bible, [The New Testament] 1913, pp. 38–39),[35] and not to administer justice in their own selves but trust in *his* justice instead (Holy Bible, [The New Testament] 1913, p. 202).[36] God of the Muslims had also characterized *himself* as just. For instance, in the Surah an-Nisa', God claims that *he* does not do any injustice, not even at the size of an atom (Itani, 2015, p. 34)[37] while highlighting that *he* has a just stance towards *his* subjects in the Surah Ali 'Imran (Itani, 2015: 30).[38] Similarly, in the final verse of the Surah al-Baqarah—which is a well-known verse by the Muslims, God claims that *he* does not burden people more than they can carry (Itani, 2015,

[29] [Exodus 18:25] Far be it from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, that the righteous should be as the wicked; far be it from thee. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? [Zephaniah 3:5] Jehovah is righteous in the midst of her; He does no evil; Every morning He brings to light his judgment, without fail; But the wicked man knows no shame.

[30] [Micah 6:8] He has told thee, O man, what is good; And what does Jehovah require of thee, But to do justly, and to love mercy, And to walk humbly with thy God?

[31] [Isaiah 1:14] Learn to do good; seek out justice, set right the oppressor, Judge the orphan, plead for the widow.

[32] [Romans 2:26] for the exhibition of his righteousness in this present time, that he may be righteous, and the justifier of him who believes in Jesus.

[33] [2 Timothy 4:8] henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, will give me at that day; and not to me only, but also to all those who have loved his appearing.

[34] [Romans 2:6–8] [6] who will render to every man according to his works, [7] to those who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life; [8] but to those who are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, wrath and indignation.

[35] [Matthew 23:23] Woe unto you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! Because ye pay tithe of mint and dill and cumin, and have omitted the weightier things of the law, judgment, and mercy, and faith; but these ought ye to have done, and not to have left those undone.

[36] [Romans 12:17–19] [17] Recompense to no one evil for evil. Provide things honorable in the sight of all men. [18] If it be possible, as far as depends on you, be at peace with all men. [19] Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give peace to the wrath [of God].

[37] [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 40] God does not commit an atom's weight of injustice; and if there is a good deed, He doubles it, and gives from His Presence a sublime compensation.

[38] [Surah Ali 'Imran (Family of Imran), Verse 182] This is on account of what your hands have forwarded, and because God is not unjust towards the creatures.

p. 20),[39] and *he* expects people to act following justice in their transactions (Itani, 2015, pp. 35–36).[40] On the other hand, the *hadith*s of Prophet Mohammad often deal with the administration of justice, which applies to those who exceed the boundaries *(hadd)* set by God. For instance, in a theme of *hadith* transferred by multiple narrators, it was claimed that the penalty of being drunk is hitting the accused several times; nuances differ in the tool as hands, palm-leaf stalks, and shoes as well as the number of hits, stretching from forty to eighty (Bukhari, 1997b, pp. 403–406). Similarly, it was reported that Prophet Mohammad had seen fit to cut off a thief's hand as the administration of justice; the narrators, however, did not reconcile with the value of the stolen item. Some claimed even a quarter of a *dinar* would be sufficient to execute this mutilation process, while others claimed the worth of the stolen item should be equal to a [specific type of] shield in its cost (Bukhari, 1997b, pp. 410–413).

The intellectuals of the Islamic Golden Age had benefited from the explanations of both the Quran and *hadith*s in their formulations of justice; however, they preferred to attach some elements to the concept. These attachments can be reviewed under three categories: the roles of celestial objects in justice, the philosophical deconstruction of justice, and the role of sultans in administering justice and being a just king. In this respect, it can be said that al-Kindi, considered the father of Arabic philosophy, emphasized the importance of planets in administering justice. According to him, when Jupiter is influential in planetary alignments, it helps judges in their work. At the same time, people tend to violate justice and transgress laws when the effective planet is Mars (Kindi, 2011, pp. 122–123). Al-Farabi, however, evaluates the concept of justice in a very different way. According to him, justice is essentially an artificial concept that was invented by the weak to achieve a balance against the strong. He claimed that people, from individuals to tribes and from ethnic groups to nations, try to dominate each other. The dominant ones claim everything the dominated have; thus, justice is the domination acquired by force, and it is in harmony with nature and is a virtue. However, when a balance is established between parties in terms of strength, that is, when everyone is as weak as everyone and when everyone is afraid of everyone, the concept of justice is redefined. This time, justice is conceptualized as giving what is due, not possessing anything by force, refraining from

[39] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 286] God does not burden any soul beyond its capacity. To its credit is what it earns, and against it is what it commits. "Our Lord, do not condemn us if we forget or make a mistake. Our Lord, do not burden us as You have burdened those before us. Our Lord, do not burden us with more than we have strength to bear; and pardon us, and forgive us, and have mercy on us. You are our Lord and Master, so help us against the disbelieving people".

[40] [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 58] God instructs you to give back things entrusted to you to their owners. And when you judge between people, judge with justice. God's instructions to you are excellent. God is All-Hearing, All-Seeing.

wrongdoings and harms, valuing fairness in trade, etc., and these newer understandings of justice are fortified with newly circulated laws. Therefore, the following generations of these people will eventually forget the genuine meaning of justice and adapt themselves to this new paradigm that comes with it (Farabi, 2017, pp. 137–139). Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, on the other hand, approached the concept of justice from the sides of the administration of justice and the elements of being a just king. In this respect, by utilizing some historical narratives, he claimed that al-Ma’mun, the seventh Abbasid caliph, did not even hesitate to take the side of an innocent against his own son. The innocent shouted during the trial, but he interpreted that situation as God had given that permission. Additionally, ‘Abd Rabbih believed that the most just person on earth is the one who behaves justly with their soul, while the cruelest person is the one who tyrannizes others for their own advantage. This is why justice brings wealth to society while cruelty causes famines (Abdirabbih, 2021, pp. 42–46). Next to that, ‘Abd Rabbih cited Hasan al-Basri’s letter to Umar ibn ‘Abd al-Aziz, the eighth Umayyad caliph, where it was mentioned how to become a just king. Accordingly, a just king must shelter the oppressed, be compassionate to his subjects, focus on the welfare of his people, consider orphans, and serve as a bridge between God and people. In this case, the just king resembles the heart in the body; his wellness brings wellness to the body, and his corruption brings corruption to the body. Quoting from the Quran, as nothing will remain hidden on the day of judgment,[41] it was advised that a just king must never forget to give just decisions to the cases that exceed the limits set by God (Abdirabbih, 2021, pp. 48–51).

Jean Bodin approximated justice and order; according to him, the order of a state, or with his words, the order of a *commonweale*, can only be secured with the laws. That is, the laws and their practices can provide welfare to society, guaranteeing the public order (Lewis, 2006, p. 12). Hugo Grotius had taken this kind of internal approach to justice and interpreted it at the interstate level, which, in turn, required several states to participate in this interpretation. According to him, the concept of war, which has more than one party and occurs internationally, does not carry justice within. Because all the participants call their wars just, and claim they have the right to fight, thus, the definition of justice is required at the global level. Grotius underlined that the concept of injustice has a hideous meaning for societies but has an innate relation with the rational creatures: human beings. In this case, people abhor others and call

[41] [Surah al-Kahf (The Cave), Verse 49] And the book will be placed, and you will see the sinners fearful of its contents. And they will say, “Woe to us! What is with this book that leaves nothing, small or big, but it has enumerated it?” They will find everything they had done present. Your Lord does not wrong anyone (Itani, 2015, p. 125).

them unjust when they deny submitting to what belongs to another. Therefore, justice becomes subject to reciprocal relations, from parents and children to kings and subjects, as well as God and human beings. That is, justice does not have to be executed between equals, and claims of the states as waging a just war while highlighting that as a right. Grotius accepts this argument and adds that not all wars are unjust. His formulation on this matter is straightforward: if the law of nature is valid for humans, then the same law can be applied to nations, in which it transforms into the law of nations. Akin to Abraham's war against Sodom—which God celebrated, some wars are in harmony with justice. Therefore, if there is a voluntary act between two individuals, we cannot speak of justice within the realm of the law of nature; similarly, a voluntary participation in war cannot be condemned as being against justice within the realm of the law of nations (Grotius, 2016, pp. 1–3, 13–15). Samuel von Pufendorf takes justice from where Grotius left off and tailors it with a vivid example. In this case, if there is an open public position and only one individual is suitable for the post, how can we calibrate whether that individual is perfect or imperfect? Pufendorf claimed that if they were an imperfect candidate, then we could discuss a universal justice here (Pufendorf, 1934, p. 121). Because if they were a perfect candidate, then the discussion would revolve around the concepts of equity and fairness. However, equity has a broader scope, and its duties and responsibilities are larger than those of justice (Pufendorf, 1934, pp. 32–33). This is how Pufendorf divided justice into two as universal and particular. In this sense, universal justice aims to pay due to others, without considering how large, big, or perfect that due is. On the other hand, particular justice deals with the perfect rights one owes another; the equality and proportionality of what was owed is important (Pufendorf, 1934, p. 119). Pufendorf quotes from Philostratus and claims that justice cannot be seen as the opposite of injustice; it refers to something extensive than that. Akin to the fact that no one praises another for not being evil, the concept of justice, which rests between praise and punishment at equal range, should not be immediately deemed a virtue (Pufendorf, 1934, p. 139).

Though these comments are more related to the practical side of justice, there were also some philosophical comments on the concept on the eve of the *Encyclopédie* project. For instance, Blaise Pascal's approach to the essence of justice is striking. According to him, there are various explanations on the source of justice; some claim it is the legislator's authority, some claim the sovereign's interest, and others claim the source of justice is the existing customs. He believes the customs are closer in explaining their essence, because understandings of justice vary with moving from one climate to another, and from one meridian to another.

Some people believe in the impact of celestial alignments on justice, and a just action in France can be deemed unjust on the other side of the Pyrenees (Spain). This is how Pascal rejects the existence of a universal justice; besides, according to him, justice is all about the magnitude of power. Justice is relative, but power is certain; that is why, the people, he adds, could not make the just powerful, instead, deemed the powerful just—hoping to establish peace and happiness with it (Pascal, 2017, pp. 140–144). This is why human beings are unable to fully comprehend the infinite nature of God's justice. Just as adding one (1) to infinity does not change its value, we cannot measure the extent of *his* compassion, mercy, and justice with reason alone. Instead, we understand this disparity through our imagination and faith (Pascal, 2017, pp. 109–111). According to Pascal, the same imagination often manipulates our stance towards justice; a sense of love or hate, for instance, can easily alter our sense of justice. Therefore, imagination prevails against reason, and complementary but majestic symbols of the magistrates, such as robes, furs, *fleurs-de-lys*, four-cornered hats, and the palaces of justice, conquer our reason with imagination; thus, we become more ready to believe justice was administered (Pascal, 2017, pp. 41–42). Montesquieu portrays magistrates as majestic officers and criticizes the power of the Ottoman judicial system. According to him, many people in France during his time believed that France should imitate the Ottoman justice system. Montesquieu rejects this view; he considers the Ottoman society the most ignorant community on earth, and their justice system aimed to close debates as quickly as possible. Administering justice was not a primary concern; their main goal was to resolve conflicts swiftly. Magistrates would briefly listen to both parties, give their verdicts, arbitrarily chastise the parties, and send them home. However, Montesquieu argues that justice should be administered with moderation, and the states should thoroughly investigate all sides of a case (Montesquieu, 2020, pp. 94–95). Diderot's thoughts on the role of magistrates in justice share similarities with Pascal and Montesquieu. He claimed that people consider magistrates as the masters of good and evil; they can decide what is just and unjust, what is false and true, what is beautiful and ugly—similar to the priests. People can easily abandon nature by living to satisfy themselves and remain good citizens (Diderot, 1992, p. 51). This is why Diderot warned the Tsarina Catherine in his *Observation sur le Nakaz* that the roles of magistrates should be separated into executive and legislative branches. Otherwise, they will neglect individuals in front of them if they are too occupied with their executive duties, or they will seek revenge from individuals and alter justice if the legislation passes some laws that do not fit with their worldview (Diderot, 1992, p. 106).

