

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

QUESTIONING THE ENTITATIVITY OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES IN TURKEY AND ITS INTERGROUP IMPLICATIONS

PhD Thesis

Emine YÜCEL

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

Ankara, 2021

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Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Cem Şafak ÇUKUR

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APPROVAL PAGE

The thesis, prepared by Emine YÜCEL and titled "Questioning the Entitativity of Social Categories in Turkey and Its Intergroup Implications," is accepted by a unanimous vote as a doctoral thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.

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……

PLAGIARISM PAGE

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work; otherwise, I accept all legal responsibility. Date (27-09-2021)

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Signature:

To all wise old people,

including Ali, Muammer, Zeki, & Yakup

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ABSTRACT

Questioning the Entitativity of Social Categories in Turkey and Its Intergroup Implications

Entitativity is the perceived unity or coherence of social aggregates. The present research was mainly interested in measuring this concept and questioned its implications for social identity processes and intergroup relations, focusing on ethnic (Kurds vs. non-Kurds) and religious (Alevis vs. Sunnis) divides in Turkey. In Study 1, with 314 participants, the content domain of entitativity was qualitatively examined about eight different social categories, representing ethnicity, sect, political groups, and women. By drawing on the emergent themes about entitativity from this study, a novel, category-specific (ethnicity-based) entitativity scale was offered in Study 2. The scale was used to test the degree of the entitativity of Kurds and Alevis from ingroup and outgroup perspectives. Accordingly, four different respondent groups (i.e., Kurds & non-Kurds; Alevis & Sunnis) were reached (*n*s = 230). The exploratory factor analysis yielded four factors for the newly proposed entitativity scale: interdependency, boundary-making, common fate, and essentialism. The instrument yielded acceptable internal consistency and demonstrated convergent validity by significantly correlating with generic entitativity measures. Based on the scores on this scale, for the minority members (especially in the dataset of the Kurdish participants), ingroup entitativity (through the interdependency and common fate scales) led to greater anti-majority attitudes by increasing ingroup identification. For the non-Kurdish and Sunni participants, outgroup entitativity (through the boundary-making scale) played a mediatory role in explaining the relationship between ingroup identification and anti-minority attitudes. The findings were discussed considering intergroup relations in Turkey.

Keywords: entitativity, social category, intergroup bias, social identification, ethnicity, the Kurdish conflict, Alevi-Sunni relations, essentialism.

ÖZET

Türkiye'deki Sosyal Kategorilerin Bütünleşikliğinin ve Gruplar Arası Etkilerinin Sorgulanması

Bütünleşiklik (yekparelik), sosyal yığınların algılanan birliği veya tutarlılığıdır. Mevcut araştırma temel olarak bu kavramın ölçümlenmesi ile ilişkilidir ve Türkiye'deki etnik (Kürtler ve Kürt olmayanlar) ve dinî (Aleviler ve Sünniler) farklılıklara odaklanarak bütünleşikliğin sosyal kimlik süreçleri ve gruplar arası ilişkiler üzerindeki etkilerini sorgulamak üzere yürütülmüştür. Toplam 314 katılımcının yer aldığı Çalışma 1'de etnik köken, mezhep, siyasi gruplar ile kadınları temsil eden sekiz farklı sosyal kategori özelinde bütünleşikliğin kavramsal bileşenleri nitel olarak incelenmiştir. Bu çalışmadan bütünleşikliğe ilişkin açığa çıkan temalardan yararlanılarak, Çalışma 2'de yeni ve kategoriye özgü (etnisite temelli) bir bütünleşiklik ölçeği önerilmiştir. Ölçek, Kürtlerin ve Alevilerin algılanan bütünleşiklik derecesini iç grup ve dış grup perspektiflerinden değerlendirmede kullanılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda 230'ar kişiden oluşan dört farklı katılımcı grubuna (Kürtler-Kürt olmayanlar; Aleviler-Sünniler) ulaşılmıştır. Keşfedici faktör analizi yeni önerilen bütünleşiklik ölçeği için dört faktör ortaya koymuştur: karşılıklı bağımlılık, sınır oluşturma, ortak kader ve özcülük. Ölçme aracı kabul edilebilir iç tutarlılığa sahiptir ve genel bütünleşiklik ölçekleriyle anlamlı korelasyon sergileyerek yakınsak geçerlilik göstermiştir. Bu ölçekten alınan puanlara dayalı olarak, azınlık üyeleri için (özellikle Kürt katılımcıların veri setinde), iç grup bütünleşikliği (karşılıklı bağımlılık ve ortak kader boyutları üzerinden), iç grupla özdeşimi artırarak daha yüksek düzeyde çoğunluk karşıtı tutumlar üzerinde belirleyici olmuştur. Kürt olmayan ve Sünni katılımcılar için ise dış grup bütünleşikliği (sınır oluşturma boyutu üzerinden), iç grupla özdeşim ile azınlık karşıtı tutumlar arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamada aracılık rolü üstlenmiştir. Bulgular, Türkiye'deki gruplar arası ilişkiler ekseninde tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bütünleşiklik, sosyal kategori, gruplar arası yanlılık, sosyal kimliklenme, etnisite, Kürt meselesi, Alevi-Sünni ilişkileri, özcülük.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Human beings resort to abstractions (e.g., concepts, categories) in managing the complexity of their social worlds. For example, Turkey stands for a piece of land, Kurds for an ethnic group, or the Black Eagles for one's favorite football team (i.e., Beşiktaş). Those designations are nothing more than ideas in people's heads about real things, such as geographical zones, communities, or relationships. Yet, by reifying their abstractions, people start to treat them as natural and solid things (Lukács, 1923/1967) and appreciate their "social world to be composed of real entities" as if they have "an objective status independent of particular perceivers" (Haslam et al., 2004, p. 50).

The concept of reification typically belongs to the discipline of sociology. Its conceptual equivalent in the social psychology tradition is entitativity (Haslam et al., 2004). Entitativity refers to the degree to which an aggregate of people is perceived as a real, coherent unit with identifiable boundaries (Campbell, 1958; Lickel et al., 2000; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007). Alternatively, it is the cognitive assessment of social units as groups (Blanchard et al., 2020). Sociologists do not limit the applicability of reification to social groups, whereas psychologists employ entitativity only for social groups (Haslam et al., 2004). In addition, to sociologists, reification might lead to certain drawbacks in society because people tend to forget or overlook the constructed-ness of social reality (Thomason, 1982, as cited in Haslam et al., 2004). For instance, a governmental leader might lead his subjects (or country) into a war when the nation's liberty or security is under threat. Yet, if people could appreciate people as people but not as nations, maybe it would become harder for politicians or warmongers to drag real people into a battle against other people (Sahn, 2013). Unlike sociologists who emphasize the potential perils of reification, social psychologists conceptualize entitativity in a relatively neutral way. They use entitativity to distinguish between a mere aggregate (e.g., people waiting for the same train) and a social group (e.g., a rock band). As a perceptual phenomenon, entitativity has both benefits and costs for human societies. Entitativity is regarded as a valued ingroup characteristic (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003) since entitative groups better serve people's basic needs, such as securing a positive self-image, reducing uncertainty, or having an optimal balance between belonging and separation needs (Yzerbyt et al., 2000). Conversely, entitativity is viewed as something threatening in the outgroup as it communicates how

powerful a group can be against its intergroup enemies (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Hamilton et al., 2011).

Beginning with the minimal group studies by Tajfel and his colleagues (e.g., Tajfel et al., 1971); the literature has shown that people quickly divide their social world into groups and might use any kinds of arbitrary cues to generate such distinctions (Kinzler et al., 2010). Social categories simplify the social world in minimizing intragroup differences and highlighting intergroup differences (Allport, 1954; Brown, 2000). Deaux et al. (1995) gathered social categories under five significant branches, namely, relational identities (e.g., mother, wife, or divorced), vocational identities (e.g., teachers, scientists, or psychologists), stigmatized identities (e.g., a fat, an alcoholic, or an unemployed person), political identities (e.g., democrats, feminists, or republicans), and ethnicity/religion (e.g., Americans, New Yorkers, or Christians). Among them, particular social categories such as age, gender, race (Fiske, 1998), and language/accent (Kinzler et al., 2010) are psychologically more salient. We more readily attend to those markers in social life and classify people accordingly.

In this dissertation, I will examine the perceived entitativity of social categories. Here, it is essential to delineate conceptual boundaries between the terms social category and social group. A social category refers to a bundle of people who share at least one common characteristic (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988). On the contrary, a social group is a rather dynamic entity characterized by the interdependence among its members (Lewin, 1939), and it can be defined as "two or more individuals who are connected by and within social relationships" (Forsyth, 2019, p. 3). For some researchers, a group is detectable in the presence of at least two individuals (e.g., Williams, 2010). However, for some others, there should be at least three individuals in an actual group (Moreland, 2010). Even though the minimum number of members in a group is controversial (Forsyth, 2019), the term group is often used for a wide range of social collectives, including dyads, triads, or large-scale groups (e.g., ethnicities or social class). Since social categories are by definition drawn on intragroup similarities, entitative categories will be perceived to be composed of members with some common characteristics (Haslam et al., 2004). In addition, categorical entities (e.g., nations, religions, or ethnicities) are sometimes discussed in terms of their action capacity and viewed as living organisms with plans, hopes, agendas, mood, and so on (Abelson et al., 1998; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988). For example, people might assert that Jews in Ethiopia desire a

life in Israel or Serbs committed genocide in Bosnia. Such statements also convey a certain degree of entitativity that goes beyond the static perception of social categories.

Perceiving social categories as entitative versus loose bodies makes a difference in intergroup relations (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988). Even though there is a well-established link between entitativity and intergroup bias (for a meta-analysis, see Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018), highly comprehensive prejudice-related texts (e.g., Brown, 2010; Whitley & Kite, 2010) spare less than 1 percent of their pages to entitativity (Hodson & Skorska, 2015). The authors mainly questioned how entitativity relates to stereotyping, even on a chapter entirely devoted to entitativity (Hamilton et al., 2009). Yet, the association of entitativity with prejudice is also a valuable research area (Hodson & Skorska, 2015) since focusing on the potentially malleable precursors of intergroup bias (including entitativity) rather than its supposedly stable personality-level predictors (e.g., social dominance orientation) might better help in reducing prejudices (Phelps et al., 2013).

The purpose of the current research was two-fold. First, a qualitative exploration of the perceived entitativity of numerous social categories about the Turkish sociopolitical context was held. Second, a quantitative examination on how both ingroup and outgroup entitativity might affect intergroup attitudes was performed by considering interethnic and interreligious relations in Turkey. Two consecutive studies were carried out in this dissertation. In Study 1, participants evaluated eight different social categories by reacting to a set of open-ended questions about various correlates of entitativity (e.g., the degree of similarity among group members, collective agency, or intragroup interaction). Turkey has always been influenced by societal polarizations across ethnic, religious, ideological, and gender faultlines (Aydin et al., 2021; Bilali et al., 2018; BILGESAM, 2014; Çelik et al., 2017; KONDA, 2019). Relatedly, the social categories examined in Study 1 exemplified ethnic belonging (i.e., Kurds & Turks), sectarian division (i.e., Alevis & Sunnis), political polarity (i.e., supporters of the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—Justice and Development Party) & supporters of the CHP (*Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi*—Republican Peoples Party)), and certain women groups (i.e., working women & covered women). This study mainly aimed to discover the perceptual assets that people mostly consider in construing different social categories as entitative units. I expected to come across both the previously identified and the possibly not-yet identified group characteristics that might shape people's entitativity perceptions.

Using the emergent themes on the concept of entitativity from the first study, in Study 2, I developed a novel entitativity scale and questioned the relationship between entitativity and intergroup attitudes with a particular focus on ethnic (Kurds vs. non-Kurds) and religious divides (Alevis vs. Sunnis) in Turkey. Compared to other social categories (e.g., vocational or stigmatized identities), ethnic and religious categories are believed to be performed collectively and expressed actively (Deaux et al., 1995). Since my focus was to understand the intergroup implications of entitativity, I specifically concentrated on Turkey's often-studied ethnic and religious faultlines. The entitativity of Kurds and Alevis was evaluated from the perspectives of both ingroup and outgroup members. The differential roles of ingroup and outgroup entitativity in leading to negative intergroup attitudes were probed by testing the validity of two separate mediation models. In the first model, ingroup entitativity as a valued group characteristic (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003) was expected to positively predict ingroup identification, which would, in turn, lead to more significant intergroup bias. Since this model was drawn on ingroup entitativity perceptions, it was tested on the datasets of the Kurdish and Alevi participants. In the second model, because ingroup identification might increase outgroup entitativity perceptions, especially in intractable conflicts (Stenstrom et al., 2008), outgroup entitativity was hypothesized to mediate the link between ingroup identification and intergroup bias. This model was tested on the datasets of the non-Kurdish and Sunni participants since they assessed the entitativity of Kurds and Alevis, respectively, from the outgroup standpoint.

Throughout this chapter, the concept of entitativity will be introduced in detail, and its implications as an ingroup and outgroup characteristic on intergroup phenomena will be probed. Next, different measurement procedures on entitativity will be critically examined. After that, to locate the present studies within the particular sociopolitical context of Turkey, various intrastate differences across ethnic, religious, political, and gender divides will be introduced. Eventually, the rationale behind the current research will be presented with an overview of the aims and hypotheses.

1.1. Defining Entitativity

Assistants of a social psychology lab can be viewed as a group, whereas an assembly of people waiting in a queue cannot be readily perceived so. Here, the word group refers to a social body's discrete, independent, and self-contained existence. Can social aggregates

have a real existence or an entity-like quality? For example, to Campbell (1958), a clan or a tribe that inhabits a specific place carries such a quality. On the contrary, modern cities are composed of only random social entities—social groups are less tangible and somehow undetectable to perceivers since they do not possess solid boundaries. In addressing the issue of "perceiving invisible entities as social groups" (p. 17), Campbell (1958) invented the term entitativity to denote the degree to which a group has actual existence. By entitativity, he meant the equivalence of social aggregates to physical objects (e.g., a rock or a chair) in perceivers' minds. However, the term has subsequently been used in questioning how and why human collectives are viewed as single units (Thurston, 2012). Accordingly, the definition of entitativity can be revised as the perceived unity or coherence of social bodies (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Groups can vary on the degree of their being perceived as "one thing" (Campbell, 1958) and can be compared to one other on the entitativity continuum (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).

A close conceptual associate of entitativity is cohesion, which motivates group members to remain part of the group and stick together to satisfy their instrumental goals or affective needs (Carron & Brawley, 2000). While cohesion is the actual unity of a group (Hamilton, 2007), entitativity is the subjective assessment of group coherence (Lickel et al., 2000). Cohesion is pertinent to small groups, such as therapy groups or organizational teams. Conversely, entitativity is relevant to both small and large scale groups, including social categories. Despite the conceptual differences between the two terms, participants showed a 75% similarity in clustering forty groups according to the degree of their perceived entitativity and cohesion (Thurston, 2012), and high correlations between entitativity and cohesion were also obtained in various empirical studies (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2020; Ip et al., 2006).

1.1.1. Cues to Entitativity

Lickel et al. (2000) came up with three different classes of antecedents to perceptions of entitativity. The first class of forerunners is concerned with *perceiver characteristics*, such as the need for closure (De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) or positive mood (Dovidio et al., 1995). The second class of antecedents deals with *contextual factors*. For example, a competitive or conflicting intergroup context might increase attributions of entitativity to opposing groups (Brewer et al., 1995; Ip et al., 2006). However, interaction

among members could be sufficient to induce entitativity perceptions regardless of the presence of a contrasting outgroup (Gaertner et al., 2006; Gaertner & Schopler, 1998), which brings us about to the third class of antecedents. This antecedent set relates to specific *group properties* that are influential on entitativity perceptions. Some of the relevant properties are covered below.

Applying the Gestalt principles of perception, Campbell (1958) suggested particular entitativity cues in guiding people to perceive a collective of individuals as a single unit. Those cues are proximity, similarity, and common fate. Accordingly, an aggregate of individuals who live side by side or in the same geography, share similar qualities, and are affected by the same external events or forces are more likely to be seen as an entitative unit. The spatial closeness of group members is the least essential predictor of entitativity, followed by similarity and common fate (Campbell, 1958; Rothbart & Park, 2004). This list of entitativity cues has been expanded with further studies throughout the years. For example, Lickel et al. (2000) examined how various cue properties impacted the perceived entitativity of 40 different groups. They tested the roles of the following group characteristics: ingroup similarity, group size, the level of difficulty in entering and leaving the group (permeability), duration of the group, the degree to which group members have shared goals, the importance of the group to its members, the extent to which members experience similar outcomes or share a common fate, and frequency of interaction among members. According to the results, while the cue properties of interaction, common goal, shared destiny, self-importance, and physical similarity were highly correlated with entitativity, group size, duration, and permeability emerged as the weakest correlates of entitativity.

In addition to physical similarity, behavioral similarity (Lakens, 2010; Welbourne, 1999), and synchrony in the non-identical movements of group members (Lakens, 2010; Lakens & Stel, 2011) led to increased perceptions of entitativity. Besides, the group's internal organization and intragroup role differentiation have been suggested as additional predictors of entitativity (Hamilton et al., 1998; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007). In a related vein, a group's ability to achieve its objectives, namely its agency, also acts as one other basis of its perceived entitativity (Abelson et al., 1998; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007). What is more, Yzerbyt et al. (2004) added essentialism (i.e., the belief that group members possess a common underlying essence) into this cue list.

Furthermore, when a group is viewed as continuous in time in that its past, present-day, and future are linked, and its group-defining aspects such as common beliefs or traditions are passed along from generation to generation, that group is also concordantly regarded as an entitative unit (Herrera & Sani, 2013; Sani et al., 2008; Sani et al., 2007; Warner et al., 2016).

Lickel et al. (2000) developed a novel taxonomy of groups based on systematic differences in their perceptual qualities. In this classification, there are four primary group types: *intimacy groups* (e.g., families or street gangs that are distinguished by frequent contact, high self-importance, long-history, and low permeability), *task groups* (e.g., sports teams or juries, associated with the qualities of high levels of communication and self-importance, intermediate permeability, small size, and short duration), *social categories* (e.g., large groups such as women, blacks, or Jews with an enduring history, impenetrable boundaries, and limited interaction), and *transitory groups* (e.g., passengers in the same train or customers in a bank queue that are short-lived and small in size, and are considered by a low degree of interaction and little barrier to entry or exit). People rate intimacy and task groups as highest on the entitativity continuum, followed by social categories and transitory groups (Lickel et al., 2000). Perceivers spontaneously employ group-type information in organizing their social worlds (Sherman et al., 2002). Moreover, different groups are functional in satisfying different psychological needs (Hamilton & Van Acker, 2010). Mainly speaking, belonging needs (e.g., emotional attachment, acceptance, or support) are best met by intimacy groups, competence needs (e.g., goal mastery, achievement, or success) by task groups, and identity needs (e.g., self-esteem, uniqueness, or distinctiveness) by social categories (Crawford & Salaman, 2012; Johnson et al., 2006).

1.1.2. Essence-Based vs. Agency-Based Entitativity

The above-covered multitude of entitativity cues are reduced to two distinct clusters by different scholars (e.g., Brewer et al., 2004; Ip et al., 2006; Rutchick et al., 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2000). First, when a group is perceived based on shared attributes of its members, this is called *essence-based entitativity* (Brewer et al., 2004). In this type of entitativity, perceivers often focus on the members' common personality traits, behavioral tendencies, physical appearance, or personal histories (e.g., upbringing style, socialization environment, or everyday life events), which are the hallmarks of categorical groups, such as race or gender. The implications of the similarity-based group perception are generally addressed in

the intergroup relations literature (Brown, 2000). Second, when a group is perceived based on its members' collective actions, this is called *agency-based entitativity* (Brewer et al., 2004; Hamilton, 2007). In this type of entitativity, perceivers often focus on the common goal status of group members, their organizational potential for joint acts, and their shared future, which are the hallmarks of agentic groups, such as task groups or sports teams (Brewer et al., 2004; Rutchick et al., 2008). The concept of agency has been interpreted in two different ways in the literature (Hamilton, 2007). According to the first interpretation, a group becomes agentic to the extent that it can act effectively and thereby affect its outcomes and other groups and individuals. According to the second interpretation, a group becomes agentic to the extent that it enjoys certain mental states such as goals, ideals, motives, or intentions behind its members' goal-directed behaviors. Perceiving agency in the first sense might imply the second interpretation (Hamilton, 2007). However, the reverse might not necessarily hold. Not every group possessing common ideals is capable of implementing practical actions to achieve its goals. The implications of the agency-based group perception are often addressed in small group research (Levine & Moreland, 2006). Being a bridge between intergroup relations and small group literature (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998), entitativity provides a fruitful and flexible approach to group phenomena (Yzerbyt et al., 2001).

According to some scholars, the similarity is not as crucial as the agency for entitativity judgments (e.g., Brewer et al., 1995; Welbourne, 1999). However, for others, both cue sets are fundamental antecedents of entitativity. For example, Ip et al. (2006) demonstrated that participants perceived comparable levels of entitativity in the target aggregates even though they were led to focus on either the surface similarity or the movement synchrony in the social bodies. The link between physical similarity and entitativity was mediated through trait inferences, whereas the connection between movement similarity and entitativity was mediated through the attributions of shared goals. Consequently, Ip et al. (2006) unearthed at least two primary perceptual-inferential routes to the same destination (i.e., perceived entitativity).

Even though some researchers (e.g., Rothbart & Park, 2004) strictly separate between groups that are perceived based on their common traits on the one hand and groups that are perceived based on their shared goals on the other, according to Hamilton (2007), people might judge groups as not only agentic but also homogenous entities regarding their common

goals. Similarly, Kashima (2004) has also stated that all the entitativity cues suggested by Campbell (1958) can be viewed as the basis of homogeneity. In empirically confirming these arguments, Ip et al. (2006) showed that group members acting similarly led participants to make the common goal and common trait inferences. In addition, since there was no strict distinction between the judgments of similarity and shared goals, Blanchard et al. (2020) modeled homogeneity as a second-order factor comprised of these two relevant components. On the whole, one should always keep in mind that perceivers might not always have a nuanced understanding in distinguishing between group members' similarity and their shared goals.

1.1.3. The Link Between Essentialism and Entitativity

Brewer et al. (2004) utilized the term "essence" in alluding to the common traits attributed to group members, the permanence of the group in time, and intragroup homogeneity. In this regard, their idea of essence resembles the notion of homogeneity in social psychology (Hamilton, 2007). Yet, categorization judgments might exceed mere similarity perceptions since individuals might need to justify their particular ways of grouping people (Medin, 1989). Another group of researchers (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000, 2004; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Rothbart & Park, 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2004) used "essentialism" to convey the perceptions of groups as natural kinds. In the essentialist understanding of groups in this respect, group members are believed to share some deep core (i.e., essence) that makes them who they are and separates them from other groups. Essentialism goes beyond pointing out the categorical similarities and differences as it provides a rationale why the category members share the characteristics they show and why they are categorized so (Hamilton, 2007). Essential qualities of category members are viewed as highly persistent and assumed to be "transmitted across time and space through the "mysterious mana" of biology or culture" (Rothbart & Park, 2004, p. 81).

People frequently attribute an underlying reality not only to the allegedly biological groups (e.g., race, gender, or ethnicity) (Haslam et al., 2000), but also to the "not-so-natural" social categories, such as Catholics, students, or athletes (Demoulin et al., 2006). According to Yzerbyt et al. (2001), entitativity corresponds to the perceptual side of group cognition (i.e., recognizing a high degree of resemblance among group members). In contrast, essentialism corresponds to the inferential facet of social perception (i.e., ascribing an

underlying sameness to group members). The two elements interact with one other in that people more readily essentialize an entitative group to explain the apparent similarities among its members. And, they are also likely to attribute entitativity to an essentialized group since they will focus on the surface regularities in the members of the essentialized group (Yzerbyt et al., 2001).

Rothbart and Taylor (1992, as cited in Hamilton et al., 2004) suggested that essentialist thinking includes two primary constituents: "inalterability" (the difficulty of changing one categorical membership to another) and "inductive potential" (the possibility of making inferences about individuals based on their categorical belonging). Haslam et al. (2000) conducted a factor analysis on the nine elements of essentialism and discovered two independent dimensions. The first dimension is about the degree to which groups are viewed as natural kinds and comprises the facets of naturalness (the biological basis of the membership), the immutability of membership, discrete boundaries, necessary characteristics for the membership, and group stability in time. This factor corresponds to the inalterability component of Rothbart and Taylor's notion of essentialism, and its implications have commonly been addressed concerning biological essentialism (e.g., Keller, 2005; No et al., 2008). The second factor is about the degree to which groups are viewed as meaningful units with underlying reality, and it captures the qualities of informativeness, uniformity, and inherence. While this dimension is similar to Rothbart and Taylor's inductive potential dimension, Haslam et al. (2000) called it "entitativity." Their use of the term entitativity for this dimension can reflect conflicting views on the link between essentialism and entitativity in the literature. While Haslam et al. (2000) consider entitativity as one of the two components of essentialism, other researchers subsume essentialism under entitativity (e.g., Brewer et al., 2004; Ip et al., 2006).

Inspired from this line of discussions, Roets and Van Hiel (2011) make a distinction between (a) *essentialist entitativity*, the belief that group members are fundamentally alike and it is possible to make inferences about them concerning their inherent core aspects, and (b) *essentialist naturalness*, the belief that group boundaries arise out of biological (natural) differences and are immutable. In many empirical studies, essentialist entitativity has often been equated with the general concept of entitativity (Hodson & Skorska, 2015). Besides, it is empirically distinguished from the non-essentialist (or agency-based) entitativity or essentialist naturalness (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011).

The degree to which a social category is essentialized can be independent of the extent to which it is perceived as an entitative unit (Prentice & Miller, 2007). For example, some groups (e.g., men) are perceived as high on essentialism and low on entitativity, some (e.g., Republicans) as high on entitativity but low on essentialism, and some (e.g., movie buffs) as low on both dimensions (Haslam et al., 2000). Some researchers suggested that essentialism rather than entitativity is more closely associated with the perceptions of social categories (Brewer et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2004). In agreement with this reasoning, compared to task groups, social categories were lower on entitativity but higher on essentialism (Denson et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2000). Yet, the valence of intergroup attitudes is also influential on how social categories are perceived. For example, in Haslam et al.'s (2000) study, positively-laden categories such as Whites, heterosexuals, or men were seen as high on essentialism but low on entitativity. In contrast, negatively-laden categories such as Hispanics, AIDS patients, or blind people were rated as high on both dimensions (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011).

Even though separating entitativity from other related concepts is an unfinished endeavor, the intergroup implications of entitativity have widely been addressed in the literature. For example, entitativity has been examined as one of the bases of stereotypical thinking (Hamilton, 2007) since people more readily infer dispositions from the behaviors of members of entitative groups. As evident in the finding that people are prone to making fundamental attribution errors for entitative targets (Rogier & Yzerbyt, 1999; Yzerbyt et al., 1998); people may ignore the effects of situational factors and overestimate the decisiveness of group characteristics in explaining the behaviors of members in highly entitative groups. In addition, for groups high on entitativity, people generally take their first impressions as the basis of group cognition; they have difficulty incorporating following group-related information into their already-formed perceptions (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Besides, it takes longer for perceivers to process exemplars that do not fit the group prototype for an entitative (vs. a non-entitative) group (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Moreover, since the members of highly entitative groups are viewed as interchangeable, the traits of one group member were more readily transferred to other group members for such groups (Crawford et al., 2002). Similarly, as perceivers are less attentive to individual differences within an entitative group, participants made more significant recognition errors in distinguishing individual members of the high than low entitative groups (Dasgupta et al., 1999). Altogether, these findings demonstrate the facilitating effect of entitativity on the

development and frequent use of stereotypes. According to the meta-analytic results (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996, as cited in Newheiser & Dovidio, 2012), there was a modest degree of correlation (r = .25) between stereotypes and prejudices. While the former relates to cold and cognitive processes, the latter relates to hot and motivated processes (Fiske, 1998). In this dissertation, entitativity will be questioned by focusing on its links to social identification processes and prejudices.

1.2. Social Identification and Group Entitativity

Ingroup identification is the degree to which people attribute importance and attach value to their group belonging in defining themselves (Ellemers et al., 1997). According to self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 2012), how people cognitively categorize themselves is influential on their attitudes and behaviors towards others. To succeed in a positively distinctive social identity, they will favor their ingroup during intergroup comparisons on appropriate dimensions (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). It is possible to distinguish between the two forms of intergroup discrimination (Levin & Sidanius, 1999). One form relates to enhancing or promoting the ingroup. The other form relates to deliberately derogating or harming the outgroup (e.g., prejudice, discrimination, outgroup hate, or intergroup aggression). According to Brewer (2001, 2007), ingroup identification or favoritism can be manifested independently of outgroup derogation. However, especially in high conflict settings, people are likely to develop strong ingroup identification in securing a sense of security and belonging (Turner & Reynolds, 2001), and thereby show greater negative attitudes towards threatening outgroups to sustain the value and continuity of their ingroups (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Brewer, 1991). Consequently, as the strength of ingroup identification increases, it is likely to perpetuate intergroup conflict (Brewer, 2007; Brown & Zagefka, 2005; Ellemers et al., 1997; Hogg, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The literature on intergroup relations has covered many factors that determine people's strength of ingroup identification. Among them, self-enhancement motive (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986), self-uncertainty (Hogg, 2012), and the need for optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991, 2012) can be counted as personal factors. Certain group-related aspects, such as group size and status, can also influence people's group identification levels (Ellemers et al., 1999). As being one of such group-related characteristics, ingroup

entitativity will be questioned for its potential contribution to ingroup identification in this section. Besides, ingroup identification can determine how people perceive outgroups. For example, people with higher national ingroup identification perceived greater intergroup threat from migrants (e.g., Caricati, 2018; Verkuyten, 2009). Similarly, participants relatively high on ingroup identification displayed greater levels of outgroup contrast in that they attributed contradictory features to the ingroup on the one hand and the outgroup on the other (Riketta, 2005). This part will also discuss how outgroup entitativity perceptions might also be affected by ingroup identification.

1.2.1. The Link Between Ingroup Identification and Ingroup Entitativity

Ingroup entitativity is an attractive perceptual quality for various reasons (Castano, 2004). First, it affirms a group's power and capacity for joint action against its intergroup foes and thereby supplies group members with a sense of security (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Hamilton et al., 2011; Sacchi et al., 2009; Pagliaro et al., 2013). Second, it reduces self-uncertainty (Hogg et al., 2010; Hogg et al., 2007). Third, it helps people overcome their existential anxiety (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Herrera & Sani, 2013). Fourth, it satisfies people's need for self-understanding and provides them with a clear image of who *we* (as a group) are, especially in the face of a severe external threat (Rothgerber, 1997) and through negative collective past experiences (Bougie et al., 2011). Fifth, it contributes to people's social well-being (Sani et al., 2008) and buffers them from self-esteem loss or negative mood following a social rejection experience (Knowles & Gaertner, 2008).

Given its usefulness for psychosocial functioning, people perceived their ingroups as more entitative than outgroups (Crump et al., 2010). Various correlational studies (e.g., Lickel et al., 2000; Jans et al., 2011; Sani et al., 2007; Sani et al., 2008) have revealed that ingroup entitativity positively predicted the degree of ingroup identification or collective self-esteem regarding real groups. In addition, experimental studies have also indicated the causal prominence of ingroup entitativity in strengthening ingroup identification. For example, manipulating the entitativity of a real group (i.e., European Union) based on the common fate of its members, ingroup similarity, and the clarity of ingroup boundaries led to increased levels of ingroup identification among Europeans (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003). Even with a minimal group paradigm, participants identified with their

minimal identities more when they experienced a common fate with their ingroup members after they knew their category membership than when they shared a common fate before learning their category membership (Moscatelli & Rubini, 2013; Rubini et al., 2007). In the same vein, greater intragroup interaction and interdependence in a minimal group context caused an increase in positive ingroup regard by strengthening perceived ingroup entitativity (Gaertner et al., 2006).

Even though ingroup entitativity has generally been addressed as an antecedent of ingroup identification, the directionality between ingroup identification and ingroup entitativity might work the other way around. For example, in encountering an opposing ingroup member, highly identified group members demonstrated a greater black-sheeping pattern in that they judged the deviant ingroup member more harshly than lowly identified members (Branscombe et al., 1993). Similarly, strongly identified group members used stricter criteria or were more selective in accepting a person in the group than weakly identified members (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002). In light of these findings, Yzerbyt et al. (2000) proposed that excluding negative ingroup members and refusing to consider a person as an ingroup member erroneously might be the two strategies that highly identified members use to sustain the entitativity of their group. In their own words (Yzerbyt et al., 2000, p. 281), "[t]he stronger the ties between the person and the group, the more the group is supposed to meet the criteria set forth by Campbell (1958)". This speculation brings to light the possibility that ingroup identification might precede ingroup entitativity.

1.2.2. The Link Between Ingroup Identification and Outgroup Entitativity

Identification at the group level might also be influential on how people perceive outgroups. People ascribe greater collective responsibility to an entitative (vs. a non-entitative) group based on the wrongdoings of individual members (Denson et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2003). When outgroup members damage ingroup members, especially people with more robust ingroup identification are likely to react to such events with increased levels of anger and retaliatory intentions. In addressing the process of vicarious retribution, Stenstrom et al. (2008) revealed that the link between ingroup identification and retaliation against a provocateur group as a whole was mediated through increased outgroup entitativity perceptions. Similarly, among Lebanese Maronites (as the

largest Christian community in Lebanon), identification with their religious identity resulted in the perceptions of Lebanese Muslims (as their former enemies) as a continuous unit across time, which in turn led to greater negative intergroup attitudes (Licata et al., 2012). In this respect, outgroup entitativity can be said to lay the ground for the perpetuity of hostile intergroup relations since it makes intergroup borders seem sharper (Rothbart & Park, 2004) and facilitates the attributions of negative qualities and intentions to outgroup members (Dasgupta et al., 1999), possibly through stereotyping (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018). From the motivated reasoning perspective (Kunda, 1990), due to their motivational investment in the ingroup, people with stronger ingroup identification might be attracted to such outgroup entitativity judgments more in justifying their negative intergroup attitudes or harmful actions against a relevant outgroup. Accordingly, especially in high-conflict intergroup situations, one might expect to observe that ingroup identification leads to greater outgroup entitativity perceptions, which in turn produces heightened levels of negative outgroup attitudes.

1.3. Implications of Group Entitativity for Intergroup Relations

Entitativity as an ingroup and outgroup characteristic can shape intergroup outcomes (Castano, 2004). In this section, the link between entitativity and intergroup relations will be addressed.

1.3.1. The Impact of Ingroup Entitativity

Although the roots of intergroup bias are often questioned concerning intergroup dynamics, there might be an intragroup element to such biases. Self-categorization theory suggests that ingroup perception arises in the presence of a comparative outgroup (Turner & Reynolds, 2012). However, according to the entitativity approach, an ingroup can be seen as a distinct unit even in the absence of contrasting outgroups (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998). Accordingly, it is possible to assert that a positive intragroup interaction (i.e., intragroup effect) and a competitive intergroup context (i.e., intergroup effect) might equally result in group-based phenomena. In line with this reasoning, Gaertner and Schopler (1998) manipulated the degree of ingroup entitativity through the quality of intragroup interaction among participants across three levels within a minimal group paradigm. Participants were instructed to work on a problem-solving and self-disclosure task with their minimal ingroup

members in the high intragroup interdependency condition. In the medium interdependency condition, participants completed the problem-solving task collectively but independently worked on the self-disclosure task. In the low interdependency condition, participants completed both tasks on their own. According to the results, participants in the high and medium interaction conditions demonstrated greater ingroup favoritism in reward distribution and higher attitudinal ingroup bias in the output evaluation than participants in the low interdependency condition, and these connections were mediated through an increased sense of ingroup entitativity (for similar results, see also Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Gaertner et al., 2006). What is more, in confirming the predictions of the entitativity approach, the intergroup implications of ingroup entitativity were evident independent of the presence or absence of intergroup competition (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998).

Ingroup love has been proposed not to necessitate outgroup negativity (Brewer, 2001, 2007), and since ingroup entitativity increases group efficacy in the eye of ingroup members, members of entitative groups might not feel an urge to derogate outgroups. However, many empirical attempts yielded findings opposite of this prediction and revealed that ingroup entitativity could also impact negative outgroup attitudes. In Moscatelli and Rubini's (2013) study, participants allocated adverse outcomes (i.e., aversive noise) to outgroup members more than ingroup members when they perceived their ingroup as an entitative unit. The impact of ingroup entitativity might also manifest in less overt forms of outgroup discrimination, including linguistic discrimination. In Rubini et al.'s (2007) study, participants experiencing a common fate with their ingroupers showed linguistic discrimination against outgroup members; they preferred to describe positive behaviors of outgroup members with a more positive concrete language and their negative behaviors with a more negative abstract language. With this outgroup image, positive outgroup attributes are confined to specific situations, and their harmful deeds can be more easily generalized to other situations as the ingroup entitativity increases.

Ingroup entitativity was also positively associated with the perceived economic and physical threat from the outgroup, and the link between ingroup entitativity and prejudice was evident independently of whether entitativity was conceptualized as an essence-, agency-, or unity-based construct (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2017). Besides, in a series of studies, Effron and Knowles (2015) demonstrated that ingroup entitativity was associated

with the social acceptability of prejudice against outgroups. Effron and Knowles (2015, 7th study) hypothesized that ingroup entitativity would open "a valve through which bias can escape" (p. 246) under appropriate conditions. Highly identified Christians presented with an entitative image of their group (i.e., being united and sharing a common agenda) expressed greater Islamophobic reactions than their control counterparts. However, such an effect was not observed for lowly identified Christians. High identifiers seemed to recklessly express intergroup bias in pursuing their shared agenda in perceiving their ingroup as an entitative unit. It is possible to conclude that greater ingroup identification fuels people with intergroup bias and ingroup entitativity lays the ground for its open expression (Effron & Knowles, 2015). However, given the above-covered experimental evidence that ingroup entitativity might act as a causal antecedent of ingroup identification (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003; Hogg et al., 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2001), ingroup identification might also facilitate the effect of ingroup entitativity on intergroup bias by acting as a mediatory mechanism (Effron & Knowles, 2015). In other words, ingroup entitativity might result in negative intergroup attitudes by increasing ingroup identification.

