THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

ETHIOPIA'S DEFENSIVE MODERNIZATION: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SETTINGS (1896-1974)

PH.D. DISSERTATION

Yihenew Wubu ENDALEW

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ankara – 2021

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Supervisor
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA

Ankara, 2021

APPROVAL PAGE

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all the data utilized in this study is collected with adherence to academic ethical considerations and all the sources consulted in producing this dissertation are duly acknowledged. I also declare that all published and unpublished works of which are not original to this work are cited and referenced in accordance with the standard of the university.

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GLOSSARY

Blattengeta: a government official at the ministerial level

Dejazmach: A political and military status that is one step lower than the title of *Ras*

Derge: A committee, which was used to refer the army officers that seized power during the Ethiopian revolution

Gebbar: it means a peasant that own tax for the ruling class, represents the land tenure system

Lij: a child (son) born from the ruling class

Negadras*:* 'Head of merchants', responsible for tax collecting responsibility

Negus: King

Niguse-Negest*:* King of Kings

Ras: literally means 'head' and it is the "highest political and military authority under the negus

Zemene Mesafint*:* 'the time of the nobility', 'the Era of the Princes'

ABSTRACT

"ETHIOPIA'S DEFENSIVE MODERNIZATION: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DOMAINS (1896-1974)"

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Ph.D., Department of International Relations
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Ethiopia's victory against colonialism and its emergence as the only independent African state at the end of the 19th -century allows us to investigate how underdeveloped states that survived colonialism entered into the international system in the face of European imperialism. This dissertation divides Ethiopian history from the beginning of the 16th-century to the late 20th-century into three phases of defensive modernization: a process that focused on preserving major domestic traits while adopting some elements of foreign modernity. The first phase of this historical process was characterized by the beginning of awareness and interest towards firearms as the result of the 16th-century involvement of Ottoman Turkish and Portuguese forces in Ethiopia siding the Adal Sultanate and the Christian Kingdom, respectively. The second phase started with the rise of Tewodros II (r. 1855-68) which also defined the beginning of the project of creating a unified Ethiopian state by establishing central authority vis-à-vis increasing encroachment of foreign powers in the Red Sea region. This epoch ended with the 1896 military victory against the Italian colonial ambition. Though success in building a strong national army remained unachieved until the late 19th-century, these two phases of defensive modernization focused on military reforms for the sake of centralizing power domestically and to deal with external threats. After assessing this historical background, the dissertation focuses on the third epoch of defensive modernization that started with the consolidation of the state formation process in 1896 to the Ethiopian revolution in 1974.

Accordingly, through the utilization of Historical Sociology in International Relations (HSIR), the data collected from primary and secondary sources is interpretatively analyzed to uncover the place of the modernization agenda in domestic politics and foreign relations of Ethiopia. In line with this objective, the dissertation focuses on the shift observed

after the assertion of independence in terms of the change in the emphasis of defensive modernization from the narrow pursuit of improved weapons to the creation of a modern state by incorporating other goals including the introduction of modern education, legal reforms, and establishment of modern state institutions. The dissertation also concentrates on how the project of defensive modernization sought to achieve this while preserving fundamental domestic institutions which mainly included the monarchy, the role of the Church, and the land tenure called *gebbar*. The finding of the dissertation shows that despite the modernization-focused foreign relations succeeded in maintaining fundamental internal characters while introducing some European modernity features, the project of defensive modernization was neither able to transform the overall underdevelopment of the state nor to build a state that could avert foreign threats.