5.2.2. Justice in al-Rasa'il

The Ikhwan claim that anything we name in this world occurs between two opposites; therefore, justice means finding a balance between two cruelties (XXXI, p. 106). Justice is one of the good moralities (V, p. 155), and it must be remembered that, akin to the worth of happiness is known by distress, and health with illness, justice is known with cruelty (L, p. 203). As the Ikhwan pointed out, these two cruelties were illustrated via a scales metaphor, which had also found its resonance in a Quranic verse.[42] Accordingly, God's scales were the most precise, as *he* openly mentioned in the Quran; *he* did not mention ordinary or regular scales. That is, justice between humans has to be careful, delicate, and precise like God's (XXXIV, p. 178), so that the measurement would not bring out cruel outcomes. Similar to measuring weights in public market transactions, these measures must follow the principle of fairness and protection of rights in their effects (XLII, p. 361). With an understandable fact that the Ikhwan preferred to name themselves with *"Justice Experts"* among other epithets (*Fihrist*, pp. 15, 30), it is not surprising to witness the Ikhwan recommending people to read their epistles—to follow their path in realizing justice in their lives (XXVI, p. 332; XLIV, p. 31). In this respect, it is possible to review the Ikhwan's understanding of justice under three categories: justice in daily life, which can be read as 'justice of men', justice of God that is divine justice, and justice in the political/practical realm, which includes the sovereign's and magistrates' justice.

People's desires and needs innately make them ambitious, claimed the Ikhwan; however, it is unlikely to acquire everything desired and needed instantly. In this scenario, a just and fair person should take what was immediately needed by them; they should not ambitiously or enviously desire more than they need (IX, p. 242). The Ikhwan narrated a story about two travelers heading to the same destination, who took a break on the riverbank for lunch and shared their food in the middle. One had two, and the other had three pastries. They were just about to eat, but another traveler arrived, asked them to share their food with him, and he was welcomed. The third traveler ate some pastries, gave them five coins, told them to share the money equally, and left. Two travelers argued about this equal share: one claimed that the third traveler meant 2.5 coins per traveler, and the other insisted on sharing equally, per the number of pastries they originally had. They fought and took the dispute to the judge. The judge

[42] [Surah al-Anbiya (The Prophets), Verse 47] We will set up the scales of justice for the Day of Resurrection, so that no soul will suffer the least injustice. And even if it be the weight of a mustard-seed, We will bring it up. Sufficient are We as Reckoners (Itani, 2015, p. 138).

gave one coin to the two-pastries-owner and four coins to the three-pastries-owner. The Ikhwan claimed that the judge's decision was rightful, and he favored justice. Because, instead of determining justice by how many pastries these travelers initially had, he considers how many of their original pastries they gave up for the newly arrived traveler. This narrative, Ikhwan claimed, deftly explains that justice has no relation with equality but fairness (XLVI, p. 69). Concerning the themes of hunger for pastries and passion for money, this story brings forward a former dichotomy mentioned by the Ikhwan in the earlier pages: soul and body. Individuals born with the trait of moderation are more inclined to favor justice (IX, p. 208), and the venerated physician Galen approves of this. Because, according to him, a body with moderation in its temperament will make its governor, the soul, just (LII, p. 294). In the same vein, the Ikhwan underlined that if the soul chooses an unjust path in its decisions, the body will reflect this through a distorted, unattractive, and unhealthy physical appearance (XXVII, p. 20). Still, the original possessor of justice is the soul (VII, p. 179), and the philosophers emphasized this possession in several ways, such as listening to good music to prevent the soul from uncovering its animalistic features that do not align with justice. Winter's cold and moist qualities also cause the soul to feel just, similar to poetry that praises justice and good morality (V, pp. 155, 157). Therefore, a beautified soul requires justice within (XLVI, p. 94), and initially, this justice was instilled inside the soul, which comes with its ability to think (IX, p. 249). Still, such instillation has some external sources that humans become subject to. The primary source is the birth time of an individual; if they were born during a phase where the Sun, Mercury, or Jupiter's dominance was in effect, their soul would become more inclined to follow justice in their life (XXXVII, p. 221). Jupiter, in particular, allows them to become just and fair in their social relationships. According to the Ikhwan, the main characteristic of Jupiter is moderation (XL, p. 297; XXV, p. 302). In addition to these external sources that have impact on one's soul, as it was mentioned earlier in the fourth chapter under the Ikhwan's thoughts on morality, people living in the fourth belt of climates constitute 'the most just' people among the rest, only because this belt remains in the middle of the climates and its patron is directly the Sun (IV, pp. 123–124).

In harmony with their earlier discussions on various matters, as reviewed from the perspective of the Ikhwan, the role of reason was [once again] not bypassed in the realm of justice: the ability of one's reason and justice depends on the purity of their soul (VII, p. 176). The most distinguished feature of reason is the ability to make a choice; this choice encompasses knowing the truth and choosing to live a just life (IX, p. 265). Reason commands

us to follow justice, and the Ikhwan explained the link between body, soul, and reason with a story. According to this, a blind man and a cripple visited a garden and asked for food from the owner. The owner welcomed them and permitted them to eat the fruits of his garden, but not harm the trees. A few days later, the cripple persuaded the blind to climb his shoulder, and plucked better fruits on top of trees by hitting his walking stick. The caretaker realized the harm to the garden came from them, but gave them a second chance, which they abused with the same fruit-plucking technique. Thus, the caretaker told the owner this, and the owner abandoned these two ungrateful thieves in the desert to be hunted by wild animals. The Ikhwan resembled the soul to the cripple man, who uses his body (the blind) as a tool for its earthly (the garden) desires (better fruits). In this story, the garden owner was God *himself*, while the caretaker was reason. According to the Ikhwan, the caretaker, whose act was following justice, gave the soul a second chance to contemplate its choices (XXXI, pp. 130–132). Finding the correct choice with its reason is based on making a logical comparison between options, which was strongly embraced by philosophers, and is the first step to reach a just decision in the Ikhwanian way (XLII, p. 360). This is how Socrates reached a decision to drink poison willingly, which was prepared by the *sharia* (law) for his execution. Socrates balanced eleven just people who gave false testimony against him on one side of the scales, and the commitment of people to *sharia* on the other; thus, his reason compelled him to pursue justice between these sides, and he chose to take his own life rather than standing against the verdict to preserve society's loyalty to the communal statutes (XLIV, pp. 31–32). Thus, the Ikhwan claimed, individuals who use their reason can be proud of themselves for being just and fair (XXII, p. 161), because making comparisons with the assistance of reason is a just measurement that was also verified by the philosophers (*Fihrist*, p. 18).

In the second place, which is about justice in religion or divine justice, it is possible to see that the Ikhwan claimed God is just, and even the Zoroastrians acknowledge this characteristic of *him* (IX, pp. 210–211). The Quran testifies to this fact according to the Ikhwan, where God claims *he* is 'the most just' judge (XXXII, p. 157).[43] God, in this sense, is likened

[43] [Surah at-Tin (The Fig), Verses 4–8] [4] We created man in the best design. [5] Then reduced him to the lowest of the low. [6] Except those who believe and do righteous deeds; for them is a reward without end. [7] So why do you still reject the religion? [8] Is God not the Wisest of the wise? (Itani, 2015, p. 271). The eighth verse here clearly states بِأَحْكَمِ الْحَاكِمِينَ *(bi'ahkami al-ḥākimīn)* phrase in its original Arabic form, in which it can be translated as "the judge of judges" or "the best/most supreme judges". This word, *al-ḥākim* can also be translated as "sovereign" and "wise" while the phrase can be translated as "the best of sovereigns" or "the best of wises"; but as we see the God warns non-believers and mentions a reward in the previous verses, the correct translation should be about the concept of judge and judgment. Therefore, it feels like Itani's translation did not consider earlier verses and the contextual meaning of the eighth verse.

to a just sultan by the Ikhwan, who gives everyone what they deserve (XXIX, p. 48). *His* insistence on justice and asking humans to be just is a blessing for human beings, according to the Ikhwan (XXII, p. 199), and such a blessing has shown itself in two forms. First, God created all entities with *his* justice; for instance, *he* gave the elephant a gigantic physical form, but even a child could ride it. Similarly, the camel obeys anyone's herding so long that its leash is pulled; some tiny insects or a grasshopper can easily kill a giant elephant or camel with a simple stroke (XXII, p. 249). Second, God followed a just path in allocating *his* blessings to *his* subjects; some 'chosen' creatures of *his* receive *his* blessings more, while some do not receive any. God denies them as a punishment, reflecting *his* justice according to the Ikhwan (IX, pp. 234, 242). One should follow the path of justice and fairness in this life to receive blessings of God (IX, p. 254), and *he* has sent *his* books to people on earth that guide them to a just life (XV, p. 14). People who do not follow this divine path that leads a just life for them and do not obey God's rules cannot enter Heaven, as it was clearly stated in the Quran (XXVII, p. 12).[44] Because, according to the Ikhwan, obedience is one of the sacred names of God, with which the existence of the earth and the skies keep going (IX, p. 240). God's wisdom and *his* selected paths towards instituting justice cannot be known to an individual, and the Ikhwan explained this with a parable. Accordingly, an unnamed prophet went to a spring to purify himself before praying to God, and to a quiet place afterwards. He saw a cavalier come to the spring, drink water, forget his purse, and leave. A young shepherd soon arrived at the spring, took the purse, and left. The cavalier returned to the spring and asked an old woodcutter resting next to the water about the purse. After receiving a negative answer about the purse's location, he killed the old man. The prophet, puzzled, asked God of such a performance of divine justice, which he thought would be more suitable for the old woodcutter to receive the purse instead of the young shepherd. God then explained *his* justice, revealed that the old man's father had killed the cavalier's father years ago, and the cavalier's deceased father owed the shepherd's father the same amount of money in the purse. According to the Ikhwan, God had enacted a divine form of *lex talionis,*[45] whose wisdom and justice cannot be questioned (XLII, pp. 404–405).

[44] [Surah al-A'raf (The Elevations), Verse 40] Those who reject Our revelations and are too arrogant to uphold them -the doors of Heaven will not be opened for them, not they will enter Paradise, until the camel passes through the eye of the needle. Thus, We repay the guilty (Itani, 2015, p. 63).

[45] Justice by retaliation, which is known as the "eye for an eye" principle by the people throughout history, aims to balance harm to establish justice with an appropriate retribution.

The Ikhwan claimed that divine justice is a clear command, and God insists that people obey *his* judgment by following the path *he* has seen fit for the people (XLVII, p. 108).[46] Nevertheless, the Ikhwan claimed that *his* justice cannot be evaluated using reason; people may misinterpret God's judgments. For instance, the divine law of inheritance favors two shares for men and one share for women. If justice were evaluated by reason, people might think reverse sharing would be fairer since women have fewer opportunities to earn money. However, the Ikhwan emphasize that divine justice equalizes women's smaller inheritance shares with their rights to receive dowry *(mahr)*, which is women's natural and divine right received before marriage (XLVI, p. 69). God had sent prophets to explain these nuances in *his* justice to human beings, and these prophets follow a lifestyle that draws parallelism with divine justice (IX, p. 265). As God clearly stated in the Quran, *he* had sent these prophets[47] to become examples to others in their practices of justice, which people should follow them in their lives as well and not to find excuses afterwards (XXV, pp. 314–315).[48] Thus, the Ikhwan claimed, God has valued the scales of justice in transactions of *his* creations (*Fihrist*, p. 20), the lives of prophets are balanced and just (XXVII, p. 16), and individuals following this path will become as just as the prophets (XXVIII, p. 33). This is why pious people like the 'friends of God' and ascetics share a common trait in their lives: justice (XXII, p. 257; IX, p. 245).