1.3.2. The Impact of Outgroup Entitativity

The individual-group discontinuity effect suggests that intergroup interactions are more competitive, distrustful, and less cooperative than interindividual interactions (Wildschut et al., 2004). In support of this proposition, people often think that members of highly entitative groups are more likely to manifest harmful behaviors (e.g., retaliation or threat) than members of lowly entitative groups (e.g., Callahan & Ledgerwood, 2016; Dasgupta et al., 1999). It is so because entitative groups are regarded as clannish, resilient to external intrusion, and capable of organized harmful action against outsiders (Abelson et al., 1998). High group entitativity also increases attributions of intentionality to group members (Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003). Relatedly, because highly entitative groups are believed to possess collective interests, they were more readily held collectively responsible for the harmful acts of individual members (Denson et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2003; Pereira & Van Prooijen, 2018). Besides, perceivers approached the entire group with greater moral suspicion and viewed any of its members (even those who are not personally involved in the wrongdoing) as deserving of punishment (Newheiser et al., 2012; Stenstrom et al., 2008; Vasquez et al., 2015). In protecting themselves from such powerful outgroups, ingroup members might develop a counter-entitativity (i.e., ingroup unity) and take specific

collective actions in conveying their entitativity to the rival outgroups. According to Abelson et al. (1998, p. 248), this process is highly relevant to the "escalatory spiral" of intergroup conflict. In cases of extreme violence (e.g., terrorist attacks), seeing the outgroup as an entitative unit might also lead perpetrators to harm any bystanders who are not directly involved in the relevant intergroup conflict (Choi et al., 2018)

The links of outgroup entitativity to prejudice against homosexuals (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Hodson & Skorska, 2015), negative attitudes towards people with mental disorders (Haqanee et al., 2014; Hodson & Skorska, 2015), racism in Belgium (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) and in Canada (Hodson & Skorska, 2015), and xenophobia (Ommundsen et al., 2013) have been empirically confirmed. There is also a strong relationship between outgroup entitativity and conspiracy stereotyping about the relevant outgroups, which has been confirmed about Germans, Arabs, homosexuals, and Jews in a Polish sample (Grzesiak-Feldman & Suszek, 2008). In the migrant-host relationships, perceiving immigrants as an entitative body was found to negatively influence the integrative attitudes of majority members (Phelps et al., 2013). Even though outgroup entitativity might have negative implications for intergroup relations, it might also play a role in restoring damaged intergroup relations when the intergroup behavior is a positive one. For example, since apologies of highly entitative groups can be regarded as more collectively endorsed and victims may find greater certainty and predictability in the apologies conveyed by such groups, their apologies were perceived as sincerer and less due to ulterior motive, and victims concurrently developed a greater liking for the relevant entitative outgroups (Leonard, 2019).

The impact of outgroup entitativity on intergroup attitudes depends on different conceptualizations of entitativity in various empirical studies. While essentialist entitativity was positively associated with racism, the non-essentialist entitativity (i.e., interdependency among members regarding their interaction and shared goals) was not related to racial prejudices (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). What is more, tapping the shared variance between essentialist entitativity and essentialist naturalism explained more significant variance in racial prejudices than pitting the two against each other (Hodson & Skorska, 2015). This finding might indicate that not only the perceived homogeneity or unity of a group but also its deeply ingrained qualities are influential on intergroup attitudes when the target group exemplifies a racial category. What is more, in the meta-analytical results, prejudice towards

different social categories was found to be associated with essence-based entitativity but not with agency-based entitativity (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018). The link between essence-based entitativity and prejudice towards social categories is reasonable. It is because social categories are homogenous entities in terms of common attributes of their members, and essence-based entitativity is mainly concerned with the similarity of group members. However, social categories are such large groups that it might be hard to imagine that all members in a category share a superordinate goal and jointly act to achieve this goal. From this point of view, it is also plausible why agency-based entitativity might not be linked to prejudice towards social categories. Yet, when it comes to political attitudes, while outgroup entitativity (i.e., perceived groupness) was not correlated with different indicators of intergroup bias, outgroup agentivity (i.e., ability to act as a group) was positively associated with cognitive prejudice and intergroup threat (Schepisi et al., 2019).

Even though prejudice has generally been examined as an outcome of entitativity perceptions, there might be a bidirectional relationship between outgroup entitativity and bias. In agreement with this prediction, the associations of right-wing authoritarianism, intergroup contact (Newheiser & Dovidio, 2012), and social dominance orientation (Newheiser et al., 2009) to entitativity were mediated through anti-Muslim bias. Similarly, prejudices towards South Asians predicted outgroup entitativity only for the participants with a high degree of attitude certainty (Newheiser et al., 2009). The authors speculated that highly prejudiced individuals might more readily endorse outgroup entitativity beliefs in justifying their prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory acts.

According to the polarization hypothesis, the link between outgroup entitativity and negative intergroup attitudes is moderated by the functional structure of intergroup relations (Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003). That is, high outgroup entitativity might result in positive intergroup attitudes when the outgroup is perceived as the ally of the ingroup, whereas it might be associated with negative attitudes when the outgroup is seen as the enemy of the ingroup. In various empirical attempts, entitativity was correlated with greater suspicion (Newheiser et al., 2012) and prejudice (Newheiser et al., 2009) when the target group was believed to possess hostile intentions. In contrast, when the target group was perceived as cooperative, outgroup entitativity was associated with more positive attitudes (Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003; Warner et al., 2016). In a related vein, highly entitative outgroups were perceived as warmer in cooperative relations, whereas they were viewed as colder in

conflicting relations (Dang, Liu, Ren, & Su, 2018). Similarly, when participants were positive towards Muslims, they characterized Muslims with lower levels of entitativity following an individual Muslim's adverse action and higher levels of entitativity in the face of positive action of an individual Muslim (Adelman et al., 2019). These empirical outcomes confirm the polarization hypothesis of Castano, Sacchi, and Gries (2003), as opposed to the previously obtained findings indicating a direct association between outgroup entitativity and harmfulness attributions (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 1999). On the whole, one can assert that outgroup entitativity is more likely to yield a positive association with prejudices in conflicting intergroup contexts, including societies haunted by important historical or sociopolitical polarizations.

1.4. Critical Perspectives on Measuring Entitativity

The literature on entitativity has difficulties measuring the construct for two reasons (Zyphur & Islam, 2006). First, entitativity has a broad nature as it is composed of theoretically divergent and not necessarily (strongly) correlated aspects (John & Benet-Martínez, 2000). Second, the measurement-focused studies on entitativity have rarely been held (for exceptions, see Agadullina & Lovakov, 2017; Blanchard et al., 2020). Some researchers (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2020; Ip et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 2000) have strictly separated the operational definition of entitativity (i.e., perceived unity or groupness) from its antecedents (i.e., entitativity cues). Accordingly, they have preferred to measure entitativity by asking participants to assess the extent to which an aggregate of interest can be qualified as a group, "one thing," or a unified whole. Alternative pictorial measures of entitativity (e.g., Gaertner et al., 2006; Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Rutchick et al., 2008) have also been used for the same end. Those graphical measures generally include a set of diagrams composed of circles that become increasingly closer (i.e., united) to one other as the scale goes from one end to another. Participants are instructed to imagine that the circles in each diagram symbolize the members of the target group, and they are asked to judge the degree to which the relevant group forms a unit by selecting the visual depiction that best represents their perception. To Hamilton (2007), such measures help quantify what entitativity *is* rather than what it is *related to*.

Instead of referring to the generic definition of entitativity in assessing the construct, other researchers have used cues to entitativity (e.g., similarity, interaction, shared goals, or

importance) as a substitute for entitativity. They measured it by asking participants to evaluate target groups on specific sets of entitativity cues (e.g., Stenstrom et al., 2008). By experimentally manipulating the degree of intragroup interaction (Gaertner et al., 2006), the graphical depiction of intergroup interactivity (Igarashi & Kashima, 2011), interdependency among group members (Crump et al., 2010; Dang, Liu, Ren, & Gu, 2018; Rutchick et al., 2008), and behavioral, attitudinal, or physical similarity within the group (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003; Dasgupta et al., 1999; Ip et al., 2006; Rutchick et al., 2008) through a multitude of behavioral tasks, visual stimulus, or instruction sets, various researchers have demonstrated that those cue properties are central in leading to entitativity judgments. In other studies (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003; Newheiser et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007; Vasquez et al., 2015), an additive or common scale approach was preferred in that items on the generic definition of entitativity and cue properties are used together, and a composite score based on them was employed as a measure of entitativity. Besides, in some studies, different entitativity types (e.g., essentialist entitativity) have been equated with the larger concept of entitativity (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018; Hodson & Skorska, 2015). Even though Blanchard et al. (2020) criticized this common scale approach for failing to differentiate entitativity from its antecedents or consequences, Hamilton (2007) stated that the additive method is also a reasonable measurement strategy since cue properties are directly associated with what qualifies a social body as a group.

Agadullina and Lovakov (2017) conceptualized entitativity as comprising of three interrelated components. The first component refers to the similarity of group members to each other (the essence component). The second one relates to group goals and intentions, intragroup interaction, and interdependency among group members (the agency component). The third one is about group cohesion and the importance of the group to its members (the unity component). This three-component model yielded better fit statistics than an alternative uni-component model of entitativity, and these three components were highly correlated to one other (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2017). Other studies have also provided further evidence about the interconnectedness among different entitativity dimensions (e.g., Brewer et al., 2004; Ip et al., 2006; Rutchick et al., 2008; Schepisi et al., 2019), and this trend has also been cross-culturally confirmed (e.g., Kashima et al., 2005; Kurebayashi et al., 2012). What is more, Agadullina and Lovakov (2017) demonstrated that all three dimensions of entitativity were significantly associated with ingroup identification and prejudice.

Accordingly, entitativity appears to be "not a coherent unitary psychological phenomenon, but a collection of diverse attributes of the psychological meaningfulness of a social entity" (Kashima et al., 2005, p. 162), and there might not be substantial differences across various conceptualizations in questioning the implications of entitativity (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2017). However, since different cue properties might be more prominent in construing different group types as entitative units (Blanchard et al., 2020; Ip et al., 2006; Rutchick et al., 2008; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, et al., 2007), a category-specific (i.e., ethnicity-based) entitativity scale was offered within the scope of the current research. The scale provided in Study 2 was aligned with the measurement approaches that suggest evaluating entitativity by its correlates. Yet, a set of generic entitativity items were also used in validating the newly-developed scale. Before presenting the aims and hypotheses of the present studies, a review of social polarizations across multiple divides in Turkey will be submitted in the next section.

1.5. Intergroup Relations in Turkey

Turkey has been a fertile ground for understanding intergroup dynamics since societal polarizations among social groups have historically been a common problem (Çelik et al., 2017), and many public surveys (e.g., BILGESAM, 2014; KONDA, 2010, 2014, 2019) have pointed out an increase in social distance and tension among various identity groups in the country. Societal polarization in Turkey can be placed at different levels of analysis, such as ethnicity, religion, political preferences (Çelik et al., 2017), or gender (Toprak et al., 2009). Previous studies have often focused on only one aspect of intergroup tensions, such as ethnic (e.g., Bilali et al., 2014; Dixon & Ergin, 2010; Saraçoğlu, 2009) or religious divides (e.g., Akbaş, 2010). Yet, there is also limited research providing a comprehensive mapping of patterns of othering in Turkey across ethnic, religious, and political divides (e.g., Bilgiç et al., 2014; Çelik et al., 2017).

In the first study of the present dissertation, the entitativity of various social categories will be under examination. The target categories cover the ethnic (i.e., Kurds–Turks), sectarian (i.e., Alevis–Sunnis), and political (i.e., AKP supporters vs. CHP supporters) divide in Turkey. Those category names are mutual others produced in the Turkish sociopolitical context (Çelik et al., 2017). In addition, the two women groups, specifically working women and covered women, are also addressed in Study 1. The former

category was chosen because women have been a commonly otherized group in Turkey (Toprak et al., 2009). The latter category was selected because the center-periphery dilemma in Turkey has reproduced itself in the polarization between covered vs. uncovered women in that the center generally retains its cultural superiority claims even when it does not occupy a central position in political or economic spheres (Bilgiç et al., 2014). In the second study of this dissertation, among various social faultlines, only the interethnic (Kurds vs. non-Kurds) and intersectarian (Alevis vs. Sunnis) relations would be the focus of interest. In what follows, three primary sources of polarization, namely, ethnic, sectarian, and political faultlines, will be discussed. Next, gender as a source of othering in Turkey will be covered; the status of working women in society and the headscarf issue will be examined in particular.

1.5.1. Ethnic Divide: The Kurdish-Turkish Context

A social aggregate sharing a common ancestry, history, language, and particular cultural elements (e.g., myths, values, beliefs, or tradition), connecting themselves with a real or imagery common land, and experiencing a sense of solidarity among themselves is called as an ethnic group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996). Ethnicity has always been a sensitive topic in Turkey, beginning in the 1960s, and the year 1965 was the last time that national-level data concerning ethnicity was produced in the general census by using mother tongue as a proxy for ethnicity (Koc et al., 2008). There are at least 51 ethnic groups in Turkey whose actual size and spatial distribution are unknown (Andrews, 1992). As the biggest minority in Turkey, Kurds are estimated to constitute approximately one-fifth of the country's population (KONDA, 2006, 2011; Sirkeci, 2000).

The Turkish state has been founded on the ideology of one nation, one language, and centralized control (Çelebi et al., 2014). Kurds were seen as the greatest threat to this monolithic nation-state ideal from the early days of the Republic (Yıldız, 2012), and they were subjected to the state's official "Turkification" or assimilation policies (e.g., the ban on the Kurdish language or the replacement of Kurdish names by Turkish counterparts) (Çelebi et al., 2014). The Kurdish-Turkish conflict has evolved into its "current" form after the emergence of the PKK (*Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan* – Kurdistan Workers' Party) as an insurgent group in 1984 (Çelik & Kantowitz, 2009). The intensification of oppressive state policies after the 1960 coup d'état and the libertarian political atmosphere accompanying the

1961 constitution have accelerated ethnic awakenings among Kurds, and the PKK has started armed conflicts with the state's army in the pursuit of independence from the Turkish state (Bilgiç et al., 2014). Those conflicts between the PKK fighters and the Turkish state forces have caused over 30,000 causalities from both sides throughout the 1990s (Baysu et al., 2018), a period in which human rights violations and the forced displacement of eastern Kurdish villagers to big western cities were also highly relevant (Çelik et al., 2017). The imprisonment of Öcalan as the PKK leader, Turkey's candidature to the European Union in 1999, the Kurdish Opening in 2009, and the break of ceasefire by the PKK in 2011 have been the major turning points for the Kurdish conflict in Turkey' near history (for further details, see Bilali et al., 2014; Çelik et al., 2017; Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017).

According to Çelik and Blum (2007), the Kurdish conflict can be construed across three levels of conflict frames. In the first understanding, the PKK is viewed as a terrorist organization (Dixon & Ergin, 2010) posing a threat to the stability of Turkey, and thereby the Kurdish conflict is defined as a conflict between the state and the PKK (the terrorism or armed conflict frame). In the second understanding, the conflict is viewed as one between the state and Kurds as a minority group focusing on their disadvantageous position in Turkey (the minority rights frame). In the third understanding, the conflict is seen between ethnic Turks and Kurds (the ethnic tension frame). Both Kurds and Turks understood the conflict more strongly in terms of the terrorism frame rather than the other frames (Çelebi et al., 2014). Yet, Turks endorsed this frame stronger than Kurds, while Kurds tended to adopt an ethnic tension frame stronger than Turks (Çelebi et al., 2014).

The majority of Kurds live in the eastern and southeastern cities of Turkey (Koc et al., 2008; Smits & Gündüz-Hoşgör, 2003), which are the socioeconomically least developed parts of the country (Filiztekin, 2009). Kurds are characterized by particular cultural and anthropological assets, such as frequent endogamic marriages (Zeyneloğlu et al., 2011) and a different language. While speaking Kurdish reinforces intraethnic solidarity among Kurds, being unable to speak Turkish (i.e., Turkey's official language) has hindered many Kurds' access to vital public resources (e.g., education, employment) and brought about severe socioeconomic disadvantages, especially for the Kurdish women (Smits & Güzdüz-Hoşgör, 2003). Poverty and the eruption of violent conflicts between the PKK and the state in eastern cities have led to a continuous internal migration from eastern Turkey to the western and southern cities starting with the mid-1980s (Saraçoğlu, 2009). In receiving cities, migrated

Kurds have gained significant visibility since they compete with the locales for scarce resources in the labor market (Duman, 2013; Duman & Alacahan, 2011) and concentrate in particular neighborhoods where they can find cheaper housing and greater informal job opportunities and live with other ethnic Kurds (Saraçoğlu, 2009).

While the traditional assimilationist state discourse considers Kurds part of the larger Turkish ethnicity, Kurds have been recognized as a separate "people group" in the recent anti-Kurdish speech (Saraçoğlu, 2009, p. 642). Many studies (e.g., Aytaç & Çarkoğlu, 2019; Dixon & Ergin, 2010; Saraçoğlu, 2009) have revealed that Kurds frequently experience prejudice and discrimination in Turkey. They have been associated with highly negative stereotypes, such as ignorant, terrorist, untrustworthy, criminals, aggressive, culturally backward, dirty, invaders of urban life, or separatist (Çelik et al., 2017; Saraçoğlu, 2009, 2010). Negative attitudes of Kurds and Turks towards one other are reciprocal. For example, Turks perceived Kurds as a high threat, low power, and culturally inferior community, whereas Kurds viewed the Turkish majority as threatening, highly powerful, and inferior in cultural status (Bilali et al., 2014). Some social psychological studies have also indicated high levels of intergroup prejudice (Bagci & Çelebi, 2017a; Bilali et al., 2014; Yılmaz et al., 2018) and low levels of outgroup trust among both ethnic Turks and Kurds (Çelebi et al., 2014). Turks' prejudices against Kurds were higher than Kurds' prejudices against Turks (Bilali et al., 2014; Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017). Yet, a study by Bağcı and Çelebi (2017b) yielded the opposite results. The recent findings on the worsening of Kurds' outgroup attitudes (compared to Turks' outgroup attitudes) might be associated with the halt of the ceasefire.

Ethnic identification predicted greater outgroup bias for both Kurds and Turks (Bagci & Çelebi, 2017a; Çelebi et al., 2014; Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017; Yılmaz et al., 2018), and less support for Kurdish language rights among Turks (Çelebi et al., 2016). Higher national identification was also positively associated with greater levels of othering of Kurds (Çelik et al., 2017; Dixon & Ergin, 2010; Sarigil, 2018; Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017) and lower levels of support for Kurdish minority rights among Turks (Çelebi et al., 2016). In contrast, among Kurds, higher national identification was linked to greater trust towards Turks (Çelebi et al., 2014), and Muslim identification predicted greater support for reconciliation via increased positive intergroup emotions (Baysu et al., 2018). In addition, older age, lower education levels, and dissatisfaction with socioeconomic status were associated with greater levels of

prejudice against Kurds (Aytaç & Çarkoğlu, 2019). In contrast, left-wing orientation, higher religiosity, better socioeconomic status, and greater contact with Kurds were associated with greater social tolerance (Sarigil, 2018; Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017). However, among Kurds, greater religiosity or intergroup contact was not related to decreased prejudice against Turks (Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017). Some experimental attempts have suggested specific prejudice reduction strategies in combatting anti-Kurd attitudes. For example, when Turkish participants were led to believe that anti-Kurd attitudes are prevalent in the society, they exhibited more significant support for multiculturalism and minority culture maintenance and more positive attitudes towards minority contact (Bagci et al., 2017). However, their affective outgroup attitudes were not affected by the experimental salience of ethnic discrimination.

1.5.2. Religious Divide: The Alevi-Sunni Context

Following the Sunni majority, Alevis are the second-largest religious group in Turkey (Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017). Estimating the exact number of Alevis in Turkey is practically impossible since they do not possess specific features (e.g., a different language or unique physical features) that distinguish them from Sunnis (Shindeldecker, 2006). In addition, Alevis generally prefer not to reveal their identity due to their being frequently otherized in the social, political, and economic spheres of life (Koçan & Öncü, 2004; Sarigil & Karakoc, 2017; Şirin, 2013). Today at best, their size is estimated to be around 10 to 25 percent of the country's population (Çarkoğlu, 2005; Erdemir, 2005; Erman & Göker, 2000). Most Alevis are known to be populated in certain provinces of Central and Eastern Anatolia, including Adıyaman, Amasya, Bingöl, Çankırı, Çorum, Elazığ, Erzincan, Kars, Malatya, Muş, Sivas, Tokat, Tunceli, and Yozgat. However, today, Alevis live in almost all the cities of Turkey since they have migrated to the more developed cities due to the urbanization process (Shindeldecker, 2006).

Even though most Alevis are ethnically and linguistically Turks (Zeidan, 1999), there is a vast degree of heterogeneity among people who call themselves Alevis (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009). Approximately 20 percent of them are Kurds, which corresponds to one-fourth of the total Kurdish population in Turkey (Zeidan, 1999). There are also various other Alevi groups in the country, such as Tahtacılar in the Mediterranean and Aegean regions, the Zazaca-speaking Alevis in Tunceli, Erzurum, and Erzincan, or the Arabic-speaking Nusayri

or Alawite group in Turkish provinces bordering Syria and Iraq (Shindeldecker, 2006). "Kizilbash" (literal *redhead*) was a historical label used for Anatolian Alevis in the Ottoman period (Shindeldecker, 2006). The term Alevi is a late period name given to this community with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s (Özalay, 2006, as cited in Akbaş, 2010), and it means "a devotee to Ali" (TDK, n.d.)—who is the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Mohammed, and fourth caliph.

As an extension of an ongoing debate in defining Alevi identity in Turkey (Van Bruinessen, 1997), Alevism has been interpreted in cultural, linguistic, religious, and political terms (Shindeldecker, 2006). Some people view Alevi identity as a distinct cultural way of life originating from pre-Islamic Anatolia and Mesopotamia (Erdemir, 2005). Others argue that Alevi identity is an extension of a historical opposition to the Turkish state, and thereby it represents a secular, progressive, and democratic political position in Turkey (Shankland, 2003; Erdemir, 2005; Poyraz, 2005). Alternatively, others perceive Alevi identity as the Turkish (or the Kurdish) interpretation of Islam and underscore its difference from Sunni identity, the Arabic interpretation of Islam (Shankland, 2003).

The Alevi faith is a blend of elements from Shiite Islam, Shamanism, Christianity, and other Anatolian cultural traditions (Grigoriadis, 2009). Even though some Alevis have a secular political orientation and do not prefer to identify themselves with Islam, Alevis defining themselves as Muslims still differ from Sunni Muslims in many respects (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009). Alevis have their religious heroes, customs, and holy places (Shankland, 2003). In opposition to the Sunni caliphs, they feel allegiance to the Twelve Imams of Shia Islam (beginning with the Caliph Ali) and the Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli line (Erdemir, 2005). Instead of going on the Hajj to Mecca, they visit the tombs of Alevi-Bektashi saints and pirs. Rather than going to mosques and practicing prayer five times a day, they engage in corporate worship named *Cem* or *Cem ayini* at Cem houses. Those assembly meetings are led by *dede*s (grandfathers) who are believed to be descended from the Caliph Ali. The *semah* ritual incorporates music and dance as the constituents of worship, and it is an inseparable part of Cem. Men and women pray together during Cem, indicating the absence of gender segregation as a religious tradition among Alevis (Erdemir, 2005). Instead of Ramadan fast, Alevis fast in the first 12 days of Muharram month mourning for Hz. Hasan and Hussein (Shindeldecker, 2006). *Musahiplik* (spiritual brotherhood) is a core institution to Alevism, a lifelong bond formed between two married Alevi couples on the

principle of helping one other in social, moral, and economic terms (Coşkun, 2019; Karademir & Şen, 2021). What is more, Alevis endorse a mystical and spiritual interpretation of Islam and the Quran and prioritize human wisdom and the love of God and other human beings. For them, being a caring and responsible human being is more important than strictly following the religious rules and regulations (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2009).

The current apathy between Alevis and Sunnis dates back to the military confrontations with the Safavid Empire in the 16th century and accompanying Kizilbash revolts during the reign of the Ottoman Empire (Bilgiç et al., 2014). An everyday discourse inside the empire that Sunni Islam was the true Islam but Safavid Shiism was heretical laid the ground for a religious opposition between Alevis and Sunnis (Karolewski, 2008). Since Alevis were regarded as religiously deviant, morally degenerated, and sexually aberrant due to their particular ways of worshipping and lifestyle, Sunni orthodoxy was adopted as a state doctrine by the empire against the Alevi heterodoxy (Karaosmanoğlu, 2013). In line with these anti-Alevi discourses, Alevis were subjected to exclusion and marginalization in social life for centuries. Alevi tribes preferred to live in semi-isolated rural and mountainous places to escape persecution (Karademir & Şen, 2021; Şen, 2018). However, as Alevis isolated themselves from the rest of the society, the Alevi-Sunni divide deepened further (Karolewski, 2008).

Due to the sunnification policies and concomitant negative experiences that befall Alevis in the Ottoman period, Alevis have more readily embraced the secular structure of the newly-found Turkish Republic and appreciated its secularization efforts, such as the abolition of the caliphate and the office of Shaykh al-Islam, the education union law, or regulations for gender equality (Poyraz, 2005). Yet, Turkish secularism has never intended to separate religion and the state, but rather it aimed to exert state control over religion by bureaucratizing "Turkish" Islam from above (Koçan & Öncü, 2004). After its establishment in 1924, the Directorate of Religious Affairs prioritized Sunni Islam and imposed this religious identity on Turkish citizens (Koçan & Öncü, 2004). Even though Alevis have persistent demands from the state, such as equating the status of Cem houses to mosques or providing regular salaries for their dedes, the state has never been sure in recognizing Alevism as a unique interpretation of Islam (Shankland, 2003).

Due to the oppressive policies of the CHP during the one-party period, all alienated groups, including Alevis, embraced the beginning of the multiparty period in the hope that the new liberal party (i.e., Democrat Party) would put an end to their exclusion from society (Göner, 2005). However, their expectations were not met; the secularist nationalist discourse of the early Republican era was transformed into a conservative nationalist discourse (Göner, 2005). When the Democrat Party also gave prominence to Sunni Islam in the 1960s, Alevis became more conscious of their past, which kept the Alevi-Sunni conflict alive (Gölbaşı, 2008). Throughout history, Alevis have always maintained their oppositional stance, and whenever they rebelled, they had to face intense state interventions, which have caused severe wounds in the Alevi population. The Koçgiri Rebellion in 1921 and the Dersim Rebellion in 1937 can be given examples of such traumatic events. Political polarization in the 1970s also made the situation worse. The extreme leftists saw the past Alevi revolts as the earlier footsteps of communism and accepted Alevis as one of their allies. In return, the radical rightist group tried to attract Sunnis to its side and developed more negative attitudes towards Alevis (Van Bruinessen, 2020) as they associated Alevism with atheism and communism (Şen, 2018). Concerning this political schism as well, Alevis' experiences of other traumatic events in the later periods (e.g., the 1978 Maraş massacre, the 1980 Çorum massacre, the 1993 Sivas massacre, or the Gazi incidents in 1995) have sharpened the Alevi-Sunni divide in Turkey (Bilgiç et al., 2014).

The Turkish state refrained from openly discussing the Alevi issue until recent years. However, after the 1990s, there was an increasing interest in Alevism, and Alevis have gained public visibility to a certain degree. For example, Alevis have started to perform their ceremonies in public (Shankland, 2003), and they have initiated highly influential associations such as the Alevi-Bektaşi Federation or the Pir Sultan Abdal Institution (Van Bruinessen, 2006). Despite the apparent Alevi revivalism in cultural and political terms, Turkey's Alevis still lack a unified group image and cannot act as a single political unit, which might contribute to their official recognition by the state (Karaosmanoğlu, 2013). Yet, after Alevis have transformed into a more transparent community rather than being a closed community, according to Bilgiç et al. (2014), a more tolerant atmosphere that is instrumental for reducing sectarian polarization in Turkey has arisen, and there is a decreasing trend in prejudices against Alevis among Sunnis. Most probably, as a reflection of this development, among many other "Other" categories (e.g., Kurds, AKP supporters), Alevis were seen as the most friendly, cultured, and trustworthy group in a nationally representative sample

(Çelik et al., 2017). Alevis' relatively positive image compared to other groups in Turkey might also be related to the fact that Alevis has never emerged as a violent other in Turkish history (Çelik et al., 2017).

There are only a limited number of social psychological studies addressing the Alevi-Sunni relations. Reports on social inequalities in Turkey have evinced that Alevis are often subjected to discrimination in their access to housing, education, and employment (Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2009). Alevis had greater ingroup identification and reported higher levels of group-based discrimination than Sunnis (Akbaş, 2010). While there was no difference between rural and urban Alevi residents in terms of the strength of their Alevi identification, Alevis who frequently experienced personal discrimination in social life gave priority to their religious identity over ethnic identity (Şirin, 2013). Among Alevis, the link between ingroup identification and ingroup bias was mediated through various aspects of collective memory (Bükün & Cingöz-Ulu, 2017). While ingroup identification positively predicted the well-being of Alevis, as the degree of perceived discrimination from outgroups increased, Alevis' well-being worsened (Yılmaz, 2012).

Religiosity and right-wing orientation among the Sunni-Turkish majority were associated with greater social distance towards Alevis (Çelik et al., 2017; Sarigil, 2018). Sunni identification increased perceived threat from Alevis and decreased intergroup empathy, which in turn contributed to greater social distance towards Alevis (Bilali et al., 2018). However, in Durmaz's study (2015), the link between religious identification and outgroup prejudice was statistically significant only among Alevis but not among Sunnis. What is more, even though Alevis attributed positive qualities to their ingroupers and negative qualities to outgroup members, Sunnis attributed positive qualities to both Sunnis and Alevis (Durmaz, 2015). Yet, as a vital factor in the restoration of intergroup relations, increased levels of intergroup contact were negatively correlated with social distance for both Alevis and Sunnis (Bilali et al., 2018; Durmaz, 2015).

1.5.3. Ideological Divide: The AKP versus CHP Supporters

Political parties are "political communities with a permanent and stable organization that seeks to seize or maintain control of the state machinery by gaining public support" (Özbudun, 1979, as cited in Altıntaş, 2003). By its very nature, politics appears to be a natural and justifiable ground for partisan competition. Political polarization includes

partisanship, party policies, and the impact of those policies on citizens (Bilgiç et al., 2014). Intense political polarization has reflected various divides in Turkish political history (Bilgiç et al., 2014). In the early Republican period, the center-periphery divide was salient. When it comes to the 1950s, the tension between the leftist and rightist groups was politically more relevant. In the 1960s, the country's political atmosphere was influenced by the strife between the secularist and pro-Islamist fractions and the Turkish and Kurdish nationalists (Gürsoy, 2012). For a very long time in Turkey's political history, while the modernization proponents occupied the center, the periphery naturally gained a more religion-oriented consensus in itself (Özbudun, 1975, as cited in Bilgiç et al., 2014). After the 1990s, this religious-conservative periphery rose to the center, triggering an unassuageable conflict between the secular/modernist and religious/conservative groups. Amid the highly influential recent sociopolitical developments (e.g., Gezi Park protests, a large influx of Syrian refugees, a coup attempt on July 15, 2016, or the switch to the presidential system), the social contract among citizens has been severely damaged in Turkey (Çelik et al., 2017). Consequently, extreme political polarization has erupted, forcing people to choose between two opposing ends of the political spectrum (Erişen & Erdoğan, 2019).

Çelik et al. (2017) put the supporters of the AKP vis-à-vis its opponents at the two poles of the current political polarity in Turkey. Alternatively, according to Taşkın (2021), this polarity in Turkey's party system relates explicitly to the divide between the AKP and the CHP, representing the Islamist-nationalist and secular wings, respectively. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the CHP in 1923, and it has been ideologically molded by Kemalism, basically comprising Turkish nationalism and republicanism. In the single-party period between 1923 and 1945, the party adopted overly radical secularist policies, leading to the removal of the Caliphate, the abolition of civil, religious organizations (the *tarikats*), and the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Those reforms mainly aimed to protect the secular state against the perceived threat from political Islam (Grigoriadis, 2009). Yet, such attempts have also sown the seeds of a long-standing ideological polarity between the religious (Islamist) and secular (Kemalist) fractions in Turkey (Bilali et al., 2018; Taşkın, 2021). In contemporary politics, while Islamist voters have supported the AKP, urban seculars have voted for the CHP since 2002 (Taşkın, 2021). Recent empirical studies also indirectly confirm this tendency in that the AKP supporters mostly identified themselves with religious and conservative people and the CHP supporters with Kemalists, Alevis, and laicists (Erdoğan, 2020).

The AKP has emerged as a re-interpretation of Necmettin Erbakan's movement by embracing moderate Islamism and its liberal interpretation in its party program (Gündoğan, 2019). While the AKP claims to be a conservative democrat party, it has generally been seen as an Islamic or a religious conservative party (Çelik et al., 2017). The AKP entered into Turkish politics as a majority party in 2002, and the CHP has played the role of the main opposition party against its rising power since then. The AKP has consolidated its power until recently as it was able to sustain a firm pace of economic expansion, improve the democratic standards of Turkey, and extend Turkey's regional influence in the Middle East (especially in its initial government term) (Çelik et al., 2017; Gumuscu, 2010). Yet, the CHP could not act as a dependable alternative to the AKP since it has lacked an electoral agenda representing the voter demands of various segments of the society (Ciddi, 2008; Ciddi & Esen, 2014). The CHP has experienced a populist turn with the ascent of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as the party leader in 2011 by softening its ideological position on critical issues (e.g., headscarf ban or the Kurdish issue). However, such reformist attempts did not arise out of a well-developed political agenda, and the Kemalist base of the party was highly critical of this populist transformation (Ciddi & Esen, 2014). Even though the CHP was not able to become a governing alternative to the AKP, the "Gezi Park" protests in 2013 have shaken the credibility of the AKP in that all the anti-AKP strata in Turkey came together in accusing the AKP government of becoming authoritarian, polarizing society, and interfering in private life (Esen & Gumuscu, 2020; Gündoğan, 2020; Kemahlıoğlu, 2015; Taspinar, 2014).

The weakness of the AKP came to the surface in the national elections held on 7 June 2015. For the first time, the AKP could gain only 235 seats in the Parliament, which was not enough to form a one-party government. In the following days, the AKP and its supporter party, the MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – Nationalist Movement Party), pressed for repeating the elections. Under the extraordinary conditions and terrorism threat of the time, the AKP won approximately half percent of the votes (meant 317 seats in the parliament) and was again able to govern as a one-party rule after the 1 November 2015 national elections. However, an extraordinary anti-government military coup, the 15 July 2016 coup, erupted eight months later, which led the government to take restrictive countermeasures in restoring its power (Gündoğan, 2020).

The transformation from a parliamentary to a presidential system in 2017 has brought about two electoral alliances at the national level (Gündoğan, 2020), sharpening the political

opposition between the AKP and the CHP. On the one hand, the AKP and the MHP have started to act together in politics under the People's Alliance (*Cumhur İttifakı*) as a Turkish-Islamic synthesis bloc. On the other hand, the Nation Alliance (*Millet İttifakı*) has been formed and led by the CHP in collaboration with the Good Party (*IYI Parti*) as representing the secularist-nationalist camp, the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*) as a pro-Islamist party, and Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*) as a conservative and pro-Kemalist right-wing party. The Peoples' Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokrat Partisi*), as a pro-Kurdish party, has also supported this alliance externally. The ideological orientation of the Nation Alliance is hybrid ranging from ultra-nationalist to pro-Islamist, and this hybridity that is appealing to the broad segments of society is expected to be functional in forming an effective opposition against the AKP's rule (Taşkın, 2021). In the 24 June 2018 elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was re-elected as Turkey's president (with a vote rate of 52.6%), and the People's Alliance took 53.70% of the total votes. These results pointed out that the AKP was now dependent on the vote potential of the MHP to maintain its power. However, the actual decline of the AKP rule was evident in the 31 March 2019 local elections, wherein it lost its electoral power in more urbanized and developed parts of the country. With its strategic influence in the Nation Alliance, the CHP won the local elections in nine of the ten largest metropolitan municipalities. The AKP was still powerful enough in blocking the CHP mayors since it won majorities in provincial councils in the 2018 parliamentary election. Yet, the 2019 mayoral race has ended the dominance of local Islamist governance in significant metropolitan cities starting in 1994 with the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) as the forerunner of the AKP, and this result can be regarded as the most serious defeat of the AKP in its history (Taşkın, 2021).

Political polarization has many real-life reflections in Turkey. For example, Turkish people feel moral superiority towards the political party supporters that they feel farthest from (Erdoğan, 2020). In a nationally representative sample, AKP supporters appeared to be the most disliked Other for CHP supporters, whereas Kurds emerged as the most commonly selected Other for AKP supporters (Çelik et al., 2017). Due to their political lineage, CHP supporters reported experiencing exclusion and discrimination in different spheres of social life (e.g., job applications, police stations, or public offices). In contrast, the ratio of the AKP and MHP supporters who reported similar negative experiences is negligible (Erdoğan, 2020). In addition, supporters of different parties also experience intergroup tension based on specific topics, such as the opening of the Hagia Sophia Grand Mosque, the Kanal İstanbul project, or education in the mother tongue (Erdoğan, 2020). Overall, overly heated

political dynamics in Turkey seem to maintain and reproduce intergroup boundaries across various political parties and their supporters.

1.5.4. Gendered Divides: Working Women & Covered Women

1.5.4.1. Working Women

Women have been attributed a highly critical role in the modernization, nation-building, and secularization process of the Turkish Republic, starting with 1923 (Akboğa, 2020). Many revolutionary reforms for improving women's status (e.g., compulsory primary-school education for both sexes, a new Civil Code granting gender equality in marriage, divorce, or inheritance) were made (Toprak, 1994). Even though those reforms have been helpful in women's entrance into education and professional life, the reform beneficiaries were not the lower social class or agrarian women, but a privileged small minority (i.e., daughters of the bureaucracy or bourgeoisie) (Tekeli, 1982). Besides, a historical emphasis on traditional gender roles has posed a constant threat to gender equality in Turkey (Tatli et al., 2008).

In traditional division of labor, women are held responsible for childbearing and doing household chores, and men are done so for breadwinning, as a consequence of which women are given a secondary role in the labor market all over the world (Ross, 1987). Until the 1950s, women in rural areas undertook unpaid familial work in Turkey (Kabasakal et al., 2004). However, as a natural outcome of urban transformation, women had to leave the agricultural work after migrating to cities from rural areas (Göksel, 2013). In the development economics literature, female labor force participation is expected to show a U-shaped trend during the transformation from an agrarian society to an industrial and service-based economy (Goldin, 1995; Psarchapoulos & Tzannatos, 1989). In the early days of industrialization and urbanization, female employment will remain stable at low rates since women either might prefer to live in comfort as housewives in cities or could not find an appropriate place in the urban market economy due to their physical weakness or low education levels (Göksel, 2013; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008). However, after some time, female employment rates are expected to increase in confirming the upward part of the U-curve as the tertiary sector offers new job opportunities for women, fertility rate decreases, women complete higher education, their political power increases, and discriminatory

practices drop in the labor market. Even though there is a decreasing trend in the fertility rate and an increasing trend in the average woman education level, female labor force participation in Turkey is still one of the lowest in Europe or among MENA countries (Göksel, 2013), and lower than the other parts of the world with similar levels of economic development such as South-East Asia or Latin America (Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008). According to the Global Gender Gap Report delivered by the World Economic Forum in 2021, Turkey ranked 133rd of 156 countries (WEF, 2021), demonstrating one of the lowest female labor force participation statistics (İlkkaracan et al., 2015). Accordingly, it is possible to assert that Turkey's current female employment rates are still at the bottom of the U-shaped trend (Dildar, 2015).