The dissertation illustrates how internally initiated and externally precipitated state formation process resulted in the emergence of a state that was geographically segregated with complete encirclement by colonial powers that made Ethiopia dependent not only on great powers but also on the surrounding post-colonial small states. Ethiopia's experience as an independent but underdeveloped state from 1896 to the interwar period shows the challenges of the civilization criteria of statehood which in turn made the primary agenda of the ruling class assuring continuity of independence by preserving fundamental domestic features while conquering powerful foreign modernity elements. The dissertation demonstrates that Ethiopia was one of few forerunner states in terms of its attempt to ensure its existence by exploitation of foreign resources and international norms without possessing the capacity of reciprocation. Moreover, it emphasizes the attempts of reconciling tradition and progress which ultimately became self-contradictory because it created new classes that were frustrated by the general picture of the socio-economic underdevelopment and the autocracy of the monarchy. Accordingly, the end of the monarchy was brought not by the foreign threat but by the revolution led by the newly emerged sections of the society that were the very fruits of the modernization endeavor. The dissertation also focuses on how Ethiopia’s rarity in the international system ended in the post-Second World War (WWII) era following the proliferation of post-colonial states which Ethiopia became a voice of underdeveloped states at the global level.

Key Words: Defensive Modernization, Foreign Relations, Domestic Realm, Foreign Realm, Ethiopia

ÖZET

ETİYOPYA'NIN SAVUNMACI MODERNLEŞMESİ: ULUSAL VE ULUSLARARASI ALANLAR ARASINDAKİ ETKİLEŞİM (1896-1974)

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Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı
Danışman: Doç. Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA
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Etiyopya'nın sömürgeciliğe karşı kazandığı zafer ve 19. yüzyılın sonunda tek bağımsız Afrika devleti olarak ortaya çıkması, sömürgecilikten kurtulan azgelişmiş devletlerin Avrupa emperyalizmi karşısında nasıl uluslararası sisteme girdiğini araştırmamıza olanak sağlamaktadır. Bu tez, yabancı modernitenin bazı unsurlarını benimserken, belli başlı yerel özellikleri korumaya odaklanan bir süreç olarak Etiyopya tarihini, 16. yüzyılın başından 20. yüzyılın sonlarına kadar savunma amaçlı modernizasyonun üç aşamasına bölmektedir. Bu tarihsel sürecin ilk aşaması, 16. yüzyılda Osmanlı Türk ve Portekiz kuvvetlerinin Etiyopya'da sırasıyla Adal Sultanlığı ve Hıristiyan Krallığı'nın yanında yer almalarının bir sonucu olarak ateşli silahlara yönelik farkındalığın ve ilginin başlamasıyla nitelendirilmiştir. İkinci aşama, Kızıldeniz bölgesindeki yabancı güçlerin artan tecavüzüne karşı merkezi otorite kurarak birleşik bir Etiyopya devleti yaratma projesinin başlangıcını da tanımlayan II.Tewodros'un (1855-1868) yükselişi ile başlamıştır. Bu çağ, İtalyan sömürgeci hırsına karşı 1896 askeri zaferiyle sona ermiştir. Güçlü bir ulusal ordu kurmadaki başarı 19. yüzyılın sonlarına kadar elde dilememiş olsa da, savunma amaçlı modernizasyonun bu iki aşaması, gücü yurtiçinde merkezileştirmek ve dış tehditlerle başa çıkmak adına askeri reformlara odaklanmıştır. Bu tarihsel arka planı değerlendirdikten sonra, bu u tez, 1896'da devlet oluşum sürecinin konsolidasyonu başlayan savunma modernizasyonunun ve 1974'teki Etiyopya devrimi kadar savunma modernizasyonunun üçüncü aşamasına odaklanmaktadır.

Buna göre, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Tarihsel Sosyolojiden yararlanılarak, Etiyopya'nın iç siyasetinde ve dış ilişkilerinde modernleşme gündeminin yerini ortaya çıkarmak için birincil ve ikincil kaynaklardan toplanan veriler yorumlayıcı olarak analiz edilmektedir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, tez; savunma amaçlı modernizasyon vurgusunun,

gelişmiş silahların dar arayışından, modern eğitimin getirilmesi, yasal reformlar ve modern devlet kurumlarının kurulması dahil olmak üzere diğer hedefleri bir araya getirerek modern bir devletin yaratılmasına kadar olan değişimi açısından, bağımsızlık iddiasından sonra gözlenen değişime odaklanmaktadır. Tezin bulgusu, modernleşme odaklı dış ilişkilere rağmen, bazı Avrupa modernite özelliklerini tanıtırken temel iç karakterleri korumayı başardığını göstermektedir. Fakat Etiyopya'nın savunma amaçlı modernizasyon projesi, ne devletin genel olarak azgelişmişliğini dönüştürebildi ne de dış tehditleri önleyebilecek bir devlet inşa edebildi.