In the final categorization, it is possible to say that the Ikhwan had attributed a special place to practicing justice in the political realm. Such a practice shows itself within two closely connected subjects, the sovereign and the magistrates, with a specific name in the Islamic terminology as the *qadi*. As the Ikhwan's understanding of the sovereign for taking *his* power from God, which was reviewed earlier, they believe that kings are God's *caliph*s on earth, and are obliged to rule with justice (XXII, pp. 174, 212). These kings either favor the material world in their doings, which end up with cruelty, or seek afterlife salvation and rule with justice (XLVII, pp. 101–102). Thus, kings are expected to understand God's wisdom and justice from the outset to mirror *his* justice in their doings and create a better society (*Fihrist*, p. 26). This is why the Ikhwan counted twelve separate traits of a just king, which they believe these should

[46] [Surah al-An'am (Livestock), Verse 153] This is My path, straight, so follow it. And do not follow the other paths, lest they divert you from His path. All this He has enjoined upon you, that you may refrain from wrongdoing (Itani, 2015, p. 61).

[47] [Surah al-Baqarah (The Heifer), Verse 213] Humanity used to be one community; then God sent the prophets, bringing good news and giving warnings. […] (Itani, 2015, p. 14), and [Surah al-Hadid' (Iron), Verse 26] We sent Noah and Abraham, and established in their line Prophethood and the Scripture. Some of them are guided, but many of them are sinners (Itani, 2015, p. 240).

[48] [Surah an-Nisa' (Women), Verse 163] Messengers delivering good news, and bringing warnings, so that people may have no excuse before God after the coming of the messengers. God is Powerful and Wise (Itani, 2015, p. 42).

be instilled *him* innately: [1] wholeness and strength of his body, [2] fast comprehension and quick thinking, [3] rapid memorizing and retaining, [4] a brilliant and witted mind, [5] competency in rhetoric, [6] cherishing knowledge and wisdom, [7] valuing righteousness and fair treatment, [8] snubbing addiction to humane delights, [9] a zealous and high soul, [10] not valuing worldly goods, [11] embracing justice and just people, and [12] courage and fearlessness (XLVII, pp. 102–103). Considering the fact that governing masses requires a fair and just sharing within the society (VII, p. 185), it is the people's right to demand justice from the kings (XXII, p. 211). In the same vein, for the Ikhwan, one must obey their leader to be deemed a just and honorable person (IX, pp. 241–242). Thus, it is possible to say that the king's justice was originally a reciprocal practice for the Ikhwan, and such reciprocity showed itself in the Prophet Mohammad's advice. Accordingly, the Prophet claims that producing evidence in judicial cases is mandatory to receive justice, for both the ruler and the subject (XXII, p. 176). Because *the* religion commands entire humanity to follow justice in their doings (IX, p. 227); therefore, one who seeks justice from the rulers should prove their arguments, and the judgment process should advance with reciprocal explanations in the form of a debate (XXII, p. 187). Naturally, such a judicial progress introduces another authority to the explanations of the Ikhwan: the magistrates. In their account, Jupiter is a just magistrate amongst the celestial embodiments (XXXVIII, p. 259), and one born under Jupiter's effect will fancy the truth in their life (III, p. 101). God's justice rests between *his* standards of truth and measurements of it, claimed the Ikhwan; that is why *he* assigns magistrates to dispense justice among the conflicting people. These magistrates dispense justice by consulting reason and showing no tolerance to any parties that come before them (XIII, pp. 301–302). The magistrate's justice, therefore, should not be carried out under the influence of one's sense of superiority (XXII, p. 192); instead, a balance between boasting about superior traits and repenting for wickedness is what a magistrate needs to see in the court when making *his* fair and just decisions (XXII, p. 201). Still, the Ikhwan's reciprocal balance in the courts is also evident in their criticism towards the parties. In their account, people favor an arrogant stance in their debates with yelling, to receive an upper hand in their cases (XXII, p. 179). At the same time, the magistrates purchase their posts from the sovereign with money and fall into the pit of cruelty by accepting bribes from the people who seek justice from them. The Ikhwan claim that such magistrates were condemned in the Old Testament, in the New Testament, and in the Quran since they desecrate God and *his* commands on establishing justice (XXII, pp. 247–248).

5.2.3. Justice in the *Encyclopédie*

Justice is defined as the obligation to give everyone what belongs to them in the *Encyclopédie* (Diderot, 1755, p. 115). With this understanding, it is possible to categorize the Encyclopedists' approach to justice into three groups, similar to the Ikhwan's, in order to examine the concept from a broader perspective: justice of humans, justice of God, and justice in practice—which is jurisdiction.

Justice is placed within the set of virtues by the *Encyclopédie*. The definition of justice as *"giving everyone what belongs to them"* includes both ourselves, others, and God. It encompasses all our duties. This is why, for the *Encyclopédistes*, being just has the same meaning as being virtuous. Because, in a strict line between a duty and a virtue, the philosophy of justice realizes itself by giving back to the mentioned parties what we owe them (*Justice*, 1765, p. 88). Naturally, the word 'owe' brings some properties to the scene, either tangible or intangible. Acting against justice, in this owing process, creates a vice. Vice, however, is different from faults and errors. According to the *Encyclopédie*, the central reason for an error is wrongly measuring the probabilities, while the primary reason for a vice is wrongly measuring the properties (Diderot & Jaucourt, 1765). This is why people often confuse justice with equity. Justice tends to follow strict laws and established rules, but equity is more flexible and considers the specific circumstances of an action. Therefore, it is safe to say that equity is about fairness and conscience, while justice often requires a punishment or reward (Jaucourt, 1755c, p. 894). This flexibility trait of equity, thus, is neither a good nor an evil quality; it is the circumstance that makes it a vice or a virtue (Diderot, 1765g). Human beings carry all the central principles of virtues within themselves, says the *Encyclopédie*; thus, virtue and justice are not artificial constructs created by codes or rulers. The sovereign's will cannot be the origin of justice or morality—it would be an absurd source. If that were the case, rights and wrongs would have been arbitrary concepts and would be in constant flux. They would then demolish people's justice perspective, making justice unstable and unreliable (Romilly & Seguiran, 1765, p. 178). Thus, the *Encyclopédie* claims, equity is the foundation or cause of justice, and justice is the manifestation or effect of equity (Diderot, 1755, p. 116). The legislators, therefore, should follow the central principles of virtue engraved within humans if they wish to enact laws that last longer. Because the basis of civil society and legislation are constituted upon these principles, and they are historically older than the emergence of the codes and governments (Romilly & Seguiran, 1765, p. 178). Such neglect by legislators causes public corruption, which manifests in two forms: non-compliance with good laws and enforcement of bad laws.

Authorities, therefore, prefer to abolish bad laws to prevent such corruption because it is easier to carry out. However, following good laws is more difficult because it requires personal integrity (Diderot, 1754).

As one may see, justice has an intimate relation with the individual for the *Encyclopédie*, and the virtue s/he carries within. The *Encyclopédie* explains the philosophical background of justice with another concept: charity. The primary need of humans is not suffering from evil or harm, and the primary duty is to do no evil or harm to anyone—to life, to honor, and to property in particular. Harms done to humans' central features will automatically harm society's feelings towards justice and charity. Both justice and charity derive from what we owe to others; one cannot harm justice without harming charity, and one can harm charity without harming justice. A clear example of such a strict judgment is as follows: if one does not prefer to give alms to a beggar, not justice but charity is harmed. On the other hand, if one does not pay his/her debt, justice is harmed first, and charity's harm follows. Therefore, as the *Encyclopédie* highlights, charity is about compassion, but justice is about maintaining rights and obligations (*Justice*, 1765, p. 88). Within these parameters, compassion is an affliction one feels when seeing, hearing about, or recalling someone else's suffering; it is an affliction that gives pleasure to a person. The *Encyclopédie* quoted this Latin couplet:

> *Non quia vexari quemquam est jucunda voluptas,*
> *Sed quibus ipse malis careas, quia cernere suave est*.[49]

The pleasure coming from 'within' originates from one's innate sense of being human. The more suffering we observe, the more compassion we develop. That is why people sometimes test their compassionate feelings; witnessing a public execution is one example. People do not attend these events because they are cruel or barbaric, but because they seek emotional responses to suffering, justice, and moral balance (d'Alembert, 1753). Perhaps this is not the purest form of compassion but a broader and more complex emotional dynamic. The key point of compassion here, as the *Encyclopédie* highlighted, is the connection of justice with the restoration of moral balance by facing the consequences of a wrongdoing. Essentially, this is a feeling of humanity because humanity is a feeling of benevolence for all humans, which aims to abolish misfortune. It hides the faults of our fellow humans or prevents us from feeling these faults. At the same time, that very humanitarian feeling makes us sensitive to crimes, which contributes to us becoming better friends, spouses, and citizens (Saint-Lambert, 1765).

[49] "It is not because it is pleasant to see someone else suffer / But because you are free from those same miseries, it is sweet to witness them".

The stress of misfortune here is the key for the *Encyclopédie* because we call fortune a sequence of events that make a person happy or unhappy (d'Alembert, 1757, p. 205). This is why Fortuna, as the pagan goddess who is blind and the daughter of Jupiter, has always been the most revered deity (Jaucourt, 1757a, p. 206). Human beings should not complain about their chances, claimed the *Encyclopédie*, because chance is beyond our reach. Thus, a person cannot make themselves lucky; they are either lucky or not (Diderot, 1753a). Chance, therefore, is blind, and fortune brings us a good or a bad while making us happy or unhappy (Morellet, 1756, p. 422). A man, thus, may harm or contribute to another man's happiness (Diderot, 1753a). Considering the fact that the degenerated version of Fortuna's name, fortune, covers a meaning of wealth or being rich, such a contribution or harm best shows itself in social justice. There are millions of needy people in every country, claims the *Encyclopédie*. The sovereigns prefer to make fortunes for themselves instead of assisting in eradicating the unfortunate people's needs. Such a preference might be lawful in the legal sense, but it is a crime in the moral sense; it is against both natural law and humanity—producing injustice. It might be explained with reason that it is required to fill the vaults of state with consideration of possible future dire times; but multiplying unfortunate people today for the sake of filling the vault resembles cutting one's arm to provide extra food for another. Such a preference produces inequality and injustice: one will perish of hunger while another fills to burst (d'Alembert, 1757, p. 206). A man may acquire a fortune by working hard, but his personal qualities cannot increase his chances (Diderot, 1753a). Thus, according to the *Encyclopédie*, the just way to acquire fortune passes through hard labor and perseverance in working. By quoting from a dialogue from Newton, the Encyclopedists claim that a man asked Newton how he was able to find the system of the world, and he replied with *"By thinking about it constantly"* (d'Alembert, 1757, p. 206). Therefore, looking from the same window as the Encyclopedists, it is possible to say that injustice is the violation of the rights of others, often the unfortunate, by greed, sensuality, anger, ambition, etc. It must be remembered that an innocent person has the right to live, to maintain their bodily integrity, and receive necessary sustenance. That is, violating these rights is called injustice by the *Encyclopédie*; no knowledge of human laws is required to know these are wrong (Jaucourt, 1765u).