In addition to these structural factors, conservatism, ongoing workplace discrimination towards women, patriarchy, stereotypes, and the lack of investment in women's education and training can be mentioned as the cultural determinants of the low levels of female workforce participation in Turkey (Dayioglu & Kirdar, 2010; Dildar, 2015; Göksel, 2013; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008). Even though female workforce participation in Turkey is lower than in other European countries, Turkey's female involvement in science, finance, and engineering careers is higher than in Europe (Tatli et al., 2008). However, this numerical supremacy does not warrant gender equality even in those sectors. Since state policies and reforms are not sensitive to the impact of the traditional division of labor on women's occupational experiences, women often fail to sustain a balance between their domestic roles and professional aspirations. In this respect, insufficient early childhood education and care services can also account for Turkey's highly masculinized labor market (İlkkaracan et al., 2015).

Working women in Turkey have to overcome many obstacles to obtain jobs and survive as women in the labor market. Even though women are often associated with fragility, passivity, care-giving role, and dependency in the Turkish context (Kurt Topuz & Erkanlı, 2016); in a study by Aktan and Bilim (2016), working women clustered together with feminists, women rights supporters, and academician women, who were perceived as more competent than warm.

1.5.4.2. Covered Women

Secularization as one of the founding principles of the Republic has been influential on the sociopolitical developments concerning "the veiling issue" or "the headscarf dispute" in contemporary Turkey (Göle, 1997, p. 62). Even though veiling was not banned at the early Republican period, the ideal republican woman was always presented as unveiled (Göle, 1996), and unveiling was seen as a necessary condition of modernization (Gökarıksel, 2009). Although Muslims constitute the overwhelming majority of the population in Turkey, the contested veiling politics has contributed to a significant degree of polarization in both ideological and emotional terms in the society (Akboğa, 2020; Hortaçsu, 2000).

Covered women constituting approximately 70% of the Turkish women differ in their covering practices in form (Vojdik, 2010). Some wear the *çarşaf*, a black garment covering the whole body except for the hands and the eyes. Some traditionally cover their head under the chin or behind the neck with some hair exposed, which is named the *başörtüsü*. Some use the style of the *türban* or *tesettür*, which covers the head, neck, and shoulders without any hair exposed. Women have also used a shapeless overcoat concealing the feminine body shape to complement this coverage style in the 1980s. In the contemporary interpretations of this style, the overcoat has been replaced by tunics or narrower coats over pants. Even though there are variations among the wearing styles of covered women, the headscarf itself might act as a visual cue that is powerful enough to evoke stereotypic images about the group (Brader et al., 2008). With this point in mind, it becomes possible to examine the headscarf issue from the intergroup relations perspective and consider its development as a controversial issue in Turkish politics.

Until the end of the 1970s, Turkish conservative-religious women were typically uneducated, lower-class homemakers and mothers wearing traditional veiling styles (Göle, 1996). With the rise of political Islam against the threat of communism and due to globalization and feminism in the 1980s, women with a unique religious outlook (i.e., *türban*) gained visibility in social spheres (Göle, 1996; Seggie, 2015). These women actively partook in religious movements, held open discussions on Islamic teachings, and were eager to pursue education and careers. Yet, in constituting a sharp contrast with traditional covered women who were often associated with rurality and backwardness (Aldıkaçtı Marshall, 2005; Göle, 1996), these newly-emergent covered women were perceived as a novel group rather than being melted into the traditional covered women identity (Camcı, 2015).

Relatedly, their unexpected appearance in public domain caused a severe discomfort in the secularist camp in Turkey, was interpreted as a threat to the identities and lifestyles of uncovered women (Çarkoğlu, 2010; Kalaycıoğlu, 2005), and aroused suspicions about the Islamization of the society (Hortaçsu, 2000; Saktanber & Çorbacıoğlu, 2008). Subsequently, novel dress codes that nationwide restrict wearing headscarves in public institutions were launched; women were required to unveil in specific public spaces, including schools, university campuses, the courtroom, military institutions, and the parliament. Despite its conservatism about gender equality, the AKP held a gradual and relentless struggle in lifting the long-standing headscarf ban in reducing discrimination against veiled women (Çörekçioğlu, 2021). The ban was progressively removed for university students in 2010, civil servants in 2013, high school students in 2014, policewomen in 2017, and army officers in 2019.

This ban has had a drastic impact on the lives of covered women. For example, some covered women chose to quit their university education, some alternatively went abroad to continue their education with their headscarf on, and others conformed to the ban for pursuing their education by either unveiling or wearing wig or hat on campuses (Seggie, 2015). Before the removal of the prohibition, campus life threatened the well-being of covered students due to their experiences of discrimination and harassment by the administration, their professors, and peers (Seggie & Austin, 2010). While the ban has now been lifted, "newcomers" with no experience of the ban still suffer from a sense of discomfort and tension on campuses (Seggie, 2015).

Before lifting the ban, a study revealed that 70% of the population was against the headscarf ban in Turkey (Çarkoğlu, 2010). This finding seems to highlight the possibility that ideological conflict about the headscarf issue did not cause a deep intergroup differentiation between covered women and outgroup members in society. Among the minimal numbers of studies examining the relations between covered and uncovered women (Kuşdil & Günbay, 2014), Hortaçsu (2000) found that while covered women expressed greater outgroup bias than uncovered women in 1996, this tendency reversed in 1998. This change was attributed to the rising success of an Islamist political party in that period. Yet, prejudice against covered women is not the same across different covering styles. Participants were more prejudiced against women fully covered in black garments (*çarşaflı*), followed by contemporary and conservative covering styles (Sever, 2014). While Kuşdil and

Günbay (2014), in their 2006 study, found that both covered and uncovered women showed ingroup favoritism, Camcı (2015) failed to confirm this tendency. This contrast might be associated with the fact that the social comparison value of the headscarf category might have lost its strength with the removal of the headscarf ban. In addition, variations among covered women regarding their covering and wearing styles might hinder their being perceived as a unified whole and might soften intergroup boundaries between them and others (Camcı, 2015; Gökarıksel, 2009).

1.6. Current Research

1.6.1. Study 1

Within the scope of this dissertation, Study 1 was held to understand how people think about specific social categories and on what basis those social categories turn into "groups" in people's minds. In this qualitative study, I asked participants whether and to what extent they attributed certain group characteristics (e.g., homogeneity, agency, or solidarity) to the members of the social categories of interest. Four different social category types, namely, ethnic, religious, political, and women-related categories, were addressed, and two exemplar groups represented each category type.

According to the results of this qualitative study, one might expect to observe common emergent themes cutting across the social categories, such as the importance of the group or the similarity of group members. However, since those categories differ from one other by their very nature, unique themes regarding the entitativity of each category type might also be obtained. For example, it is hard to capture a theme about biological essentialism about political groups or working women. However, such attributions might be more relevant to ethnic or religious identities. Because there is a long list of entitativity cues, I did not develop specific hypotheses about which cue properties would be more salient for different category types. In addition, one might also anticipate that participants would consensually perceive ethnic, religious, and political categories as more entitative bodies given the unceasing polarization along ethnic, religious, and political lines in Turkey both today and in the past (Bilgiç et al., 2014; Çelik et al., 2017). Besides, due to a high degree of gender segregation in the workplace or other public spaces in contemporary Turkey (Kağnıcıoğlu, 2017; Kaya, 2009), and concerning the fact that working women constitute a

significant contrast with the traditionally-valued woman images in society (Kaya, 2009), the intergroup boundaries between working and non-working women might be perceptually salient in the eye of perceivers, which might, in turn, increase the perceived entitativity of working women as well. However, with the lift of the headscarf ban, the headscarf use might have lost its social comparison value (Camcı, 2015), and relatedly, today, it is less likely that covered women would be perceived as a united whole. Since this was a qualitative study, it might be hard to test or compare the entitativity of the target categories quantitatively. Yet, I expected to observe that those categories would vary in terms of their entitativity levels even if they depend on different entitativity cues. Accordingly, three specific research questions were addressed within the scope of Study 1:

Q1: What are the various bases of entitativity concerning different social category types?

Q2: Will the target categories demonstrate varying levels of entitativity, albeit construed in terms of different entitativity cues?

Q3: Will the target categories systematically differ from one another concerning their bases of entitativity?

1.6.2. Study 2

In Study 2, I came up with a novel entitativity scale based on the qualitative findings of the first study and used that scale to evaluate the entitativity of Kurds and Alevis. Those particular social categories were chosen to understand the relations between majority members (i.e., Sunni Turks) and the largest ethnic (Kurds) and religious minorities (Alevis) in Turkey with a focus on entitativity. Even though previous studies mostly addressed the attitudes of majority groups (e.g., Çelik et al., 2017; Sarigil, 2018), the present study aimed to cover the intergroup attitudes of both majority and minority group members. Accordingly, four different samples were reached. The Kurdish and non-Kurdish participants were recruited to evaluate Kurds' entitativity, and the Alevi and Sunni participants were recruited for assessing the entitativity of Alevis. There are differences between Kurds and Alevis in their structural qualities in that the former is an ethnic group and the latter is a religious group. Yet, Alevis cannot simply be classified as a religious group; since Alevis are often reluctant to accept non-Alevis into their community and strictly practiced endogamy

throughout history, they have been gradually evolved into a quasi-ethnic or an ethnoreligious community (Arakelova, 2010; Aydın, 2018; Şirin, 2013; Zeidan, 1999). The newly-proposed scale touched on the same cue domains and included the same items for Kurds and Alevis (except for the words "Kurds" and "Alevis" in the items). Accordingly, I hypothesized the following:

H1: Entitativity scale would yield a similar factorial structure for Kurds and Alevis.

Even though Brewer et al. (2004) proposed that any group can be construed in terms of the essence- or agency-based entitativity, there are potential differences across group types in what entitativity means and what functions it serves for (Hamilton, 2007). For example, Lickel et al. (2000) demonstrated clear distinctions in the group-defining assets across task groups, intimacy groups, and social categories. In addition, different correlates of entitativity might have different implications for intergroup relations concerning different group types. While essentialism and homogeneity were more strongly correlated with stereotyping than agency and role differentiation for social categories, the opposite correlation patterns were evident for task groups (Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007). Critical entitativity markers might change for different group types. However, the same entitativity measures have been used in previous studies in assessing the entitativity of different group profiles, including face-to-face groups, religious groups, nationalities, races, and so on (e.g., Blanchard et al., 2020; Denson et al., 2006; Effron & Knowles, 2015; Newheiser et al., 2012). The current study might be a critical attempt to suggest a novel entitativity measure that uniquely addresses the entitativity of social categories (especially ethnic groups).

Since none of the entitativity measures commonly used in the literature have gone through factor analytic explorations (Zyphur & Islam, 2006), it is hard (if not impossible) to predict which entitativity components would load on the same or different factors during factor analysis. Confirming this difficulty, for example, in Blanchard et al.'s (2020) study, from the viewpoint of potential members, the general similarity of group members and their shared goals were subsumed under a second-order factor named "homogeneity." However, these two components (i.e., similarity and common goals) were best modeled as two separate first-order constructs for the already-existing group members. Given the lack of sufficient empirical evidence, I preferred not to make specific predictions about the factorial structure of the currently proposed entitativity scale.

Another aim of Study 2 was to examine the link between ingroup and outgroup entitativity and intergroup bias. Since the salience of intergroup conflict is influential on how entitativity affects intergroup relations (e.g., Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003), and there is a heightened conflict in Turkey in terms of interethnic and intersectarian relations (e.g., Bilgiç et al., 2014; Çelik et al., 2017), my second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Both ingroup and outgroup entitativity would positively predict prejudices against ethnic and religious outgroups.

Ingroup entitativity led people to more strongly identify with their ingroup (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003; Hogg et al., 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2000), which could, in turn, build up greater intergroup prejudices (Brewer, 2007; Brown & Zagefka, 2005; Ellemers et al., 1997; Hogg, 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). That is, the association between ingroup entitativity and negative intergroup attitudes might be mediated through increased levels of ingroup identification (Effron & Knowles, 2015). Accordingly, my third hypothesis is as follows:

H3: Ingroup identification would mediate the link between ingroup entitativity and negative intergroup attitudes.

Outgroup entitativity might also play a role in the persistence of intergroup conflict as it might act as a mediatory mechanism in explaining the associations of group identification with outgroup retaliation (Stenstrom et al., 2008) and negative intergroup attitudes (Licata et al., 2012). In the highly polarized context of Turkey as well, identification at the ethnic or religious group levels might perpetuate adverse intergroup climate through increased outgroup entitativity perceptions. Accordingly, my fourth hypothesis is as follows:

H4: Outgroup entitativity would mediate the link between ingroup identification and negative intergroup attitudes.

Even though there are various conceptualizations of entitativity, the associations of entitativity with prejudice and ingroup identification (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2017), and with the social acceptability of prejudice against outgroups (Effron & Knowles, 2015) were confirmed independent of whether it was conceptualized in essentialist, agentic, or unity-based terms. Accordingly, I expected to ensure the viability of *H2*, *H3*, and *H4* for different

entitativity dimensions that could appear during the initial factor analyses on the currently proposed entitativity scale.

Minority groups are perceived to be more entitative than majority groups (e.g., Brewer et al., 1995; Simon & Brown, 1987) given the possibility that only a coherent ingroup can fulfill the (possibly) unsatisfied social support and solidarity needs of minority members (Yzerbyt et al., 2000). High entitativity is associated with greater competence attributions (Callahan & Ledgerwood, 2016; Dang, Liu, Ren, & Gu, 2018; Dang, Liu, Ren, & Su, 2018), and minorities are often seen under negative light due to various historical, realistic, and symbolic reasons. Accordingly, minorities as perceptually competent and cold groups are likely to be considered highly threatening (Dang, Liu, Ren, & Gu, 2018). In this regard, it might be a viable strategy to reduce the perceived entitativity of minority groups in combatting negative intergroup attitudes directed towards them (Rothbart & Park, 2004). Therefore, questioning the role of entitativity in majority-minority relations might be valuable in coming up with entitativity-based prejudice reduction strategies in the future in improving intergroup relations.

2. STUDY 1: A QUALITATIVE EXAMINATION ON THE ENTITATIVITY OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES IN TURKEY

2.1. A Summary of the Study Objectives

In addition to perceiver characteristics or the nature of intergroup relations, specific group characteristics such as similarity among group members, common goals, or intragroup interaction might affect entitativity perceptions (Lickel et al., 2000). The current study was conducted to qualitatively question the group characteristics that are influential in determining the entitativity of particular social categories that belong to the contemporary sociopolitical landscape of Turkey. This study can also be regarded as a preparatory study for Study 2, in which a novel ethnicity-based entitativity scale was aimed to be put forward.

Many (if not all) of the entitativity scales employed in previous studies have not been developed by following classical scale development procedures. Researchers (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2005; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, et al., 2007) have primarily developed their entitativity measures based on Campbell's (1958) definition of entitativity and have never thoroughly questioned the psychometric qualities of their scales. Most of the items in the scales are theory-driven; we cannot be sure whether people use such cues to reach entitativity-related conclusions. Besides, it is not also clear what people might infer from particular entitativity items. Let's assume that we ask our participants to respond to the item "To what extent do you believe that Sunnis share common goals?". If this question had been reworded for a task group, the meaning of "common goals" would be explicit since members typically come together to achieve specific goals in task groups. However, what people might think when they read such an item for social categories (Sunnis at this particular example) is not clear since membership to social categories is often determined demographically (Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007), and there is relatively little interaction among category members (Lickel et al., 2000). It might not be easy to imagine that all members in large social categories possess some common goal and put collective effort to reach this goal (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018). What is more, in this example, for some perceivers, the common goal status might mean certain individual-level objectives that are prevalent among Sunnis, such as going to heaven by performing one's

religious duties. But, for other perceivers, Sunnis' common goal might stand for protecting and spreading their religious beliefs and principles. There is a difference between these two goals ascribed to Sunnis. The former goal relates to individual-level outcomes and is likely to be interpreted as a trait-like quality (e.g., religiosity), and it thereby might lead perceivers to construe Sunnis as a homogeneity-based group. However, the latter goal relates to group-level objectives since it can mobilize group members for a particular collective end, and thus it might lead perceivers to construe Sunnis as an agency-based group. In this respect, it seems crucial to reach the minds of perceivers if we want to measure better what we initially intended to measure. Accordingly, an additional concern in this qualitative study was to adjust the verbalization of entitativity items by the research objectives.

The social categories questioned in the current study were selected to represent ethnic lineage (Turks & Kurds), religious belonging (Alevis & Sunnis), political preferences (AKP supporters & CHP supporters), and different women groups (working women & covered women). Even though all these groups exemplify social categories, they have unique social identities (Deaux et al., 1995) and are implicated in different sociopolitical divisions in Turkey (Bilgiç et al., 2014; Çelik et al., 2017). This study aimed to explore possible entitativity cues relevant to specific social categories based on the judgments of the present participants.

2.2. Method

2.2.1. Participants

There were 314 participants recruited by a convenience sampling method. Each participant was asked to evaluate only one target social category. As an exception, two participants evaluated both Alevis and Sunnis, and a participant assessed both Turks and working women. In total, 317 different evaluation forms were obtained for eight social categories, and approximately 40 participants evaluated each category. A large proportion of the data were collected between April 29, 2019, and May 27, 2019. Nearly 72% of the data (n = 227) were collected in the classroom context, and the remaining data came from an online survey. Eighty-nine percent of the participants were students in Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University (AYBU). Undergraduates from the Turkish Language and Literature Department (n = 103) and the Psychology Department (n = 131) took extra course credits

for their participation. There were also a limited number of participants from other disciplines and other universities.

Further participant characteristics can be found in Table 2.1. Sex distribution was balanced across different evaluator groups ($\chi^2(7) = 12.12$, $p > .05$), and 81.4% of the total sample was composed of female participants. The eight evaluator groups did not differ from each other in terms of their mean age ($F(7, 306) = 1.42$, $p = 1.95$), general health status ($F(7, 307) = 1.03$, $p > .41$), life satisfaction ($F(7, 308) = 1.96$, $p = .06$), average income ($F(7, 277) = .51$, $p = .83$), income satisfaction ($F(7, 302) = .67$, $p = .70$), and religiosity levels ($F(7, 306) = .52$, $p = .82$). A one-way ANOVA test revealed a statistically significant F value for ideological orientation ($F(7, 303) = 2.27$, $p < .05$). Since sample sizes differed across the evaluator groups, the Gabriel procedure was used as a posthoc test (Field, 2018, p. 735). However, none of the p-values observed in the multiple pairwise comparison tests were lower than .05, indicating that the evaluator groups did not significantly differ from one other in ideological terms neither. The Turk, human being, Turkish citizen, world citizen, and Muslim appeared to be the commonly-selected identities by the participants in defining themselves. The personal importance of religion was high for the current participants, as the mean religiosity level in the total sample ($M_{\text{Total}} = 7.51$, $SD = 2.50$) was well above the midpoint of the 10-point centrality of religion scale ($t(310) = 14.20$, $p < .001$). Besides, participants ideologically positioned themselves at the slight right of the 10-point left-right continuum with a mean of 5.96 ($SD = 2.53$) in the total sample ($t(307) = 3.18$, $p < .01$).

Table 2.1. The characteristics of participants evaluating different social categories

The evaluators of … (*N* = 317)	**Kurds (*n* = 46)**	**Turks (*n* = 38)**	**Alevis (*n* = 45)**	**Sunnis (*n* = 38)**	**AKP supporters (*n* = 38)**	**CHP supporters (*n* = 37)**	**Working women (*n* = 37)**	**Covered women (*n* = 38)**
Sex	34 F + 12 M	31 F + 7 M	35 F + 10 M	26 F + 12 M	34 F + 4 M	34 F + 3 M	33 F + 4 M	31 F + 7 M
Age range	18–41	18–30	18–40	19–31	18–25	18–30	19–28	18–34
Mean age (*SD*)	21.87 (6.44)	21.10 (2.13)	22.87 (4.97)	22.37 (4.02)	21.13 (1.60)	20.97 (2.05)	20.94 (1.88)	21.58 (3.20)
Educational status								
# of undergraduates	37	35	37	34	37	36	37	35
# of graduates	9	3	8	4	1	1	0	3
Marital status	41 single	36 single	41 single	37 single	35 single	36 single	36 single	37 single
Work status	8 employed	3 employed	8 employed	4 employed	4 employed	1 employed	1 employed	4 employed
General health status on a 7-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	5.09 (1.26)	5.00 (1.53)	5.31 (1.58)	4.97 (1.38)	4.74 (1.22)	5.35 (.79)	4.78 (1.44)	5.10 (1.47)
General life satisfaction on a 7-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	4.67 (1.54)	4.95 (1.27)	5.04 (1.43)	4.26 (1.60)	4.18 (1.33)	4.89 (1.07)	4.57 (1.46)	4.89 (1.69)
Average monthly income	4.386 TL	4.408 TL	4.617 TL	3.979 TL	3.351 TL	4.177 TL	4.471 TL	3.739 TL
Income satisfaction on a 7-point scale – Mean (SD)	4.44 (1.18)	4.06 (1.45)	4.09 (1.73)	4.34 (1.38)	4.13 (1.29)	4.38 (1.38)	4.43 (1.55)	4.57 (1.66)
# of participants who define themselves								
as Turk	27	24	32	23	24	21	26	24
as Kurd	5	1	3	3	2	3	5	1
as Alevi	1	0	5	4	1	1	0	1
as human being	35	24	39	28	36	30	30	33
as Muslim	29	25	29	23	23	18	26	26
as Turkish citizen	24	18	22	21	7	21	30	26
as world citizen	14	14	20	10	12	14	14	12
Other (e.g., Circassian, Arabic)	3	4	8	4	4	0	0	2
Centrality of religion on a 10-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	7.78 (2.56)	7.76 (2.40)	7.04 (2.94)	7.54 (2.67)	7.73 (2.22)	7.11 (2.38)	7.57 (1.94)	7.45 (2.82)
Ideological orientation on a 10-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	5.84 (2.61)	6.82 (2.17)	5.31 (2.83)	5.36 (2.96)	6.25 (2.60)	5.38 (2.35)	5.89 (2.06)	6.76 (2.20)

Notes. Concerning the sex variables, F stands for females and M for males. *SD* = Standard deviation.

2.2.2. Qualitative Survey Questionnaire

The data were collected via a qualitative survey composed of two parts. The first part asked participants to define a group and jot down specific examples from daily life. The second part was designed to assess the entitativity of eight different social categories concerning various entitativity cues. The questions were prepared based on the commonly studied entitativity cues in the literature (Lickel et al., 2000), namely, permeability, homogeneity, ingroup ties, common fate, the importance of the group, and shared goals. All of the questions took their final shape after pre-testing the questionnaires for each social category. The same eight questions were used in questioning the entitativity of the target ethnic (Turks & Kurds), religious (Alevis & Sunnis), political (AKP supporters & CHP supporters), and woman categories (working women & covered women). Those entitativity-probing questions were as follows:

(1) What are the reasons why the members of Category A are perceived as a group? Please explain. If you don't see them as a group, please also explain the reason why.
(2) What do you think it means to be a member of Category A? Please explain.
(3) It is easier or harder to join or leave certain groups. In this respect, how much do you think it is easier or harder to join or leave the Category A membership? Why? Please explain.
(4) How much do you think the members of Category A are similar to or different from each other? In what respects do you think they are identical to each other? Please jot down the commonalities you believe the members of Category A share with one another.
(5) How strongly do you think the members of Category A are connected? Explain why it is so.
(6) For certain groups, we observe that members experience similar kinds of events. That is, group members share a common fate by their group belonging. Within this framework, do you think that the members of Category A share the same fate? Why? Please explain.
(7) To what extent do you think it is important for the members of Category A to be a member of Category A? Please explain.
(8) In some groups, all members share the same goals. Aside from their similarities or differences, group members possess common goals that bring them together. Do you

think there are also common goals that hold the members of Category A together? If you think they have common goals, (a) what are those goals, (b) what do the Category A members do to achieve their goals, and (c) to what extent do you think they are effective in succeeding in their goals? If you don't think that the members of Category A have common goals, why do you think so? Please explain.

2.2.3. Procedure

Ethical approval of the study was obtained from the AYBU Ethics Committee. With the help of an informed consent form (Appendix A.1), participants were told about the study aims and informed that they might take approximately 40 minutes to complete the study. They were given an open-ended questionnaire comprising of two major parts (see Appendix B). The first part was common to all participants; they were asked to define the term group and write down example groups prevalent in society. The second part was designed to question the entitativity of one of the target social categories. Participants also filled out a demographics form (Appendix C.1) probing their age, sex, educational status, marital status, work status, general health and well-being, religious belonging, ethnicity, religiosity level, and ideological orientation. Finally, participants were debriefed, and their questions were addressed verbally or via email.

2.3. Results

Three basic questions were examined in the present dataset: (1) What is the lay definition of the group? (2) What are the common examples of the group in people's minds? (3) On what basis do people decide whether or not members of social categories constitute a meaningful unit (i.e., group)? The data management strategies and results concerning these questions are presented in the following parts.

2.3.1. What is the Lay Definition of Group?

In addressing this question, participants' mostly short definitions of the term group were combined, and the researcher read them several times. Many recurrent words and phrases (e.g., common, opinions, attributes, aims, action, or aggregation) were encountered during this process. Since there were over 300 different definitions of the concept, Microsoft

word software was used to count the frequencies of keywords or key phrases. Particular meaning units were coded under the same subcategory if they had similar meanings or were synonymous with one other in Turkish (e.g., "görüş," "fikir"). Next, various subordinate categories were brought together under appropriate higher-order categories. As can be seen in Table 2.2, the participants' definitions of the group included the following nine categories: "Commonalities," "Unity," "Group size," "Collective agency," "Group structure," "Intragroup relations/climate," "Sense of belonging," "Self-categorization," and "Groupness as an ascribed quality."

Firstly, "Commonalities" emerged as the most frequently mentioned category in different definitions. Participants stated that an aggregate of individuals who are similar to each other in terms of their thoughts/opinions (200), attributes (71), feelings (22), culture (19), values (16), lifestyle (14), ideology (11), preferences/tastes (10), beliefs (9), space (8), fields of interests (7), fate (4), enemy (4), appearance (2), and history (2) could be called as a group. Secondly, participants often viewed the group as a united whole; the words or phrases "aggregation" (217), "assembling" (196), "oneness" (66), "wholeness" (20), "connection" (18), "structure" (7), "synchrony" (5), and "mass" (1) were coded under the second overarching category, "Unity." Thirdly, another common theme in the group definitions was the minimum number of members in a group. The assertions that a group is composed of "more than one person" (36), "at least two people" (47), and "at least three people" (5) were brought together under the third category "Group size." Fourthly, some participants identified a group by the agentic qualities of its members; the words or phrases "aims/pursuits" (193), "joint action" (75), and "teamwork" (3) were coded under the higher-order category of "Collective agency." Fifthly, participants also mentioned the concepts of "norms/order" (14), "consensus" (11), "mutual influence" (7), "diversity" (6), "duty" (5), "responsibility" (4), "compliance" (4), and "hierarchy" (2) about the definition of the group; those elements were coded under the category of "Group structure." Sixthly, participants stressed the importance of interpersonal relations in groups. Accordingly, the subcategories of "interaction" (35), "solidarity" (28), "respect/acceptance" (15), and "getting alone with group members" (14) were compiled under the category of "Intragroup relations/climate." Seventhly, participants also emphasized the necessity of a sense of social belonging among members in a group; such expressions were coded under the "Sense of belonging" category (40). Eighthly, for some participants, groups become perceptible when people start to classify themselves with particular group labels. Accordingly, an eighth category was

generated under the name “Self-categorization.” Ninthly, for some other participants, groups become perceptible when they are called as a group by third parties; such statements were coded under the category of “Groupness as an ascribed quality” (4).

Table 2.2. Categories and their frequencies (*f*) concerning the definition of group

Category name	*f*
1. Commonalities	
Thoughts/Opinions	200
Attributes	71
Feelings	22
Culture	19
Values	16
Lifestyle	14
Ideology	11
Preferences/Tastes	10
Beliefs	9
Space (Proximity)	8
Fields of interests	7
Fate (Status & Life events)	4
Enemy/Threat	4
Appearance	2
History	2
2. Unity	
Aggregation	217
Assembling	196
Oneness	66
Wholeness	20
Connectedness	18
Structure	7
Synchrony	5
Mass	1
3. Group size	
More than one person	36
At least two people	47
At least three people	5
4. Collective agency	
Aims/Pursuits	193
Joint action	75
Teamwork	3
5. Group structure	
Norms & Order	14
Consensus	11
Mutual influence	7
Diversity	6
Duty	5
Responsibility	4
Compliance	4
Hierarchy	2
6. Intragroup relations/climate	
Interaction	35
Solidarity	28
Respect/Acceptance	15
Getting along with group members	14
7. Sense of belonging	40
8. Self-categorization	17
9. Groupness as an ascribed quality	4

2.3.2. What are the Salient Group Examples in People's Minds?

A very long list of group examples was obtained in the current study. To handle this vast list, the word frequency feature of MAXQDA—a software package designed for qualitative data analysis—was utilized. Initially, it was observed that participants referred to both generic group names (e.g., "ethnic groups," "political groups," or "religious groups") and specific examples representing those principal categories (e.g., "Kurds," "leftists," or "Muslims"). Those generic and specific group examples were kept during the data analysis. That is to say, the phrases such as Kurds, Circassians, or Laz were not merged under a higher-order category of ethnicity, but those particular group names and the related generic categories were counted separately. The words that are the variants of the same word stem (e.g., politics-related words such "siyasi," "siyasal," or "siyaset") or that are synonymous with one another in Turkish (e.g., "politik" and "siyasal") were counted together. Groups that at least 10 participants mentioned are presented in Table 2.3.

The most commonly-mentioned generic group name was "political groups" (115), prototypically exemplified by leftists (63), rightists (61), AKP supporters (21), conservatives (19), CHP supporters (17), or communist people (14). It was followed by "religious groups" (69), including Alevis (56), Muslims (48), Sunnis (46), Christians (30), atheists (20), pious people (20), or jamaat (15). Participants also referred to "ethnic groups" (35), commonly exemplified by Turks (58), Kurds (57), Circassians (18), or Laz (18). "Social class" (29) was also suggested as another basis of grouping, represented by rich people (54) and poor people (53). As another indicator of people's socioeconomic status, "occupational groups" (45) were frequently cited at the generic level. "Sex" (23) also emerged as another salient group category, represented by women (49) and men (49). As another generic category, "age groups" (18) were represented by old people (31), children (27), and young people (20). Besides, participants gave examples of common bond groups, such as friendships (58), family (33), or relatives (16). They also cited certain task groups, such as associations (52), student clubs (20), workgroups (16), or sports teams (16).

Table 2.3. Frequencies of group names

Rank	Group Name	Frequency	Rank	Group Name	Frequency
1.	Political groups	115	41.	Black people	17
2.	Religious groups	69	42.	Ignorant/ uneducated	17
3.	Leftist people	63	43.	The CHP/ CHP supporters	17
4.	Rightist people	61	44.	Workgroups	16
5.	Turks	58	45.	Feminists	16
6.	Friendships	58	46.	Relatives	16
7.	Kurds	57	47.	Sports team	16
8.	Alevis	56	48.	Peasants	15
9.	Rich people	54	49.	Teachers	15
10.	Poor people	53	50.	Cultural groups	15
11.	Associations	52	51.	Officers	15
12.	Women	49	52.	Jamaat	15
13.	Men	49	53.	Covered women	14
14.	Muslims	48	54.	Communist people	14
15.	Sunnis	46	55.	Disabled people	14
16.	Occupational groups	45	56.	Animal lovers	14
17.	Students	42	57.	White people	14
18.	Ethnic groups	35	58.	Educational status	14
19.	LGBT	33	59.	Jews	13
20.	Family	33	60.	Doctors	13
21.	Old people	31	61.	Educated people	13
22.	Christians	30	62.	FB fans	12
23.	Social class	29	63.	Syrians	12
24.	Race	27	64.	Terrorist organizations	11
25.	Children	27	65.	Hometown	11
26.	Sports groups	26	66.	Academicians	11
27.	School groups	24	67.	Football groups	11
28.	Music groups	23	68.	Politicians	10
29.	Sex	23	69.	Artistic groups	10
30.	The AKP/ AKP supporters	21	70.	Uncovered women	10
31.	Sect	22	71.	Nationalists	10
32.	Atheist people	20	72.	Married people	10
33.	Student clubs	20	73.	Ülkücü people	10
34.	Young people	20	74.	Fan clubs	10
35.	Workers	20	75.	Western people	10
36.	Pious people	20	76.	Eastern people	10
37.	Conservatives	19			
38.	Circassians	18			
39.	Laz	18			
40.	Age groups	18			

2.3.3. What are the Bases of Groupness of Social Categories?

The current qualitative study was mainly held to examine whether and how people construe various social categories as groups. Accordingly, eight entitativity-related questions about the target social categories were asked to participants. The related data were analyzed keeping in mind whether the emergent qualitative categories contribute to the psychological realness of social categories. The responses to those questions were concise (composed of a couple of words or sentences) for some participants, while others expressed their ideas in a rather lengthy manner. The portion of the data collected in the classroom context was hand-written; those responses were transcribed with the help of two undergraduate students. The researcher merged them with the online data, and all the transcribed material became ready for qualitative analysis. The data were analyzed through a content analysis procedure, especially useful for introductory studies on a novel or an understudied phenomenon (Vaismoradi et al., 2013).

There are three phases of content analysis (Elo & Kyngas, 2008): preparation, organizing, and reporting. Participants' answer to each question was taken as the unit of analysis, and individual words, phrases, and sentences were specified as the units of meaning. The analysis was held based on both the manifest and latent content of the responses. During the preparation phase, the researcher read and re-read all answers many times to fully understand the data. After becoming immersed with the responses, the researcher decided to analyze the data both inductively and deductively. That is, qualitative categories were derived from the data itself and the existing concepts in the literature. In the organizing phase, participants' answers to each question were transferred into multiple cells in Excel sheets, and those responses were examined for whether they exemplified the target qualitative categories. Both higher-order categories and subcategories were generated in abstracting the data. Codes assigned to each (sub)category were also reevaluated independently to ensure that they were representative of the related qualitative categories.

Even though responses about each social category were analyzed separately, various overarching qualitative categories and subcategories were identified across different social categories. Many of the higher- and lower-order categories were common to all social categories. However, there were also unique (sub)categories specific to particular social categories. The frequencies and percentages of the principal categories and their

subcategories about the eight different social categories are presented in Table 2.4. Some participants gave highly similar answers to the different questions in the same survey. Not to artificially inflate the category frequencies, the numbers (or percentages) in this table represent the number of participants who mentioned the related qualitative category concerning the same social category. Even if a participant mentioned the same qualitative category in his/her answers more than once, his/her reaction was coded only once. Representative examples/excerpts for each qualitative (sub)category can be found in Appendix D. In the following parts, the four main qualitative categories, namely, "Groupness Attribution," "Basis of Rejecting the Groupness," "Sociopolitical Determinants of Perceived Unity," and "Group-Related Determinants of Perceived Unity" will be introduced. The findings concerning different social categories are presented together; each overarching qualitative category is defined, and a narrative account of it is provided by referring to its common and group-specific subcategories.

2.3.3.1. Groupness Attribution

This category is formed to answer whether the social categories under investigation were perceived as a group or not. For this category, mainly, participants' answer to the first qualitative question was examined. As is clear in Table 2.4, participants consensually labeled Turks, Sunnis, AKP supporters, and CHP supporters a group. Except for the category of covered women, over 50% of the participants also perceived Kurds, Alevis, and working women as separate groups. Covered women emerged as the least group-like or entitative category in the present study. Participants put forward many reasons in approving or denying the groupness of the target social categories. Those reasons were divided into three basic categories: (a) "Basis of Rejecting the Groupness," (b) "Sociopolitical Determinants of Perceived Unity," and (c) "Group-Related Determinants of Perceived Unity."