Bu tez, dahili olarak başlatılan ve harici olarak hızlandırılan devlet oluşum sürecinin, sömürgeci güçler tarafından tamamen kuşatma ile coğrafi olarak ayrılmış bir devletin ortaya çıkmasıyla sonuçlandığını göstermektedir. Bununla ilgili olarak, devlet oluşum sürecinin Etiyopya'yı nasıl büyük güçlere bağımlı hale getirdiğini ve aynı zamanda sömürge sonrası küçük devletlere nasıl bağımlı hale getirdiğini tartışacaktır. Etiyopya'nın 1896'dan iki savaş arası döneme kadar bağımsız ama az gelişmiş bir devlet olarak edindiği deneyim, egemen sınıfın birincil gündemini, temel yerel özellikleri korurken güçlü yabancı modernite unsurlarını fethederek bağımsızlığın sürekliliğini güvence altına alan devlet olmanın uygarlık kriterlerinin zorluklarını göstermektedir. Dahası, Etiyopya'nın, karşılıklılık yeteneğine sahip olmaksızın, yabancı kaynakları ve uluslararası normları sömürerek varlığını sürdürme çabası bakımından öncü birkaç devletten biri olduğunu göstermektedir. Buna göre, sosyo-ekonomik azgelişmişliğin genel resmi ve monarşinin otokrasisi tarafından hüsrana uğrayan yeni sınıflar yarattığı için nihayetinde kendi içinde çelişkili hale gelen gelenek ve ilerlemeyi uzlaştırma girişimlerini vurgular. Dahası, monarşinin sonunu, dış tehdit değil, modernleşme çabasının sonucu olan toplumun yeni ortaya çıkan kesimlerinin önderlik ettiği devrim getirdi. Ayrıca, bu tez Etiyopya'nın küresel düzeyde azgelişmiş devletlerin sesi haline geldiği sömürge sonrası devletlerin çoğalmasının ardından İkinci Savaş sonrası dönemde Etiyopya'nın uluslararası sistemdeki nadirliğinin nasıl sona erdiğine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Savunma amaçli Modernizasyonu, Dış İlişkiler, Yurtiçi alan, Dış alan, Etiyopya

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ESM	The Ethiopian Student Movement
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
HSIR	Historical Sociology in International Relations
IBG	The Imperial Bodyguard
IR	International Relations
LN	League of Nations
NAM	Non-Alighned Movement
OAU	Organization of African Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWI	The First World War
WWII	The Second World War

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Modernization Question in Ethiopian History

In late 19th-century, it only took few decades for European colonizers to arbitrarily scramble African territory. This brought the present more than fifty states of the continent into existence as the outcome of the decolonization process in the post-WWII era. However, the aversion of the Italian colonial ambition in Ethiopia[1] as the result of the latter's military victory at the battle of Adowa on 1 March 1896 ensured continuity of the independence that survived since antiquity. An underdeveloped Ethiopia exceptionally defeating a modern and civilized European nation was the puzzle that captivated the world.[2] This dissertation is conducted based on a conviction that investigating the nexus between the idea and practice of change and modernity is key to reveal the link between internal and foreign spheres that made Ethiopia's saliency possible. Moreover, understanding Ethiopia's success in averting colonialism and in emerging as the only free African state requires the internal and external conditions that were taking place for centuries before the advent of colonialism.

Thus, defiance against colonialism was the result of internal and external developments that were undergoing at least since the first half of the 16th-century. Ethiopian history is a history of addressing internal and foreign survival challenges. The trajectory of its history was full of attempts of avoiding internal problems that would destroy the system

[1] Though this dissertation widely uses the term "Ethiopia", it should be noted that "Abyssinia" was the historical name that was used even in the 20th century. For instance, during Ethiopia's engagement with the LN, the name Ethiopia was used seldom in comparison with Abyssinia. However, for the sake of convenience this paper employs the name Ethiopia through all period under investigation. Abyssinia was the name specifically signify the historical Ethiopia that constituted the northern portion of the current state. Accordingly, the term "Abyssinia" and the "Christian Kingdom" are only used in the discussion that focuses on the interaction of this part of Ethiopian vis-à-vis ethnically and religiously diverse population that were in continuous interaction in the region.