The *Encyclopédie*, by summarizing from Montesquieu, claims that extremely happy or extremely unhappy people tend to violate justice; they become cruel. This situation can be observed both in the conquest mechanism and its outcomes, as well as in the unhappy peasants of some European countries. Only mediocrity and a mixture of good and bad fortune will bring gentleness and pity, therefore, justice (Jaucourt, 1754b, p. 518). People carry an understanding

within themselves that wrongdoings to someone occur because there is a conflict of interest or conflict of rights in this scenario. The *Encyclopédie* challenges such an opinion. Accordingly, the Encyclopedists ask whether a person has a right to expect both the good we owe them (in terms of charity) and the harm we owe them to avoid (in terms of justice). Thus, why do the faults against charity not harm others' rights, but they do when justice is violated? According to the *Encyclopédie*, justice is about fulfilling obligations, but charities are mere actions beyond anything strict (*Justice*, 1765, p. 88). Moving from this point, the *Encyclopédie* expresses both surprise and concern that people tend to possess some ill views against the broader sense of humanity, which surfaces during the discussions of justice in particular. For example, punishing criminals after executing the death penalty, like mutilation or desecration of the corpse, is a form of injustice—a cruelty. We tend to accept a notion, a principle that the entire universe is at human beings' disposal, and the Scripture also accepts it. However, interpreting this principle arbitrarily should not legitimize injustice and cruelty; else, the notion of humanity will turn into inhumanity. The people owe humans justice and kindness; we owe compassion to the misfortunes of even our enemies. One should remember, the *Encyclopédie* emphasizes, that compassion is a universal sentiment connecting all humans and guiding them toward the same fate (Jaucourt, 1754b, pp. 518–519). People should endure the fault of others and forgive them; this is a characteristic of enlightened virtue. Judging people with some 'ideas of perfection' will bring nothing to a person—a virtuous behavior is a just behavior (*Indulgence*, 1765).

Fault and sins are against justice and require repair and restitution. However, faults and sins against charity do not produce such a result. When someone is offended by our actions or our lack of action, we owe that person a repair or restitution. Nevertheless, the *Encyclopédie* adds that when we do not owe any repair to that person, it means none of their rights were violated. That is, if no tangible harm was done, asks the *Encyclopédie*, can we genuinely say that person was truly offended or wronged? To explain this philosophical question, the *Encyclopédie* explained an imaginary scenario. Accordingly, assuming we live in a world where all faults are opposed to charity but not justice, and one person treats another unkindly, say, one insults another. In this case, is restitution required? The *Encyclopédie* claims it is required, not for harming one's honor, but also violating one's contentment and satisfaction with life. That is, harms can also be intangible, and these should be repaired as well. In the same vein but in the opposite direction, we may assume that one injured the other badly. The injured gave up applying to the court and demanded financial compensation from the attacker. The injured person has the right to demand more money than adequate compensation, says the

Encyclopédie, because such a situation has harmed both their physical condition and honor. They might not be a high-status individual but a lower one; still, they might exchange the violation of their honor with money, which should be regarded as a legitimate choice. Therefore, the physical harm will naturally be compensated by the perpetrator of injustice; however, they also might see themselves as owed to compensate for the emotional harm the other caused, by giving some comfort to the injured in different ways, like providing better food, certain conveniences, etc. The one who caused injustice must repair the pain they caused, says the *Encyclopédie*; they owe satisfaction to the harmed, equal to the displeasure they had given (*Justice*, 1765).

The *Encyclopédie* believes that God must act harmoniously with the highest moral standards; justice is among them. However, such a necessity is not a fatalistic necessity but a moral one. That necessity aligns with free will and moral choice (*Dieu*, 1754, p. 980). This understanding is also valid for the pagans. For instance, they reject the holiness and justice of God but still accept *his* existence and power. Atheists, however, reject anything about God. Their tendency on this matter resembles the desire to destroy the Sun only because its rays burn their skin (Yvon, 1751, p. 802). Still, the paganist justice of God is not entirely in denial, says the *Encyclopédie*; the divine justice aims to restore order and moral balance to the world. Therefore, God intervenes in the universe to make things operate justly (*Providence*, 1765, p. 512). This is why the ancients (Greek and Roman) attributed the omnipotent characteristic of God to Jupiter; distributed duties to others like wisdom to Minerva and justice to Juno, the queen of the gods (*Dieux*, 1754, p. 983; Jaucourt, 1765v, p. 59). Themis, for instance, who was seen as the daughter of heaven and earth, and aunt of Jupiter, was deemed goddess of justice. She was known for her prudence and love for justice. As an antique fable tells us, according to the *Encyclopédie*, she wanted to keep her virginity, but Jupiter forced her to marry her. She had three daughters from this marriage: equity, law, and peace (Jaucourt, 1765y). Pagans struggled to reconcile the idea of divine justice with their metaphysical understanding of the concept of God. This is why, as the *Encyclopédie* claims, they gave no active roles to them in rewarding or punishing human behavior. Since reward and punishment were excluded from the equation, their idea of divine justice became more abstract (*Providence*, 1765, pp. 512–513).

The *Encyclopédie* claims that the existence of God is certain—an infinitely perfect being exists. Justice is a fundamental aspect of *his* nature and part of *his* infinite perfection. This is why it must be remembered that God's actions are always just. However, an important nuance should also be taken into consideration: justice is not something attached to God; it is an

essential part of *his* perfection, similar to love, wisdom, and power. Moving from this clarification, the *Encyclopédie* states that *his* actions, including the creation, are just. Similarly, God had created human beings and asked them to mirror *his* justice in their lives. Therefore, as the Encyclopedists emphasized, human beings should live by reflecting God's justice. In other words, it is humans' duty to know God's supremacy and act by observing God's justice. Such justice can also be seen in all other domains, and the *Encyclopédie* gave an example through love: if human beings follow God's justice in their thoughts and actions, then they should love God at most first, and *his* creations second: this is the just way (*Religion Naturelle*, 1765, pp. 80–81). A clear example of earthly justice by following this method is shown with a criticism of Hobbes. Accordingly, Hobbes was keenly convinced that the injustices people face presuppose human laws. The *Encyclopédie* rejects such a comment because God's natural laws bestowed upon humans are sufficient for determining justice (Jaucourt, 1765u); whatever is against natural law and natural duty that comes with it, is vice (Diderot & Jaucourt, 1765). By quoting Montaigne, the *Encyclopédie* underlines that religion commands us to have affection even for animals and treat them with justice. Because there is a connection between them and us, which foresees a mutual obligation (Jaucourt, 1754b, p. 519).

According to the *Encyclopédie*, the atheists deem justice and civil government neither good nor desirable concepts; they assert that these institutions limit human freedom. Still, they consider their creations as lesser evils, invented by people to avoid the harms that come with the state of war. Their stress here is to explain the link between the sovereign and justice. That is, if the sovereign has an unlimited power (which can be read as God simultaneously), *his* will becomes the ultimate source of justice, in which *he* can demand obedience to any command then, regardless of seeking any moral conditions (Yvon, 1751a, p. 816). Still, the *Encyclopédie* felt it had to find a reason for atheists to observe justice, and this is how they presented Pierre Bayle's thoughts as a witness. Accordingly, Bayle claims that hope and fear determine human behavior. However, he found these insufficient in explaining the basis of moral reasoning; they fell short of living virtuously. This is why he had seen honor and infamy as the secondary motivators. Therefore, even the atheists—who do not believe in God or divine consequences, were not immune from feeling social pressure in their perspectives of justice; thus, fear and hope amalgamated with honor and infamy: desire for honor and fear of disgrace. That is, the atheists seek to be men of honor even though they do not have any positive stance towards divine justice. Moving from this conclusion, Bayle exemplified his thoughts by reviewing some savage atheists living in some remote islands of Africa and America. These people do not have

any civil laws, civil polices or magistrates; but they still live in peace. Therefore, it is possible to expect them to live well within the civil society; they may even become more reasonable in such a social structure. Because the people living in civil society prevent some of their fellow citizens from committing injustice with some general laws. The *Encyclopédie* develops an optimistic conclusion by leaning on Bayle's thoughts. Thus, it was claimed that even atheists can possess a natural inclination towards justice and virtue. People are born with a natural sense of empathy, claims the *Encyclopédie*, coupled with the love for others and some virtues that bind the society together; believing in God is not required to have these traits. Therefore, there is no such principle that only God can provide moral behavior. In some cases, even an atheist might become more inclined to act with malice or deceit. Because, the *Encyclopédie* adds, their religious faith may serve as a shield of excuse for their immoral behavior that causes injustice (Yvon, 1751, pp. 806, 810-811, 813).

The *Encyclopédie* counts several types of justice, like distributive justice, which focuses on a fair distribution of goods and benefits within a society, commutative justice, which focuses on fairness in exchanges between individuals, and Pufendorf's universal and particular categories of justice, which received severe criticism from the Encyclopedists for not being clear and valuable. Beyond that, perhaps the most comprehensive justice type in the conclusions of the *Encyclopédie* shows itself over a division of justice into two sets: perfect/rigorous justice and imperfect/non-rigorous justice. In this respect, the perfect justice focuses on fulfilling what is due to other people. This process is executed under a perfect and rigorous right. If the harmed/injured is unsatisfied with the compensation, s/he has the right to demand enforcement by force. Naturally, this kind of perfect justice is seen between two parties; however, these parties do not have to be of equal status. The expected and customary execution of such a type of justice is observed between citizens. Next to that, however, another type of perfect justice leans on the relationship between the inferior and superior. This type changes from one society to another, and it is based on the command and obedience mechanism. The imperfect justice, on the other hand, comes with imperfect obligation. That is, it cannot be demanded by force; its fulfillment is left to the honor and conscience of each individual (*Justice*, 1765, p. 89). Though perfect and imperfect justice types were reviewed in detail in the previous pages, the *Encyclopédie*'s stress on the justice type that executes itself between the inferior and superior is crucial since the legal procedures of practicing justice were explained through this kind of justice between unequal parties. The *Encyclopédie* attributed such justice to the sovereigns first, and the magistrates second.

By explaining such justice in reverse, the *Encyclopédie* claimed that the injustice and cruelty of a sovereign originate either from *his* cowardice or tyranny. For instance, Emperor Maurice believed a soldier named Phocas would kill him and wondered about the character of this man. The report indicated that he was a coward. Thus, the *Encyclopédie* claims, the emperor was convinced that Phocas would definitely kill him. Similarly, Augustus mentioned that cowardice and cruelty are sisters. He proved this maxim of his by showing injustice to his men in the Battle of Philippi, where he abandoned his army and allowed the barbaric actions of his soldiers towards the prisoners. Tyrants are known for injustice, says the *Encyclopédie*; they are the violators of the most holy rights in society; they practice injustice and cruelty to maintain their throne. Philip of Macedon, for example, seized the children of families he had slaughtered, only to secure his own peace. Similarly, Tiberius, who rose to power by trickery, committed several unjust and barbaric actions. At some point in his life, he had developed an immense self-disgust that he preferred to choose Caligula as his successor, who was more cowardly than himself. Thus, Tiberius expected people to forget his wrongdoings and injustice. Caligula proved the prophecy of Tiberius and became so wicked in his unjust actions that he delighted to hear the groans of people he ordered to be killed; he practiced an extreme form of injustice and sadism. The *Encyclopédie* quoted the words of Suetonius—a famous Roman historian, and claimed that true clemency and moderation involve only punishing those who have directly offended the sovereign, which goes against what tyrants do. Therefore, it is safe to say for the Encyclopedists that when someone is cruel in civil society, natural kindness and gentleness quickly leave the scene; the harshness of justice, which is often called with the 'necessary discipline' words by some inflexible individuals, can easily suffocate all the inherent feelings of pity (Jaucourt, 1754b, pp. 517–518). This is how the kings and princes of Europe, and their vassals, slaughtered everything in Jerusalem during the Crusades. No distinction of sex or age was considered; they raped women first, and massacred them afterwards. Such a holy region as Jerusalem, the *Encyclopédie* adds, witnessed such a practice of injustice as that (Jaucourt, 1754b, p. 518). By referencing Charles Loyseau, the *Encyclopédie* claims that military virtue is only in effect during the war. However, justice should be in effect at both war and peace: to prevent war at peace, and to restore peace at war. Therefore, strength without justice is not a virtue but a form of violence (Boucher d'Argis, 1765t).