Table 2.4. The frequencies (%) of categories and their subcategories regarding the entitativity of social categories

Categories and their subcategories	Kurds (*n* = 46)	Turks (*n* = 38)	Alevis (*n* = 45)	Sunnis (*n* = 38)	AKP supporter (*n* = 38)	CHP supporters (*n* = 37)	Working women (*n* = 37)	Covered women (*n* = 38)
1. Groupness attribution								
It is a group	26 (56.52%)	31 (81.58%)	27 (60%)	32 (84.21%)	34 (89.47%)	32 (86.49%)	22 (59.46%)	9 (23.68%)
It is not a group	17 (36.96%)	7 (18.42%)	15 (33.33%)	3 (7.89%)	3 (7.89%)	4 (10.81%)	14 (37.84%)	27 (71.05%)
2. Basis of rejecting the groupness								
The inappropriateness of the term group	4 (8.70%)	5 (13.16%)	1 (2.22%)	-	-	-	-	-
The wrongness of grouping people	9 (19.57%)	-	7 (15.56%)	2 (5.26%)	-	1 (2.70%)	5 (13.51%)	10 (26.32%)
3. Sociopolitical determinants of perceived unity								
Prevalence of negative stereotypes	7 (15.22%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Discriminatory/polarized sociopolitical environment	5 (10.87%)	-	1 (2.22%)	2 (5.26%)	-	1 (2.70%)	-	8 (21.05%)
Counter-stereotypicality	-	-	-	-	-	-	10 (27.03%)	-
4. Group-related determinants of perceived unity								
4.1. Commonalities among group members								
Ancestry/Blood ties	24 (52.17%)	21 (55.26%)	13 (28.89%)	4 (10.53%)	-	-	-	-
Culture/Traditions/Values	26 (56.52%)	37 (97.37%)	13 (28.89%)	-	-	-	-	-
Group symbols (e.g., flag)	-	14 (36.84%)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Language	11 (23.91%)	12 (31.58%)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Life style	-	2 (5.26%)	6 (13.33%)	-	2 (5.26%)	3 (8.11%)	-	2 (5.26%)
Physical appearance	6 (13.04%)	2 (5.26%)	5 (11.11%)	-	2 (5.26%)	-	-	11 (28.95%)
Political agenda & Ideology	3 (6.52%)	-	3 (6.67%)	-	38 (100%)	37 (100%)	-	2 (5.26%)
Religious beliefs & concerns	3 (6.52%)	16 (42.11%)	44 (97.78%)	34 (89.47%)	12 (31.58%)	1 (2.70%)	-	35 (92.11%)
Space (e.g., region, city, or district)	4 (8.70%)	23 (60.53%)	3 (6.67%)	-	2 (5.26%)	-	-	-
Traits/Attributes/Typical behaviors	8 (17.39%)	19 (50%)	8 (17.78%)	1 (2.63%)	14 (36.84%)	6 (16.22%)	14 (37.84%)	5 (13.16%)
4.2. Group size: Majority vs. minority	2 (4.35%)	-	3 (6.67%)	2 (5.26%)	-	-	-	-
4.3. Self-categorization (Boundary-making efforts)	12 (26.09%)	-	3 (6.67%)	2 (5.26%)	1 (2.63%)	1 (2.70%)	-	-

(Table 2.4 continued)

Categories and their subcategories	Kurds (*n* = 46)	Turks (*n* = 38)	Alevis (*n* = 45)	Sunnis (*n* = 38)	AKP supporter (*n* = 38)	CHP supporters (*n* = 37)	Working women (*n* = 37)	Covered women (*n* = 38)
4.4. Intergroup differentiation	7 (15.22%)	2 (5.26%)	17 (37.78%)	16 (42.11%)	-	6 (16.22%)	-	-
4.5. Importance of membership	23 (50%)	27 (71.05%)	24 (53.33%)	20 (52.63%)	23 (60.53%)	25 (67.57%)	28 (75.68%)	21 (55.26%)
4.6. Historical continuity	13 (28.26%)	27 (71.05%)	7 (15.56%)	6 (15.79%)	-	8 (21.62%)	-	-
4.7. Ingroup ties								
Presence of strong ties	30 (65.22%)	24 (63.16%)	31 (68.89%)	14 (36.84%)	18 (47.37%)	13 (35.14%)	11 (29.73%)	11 (28.95%)
Its nature								
Positive ingroup climate	4 (8.70%)	8 (21.05%)	7 (15.56%)	2 (5.26%)	3 (7.89%)	-	10 (27.03%)	-
Resistance to intrusion	2 (4.35%)	3 (7.89%)	1 (2.22%)	2 (5.26%)	-	-	-	-
Benefit maximization	-	-	-	-	9 (23.68%)	-	-	-
Negative ingroup climate	5 (10.87%)	-	-	3 (7.89%)	-	10 (27.03%)	-	-
Its reasons								
Due to the majority status	-	-	-	2 (5.26%)	-	-	-	-
Due to their joint aims & success	4 (8.70%)	-	-	1 (2.63%)	4 (10.53%)	6 (16.22%)	2 (5.41%)	1 (2.63%)
Due to their uniting value or belief system	6 (13.04%)	8 (21.05%)	10 (22.22%)	8 (21.05%)	5 (13.16%)	2 (5.41%)	-	4 (10.53%)
Due to (past/present) oppression	5 (10.87%)	-	8 (17.78%)	-	-	-	-	7 (18.42%)
Due to the minority status	6 (13.04%)	-	7 (15.56%)	-	-	2 (5.41%)	-	-
4.8. Collective agency								
Presence of collective ideals	26 (56.52%)	27 (71.05%)	10 (22.22%)	9 (23.68%)	33 (86.84%)	32 (86.49%)	16 (43.24%)	9 (23.68%)
Presence of collective efforts	23 (50%)	18 (47.37%)	9 (20%)	8 (21.05%)	28 (73.68%)	24 (64.86%)	15 (40.54%)	8 (21.05%)
Collective success	6 (13.04%)	8 (21.05%)	3 (6.67%)	3 (7.89%)	22 (57.89%)	9 (24.32%)	12 (32.43%)	4 (10.53%)
4.9. Common fate								
Experiences of common fate	24 (52.17%)	25 (65.79%)	23 (51.11%)	13 (34.21%)	25 (65.79%)	16 (43.24%)	24 (64.86%)	20 (52.63%)
Its nature								
Generalization, prejudice, & discrimination	14 (30.43%)	9 (23.68%)	14 (31.11%)	3 (7.89%)	9 (23.68%)	6 (16.22%)	9 (24.32%)	21 (55.26%)
Socioeconomic status	1 (2.17%)	-	-	-	2 (5.26%)	1 (2.70%)	-	-

(Table 2.4 continued)

Categories and their subcategories	Kurds (*n* = 46)	Turks (*n* = 38)	Alevis (*n* = 45)	Sunnis (*n* = 38)	AKP supporter (*n* = 38)	CHP supporters (*n* = 37)	Working women (*n* = 37)	Covered women (*n* = 38)
Belief or value socialization	3 (6.52%)	1 (2.63%)	6 (13.33%)	2 (5.26%)	1 (2.63%)	1 (2.70%)	-	-
Collective ideals	1 (2.17%)	1 (2.63%)	-	-	3 (7.89%)	2 (5.41%)	-	-
Common life stressors	-	-	-	-	-	-	11 (29.73%)	-
4.10. Nature of intergroup relations								
Openness to intergroup contact	7 (15.22%)	11 (28.95%)	9 (20%)	-	-	-	-	-
Closeness to intergroup contact	6 (13.04%)	3 (7.89%)	5 (11.11%)	2 (5.26%)	-	-	-	-
4.11. Membership permeability								
Objective constraints	3 (6.52%)	5 (13.16%)	2 (4.44%)	3 (7.89%)	-	-	-	-
Personal constraints	-	-	-	-	-	-	6 (16.22%)	-
Value constraints	3 (6.52%)	4 (10.53%)	4 (8.89%)	10 (26.32%)	5 (13.16%)	8 (21.62%)	1 (2.70%)	5 (13.16%)
Ingroup constraints	2 (4.35%)	2 (5.26%)	4 (8.89%)	5 (13.16%)	7 (18.42%)	5 (13.51%)	-	14 (36.84%)
Practical constraints	-	-	-	-	4 (10.53%)	-	6 (16.22%)	-
Structural constraints	-	-	-	-	-	-	7 (18.92%)	-

2.3.3.2. Basis of Rejecting the Groupness

This category relates to why participants refused to label the target categories a group, including two subcategories. First, some participants rejected the groupness, especially that of Kurds and Turks, in stressing that the people who belong to those categories do not represent a group, but they are instead a race, a nation, or an ethnicity. In other words, they were critical of calling those categories groups. Such statements were brought under the first subcategory, "The Inappropriateness of the Term Group." Some other participants regarded grouping (or perceiving people in groups) something as discriminatory or derogatory and therefore refused to label Kurds, Alevis, working women, and covered women a group. Such statements were coded under the second subcategory, "The Wrongness of Grouping People." The members of those particular categories are often subjected to discrimination in Turkey, and this situation seems to increase people's sensitivity in not viewing them as separate or isolated entities. In a related vein, some participants also preferred to categorize Kurds, Alevis, and covered women under the novel and all-encompassing identities such as Islam, nationhood, or even common humanity. Besides, in the case of working women, participants were unwilling to accept their groupness in that seeing them as a separate group might create an artificial hierarchy between working and non-working women, and this might, in turn, impede the societal acceptance of the female workforce participation in Turkey. Participants also denied the groupness of the given social categories regarding the group's heterogeneity, absence of collective ideals, or lack of ingroup ties. Since those reasons were the exact opposite of the group-related bases of perceived unity in those categories, new subcategories specific to them were not generated under this higher-order category. Instead, they were examined under the already-existing overarching category of the "Group-Related Determinants of Perceived Unity."

2.3.3.3. Sociopolitical Determinants of Perceived Unity

A set of participants mentioned that the target social categories are seen as groups because the category members are construed as groups in socio-cultural terms. In other words, those participants rejected to consider the target social categories in a social vacuum but instead preferred to put them into the particular sociopolitical context of Turkey. For example, to some participants, Kurds constitute a distinct group because of the stereotype that all Kurds are affiliated with the PKK or terrorist activities. Such statements were coded

under the subcategory "Prevalence of Negative Stereotypes." Besides, some participants held the highly discriminatory and polarized sociopolitical environment in Turkey responsible for why Kurds and covered women, particularly, are perceived as groups in the eye of ordinary citizens. Such expressions were coded under the subcategory of "Discriminatory/Polarized Sociopolitical Environment." As a relevant last subcategory in this category, "Counter-Stereotypicality" is concerned that working women constitute a sharp contrast with non-working women in society since women's entrance into the paid sector is overly limited in Turkey. Consequently, they are likely to be seen as a separate group due to their extraordinariness or counter-stereotypicality in social life.

2.3.3.4. Group-Related Determinants of Perceived Unity

In addition to the impact of sociocultural context, particular group characteristics might also influence how people perceive social categories. In confirming many of the entitativity cues proposed by Lickel et al. (2000), the present results revealed various group-related characteristics conducive to perceiving social categories as entitative units. This overarching qualitative category is formed to comprise those group-related determinants of the perceived unity of social categories. It includes 11 different subcategories, namely, "Commonalities Among Group Members," "Group Size: Majority vs. Minority," "Self-Categorization (Boundary-Making Efforts)," "Intergroup Differentiation," "Importance of Membership," "Historical Continuity," "Ingroup Ties," "Collective Agency," "Common Fate," "Nature of Intergroup Relations," and "Membership Permeability." The scope of these subcategories is briefly presented in what follows.

a) <u>Commonalities Among Group Members</u>

In perceiving social categories as entitative, participants mentioned the similarities among category members in terms of their "Ancestry/Blood ties," "Culture/Traditions/Values," "Group symbols," "Language," "Lifestyle," "Physical appearance," "Political agenda & Ideology," "Religious beliefs & concerns," "Space," and "Traits/Attributes/Typical behaviors." All of those components were coded under the subcategory "Commonalities Among Group Members." What commonality elements are germane to which social categories are noted in Table 2.4. Kurds, Turks, and Alevis were seen as possessing commonalities on many of those elements. Considering that Alevis are

perceptually construed as similar to ethnic categories, one can underline the truth in the claim that Alevis function like an ethnoreligious community in Turkey (Arakelova, 2010; Aydın, 2018). In contrast, Sunnis seemed to be perceived as a religious community since their sole shared characteristic relates to their religious beliefs and principles.

The AKP and CHP supporters were homogeneous in their shared political ideals and common traits and attributes. In this respect, the present participants seemed to construe the political party supporters as homogeneous entities based on their political preferences and stereotypical qualities. Working women were also perceived as homogenous in terms of their stereotypical attributes even though they constitute a broad social category comprising many unconnected women from various branches of the paid sector. Covered women were understandably seen as homogeneous in terms of their religious concerns. In addition, due to publicly communicating their religious sensitivities by using headscarves, covered women also became homogeneous in the eye of some participants based on their physical appearance.

b) Group Size: Majority vs. Minority

Group size emerged as another determinant of the perceived unity of certain social categories even though a tiny percentage of participants referred to the subcategory "Group Size: Majority vs. Minority." As predictably, while Kurds and Alevis were proposed to be united entities due to their minority status, Sunnis were perceived as a distinct entity due to their religious majority status in Turkey.

c) Self-Categorization (Boundary-Making Efforts)

Another basis of the perceived unity was the attributions of deliberate efforts to the members of particular categories in isolating themselves from the rest of the society or construing themselves as a separate identity group in society. For example, a participant evaluating the entitativity of Kurds declared that Kurds' separating "themselves from our [religious] holidays, our flag, our anthem, and almost all of our national identity" leads people to perceive Kurds as a separate group. Such statements were coded under the subcategory "Self-Categorization (Boundary-Making Efforts)." This qualitative category was of particular importance for the perceived unity of Kurds.

d) Intergroup Differentiation

In addition to ingroup homogeneity, the salience of intergroup contrast seemed to contribute to the perceived unity of specific social categories. For example, the perceived faith-related difference between Alevis and Sunnis was held responsible for their being perceived as distinct units. Accordingly, another subcategory, namely "Intergroup Differentiation," comprised the statements that underline the role of perceived differences between members of different social categories in determining group entitativity.

e) Importance of Categorical Membership

Independently of whether the target social categories are openly labeled as a group or not, all of those categories were seen as vital identity components for the present participants. More than 50 percent of the participants in each evaluator group underlined the importance of belonging to the target category for its members. Such statements were brought together under the subcategory "Importance of Categorical Membership." When looking at the percentages, the social categories that are ascribed utmost importance appeared to be political categories, working women, and Turks from the viewpoint of the present participants.

f) Historical Continuity

Even though the duration of the group was found to be one of the weakest predictors of group entitativity (Lickel et al., 2000), participants in the current study referred to the historical continuity of the particular social categories in explaining why the category members are seen as entitative units. For example, a participant asserted, "I see the CHP as a group since Atatürk has founded it." Similar statements referring to the historical roots of the social categories were coded under the subcategory "Historical Continuity." This category was of particular importance for the perceived unity of Turks (71.05%), Kurds (28.26%), the CHP supporters (21.62%), Sunnis (15.79%), and Alevis (15.56%).

g) Ingroup Ties

The frequency and nature of intergroup relations in the group might act as another basis of perceived unity among category members. The related meaning units were coded

under a broader qualitative category, "Ingroup Ties." As can be seen in Table 2.4, a great majority of the participants perceived the ingroup ties among Alevis (68.89%), Kurds (65.22%), and Turks (63.16%) to be strong (see the subcategory "Presence of Strong Ties"). However, only one-third of the participants in each evaluator group characterized Sunnis, CHP supporters, working women, and covered women with strong ingroup ties. The ingroup ties among AKP supporters seemed to be perceived relatively more robust (47.37%) than this last set of categories.

Participants also explained the nature of ingroup climate among the category members. Accordingly, a subordinate category ("Its Nature") was formed under this qualitative category. For example, ingroup favoritism, solidarity, respect for one other, and cooperation were interpreted as evidence that the category members have strong ingroup ties. Such expressions were compiled under the subcategory of "Positive ingroup climate," which was mainly associated with working women, Turks, and Alevis. Additionally, the members of particular social categories were seen as capable of uniting in the face of a common threat. For example, a participant mentioned a recent event that the cartoons of Prophet Muhammad offended many Muslims and ignited a collective protest among Sunnis. Accordingly, "Resistance to intrusion" was generated as another subcategory. However, participants sometimes referred to this subcategory in negative terms because though typically the category members are perceived to be loosely connected, they will likely unite against the emergent threats. Besides, some participants also mentioned the priority of self-interest among AKP supporters; such statements were coded under the subcategory "Benefit maximization" as another indicator of the nature of ingroup ties. Additionally, some participants referred to cliques and clashes of ideas within the group (especially among CHP supporters); such claims were coded under the subcategory of "Negative ingroup climate."

In addition to the nature of intragroup interaction, some participants also stated the reasons behind the firm (or weak) ingroup ties among category members ("Its reasons"). For example, a small number of participants (5.26%) characterized Sunnis with weak ingroup ties "Due to their majority status." Yet, the ties among CHP supporters (16.22%), AKP supporters (10.53%), and Kurds (8.70%) were perceived to be strong "Due to their joint aims and successes." A considerable number of participants proposed that their common belief or value system binds the target category members together. The subcategory of "Due to their uniting value or belief system" seemed relevant to all the social categories except for working women. Participants viewed the ingroup ties among covered women (18.42%),

Alevis (17.78%), and Kurds (10.87%) as vital based on their being oppressed today or in the past. Such statements were coded under the subcategory "Due to (past/ present) oppression." Lastly, some participants interpreted the ingroup solidarity among Alevis (15.56%) and Kurds (13.04%) as a self-protective reflex in overcoming the difficulties of their minority status; those statements were also brought together under the subcategory "Due to minority status."

h) Collective Agency

A group that can carry out organized actions to achieve its goals is perceived as an agentic unit (Brewer et al., 2004; Lickel et al., 2000). Accordingly, the perceived group agency of social categories was also questioned in the current study. To begin with, I should note that some participants came up with individual-level goals that are common to the members of particular social categories. For example, some participants said that Alevis aim at Heaven and live faithfully accordingly. However, such individual-level goals might not orient the category members for collective action. As a result, it becomes somehow impossible to talk about group agency in terms of such purposes. Yet, after a critical examination of the responses to the question on common goals status, the goals that implied group-level actions or outcomes were grouped under the overarching category of "Collective Agency." There were three basic subordinate categories in this broader category: "Presence of collective ideals," "Presence of collective efforts," and "Collective success."

As can be seen in the subcategory "Presence of collective ideals" in Table 2.4, participants with a considerable degree of consensus perceived the members of the social categories (except for Alevis, Sunnis, and covered women) as possessing collective ideals. Over 80 percent of the participants associated the AKP and CHP supporters with collective political purposes. Nearly 72 percent of the participants also characterized Turks with certain shared ideals. They were mainly associated with the collective dreams of unity, development, continuity, respect, and world peace. Over 50 percent of the participants also perceived Kurds as sharing collective goals; they were associated with the ideals of sustaining their continuity, establishing an independent state within Turkey, gaining societal respect, and contributing to world peace. Forty-three percent of the participants also saw working women as collectively striving for gender equality. Approximately one-fifth of the participants construed Alevis and Sunnis as having the collective ideal of preserving and

spreading their belief systems. Lastly, by a small number of participants (23.68%), covered women were also associated with the shared ideals of gaining societal respect and spreading their religion.

Even though the target social categories were associated with various group-level goals, mainly speaking, only the political and ethnic categories were viewed as putting collective efforts in succeeding their aims (for the exact percentages, see the subcategory "Presence of collective efforts" in Table 2.4). However, only AKP supporters were seen as collectively successful in attaining their goals (see the subcategory "Collective success" in Table 2.4).

i) Common Fate

This category included two basic lower-level categories, namely, "Experiences of common fate" and "Its nature." The first subordinate category relates to whether or not participants believed that the members of the target social categories have a common fate. Except for Sunnis and CHP supporters, over fifty percent of the participants stated that the category members experience common outcomes by their group belonging. The reasons why the target category members are believed to share a common destiny were coded under the second subordinate qualitative category (i.e., "Its nature"). Some participants stressed that the members of specific categories are treated negatively, discriminated against, marginalized, or commonly stereotyped in society just because they belong to those particular categories. Those statements were coded under the subcategory "Generalization, prejudice & discrimination"; it was of critical importance for covered women (55.26%), Alevis (31.11%), and Kurds (30.43%). Even though few participants mentioned it, the category members' common "Socioeconomic status" was also interpreted as another indicator of their shared fate. In addition, some participants proposed that the members of ethnic and religious categories would experience common outcomes due to their shared values, upbringing styles, and religious lifestyle. Those statements were assembled under the subcategory "Belief or value socialization." In the eye of some participants, the members of particular social categories (e.g., the supporters of political parties) might also experience shared outcomes in the pursuit of their "Collective ideals." Lastly, working women were also thought to experience a common destiny based on their "Common life stressors" since they frequently experience work/family imbalance.

j) Membership Permeability

The category "Membership Permeability" was generated to describe the ease or difficulty of entering or leaving the target social categories. Groups that are hard to join and exit are accepted as impermeable. Here, the factors that make category boundaries impassable were primarily classified in line with the study of Armenta et al. (2017). Firstly, if outgroup defining characteristics are perceived as too restricted or distant, this refers to *objective constraints*. In the current study, if participants assumed a biological or cultural essence residing within the category members (as in the case of ethnic and sectarian groups), such statements were grouped under the subcategory of "Objective constraints." Secondly, if an individual is incapable of joining a group, this refers to *personal constraints.* For example, becoming a working woman or continuing their career requires women to get a qualified education, develop essential job skills, and sustain a work-family balance. Such statements were brought together in the subcategory of "Personal constraints." Thirdly, if an individual's values do not permit leaving his/her group or joining other groups, this refers to *value constraints*. For example, participants stated that it is difficult for individuals to give up their religious beliefs or political views. Those statements were coded under the "Value constraints"; this subcategory was relevant to almost all of the social categories examined in the present study. Fourthly, if an ingroup does not permit intergroup mobility, this refers to *ingroup constraints*. The current participants emphasized the difficulty of leaving the groups due to the perceived exclusion threat from ingroup members. Such statements were compiled in the subcategory of "Ingroup constraints." Even though this subcategory was germane to most of the target social categories, it was particularly important for covered women (36.84%) since uncovering might elicit serious condemnatory reactions from others.

In addition to the dynamics by Armenta et al. (2017), the two additional constraints were also diagnosed during this qualitative analysis. Some participants mentioned that groups might supply people with comfort, security, and specific material gains. In this respect, leaving the membership of particular social categories (e.g., working women or AKP supporters) might mean the loss of such profits, and relatedly, it might not be easy for the members to exit those categories. Those expressions were coded under the subcategory of "Practical constraints." Being a working woman depends not only on women's abilities but also on the permeability of the labor market. For instance, men are more likely to get hired than women even when the opposite sex candidates are equal in their qualifications.

Such themes concerning gender discrimination were coded under the subcategory of "Structural constraints."

k) Nature of Intergroup Relations

In the current study, some participants interpreted the issue of "joining/leaving a group" in terms of the possibility of interacting with outgroup members. For example, they interpreted intergroup friendships as indicating the absence of solid intergroup boundaries (or low levels of group entitativity). Accordingly, a novel category, "Nature of Intergroup Relations," was formed to refer to the ease or difficulty that opposite groups can get in touch with one other in social life. For instance, some participants stressed the importance of societal tolerance during the Ottoman period and concluded that Turks were warm and easy to get in contact with. Such statements were brought together under the subcategory "Openness to intergroup contact." On the contrary, some participants referred to the unacceptability of interethnic marriages among Kurds, Sunnis, and Alevis. Besides, some other participants indicated that Kurds or Alevis might prefer to live in separate neighborhoods that their religious or ethnic ingroup members mostly populate. Such expressions were subsumed under the subcategory of "Closeness to intergroup contact."

2.4. Discussion

This qualitative study sheds light on the term entitativity in many respects. First, a lay definition of the group can be made based on the current findings. Second, the most prototypical group examples were detected, which is critical to understand what comes to people's minds when they hear the word group. Third, the various bases of the perceived unity of social categories were unearthed. All of these contributions are discussed in this section.

No single definition can encapsulate the many nuances in the word group (Forsyth, 2019). There are many different definitions of the term in the literature. Some researchers focus on the importance of common fate (e.g., Campbell, 1958; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988) or intragroup interaction (e.g., Frey & Konieczka, 2010) in their definitions. Some stress the role of shared goals or purposes in differentiating a mere aggregate of individuals from a bona fide group (e.g., Gould, 2004, Chapter 5). Some other researchers suggest that when a set of individuals think of themselves as a separate group and others recognize them as a

group, the group becomes perceptually salient (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Brown & Pehrson, 2020, Chapter 1). Forsyth (2019) has come up with several key phrases that are often mentioned in different group definitions, including "categorization," "communication," "influence," "interdependence," "relations," "psychological salience of membership," "shared identity," "size," "shared tasks or goals," "structure," and "social unit." Regarding the qualitative categories emerged about the definition of group in the present study, a group can be defined as a united whole comprising of at least two people who (a) classify themselves as members of the same social unit, (b) possess some kind of similarity, (c) have a sense of belonging and affection towards one other, (d) can act as an organized unit in the pursuit of their goals, and (e) are recognized as a group by third parties. This lay definition of the group comprises almost all of the above-mentioned critical elements identified by Forsyth (2019) in various theoretical definitions of the group in the literature. Besides, Agadullina and Lovakov (2017) proposed a three-component model of entitativity, consisting of essence, agency, and unity elements. In the current study, when we look at the sheer frequencies of the characteristics critical to group definition, three of them, namely, commonalities among members, unity, and collective agency, appear to be more prominent. This finding also seems to qualitatively confirm the truth in the three-component entitativity model of Agadullina and Lovakov (2017). On the whole, it is possible to state that laypeople use the word group in daily life by referring to similar connotations with social psychologists.

Even though some elements in the group definitions (e.g., structure or face-to-face interaction) mainly apply to small scale groups such as families or workgroups, large scale social categories, including ethnic or religious communities, nationalities, or social class, are also referred to as groups in the literature (Brown & Pehrson, 2020). In this study, the participants' most frequently mentioned group examples came out to be large-scale categories (primarily political, religious, and ethnic groups) rather than face-to-face groups. When people hear the word group, broader social categories are more readily accessible in their minds than small-scale groups. Possibly, people generally refer to small scale groups not as groups but by using their specific names (e.g., team, family, or association). However, they might need a more comprehensive label in denoting social categories; the word group might be employed for such an end. In Turkish, there are also many other terms used for the same purpose, such as *kesim* (fraction), *topluluk* (community), *halk* (folk, community), *millet*

(kind, for example "*kadın milleti*" meaning the womankind in lay terminology), *camia* (community), or *zümre* (community, category).

Of course, the salience of specific group names is also likely to be influenced by the sociopolitical climate of Turkey. Given that Turkey has long been haunted by polarizations across ethnic, religious, and political divides (Bilgiç et al., 2014; Çelik et al., 2017), it is understandable why the related social categories were more readily accessible than other social categories or group types in perceivers' minds. In addition, this study was conducted right after the March 2019 local elections, one of Turkey's most contested elections due to the heightened tension between the political alliances (SETA, 2019; Taşkın, 2021). Relatedly, the timing of the current study might also account for the greater cognitive accessibility of political categories compared to other group types.

The results revealed that participants, with an over fifty-percent consensus, labeled the members of all target social categories except for covered women a group. As contemporary Turkey is resting on the ethnic, religious, and political faultlines (Bilgiç et al., 2014; Çelik et al., 2017), it is understandable why the present participants associated the relevant social categories with a considerable degree of entitativity. However, regarding the fact that the lift of the headscarf ban during the AKP power has soothed the Islamist-secularist tension in Turkey to a certain degree (Aytaç & Çarkoğlu, 2019); it is also understandable why covered women were not perceived as a distinct unit by the participants. Yet, in an examination of the bases of denying the groupness of social categories, one should note that some participants emphasized the fact that thinking of peoples as groups or categorizing them is a kind of discrimination, and this is why they refrained from calling particular categories (i.e., covered women, Kurds, Alevis, and working women) a group. This tendency might be a judgmental defense against violating a personal, universalist worldview. But, it might not mean that participants do not perceive these social categories as groups, which is a nonconscious, perceptual experience. Besides, some people held the prevalence of negative stereotypes or the polarized sociopolitical environment responsible for construing the most marginalized members of society as separate groups. In this respect, it can be put forward that the word group might carry negative connotations in daily usage, particularly when it is used for socially sensitive social categories. In addition, from the lay viewpoint, there are better alternative denominations other than the term group, such as nation or race, especially in denoting the members of ethnic categories.

All of these points are closely linked to the discussions on the measurement of entitativity. Blanchard et al. (2020) have defined entitativity as a person's cognitive evaluation of a social aggregate as a group. Accordingly, they have strongly suggested measuring the concept by asking participants to assess the target social units on a scale ranging from "not a group" to "very much a group." However, in light of the current qualitative results, evaluating the entitativity of marginalized or stigmatized groups via direct questions on their groupness might be problematic. First, it can increase social desirability concerns in that some participants might avoid naming the target category a group in presenting themselves as unprejudiced or tolerant individuals. Second, given that some people might use the term group more neutrally while others attach negative meanings to it, the measurement results on the perceived groupness scale might not yield the expected correlations with other theoretically relevant variables. In this vein, further researchers should refrain from using direct questions on groupness in evaluating the general unity of socially sensitive categories. Alternatively, they might ask participants to judge the degree to which the target group constitutes a single unit (opposed to an aggregate of unrelated individuals) or how cohesive or internally coherent the group is (Hamilton, 2007).

Almost all entitativity cues examined in the past (Lickel et al., 2000) have also been identified in this qualitative study. Commonalities among group members, group size, self-categorization, the importance of the group to its members, positive ingroup climate, collective agency, common fate, and impermeability of group boundaries emerged as the critical bases on which various social categories turn into meaningful groups in perceivers' minds. From the lay perspective, perceived counter-stereotypicality or the presence of contrasting outgroups also seemed to play a role in construing social categories as entitative units. This finding qualitatively highlights the importance of contextual factors in shaping entitativity perceptions (Brewer et al., 1995). In minimal group settings, the presence or absence of a competitive outgroup was found not to cause any differences in the evaluations of ingroup entitativity (Gaertner et al., 2006; Gaertner & Schopler, 1998). However, this effect might be specific to the dynamically construed groups since Gaertner and his colleagues (Gaertner et al., 2006; Gaertner & Schopler, 1998) manipulated entitativity via altering the degree of interaction among group members. Similarly, Ip et al. (2006) also found that people did not need a contrasting outgroup in inferring group entitativity based on the joint body movements of group members. Yet, in evaluating group entitativity based on the physical similarity of group members (i.e., body color), participants perceived the

target group as high in entitativity only when there was a contrasting outgroup (Ip et al., 2006). The salience of intergroup differentiation seems especially relevant to categorically construed groups (as opposed to dynamically construed groups). Since social categories are perceived based on the commonalities shared by category members (Forsyth, 2019; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988), it is understandable why the present participants also referred to the salience of intergroup boundaries construing the target social categories as entitative units. In addition, the principle of meta-contrast in self-categorization theory (Turner & Reynolds, 2012) suggests that groups become perceptible as the ratio of inter-category differences to intra-category differences increases. Accordingly, people are likely to view a social aggregate as a united whole when they perceive high within-group homogeneity and between-groups contrast (McGarty et al., 1995). While group homogeneity is often addressed as an antecedent of entitativity in the literature (e.g., Brewer et al., 2004; Hamilton, 2007; Lickel et al., 2000), the perceived contrast or distinctiveness between a given group and other groups can also be examined as another determinant of entitativity (e.g., Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, et al., 2007). Future researchers should consider using items about the perceived salience of intergroup differentiation to measure the entitativity of social categories.

Another interesting entitativity component identified in the current study came out to be the degree of group members' perceived openness to intergroup contact. In evaluating the perceived unity, especially of ethnic and religious categories, some participants referred to friendship potential or other intergroup contact opportunities in rejecting the groupness of the target category members. This reasoning seems plausible in that when different groups in multicultural settings retreat into their shells as separate communities and thereby lose opportunities for meaningful intergroup communication, they start to live "parallel lives" (Cantle, 2001, as cited in Crisp & Turner, 2009), which might, in turn, lead perceivers to see non-interacting parties as distinct entities. There was a negative correlation between prior contact with individuals with schizophrenia and their perceived entitativity (Haqanee et al., 2014). Similarly, among Russians, the avoidance of close contact with Central Asian migrants was associated with higher levels of perceived outgroup entitativity (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2017). However, there was no association between intergroup contact and the perceived entitativity of Muslims (Newheiser & Dovidio, 2012) or individuals with alcoholism and Parkinson's disease (Haqanee et al., 2014). Yet, Newheiser and Dovidio (2012) confirmed the validity of an indirect link between intergroup contact and entitativity

via reduced prejudices against Muslims. Considering these contrasting findings, whether contact-related variables should be regarded as another core determinant of entitativity awaits future empirical investigation.

According to the current results, the perceived unity of different social category types seems to be determined by different entitativity components. While covered women were seen as the least entitative group among the target categories, they were also associated with fewer entitativity cues. They were characterized by relatively high levels of intragroup homogeneity (particularly in religious terms), the importance of the group, and common fate (in terms of marginalization in society), and moderate levels of membership impermeability (due to ingroup and value constraints). However, they were qualified with lower levels of group-member interaction and collective agency.

Working women were construed as an entitative unit based on the importance of the group, common fate, collective agency, ingroup solidarity, impermeable group boundaries, and homogeneity (specifically in terms of their typical attributes that are the opposite of traditional gender roles). Given that the category of working women comprises large numbers of unrelated women from various work sectors, it might be surprising that people perceive them as a separate group. However, the gender gap in Turkey is still highly salient (WEF, 2021), and the working woman image is in sharp contrast with conservative values (Tatli et al., 2008). Besides, women have to cross many hurdles in entering professional life and surviving their careers, such as getting a good education, combating gender discrimination in the workplace, or sustaining work-family balance (Dayioglu & Kirdar, 2010; Dildar, 2015; Göksel, 2013; Gündüz-Hoşgör & Smits, 2008; İlkkaracan et al., 2015). In this respect, it is understandable why working women were seen as a coherent unit in this study. However, this finding might also be associated with the sample characteristics. A great majority of the participants were female university students. Since they will be striving to enter professional life as women in the future, they might have reflected their desire for female solidarity for their collective economic and political interests into their answers and thereby viewed working women as an entitative body.

The remaining social categories examined in this study are in mutual opposition to one another in ethnic, religious, and political terms (Çelik et al., 2017). Highly salient intergroup contrast between the categories might account for the inflated entitativity perceptions about the target categories (Turner & Reynolds, 2012). Besides, particular group

characteristics are also influential in determining the perceived unity of the social categories. For example, participants associated the political party supporters with high levels of collective agency, the importance of the group, group homogeneity (in terms of their political views and typical attributes), interaction among group members, and common fate. Even though political parties are viewed as relatively easy to enter and exit (Lickel et al., 2000), the present findings suggest that political party memberships (or preferences) might be somehow stable in Turkey. It was seen as difficult for the AKP and CHP supporters to change their political views due to the value, ingroup, and practical constraints. This result might be because the current AKP-CHP tension corresponds to a never-ending Islamist-laicist polarization in Turkey (Aydın et al., 2021). According to a recent poll (KONDA, 2019), while conservatives in Turkey saw CHP supporters as the most distant group to themselves and said that they would never vote for the CHP, seculars manifested the highest levels of social distance towards AKP supporters and also said that they would never vote for the AKP. Besides, as mentioned above, the present study was held following the March 2019 mayoral elections. The supremacy of the CHP candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, over the AKP candidate, Binali Yıldırım in İstanbul was evident in the early electoral outcomes. However, in response to the AKP's objection to this result, the Supreme Electoral Council (*Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*) decreed that the March 2019 Istanbul mayoral elections were void and rerun on June 23, 2019. In interpreting the adverse sociopolitical effects of this election, Taşkın (2021) stated that Turkish politics has turned into a zero-sum game in that one's defeat means the other side's gain. In this respect, the heated political climate during which the present study was held might have also been influential on how participants perceived the politics-related social categories.

Alevis and Sunnis can be said to be perceived similarly in terms of their structural properties. Participants specified these two contrasting groups with comparable levels of homogeneity (in religious terms), the importance of the group, historical continuity, collective agency, and membership impermeability (concerning biological, value, and ingroup constraints). However, due to their minority status, Alevis were perceived as more tightly-knit and characterized by greater common outcomes than Sunnis. In addition, openness to intergroup contact also emerged as another determinant of the entitativity of Alevis. Even though Sunnis were seen as more of a religious group, it is clear that Alevis were perceived as homogeneous concerning their religious beliefs as well as their traditions and cultural values. This finding can be explained regarding that Alevis have turned into an

ethnoreligious community throughout their historical journey (Arakelova, 2010; Aydın, 2018). Even when Alevis have migrated from rural to urban areas or other countries in the near past, they put adaptive efforts in upholding Alevism in their new locations and protecting boundaries between them and others. These efforts have played a critical role for their group cohesion through "a 'convincing' sense that tradition, as a cultural acknowledgment, still maintains its existence" (Aydın, 2018, p. 12).

When it comes to ethnic categories, this study showed that Kurds and Turks are perceived as coherent entities regarding the entitativity components of the shared ancestry, history, (real or imagined) land, language, culture, fate, and collective aims and efforts, and intragroup solidarity. These elements correspond to the critical constituents in defining an ethnic group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996) and prove ethnicities' distinct and authentic cultural identity. In addition, approximately one-third of the participants in evaluating the entitativity of Kurds also underlined that Kurds are a separate entity since they draw borders regarding others in demanding an independent Kurdish state within Turkey or in maintaining their own unique culture or language. When an aggregate of individuals is perceived as categorizing themselves as a separate unit or drawing boundaries between themselves and others, they are likely to be viewed as a group by third parties (Brown & Pehrson, 2020; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Also, Kurds' perceived demand for an independent state or minority rights (e.g., Kurdish language rights) stir up strong feelings of fear among ethnic Turks in that the social cohesion of the Turkish state will be undermined, and the country will be divided into ethnic lines (Çelebi et al., 2016; Kentel et al., 2007; SETA, 2009). To the extent Turks believe that Kurds in Turkey do not endorse national unity, they were found to lend less support for Kurdish linguistic rights (Çelebi et al., 2016). In consideration of the fact that separatist efforts perceived from the members of minority members might have important intergroup implications (especially in the cases of intractable conflicts), items directly measuring the perceived salience of self-categorization attempts or boundary-making efforts might be developed for future entitativity scales.

This exploratory study on the entitativity of social categories has several caveats. Given that identities come into existence within a shared cultural context and people thereby develop common social representations about social categories (Deaux et al., 1995), the differences between the ingroup and outgroup perspectives were not considered in questioning the entitativity of social categories in the present study. Yet, different entitativity cues might play a differential role in perceiving ingroups and outgroups as coherent bodies.

For example, Lickel et al. (2000) showed that the importance of the group to its members was more critical to ingroup entitativity than outgroup entitativity. In contrast, interaction among group members was more impactful on outgroup entitativity than ingroup entitativity. The currently identified qualitative categories, subcategories, and their frequencies concerning the target social categories might change depending on participants' taking an ingroup or outgroup perspective. Consequently, replicating the present study in comparing the entitativity of social categories from the ingroup and outgroup perspectives may yield a more detailed picture of the qualitative questions at hand. In addition, some open-ended questions in the current qualitative survey might have pushed participants to respond in a particular manner due to the framing of the questions. For example, the question "How strongly do you think the members of Category A are connected?" might be hiding the assumption that members of a target category were somehow tied to each other. A better alternative would have included the phrase "strongly or weakly" instead of only "strongly" in the question stem.

In the qualitative study tradition, dependability is data stability across time and in different settings (Elo et al., 2014). The participant characteristics were described in detail for the present study. According to their demographics, the current sample was composed of somewhat religious individuals, even though they appear to be somewhat ideologically neutral. As religiosity was impactful on intergroup attitudes in Turkey (Bilali et al., 2018), one can suspect that the present findings are biased towards the views of religious people in Turkey. In checking the dependability of this data, further studies can employ purposive sampling techniques instead of a convenience sampling method. However, as the categorization and abstraction phases of the data analysis was somehow manageable and the qualitative categories identified in this dataset reflect almost of all of the entitativity components from the literature and add novel elements to this list, the present dataset can be said to be saturated enough in addressing the entitativity of social categories. In this respect, the current data also seems to eliminate the disadvantages of using a survey method instead of an interview technique.

As can be understood with a detailed examination of the emergent qualitative categories and their subcategories, it isn't easy to differentiate various entitativity cues from one other. For example, the qualities that turn a social collective into an agentic unit (i.e., shared goals) are closely associated with the group's collective continuity. Likewise, the common goal status of a given group might lead its members to experience a common fate

in the time being or might provide them with solid ingroup ties. Group members might also develop strong ingroup ties as they experience common outcomes in social life (e.g., oppression or marginalization). Although there are theoretically distinct cues to entitativity, it might be practically impossible to separate those components from one other, and they might influence entitativity perceptions cumulatively. In this vein, one can underline the importance of future empirical studies in addressing the factorial structure of entitativity (Zyphur & Islam, 2006).