[2] For the fame the Adowa victory brought to the Emperor Menelik II and its effect on the global image of Ethiopia, see A Raymond, "The Battle of Adowa: African Victory in the Age of Empire," *Michigan War Studies Review* 413 (2011): 267-85.

and efforts of protecting it from foreign threats i.e., defensive modernization.[3] Seen from this perspective, the period in Ethiopian history that spanned from the beginning of the 16th-century to the late 20th-century can be roughly divided into three stages of defensive modernization. However, it should be noted that the division is based on shifts in modernization objectives, domestic contexts, and foreign relations, and it must not be taken as denying the existence of continuity across all three phases. The first period begins with the war between the Christian Kingdom and Adal Sultanate in the first half of the 16th-century and ends with the rise of Tewodros II (r.1855-68) which also marks the beginning of the project of creating a modern Ethiopian state. This was a period when the pursuit of modern weapons began as the result of exposure to the potential of advanced firearms from the involvement of Portugal and Ottoman Turkey siding the parties in the war, respectively. This period was characterized by religious conflicts, population movements, the weakening of central authority, and provincialism known as *Zemene Mesafint* (the Era of Princes).

The second phase of defensive modernization covers the time from the coming to power of Tewodros II on 11 February 1855 and ends with the abortion of the Italian colonial ambition on 1 March 1896. This was a period when a project of creating central authority was envisioned and realized under the leadership of three powerful emperors i.e., Tewodros II, Yohannes IV (r.1872-89), and Menelik II (r.1889-1913). This epoch of defensive modernization was also characterized by internal rivalry for power and coincided with the advent of colonialism and multiple foreign threats including from Egypt, Britain, Dervishes, and Italy. The pursuit for modern firearms was taken to a whole new level in this period with the attempt of manufacturing of canons by Tewodros II, effective utilization of weapons and change in combating strategies by Yohannes IV, mass mobilization and exceptional leadership by Menelik II. The period ended with successful territorial expansion and repulsion of foreign threats by the end of the -century. The third phase began with the emergence of an independent state in 1896 to the collapse of the monarchy as the result of the revolution of 1974. This period necessitated the renovation of goals of defensive

[3] The concept "defensive modernization" is used in this dissertation to refer to the context which non-colonized states employed to maintain their internal features while adopting important features of European modernity. It represents the way such states tried to exist independent in the face colonialism. Despite modernizing the military is one of this process, it may include adopting changes in the education, legal, bureaucracy, production, and other features, particularly of the European modernity. There are several states that went through this process. For example, to understand how the underdeveloped but independent Thailand state faced employed defensive modernization. See Keerati Chenpitayaton, "When Siam Faced the World: Transnational Relations and the Thai Modernizing State, 1855-1932" (The New School, 2016).

modernization by transforming it from pursuing modern weapons to the broader task of building a modern state by adopting elements of European modernity while maintaining domestic political, economic, religious, and cultural features. Though the first two phases of defensive modernization are assessed in this dissertation to give a background to the period under investigation, the study is aimed at investigating the link between the quest for modernization and foreign relations that took place during the third stage (1896-1974). Thus, this dissertation aims at analyzing the trajectories of a defensive modernization project that took place during the reigns of Emperor Menelik II, *Lij* Eyasu (r. 1913-16), Queen Zewditu (r. 1916-30), and Emperor Haile-Selassie (r. 1930-74).