Practicing justice, which shows itself in the realm of jurisprudence and focuses on the knowledge of all that is fair and unfair, has two objects according to the *Encyclopédie*: one who has the knowledge of law, and one who administers the law (Boucher d'Argis, 1765u, p. 81).

An amalgamation of both objects finds its flesh and bones in the magistrate profession. It was mentioned that when the monarchy was established during Clovis, France had three types of nobility: Gallic knights, Franks, and Roman magistrates. The first two groups mainly consisted of soldiers and seasoned warriors, while the Franks were exempt from all personal servitude and taxes; that is why the word *'franc'* transformed into a meaning that addresses 'free' in French. On the other hand, the Roman magistrates were assigned to administer justice and deal with civil governance and financial occupations (Boucher d'Argis, 1765v, p. 168). The nobles, then, were considered holders of high justice within their territories, in addition to having the rights of the forests and water sources, of which the usage of commoners of these natural sources depended on the mercy of the nobility (Boucher d'Argis, 1765v, p. 171). That is, in time, military men became responsible for administering justice. However, they could also retain their military positions (Boucher d'Argis, 1765t). Then, military, judiciary, and financial officials were deemed noble since 1 January 1689. However, Louis XIV regulated such a historical practice of justice over nobility with an edict he issued in August 1715 (*Noblesse par Lettres*, 1765, p. 174). Therefore, the judiciary branch became an independent profession, and individuals of this branch represent their status by wearing a long robe—a symbol of their profession (Boucher d'Argis, 1765t). The *Encyclopédie* praises kings who bestowed upon the men of justice the honor to wear purple (Boucher d'Argis, 1765u, p. 82). Nobility has no power in administering justice, claims the *Encyclopédie*, which benefits both the sovereign and justice itself (Jaucourt, 1765f, p. 166). For example, though the Turks do not have any concept of nobility, they have a *sharif* title, which is attributed to people coming from the Prophet Mohammad's lineage. They have the privilege to wear a green turban and are entirely immune from legal reproach or punishment (Boucher d'Argis, 1765v, p. 167).

The concept of sovereign in French *(souverain)* also addresses the magistrates in 18th-century France. These people borrow the sovereign's rights and authority for administering justice; they do not have any authority of their own on this matter (Boucher d'Argis, 1765w). The *Encyclopédie* claims that four duties are expected to be fulfilled from the magistrates in France: [1] to fulfill duties to their state, [2] to behave with dignity and decorum, [3] to enforce the authority entrusted to them, and [4] to honor the magistracy post in general (Boucher d'Argis, 1765x, p. 857). They are expected to have a vast amount of knowledge in various fields. They have to know [almost] everything about religion, because some of the primary duties of justice are to support religion, to encourage its exercise, to repel errors that might disturb it, and to oppose anything that might lead to the contempt of religion. Similarly,

geography, chronology, and history should be known. People seeking justice in front of the magistrate may not be aware of these laws and the laws that come with these fields. Additionally, the *Encyclopédie* claims that all other sciences and disciplines are related to jurisprudence; no profession is exempt from the subject of justice. Thus, human beings, goods, contracts, obligations, actions, and judgments are all parts of subjects that the jurisprudence involved (Boucher d'Argis, 1765u, pp. 81–82). Still, the *Encyclopédie* is aware that the human brain has its limits; not a single individual can possess all the knowledge of jurisprudence; having perfect knowledge on this matter is difficult. This is why such a dilemma was explained through Montesquieu's comments. According to him, this is the central reason that different magistrates approach the same case differently. This is why, it would be better to understand the practical side of justice in the same vein as what Cassiodorus, a Roman scholar, said for the philosophy: *in quantum homini possibile est*, that is, as much as it is possible for a human being (Boucher d'Argis, 1765u, p. 82).

The *Encyclopédie* believes that philosophy involves the primary principle of laws: to prevent people from doing what is against the laws of nature. Therefore, both philosophy and jurisprudence carry the objective of love of mankind and fair practice of justice within (Boucher d'Argis, 1765y, p. 70). Indeed, injustice as against laws of nature, as the *Encyclopédistes* believe, has different degrees, and these degrees can only be sorted via the compensation they require: the more people are affected by it, the bigger the injustice is (Jaucourt, 1765u). Thus, jurisprudence has three primary sources: natural law, people's law, and civil law (Boucher d'Argis, 1765u, p. 82). Therefore, a magister should follow the principles of these different laws during the judicial trials. These trials follow a particular sequence in France, says the *Encyclopédie*: first, there must be a dispute between parties, and that dispute should come before the magistrate for a solution. The case develops into a judicial action at this point in the process. The magistrate delivers *his* decision then, and the parties always carry the right within themselves to apply to the appellate court. Another judicial process is followed there, which is called the written process (*Procès*, 1765). The *Encyclopédie* asserts that the magistrate is the sole authority in these processes; thus, people might seek to alter the magistrate's decision by corrupting *him* with some flatteries, promises, or threats. This form of bribery corrupts the magistrate, says the *Encyclopédie*, which is against the laws of nature. The Romans, for instance, were very harsh against this kind of corruption, fortifying their stance with civil laws; *Lex Cornelia de Falsis* (The Cornelia Law) punishes both the briber and the bribed per the discretion of the judge and the following circumstances. Though the *Encyclopédie* was aware

that it is hard to receive any evidence to prove such an ill action, it was welcomed that both the briber and the bribed, who alter the justice in exchange of their own wills and interests, are being subjects to the civil law and executed in France since an ordinance was put in circulation in 1531. This ordinance, additionally, chooses to execute these figures in more brutal and painful ways, such as torture at the wheel first, if the verdict harmed the notion of innocence. Similarly, according to the canon law, the briber would be excommunicated while the bribed would be declared incapable of being a witness in any court, next to be marked with infamy at the social level (Boucher d'Argis, 1765z).

5.2.4. A Comparison of Justice in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

Justice is inherently an abstract concept, and it is difficult to make clear explanations on this matter; this might be the reason that both the Ikhwan and the *Encyclopédie* preferred to concretize their thoughts on justice either via stories and imaginary scenarios, or by giving evidence to some known figures. For example, the Ikhwan chose to explain some nuances of justice with some stories like the one about travelers and pastries (XLVI, p. 69), the tale of the cripple and the blind (XXXI, pp. 130–132), and the story that reviewed the events happened around a water spring (XLII, pp. 404–405). In addition, they preferred to explain justice through the scales metaphor, which also has a Quranic background (XXXIV, p. 178), and created a link between justice and logical comparison by referencing the execution of Socrates (XLIV, pp. 31–32). In the same vein, the *Encyclopédie* had also followed a similar method in its explanations like assessing the atheists through a metaphor which ends up with destruction of the Sun (Yvon, 1751, p. 802), reminding former rulers who committed injustice to people with their cruelties like Maurice, Augustus, Philip, Tiberius, and Caligula (Jaucourt, 1754b, pp. 517–518), and quoting a dialogue of Newton on his discovery of the system of the world (d'Alembert, 1757, p. 206). Therefore, one may easily notice that this subchapter about justice diverges from former subchapters in its characteristic: the Ikhwan's understanding of justice was conceptualized in a more mechanical fashion, while the *Encyclopédie* preferred to explain the concept more humanely. Thus, comparing their thoughts on justice requires a more delicate approach.

Although this is the case, it would not be wrong to claim that both texts attributed justice more to the realm of the individual than to others. Al-Rasa'il, for instance, highlighted individuals' desires and needs (IX, p. 242), explained justice through the duality of soul and

body with a particular emphasis on the moderation trait of an individual (IX, p. 208; LII, p. 294), and characterized an individual's sense of justice based on their birth time within astrological parameters (XXXVII, p. 221). The *Encyclopédie* also held individuals responsible by defining justice as an obligation (Diderot, 1755, p. 115) and a duty (Justice, 1765, p. 88). This sense of responsibility for justice was connected to the greater good of humanity (Saint-Lambert, 1765) through the self-integrity of the individual (Diderot, 1754); thus, the Encyclopedists believed that justice is not a constructed concept (Romilly & Seguiran, 1765, p. 178). Naturally, such an emphasis on the individual brought about other features directly related to human beings. The Ikhwan, for example, placed justice within a set of good moralities (V, pp. 155, 157), assigned reason the duty to choose between just and unjust (IX, p. 265), while highlighting the importance of making logical comparisons in this process (XLII, p. 360), and excluded the trait of indulgence and being human from the magistrates while they perform their professional duties in distributing justice (XIII, pp. 301–302). The *Encyclopédie* also included justice among the virtues (Justice, 1765, p. 88). By emphasizing the specific characteristic of justice that should be paid individually (Diderot & Jaucourt, 1765), the *Encyclopédie* distinguished justice from charity, which is also an individual act but occurs voluntarily (Justice, 1765, p. 88). This is why compassion was also viewed within the parameters of justice, as it helps restore moral balance (d'Alembert, 1753), and as a requirement to receive a just decision or action, which involves moderation (Jaucourt, 1754b, p. 518).

The Ikhwan define justice as finding balance between two cruelties (XXXI, p. 106) and likening justice to the scales, where pans shall be balanced. The stress on cruelty here is the key because there will be an injustice if the balance cannot be maintained. In other words, when one pan of the scales outweighs the other, the latter pan will receive an injustice; this is also valid for the first pan, since it will receive more than it deserves. This is how the rights of pans are violated. So, the Ikhwan emphasized the fairness and the protection of rights in justice (XLII, p. 361). The narrated story of the Ikhwan on the pastries and travelers vividly demonstrates that the pans of scale do not have to be equal to provide justice, but in balance; therefore, the concept has a much deeper meaning than equality. Justice is more related to equity and fairness in such a balance since the equal share of money was not executed in the story; the judge had given one coin to one man and four coins to another, not by respecting the equality but equity (XLVI, p. 69). The importance of fairness and equity in justice also shows itself in receiving the blessing of God; the Ikhwan underline that this is the reason lying beneath the inequality in receiving God's blessing: some people take more, some take less, per God's justice (IX, pp. 234, 242,

254). The *Encyclopédie*'s arguments on justice show some similarities with the Ikhwan. In this respect, justice was defined as giving everyone what is due (Diderot, 1755, p. 115), and this due was conceptualized within the set of rights (*Justice*, 1765, p. 88). In another perspective, injustice was considered as the violation of rights by the *Encyclopédie*, which is often performed by acquiring additional rights from the rightful owner, often with the motivation of greed, anger, ambition, etc. (Jaucourt, 1765u). Though the *Encyclopédie* has also pointed out a link between justice, fairness, and equity, this link did not embrace all these concepts like the one observed in al-Rasa'il. Because fairness and equity have more flexible characteristics, while justice is more certain, that is why fairness and equity are related to conscience, while the outcome of justice is fixed, either in the form of reward or punishment (Jaucourt, 1755c, p. 894). From this perspective, it is safe to say that the *Encylopédie* establishes the link between these concepts in a linear manner, rather than a circular one. Hence, equity and fairness are the roads that reach justice—vehicles to some extent—which make justice the outcome of equity and fairness (Diderot, 1755, p. 116). This is why it was expected from the magistrates to know about what is fair and unfair, to execute justice with this knowledge (Boucher d'Argis, 1765u, p. 81).