We can also mention the uncertainties about defining the scope of specific entitativity cues. For example, common fate was described as "co-variability in time and other variable parameters such as activity level, temperature, reflected light, morale, hedonic tone, nutritional status, etc." by Campbell (1958, p. 19). In contrast, others associated common fate with the collective agency of group members (Rothbart & Park, 2004) or with the shared outcomes that befall group members (e.g., Bornstein, 1992; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Such discrepancies might cast doubt on the validity of previous studies; if different researchers develop their own operational definitions of the cue properties, it is hard to reach a conclusive picture of the impact of entitativity on various group processes. This point also underscores the value of adopting clearly defined measurement approaches in empirically questioning entitativity and its intergroup implications.

3. STUDY 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ENTITATIVITY SCALE AND AN INQUIRY ABOUT THE ROLE OF INGROUP AND OUTGROUP ENTITATIVITY IN SHAPING INTERETHNIC AND INTERSECTARIAN RELATIONS

3.1. A Summary of the Study Objectives and Hypotheses

The purpose of Study 2 was four-fold: (a) to come up with a reliable and valid entitativity measure in evaluating the entitativity of ethnic (or ethnoreligious) groups, (b) to examine the impact of different entitativity dimensions in predicting intergroup attitudes (c) to test the mediatory role of ingroup identification in the association between ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias, and (d) to test the mediatory role of outgroup entitativity in the link between ingroup identification and intergroup bias.

Drawing upon the emergent themes about the concept entitativity in Study 1, I aimed to offer a novel entitativity scale in this study. There are two basic approaches to item development during the scale development process (Hinkin, 1998): (a) developing items regarding the theoretical definition of the construct under examination, namely *deductive approach*, and (b) generating items based on qualitative exploratory studies in asking participants open-ended questions about the construct domain, namely *inductive approach*. While the former approach requires a thorough literature review to develop a working definition of the construct, the latter requires a thoughtful content analysis in interpreting the explanations provided by participants (Hinkin, 1998). Since entitativity is a highly abstract concept comprising many theoretically divergent constituents (Zyphur & Islam, 2006), I preferred to adopt deductive and inductive approaches during the item generation process. Accordingly, the findings of Study 1 were used to specify the content domain of entitativity inductively. The entitativity-related theoretical discussions, the commonly-used entitativity scales in the literature, and other related scales were also extensively examined to expand the current scale deductively. The psychometric characteristics of the newly-developed entitativity scale were examined in questioning the extent to which Kurds and Alevis are perceived as entitative units in Turkey. In other words, the entitativity of Kurds and Alevis

was examined with the help of this scale. The scale was expected to yield a common factorial structure for both groups (*H1*).

Another aim of Study 2 was to question the effect of entitativity on intergroup relations. Intergroup relations between Kurds and non-Kurds and Alevis and Sunnis in Turkey were chosen as the focus of interest. To what extent the two minority groups were seen as coherent units from the ingroup and outgroup perspectives was tested; both Kurds and non-Kurds evaluated the entitativity of Kurds, and both Alevis and Sunnis evaluated the entitativity of Alevis. The intergroup attitudes of opposing groups about one other were examined as the outcome variable. Both ingroup and outgroup entitativity were expected to predict negative intergroup attitudes (*H2*) positively. The link between ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias was hypothesized to be mediated through ingroup identification (*H3*). Lastly, the connection between ingroup identification and negative intergroup attitudes was postulated to be mediated through outgroup entitativity (*H4*).

3.2. Method

3.2.1. Participants

One of the primary goals of Study 2 was to compare the entitativity of Kurds and Alevis from the perspectives of ingroup and outgroup members. Accordingly, comparable numbers of Kurdish and non-Kurdish participants in assessing the entitativity of Kurds and similar numbers of Alevis and Sunnis in determining that of Alevis were recruited.

3.2.1.1. Characteristics of Participants Evaluating the Entitativity of Kurds

A total of 474 participants evaluated the entitativity of Kurds. Nine of them could not be classified as Kurd or non-Kurd since they either reported dual identities or preferred not to define themselves in ethnic terms. As a result, they were removed from the analysis set. Four Kurdish participants and one non-Kurdish participant were also excluded from the dataset due to their very young ages or unchanging response patterns.

There were 103 males and 127 females in the Kurdish participant set. Approximately 85% of them (n = 201) reported knowing the Kurdish language. A great majority of the Kurdish participants participated in the study from the Eastern, Southeastern, and Central

Anatolia regions. There were 165 females and 65 males in the non-Kurdish participant set. Of them, 186 reported their ethnic origin as Turk, 17 as Zaza, six as Circassian, five as Arab, and four as Turkmen. The remaining 3.75% were ethnically Tatar, Georgian, Persian, Chepni, Bulgarian, or Armenian. Nearly 11 percent of them (n = 26) also reported knowing the Kurdish language. They participated in the study mainly from the Central Anatolia, Marmara, and Aegean regions. Seventy-three percent of them (n = 168) declared that they had ever lived in an area or a neighborhood where non-Kurds live together with Kurds. In addition, the current non-Kurdish sample had a moderate degree of daily contact with Kurds (M = 3.18, SD = 1.33) on a scale ranging from 1 (*not know any Kurd personally*) to 6 (*excessive contact with Kurds*).

The demographic characteristics of the Kurdish and non-Kurdish participant sets can be seen in Table 3.1. There were no differences between the two groups regarding their mean age (t(458) = .70, p = .49), general health status (t(458) = -.40, p = .69), and life satisfaction (t(458) = -1.69, p = .09). However, concerning educational status, Kurds (M = 5.02, SD = 1.35) had a higher educational degree than non-Kurds (M = 4.77, SD = 1.34) on a scale ranging between 1 = *primary school graduate* and 7 = *postgraduate degree* (t(458) = 1.98, p < .05). Yet, household monthly income per person for Kurds was lower than that for non-Kurds in the current sample, t(401.42) = -4.60, p < .001. The perceived socioeconomic status of Kurds was also lower than that of non-Kurds (t(458) = -3.73, p < .001. Even though the two groups did not differ from one other regarding the centrality of religion to their lives (t(458) = -.90, p = 37), ideologically speaking, Kurds were more leftist than non-Kurds (t(458) = -4.31, p < .001). The most frequently-selected identities by Kurds were “human being,” “Muslim,” and “world citizen.” The non-Kurdish participants preferred to define themselves by mostly using the labels “Muslim,” “human being,” “Turkish citizen,” and “world citizen.”

Table 3.1. Demographic characteristics of the Kurdish and non-Kurdish participa

	The Kurdish participants (*n* = 230)	**The non-Kurdish participants (*n* = 230)**
Sex	127 F + 103 M	165 F + 65 M
Age range	18–68	17–60
Mean age (*SD*)	27.29 (7.41)	26.77 (8.45)
Educational status		
Primary school graduate	3 (1.3%)	3 (1.3%)
Secondary school graduate	6 (2.6%)	5 (2.2%)
High school graduate	18 (7.8%)	21 (9.1%)
University student	66 (28.7%)	97 (42.2%)
College degree	21 (9.1%)	7 (3%)
Graduate degree	95 (41.3%)	80 (34.8%)
Postgraduate degree	21 (9.1%)	17 (7.4%)
Mean educational degree (*SD*)	5.02 (1.35)	4.77 (1.34)
Marital status	176 single (76.5%)	167 single (72.6%)
Work status	103 working (44.8%)	77 working (33.5%)
Range of household size	1–19 people	1–14 people
Household size – Mean (*SD*)	5.23 people (2.38)	4.11 people (1.72)
Household income – Mean (*SD*)	5626.52 TL (3814.06)	6892.61 TL (4378.63)
Household monthly income per person – Mean (*SD*)	1395.55 TL (1264.10)	2082.01 TL (1875.93)
Perceived socioeconomic status on a 10-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	4.44 (1.72)	5.03 (1.63)
The geographical region mostly lived in		
Marmara Region	22 (9.6%)	28 (12.2%)
Aegean Region	8 (3.5%)	26 (11.3%)
Mediterranean Region	13 (5.7%)	17 (7.4%)
Central Anatolia Region	33 (14.3%)	110 (47.8%)
Black Sea Region	2 (0.9%)	10 (4.3%)
Eastern Anatolia Region	73 (31.7%)	22 (9.6%)
Southeastern Anatolia Region	79 (34.3%)	17 (7.4%)
General health status on a 7-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	5.23 (1.42)	5.29 (1.35)
General life satisfaction on a 7-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	4.00 (1.81)	4.28 (1.66)
Ideological orientation on a 10-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	4.54 (2.29)	5.44 (2.17)
Centrality of religion on a 10-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	6.92 (3.14)	7.18 (2.99)

Notes. For the sex variable, F stands for females and M for males. *SD* = Standard deviation.

3.2.1.2. Characteristics of Participants Evaluating the Entitativity of Alevis

A total of 233 Alevi and 233 Sunnis were reached. Three Alevi participants were removed from the analysis set since one of them was 15 years old, one noted that he did not define himself as an Alevi in one of the open-ended questions in the battery, and one participant did not react to the Alevi identification scale. Three Sunni participants were also excluded from the dataset due to their fixed response pattern to different items.

There were 143 female and 85 male Alevi participants and 175 female and 53 male Sunni participants in the primary analysis set. Two participants in both participants set preferred not to report their sex. A great majority of the participants participated in the study from the Central Anatolia, Marmara, Mediterranean, and Eastern Anatolia regions. Mainly speaking, the current Alevi-Sunni samples were the residents of cosmopolitan cities like İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir. Nearly 58% of the Sunni participants (n = 133) reported that they had ever lived in a region or a neighborhood where Sunnis live together with Alevis. However, they seemed to have limited daily contact with Alevis (M = 2.60, SD = 1.32) on a scale ranging from 1 (*not know any Alevi personally*) to 6 (*excessive contact with Alevis*).

The demographic characteristics of the Alevi and Sunni participant sets can be seen in Table 3.2. Alevis were older than Sunnis in the current sample, $t(458) = 2.15$, $p < .05$). Sunnis had higher educational degree than Alevis on a 7-point scale, $t(458) = -3.07$, $p < .01$. Even though the two groups did not differ from one another in terms of the mean household monthly income per person ($t(458) = -.61$, $p = .54$), Alevis subjectively perceived their socioeconomic status to be lower than Sunnis ($t(458) = -2.21$, $p < .05$). Religion was less central to everyday life for Alevis than Sunnis ($t(458) = -9.97$, $p < .001$), and they were ideologically more leftist than Sunnis ($t(458) = -11.83$, $p < .001$). There was no statistically significant difference between the two groups in terms of their perceived health status ($t(458) = -.26$, $p = .80$) and general life satisfaction ($t(458) = -1.76$, $p = .08$). The most commonly-selected identity labels by the members of the two groups were similar; they were “human being,” “Turkish citizen,” “Turk,” “world citizen,” and “Muslim.”

Table 3.2. Demographic characteristics of the Alevi and Sunni participants

	The Alevi participants (*n* = 230)	**The Sunni participants (*n* = 230)**
Sex	143 F + 85 M	175 F + 53 M
Age range	18–61	17–68
Mean age (*SD*)	29.97 (9.93)	28.03 (9.44)
Educational status		
Primary school graduate	2 (0.9%)	1 (0.4%)
Secondary school graduate	7 (3.0%)	3(1.3%)
High school graduate	29 (12.6%)	10 (4.3%)
University student	64 (27.8%)	82 (35.7%)
College degree	18 (7.8%)	3 (1.3%)
Graduate degree	91 (39.6%)	78 (33.9%)
Postgraduate degree	19 (8.3%)	53 (23.0%)
Mean educational degree (*SD*)	4.90 (1.39)	5.30 (1.38)
Marital status	152 single (66.1%)	156 single (67.8%)
Work status	116 working (50.4%)	101 working (43.9%)
Range of household size	1–8 people	1–9 people
Household size – Mean (*SD*)	3.69 people (1.23)	3.87 people (1.33)
Household income – Mean (*SD*)	7130.57 TL (4117.71)	7905.68 TL (5485.05)
Household monthly income per person – Mean (*SD*)	2255.92 TL (1771.91)	2358.07 TL (1814.45)
Perceived socioeconomic status on a 10-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	4.86 (1.61)	5.20 (1.65)
The geographical region mostly lived in		
Marmara Region	56 (24.3%)	58 (25.2%)
Aegean Region	22 (9.6%)	25 (10.9%)
Mediterranean Region	27 (11.7%)	27 (11.7%)
Central Anatolia Region	84 (36.5%)	68 (29.6%)
Black Sea Region	12 (5.2%)	20 (8.7%)
Eastern Anatolia Region	26 (11.3%)	25 (10.9%)
Southeastern Anatolia Region	3 (1.3%)	7 (3.0%)
General health status on a 7-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	5.37 (1.32)	5.40 (1.23)
General life satisfaction on a 7-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	4.26 (1.56)	4.52 (1.56)
Ideological orientation on a 10-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	3.10 (1.98)	5.36 (2.12)
Centrality of religion on a 10-point scale – Mean (*SD*)	4.23 (2.86)	6.92 (2.91)

Notes. For the sex variable, F stands for females and M for males. *SD* = Standard deviation.

3.2.2. Instruments

3.2.2.1. Item Generation for the Entitativity Scale

The current entitativity scale was developed based on the qualitative themes about the entitativity of social categories in Study 1. Three to six items were written for each theme. There were 47 items representing the qualitative categories of group homogeneity (3 items; e.g., "Kurds have many common features."), boundary-making efforts (4 items; e.g., "Kurds often refer to themselves as we."), intergroup differentiation (6 items; e.g., "Kurds and non-Kurds differ in many ways."), importance of membership (3 items; e.g., "Being Kurdish is important for Kurds."), collective continuity (5 items; "Kurds pass on their common values and beliefs from generation to generation."), ingroup ties (5 items; e.g., "Kurds generally share in each other's sorrows and joys."), collective agency (5 items; e.g., "Kurds raise their voice together for the solution of their problems."), common fate (5 items; e.g., "Kurds experience common outcomes just because they are Kurds."), nature of intergroup relations (5 items; e.g., "Kurds are a closed community."), membership permeability (3 items; e.g., "An individual born as a Kurd is a Kurd until the end of his/her life."), and the ascription of groupness by third parties (3 items; e.g., "Non-Kurds generally see Kurds as a separate group."). The Kurds- and Alevis-related items were the same except for "Kurds" and "Alevis" in the items.

The items were primarily written by utilizing the sentences or phrases that participants commonly used in Study 1. In addition, the scales that have been used to measure the same construct domains in the literature (e.g., "Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale" by Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; "Perceived Collective Continuity Scale" by Sani et al., 2007) were also scanned to expand the item pool further. Three social psychologists from the field of intergroup relations in Turkey were also reached in revising items and checking their appropriateness for the research purposes. In this process of the content adequacy assessment, the items that were thought not to exemplify the conceptual realm of the construct sufficiently were revised or deleted (Hinkin, 1998). To warrant that the language used is familiar to target participants (Hinkin, 1998), an expert on Turkish language and literature also controlled the items linguistically at the final step. The ultimate version of the item pool in Turkish and English is included in Appendix E. Participants reacted to the items in a standard order by using 5-point Likert scales, ranging between *I certainly disagree* (1)

and *I certainly agree* (5) with a neutral midpoint (*neither agree nor disagree*). This type of 5-point Likert scaling is suggested mainly for the newly-developed scales (Hinkin, 1998; Likert, 1932). The three reverse items were recoded before the analysis; higher scores indicated greater perceived entitativity.

3.2.2.2. Generic Measures of Entitativity: Verbal and Pictorial Items

Two verbal items were written to evaluate the entitativity of Kurds and Alevis in general terms: (1) "Kurds/ Alevis represent a coherent "whole" or "unity" within itself." and (2) "Kurds/ Alevis are a group." Those items were also rated through 5-point Likert scales (1 = *I certainly disagree*; 5 = *I certainly agree*). According to the findings of Study 1, the term "group" in the second item might be interpreted negatively by some participants. Consequently, the links of these two generic measures of entitativity to the currently-developed entitativity scale were examined separately.

Two additional pictorial measures of entitativity were also developed. The first pictorial measure was used to evaluate perceived unity in the target categories. Taken from Rutchick et al. (2008), this graphical measure included six sets of five circles that differed in the degree of closeness of those circles amongst themselves. Five circles were presented as detached from each other at the one end of this 6-point unity scale, and they became united or "one" at the other end of the continuum. Participants were asked which of those pictorial representations depicted Kurds or Alevis the best. Higher scores on this measure were associated with greater entitativity. This graphical item is a valid entitativity measure since it was sensitive to the experimental manipulations of intragroup similarity, coordination, and interdependency (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998).

The second pictorial measure was used to evaluate the perceived differentiation of the target category members from outgroups. It was developed by adapting the Inclusion of Other in the Self scale by Aron et al. (1992) for the research purpose. Even though the original scale was a 7-point measure, it was designed as a 6-point measure for the present study. Participants evaluating the entitativity of Kurds were given six pairs of circles, each of which was said to represent Kurds vs. non-Kurds, and participants who took the Alevis-related measures were given the same six pairs of circles, each of which was said to represent Alevis vs. non-Alevis. The amount of overlap between two circles in each pair changed between no overlap (i.e., a complete differentiation) and almost complete overlap (i.e., a lack

of differentiation). This item was reverse-scored so that higher scores showed greater perceived distinctiveness of Kurds and Alevis in society. A similar set of graphical representations has also been used by Cikara et al. (2014) to manipulate the entitativity of two competitive groups. Both verbal and pictorial generic entitativity measures (see Appendix F) were utilized in assessing the convergent validity of the newly-developed entitativity scale. These generic measures were expected to correlate with various entitativity dimensions.

3.2.2.3. Ingroup Identification Scale

After participants reacted to the above-covered entitativity measures, they were asked to indicate their group belonging. Participants who evaluated the entitativity of Kurds were given the question, "There may be people from different ethnic backgrounds in your family (e.g., your parents or spouse). Which of the following ethnic groups would you describe yourself as a member of?". They were asked to select one of the given ethnic categories (i.e., Arab, Circassian, Armenian, Georgian, Kurd, Laz, Tatar, Turk, Turkmen, and others). Participants who evaluated the entitativity of Alevis were given the question, "When you consider the family you were born into or your upbringing traditions, which of the following options is more suitable for you?" and were requested to select one of the two religious categories: Alevi or Sunni.

The Kurdish and non-Kurdish participants were asked to evaluate the degree of identification with their ethnic groups. The Alevi and Sunni participants were asked to assess the degree of identification with their religious belief groups. The 4-item satisfaction component of the Multicomponent Ingroup Identification Scale (Leach et al., 2008) was employed in measuring participants' social identification levels. Participants reacted to the questions (e.g., "It is pleasant to be a member of my ethnic/ religious group.") on 5-point Likert scales ranging between *I certainly disagree* (1) and *I certainly agree* (5). An average score on these four items was computed for each respondent. Higher scores indicated greater ingroup identification. The scale's internal consistency was .90 for Kurds, .94 for non-Kurds, .93 for Alevis, and .83 for Sunnis. This scale can be found in Appendix G.

3.2.2.4. Affective Intergroup Bias Scale

Six semantic differential items assessing liking for ingroup and outgroup members (Voci & Hewstone, 2003; Wright et al., 1997) were used to measure intergroup bias. Participants were given 7-point scales ranging from 1 to 7 (1 = *negative, cold, hostile, distant, dislike, and mistrust* to 7 = *positive, hot, friendly, close, like, and trust*), and they were asked to express their feelings towards their ingroup and outgroup members, respectively. In assessing the ingroup-related feelings, the Kurdish and non-Kurdish participants were asked to report their feelings towards the members of their ethnicities. In determining the outgroup-related feelings, the non-Kurdish participants were asked about their feelings towards Kurds, and the Kurdish participants were asked about their feelings towards ethnic Turks. The Alevi and Sunni participants were asked about their feelings towards the members of their religious belief groups (ingroup) and towards one another (outgroup).

Based on the liking ratings for ingroup and outgroup members, the affective ingroup bias score was calculated by subtracting outgroup liking scores from ingroup liking scores for each evaluative dimension and averaging them together. Higher scores on this measure indicated a greater liking for ingroup (vs. outgroup) members. This calculation method was also used in the past studies testing hypotheses on intergroup bias and prejudices (e.g., Abrams et al., 2006; Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Guimond et al., 2003; Keller, 2005; Levin et al., 2002). The difference between ingroup and outgroup ratings was a more sensitive measure of intergroup bias than the outgroup-related ratings alone (Guimond et al., 2003). The Cronbach's alpha for this measure was .96 for Kurds, .94 for non-Kurds, .93 for Alevis, and .94 for Sunnis. The related scale is included in Appendix H.

3.2.2.5. Social Distance Scale

An adapted version of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale (1967) was used to measure the extent to which members of different groups were socially distant towards outgroup members. Participants were asked to evaluate the degree to which they would feel uncomfortable interacting with the target outgroup members in six different contexts, including marriage, close friendship, neighborly relations, and workplace interaction. Participants reacted to the questions with 5-point Likert scales ranging from *I would not feel uncomfortable at all* (1) to *I would feel highly uncomfortable* (5). Higher scores indicated

greater social distance towards outgroup members. The Kurdish participants reported their social distance towards Turks, the non-Kurdish participants towards Kurds, the Alevi participants towards Sunnis, and the Sunni participants towards Alevis. The scale's internal consistency was .85 for Kurds, .91 for non-Kurds, .87 for Alevis, and .88 for Sunnis. This scale is included in Appendix I.

3.2.2.6. Demographics Form

Participants were given a detailed personal background form comprising of questions on age, sex, education level, work status, household size, total monthly earning in the household, perceived socioeconomic status, health status, life satisfaction, currently lived city, the longest-lived geographical region, self-definitions, ideological orientation, and the centrality of religion to everyday life. Additionally, the Sunni (non-Kurdish) participants were asked whether they had ever lived in a region or neighborhood where Sunnis (non-Kurds) live together with Alevis (Kurds) and the degree to which they had daily contact with Alevis (Kurds). Besides, the participants evaluating the entitativity of Kurds were also asked whether they knew the Kurdish language. The demographics form is included in Appendix C.2.

3.2.3. Procedure

After institutional ethical approval of the study was obtained from the AYBU Ethics Committee, the data was collected online between July 1 and September 21, 2020, during the post-pandemic normalization process in Turkey. Two separate study links were prepared; one for the Kurds-related study and the other for the Alevis-related study. Both online surveys comprised the same question sets except that one was designed to evaluate the entitativity of Kurds and its implications, and the other was intended to question the entitativity of Alevis and its impacts. Participants provided their informed consent (Appendix A.2) at the beginning of the study. They were debriefed at the end of the survey with a written explanation attached to the study link, and their further questions were answered via email. No incentive was offered to the participants.

A data collection team with 9 AYBU psychology students living in various cities of Turkey was formed to disseminate the study links to the target populations in their networks and social media (WhatsApp, Facebook, etc.). The members of the AYBU Psychology

Department, Social Cognition Laboratory, were also contacted for the same purpose. Since the two study links included highly similar item sets, the assistant students were warned not to send the two links to the same participants. Some research assistants and professors were also requested to share one of the study links with their students in their universities, including AYBU, Selçuk University, Bakırçay University, Akdeniz University, Doğuş University, etc. In addition, especially in reaching the Alevi population in Turkey, the researcher herself contacted particular cemevis, Alevi associations, and academicians who had Alevis-related scientific works. Through their help as well, the related study link was distributed to larger Alevi circles.

The scales were given to the participants in a standard order. The survey started with the entitativity scale and generic entitativity measures. After participants indicated their ethnic or religious belonging, they reacted to the ingroup identification scale. Next, they were given the affective bias and social distance scales. The study concluded with the demographics form. It took approximately 15 minutes for participants to complete the online survey.

3.2.4. Statistical Analysis Plan

Firstly, the newly-offered entitativity scale was factor analyzed. The internal consistency values of the emergent sub-factors and the total scale were calculated. Its validity was checked by examining the correlations of the scale scores with the generic entitativity measures. During these analyses, the Kurds-related entitativity items were factor analyzed by merging the datasets of the Kurdish and non-Kurdish participants. A similar merging procedure was also applied for the datasets of Alevis and Sunnis in factor analyzing the Alevis-related entitativity items. Since an equivalent factorial structure for the Kurds- and Alevis-related items was expected to be observed (*H1*), the two scales were concurrently factor analyzed, and the statistical plausibility of a common factorial structure was questioned. Secondly, as the descriptive statistics procedures, group comparisons on the main study variables across ethnic and religious divides were made, and intercorrelations among the variables were examined in four datasets (i.e., Kurds, non-Kurds, Alevis, and Sunnis). Thirdly, the roles of ingroup and outgroup entitativity in predicting intergroup attitudes (*H2*) were tested through a series of multiple regression analyses. The impact of

entitativity was questioned at the factorial level; different entitativity factors were simultaneously entered into the models as the predictor variables.

Fourthly, in line with *H3* and *H4*, the two mediation models were tested through the PROCESS macro with Model 4 (Hayes, 2009, 2018; Hayes & Preacher, 2014). In the ingroup entitativity model, ingroup identification was proposed to mediate the link between ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias (*H3*). Since it was concerned with the implications of ingroup entitativity, this model was tested separately on the datasets of the Kurdish and Alevi participants. The PROCESS macro is commonly used in questioning the indirect impact of a single antecedent variable on a single outcome via single or multiple mediatory mechanisms. However, it can also be employed to examine whether "several causal agents (X variables) simultaneously transmit their effects on the same outcome through the same mediator(s)" (Hayes, 2018, p. 141). Because different entitativity dimensions were treated as the multiple predictor variables in the ingroup entitativity model, the related statistical procedures were applied in generating the indirect effects in PROCESS for all entitativity dimensions (for further statistical details, see Hayes, 2018, p. 144; Hayes & Preacher, 2014). In the outgroup entitativity model, outgroup entitativity was hypothesized to mediate the link between ingroup identification and intergroup bias (*H4*). As it relates to the implications of outgroup entitativity, this model was tested separately on the datasets of the non-Kurd and Sunni participants. All of the analyses mentioned above were run through IBM SPSS Statistics 20.

3.3. Results

3.3.1. Factor Analysis on the Entitativity Scale

Before the exploratory factor analysis, an item analysis was held to eliminate items that demonstrated lower than .30 corrected item-total correlations with the remaining items in the item pool (Kim & Mueller, 1978; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). There were eight such items in both the Kurds- and Alevis-related datasets. Seven of them were the same in the two datasets; only those common items were deleted from the analysis. This stage ensures that all the items to be factor-analyzed belong to a common domain (Hinkin, 1998). Since the factor analyses were conducted on the remaining 40 items using the two samples of 460 participants, the participant-to-item ratio was 11.5: 1 in both datasets. This ratio exceeded a

minimum acceptable percentage of 5-10 participants per item for exploratory factor analysis (Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987).

The correlation matrices were analyzed, and the factorability of them was checked in both datasets. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sampling adequacy test yielded a value of .93 in the Kurds-related dataset and that of .92 in the Alevis-related dataset. Those values were well-above a minimum KMO value of .60 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2019) and thereby justified a factor analysis in demonstrating that the 40 items were sufficiently intercorrelated. Additionally, Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ($p < .0001$) in both datasets, indicating that the correlation matrices were not random.

Since a latent factor structure was aimed to be reached in this analysis, a common factoring method was preferred instead of the principal-components method of analysis (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Hinkin, 1998). The principal axis factoring was selected as the factor extraction method as it is tolerant to non-normality and can improve weak factors (Guttman, 1956). Many of the constructs in social sciences are expected to correlate with each other (Russell, 2002); an oblique rotation (i.e., Promax) was employed accordingly.

Multiple criteria were used in determining the number of factors to be retained. Among them, the criteria of eigenvalues greater than 1.00, the visual scree test (Kaiser, 1958), parallel analysis (Horn, 1965), and Velicer's minimum average partial (MAP) test (Velicer, 1976) were concurrently considered. Besides, parsimony and interpretability (i.e., theoretical convergence) were also taken into consideration. Nine factors in the Kurds-related dataset and eight in the Alevis-related dataset met Kaiser's retention rule of eigenvalues greater than 1. For the Kurds-related entitativity scale, the scree test offered a structure for 3 to 8 factors, the MAP test for three factors, and the parallel test for four factors. For the Alevis-related entitativity scale, the scree test suggested 4 to 7 factors, and both the parallel analysis and the MAP test offered a five-factor solution. The two datasets were reanalyzed, specifying a seven- to a three-factor solution. Among them, a four-factor solution was chosen over other solutions in both datasets since it yielded factors that included a minimum of 3 items (Comrey, 1988) with factor loadings of .40 or above (Floyd & Widaman, 1995), and it demonstrated more robust pattern coefficients and fewer cross-loadings than other solutions. The items with loadings less than .40 on the intended factor or cross-loadings greater than .15 (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006) were omitted.

These retention rules were concurrently applied in both datasets; the results showed that almost the same items loaded onto the same factors in the Alevis- and Kurds-related entitativity scales. The target category was the Alevis on one scale and the Kurds on the other scale. Yet, in support of *H1*, this finding could be indicating the presence of a common factorial structure for both social categories. I decided to retain the commonly loaded items onto the same factors in both datasets at the final step. The final four-factorial solutions for Kurds and Alevis-related entitativity scales can be found in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, respectively. These procedures resulted in a 26-item instrument, which accounted for approximately 50% of the variance in the Kurds-related entitativity items and %51 of the variance in the Alevis-related items. The subscale scores were computed by summing all items in each subscale and dividing them by the number of items. The average of all items was taken in obtaining the total entitativity scores.

Table 3. 3. Pattern coefficients on the Kurds-related entitativity items

	Factors				
Items	**Interdependency**	**Boundary-Making**	**Common Fate**	**Essentialism**	h^2
27. Kürtler genellikle birbirlerini koruyup kollar.	**.80**	.08	-.20	-.08	.56
19. Aralarında ayrılıklar olsa da, Kürtler kendileri için önemli konularda ortak hareket eder.	**.77**	.07	-.10	-.04	.57
5. Aralarında anlaşmazlıklar olsa da, zor zamanlarında tüm Kürtler birbirlerine destek olur.	**.76**	-.01	-.12	-.07	.48
16. Kürtler genelde birbirlerinin üzüntü ve sevinçlerine ortak olur.	**.72**	-.15	.04	.02	.47
8. Kürtler yaşadıkları sorunların çözümü için seslerini birlikte duyurur.	**.60**	-.02	-.09	.12	.37
41. Sahip oldukları değerler Kürtleri bir arada tutar.	**.59**	.03	.21	-.07	.47
30. Kürtler gerektiğinde birlikte hareket ederek toplumsal bir etki uyandırabilir.	**.56**	-.02	.18	-.09	.38
9. Kürtler ortak değerlerini ve inançlarını nesilden nesle aktarır.	**.56**	-.10	.02	.28	.46
43. Kürtler, üzerinde birlikte çaba sarf ettikleri ortak amaçlara sahiptir.	**.52**	.21	.08	.01	.46
6. Kürtler pek çok ortak özelliğe sahiptir.	**.44**	.02	.09	.19	.36
44. Kürtler sahip oldukları gelenek ve görenekleri geçmişten bugüne korumuştur.	**.42**	-.02	.18	.12	.33
34. Kürtler kendilerini "biz", diğerlerini ise "onlar" olarak görür.	-.05	**.74**	-.06	.01	.51
1. Kürtler genelde kendilerinden "biz" diye bahseder.	.03	**.65**	.05	-.03	.45
12. Kürtler kendilerini toplumun geri kalanından ayrı bir grup olarak görür.	-.20	**.63**	-.02	.21	.45
33. Kürtler kendilerini tanımlarken genelde Kürt kökenlerini ön plana çıkartır.	.20	**.60**	-.04	-.06	.44
42. Kürtler genellikle Kürtlerin çoğunlukta olduğu yerlerde ikamet etmeyi tercih eder.	-.01	**.56**	.18	-.12	.35
7. Kürtler genelde kendileriyle aynı kökenden insanlarla evlenmek ister.	.14	**.47**	.04	.03	.33

(*Table 3.3 continued*)

Items	Factors				h^2
	Interdependency	**Boundary-Making**	**Common Fate**	**Essentialism**	
21. Kürt olmayanlar genelde Kürtleri ayrı bir grup olarak görür.	-.09	.01	**.66**	-.02	.40
32. Kürt olmayanlar konuşurken genelde Kürtlerden ayrı bir grup olarak bahseder.	-.06	.06	**.66**	-.00	.43
25. Kürtler sırf Kürt oldukları için toplumsal yaşamda aynı türden muameleye maruz kalırlar.	.12	-.10	**.61**	-.15	.35
10. Kürtler medyada (gazete, TV, sosyal medya vb.) genelde ayrı bir grup olarak ele alınır.	.03	.00	**.54**	-.04	.30
3. Kürtlerin başından sırf Kürt oldukları için benzer olaylar geçer.	-.06	.06	**.54**	-.14	.37
36. Kürtlerin toplumsal açıdan kaderi ortaktır.	-.02	.10	**.47**	.13	.33
4. Bir Kürt istese bile Kürt olmayı bırakamaz.	.03	-.03	.08	**.58**	.38
26. Kürt olarak doğan bir birey ömrünün sonuna kadar Kürt'tür.	.06	-.05	.03	**.57**	.34
15. Doğuştan Kürt olmayan birinin sonradan Kürt olması neredeyse imkânsızdır.	-.01	.20	-.20	**.41**	.23
Eigenvalue	7.05	2.49	2.05	1.37	
% variance	27.12	9.57	7.87	5.28	
Total variance	49.83				
Factor correlations	F1	F2	F3	F4	
F1 – Interdependency	1.00				
F2 – Boundary-Making	.43	1.00			
F3 – Common Fate	.40	.38	1.00		
F4 – Essentialism	.39	.45	.38	1.00	

Notes. N = 430. The h^2 refers to the communality of each item. The eigenvalue for the unretained (fifth) factor was 1.29.

Table 3.4. Pattern coefficients on the Alevis-related entitativity items

	Factors				
Items	**Interdependency**	**Boundary-Making**	**Common Fate**	**Essentialism**	h^2
27. Aleviler genellikle birbirlerini koruyup kollar.	**.84**	.02	-.19	.11	.65
16. Aleviler genelde birbirlerinin üzüntü ve sevinçlerine ortak olur.	**.76**	-.18	.03	.04	.53
19. Aralarında ayrılıklar olsa da, Aleviler kendileri için önemli konularda ortak hareket eder.	**.75**	.04	-.10	.03	.54
5. Aralarında anlaşmazlıklar olsa da, zor zamanlarında tüm Aleviler birbirlerine destek olur.	**.70**	-.10	-.07	.14	.48
8. Aleviler yaşadıkları sorunların çözümü için seslerini birlikte duyurur.	**.67**	.12	-.07	-.07	.46
41. Sahip oldukları değerler Alevileri bir arada tutar.	**.60**	.03	.18	-.12	.48
9. Aleviler ortak değerlerini ve inançlarını nesilden nesle aktarır.	**.60**	-.06	.14	-.05	.40
43. Aleviler, üzerinde birlikte çaba sarf ettikleri ortak amaçlara sahiptir.	**.59**	.17	.12	-.10	.51
30. Aleviler gerektiğinde birlikte hareket ederek toplumsal bir etki uyandırabilir.	**.56**	.15	.03	-.15	.37
44. Aleviler sahip oldukları gelenek ve görenekleri geçmişten bugüne korumuştur.	**.51**	-.14	.08	.04	.27
6. Aleviler pek çok ortak özelliğe sahiptir.	**.43**	.06	.18	.13	.38
34. Aleviler kendilerini "biz", diğerlerini ise "onlar" olarak görür.	-.05	**.80**	-.12	.08	.59
12. Aleviler kendilerini toplumun geri kalanından ayrı bir grup olarak görür.	-.10	**.68**	-.01	.06	.43
33. Aleviler kendilerini tanımlarken genelde Alevi kökenlerini ön plana çıkartır.	.06	**.56**	-.02	.02	.34
1. Aleviler genelde kendilerinden "biz" diye bahseder.	-.14	**.53**	.14	.09	.33
7. Aleviler genelde kendileriyle aynı kökenden insanlarla evlenmek ister.	.19	**.51**	-.05	.05	.37
42. Aleviler genellikle Alevilerin çoğunlukta olduğu yerlerde ikamet etmeyi tercih eder.	.11	**.40**	.14	-.02	.28

(*Table 3.4 continued*)

Items	Factors				h^2
	Interdependency	**Boundary-Making**	**Common Fate**	**Essentialism**	
25. Aleviler sırf Alevi oldukları için toplumsal yaşamda aynı türden muameleye maruz kalırlar.	-.01	-.21	**.68**	.07	.41
21. Alevi olmayanlar genelde Alevileri ayrı bir grup olarak görür.	-.06	.19	**.57**	-.13	.38
3. Alevilerin başından sırf Alevi oldukları için benzer olaylar geçer.	.03	-.01	**.55**	.18	.41
36. Alevilerin toplumsal açıdan kaderi ortaktır.	-.00	.04	**.54**	.25	.45
32. Alevi olmayanlar konuşurken genelde Alevilerden ayrı bir grup olarak bahseder.	.01	.23	**.50**	-.17	.36
10. Aleviler medyada (gazete, TV, sosyal medya vb.) genelde ayrı bir grup olarak ele alınır.	.08	-.03	**.46**	-.06	.23
26. Alevi olarak doğan bir birey ömrünün sonuna kadar Alevi'dir.	.06	.02	.04	**.72**	.57
4. Bir Alevi istese bile Alevi olmayı bırakamaz.	-.01	.02	.10	**.67**	.50
15. Doğuştan Alevi olmayan birinin sonradan Alevi olması neredeyse imkânsızdır.	-.03	.23	-.13	**.53**	.33
Eigenvalue	7.25	2.49	1.83	1.71	
% variance	27.87	9.59	7.03	6.60	
Total variance	51.08				
Factor correlations	F1	F2	F3	F4	
F1 – Interdependency	1.00				
F2 – Boundary-Making	.39	1.00			
F3 – Common Fate	.48	.40	1.00		
F4 – Essentialism	.30	.23	.29	1.00	

Notes. N = 430. The h^2 refers to the communality of each item. The eigenvalue for the unretained (fifth) factor was 1.57.

3.3.1.1. Naming of Factors

Adopting an inductive approach in the item development process might bring about difficulties in factor-naming (Hinkin, 1998). Even though no specific factorial structure was proposed in the present study, certain inductive content domains (e.g., nature of intergroup relations or perceived intergroup contrast) were lost during item analysis and factor analysis. Unsurprisingly, some of those content domains loaded together onto a common factor. For example, the first factor combined various content domains, including ingroup ties, collective agency, collective continuity, and homogeneity. The current entitativity factors were labeled in consideration of such losses and overlaps.