Ethiopia's independence at the time of colonization may prompt us to ask a question that whether Ethiopia was an aberration in Africa i.e., whether Ethiopia as the state can be taken as the African enigma in terms of its origin and its interaction with regional and international developments. The contexts from which the Ethiopian state emerged, and prior historical events had contributed to the perception of Ethiopia especially by the Westernscholarship as a unique entity in comparison with the rest of Africa. In an article titled *Ethiopia: The "Anomaly" and "Paradox" of Africa,* Teshale Tibebu assessed how Ethiopia is depicted by the outside world mainly by the West and he concluded that there are several and contradictory views. Accordingly, given its glorious past, independence from external control, the early adoption of Christianity and Islam, the existence of a unique writing system and sophisticated political culture…etc., Ethiopia was seen as civilized and non-African. On the other hand, it was regarded as backward because of laborious thousands of years old subsistence farming, widespread poverty, repeated famines, and continuous political instability and civil strife. According to Tibebu, among the perspectives towards Ethiopia, one of the dominant views is the one that depicted it as a detached island of highlands impenetrable by the enemy. This interpretation claimed Ethiopian continuous existences as a consequence of its mountainous geographical feature.[4]

However, a comparison between Ethiopia and post-colonial African states reveals that the above "isolationist" view is exaggerated if not inconsiderable. Though the international sphere did not play an exclusive role as it did in the rest of Africa, the emergence of Ethiopia at the end of the 19th-century had also a significant international

[4] Teshale Tibebu, "Ethiopia: The" Anomaly" and" Paradox" of Africa," *Journal of Black Studies* 26, no. 4 (1996).

character. The formation of the Ethiopian state did not happen in a vacuum rather it took place simultaneously with regional and global developments that were continuously interacting with the domestic setting. Thus, the view that considers Ethiopia as a sealed-off state from the foreign sphere is not reasonable since the process of Ethiopia state formation was the result of a defensive modernization project which was taking place in close interaction with foreigners, and it was influenced by different international circumstances including colonialism. The study of modernization needs to transcend domestic-international boundary; thus, opposed to the widely held dichotomizing approach, this study aspires to uncover that the international sphere did not only serve as a resource pool to mitigate domestic military and economic retardation that persisted for centuries in modern Ethiopia but also the very formation of the state was facilitated by it.

However, the above remark should not be taken as denying the unique features of the Ethiopian state. In the words of Christopher Clapham, "Ethiopia is an odd man out among African states".[5] Beyond acknowledging deviations, neither homogenizing Ethiopia with other states nor augmenting its peculiarity will help in the attempt to understand Ethiopian foreign relations. Rather, utilizing the most appropriate theoretical and conceptual frameworks and addressing issues that matter most for the Ethiopian state and society reveals the true pictures of change and continuity in domestic politics and foreign relations. The link between modernization and foreign relations allows us to do a grand analysis that sheds a light on political, economic, social, and security issues and how they are impacted by opportunities and challenges from the foreign domain. Thus, the study of modernization and foreign relations of Ethiopia in this dissertation is founded on a broader analytical foundation that incorporates actors at the society, state, regional and international levels; and attention is directed towards understanding top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top interactions.

1.2. Review of Literature

Despite the huge importance the question of modernization played in shaping Ethiopia's internal and foreign affairs, it is one of the less investigated subjects. Let alone the link between modernization and foreign relations, IR studies on Ethiopian foreign policy are very scarce. The literature reviewed in this section is divided into two parts. First, the

[5] Christopher Clapham, "Imperial Leadership in Ethiopia," *African Affairs* 68, no. 271 (1969): 110.

literature on the study of Ethiopian foreign policy is reviewed. In the second part, the literature on the study of modernization is discussed. To begin with the first, beyond few articles that analyze Ethiopian foreign policy focusing on the policies of particular Ethiopian leaders and regimes, there is no full-fledged theoretically founded study that assesses the change and continuity in Ethiopia's foreign relations. It seems that the task of analyzing Ethiopian foreign relations is considered as the scope of historical studies. The place of the external domain in the Ethiopian domestic context is well-documented in historical studies. However, despite giving a detailed account of the history of the interaction of Ethiopian society and state with foreigners and their relevance as an invaluable source of data, such works cannot be considered as IR studies as they are not theoretically informed and lack interpretation. Little attention is given to IR in Ethiopia as an academic discipline, and the task of analyzing Ethiopia's foreign relations is taken by professionals of other disciplines.[6]