It is surprising to see both texts approach divine justice and God's role in it from the same perspective: the Ikhwan claimed that God is the most just entity (XXXII, p. 157), and the *Encyclopédie* stated that justice is an essential part of God (*Religion Naturelle*, 1765, p. 80). The Ikhwan emphasized that God's wisdom is immense, and humans cannot fully understand *his* actions; therefore, whatever appears unjust might be just in God's plan, and should not be questioned. This is how the story narrated by the Ikhwan about the purse left at a spring led to a man being murdered, a man becoming rich, and a man losing his money (XLII, pp. 404–405). In the same vein, utilizing reason often falls short in understanding God's justice; the Ikhwan explained this statement by interpreting the inheritance canons of Islam about women. Accordingly, women take a smaller share of inheritance than men because God's justice compensated them with their rights in receiving dowry (XLVI, p. 69). The *Encyclopédie*, on the other hand, attributed God's justice to *his* supremacy and innate characteristic of *his* doings as being morally good (*Dieu*, 1754, p. 980). This is why *he* gave laws of nature to mankind, long before human laws, to execute justice (Jaucourt, 1765u). God's creation also follows *his* justice, says the *Encyclopédie*, which should be an example to human beings for mimicking God's justice in their lives (*Religion Naturelle*, 1765, pp. 80–81). An almost identical approach can be seen in al-Rasa'il, though it was exemplified in detail. According to that, the Ikhwan

believe God's creation was just; *he* granted a massive physical appearance to, for example, an elephant, but it can be ridden by a child or even killed instantly by an insect (XXII, p. 249). Mirroring God's justice also finds its place in al-Rasa'il; however, it was not attributed to the entire humanity but to the kings alone. The Ikhwan claimed that a king should mimic God's justice if he wants to create a better society (*Fihrist*, p. 26).

The judicial process of distributing justice carries some striking similarities within, in both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*. The Ikhwan identify this process as a reciprocal practice, in which the parties should explain themselves in a debate before the sultan or magistrate. Parties are expected to bring their evidence to the court, so that justice can be achieved (XXII, pp. 176, 187). Although the Ikhwan asserted that God assigns the magistrates for dispensing justice to humans, it was also highlighted that they should favor reason, refrain from showing mercy, and not be in fear when seeing higher-status parties during the execution of their assignments (XIII, pp. 301–302; XXII, p. 192). The *Encyclopédie* highlights a similar judicial process in France, though it was more systematic—even bureaucratic. In this respect, a reciprocal discussion is required in front of the magistrate, where *his* decision can be taken for an appeal afterwards, to be discussed again (*Procès*, 1765). These magistrates take their power and authority from the sovereigns to distribute justice to people (Boucher d'Argis, 1765w). Therefore, they were expected to perform their assignments with dignity, decorum, and honor (Boucher d'Argis, 1765x, p. 857). One may notice that such entrusting justice authority to the magistrates was anchored to some provisions in both texts that are attributed to God's role or humans' honor. Such a tendency arises from humans' inability; their falling into the pit of evil, since justice is inherently seen as something attached to individuals separately. This is why both texts highlight the abuse of entrusted justice. The Ikhwan, for instance, claimed that the corruption of individuals could lead to justice being misconducted, either by those seeking justice or the magistrates. The former happens when people shout at the court during the judicial process, expecting to receive an advantage by manipulating the magistrate (XXII, p. 179). The latter on the other hand, occurs when the magistrates pay to the sovereign to claim a judicial post or seek bribes from the people for altering justice; distributing justice with bribe is a damned business in the eyes of God for the Ikhwan (XXII, pp. 247–248). The *Encyclopédie* also highlights the manipulation of judges via flatteries or bribes. Receiving justice via bribery is considered an action against the natural law, which has also found its place in human law in the form of punishment. It was claimed that France considers the death penalty for both the

briber and the bribed since 1531; additionally, the execution of this penalty becomes more severe if an innocent person was harmed (Boucher d'Argis, 1765z).

Although both texts manage to converge on some points regarding various conceptions of justice, there are significant differences between them. For instance, the Ikhwan highlight external influences on a person's understanding of justice. Climate, in this context, shapes a person's sense of justice (IV, pp. 123–124), while the astrological positions of celestial planets at an individual's birth—particularly Jupiter—determine that person's understanding of justice (XXXVII, p. 221; XL, p. 297; XXV, p. 302). Though it is possible to find the impact of external contributors to justice in the *Encyclopédie*, these often revolve around concepts like chance, luck, and fortune. Chance was accepted as something beyond an individual's reach (Diderot, 1753a), and receiving justice was formulated as the combination of mediocrity and a blend of good and bad luck (Jaucourt, 1754b, p. 518). The *Encyclopédie* discussed social justice separately, and its responsibility was attributed solely to the kings, who should donate to the unfortunate to alleviate their suffering instead of accumulating wealth (d'Alembert, 1757, p. 206). However, the Ikhwan did not mention anything about it, even though they saw themselves as *"Justice Experts"* (*Fihrist*, pp. 15, 30). Still, it is possible to suggest that the Ikhwan may have left this responsibility to God because they emphasized that God grants *his* blessings in accordance with *his* divine justice; some receive many, some receive none (IX, pp. 234, 242).

A summarizing table on their similarities and differences on the concept of justice can be given as follows:

TABLE 8. A comparison of justice in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

JUSTICE FOR AL-RASA'IL AND THE ENCYCLOPÉDIE		
THEMES	**SIMILARITIES**	**DIFFERENCES**
Conceptualization of Justice	Metaphorical explanations (scales, stories, famous historical figures, etc.)	Mechanical, concrete vs. Humane, ethical
Individual Responsibility	Justice is an individual obligation, linked to virtues and morality.	Astrological influences vs. Innate morality
Equity, Fairness, and Rights	Justice involves fairness, balance, equity, and protection of rights.	Circular balance vs. Linear process; justice as a result
Divine Justice and Human Imitation	God's justice is the ultimate standard; humans shall mimic this.	Kings primarily mimic God vs. All humanity encouraged
Judicial Process and Corruption	Judicial authority entrusted. Reciprocal debate exists. Corruption and bribery are condemned.	Corruption as spiritual crime vs. Corruption as legal crime; severe penalties

5.2.5. Concluding Remarks

The concept of justice had remained relatively similar after the Ikhwan, and it was often conceptualized through its relation with the sovereign in two forms: self-justice of the sovereign and justice towards the subjects. First conceptualization aims to enhance the sovereign's right to rule in God's eyes; *he* was expected to become a good Muslim and refrain from what God forbade *him* while following what *he* ordered. Second conceptualization charges the sovereign with a duty to treat *his* people—therefore the subjects of God—with justice. That is, the link between justice and public happiness was established over the sovereign, and this link was emphasized in numerous texts afterwards. For example, the just administrations of Mehmet [II] the Conqueror and Murat IV were so highly praised that the authors and poets of their times exemplified these governance styles with *"even the eyes were refraining from committing sins"* or *"even the predatory animals were behaving with manners"* words (Bağdatlı, 2018, pp. 315–316). This conceptualization of justice was actually attaching divine justice to the worldly order, and Ibn Khaldun managed to link the role of God to Aristotle's eight-sentence reasoning that connects justice and governance (İbn Haldun, 1997, pp. 94–96). Such an understanding of the Islamic type of justice had shown itself best in Kınalızâde Ali Çelebi's (16th century) poetry with eight lines, named *"Circle of Justice" (Dâire-i Adliyye)*, as follows:

> Justice alone provides the order of the entire world,
> The world is a vineyard, the state is its wall,
> The laws of God establish the order,
> Only the sultan can protect the laws of God,
> The state can only be protected by the soldier,
> Only property can provide soldiers,
> The people possess the property,
> Justice makes people obey the sultan (Kınalızâde, 2020, p. 228).[50]

The last line of the poetry connects to the first line cyclically, and justice in the Islamic governance style in the agricultural society was, thus, rationalized.

The Enlightenment conceptualizations of justice and the formulations expressed in the *Encyclopédie* had shown themselves in the 1789 French Revolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen *(Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen)* of the Revolution had redefined justice, especially in its administration. The Declaration conceptualized the rights and equality of people through justice (Declaration, 1995a).

[50] *"Adalet, bütün dünyanın düzenini temin eder, / Cihan bir bağdır, duvarı devlettir, / Devletin nâzımı Allah kanunudur, / Allah kanununu ancak Melik korur, / Mülk ancak ordu ile zabtedilir, / Orduyu ancak mal ayakta tutar, / Malı bir araya getiren ancak halktır, / Halkı idare altına cihan padişahının adaleti alır".*

Multifaceted complexities of the administration of justice were cleaned, and new courts were established. The *letter de cachet* system, which closed judicial remedies like appealing with the king's or his ministers' sign, was abolished, and *habeas corpus* principles were introduced. The death penalty was considered the last resort, and very few people convicted of serious crimes were punished in this way. Some barbaric executions—like torturing on the wheel—were replaced with a more 'humane' execution machine that instantly beheads the criminal, after Joseph-Ignace Guillotin's recommendations, who was a deputy of Paris. The French welcomed this kind of administering justice until 1792–1793, when the Reign of Terror replaced the justice of the Assembly (Hampson, 1963, pp. 118–119). Revolutionary justice was harsh and rapid; over 16 thousand people were executed with the guillotine during the two-year-long tenure of the Terror. They were mainly of the laity, and thousands more were executed after biased and swift trials; shooting with cannons or blowing people up with dynamite were included as the preferred execution techniques (McMahon, 2001, pp. 90–91). There was a lack of state authority in this practice; justice was both manipulated and radicalized during the Terror times. This might be why Hegel filled the gap here; he claimed that justice can only be realized with the state and its institutions. Because, in his view, the harm given to the criminal is not only just, but it is *their right* that should be respected. In the Hegelian parameters, the state is not a contract and does not unconditionally guarantee people's protection. It is above the people and has the right to endure its life; thus, it does not have to seek people's consent during the punishment it sees fit. The criminal, therefore, does not have to consent to the state for their punishment; they automatically gave that consent during their crime (Hegel, 2012, pp. 126–130). It is possible to say that this argument of Hegel constituted the cornerstones of the administration of justice, by the authority of the state. Though the administration of justice is attributed to the states, after witnessing two world wars, the universal social contract of humanity introduced a new concept to universal justice: *jus cogens* (compelling law). According to this principle, international law should protect the interests and values of the entire humanity; thus, it takes justice to another and higher level in the international arena. Its manifestation had shown itself in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969, and binds the states since then, while restricting them from violating justice for humanity (Weatherall, 2015, pp. 3–8, 13–14). The final practice of this principle was the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002.

Though the practice of justice in the realm of its administration concerned people more, the philosophical approaches towards the concept have shown a variety of formulations.

However, these newer formulations do not approach justice as a whole; instead, several thematic argumentations arise. For instance, John Rawls, in his famous book *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, interpreted the concept at the social level; he was concerned about establishing a just society, and explained it through a hypothetical example of what he called *"veil of ignorance"*. This notion approximated social equality and justice by assuming people would have opted to establish a more just and fair society if they were unsure about who would get what, when, and how (Rawls, 1971, pp. 136–142). As another example, Judith Butler explored the concept of justice through a different theme: gender. Her main argument was that injustice related to gender does not stem from 'how individuals are' but from 'how individuals act'; that is, gender is not a fixed status but rather a form of power play within society (Butler, 2014, pp. 44–48, 175–176). These thematic approaches towards the concept of justice in modern times can be multiplied: justice in different human races, justice in sexual orientations, justice in accessing knowledge, justice in the environment, justice in accessing data, justice in the lives of the handicapped, justice in linguistics, and many more.