Factor 1, Interdependency, included 11 items and explained nearly 27% of the variance in the Kurds-related entitativity items and 28% of the variance in the Alevis-related items. Since this factor is about the perceived interconnections among members in terms of their solidarity, collective agency, and continuity in cultural terms, this factor was termed "Interdependency." High scores on this dimension refer to higher perceived interdependency in the target group. A sample item is "Kurds/Alevis have preserved their traditions and customs from past to present." Factor 2, Boundary-Making, included six items and explained approximately 10% of the variance in both the Kurds- and Alevis-related items. This factor relates to the attributions of boundary-making efforts to the target category members in separating themselves from the rest of the society either categorically or by acting as a closed community. A sample item is "Kurds/Alevis often refer to themselves as we." High scores on this dimension indicate greater perceived separatist efforts from the target group members. Factor 3, Common Fate, included six items and explained roughly 8% of the variance in the Kurds-related items and 7% of the variance in the Alevis-related items. This factor is composed of the items relating to common events that befall members of the target group and the items about the belief that they are perceived as a separate group in society. In Study 1, Kurds and Alevis as socially sensitive groups were characterized by common outcomes, primarily based on their experiences of social marginalization and discrimination. As is evident in this factor, groupness ascriptions by the third parties were also seen as some kind of discrimination or "other"ization directed towards the target group members. It might explain why the items about the belief that category members are seen as a group by third parties were loaded together with the items about common outcomes onto this factor. A sample item is "Kurds/ Alevis are generally treated as a separate group in the media

(newspaper, TV, social media, etc.)." High scores on this dimension indicate that the target group members are believed to experience common outcomes due to their social identity. Factor 4, Essentialism, included three items and explained approximately 5% of the variance in the Kurds-related items and 7% of the variance in the Alevis-related items. This factor relates to the perceived permeability of the group's boundaries concerning the ease or difficulty of entering or departing the group. As both ethnic and sectarian categories were found to be perceived as biological or natural kinds in Study 1 (remember the qualitative category of "Objective constraints"), this factor was termed "Essentialism." Higher scores on this factor indicate the perceptions of less permeable group boundaries. A sample item is "An individual born as a Kurd is a Kurd until the end of his/her life."

3.3.1.2. Reliability Estimates

The internal reliability coefficient alpha estimates were computed separately for Kurds and non-Kurds concerning the Kurds-related items and Alevis and Sunnis concerning the Alevis-related items. Those estimates are presented in Table 3.5. Since the scale demonstrated good internal consistency reliabilities at both the sub-factor and total score levels, one can assert that the sampling domain of the construct was adequately captured for this measure (Churchill, 1979).

Table 3.5. Reliability estimates for the Kurds- and Alevis-related entitativity items

	Coefficient Alpha				
The Participant Groups	F1	F2	F3	F4	Total Scale
Kurds	.88	.76	.71	.51	.87
Non-Kurds	.89	.82	.73	.62	.89
Alevis	.90	.78	.69	.73	.88
Sunnis	.87	.77	.67	.68	.88

Notes. F1 stands for "Interdependency," F2 for "Boundary-Making," F3 for "Common Fate," and F4 for "Essentialism."

3.3.1.3. Convergent Validity

As a check of convergent validity, the degree to which the entitativity scale and its sub-factors correlated with the generic entitativity measures was examined in the datasets of the four participant groups. The intercorrelations among the related variables are included in Table 3.6. All of the different entitativity factors and the total entitativity score were strongly or moderately associated with the verbal unity item in all datasets. The sub-factor scores and the total scale scores showed statistically significant correlations with the pictorial unity measure from the majority viewpoint (i.e., non-Kurds & Sunnis). However, this pictorial unity measure yielded significant correlations only with interdependency among the Alevi participants and interdependency and common fate among the Kurdish participants. This majority-minority difference might be related to the possibility that majority and minority members interpreted this somewhat ambiguous pictorial unity measure differently. Even though there were differences in the intercorrelations between the sub-factors and generic unity measures in different datasets, the correlational patterns indicated that the currently proposed scale is a valid measure of perceived entitativity.

As is also evident in Study 1, the term "group" seemed to have negative connotations in the eye of the different respondent groups in Study 2. For example, the verbal groupness measure in this study was positively associated with the verbal ($r_{\text{Non-Kurds}} = .33$, $r_{\text{Sunnis}} = .19$, ps $< .01$) and pictorial unity measures ($r_{\text{Non-Kurds}} = .32$, $r_{\text{Sunnis}} = .17$, ps $< .01$) from the majority's standpoint. However, the groupness seemed not to be interpreted as "unity" by the Kurdish and Alevi participants in that their groupness ratings of themselves were not associated with their perceived unity scores on the verbal ($r_{\text{Kurds}} = .04$, $r_{\text{Alevis}} = .11$, ps $> .05$) and pictorial measures ($r_{\text{Kurds}} = .07$, $r_{\text{Alevis}} = .03$, ps $> .05$). A similar pattern is also apparent when we examine the link between groupness attributions and the entitativity scores. Even though the groupness ratings of non-Kurds and Sunnis were positively correlated with their entitativity scores on the newly-developed measure, the verbal groupness measure was only correlated with the boundary-making and essentialism factors in the dataset of Alevis, and it was positively associated with the boundary-making factor in the dataset of Kurds. In addition, while Kurds were perceived as more united by Kurds ($M = 3.56$, $SD = 1.14$) than by non-Kurds ($M = 3.28$, $SD = 1.15$) on the verbal unity measure ($t(458) = 2.61$, $p < .01$), non-Kurds ($M = 3.23$, $SD = 1.34$) characterized Kurds by greater levels of groupness than Kurds did so ($M = 2.70$, $SD = 1.49$) on the verbal groupness measure ($t(453.14) = -4.05$, $p < .001$). The same situation was also evident for the Alevis-related perceptions. While Alevis

(*M* = 3.83, *SD* = 1.05) scored higher on the verbal unity measure than Sunnis (*M* = 3.56, *SD* = .92) (*t*(458) = 2.93, *p* < .01), they (*M* = 2.98, *SD* = 1.42) scored lower on the verbal groupness measure than Sunnis (*M* = 3.65, *SD* = 1.18) (*t*(442.55) = -5.47, *p* < .001).[1] In this respect, one can suspect that being named a "group" might be something negative or disparaging for minority members in that calling themselves a distinct group might mean their willingness to break away from the rest of society. Indeed, the statistically significant correlations between the verbal groupness measure and the boundary-making factor among the Kurd and Alevi participants might be interpreted as a confirmation of this possibility.

The pictorial distinctiveness item aimed to measure the extent to which Kurds and Alevis are perceived as a distinct whole in society. Largely speaking, this generic measure of entitativity seemed to confirm the study expectations. It demonstrated weak to moderate correlations with different entitativity dimensions and the total entitativity score in all datasets. The participants perceived both Kurds and Alevis as moderately distinctive on this measure, independent of their ethnic or religious belongings. The means about this item on the 6-point Likert scale measure ranged between 3.44 and 3.76 across the four datasets; those means were not statistically different from one other from the viewpoints of Kurds and non-Kurds (*t*(458) = .04, *p* = .97) and the views of Alevis and Sunnis (*t*(458) = 1.08, *p* = .28). All in all, the currently proposed entitativity scale seems to measure what it intends to measure. Since it yielded statistically significant correlations with other measures designed to assess entitativity, it can be accepted as a valid measure of entitativity.

[1] Kurds (*M* = 3.38, *SD* = 1.30) and non-Kurds (*M* = 3.33, *SD* = 1.23) rated Kurds with comparable levels of unity on the pictorial unity measure (*t*(458) = .41, *p* = .68). Similarly, there was also no statistically significant difference between Alevis (*M* = 3.47, *SD* = 1.26) and Sunnis (*M* = 3.39, *SD* = 1.16) concerning the perceived of unity of Alevis on this generic measure (*t*(458) = .73, *p* = .46).

Table 3.6. Correlations of the entitativity scale at the factorial and total-score levels with generic entitativity measures

Entitativity of Kurds

	The dataset of Kurds				The dataset of non-Kurds			
	Unity (Verbal)	Groupness (Verbal)	Unity (Pictorial)	Distinctiveness (Pictorial)	Unity (Verbal)	Groupness (Verbal)	Unity (Pictorial)	Distinctiveness (Pictorial)
1. Interdependency	.76**	.10	.51**	.15*	.63**	.26**	.56**	.15*
2. Boundary-Making	.29**	.19**	.09	.26**	.36**	.44**	.42**	.30**
3. Common Fate	.33**	.09	.08	.29**	.30**	.36**	.26**	.39**
4. Essentialism	.26**	.23**	.02	.12	.29**	.34**	.27**	.12
5. The Total Scale	.65**	.19**	.33**	.28**	.58**	.45**	.55**	.31**

Entitativity of Alevis

	The dataset of Alevis				The dataset of Sunnis			
	Unity (Verbal)	Groupness (Verbal)	Unity (Pictorial)	Distinctiveness (Pictorial)	Unity (Verbal)	Groupness (Verbal)	Unity (Pictorial)	Distinctiveness (Pictorial)
1. Interdependency	.63**	.06	.43**	.18**	.43**	.28**	.34**	.18**
2. Boundary-Making	.29**	.37**	.17*	.11	.26**	.38**	.16*	.32**
3. Common Fate	.39**	.08	.20**	.23**	.24**	.32**	.14*	.26**
4. Essentialism	.25**	.12	.01	.14*	.22**	.25**	.20**	.15*
5. The Total Scale	.61**	.21**	.35**	.23**	.41**	.41**	.31**	.30**

Notes. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

3.3.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Study Variables

The descriptive statistics are separately examined in the Kurds- and Alevis-related datasets. First, intergroup differences concerning the critical study variables are addressed. Next, intercorrelations among the study variables (including the selected demographical variables) are presented.

3.3.2.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Kurds-Related Dataset

The descriptive statistics for the study variables concerning the Kurds-related dataset can be found in Table 3.7. Kurds perceived Kurds as more entitative than non-Kurds on the common fate ($t(458) = 8.29$, $p < .001$) and total entitativity scores ($t(458) = 2.58$, $p < .05$). Besides, non-Kurds attributed greater boundary-making efforts to Kurds at a marginal level than Kurds did to themselves ($t(458) = -1.94$, $p = .05$). However, there was no difference between the two groups on their interdependency ($t(458) = 1.01$, $p = .31$) and essentialism scores ($t(458) = .86$, $p = .39$). The importance of those entitativity dimensions differed depending on ingroup and outgroup perspectives. Across different entitativity dimensions, Kurds' ingroup ratings ranked as follows ($F(3, 687) = 35.35$, $p < .001$): Common Fate > Interdependency = Essentialism > Boundary-Making. Almost all of the related *p*s concerning the pairwise comparisons were significant at an alpha level of .001. There was also a significant within-dimensions difference among non-Kurds ($F(3, 687) = 10.93$, $p < .001$). While non-Kurds' ratings on the interdependency and essentialism dimensions did not differ from one other, their interdependency scores were significantly higher than their boundary-making and common fate scores ($p < .001$). Although their essentialism and boundary-making scores and their boundary-making and common fate scores were comparable, they rated Kurds higher on essentialism than common fate ($p < .05$).

Kurd and non-Kurds did not differ from one other regarding their ethnic identification levels ($t(458) = -.28$, $p = .78$). Even though there was no difference between Kurds and non-Kurds concerning their affective ingroup bias ($t(458) = -.95$, $p = .34$), non-Kurds reported greater levels of social distance towards Kurds ($t(406.25) = -5.84$, $p < .001$) than Kurds did so towards Turks.

Table 3.7. Means and standard deviations (*SD*) of the study variables for Kurds and non-Kurds

Variables	**Kurds (*n* = 230)**		**Non-Kurds (*n* = 230)**	
	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Interdependency	3.69	.76	3.61	.74
Boundary-Making	3.23	.89	3.39	.88
Common Fate	3.90	.80	3.27	.83
Essentialism	3.59	1.00	3.51	1.00
Total Entitativity Score	3.62	.60	3.47	.62
Ingroup Identification	4.08	.95	4.11	1.05
Affective Ingroup Bias	.34	1.73	.48	1.47
Social Distance	1.43	.67	1.88	.98

The correlations among the study variables in the datasets of Kurds and non-Kurds are presented in Table 3.8. All of the entitativity dimensions were significantly correlated with each other in both datasets. For Kurds, greater ethnic identification was positively linked to ingroup entitativity at factorial and total-score levels. Kurds with stronger ethnic identification demonstrated higher affective ingroup bias and social distance towards Turks. All the entitativity scores except for essentialism were positively linked to the affective ingroup bias and social distance scores. Female Kurds perceived their ingroup as more interdependent than male Kurds. Age was negatively associated with perceived ingroup interdependency. As Kurds' education and income levels increased, their ingroup interdependency perceptions and total entitativity scores decreased. As the Kurdish participants became more left-wing oriented, their boundary-making, common fate, and total entitativity scores increased. Less religious Kurds had higher common fate scores, and more religious Kurds had higher essentialism scores. More educated and richer Kurds demonstrated lower levels of ethnic identification. As Kurds became more religious and ideologically more rightist, they showed less affective ingroup bias. However, Kurds' scores on ideological orientation and the centrality of religion were not linked to their social distance scores.

In the dataset of non-Kurds, higher ethnic identification was associated with greater boundary-making and common fate scores. It was also positively correlated with affective ingroup bias and social distance towards Kurds. There was a positive link between outgroup entitativity (the boundary-making and common fate dimensions in particular) and affective ingroup bias. All the entitativity scores except for essentialism were also positively

correlated with social distance towards Kurds. Female non-Kurds perceived greater levels of outgroup interdependency than male non-Kurds. As the age of the non-Kurdish participants increased, and they became more religious and ideologically more rightist, their common fate scores decreased. Female non-Kurds had higher ethnic identification scores than male non-Kurds. More affluent non-Kurds had lower ethnic identification scores. As non-Kurds became ideologically more rightist, their ingroup identification, affective ingroup bias, and social distance levels increased. The centrality of religion to everyday life was also positively linked to ingroup identification and affective ingroup bias.

Table 3.8. Correlations among the study variables in the Kurds-related dataset

	1.	**2.**	**3.**	**4.**	**5.**	**6.**	**7.**	**8.**	**9.**	**10.**	**11.**	**12.**	**13.**	**14.**
1. Interdependency	-	.36**	.35**	.25**	.82**	.58**	.29**	.21**	.14*	-.21**	-.20**	-.35**	-.07	.06
2. Boundary-Making	*.48***	-	.50**	.22**	.73**	.35**	.35**	.33**	.01	.08	-.07	-.07	-.14*	-.10
3. Common Fate	*.38***	*.33***	-	.27**	.72**	.43**	.41**	.27**	.00	.05	.00	-.07	-.27**	-.18**
4. Essentialism	*.42***	*.48***	*.22***	-	.49**	.21**	.10	.07	.06	.00	-.05	-.06	.10	.17*
5. Total Entitativity Score	*.86***	*.76***	*.65***	*.62***	-	.60**	.42**	.32**	.09	-.07	-.14*	-.25**	-.15*	-.02
6. Ingroup Identification	*.11*	*.26***	*-.13*	*.14**	*.13*	-	.41**	.21**	.02	-.11	-.14*	-.19**	-.12	.01
7. Affective Ingroup Bias	*.09*	*.39***	*-.05*	*.19***	*.20***	*.41***	-	.52**	-.01	.08	-.01	.05	-.33**	-.33**
8. Social Distance	*.13**	*.34***	*.14**	*.12*	*.25***	*.20***	*.60***	-	.12	.09	.01	.02	-.12	-.10
9. Sex	*.13**	*.04*	*-.09*	*.02*	*.06*	*.15**	*-.01*	*.00*	-	-.17**	-.14*	-.09	-.07	.11
10. Age	*-.08*	*-.05*	*-.13**	*.12*	*-.08*	*-.11*	*-.08*	*-.12*	*-.23***	-	.26**	.42**	-.03	-.14*
11. Educational Level	*.07*	*-.01*	*.02*	*.12*	*.06*	*-.07*	*-.02*	*-.13*	*-.06*	*.21***	-	.42**	-.03	-.07
12. Monthly Income	*.00*	*.00*	*.03*	*.08*	*.03*	*-.16**	*-.05*	*-.01*	*-.11*	*.23***	*.47***	-	.01	-.15*
13. Ideological Orientation	*.03*	*.13*	*-.15**	*.04*	*.02*	*.23***	*.19***	*.13**	*.10*	*.07*	*.05*	*.04*	-	.48**
14. Centrality of Religion	*.04*	*.13*	*-.15**	*.07*	*.03*	*.40***	*.16**	*.10*	*.28***	*-.02*	*.07*	*-.07*	*.47***	-

Notes. The values in regular font represent the ratings of Kurds, and the values in italics represent the ratings of non-Kurds. For the sex variable, males were coded as 0 and females as 1. The monthly income variable refers to participants' income per person in the household. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

3.3.2.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Alevis-Related Dataset

The descriptive statistics for the study variables concerning the Alevis-related dataset can be found in Table 3.9. As expected, Alevis were perceived as more entitative by Alevis than by Sunnis. Ingroup entitativity perceptions were higher than outgroup entitativity scores regarding the interdependency ($t(431.71) = 3.01$, $p < .01$), boundary-making ($t(449.41) = 2.31$, $p < .05$), common fate ($t(458) = 10.80$, $p < .001$), and essentialism dimensions ($t(444.40) = 2.02$, $p < .05$), and the total entitativity score ($t(458) = 5.94$, $p < .001$). Alevis' ingroup ratings across different entitativity dimensions ranked as follows ($F(3, 687) = 93.35$, $p < .001$): Common Fate = Interdependency > Boundary-Making > Essentialism. On the contrary, Sunnis' outgroup ratings across the entitativity dimensions ranked as follows ($F(3, 687) = 100.80$, $p < .001$): Interdependency > Boundary-Making = Common Fate > Essentialism. All the related *p*s concerning the pairwise comparisons across the entitativity dimensions were significant at an alpha level of .001. Alevis had greater ingroup identification scores than Sunnis ($t(447.46) = 6.05$, $p < .001$). While Alevis had greater levels of affective ingroup bias than Sunnis ($t(458) = 6.46$, $p < .001$), Sunnis showed higher social distance towards Alevis ($t(450.35) = -3.01$, $p < .01$) than Alevis did so towards Sunnis.

Table 3.9. Means and standard deviations (*SD*) of the study variables for Alevis and Sunnis

Variables	**Alevis (*n* = 230)**		**Sunnis (*n* = 230)**	
	Mean	*SD*	Mean	*SD*
Interdependency	3.79	.78	3.60	.61
Boundary-Making	3.43	.88	3.25	.76
Common Fate	3.91	.75	3.18	.70
Essentialism	2.80	1.22	2.59	1.03
Total Entitativity Score	3.62	.61	3.30	.54
Ingroup Identification	4.25	.96	3.66	1.12
Affective Ingroup Bias	1.10	1.30	.29	1.37
Social Distance	1.67	.80	1.91	.91

The correlations among the study variables in the datasets of Alevis and Sunnis are presented in Table 3.10. All entitativity dimensions were positively associated with each other in both datasets. For Alevis, higher religious belief group identification was associated with higher ingroup interdependency, boundary-making, and common fate perceptions. Greater ingroup identification was positively correlated with affective ingroup bias and social distance towards Sunnis. All of the different entitativity indicators were positively linked to the affective ingroup bias and social distance scores. Alevis scored higher on the common fate and essentialism dimensions and the total entitativity scale as the age increased. There was a negative association between Alevis' income levels and perceived ingroup interdependency. As Alevis became more leftist in their ideological orientations, they perceived their ingroup as higher on the boundary-making and common fate dimensions. As religion became more central to their lives, Alevis showed higher interdependency but lower boundary-making scores. Older and more religious Alevis manifested greater levels of ingroup identification. More leftist Alevis had higher ingroup bias scores. As Alevis became more affluent, educated, and less religious, their social distance towards Sunnis decreased.

For the Sunni participants, higher ingroup identification was associated with greater levels of outgroup interdependency and boundary-making perceptions. Ingroup identification was positively linked to affective ingroup bias and social distance towards Alevis. Among the different entitativity dimensions, the interdependency and boundary-making scores were positively associated with affective ingroup bias. All the entitativity scores except for common fate yielded positive correlations with social distance towards Alevis. As the age of the Sunni participants increased, they perceived Alevis in more essentialist terms. Even though Sunnis' ideological orientation was not linked to their outgroup entitativity perceptions, as religion became more central to their lives, Sunnis started to view Alevis as putting greater boundary-making efforts. As Sunnis became older, more rightist in their ideological orientations, and more religious, they showed higher Sunni identification. Female Sunnis expressed greater social distance towards Alevis than male Sunnis. Right-wing orientation and the centrality of religion to everyday life were associated with higher levels of affective ingroup bias and social distance.

Table 3.10. Correlations among the study variables in the Alevis-related dataset

	1.	**2.**	**3.**	**4.**	**5.**	**6.**	**7.**	**8.**	**9.**	**10.**	**11.**	**12.**	**13.**	**14.**
1. Interdependency	-	.31**	*.47***	.20**	.83**	.46**	.21**	.22**	.09	.13	-.13	-.15*	-.11	.14*
2. Boundary-Making	*.45***	-	.32**	.29**	.66**	.15*	.20**	.22**	.10	.00	.02	.09	-.16*	-.15*
3. Common Fate	*.42***	*.44***	-	.29**	.72**	.42**	.24**	.18**	-.01	.19**	.00	-.05	-.16*	-.02
4. Essentialism	*.39***	*.34***	*.28***	-	.52**	.07	.18**	.26**	.00	.27**	-.05	.06	.02	-.05
5. Total Entitativity Score	*.84***	*.75***	*.71***	*.60***	-	.44**	.29**	.30**	.08	.19**	-.07	-.05	-.15*	.01
6. Ingroup Identification	*.18***	*.28***	*-.01*	*.13*	*.20***	-	.22**	.18**	.07	.17*	.06	-.04	-.10	.22**
7. Affective Ingroup Bias	*.23***	*.33***	*.11*	*.13*	*.28***	*.49***	-	.40**	.01	.03	-.03	.04	-.26**	-.10
8. Social Distance	*.15**	*.29***	*.05*	*.15**	*.22***	*.45***	*.67***	-	.01	.05	-.20**	-.16*	.11	.15*
9. Sex	*.00*	*.08*	*-.04*	*.00*	*.01*	*.08*	*.12*	*.14**	-	-.18**	-.04	-.11	-.10	.05
10. Age	*.03*	*.08*	*-.09*	*.17***	*.05*	*.18***	*.08*	*.08*	*-.31***	-	-.06	.11	.05	.06
11. Educational Level	*.05*	*.09*	*.04*	*-.07*	*.05*	*.01*	*.04*	*.10*	*.02*	*.23***	-	.38**	-.11	-.08
12. Monthly Income	*-.07*	*-.07*	*.03*	*-.10*	*-.07*	*-.11*	*-.07*	*-.05*	*.03*	*.20***	*.47***	-	-.10	-.20**
13. Ideological Orientation	*.11*	*.13*	*-.05*	*.08*	*.10*	*.45***	*.41***	*.43***	*.01*	*.08*	*.25***	.01	-	.32**
14. Centrality of Religion	*.13*	*.25***	*-.01*	*.10*	*.17**	*.71***	*.46***	*.55***	*.17**	*.18***	*.16**	*.02*	*.59***	-

Notes. The values in regular font represent the ratings of Alevis, and the values in italics represent the ratings of Sunnis. For the sex variable, males were coded as 0 and females as 1. The monthly income variable refers to participants' income per person in the household. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$.

To sum up, many of the demographic indicators (e.g., sex, age, or socioeconomic status) addressed during the descriptive statistics showed no or negligible correlations with the critical study variables. Accordingly, the impact of those demographics on intergroup attitudes was not controlled for during the hypotheses testing. Ideological orientation and the centrality of religion to everyday life emerged as the consistent correlates of the primary outcome variables. Yet, because the two seemed to overlap with some of the main study variables (e.g., religious ingroup identification), controlling for them in the main analyses might hinder our understanding of how the critical predictor variables influence intergroup prejudices. As a consequence, these two demographic indicators were also left out of further analyses.

3.3.3. Multiple Regression Analyses

In testing the viability of *H2*, a series of multiple regression analyses were held to predict the intergroup attitudes of each group towards the target outgroup from different entitativity dimensions. First, the analyses in predicting intergroup bias from ingroup entitativity were run. These analyses were conducted with the datasets of Kurds and Alevis; whether the negative attitudes of Kurds (towards Turks) and Alevis (towards Sunnis) could be predicted by their ingroup entitativity perceptions was questioned. Second, the analyses in predicting intergroup bias from outgroup entitativity were run. These analyses were conducted with the datasets of non-Kurds and Sunnis; whether the negative attitudes of non-Kurds (towards Kurds) and Sunnis (towards Alevis) could be explained by their outgroup entitativity perceptions was examined.

All of the study variables were centered before the analysis (Aiken & West, 1991). In all multiple regression analyses, different entitativity dimensions were treated as the predictor variables. In testing the unique contributions of entitativity dimensions on different intergroup bias indicators, affective ingroup bias and social distance were examined as the separate dependent variables. Accordingly, two different hierarchical regression analyses were held in the datasets of each participant group (i.e., Kurds, non-Kurds, Alevis, & Sunnis). Since different entitativity dimensions were significantly correlated, additional statistical analyses were employed to check the multicollinearity problem. In all datasets, the VIF values neither approached nor exceeded 10, and none of the tolerance values were lower

than .10. According to the benchmarks suggested by Field (2018), multicollinearity was not expected to pose a threat to the path coefficients in the present analyses.

3.3.3.1. Predicting Intergroup Bias from Ingroup Entitativity

The results of the multiple regression analyses in questioning whether ingroup entitativity perceptions could significantly predict Kurds' intergroup attitudes revealed that the model was a significant predictor of affective ingroup bias ($F(4, 225) = 15.10$, $p < .001$) and social distance ($F(4, 225) = 8.46$, $p < .001$). As can be seen Table 3.11, among the four entitativity dimensions, interdependency ($p < .05$), boundary-making ($p < .05$), and common fate ($p < .001$) emerged as the significant predictors of affective ingroup bias. Concerning Kurds' social distance towards Turks, boundary-making ($p < .01$) and common fate (at a marginal significance level of .10) also contributed to the model significantly.

In predicting Alevis' intergroup bias levels from their ingroup entitativity perceptions, the overall regression model was statistically significant for both affective ingroup bias ($F(4, 225) = 5.56$, $p < . 001$) and social distance ($F(4, 225) = 6.80$, $p < . 001$). Only the common fate dimension appeared to be the positive predictor of affective ingroup bias at the marginal significance level ($p = .08$). While essentialism positively predicted Alevis' social distance towards Sunnis ($p < .01$), interdependency also predicted this outcome at a marginal significance level of .06.

All in all, these findings provided partial support for *H2* on some entitativity dimensions for different intergroup bias indicators. Concerning Kurds' affective ingroup bias levels, all the ingroup entitativity dimensions except for essentialism were significant predictors. In other words, to the extent that Kurds perceived their ingroup as acting as an interdependent unit, seeking to draw boundaries regarding others, and possessing a shared fate, they expressed a greater liking for the ingroup. However, Kurds manifested greater social distance towards Turks only when they perceived their ingroup as entitative based on their boundary-making efforts. Even though Alevis' ingroup entitativity perceptions did not strongly impact their affective ingroup bias scores, the higher they perceived the ingroup in essentialist terms, the greater social distance they expressed towards Sunnis.

Table 3.11. Predicting the intergroup attitudes of Kurds and Alevis from ingroup entitativity scores

	Kurds' Intergroup Attitudes						**Alevis' Intergroup Attitudes**					
	Affective Ingroup Bias			Social Distance			Affective Ingroup Bias			Social Distance		
	B	SE	*β*	*B*	SE	*β*	*B*	SE	*β*	*B*	SE	*β*
Predictors												
Interdependency	.32	.15	.14*	.08	.06	.09	.17	.12	.10	.14	.07	.14†
Boundary-Making	.32	.14	.17*	.18	.06	.25**	.15	.10	.10	.10	.06	.11
Common Fate	.62	.15	.29***	.10	.06	.12†	.23	.13	.13†	.03	.08	.03
Essentialism	-.08	.11	-.05	-.03	.04	-.05	.10	.07	.09	.12	.04	.19**
R^2	.21***			.13***			.09***			.11***		

Notes. † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

3.3.3.2. Predicting Intergroup Bias from Outgroup Entitativity

The results of the multiple regression analyses in questioning whether outgroup entitativity perceptions could significantly predict non-Kurds' intergroup attitudes revealed that the proposed model was a significant predictor of affective ingroup bias ($F(4, 225) = 13.28$, $p < .001$) and social distance ($F(4, 225) = 7.91$, $p < .001$). As shown in Table 3.12, boundary-making emerged as a positive predictor of Kurds' affective ingroup bias scores ($p < .001$). Even though there was not a meaningful bivariate association between common fate and affective ingroup bias in this dataset, the common fate emerged as a negative predictor of affective ingroup bias in the tested model ($p < .01$). This finding raises doubt about the role played by common fate as a suppressor variable. The results on checking its suppressor effect revealed that common fate enhanced the contribution of boundary-making by suppressing the outcome-irrelevant variance in the boundary-making scores. Besides, the only significant predictor of non-Kurds' social distance towards Kurds was participants' boundary-making scores ($p < .001$).

In predicting Sunnis' intergroup bias levels from their outgroup perceptions (i.e., the perceived entitativity of Alevis), the overall regression model was also statistically significant for both affective ingroup bias ($F(4, 225) = 7.57$, $p < .001$) and social distance ($F(4, 225) = 6.22$, $p < .001$). The boundary-making dimension emerged as the only significant predictor of the two outcome variables ($p < .001$).

All in all, these findings also yielded partial support for *H2*; the boundary-making component of outgroup entitativity appeared to be the sole predictor of intergroup bias. Non-Kurds and Sunnis are likely to develop greater levels of intergroup bias only when they construe the target outgroups (Kurds and Alevis, respectively) as entitative units in terms of their boundary-making efforts. However, perceiving the outgroups based on other entitativity factors seemed not critical in predicting their intergroup bias scores.

Table 3.12. Predicting the intergroup attitudes of non-Kurds and Sunnis from outgroup entitativity scores

	Non-Kurds' Intergroup Attitudes						**Sunnis' Intergroup Attitudes**					
	Affective Ingroup Bias			Social Distance			Affective Ingroup Bias			Social Distance		
	B	SE	*β*	*B*	SE	*β*	*B*	SE	*β*	*B*	SE	*β*
Predictors												
Interdependency	-.16	.14	-.08	-.05	.10	-.04	.28	.17	.12	.06	.11	.04
Boundary-Making	.78	.12	.46***	.42	.08	.38***	.55	.13	.30***	.36	.09	.30***
Common Fate	-.33	.12	-.18**	.05	.08	.04	-.15	.14	-.08	-.16	.10	-.12
Essentialism	.07	.10	.05	-.06	.07	-.06	-.00	.09	-.00	.06	.06	.07
R^2	.19***			.12***			.12***			.10***		

Notes. † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

3.3.4. Model Testing

In line with the third and fourth hypotheses of the present study, two different mediation models in explaining the associations among entitativity, ingroup identification, and negative intergroup attitudes were proposed. In the first model (the ingroup entitativity model), ingroup entitativity was expected to positively predict minority members' ingroup identification levels, which would, in turn, lead to an increase in their negative attitudes towards majority members (*H3*). This model was tested separately in the datasets of Kurds and Alevis. In the second model (the outgroup entitativity model), it was hypothesized that ingroup identification would positively predict outgroup entitativity, which would, in turn, lead to an increase in negative intergroup attitudes (*H4*). This model was tested separately in the datasets of non-Kurds and Sunnis. Even though two different intergroup bias indicators (i.e., affective ingroup bias & social distance) were addressed in this study, it was observed that the mediatory results were the same for these outcome variables in all datasets. Accordingly, participants' scores on the two outcome variables were converted into z-scores, and a composite "negative intergroup attitudes" score was generated by taking the average of the two. The analyses reported below treated this newly-formed intergroup bias score as the outcome variable.

The mediation analysis steps recommended by Zhao et al. (2010) were followed in testing the currently proposed mediatory models. Firstly, all parameters (both direct and indirect effects) were estimated through the PROCESS macro. Next, the bootstrap tests of all indirect effects were conducted; 5000 bootstrap samples were generated, and the 95% bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals (CI) for each indirect effect were obtained. If zero does not occur between the lower and upper limits of the CI, then it was concluded that the related indirect effect is statistically significant. Secondly, the mediation types for each indirect route were determined in examining the signs and significance levels of both direct and indirect effects. Zhao et al. (2010) have suggested a different typology for mediation effects as opposed to Baron and Kenny's (1986) traditional classification of mediatory routes (i.e., full, partial, & no mediation). In this alternative approach, a significant indirect effect combined with a non-significant direct effect is termed an *indirect-only mediation*. If both direct and indirect effects are significant, one should multiply the direct and indirect effects and check the sign of the product term. If the product term is negative, the indirect route indicates a *competitive mediation*, and if the term is positive, it

exemplifies a *complementary mediation*. However, a direct effect in combination with a non-significant indirect effect is called *direct-only non-mediation*. Lastly, when neither direct nor indirect effects are significant, it refers to the case of *no-effect non-mediation*.

3.3.4.1. Testing the Ingroup Entitativity Model: Predicting Intergroup Attitudes from Ingroup Entitativity and Ingroup Identification

The ingroup entitativity model questioned whether the Kurds' and Alevis' ingroup identification levels played a mediatory role between their ingroup entitativity perceptions and negative intergroup attitudes. During model testing, the four entitativity dimensions were entered as the predictor variables, ingroup identification as the mediatory variable, and negative intergroup attitudes as the outcome variable. Figure 3.1 displays the mediation analysis for the Kurdish participants, and Figure 3.2 presents the mediation analysis for the Alevi participants. Table 3.13 demonstrates the significance levels and mediation types for the proposed indirect paths in these datasets; it includes the 95% bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals for each indirect path.

In predicting Kurds' negative attitudes towards Turks, the direct effects of interdependency (B = .05, SE = .08, p = .53) and essentialism (B = -.05, SE = .05, p = .35) were not statistically significant whereas the direct effects of boundary-making (B = .22, SE = .07, p < .01) and common fate (B = .21, SE = .08, p < .01) were significant. Besides, the direct effect of ethnic identification on negative intergroup attitudes was also significant (B = .17, SE = .07, p < .05). In providing partial support for *H3* in this dataset, the indirect effects of interdependency (p < .05) and common fate (p < .05) on negative intergroup attitudes through ingroup identification came out to be statistically significant (see Table 3.13). As it showed a significant indirect effect without a significant direct effect, the results indicated an indirect-only mediation for interdependency. A complementary-mediation effect was observed for common fate since its both indirect and direct effects were significant and positive. However, *H3* seemed not to be supported for the remaining entitativity dimensions, namely, boundary-making (p = .44) and essentialism (p = .73). According to the R-square statistics, 24% of the variance in Kurds' negative intergroup attitudes was explained by this model.

When it comes to the results concerning Alevis' negative intergroup attitudes towards Sunnis, only the direct effect of essentialism was statistically significant (B = .12,

SE = .04, $p < .01$). The remaining entitativity dimensions, specifically, interdependency (*B* = .10, *SE* = .08, *p* = .21), boundary-making (*B* = .12, *SE* = .06, *p* = .06), and common fate (*B* = .06, *SE* = .08, *p* = .46) did not yield statistically significant direct effects on intergroup bias. Even though the direct effect of religious belief ingroup identification was statistically significant only at the marginal level (*B* = .12, *SE* = .06, *p* = .06), the bootstrapped CIs for interdependency (*p* = .08) and common fate (*p* = .09) did not include zero (see Table 3.13), weakly confirming the validity of the related indirect paths. However, the indirect effects in relation to the boundary-making (*p* = .65) and essentialism (*p* = .37) dimensions were not statistically significant. In light of these findings, *H3* can be said to be weakly supported for interdependency and common fate, but not for the remaining entitativity dimensions in the Alevi sample. This model explained 15% of the variance in Alevis' intergroup bias scores.




Figure 3.1. Mediation model in predicting Kurds' negative intergroup attitudes from their ingroup entitativity and identification scores.

Straight lines indicate significant paths, and dashed lines indicate statistically non-significant paths.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.




Figure 3.2. Mediation model in predicting Alevis' negative intergroup attitudes from their ingroup entitativity and identification scores.

Straight lines indicate significant paths, and dashed lines indicate statistically non-significant paths.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 3.13. Indirect effects of predictor variables to Kurds' and Alevis' negative intergroup attitudes

Indirect Paths	Effect	SE	Confidence Interval	Mediation Type
Predicting Kurds' Negative Intergroup Attitudes				
1. Interdependency → Identification → Neg. Attitudes	.10	.04	[.02, .19]	Indirect-only mediation
2. Boundary-Making → Identification → Neg. Attitudes	.01	.01	[-.01, .04]	Direct-only non-mediation
3. Common Fate → Identification → Neg. Attitudes	.05	.03	[.01, .11]	Complementary mediation
4. Essentialism → Identification → Neg. Attitudes	.00	.01	[-.01, .03]	No-effect no-mediation
Predicting Alevis' Negative Intergroup Attitudes				
1. Interdependency → Identification → Neg. Attitudes	.05	.03	[.01, .11]	Indirect-only mediation
2. Boundary-Making → Identification → Neg. Attitudes	-.00	.01	[-.03, .01]	No-effect no-mediation
3. Common Fate → Identification → Neg. Attitudes	.04	.02	[.01, .10]	Indirect-only mediation
4. Essentialism → Identification → Neg. Attitudes	-.01	.01	[-.03, .00]	Direct-only non-mediation

3.3.4.2. Testing the Outgroup Entitativity Model: Predicting Intergroup Attitudes from Ingroup Identification and Outgroup Entitativity

The outgroup entitativity model questioned whether outgroup entitativity played a mediatory role in explaining the association between the non-Kurds' and Sunnis' ingroup identification levels and their negative intergroup attitudes. During model testing, ingroup identification was treated as the predictor variable, the four entitativity dimensions as the mediator variable, and negative intergroup attitudes as the outcome variable. Figure 3.3 shows the mediation analysis for the non-Kurdish participants, and Figure 3.4 shows the mediation analysis for the Sunni participants. Table 3.14 demonstrates the significance levels and mediation types for the proposed indirect paths in both datasets.

In predicting non-Kurds' negative attitudes towards Kurds, the direct effect of ingroup identification was statistically significant (B = .21, SE = .05, p < .001). In partially confirming *H4* (see Table 3.14), the indirect effect of ingroup identification on negative intergroup attitudes through boundary-making was statistically significant (p < .01). This mediatory route reflected a complementary mediation due to the simultaneous statistical significance of the related direct and indirect effects. However, the indirect paths concerning interdependency (p = .42), common fate (p = .85), and essentialism (p = .87) were not statistically significant, indicating that *H4* was not supported for those entitativity dimensions. The R-square statistics revealed that this model explained 23% of the variance in non-Kurds' intergroup bias against Kurds.

When predicting Sunnis' negative intergroup attitudes towards Alevis, the direct effect of ingroup identification was also significant (B = .37, SE = .05, p < .001). Similar to the case in the dataset of non-Kurds, *H4* was only supported for the boundary-making dimension (p < .05) in Sunnis' dataset, indicating a complementary mediation. Yet, *H4* was not confirmed for the indirect paths passing through interdependency (p = .57), common fate (p = .96), and essentialism (p = .80). The currently proposed model accounted for 31% of the variance in Sunnis' intergroup bias against Alevis.




Figure 3.3. Mediation model in predicting non-Kurds' negative intergroup attitudes from their ingroup identification and outgroup entitativity scores.

Straight lines indicate significant paths, and dashed lines indicate statistically non-significant paths.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.




Figure 3.4. Mediation model in predicting Sunnis' negative intergroup attitudes from their ingroup identification and outgroup entitativity scores.

Straight lines indicate significant paths, and dashed lines indicate statistically non-significant paths.
* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 3.14. Indirect effects of predictor variables to non-Kurds' and Sunnis' negative intergroup attitudes

Indirect Paths	Effect	SE	Confidence Interval	Mediation Type
Predicting non-Kurds' Negative Intergroup Attitudes				
1. Identification → Interdependency → Neg. Attitudes	-.01	.01	[-.04, .00]	Direct-only non-mediation
2. Identification → Boundary-Making → Neg. Attitudes	.09	.03	[.04, .16]	Complementary mediation
3. Identification → Common Fate → Neg. Attitudes	.00	.01	[-.01, .02]	Direct-only non-mediation
4. Identification → Essentialism → Neg. Attitudes	-.00	.01	[-.03, .02]	Direct-only non-mediation
Predicting Sunnis' Negative Intergroup Attitudes				
1. Identification → Interdependency → Neg. Attitudes	.01	.01	[-.01, .03]	Direct-only non-mediation
2. Identification → Boundary-Making → Neg. Attitudes	.04	.02	[.02, .09]	Complementary mediation
3. Identification → Common Fate → Neg. Attitudes	.00	.00	[-.00, .01]	Direct-only non-mediation
4. Identification → Essentialism → Neg. Attitudes	.00	.01	[-.01, .03]	Direct-only non-mediation

3.4. Discussion

The present study is unique in examining the differences between the minority and majority perceptions of minority groups. Its particular focus was upon the entitativity of Kurds and Alevis. The extent to which those minority groups are perceived as coherent units was evaluated by both ingroup (i.e., Kurds & Alevis) and outgroup members (i.e., non-Kurds & Sunnis). In an attempt to better question the impact of ingroup and outgroup entitativity on intergroup relations, a novel and category-specific (i.e., ethnicity-based) entitativity scale was proposed. In support of *H1*, the exploratory factor analysis results suggested a common factorial structure for the Kurds- and Alevis-related entitativity items. Four distinct but interrelated underlying dimensions explain the hypothesized covariance among the entitativity items. Those factors are interdependency, boundary-making, common fate, and essentialism, representing the different foundations on which the relevant categories are construed as entitative social bodies. The first factor relates to the perceived unity of group members based on their solidarity, agency, and continuity in sociocultural terms. The second factor relates to the perceived boundary-making efforts of group members in actively producing and protecting their distinctiveness from the rest of society. The third factor relates to common outcomes that befall all group members due to their shared identity. The fourth factor refers to the impermeability of group boundaries in that the group membership is seen as an inborn characteristic, and group boundaries are believed to be determined by an underlying biological essence. The newly-offered entitativity scale can be stated to be a valid and reliable measure in evaluating the entitativity of ethnic (or ethnoreligious) categories.

According to the comparative results, Kurds scored higher on the common fate dimension than non-Kurds, while Alevis scored higher on all four entitativity dimensions than Sunnis. In other words, from the ingroup (vs. outgroup) perceptive, Kurds were seen as more entitative only in their shared outcomes, whereas Alevis were perceived as more entitative based on their strong ingroup ties, boundary-making efforts, shared fate, and essential qualities. Kurds and Alevis prioritized their interdependency and common fate (than their boundary-making efforts and essential qualities) in perceiving themselves as entitative units. From the viewpoint of non-Kurds and Sunnis, while interdependency was

still the most critical constituent, they did not consider common fate as important as interdependency in their outgroup entitativity judgments.

Concerning the link between group perception and intergroup bias, both ingroup and outgroup entitativity were hypothesized to predict intergroup bias (*H2*). Two different intergroup bias indicators, namely, affective ingroup bias and social distance, were addressed as the outcome variables in this study. The results partially supported *H2* only for some entitativity dimensions in different participant groups. Among Kurds, perceiving the ingroup in terms of interdependency, boundary-making, and common fate positively predicted affective ingroup bias, while only the perceived ingroup boundary-making efforts predicted their social distance towards Turks. Yet, among Alevis, only ingroup essentialism predicted their social distance towards Sunnis. From the viewpoint of non-Kurds and Sunnis, construing the relevant outgroups (i.e., Kurds & Alevis) as entitative bodies in terms of their boundary-making efforts acted as an antecedent of intergroup bias. However, other outgroup entitativity dimensions demonstrated no predictive power in determining their intergroup attitudes towards the minority members.

Ingroup identification was proposed to play a mediatory role in explaining the association between ingroup entitativity and outgroup prejudices (*H3*). According to the results, the greater that Kurds perceived their ethnic group as interrelated and experiencing a common fate, the more they identified with their ethnic group, and consequently, the more they exhibited intergroup bias. In other words, the link of ingroup interdependency and common fate perceptions to negative intergroup attitudes was mediated through ingroup identification. The same findings applied true for the Alevi participants weakly. Accordingly, it can be concluded that *H3* was confirmed for the interdependency and common fate dimensions, whereas it was rejected for the ingroup boundary-making and essentialism perceptions. Besides, ingroup identification was expected to intensify intergroup bias by increasing outgroup entitativity (*H4*). Among non-Kurds and Sunnis, ingroup identification led to an increase in outgroup boundary-making perceptions, resulting in heightened levels of intergroup bias. However, outgroup entitativity did not act as a mediatory mechanism in the identification-prejudice link for the remaining entitativity dimensions. As a consequence, *H4* seemed to be supported only for the boundary-making dimension of outgroup entitativity.

4. GENERAL DISCUSSION

This research aimed to understand how ingroup and outgroup entitativity might influence negative intergroup relations across ethnic and religious divides in Turkey. For this purpose, first, on what basis different social category types are construed as entitative bodies were qualitatively probed in Study 1. Second, by drawing on the salient construct domains from this study, a novel, ethnicity-based entitativity scale was developed in Study 2. The ratings on the scale were used to examine the interethnic disaffection between Kurds and non-Kurds and the intersect tension between Alevis and Sunnis. Both ingroup and outgroup entitativity were treated as the potential predictors of intergroup bias for the four different participant groups. Besides, ingroup identification as a mediatory mechanism in the association between ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias and outgroup entitativity as another mediatory mechanism in linking ingroup identification to intergroup prejudices were also tested within the scope of Study 2. In this chapter, the findings are discussed concerning the measurement of entitativity and its role in shaping intergroup relations. Next, the shortcomings of the research as well as suggestions for future studies are considered.

4.1. The Measurement of Entitativity

Although there are various entitativity scales in the literature (e.g., Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003; Lickel et al., 2000; Rutchick et al., 2008; Rydell & McConnell, 2005; Sacchi et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, et al., 2007), their psychometric qualities have not been adequately described or empirically tested (Zyphur & Islam, 2006). Only a few entitativity scales have resulted from measurement-focused studies (e.g., Roets & Van Hiels, 2011; Blanchard et al., 2020; Zyphur & Islam, 2006). Due to the difficulty of measuring the construct directly, many researchers preferred manipulating rather than measuring the entitativity (e.g., Crawford et al., 2002; Dasgupta et al., 1999; Gaertner & Schopler, 1998). There are two major approaches to the measurement of entitativity. The first one relates to measuring what entitativity *is*, based on its conceptual definition (i.e., the generic entitativity measures). The second one relates to measuring what entitativity *is about*, based on the correlates of entitativity (i.e., the cue-based measures). The entitativity scale proposed in the present study was developed in line with the latter approach, whereas the items concerning

the former measurement approach were used in the scale validation. Regarding the tests of the reliability and validity of the instrument, the newly offered scale can be said to be a psychometrically adequate measure of the entitativity of ethnic categories.

Many researchers have described entitativity as comprising of two components (e.g., Brewer et al., 2004; Ip et al., 2006; Rutchick et al., 2008; Yzerbyt et al., 2000): essence (i.e., the similarity of group members) and agency (i.e., the collective action capacity of group members in pursuing their shared goals). In addition, by referring to the group cohesion and the importance of the group, Agadullina and Lovakov (2017) suggested a third component to entitativity, namely unity. Unlike the previous theoretical approaches in unfolding the elements of entitativity, entitativity was represented in the currently proposed scale by four factors: interdependency, boundary-making, common fate, and essentialism. According to the first factor, an ethnic group is perceived as a coherent whole when members are emotionally connected and could function as an agentic unit under their long-standing shared beliefs, culture, and traditions. According to the second factor, a group perceptually becomes an entitative body when group members attempt to maintain the psychological and social boundaries between themselves and other groups. According to the third factor, a group is seen as a distinct unit when group members are subjected to common treatment in society. According to the fourth factor, a group is viewed as highly entitative when group members are assumed to possess quasi-biological connections among themselves. The conceptual structure of entitativity validated in the present study did not correspond to the classical homogeneity- vs. agency-based entitativity distinction. The items representing the group characteristics of homogeneity, solidarity, collective goals, agency, and continuity loaded onto the interdependency dimension. When we look at the qualitative categories in Study 1, it is evident that some of the elements that make ethnic group members similar to each other are the cultural traits such as values, culture, traditions, and beliefs that are at the same time thought to emotionally tie group members together, steer them towards collective actions, and contribute to their temporal endurance. In considering the findings of Study 1 and 2 together, one can assert that there might not be a clear demarcation between the similarity of group members and their agentic qualities, at least for ethnic categories.

As stated above, many different cue components (e.g., solidarity, interaction, agency, homogeneity, or continuity) loaded together onto the common factor of interdependency. This particular entitativity dimension seems to provide evidence for the validity of the common scale approaches in the literature through which a total entitativity score is

computed by adding up the group ratings on similar cue components. In addition to the interdependency, the present study also suggested three additional entitativity features. The boundary-making refers to the group members' distinctiveness claims in separating themselves from others either categorically or through social isolation. As ethnicity is determined by the group's capability of maintaining its boundaries regarding others (Barth, 1969), it is understandable why boundary-making as a unique entitativity dimension emerged in this study. Yet, ethnicities can also be perceived as entitative based on the external events or forces that affect all members (Campbell, 1958). Accordingly, the common fate emerged as another component of entitativity in the present study. Group members are likely to turn into a perceptual unit as they are believed to be similarly affected by the same external events or forces, including being treated similarly in society by their identity or being categorized by others as a separate group. Concerning the "Common Fate" qualitative category that emerged in Study 1, it can be stated that perceivers generally associated minority members with the damaging treatments that they receive in social life, such as prejudice, discrimination, or stereotyping. Even though the scale included very general or neutral statements about shared outcomes (by not referring to the content or nature of the probable common outcomes), those general items likely aroused the examples of negative events that befall minority members in the participants. As thinking people in groups or categorizing them as separate groups were considered to be a kind of discrimination in Study 1, it is understandable why the items about general common outcomes and the items about the belief that the target groups are viewed as separate groups by outgroup members loaded together onto the common fate. As the last component, the essentialism also represented the construct domain of entitativity (at least of ethnic categories) in that an underlying biological essence might provide the group with more identifiable boundaries (Hamilton, 2007).

Based on the current studies, specific suggestions about the generic entitativity measures can also be made. As the word group might have negative connotations in daily usage, especially when it refers to socially sensitive groups, researchers who employ generic entitativity measures should refrain from using direct items about the perceived "group" ness. For the socially sensitive categories, the questions like whether category X is a group or not might be interpreted as discriminatory by certain participant profiles (especially the ones that are more tolerant or belong to minority groups). To combat social desirability or reactivity concerns, researchers should evaluate the general group unity without openly

referring to the groupness issue in their questions (for alternative generic entitativity measures, see Hamilton, 2007).

The findings of Study 1 are also valuable in helping researchers to come up with their own entitativity item sets concerning different social category types. Using the particular qualitative categories concerning the ethnic (and ethnoreligious) categories that emerged in Study 1, a category-specific (ethnicity-based) entitativity instrument was offered in Study 2. Future researchers might also inductively develop other category-specific entitativity tools by utilizing the essential qualitative themes concerning the remaining social categories (e.g., gender or political categories). Since the entitativity instruments in the literature are not category-specific, many items that are most suitable for evaluating the entitativity of small groups are also employed for large-scale groups. However, those items might not address the entitativity of social categories efficiently. For example, as it generally applies to small scale groups (e.g., families or task groups), the degree of interaction in the group might be irrelevant for the entitativity of social categories, or it might not mean the same thing when used for social categories. However, when this item is adjusted to measure the nature of intragroup climate among the social category members, for example, by referring to intragroup solidarity or the resistance to intrusion, such items might make more sense for social categories. The same situation also applies to the items about the collective agency. It might be difficult to imagine that all members of a broader social category (e.g., a nation, an ethnic group) endorse some goal and collectively strive to succeed in this aim (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018). This conception of collective agency might be more pertinent to small-scale groups. However, when items about joint agency are revised regarding the goals specific to the members of social categories (e.g., collective continuity, development, or social impact), potential perceivers or respondents can more aptly evaluate the agentic qualities of the social category members.

4.2. Intergroup Bias as Dependent on Ingroup Entitativity

In Study 2, at the correlational level, all ingroup entitativity dimensions were positively associated with ethnic ingroup identification among Kurds, and those factors (except essentialism) were also linked to religious belief group identification among Alevis. However, when those factors were simultaneously considered, only the interdependency and common fate factors were robust and persisted in predicting ingroup identification in both

groups. According to Parenti (1967), "[F]ew things so effectively assure the persistence of in-group awareness as out-group rejection" (p. 723), and much of the ethnic solidarity is a defensive reflex against marginalization. For example, in the case of Kurds, the state's national building attempts have threatened Kurdish human rights, language, and culture, resulting in strong objections and reinforced ethnic solidarity among Kurdish people (Şirin, 2013). Similarly, Alevis have also united against the increased Sunnism-based activities in the 1980s and initiated highly influential Alevi associations to convey their religious and cultural demands (Şen, 2018; Van Bruinessen, 2006).

Awareness of prejudice directed towards one's group is likely to foster a sense of group consciousness and linked fate in the members of marginalized groups (Sanchez, 2006). According to the rejection-identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999), refusal by a dominant group increases the dependence of minority members on their group identity to build a more positive self-concept and thereby protect them from the harmful effects of discrimination. Among African Americans, while attributions to prejudice negatively impacted their well-being, it was linked to increased well-being through greater ingroup identification (Branscombe et al., 1999). In light of these theoretical and empirical considerations, it might be understandable why ingroup entitativity (mainly based on the interdependency and common fate factors) led to increased ingroup identification among Kurds and Alevis in the present study. As a side note, the institution of *musahiplik* (religious brotherhood) in the Alevi culture can be questioned in the future for its role in increasing entitativity perceptions and thus strengthening ingroup identification among Alevis.

Compared to the dimensions of interdependency and common fate, the social identity value of boundary-making and essentialism might be somewhat vague in the eye of minority members. For example, Kurds are heterogeneous in that some Kurds strive to be recognized as a distinct ethnicity in Turkey, but others see themselves as less Kurd or not Kurd at all (Van Bruinessen, 2006). In addition, Kurds sometimes blame one another for being assimilated based on their inability to speak the Kurdish language or their adaptation into modern life by putting aside their Kurdish roots and traditions (Mengünoğlu, 2006). Accordingly, some Kurds might be eager to construe the ingroup as entitative in their boundary-making efforts and essential qualities. On the contrary, assimilated Kurds might not attribute boundary-making actions to the ingroup or essentialize it since their Kurdish identity has melted into the national identity. In addition, the items on the boundary-making factor disclose the possible separatist claims of minority groups in drawing boundaries

regarding outgroup members. Those items are likely to evoke social desirability concerns; consequently, some minority members might have refrained from rating the ingroup high on this factor, not being seen as discriminatory. Due to the possible variations among minority members in interpreting the related items, the expected association between the boundary-making and essentialism factors and ingroup identification might not have been confirmed in this study.

Ingroup entitativity determines not only people's identification levels but also their intergroup attitudes. Ingroup entitativity was posited to predict anti-majority attitudes among ethnic and religious minority groups in Study 2. The two separate outcome variables were examined during the hypothesis testing. The first one was affective ingroup bias, manifesting greater liking for the ingroup over the target outgroup and does not necessitate outgroup derogation. The second was social distance towards the target outgroup, which is directly concerned with antipathy towards outgroup members. In providing partial support to the study prediction, among Kurds, all the entitativity dimensions except for essentialism positively predicted affective ingroup bias, whereas only the boundary-making dimension was predictive of social distance towards Turks. Since high ingroup entitativity might reduce outgroup derogation by increasing the perceived efficacy of the ingroup (Yzerbyt et al., 2000), it might be explicable why the many dimensions of ingroup entitativity positively predicted affective ingroup bias, whereas it failed to predict social distance. In contrast, since the boundary-making factor might have corresponded to the distinctiveness claims of Kurds in maintaining their intergroup boundaries, this dimension might have emerged as the only predictor of social distance.

Regarding the Alevi participants, the hypothesized link between ingroup entitativity and anti-majority attitudes was not confirmed for any entitativity factors concerning affective ingroup bias. It was confirmed only for the essentialism factor relating to their social distance towards Sunnis. Since Alevis as a community prioritize the values of secularism, democracy, and tolerance (Erdemir, 2005; Poyraz, 2005), their value system might have been loosening the expected association between their ingroup entitativity perceptions and anti-majority bias. Verkuyten (2003) emphasized the potential role of essentialism as a means towards identity expression among minority members. In presenting the minoritized identities as immutable and deeply rooted in natural causes, ingroup essentialism might foster positive group identity among minority members by facilitating the sense that the identity has arisen from a stable and meaningful community

(Mandalaywala, 2020). Even though previous studies revealed a positive association between ingroup essentialism and ingroup identification (e.g., Lickel et al., 2000; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2000), this link was confirmed only for Alevis in the present research at the correlational level. However, when all entitativity dimensions were treated as the simultaneous predictors of ingroup identification, as stated above, essentialism seemed to lose its predictive power even in the dataset of Alevis. Yet, ingroup essentialism positively predicted anti-majority attitudes among Alevis. For the minority group members, ethnic minority group essentialism was positively correlated with support for multiculturalism (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). In this respect, minority members can adopt ingroup essentialism beliefs in challenging existing social hierarchies. The positive association between ingroup essentialism and anti-majority attitudes among Alevis in this study might also be interpreted as a means towards their questioning the Sunni majority.

As social identification might lead to intergroup bias in high-conflict intergroup settings (Brewer, 2007; Brown & Zagefka, 2005; Ellemers et al., 1997; Hogg, 2012; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), as another hypothesis of Study 2, the link between ingroup entitativity and anti-majority attitudes was proposed to be mediated through ingroup identification. In testing this hypothesis, a composite negative intergroup attitudes score was computed based on participants' affective ingroup bias and social distance scores. The hypothesized mediatory paths were confirmed in the dataset of Kurdish participants concerning the ingroup interdependency and common fate factors. However, among Alevis, given the unstable association between ingroup identification and anti-majority attitudes, the hypothesized mediatory links were weakly confirmed for the interdependency and common fate factors. It seems like ingroup entitativity influences negative intergroup attitudes directly and indirectly by fostering ingroup identification. Especially when outgroup members are perceived to push members of the ingroup into a harmful situation, thereby imposing a common fate on them, ingroup members likely react to such actions with negative intergroup attitudes or actions (Moscatelli & Rubini, 2013). As out-group rejection is likely to promote group consciousness, intragroup solidarity, and strong ingroup identification among the members of discriminated groups (Parenti, 1967; Sanchez, 2006), ingroup entitativity seemed to affect the degree of anti-majority attitudes by increasing ingroup identification. However, in the present research, only the entitativity of minority groups was addressed. In penetrating the intergroup dynamics better, future studies should address how the direct and

indirect effects of ingroup entitativity on intergroup bias might change concerning the entitativity of majority groups.

4.3. Intergroup Bias as Dependent on Outgroup Entitativity

Considering entitativity within a multicomponent model might help researchers understand which aspects of outgroups are perceptually more salient in viewing them as entitative bodies. In Study 2, the perceived entitativity of minority groups (i.e., Kurds & Alevis) was hypothesized to predict anti-minority attitudes among non-Kurds and Sunnis. Providing partial support to the study expectation, for the two different outcomes variables (i.e., affective ingroup bias & social distance), only the boundary-making dimension of outgroup entitativity predicted the non-Kurds' and Sunnis' negative intergroup attitudes. In other words, among the four constituents of entitativity, the perceived boundary-making efforts emerged to be the most salient outgroup characteristics, which led to more significant anti-minority bias among the participants.

In high-conflict intergroup settings, outgroup entitativity judgments might be more appealing to the highly identified members in rationalizing their heightened negative intergroup attitudes (Licata et al., 2012; Stenstrom et al., 2008). Accordingly, among non-Kurds and Sunnis, outgroup entitativity was expected to play a mediatory role in the link between ingroup identification and intergroup bias in Study 2. This hypothesis was confirmed only for the boundary-making dimension but not for the remaining entitativity dimensions in both participant groups. Outgroup entitativity, as expected, has provided a fertile ground for justifying prejudices. However, highly identified majority members appeared not to benefit from the outgroup entitativity based on interdependency, common fate, and essentialism. The only way the outgroup entitativity might legitimize their prejudicial conduct appeared to be through construing the minority members based on their boundary-making efforts.

There are parallelisms and intersections between Turkey's Kurdish and Alevi movements (Şirin, 2013; Van Bruinessen, 2006). Kurds in Turkey have been perceived to protect their own ethnic identity, culture, and language instead of accepting Turkish nationalism (Dixon & Ergin, 2010). Accordingly, negative attitudes towards Kurds might be linked to their perceived deviation from the standards of the Turkish superordinate identity (Taşdemir & Öner-Özkan, 2016a; Yıldız, 2012). The Alevi communities have also put a

great effort to protect their boundaries regarding their Sunni neighbors for the past centuries (Van Bruinessen, 2006). In addition, after the 1980 coup, the military nurtured a conservative Sunni Islam to combat the Islamist and communist radicalism threat (Karademir & Şen, 2021; Şen, 2018); Alevis became more conscious of their non-Sunni identity. As a consequence, the Alevi revival has been transformed into a religious-cultural movement with "the emergence of a wider Alevi identity transcending the various Alevi communities, the efforts to reconstruct Alevi belief and ritual at the supra-local level, and a discourse on Alevism as a type of ethnicity" (Van Bruinessen, 2006, p. 20). Relatedly, the case of Alevis in Turkey can also be interpreted as a tension between Alevis' religious-cultural demands and the state's resistance to their recognition as a distinct faith and culture (Karademir & Şen, 2021; Şen, 2018). Based on the sociopolitical developments in Turkey's near history, why higher non-Kurdish ethnic identification and Sunni identification led to anti-minority bias through increased minority boundary-making attributions in the present study might become more understandable. For the highly identified members, likely, the sociopolitical activities of Kurds and Alevis in protecting their boundaries regarding others are cognitively more accessible. Consequently, they develop negative attitudes towards Kurds and Alevis, perceiving them as distinct entities based on their boundary-making efforts.

Besides, minority boundary-making attributions might help majority members abdicating the responsibility for their prejudices. If minority members are deemed to differentiate or isolate themselves regarding others, then they themselves become responsible for how they are treated in society. That is, in their distinctiveness claims, minorities themselves might be believed to prepare an appropriate ground for intergroup tension in society. In this respect, perceived boundary-making efforts from the minority groups might help majority members avoiding the responsibility of their anti-minority attitudes and instead taxing the minority members for negative intergroup relations. As a confirmation to this prediction, in a study by Bağcı and Çelebi (2017b), holding outgroup members for potential intergroup conflict was found to play a partial mediatory role in the link between ethnic identification and intergroup bias. On the whole, perceiving minority groups as coherent units regarding their boundary-making efforts might be a form of other-blaming practice through which majority members could sustain positive ingroup identities in ethnic and religious terms (Abrams et al., 2021).

Except for minority boundary-making perceptions, other outgroup entitativity components neither predicted anti-minority attitudes nor played a mediatory role in the

identification-prejudice link in the present research. Previous studies have shown that prejudice towards social categories was only associated with the homogeneity-based entitativity but not with the interaction- or agency-based entitativity (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). As ethnicities or ethnoreligious groups are broad social categories, from the outgroup perspective, it might be somehow difficult to imagine all the category members are in contact, tied to each other, and organized to accomplish their goals. This difficulty might account for the lack of an association between outgroup interdependency and intergroup bias in the current study. However, even though it was not associated with intergroup bias indicators, the minority interdependency perception might be related to more positive intergroup indicators, such as support for minority rights or multiculturalism. Future studies might specifically address the impact of the minority entitativity perceptions for its role in producing more integrative attitudes among majority members.

As shown in Study 1, when openly asked about what kinds of common events the minority members might be experiencing in society, perceivers generally linked the fate of minorities together based on their experiences of social marginalization and discrimination. Some studies have demonstrated that awareness of prejudice might decrease negative attitudes towards disadvantaged groups (Powell et al., 2005; Spanierman et al., 2008). In a related vein, Turkish people who believe that Kurds often experience ethnic discrimination in society perceived less outgroup threat and thus felt more favorable and supportive towards minorities (Bagci et al., 2017). Accordingly, one might have expected to observe a negative association between minority common fate attributions and anti-minority bias. However, the present results did not confirm this prediction in either the non-Kurds' or the Sunnis' datasets. While minorities gave utmost importance to their shared destiny in judging the ingroup entitativity, the majority members seemed to overlook the common fate dimension in construing minorities as entitative bodies. From the majority viewpoint, accepting the possibility that minority members experience common outcomes (possibly negative treatment) under their shared identity might mean that the majority members are responsible for the marginalization of minority members. Accepting that minority members share a common fate might pose a self-esteem threat for majority members. This concern might be causing a dilemma for them in accepting or rejecting the common outcomes concerning minority members. As probable evidence of this dilemma, informing participants with low levels of discrimination against Kurds helped the Turkish majority to develop more positive

outgroup attitudes (Bagci et al., 2017). As majority members might be inclined to over or underestimate the prevalence of common adverse outcomes concerning minorities, the hypothesized link between common fate and intergroup bias might have been failed to be confirmed in the present study.

Although outgroup essentialism is expected to predict prejudice at the theoretical level (e.g., Allport, 1954), the literature has yielded mixed support for this prediction. Some studies found no significant association between essentialism and prejudice (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000; Verkuyten, 2003). In contrast, psychological essentialism positively predicted implicit and explicit prejudice against African Americans (Chen & Ratliff, 2018). The link between racial essentialism and prejudice was mediated through the greater endorsement of social hierarchies and inequality (Mandalaywala et al., 2018). However, in a study by Andreychik and Gill (2015), intergroup prejudices were found to be predicted by bio-behavioral essentialism (i.e., believing that their shared essence determines group members' behavioral tendencies), but not by bio-somatic essentialism (i.e., assuming that group members' physical qualities originate from a shared biological core). In line with the theoretical definition of entitativity, the currently-developed essentialism items were concerned with the necessary conditions of a group membership. Yet, the null finding of the relationship between minority essentialism and anti-minority bias in the present study might be associated with the fact that those items did not tap into bio-behavioral essentialism.

In addition, the essentialism-prejudice link was found to be moderated by some other critical variables. For example, by manipulating essentialist thinking, Keller (2005) found that the essentialist mindset led to increased levels of prejudice only among people who were high on general belief in genetic determinism. Similarly, the essentialism-prejudice link was also moderated by the degree of certain stereotype contents. The less moral and colder Turks perceived Kurds, the stronger biological essentialism was associated with social distance towards Kurds (Yücel, 2018). This finding might be implying the likelihood that biological essentialism functions like a cementing mechanism in consolidating already-existing negative attitudes (Andreychik & Gill, 2015). These findings bring us about to the polarization hypothesis (Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003), which proposes that outgroup entitativity is not negative in itself. It might be associated with either positive or negative intergroup outcomes depending on the nature of intergroup relations.

The association of outgroup entitativity with negative intergroup attitudes was not confirmed for all entitativity dimensions but boundary-making. Accordingly, it can be stated that participants might have experienced uncertainties in interpreting the present entitativity dimensions (except for boundary-making). Remember that in Study 1, both Kurds and Alevis were seen as striving to maintain their sociocultural characteristics. This goal might be seen as something neutral or positive for relatively tolerant majority members. However, people against multiculturalism might perceive the minority continuity as a threat to social cohesion or national unity. Even though there are past findings providing evidence for a direct association between outgroup entitativity and prejudices, the current null results might be indicating the importance of certain moderating mechanisms in shaping how entitativity relates to biases. Future researchers could unearth such moderating mechanisms in understanding the implications of outgroup entitativity for intergroup relations.

Overall, the present findings might illuminate how entitativity-related prejudice reduction strategies could be designed in the future. Given that common fate and interdependency judgments concerning outgroups might contribute to positive intergroup attitudes, it might be helpful to increase the visibility or distinctiveness of minority groups on these entitativity dimensions. In contrast, especially for highly prejudiced people, construing outgroups as entitative based on their boundary-making efforts or essential qualities might worsen intergroup prejudices. Accordingly, fostering a minority image focusing on their readiness and willingness for intergroup contact might help the majority members de-entify minority groups and decrease their anti-minority attitudes.

Last but not least, the intergroup implications of the reciprocity between the ingroup and outgroup entitativity perceptions can also be discussed in light of the present findings. The results revealed that the group's interdependency and common fate aspects are perceptually more salient for ingroup members, whereas the group's boundary-making efforts are perceptually more salient for outgroup members. As perceivers from different group identities seem to attend to varying aspects of the same perceptual unit, it is possible that the perceptions of ingroups and outgroups mutually flourish each other's negative intergroup attitudes in a vicious circle. Aligning the perceptions of different perceivers about the same target on a middle ground (by not overlooking the functional value of certain perceptual judgments) might help decreasing intergroup prejudices. In addition, the present findings of the perceptual salience of different group properties from the ingroup and outgroup viewpoints might also be critical in understanding the intergroup causal

attributions. According to the current findings, ingroup members are more likely to prioritize the situational determinants of their entitativity as implicated in the salience of the common fate dimension for them. In contrast, outgroup members are more likely to attend to dispositional qualities of the target group as implicated in the salience of the boundary-making dimension for them. All in all, this finding might mean that ingroup representations are situationally defined, whereas outgroup representations are dispositionally defined. Such a critical ingroup-outgroup difference might be a potential explanatory mechanism for the ultimate attribution error, according to which the negative behaviors of the ingroup are situationally explained and those of the outgroup dispositionally explained (Pettigrew, 1979). In line with this reasoning, prospective studies can question the link between group perception and intergroup attributions.

4.4. Limitations and Future Directions of Research

Several shortcomings of the present research should be acknowledged. Initially, limitations concerning the currently proposed entitativity scale can be discussed. First, the ratings of ingroup and outgroup members on the scale items were merged during the factor analysis since the main aim was to understand the ethnic (and ethnoreligious) categories overall. However, different group properties might take precedence over others in judging groups from the perspectives of ingroup and outgroup members. For example, the importance of the group was more critical for ingroup entitativity than for outgroup entitativity. In contrast, intragroup interaction was more relevant to outgroup entitativity than ingroup entitativity (Lickel et al., 2000). Yet, the general patterns of intercorrelations among the entitativity items seemed to be highly similar for ingroups and outgroups in the present study and Lickel et al.'s (2000) study, implying that the data merging might be a suitable statistical approach during the factor analysis. Second, while the scale reliabilities at the total score and sub-scale levels were pretty well in all participant groups, the internal reliability of essentialism was found to be less than ideal for the Kurdish participants. In further studies, adding some novel items to this scale can be suggested to increase its reliability. Third, confirmatory factor analyses should also be done with independent samples to test the entitativity measure's factor stability. Fourth, the scale was tested in the particular sociopolitical context of Turkey. Even though people's beliefs about the entitativity of social categories are universal (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018), there is still a need for cross-cultural evidence in confirming the factor structure of the proposed scale for other ethnic categories

and in other countries. Fifth, the applicability of this entitativity scale to different social category types is also worth testing in prospective studies. Other than the entitativity of ethnic or ethnoreligious communities, this scale appears useful in addressing national groups' entitativity. It is because nationalism can manifest as ethnic nationalism in defining national group membership based on quasi-biological connections among category members (Pehrson et al., 2009), with a particular focus on common language, culture, history, and homeland, and by ideologically valuing the conservation of national independence, unity, and identity (Smith, 2001). People might define themselves at various levels of categorization (e.g., national vs. sub-national; Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 2012), and defining oneself at the group and more inclusive levels might have different intergroup outcomes (e.g., Bağcı & Çelebi, 2017b; Licata et al., 2012). Accordingly, questioning the role of national entitativity might further expand what we know about the consequences of national identifications. In addition, even though ingroup entitativity might increase individuals' ingroup identification levels, Castano, Yzerbyt, and Bourguignon (2003) speculated that excessive ingroup entitativity might overwhelm individuals and lead group members to dis-identify with the ingroup. In this respect, we can expect to obtain a curvilinear rather than a linear association between ingroup entitativity and ingroup identification. Testing this speculation for the implications of national identities, especially for minority members, can also bring about fruitful perspectives.

When interpreting the study results, it should be noted that the study predictions were tested with the correlational data. However, understanding the causal links among the study variables requires experimental designs. Yet, due to Turkey's delicacy of societal polarizations, certain predictor variables (e.g., ethnic or religious identification levels) do not apply to experimental manipulation. Even though the proposed models yielded considerable support for the study predictions, there might be other theoretically plausible reverse causality models. Even though ingroup entitativity was tested as an antecedent of ingroup identification in this study, some researchers highlighted the possibility that ingroup identification precedes ingroup entitativity (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1993; Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002; Yzerbyt et al., 2000). In a similar vein, while outgroup entitativity was hypothesized to contribute to negative intergroup outcomes in the present study, the link between outgroup entitativity and prejudice might be complex and bi-directional (e.g., Newheiser et al., 2009). Nonetheless, the ecologically valid results of Study 2 appear to be compatible with experimental studies illustrating the causal precedence of

ingroup entitativity over ingroup identification (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003; Moscatelli & Rubini, 2013) and that of outgroup entitativity over negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003; Dasgupta et al., 1999). Longitudinal studies can be a viable alternative to experimental designs, yet, as far as I know, no relevant longitudinal data have examined the intergroup relations in Turkey. Besides, since people are reluctant to admit that they might hold prejudiced opinions about socially sensitive groups (Kuklinski et al., 1997), to combat social desirability pressures, future laboratory studies might employ implicit prejudice measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) or the Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne et al., 2005).

In addition, the present findings should be interpreted in the contemporary polarized environment of Turkey. Within the last decade, the country has had to handle a chain of sweeping sociopolitical events and issues, including the 2013 Gezi protests, the presidential elections in 2014, the re-escalation of terrorism-related violence after July 2015, the unsuccessful coup attempt in 2016, and the constitutional reforms in 2017, many of which have played a role in deepening existing divisions and creating new ones, such as the Gulen movement vs. the Turkish state (Bilali et al., 2018; Çelik et al., 2017). Examining the same questions in the different sociopolitical phases of Turkey might yield quite different outcomes. Societal tensions across various divides reflect upon political polarization the most markedly (KONDA, 2019), and the political polarization in Turkey comprises tensions between Kurdish-Turkish, religious-secular, modern-traditional, and Alevi-Sunni groups (Bilgiç et al., 2014). In this respect, questioning the intergroup relations across the salient ideological faultlines in Turkey with a focus on the entitativity of political groups might be a meaningful future research avenue in understanding the social fabric of Turkey.

In addition, the data of Study 2 was collected amid an ongoing global health crisis concerning the coronavirus COVID-19 pandemics. The coronavirus disease threatens human beings in existential terms (Pyszczynski et al., 2021) and plunges them into a profound sense of uncertainty (Abrams et al., 2021). Given that entitativity judgments increased after exposure to death reminders (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Herrera & Sani, 2013) and in the face of self-uncertainty (Hogg et al., 2010; Hogg et al., 2007), the current entitativity-related findings should be interpreted with caution.

The present studies were based on non-representative samples of different participant groups, hindering the generalizability of the current findings to the rest of the country. For

example, the Alevi participants in the second study mainly represented the urbanized Alevis living in metropolitan cities of Turkey. Since urban Alevis no longer function as an isolated community and have opened themselves to the outside world, their solidarity is likely weakened than rural Alevis (Zeidan, 1999). However, by self-categorization theory, the opposite pattern might also hold; as outgroup members surround urban Alevis in their having frequent contact with the Sunni population in cities, for them, the Alevi identity might be more salient, and they are more likely to perceive the ingroup as a distinct unit compared to rural Alevis (Şirin, 2013). In this respect, conducting comparative studies on ingroup entitativity might help researchers better to understand the differences between rural and urban Alevis.

The data representativeness problem also applies true for the other datasets. While approximately 50% of the Kurdish participants participated in the study from the cities located in the Eastern and Southeastern Regions of Turkey, only 14% of non-Kurds represented the residents of those geographical regions, and nearly 60% of them were from the metropolitan cities of Turkey (e.g., Ankara, İstanbul, Konya, or İzmir). Even though many other migrant groups (e.g., ethnic Bosniaks, Laz, ethnic Georgians, or Circassians) live in the metropolises such as İstanbul, Mersin, or Adana, the locales are indifferent to the ethnic origins of those groups and do not group them according to their ethnicities. However, when it comes to the Kurdish migrants in those cities, the locales have exclusively recognized them as a separate group (Saraçoğlu, 2009). In this respect, intergroup dynamics between Kurds and Turks in the western metropolises might differ from those in the eastern parts of the country largely populated by Kurdish people. Addressing the issue from a comparative perspective across geographical lines might further expand the literature on the Kurdish-Turkish conflict. Besides, the written questionnaires applied in Turkish automatically left illiterate or non-Turkish speaking people out of the scope of the present datasets. It is worth replicating the current studies with broader samples since using representative samples to address ongoing intergroup conflicts might inspire social policies to reduce prejudices (Yılmaz et al., 2018).