5.3. Conclusion

This chapter mainly focused on the concepts of sovereign and justice. Here, under the dome of the political sphere, these two concepts can be combined and reviewed under five elements: source, extent, order, hubris, and jurisdiction. Their exhibition on a table can be given as follows:

TABLE 9. A comparison of sovereignty and justice (combined) in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

	SOVEREIGNTY		JUSTICE		SUMMARY
	SIMILARITY	**DIFFERENCE**	**SIMILARITY**	**DIFFERENCE**	
SOURCE	The soul-body analogy is central in both texts.	Divinely granted vs. Via force or conquest	Justice as a divine and moral imperative	Astrological and divine vs. Innate human morality	Efforts to legitimize sources, celestial and rational. Differences are divine vs. humanistic interpretations.
EXTENT	Sovereignty rights restricted; specific individuals eligible.	Divine choice vs. Societal eligibility criteria	Justice involves individual moral responsibility universally	External influences vs. Innate individual duty	Sovereignty is exclusive, justice is inclusive; the extent of application differs in emphasis on societal roles vs. individual traits.
ORDER	States as cyclical entities requiring hierarchical governance. Virtue and merit feature.	Hereditary paths vs. Structured hierarchy	Justice as balance, equity, fairness, and maintaining social order	Cyclical balance metaphor vs. Linear conceptualization (equity leading to justice)	Sovereignty and justice ensure social stability through structured order; differences are on metaphorical vs. systematic interpretations.
HUBRIS	A good sovereign must balance pride with reason and morality	30 traits of a good ruler vs. Six practical roles of a good ruler	Magistrates should exercise dignity and restraint. Corruption is condemned.	"Corruption is a crime against God." vs. "Corruption is a crime against the people."	A cautious treatment; sovereignty highlights pride positively, justice views excessive pride negatively (as corruption).
JURISDICTION	Sovereign power defines jurisdictional authority. Rulers are seen as divine deputies.	Divine sanction vs. Internal and external power shifts	Justice is administered through magistrates with clear jurisdiction. A reciprocal judgment process; parties defend, and a verdict follows.	Judicial process as spiritual responsibility vs. Procedural, legal rigor	Sovereignty and justice rely on jurisdictional authority; gaps are about divine mandate vs. procedural legitimacy.

On Table 9, the SOURCE row reviews the origin of sovereignty and justice; al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* have several similarities but differ in some nuances. Both texts attributed the source of sovereignty to a particular divine right and people's consent through a contract; to highlight these, they preferred to employ a body-soul analogy. However, al-Rasa'il highlighted it as a divine bestowal that can *only* be given to the people chosen by God. The

Encyclopédie, on the other hand, preferred to follow a more pragmatic path by claiming that the acquisition of sovereignty can only be made through the use of force or conquest. Both texts meet on a common ground on the source of justice; it was identified as a divine and moral obligation. However, their methodologies differ: al-Rasa'il conceptualized justice through external influences like astrology, while the *Encyclopédie* preferred to explain it through innate moral values. From this perspective, it can be said that both texts have a clear worldview on these political concepts: al-Rasa'il prioritized metaphysical and religious explanations for clarifying the sources of sovereignty and justice. At the same time, the *Encyclopédie* had maintained a more secular and humanistic stance.

The EXTENT line clarifies the coverage of sovereignty and justice in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*: the subjects and situations related to these concepts are reviewed. In this respect, both texts valued certain limitations on the concept of sovereign; being sovereign is not for everyone, and only some *chosen* people with particular abilities and features can become one. Still, the sources of such a limitation differ. In al-Rasa'il, it is clear that *only* God gives this status, which then confines this authority to a metaphysical field strictly; however, for the *Encyclopédie*, some secular and practical traits are expected to be possessed by people who desire to become a sovereign: age, wisdom, courage, etc. The concept of justice was seen directly within the league of individual in both texts; individuals are expected to carry some moral responsibilities within. Again, certain factors were named in determining the extent of justice. Al-Rasa'il's justice field is broader and more flexible; certain external factors, like astrology, can easily influence it. The *Encyclopédie*, however, defined justice through individuals' moral responsibilities that are instilled in them at birth. As a result, the scope of the sovereign concept was narrow and selective, while justice was assessed from a broader and more general perspective. This reflects the ethical and political differences in these texts.

The ORDER row explains how the concepts of sovereignty and justice ensure sociopolitical stability. Both texts treat the sovereign concept as a living entity: it is born, matures, and perishes. A hierarchical system is required within this cycle. However, these texts differ in the answers to the 'How?' question. Al-Rasa'il emphasizes a more traditional and hereditary method, where sovereignty passes from father to son, while the *Encyclopédie* describes the system more directly and clearly: it must function within a rational and social hierarchy. Both texts share a common worldview on maintaining order; justice should be upheld through balance, equity, and fairness. However, their ideas of justice differ. Al-Rasa'il explains justice through a scales metaphor by giving it a cyclical character. At the same time, the

Encyclopédie identifies justice as a linear process of which equity and equality serve as the vehicles operating on this linearity. In short, the common ground of sovereignty and justice is their ability to provide social and political order and stability in both texts. The Ikhwan's method is more traditional and metaphorical, and the Encyclopedists preferred to integrate in a systematic and rational fashion.

The HUBRIS theme on this table indicates the risk management between 'the concepts of sovereignty and justice' and 'the probability of abuse of power and excessive pride'. Both texts highlighted the *necessity* of possessing pride and self-respect as a sovereign. These traits should be fortified with reason and moral values, transforming the sovereign into a philosopher-king. The Ikhwan's philosopher-king was presented in an idealistic framework; he has to carry a good number of thirty traits, which makes their formulation more extensive. The Encyclopedists, however, identified six key administrative duties—a more practical and tangible approach. Both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* agree that magistrates should set aside the pride their positions might bring and perform their duties with honor, dignity, and moderation. This is why they strongly denied corruption and bribery in judicial activities. The Ikhwan viewed judicial corruption as a spiritual and moral sin, while the *Encyclopédistes* saw it as a legal crime and called for severe penalties. In conclusion, the concept of *hubris* within the realms of sovereignty and justice was highlighted as the responsible use of power with ethical awareness by both texts; their difference lies in how they conceptualize the violation of this principle: as a spiritual issue versus a legal issue.

The JURISDICTION theme focuses on the identification and usage of the authority. Within the context of the sovereign concept, both texts accept the *necessity* of identification of the ruler's judicial and executive authorities while considering them as the deputies of God on earth. Nevertheless, the transition of authority creates a disagreement. The Ikhwan claimed this authority was determined by divine will; therefore, it is *closed* to external interventions or acquiring it by force. The *Encyclopédistes*, however, accepted a more direct, secular, and pragmatic approach: authority *can* be possessed by internal and external forces. For the justice field, both texts remark on the authority of magistrates and emphasize the reciprocal debates in the process. Al-Rasa'il highlights that this judicial authority was more of a spiritual responsibility and part of divine authority. The *Encyclopédie,* on the other hand, grounds justice upon a more official, procedural, and legal basis. Essentially, it is possible to say that the concept of jurisdiction within the parameters of sovereignty and justice constitutes the foundation of political authority; however, different remarks on the source of authority and the

legitimacy of its usage define the line between these texts: the Ikhwan advocated its divine and moral character. At the same time, the Encyclopedists highlighted legal and bureaucratic features of jurisdiction.

In conclusion, al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* share some apparent mental common ground in explaining the central tenets of political power through the concepts of sovereign and justice; the difference lies in their methodologies. Because the Ikhwan tend to shape their political thought via metaphysical and celestial references, while the *Encyclopédistes* base their ideas on a more human-oriented, rational, and legal foundation. In short, both approaches offer profound answers to key questions about the source of authority, the scope of power, maintaining social order, and ethical responsibility; however, due to their different historical, cultural, and epistemological contexts, they interpret the nature of politics differently.

This chapter concludes the main body of this study. The following conclusion section provides a general assessment of the study.

CONCLUSION

Doğan Avcıoğlu, a leftist philosopher from Turkey, argues that one can portray Atatürk—the founder of the Turkish Republic and national hero—in any way they choose by selectively using his speeches, notes, texts, and other materials. It is possible to depict him as a socialist, a liberal, a conservative, or else (Avcıoğlu, 1964). This approach is also applicable to the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists. For example, the Ikhwan can be presented as a fanatical religious group, or the Encyclopedists as a group of atheists. However, that is not an accurate reflection of reality. Each group has its own original ideas on various topics, and this study aimed to highlight those unique ideas while emphasizing their similarities. The hypothesis of this study was: "Different periods of enlightenment, each with its own distinct name in history, can offer similar answers to the same questions". With this in mind, six concepts were selected—not questions—and the hypothesis was tested individually with each concept first, then in groups: freedom, rights, morality, equality, sovereignty, and justice. These concepts were categorized to analyze how the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists evaluate the individual, society, and politics. Each comparison section—two per chapter, specifically in Chapters 3, 4, and 5—tested the hypothesis, and the conclusion sections at the end of these chapters re-evaluated it by combining two of the selected concepts. In this way, the hypothesis can be tested by examining how these two intellectual groups analyzed the concepts of individual, society, and politics through the table provided below.

TABLE 10. A comparison of individual, society, and politics in al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*

	SIMILARITIES	DIFFERENCES
INDIVIDUAL	Individuals are equipped with knowledge and the capacity for morality, making them an entity with specific duties and responsibilities.	The Ikhwan identify individuals as passengers for spiritual maturation. The Encyclopedists put citizen subjectivity and rational autonomy at the center.
SOCIETY	Society is a structure based on moral order and social coherence. The ideal society can only be reached by multiplying virtuous individuals.	The Ikhwan characterize society as projecting divine order and the ground for spiritual maturation. The Encyclopedists define society through an ideal of secular equality, reason, law, and education.
POLITICS	Politics is a mandatory instrument for securing order and establishing justice; sovereignty must be limited by justice.	The Ikhwan interpret political authority as the earthly representation of divine will. The Encyclopedists characterize sovereignty as rooted in public will and limited by secular law.

As the table illustrates, both intellectual groups view the individual as an entity equipped with reason, knowledge, and will. The importance of individual freedom is emphasized when using these faculties. Both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* link the individual's liberation to mental and moral growth. From this standpoint, the idea of liberation through knowledge is shared by both texts, even though they originated in different civilizations, cultures, and eras. However, the metaphysical and epistemological bases of this shared idea differ. According to the Ikhwan, a free individual is someone who has completed their spiritual journey and has become in harmony with the divine order. In other words, freedom is seen as temporary in this life but guaranteed in the afterlife. Conversely, the *Encyclopédie* considers individual freedom on an earthly level. The individuals realize themselves through reason and will, making them rational subjects within society. This difference leads to the individual being assessed through theology in the case of the Ikhwan, while the Encyclopedists viewed them within the framework of secular citizenship. Essentially, both texts discuss the individual in terms of freedom and rights, but the nature and purpose of these ideas vary.

Both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* depict society as a structure built on specific moral principles, with a defined order, and populated by virtuous individuals. An ideal society, therefore, depends on the ethical development of its members. In other words, knowledge and education serve as essential catalysts for social change. From this perspective, society is not just a group of people but the foundation of values, responsibilities, and norms. However, these two encyclopedic traditions differ structurally. The Ikhwan viewed society as an earthly reflection of the divine order, with the spiritual growth of individuals being part of a cosmic plan. In this view, morality is centered on God, and equality means understanding one's place within the hierarchical order of creation. Conversely, the *Encyclopédie* saw society as a secular structure shaped by reason, law, and education. Moral values can only be assessed through the individual's intention and the result of their actions. However, equality is viewed as an ethical principle rooted in rights and citizenship, aimed at addressing historical injustices. This contrast between the two perspectives highlights the fundamental difference between the Islamic theosophic worldview and the secular rationalism of the European Enlightenment.

Al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* evaluate the institution of politics as an essential instrument in maintaining order and establishing justice. In this view, sovereignty is neither unlimited absolutism nor arbitrary domination. Instead, this power must be limited by justice. Both texts see justice as the legitimate foundation of the political structure: without justice, both individual peace and social order would collapse. However, the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists differ significantly regarding the source of sovereignty. According to the Ikhwan, sovereignty reflects God's will on earth. The sovereign is God's caliph on earth and is responsible for upholding divine order. Therefore, justice is a religious obligation, and political power is a duty of servitude. In contrast, the *Encyclopédie* bases the source of sovereignty on the consent of the people, making political power a product of the secular social contract. Naturally, justice and sovereignty do not stem solely from God; they also arise from reason, experience, and the universal rights of people. In this framework, the *Encyclopédie* promotes the rule of law against despotism and tyranny, while al-Rasa'il associates political order with otherworldly salvation. To summarize, both traditions see justice as the foundation of sovereignty; however, for the Ikhwan, that foundation is divine will, while for the Encyclopedists, it is public consent.