Despite its weaknesses, the present research can be said to be a pioneering attempt in many respects. First, the current study is among the exceptional studies that have systematically evaluated the conceptual domain of entitativity (cf. Lickel et al., 2000; Thurston, 2012). Second, it is also unique in offering a category-specific (ethnicity-based) entitativity scale and questioning its psychometric qualities. Given the scarcity in the

measurement-focused entitativity scales (Zyphur & Islam, 2006), the currently proposed entitativity scale is expected to expand the number of social psychological studies on the implications of group perception in the future. Third, despite the well-established link between entitativity and prejudices in the literature (Agadullina & Lovakov, 2018), the present research is also exceptional in questioning how entitativity might influence intergroup relations in Turkey (for a similar attempt, see Taşdemir & Öner-Özkan, 2016b). Last but not least, the current research has vital importance in considering the ingroup and outgroup perceptions about minorities simultaneously. Different entitativity components seem to contribute to the escalation of intergroup conflict depending on perceivers' taking an ingrouper or outgrouper perspective. Relatedly, prejudice reduction attempts in rebuilding social harmony can be suggested to be tailored according to potential attendants' having a minority or majority status.

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6. APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. INFORMED CONSENT FORMS

A.1. Informed Consent Form for STUDY 1

TOPLUMSAL YAŞAMI ANLAMAK

Bu çalışma Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü öğrencisi Emine Yücel tarafından doktora tez çalışması kapsamında Prof. Dr. Cem Şafak Çukur danışmanlığında yürütülmektedir. Çalışmanın amacı Türkiye'deki farklı grupların toplumun üyeleri tarafından ne şekilde algılandığı tespit etmektir. Çalışma boyunca sizden toplumsal bir grup hakkındaki izlenimlerinizi belirtmeniz istenecektir. Birazdan size yöneltilecek olan soruların doğru ya da yanlış cevabı yoktur. Biz bu çalışmada toplumun bir üyesi olarak sizin toplumsal yaşam hakkında ne düşündüğünüzü öğrenmek istiyoruz. Bu sebeple formda yer alan **TÜM SORULARA OLABİLDİĞİNCE AYRINTILI BİR ŞEKİLDE CEVAP VERMENİZ** bizim sizin görüşlerinizi daha iyi anlamamız açısından oldukça önemlidir. Çalışmayı tamamlamak için *yaklaşık 30-40 dakika*ya ihtiyacınız olabilir.

Bu çalışmaya katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. *Çalışmanın hiçbir aşamasında sizden kimlik bilgisi istenmeyecektir*. Vermiş olduğunuz bilgiler gizli tutulacak ve yalnızca bilimsel amaçlar doğrultusunda kullanılacaktır. Çalışmada katılımcılarda psikolojik ya da fizyolojik hasara yol açabilecek herhangi bir uygulama yer almamaktadır. Ancak çalışmanın herhangi bir aşamasında rahatsızlık duyduğunuz takdirde hiçbir gerekçe göstermeden çalışmayı yarıda bırakabilirsiniz. Çalışmayla ilgili ayrıntılı bilgi almak isterseniz Emine Yücel (ey.emineyucel@gmail.com) ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz.

Gösterdiğiniz ilgi, ayırdığınız zaman ve katılımınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederiz.

Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim zaman çalışmayı yarıda kesebileceğimi biliyorum. Verdiğim bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı yayımlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum.

A.2. Informed Consent Form for STUDY 2

TOPLUMSAL YAŞAMI ANLAMAK

Değerli katılımcılar,

Bu araştırma Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi Prof. Dr. Cem Şafak Çukur danışmanlığında Arş. Gör. Emine Yücel'in doktora tezinin bir parçası olarak yürütülmektedir. Bu tez kapsamında Türkiye'deki farklı toplumsal kesimlerin (etnisite, dinî inanç, vb.) nasıl algılandığının anlaşılması hedeflenmektedir. Çalışmanın bu ayağında sizlere Kürtlerin nasıl algılandığını değerlendirmeye yönelik çeşitli sorular yöneltilecektir.

Farklı kesimler hakkındaki toplumsal algının anlaşılması Türkiye'de bir arada yaşama kültürüne ilişkin tartışma ve politikaların daha doğru ve gerçekçi bir zemine oturmasına yardımcı olabilir. Bu çerçevede yaklaşık 15-20 dakika ayırarak mevcut çalışmaya katılımınız hem biz araştırmacılar için hem de sosyal politika geliştiricileri açısından çok değerli bir katkı olacaktır.

Bu araştırmaya katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Dilediğiniz zaman çalışmadan ayrılma hakkına sahipsiniz. Araştırma fiziksel ya da psikolojik açıdan herhangi bir risk faktörü içermemektedir. Anket boyunca sizlere kimlik belirleyici herhangi bir soru yöneltilmeyecek ve araştırma ile ilgili bütün kişisel bilgileriniz gizli tutulacaktır.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak isterseniz, ey.emineyucel@gmail.com e-posta adresi üzerinden Emine Yücel ile irtibata geçebilirsiniz.

Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim zaman yarıda kesip çalışmadan çıkabileceğimi biliyorum. Verdiğim bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı yayınlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum.

APPENDIX B. QUALITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE FORM

STUDY 1

1- Size göre "grup" nedir? Toplumsal yaşamı düşünerek "grup" kavramını tanımlayınız.

2- Toplumsal yaşamda insanların farklı gruplar ekseninde sınıflandırıldıklarını görürüz. Toplumsal yaşamı bu çerçevede değerlendirdiğinizde aklınıza gelen farklı gruplar hangileridir? Lütfen bu grupları aşağıdaki boşluklara sıralayınız.

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Önceki çalışmalarda gruplardan bahsettiğimiz zaman insanların aklına gelen gruplardan bazıları <u>MEZHEP TEMELLİ</u> gruplar olmuştur. Bu çerçevede düşünerek, lütfen aşağıda yer alan <u>ALEVİLER</u> hakkındaki soruları olabildiğince ayrıntılı bir şekilde yanıtlayınız.

1- Sizce Alevileri bir grup olarak görmemize neden olan faktörler neler olabilir? Lütfen açıklayınız. Ancak, eğer siz Alevileri bir grup olarak görmüyorsanız, lütfen bunun nedenlerini de belirtiniz.

2- Size göre Alevi olmak ne demektir? Lütfen açıklayınız.

3- Bazı grupların bir üyesi haline gelmek ya da bu gruplardan ayrılmak daha kolay ya da daha zordur. Bu çerçevede düşündüğünüzde, sizce Alevilerin arasına katılmak ya da onlardan kopmak ne kadar zordur ya da kolaydır? Neden? Lütfen açıklayınız.

4- Sizce Aleviler genel olarak birbirlerine ne kadar benzerler veya birbirlerinden ne kadar farklılaşırlar? Alevilerin hangi açılardan birbirlerine benzerlik gösterdiklerini düşünüyorsunuz? Alevilerin ortak olarak paylaştıklarını düşündüğünüz özelliklerini belirtiniz.

5- Sizce Alevilerin birbirlerine olan bağlılıkları ne kadar kuvvetlidir? Neden? Lütfen açıklayınız.

6- Bazı gruplarda grup üyelerinin başından benzer olayların geçmekte olduğunu görürüz. Yani grup üyeleri, grup aidiyetleri sebebiyle aynı kaderi paylaşmaktadırlar. Bu çerçevede düşündüğünüzde, sizce Alevilerin aynı kaderi paylaştıkları ileri sürülebilir mi? Neden? Lütfen açıklayınız.

7- Sizce, Alevi olmak Aleviler açısından ne kadar önemlidir? Neden? Lütfen açıklayınız.

8- Bazı gruplarda grup üyelerinin tamamı aynı amacı benimsemişlerdir. Yani bireysel benzerlik ya da farklılıkları bir yana, grup üyelerinin onları bir araya getiren ortak amaçları vardır. Bu çerçevede düşündüğünüzde sizce Alevileri bir arada tutan ortak amaçlar var mıdır?

Var ☐ Yok ☐

Eğer yukarıdaki soruya cevabınız "VAR" ise,

a. Alevilerin sahip olduğunu düşündüğünüz bu ortak amaçlar nelerdir? Lütfen açıklayınız.
b. Sizce Aleviler bu amaçlarına ulaşmak için neler yapıyorlar? Lütfen açıklayınız.
c. Sizce, Aleviler bu amaçlarına erişmek konusunda ne kadar başarılılar? Neden? Lütfen açıklayınız.

Eğer yukarıdaki soruya cevabınız "YOK" ise, neden Alevilerin ortak amaçları olmadığını düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen açıklayınız.

Note. This form exemplifies the qualitative survey concerning Alevis. For the surveys about Turks, Kurds, Sunnis, AKP supporters, CHP supporters, working women, and covered women, the word "Aleviler" in questions was changed into "Türkler", "Kürtler", "Sünniler", "Ak Partililer", and "CHP'liler", "iş kadınları", and "başörtülü kadınlar", respectively.

APPENDIX C. DEMOGRAPHICS FORMS

C.1. Demographics Form for STUDY 1

KİŞİSEL BİLGİ FORMU

1. Yaşınız: _____

2. Cinsiyetiniz: Kadın ( ) Erkek ( )

3. En uzun süre yaşadığınız yer:

Büyükşehir ( ) Şehir ( ) İlçe ( ) Kasaba ( ) Köy ( ) Diğer ( ) _____

4. Medeni durumunuz: _____

5. Eğitim gördüğünüz üniversite/bölüm: _____

6. Kaçıncı sınıfta okuyorsunuz?

Hazırlık ( ) 1.Sınıf ( ) 2.Sınıf ( ) 3.Sınıf ( ) 4.Sınıf ( ) Lisansüstü ( ) Mezunum ( )

7. Hâlihazırda bir işte çalışıyor musunuz? Evet ( ) Hayır ( )

Çalışıyorsanız, mesleğiniz nedir?: _____

8. Bugünlerdeki sağlık durumunuzu nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?

1 Çok kötü	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7** Çok iyi

9. Bugünlerde hayatınızdan genel olarak ne kadar memnunsunuz?

1 Hiç memnun değilim	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7** Çok memnunum

10. Ailenizin ya da çalışıyorsanız sizin ortalama aylık geliriniz nedir? : _____

11. Maddi gelirinizi ne kadar tatmin edici buluyorsunuz?

1 Hiç tatmin edici değil	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7** Son derece tatmin edici

12. İnsanların kendilerini tanımlarken farklı ifadeler kullandıklarını görürüz. Siz kendinizi aşağıda belirtilen unsurlardan hangisi ya da hangileri ile tanımlamayı tercih edersiniz? (Birden fazla seçeneği işaretleyebilirsiniz)

a. Türk **b.** Kürt **c.** Çerkez **d.** Laz **e.** Arap **f.** Alevi **g**. İnsan

h. Müslüman **i.** T.C. vatandaşı **j**. Dünya vatandaşı **k**. Diğer _____

13. Dini kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?

a. Sünni **b.** Alevi **c.** Hıristiyan **d.** Yahudi **e.** Ateist/Agnostik **f.** Diğer **_____**

14. Din sizin hayatınızda ne kadar merkezî bir öneme sahiptir?

1 Hiç önemli değil	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10** Son derece önemli

15. İnsanlar siyaset hakkında konuşurken sıklıkla "sol" ve "sağ"dan bahsederler. Siz kendi siyasal görüşlerinizi aşağıdaki cetvel üzerinde nerede konumlandırırsınız? Lütfen politik duruşunuzu en iyi ifade eden sayıyı işaretleyiniz.

1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------10

Sol Sağ

C.2. Demographics Form for STUDY 2

KİŞİSEL BİLGİ FORMU

1. Yaşınız: _____

2. Cinsiyetiniz: □ Kadın □ Erkek

3. Medeni durumunuz:

□ Bekâr □ Evli □ Dul (Eşi vefat etmiş) □ Boşanmış □ Ayrı (Yasal olarak evli)

4. Eğitim durumunuz nedir?

A- Hiç okula gitmedim
B- İlkokul mezunuyum
C- Ortaokul mezunuyum
D- Lise mezunuyum
E- Şu anda üniversite öğrencisiyim (Lisans öğrencisi)
F- Yüksekokul mezunuyum
G- Üniversite (lisans) mezunuyum
H- Lisansüstü mezunuyum (Master/doktora derecem var)

5. Eğer üniversite öğrencisi ya da mezunu iseniz,

lisans eğitimi gördüğünüz üniversite: _____

lisans eğitimi gördüğünüz bölüm: _____

6. Şu anda üniversite öğrencisi iseniz kaçıncı sınıfta okuyorsunuz?

Hazırlık ( ) 1.Sınıf ( ) 2.Sınıf ( ) 3.Sınıf ( ) 4.Sınıf ( ) Lisansüstü ( )

7. Hâlihazırda bir işte çalışıyor musunuz? Evet ( ) Hayır ( )

Şu anda bir işte çalışıyorsanız, mesleğiniz nedir? _____

8. Siz dâhil hanenizde yaşayan kişi sayısı kaçtır? (Şu anda üniversite öğrencisi olduğunuz için farklı bir yerde yaşıyor olsanız bile lütfen bu soruyu sadece kendi ailenizi düşünerek yanıtlayınız.) ___

9. Hanenizdeki bütün fertlerin gelirlerini hesaba kattığınızda hanenizin aylık toplam net geliri kaç TL'dir? (Şu anda üniversite öğrencisi olduğunuz için farklı bir yerde yaşıyor olsanız bile lütfen bu soruyu sadece kendi ailenizi düşünerek yanıtlayınız.) ___

10. Aşağıdaki cetvelde "1" en alt gelir grubunu, "10" ise en üst gelir grubunu gösteriyor olsun. Türkiye'de yaşayan insanları gelir durumları bakımından bu 10 puanlı cetvele yerleştirecek olsak, siz kendinizi bu cetvelin neresinde görürsünüz?

1 ------- 2 ------- 3 ------- 4 ------- 5 ------- 6 ------- 7 ------- 8 ------- 9 ------- 10

11. Bugünlerdeki sağlık durumunuzu nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?

1 Çok kötü	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7** Çok iyi

12. Bugünlerde hayatınızdan genel olarak ne kadar memnunsunuz?

1 Hiç memnun değilim	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7** Çok memnunum

13. Şu anda hangi şehirde ikamet ediyorsunuz? _____

14. Hayatınızın büyük çoğunluğunu hangi bölgede geçirdiniz?

- Akdeniz Bölgesi
- Doğu Anadolu Bölgesi
- Ege Bölgesi
- Güneydoğu Anadolu Bölgesi
- İç Anadolu Bölgesi
- Karadeniz Bölgesi
- Marmara Bölgesi

15. İnsanların kendilerini tanımlarken farklı ifadeler kullandıklarını görürüz. Siz kendinizi aşağıda belirtilen unsurlardan hangisi ya da hangileri ile tanımlamayı tercih edersiniz? (Birden fazla seçeneği işaretleyebilirsiniz.)

( ) Agnostik ( ) Alevi ( ) Arap ( ) Ateist ( ) Caferi ( ) Çerkez ( ) Dünya vatandaşı
( ) Ermeni ( ) Gürcü ( ) Hanefi ( ) Hristiyan ( ) İnsan ( ) Katolik ( ) Kürt
( ) Laz ( ) Müslüman ( ) Nusayri ( ) Protestan ( ) Şafi ( ) Sünni ( ) Tatar
( ) T.C. vatandaşı ( ) Türk ( ) Türkmen ( ) Zaza ( ) Diğer _____

16. İnsanlar siyaset hakkında konuşurken sıklıkla "sol" ve "sağ"dan bahsederler. Siz kendi siyasal görüşlerinizi aşağıdaki cetvel üzerinde nerede konumlandırırsınız? Lütfen politik duruşunuzu en iyi ifade eden sayıyı işaretleyiniz.

1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------10
Sol Sağ

17. Din sizin hayatınızda ne kadar merkezî bir öneme sahiptir?

1 Hiç önemli değil	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10** Son derece önemli

18. Hayatınızın herhangi bir döneminde Kürtlerle/ Alevilerle iç içe olduğunuz bir bölge ya da muhitte ikamet ettiniz mi? (*Yalnızca Kürt olmayan/ Sünni katılımcılar için*)

( ) Evet ( ) Hayır

19. Günlük hayatınızda Kürtlerle/ Alevilerle ne sıklıkla iletişim hâlindesiniz? (*Yalnızca Kürt olmayan/ Sünni katılımcılar için*)

( ) Herhangi bir Kürt/ Alevi tanıdığım yok
( ) Hiç (Tanıdığım Kürtler/ Aleviler var ama onlarla hiç görüşmüyorum)
( ) Az
( ) Kısmen
( ) Fazla
( ) Çok fazla

APPENDIX D. SAMPLE EXPRESSIONS

STUDY 1

Sample expressions for subcategories concerning the entitativity of social categories

Categories and their subcategories	Sample statements
1. Groupness attribution	
It is a group	Since they [CHP supporters] consist of people who share the same political views and are united under an official organization, they can be considered a group.
It is not a group	They [covered women] are not a group as this [covering one's head] is a personal choice. Covered women have no connection to one other and do not join together for a common purpose.
2. Basis of rejecting the groupness	
The inappropriateness of the term "group"	As a Kurd, I see Kurds as a nation rather than a group. There are different groups of people within the Kurdish community.
The wrongness of grouping people	I do not see Alevis as a group; we are all human beings. It is wrong to discriminate, marginalize, or group people as Alevi-Sunni or Turk-Kurd.
3. Sociopolitical determinants of perceived unity	
Prevalence of negative stereotypes	I think there are political factors behind this [viewing Kurds as a group]. People think of it as if all the Kurds are pro-terrorism.
Discriminatory/polarized sociopolitical environment	Covered women are seen as a group because they were marginalized in society until recently.

Counter-stereotypicality	There is no group called housewives because they are considered "normal," but a working woman image is a new one that is both foreign and against the traditional social norms. As a consequence, we marginalize and perceive them [working women] as a distinct entity.
4. Group-related determinants of perceived unity	
4.1. Commonalities among group members	Turks are similar to each other. Being warriors, strong, and agile, protecting their values, and loving their country and flag are among their commonalities.
4.2. Group size: Majority vs. minority	Because Sunnis are the majority, Alevis might be seen as a contradictory group.
4.3. Self-categorization (Boundary-making efforts)	I think the main reason we see most Kurds as a separate group is that they separate themselves from our [religious] holidays, our flag, our anthem, and almost all of our national identity.
4.4. Intergroup differentiation	I sometimes see Alevis as a different group because there are many differences between our beliefs and theirs.
4.5. Importance of membership	It [being an Alevi for Alevis] is very important. It is a part of themselves; especially the sect is often acquired in the family, and it influences people's attitudes towards life, their behaviors, and fine religious distinctions.
4.6. Historical continuity	I see the CHP opposition as a group. The most important factor behind this [perception] is it's the party founded by Atatürk.

4.7. Ingroup ties	
Presence of strong ties	As they [Kurds] are kept under constant pressure, their interdependence among themselves increases.
Its nature	
Positive ingroup climate	They [Kurds] prefer to reside close to each other after migrating to metropolises. They also stick together on occasions like weddings, funerals, or patient visits.
Resistance to intrusion	I don't think they [Turks] are connected. Only if a war (a coup etc.) breaks out do they think of uniting among themselves.
Benefit maximization	I don't think their [AKP supporters'] ties are very strong since they are together just for profit.
Negative ingroup climate	I don't think they [CHP supporters] have strong ties. When there is a disagreement in the party, it is not easy for them to resolve it.
Its reasons	
Due to the majority status	Their [Sunnis'] ties are weak; the group is so big that they don't care much for one other.
Due to their joint aims & success	They [CHP supporters] might have a strong bond as they come together for the same purposes.
Due to their uniting value or belief system	The friendships and neighborly relations of Alevis are extremely strong. What keep them together are their religious beliefs.
Due to (past/present) oppression	As other people ostracize Kurds, their loyalty to one other has become very strong.
Due to the minority status	I think that the commitment [among Alevis] is very strong; since Alevis are a minority in the country, they might think they should be loyal to one other for the continuity of their sect and try to be tight-knit as much as possible.

4.8. Collective agency	
Presence of collective ideals	[Alevis' common ideals are] preserving their origins, maintaining their culture, and not living under pressure.
Presence of collective efforts	They [Kurds] teach their children about their own culture.
Collective success	I think they [Kurds] are successful [in maintaining their culture]. Despite living in metropolitan areas, they can preserve their culture and language.
4.9. Common fate	
Experiences of common fate	We can argue that CHP supporters share the same fate. It is because all the good and bad events that befall the CHP influence its supporters as well.
Its nature	
Generalization, prejudice, & discrimination	Their exposure to hate speech and discrimination in social life shows that they [Kurds] share the same fate.
Socioeconomic status	Yes, it can be proposed [that AKP supporters share the same fate]. Generally speaking, AKP supporters are the people who get jobs in good places.
Belief or value socialization	Since Turks have lived together for centuries and share the same mentality, we often make similar choices and experience a common destiny.
Collective ideals	Yes, [CHP supporters] experience a common destiny. They are Mustafa Kemal's comrades who share the same fate on the same road. They aim to commemorate Atatürk and to carry his ideas forward. For the sake of the Republic and democracy, they share the same fate.

Common life stressors	I think yes [working women share the same fate]. Let's imagine a working mother. She might have a common destiny with other working moms in terms of their responsibilities at home.
4.10. Nature of intergroup relations	
Openness to intergroup contact	Kurds are warm-blooded, loving, and hospitable people. In this respect, it is very easy to interact with Kurds. When you join them, they will not see you as separate from themselves.
Closeness to intergroup contact	They [Alevis] might choose Alevi families in their kinship relations. They generally reside in the areas where Alevis are the majority.
4.11. Membership permeability	
Objective constraints	You can interact with Kurds or establish positive relations with them, but in the end, they will remain Kurds just as we remain Circassian or Laz.
Personal constraints	I don't think it is easy to become a working woman. I think it is necessary to be an equipped and self-confident individual.
Value constraints	Leaving Sunnism is as difficult as leaving Zoroastrianism. Every religion or sect is valuable and indispensable for its believers.
Ingroup constraints	Taking off the headscarf might be condemned by other covered people. From this point of view, it is difficult to quit [being a covered woman].
Practical constraints	It is probably hard to quit being a working woman. It is because being a working woman means economic freedom, a new environment, and novel opportunities.
Structural constraints	It is difficult to become a working woman because there are still uneducated women in Turkey.

APPENDIX E. INITIAL ITEM POOL FOR THE ENTITATIVITY SCALE

STUDY 2

1. Kürtler genelde kendilerinden "biz" diye bahseder.
(*Kurds often refer to themselves as "we."*)
2. Kürtler kendilerine has farklı özelliklere sahiptir.**
(*Kurds have unique characteristics of their own.*)
3. Kürtlerin başından sırf Kürt oldukları için benzer olaylar geçer.
(*Kurds experience common outcomes just because they are Kurds.*)
4. Bir Kürt istese bile Kürt olmayı bırakamaz.
(*A Kurd cannot stop being a Kurd even when s/he wants to.*)
5. Aralarında anlaşmazlıklar olsa da, zor zamanlarında tüm Kürtler birbirlerine destek olur.
(*Although they may have conflicts among themselves, all Kurds support each other in difficult times.*)
6. Kürtler pek çok ortak özelliğe sahiptir.
(*Kurds have many common features.*)
7. Kürtler genelde kendileriyle aynı kökenden insanlarla evlenmek ister.
(*Kurdish people generally prefer endogamous marriages.*)
8. Kürtler yaşadıkları sorunların çözümü için seslerini birlikte duyurur.
(*Kurds raise their voice together for the solution of their problems.*)
9. Kürtler ortak değerlerini ve inançlarını nesilden nesle aktarır.
(*Kurds pass on their common values and beliefs from generation to generation.*)
10. Kürtler medyada (gazete, TV, sosyal medya vb.) genelde ayrı bir grup olarak ele alınır.
(*Kurds are generally treated as a separate group in the media (newspaper, TV, social media, etc.).*)
11. Kürt olmak Kürtler için önemlidir.**
(*Being Kurdish is important for Kurds.*)
12. Kürtler kendilerini toplumun geri kalanından ayrı bir grup olarak görür.
(*Kurds see themselves as a separate group from the rest of society.*)
13. Dış görünüşüne, hâl ve hareketlerine bakarak birinin Kürt olup olmadığı anlaşılabilir.**
(*Whether someone is a Kurd or not can be understood by looking at his/her appearance, manners, and actions.*)
14. Kürtler sosyo-ekonomik açıdan genelde birbirlerine benzer.**

(*Kurds are generally similar to each other socioeconomically.*)

15. Doğuştan Kürt olmayan birinin sonradan Kürt olması neredeyse imkânsızdır.

(*It is almost impossible for someone who is not born Kurdish to become a Kurd at a later time.*)

16. Kürtler genelde birbirlerinin üzüntü ve sevinçlerine ortak olur.

(*Kurds generally share in each other's sorrows and joys.*)

17. Kürtler birçok açıdan birbirlerine benzer.**

(*Kurds are similar to each other in many respects.*)

18. Kürtler Kürt olmayanlarla yakınlık kurmayı istemez.*

(*Kurds do not want to establish a rapport with non-Kurds.*)

19. Aralarında ayrılıklar olsa da, Kürtler kendileri için önemli konularda ortak hareket eder.

(*Even though there may be disagreements among themselves, Kurds act jointly on matters that are important to them.*)

20. Kürtlerin bugünkü yaşantısı ortak geçmişlerinin izlerini taşır.**

(*The present time of Kurds bears the traces of their common past.*)

21. Kürt olmayanlar genelde Kürtleri ayrı bir grup olarak görür.

(*Non-Kurds generally see Kurds as a separate group.*)

22. Kürt olmak Kürtlerin kimliklerinin önemli bir parçasıdır.**

(*Being Kurdish is an important part of Kurds' identity.*)

23. Kürtler kendilerini Kürt toplumuna ait hisseder.**

(*Kurds have a sense of belonging to the Kurdish society.)*

24. Kürtler ile Kürt olmayanlar arasında ayırt edici bir farklılık yoktur. (R) **

(*There is no distinction between Kurds and non-Kurds.*)

25. Kürtler sırf Kürt oldukları için toplumsal yaşamda aynı türden muameleye maruz kalırlar.

(*Kurds are subjected to the same kind of treatment in social life just because they are Kurds.*)

26. Kürt olarak doğan bir birey ömrünün sonuna kadar Kürt'tür.

(*An individual born as a Kurd is a Kurd until the end of his/her life.*)

27. Kürtler genellikle birbirlerini koruyup kollar.

(*Kurds generally protect and watch over each other.*)

28. Kürtler aynı kökenden geliyor olmak dışında birbirlerine pek benzemez. (R) **

(*Kurds are not much alike except for their common origins.*)

29. Kürtler kendilerinden olmayanı aralarına almak istemez.*

(*Kurds are not open to people who are not from themselves.*)

30. Kürtler gerektiğinde birlikte hareket ederek toplumsal bir etki uyandırabilir.
(Kurds can have a social impact by acting together when necessary.)
31. Kürtler dün ve bugün olduğu gibi gelecekte de var olacaktır.*
(*Kurds ever did exist, does exist, and will exist.*)
32. Kürt olmayanlar konuşurken genelde Kürtlerden ayrı bir grup olarak bahseder.
(*Non-Kurds refer to Kurds as a separate group in their speeches.*)
33. Kürtler kendilerini tanımlarken Kürt kökenlerini ön plana çıkartır.
(*Kurds bring their Kurdish origins to the fore in defining themselves*.)
34. Kürtler kendilerini "biz", diğerlerini ise "onlar" olarak görür.
(*Kurds see themselves as "we" and others as "them.")*
35. Bir insan saklamaya çalışsa bile Kürt olduğunu gizleyemez.**
(*Even if a person tries to hide it, s/he cannot hide that s/he is a Kurd.*)
36. Kürtlerin toplumsal açıdan kaderi ortaktır.
(*Kurds share a common social fate*.)
37. Kürtler dışa kapalı bir topluluktur.*
(*Kurds are a closed community.)*
38. Tüm Kürtleri bir arada tutan ortak amaçlar yoktur. (R) *
(*There are no common goals that hold all Kurds together.*)
39. Kürtler köklü bir tarihe sahiptir.*
(*Kurds have a deep-rooted history.*)
40. İçlerinden birinin yaptığı bir hata tüm Kürtlere mal edilir.*
(*All Kurds are held responsible for a bad act committed by one of them*.)
41. Sahip oldukları değerler Kürtleri bir arada tutar.
(*Their values hold Kurds together.*)
42. Kürtler genellikle Kürtlerin çoğunlukta olduğu yerlerde ikamet etmeyi tercih eder.
(*Kurds generally prefer to reside in the Kurdish-dominated areas.*)
43. Kürtler üzerinde birlikte çaba sarf ettikleri ortak amaçlara sahiptir.
(*Kurds have common goals on which they join efforts.*)
44. Kürtler sahip oldukları gelenek ve görenekleri geçmişten bugüne korumuştur.
(*Kurds have preserved their traditions and customs from past to present.*)
45. Kürtler farklılıklarıyla toplumda dikkat çeker.**
(*Kurds stand out in society with their differences.*)
46. Kürtler diğer Kürtlere karşı aidiyet duygusu besler.**
(*Kurds have a sense of belonging to other Kurds.*)

47. Kürtler ile Kürt olmayanlar birçok açıdan birbirinden farklılaşır.**

(*Kurds and non-Kurds differ in many ways.*)

Notes:

a. The word “Kurd” was changed into “Alevi” in evaluating the entitativity of Alevis.
b. “R” indicates reverse-coded items.
c. * indicates the items that were eliminated during the item analysis.
d. ** indicates the items that were eliminated following the exploratory factor analysis.

APPENDIX F. GENERIC MEASURES OF ENTITATIVITY

STUDY 2

1. Verbal Item – Wholeness/ Unity

Kürtler kendi içinde tutarlı bir "bütünü" ya da "birliği" temsil eder.
(*Kurds represent a coherent "whole" or "unity" within itself.*)


2. Verbal Item – Groupness

Kürtler bir gruptur.
(*Kurds are a group.*)

3. Pictorial Item – Perceived Unity

Aşağıda 1'den 6'ya kadar uzanan farklı resimler sunulmuştur. Her bir resmin içindeki dairelerin ayrı ayrı Kürt bireylerini temsil ettiğini düşününüz. 1 no'lu resim Kürtler arasında hiçbir ilişki ve bağlılığın olmadığını, 6 no'lu resim ise Kürtlerin tamamıyla birbirine bağlı, bir bütün olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Sizce bu resimlerden hangisi Türkiye'de yaşayan Kürtleri daha iyi yansıtır?


(*Below are the different pictures ranging from 1 to 6. Imagine that the circles in each picture represent individual Kurds. Picture 1 indicates no relationship or connection among Kurds, and Picture 6 indicates that Kurds are completely interconnected and a whole. Which of these pictures do you think best reflects the Kurds living in Turkey?*)



4. Pictorial Item – Perceived Distinctiveness

Aşağıda 1'den 6'ya kadar uzanan farklı resimler sunulmuştur. Her bir resimde solda yer alan dairenin Kürtleri, sağda yer alan dairenin ise Kürt olmayanları temsil ettiğini düşününüz. 1 no'lu resim Kürtler ve Kürt olmayanlar arasında hiçbir ilişki ya da bağlılığın olmadığını, 6 no'lu resim ise Kürtler ve Kürt olmayanlar arasında tam bir bağlılığın olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Sizce bu resimlerden hangisi Türkiye'deki Kürtler ve Kürt olmayanlar arasındaki yakınlığı daha iyi yansıtır?

(*Below are the different pictures, ranging from 1 to 6. For each picture, imagine that the circle on the left represents Kurds, and the circle on the right represents non-Kurds. Picture 1 indicates no relationship or connection between Kurds and non-Kurds, while Picture 6 indicates a strong connection between Kurds and non-Kurds. Which of these pictures do you think best reflects the affinity between Kurds and non-Kurds in Turkey?*)



Note. In measuring the entitativity of Alevis, the word "Kurds" was changed into "Alevis" for all generic measures.

APPENDIX G. INGROUP IDENTIFICATION SCALE

STUDY 2

Ethnic Identification Scale (*For the Kurdish and non-Kurdish participants*)

1. Etnik grubumun bir üyesi olmaktan memnunum.
(*I am glad to be a member of my ethnic group*.)

2. Etnik grubumun üyelerinin gurur duyacak çok şeyi olduğunu düşünüyorum.
(*I think that members of my ethnic group have a lot to be proud of*.)

3. Etnik grubumun bir üyesi olmak güzel bir şey.
(*It is pleasant to be a member of my ethnic group*.)

4. Etnik grubumun bir üyesi olmak bana iyi bir his veriyor.
(*Being a member of my ethnic group gives me a good feeling.*)

Religious Belief Group Identification Scale (*For the Alevi and Sunni participants*)

1. Dinî inanç grubumun (Alevi/ Sünni) bir üyesi olmaktan memnunum.
(*I am glad to be a member of my religious belief group*.)

2. Dinî inanç grubumun (Alevi/ Sünni) üyelerinin gurur duyacak çok şeyi olduğunu düşünüyorum.
(*I think that members of my religious belief group have a lot to be proud of*.)

3. Dinî inanç grubumun (Alevi/ Sünni) bir üyesi olmak güzel bir şey.
(*It is pleasant to be a member of my religious belief group*.)

4. Dinî inanç grubumun (Alevi/ Sünni) bir üyesi olmak bana iyi bir his veriyor.
(*Being a member of my religious belief group gives me a good feeling.*)

APPENDIX H. AFFECTIVE INTERGROUP BIAS SCALE

STUDY 2

Aşağıda duyguları nitelemek için kullanılabilecek birbirine zıt 6 farklı kelime çifti verilmiştir. Lütfen her bir duygu çiftini kullanarak sizin etnik grubunuzun üyelerine karşı hissettiğiniz duyguları en iyi yansıtan rakamı işaretleyiniz.

(*Below are six different pairs of words that can be used to describe emotions. By using each pair of emotions, please select the number that best reflects your feelings towards the members of your ethnic group.*)

Olumsuz (*Negative*)	← 1----2-----3-----4-----5-----6----7 →	Olumlu (*Positive*)
Soğuk (*Cold*)	← 1----2-----3-----4-----5-----6----7 →	Sıcak (*Hot*)
Düşmanca (*Hostile*)	← 1----2-----3-----4-----5-----6----7 →	Dostça (*Friendly*)
Mesafeli (*Distant*)	← 1----2-----3-----4-----5-----6----7 →	Yakın (*Close*)
Hoşlanmama (*Dislike*)	← 1----2-----3-----4-----5-----6----7 →	Hoşlanma (*Like*)
Kuşku (*Mistrust*)	← 1----2-----3-----4-----5-----6----7 →	Güven (*Trust*)

Note. The above-given version of this scale was used for evaluating ingroup liking for the Kurdish and non-Kurdish participants. For outgroup liking, Kurds' feelings towards ethnic Turks and non-Kurds' feelings towards Kurds were assessed. In the Alevi-Sunni divide, the Alevi and Sunni participants were asked to indicate their feelings towards Alevis and Sunnis.

APPENDIX I. SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

STUDY 2

Lütfen aşağıda verilen durumların sizde ne derece rahatsızlık uyandıracağını "1 = Hiç rahatsız olmam" ve "5 = Çok rahatsız olurum" arasında değişen seçeneklerden size en uygun şıkkı işaretleyerek belirtiniz.


(*Please indicate to what extent the following situations will cause you discomfort by selecting the most appropriate number from the options ranging from "1 = I would not feel uncomfortable at all" to "5 = I would feel highly uncomfortable".)*

1. Kürt biri ile evlenseniz *(If you married a Kurdish person)*
2. Kürt bir yakın arkadaşınız olsa *(If you had a Kurdish close-friend)*
3. Kürt bir kapı komşunuz olsa *(If you had a Kurdish next-door neighbor)*
4. Kürt biri ile aynı sokakta yaşıyor olsanız *(If you lived on the same street with a Kurdish person)*
5. Kürt biri ile aynı yerde çalışıyor olsanız *(If you worked in the same place with a Kurdish person)*
6. Kürt bir patronunuz olsa *(If you had a Kurdish boss)*

Note. The object of the items (i.e., "Kurds") was modified as "Turks" for the Kurdish participants, as "Alevi" for the Sunni participants, and as "Sunni" for the Alevi participants.

APPENDIX J. ETHICS BOARD APPROVAL

J. 1. Ethics Approval for Study 1



ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT ÜNİVERSİTESİ (AYBÜ)
ETİK KURULU
PROJE ONAY BELGESİ

Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Psikoloji Anabilim Dalı öğrencilerinden Emine Yücel'in "Türkiye'deki Farklı Sosyal Kategorilere İlişkin Grupluk Algısını Sorgulamak: Bir Nitel Yöntem Çalışması" adlı araştırması değerlendirilmiştir.


Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmuştur. ☑
Proje etik açısından geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir. ☐
Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmamıştır. ☐

AYBÜ ETİK KURULU KARARI (Etik Kurul tarafından doldurulacaktır)	
Araştırma kodu (Yıl – Araştırma sıra no)	2019 – 180
Başvuru formunun Etik Kurula ulaştığı tarih	26.04.2019
Etik Kurul Karar toplantı tarihi ve karar no	19.04.2019 – 36
Yer	Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Esenboğa Külliyesi
Katılımcılar	Formda imzası bulunan üyelerimiz toplantıya katılmıştır.

KURUL BAŞKANI, BAŞKAN YARDIMCISI VE ÜYELER:

		İMZA
Prof. Dr. Cem Şafak ÇUKUR	Başkan	
Prof. Dr. Tekin AKDEMİR	Bşk. Yrd.	
Prof. Dr. Muharrem KILIÇ	Üye	
Doç. Dr. Özge GÖKBULUT ÖZDEMİR	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ertuğrul DEMİRDEL	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Behlül TOKUR	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şule KAYA	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Birgül ÖZKAN	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Nimet YILDIRIM TİRGİL	Üye	

J. 2. Ethics Approval for Study 2



ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT ÜNİVERSİTESİ (AYBÜ)
ETİK KURULU
PROJE ONAY BELGESİ

Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Psikoloji Anabilim Dalı öğrencilerinden Emine Yücel'in "Türkiye'deki Farklı Sosyal Kategorilere İlişkin Grupluk Algısını Sorgulamak: Ölçek Geliştirme Çalışması" adlı araştırması değerlendirilmiştir.

Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmuştur.	☑
Proje etik açısından geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir.	☐
Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmamıştır.	☐

AYBÜ ETİK KURULU KARARI (Etik Kurul tarafından doldurulacaktır)	
Araştırma kodu (Yıl – Araştırma sıra no)	2020 – 39
Başvuru formunun Etik Kurula ulaştığı tarih	31. 01. 2020
Etik Kurul Karar toplantı tarihi ve karar no	05. 02. 2020 – 50
Yer	Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Esenboğa Külliyesi
Katılımcılar	Formda imzası bulunan üyelerimiz toplantıya katılmıştır.

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