The central hypothesis of this study claimed that different enlightenment periods in history can provide similar answers to similar questions. Discussing al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* simultaneously, as the collective and encyclopedic texts of their particular enlightenment periods, became fruitful for supporting the hypothesis in context and structure.

Because both texts emerged at the eve of specific intellectual crises and aimed to redefine knowledge production and transform society with this method. This is why both texts valued the individual's liberation via reason and knowledge. Although morality begins as an individual tenet at the beginning, it aims to ultimately transform society, making society a ground with fewer inequalities. This is how sovereignty should be secured at the political level. Society must realize the link between morality and politics, and identify justice as the *raison d'être* of the state. This is why political power must be used with limitations and responsibly. Basically, these two major texts appeared in different cultural periods and intellectual contexts, focusing on the same question at individual, social, and political levels. Although their layers of assigned meanings to the reviewed concepts differ, their interpretations of the concepts followed a similar pattern. With this, it is safe to say that the concept of enlightenment is not a denomination that belongs to the West alone, but a universal tendency of reasoning. In this regard, the comparison between the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists highlights the similarities in their texts. It shows that their differences can serve the same goal on the path to the ultimate purpose. This is how the study's central hypothesis is verified, which can also be extended as follows: the enlightenments that develop in different historical and cultural contexts can come together around the common problems of humanity with their unique formulations; both the questions and answers share the same universal trait. In truth, the Ikhwan's brothers, who seek to find the truth, and Diderot's citizens, who seek to enlighten the masses, meet on the same intellectual ground as two different voices of the same humanity.

The introduction section of this study asked five research questions, which can now be answered. The first question was, "Do the selected political and philosophical concepts undergo significant conceptual changes across different enlightenment periods?". The answer to this question would be a positive one. Because these concepts, although their essences remained intact, were evaluated differently in the context. Freedom, for example, was interpreted metaphysically by the Ikhwan, while the Encyclopedists associated it with the idea of citizenship. These concepts had also been interpreted in various ways both before and after their enlightenment periods. For instance, Plato's, the Ikhwan's, the *Encyclopédie*'s, and Tocqueville's conceptualizations of freedom differ. They assessed the concepts within their own framework, and this is how these concepts experienced significant changes.

The second question was, "How do these texts transform 'what was known' into 'what was written', and what does this reveal about their respective conceptualizations of key ideas?". The answer to this question follows a linear path. The authors of these texts aimed to spread

‘what was known’ through encyclopedic works. They preferred a method that involved dividing ‘what was known’ into categories first, classifying them, and then explaining each one according to their own *Weltanschauung*. Their key ideas can be traced through the preferred knowledge tree they incorporated into these texts. The Ikhwan, for instance, reserved a whole branch for the theological sciences, while this category was placed under the history branch in the *Encyclopédie*. Similarly, this branch of history included, for example, minerals and animals, which found a place under the natural sciences branch in al-Rasa’il. With these nuances, it is safe to say that the *Encyclopédie* considered ‘what is known’ as a whole by categorizing it under history, while the Ikhwan preferred an eclectic approach in writing ‘what was known’.

The third question was, “What are the societal impacts—direct or indirect—of the way knowledge is conceptualized in these encyclopedic texts?”. Despite facing opposition from the authorities, these texts gained popularity in their time. With this knowledge, it can be said that these texts also played the role of a manifesto in their respective periods. Both intellectual groups aimed to enlighten their societies with their knowledge, which is why Diderot fought for the publication of the *Encyclopédie*, while the Ikhwan published a summary of al-Rasa’il titled *al-Risalat al-Jami’a* so that their knowledge could reach the masses more easily. Additionally, these texts had certain societal impacts on how future generations think. The concluding remarks sections after each compared concept in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 were created in this study to highlight the impacts of these conceptualizations in the encyclopedic texts.

The fourth question was, “To what extent did their contemporary intellectual environments influence these encyclopedic projects, and did they in turn influence others?”. Both texts utilized the knowledge of their respective civilizations. For example, through the articles they wrote, the Encyclopedists were able to spread the ideas of Montesquieu, Buffon, Pufendorf, Grotius, and others, either by supporting their arguments or criticizing them. This was a bilateral process of knowledge production. Similarly, the Ikhwan relied on their intellectual environment when developing their ideas. For example, their tendency to interpret concepts through astrology and astronomy directly referenced al-Kindi’s methodology. Additionally, the Neo-Platonic explanations in the text reflect the prevailing trends in Islamic civilization during that period. These texts also influenced others. Edmund Burke’s criticism of Enlightenment morality or Ibn Sina’s use of al-Rasa’il can be understood through this perspective.

The final question was, “Did these texts contribute to or reflect broader sociopolitical transformations in their respective societies?”. Although this question is complex, the answer

could be positive. Al-Rasa'il became a manual for Ismaili *da'i*s, which helped the Fatimid Caliphate find a legitimate ground in Muslim civilization and supported the survival of Ismailism. The *Encyclopédie*, too, with its questioning of established norms and authorities, helped the Western world flourish. The French Revolution can be seen as a practical result of what was discussed in the *Encyclopédie*—though the Encyclopedists did not advocate for any uprising in any situation. Additionally, the abolition of slavery in European society can be understood through the explanations in the *Encyclopédie*, which emphasized how cruel that institution was and how it was gradually abolished in France.

This study tried to make an original contribution to the literature in both its methodology and topic. Here, the historical approach of the Annales School was combined with the interpretive method, and the examined concepts were deconstructed to establish specific fuzzy sets. A mix of these different techniques became the primary tool for analyzing al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*'s intellectual formulations. This combination helped compare these texts at the contextual level, structural level, and through layers of meaning. As a result, two separate texts, al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie*, created in different cultural contexts, were not simply compared through concepts but analyzed in a multidimensional way. These two texts had not been studied comparatively in the literature before; through this comparison, the concept of enlightenment was seen as a shared inclination of humanity. The concept does not have to refer only to a specific historical period in the West. In this regard, Kant's idea of enlightenment as daring to know showed that these two enlightenment periods could produce similar answers to common questions. Since both texts are encyclopedic and collectively written, they go beyond representing individual thoughts; they embody the intellectual foundation of their respective times. Therefore, this study not only compares two texts but also examines these two civilizations' knowledge production methods and social transformation efforts. From this perspective, it can be said that this study offers a new viewpoint to the literature, both methodologically and conceptually, by emphasizing the roles of different enlightenment periods within humanity's shared intellectual heritage.

Although this study focused on al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* alone, such a comparative approach can be applied to different texts produced within diverse intellectual and cultural contexts. In other words, future research can examine various encyclopedic and collective texts. For example, the *Siku Quanshu* of Chinese civilization, the *Vedas* of Indian society, African oral knowledge traditions, and the *Nahua* knowledge systems in Central America can all be analyzed as collective knowledge productions. These different

interpretations can highlight the broad characteristics of the concept of enlightenment. From this perspective, this study can be regarded as a contribution to the broader field of global history studies. Concerning the aim of these studies to analyze different cultures around the world in history by distancing themselves from the European-centric (or, more broadly, Western-centric) bias, this study also chose to employ the same approach—particularly in the production, use, and dissemination of knowledge. For example, C. A. Bayly, a prominent scholar in this field, clearly states that he prefers to trace *"[…] the rise of global uniformities in the state, religion, political ideologies, and economic life […]"* in the introduction of his influential book *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Bayly, 2004, p. 1). Similarly, Kenneth Pomeranz argues that viewing economic history solely through the European perspective overlooks the ambitions of other societies for further economic growth—which presents a problem. Therefore, he chooses not to examine the *"European miracle"* independently but to analyze other regions simultaneously, especially Japan and China (Pomeranz, 2000, pp. 16–18). This study also embraces this perspective at its core, aligning with the primary method used: the Annales historiography. Additionally, the key concepts analyzed here—such as freedom, equality, and justice—can be explored through new theoretical frameworks like post-colonial theory, critical theory, or queer theory, allowing these texts to be reinterpreted in innovative ways. Furthermore, the methodology used in this study can be applied to various types of texts—political pamphlets, religious writings, scientific manuscripts, and more—adding an interdisciplinary dimension to the research. Finally, these kinds of studies can foster rich discussions across disciplines, such as intellectual autonomy and collective consciousness today, which could deepen our understanding of the multiple facets of the concept of enlightenment.

Nevertheless, further studies should consider specific challenges that come with conducting this kind of research, which also proved problematic and challenging in this study. First, the concepts evaluated here are both a blessing and a curse for researchers because these concepts have been evaluated, reevaluated, interpreted, reinterpreted, discussed, and rediscussed many times throughout history. Therefore, an anchor is necessary for each concept to maintain its integrity. This anchor became the lexical meaning of each concept; dictionary definitions served as this anchor. Only with these definitions could fuzzy sets be determined, enabling meaningful comparisons. Second, these concepts do not need to be independent of each other, and they often display an intertwined nature. That is, grouping these concepts does not have to reflect uniformity. For example, in this study, the groupings were individual, social,

and political. In the individual group, the concept of right was placed; however, this concept is more closely related to justice, which was reviewed in the political group. Similarly, the concept of morality is primarily a concern of the individual, but it is placed in the social group because both texts start their discussions and explanations of morality at the individual level but conclude with its capacity for social transformation. That is, morality has a social purpose in both texts. In this regard, the groupings of concepts might seem arbitrary to the reader, but the authors of al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie* essentially define these groupings. Third, the reviewed texts span eight centuries and each reflects unique worldviews. Both texts emphasize the importance of reason, but their reasoning was shaped by the intellectual climate of their times. To address this challenge, which is complex, it was necessary to find a common ground for their explanations. The chosen common ground in this study was the concept of humanity. Therefore, the concepts were examined from their origins up to the periods of the Ikhwan and the Encyclopedists. This approach aimed to reveal their understanding of the development of the concept, offering a roadmap to analyze their individual explanations and compare their formulations collectively. Alternative solutions can also be chosen to overcome this challenge; these include tracing the referenced philosophers in texts, comparing the integrity of their formulations in different parts of the epistles and encyclopedia articles, and reviewing the pedagogic methods they used in their writings. Fourth, the dominance of religions is evident in both texts, which causes the authors to either overemphasize that dominance or avoid it through self-censorship. That is, the same concept can be interpreted differently in different parts of the texts. This challenge led the research to question the true thoughts behind these texts. To address this issue, the study compared these different interpretations and tried to find a middle ground on the discussed topic. While this challenge primarily concerned religion, future researchers may face similar issues with other dominant factors like politics, cultural norms, loyalty to their people, and more. Finally, these texts, both al-Rasa'il and the *Encyclopédie,* mainly serve the purpose of recruiting people intellectually. In this sense, they can be viewed as propaganda tools that achieve their goal by shaping society's understanding—a form of social engineering to some extent. That is why their explanations and formulations on various topics exhibit a normative bias: their discussions are built around specific, definite conclusions that are presented to the audience either by citing evidence from sacred and respected texts or through parables and stories. This situation becomes problematic when reviewing their conceptualizations on various issues. To address this challenge, the study aimed to uncover the core of their thoughts and remove the normative parts of their statements. The remaining parts reflect their genuine ideas on the chosen topic. These five elements were the main challenges

faced in this study. A future comparative research of this kind will likely encounter similar challenges, and these solutions could be useful for future researchers.

In conclusion, this study opened a field of discussion on the universal and polyphonic nature of the concept of enlightenment by comparing these two texts. The ways to attain knowledge, the methods to understand human beings, the ideals for transforming society, and the evaluations of authority can all be shaped around answers to common questions. This study aimed to highlight the importance of intellectual bridges between collective texts written at different times and places to understand humanity's intellectual heritage. In this context, it can be seen as an intellectual invitation to the future rather than a retrospective analysis.

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