Despite the lack of systematic and theoretically informed IR studies about foreign relations of Ethiopia that analyze continuity and change across regimes, the presence of few insightful studies is undeniable. Some of these studies also have given significant consideration for the coalescing role of the question of modernization in the foreign policy of Ethiopia. For instance, a rare article written by Krishnamurthy Venkataram published in 1973 precisely captures the foundation of the foreign policy of Emperor Tewodros II. Venkataram emphasized the personal qualities of the Emperor as an enthusiastic pursuer of European technological advancement. He argued that Tewodros II had awareness about the backwardness of his country in comparison with Europe and knew developments at regional and global levels which were used as a basis for his policy. Venkataram added that the necessity to solve domestic and foreign problems prompted Tewodros II to seek out an alliance with the British Empire.[7] Fantahun Ayele also analyzed the attempt of Tewodros II to manufacture modern weapons and argued this endeavor can be taken as an example of

[6] The study of IR in Ethiopia started with the establishment of the Haile Selassie I University College in 1950 (the present Addis Ababa University). Department of Political Science and International Relations was opened as one department and continued to train students at undergraduate level until the demise of the Imperial Regime in 1974. Under the social military government or the Derge Regime (1974-1991), the focus became indoctrination with socialist ideology and attention was not given to produce experts in IR. After the overthrow of the Derge Regime, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) came to power and the study of Political Science and International Relations resumed. Currently, the other academic institutions that delivers the program is Civil Service University: an institution that mainly trains staffs of the state bureaucracy. The fact that the department of IR is available only in these two institutions in a country that has more than 30 universities shows the little attention given to it as a discipline.

[7] Krishnamurthy Venkataram, "Foreign Policy of Theodore Ii of Ethiopia: An Interpretation," *Transafrican Journal of History* 3, no. 1/2 (1973).

"translative adaptation" which refers to a process of absorbing foreign modern elements and amalgamating them with indigenous elements. In other words, Ayele presented Tewodros II's endeavors as an attempt to 'Ethiopianize' foreign modernity elements.[8]

Harold Marcus also assessed the foreign policy of Menelik II from 1896-1898 with a focus on how Menelik II's diplomatic skill was vital in dealing with European powers that were ruling the neighboring colonial states. Marcus argued Menelik II's genius enabled him to expand his territory and secure arms provision mainly from France. In Marcus's view, the alliance of Menelik II with Mahdist Sudan and France against Britain was vital in the expansion of Ethiopia's territory towards the west.[9] G. N. Sanderson also investigated the same period of Menelik II's reign and in contrary to Marcus argued that the alliance of Menelik II with the Mahdist ruler Abdullah was pursued as a strategy to discourage the colonial interest of Europeans in East Africa. Contrary to Marcus's view of the Menelik II-Abdullah alliance as instrumental for territorial expansion, Sanderson argued that the alliance was founded on anti-colonialism strategy, and he claimed that the Menelik II-France alliance was symbolic for the sake of gaining military support.[10] Gebeyehou Mekbib's *The Foreign Policy of Emperor Menelik II: Its Political and Diplomatic Significance (1869-1910)* is the most important work in comprehensively analyzing Menelik II's foreign policy including his rise to power as a *negus* (king) of Shewa before he became *Neguse-Negest* (king of kings) in 1889. Mekbib concluded that Menelik II's foreign policy motivations included the need to secure a means to win rivalry against Yohannes IV and other contenders of power, to prevent the Italian colonial ambition, and exploiting the rivalry between European powers.[11]

Probably the only theoretically informed study about the foreign policy of Emperor Haile-Selassie, Arka Abota explored how Haile-Selassie exploited the international environment to capture and consolidate power. Abota employed classical realism as a theoretical framework and provided the ego and cunning personality of Haile-Selassie as a

[8] Fantahun Ayele, "Revisiting History of Gafat: Was Emperor Tewodros's Military Reform an Attempt at" Translative Adaptation" of Western Technology?," *African Journal of History and Culture* 8, no. 4 (2016).
[9] Harold G Marcus, "The Foreign Policy of the Emperor Menelik 1896–1898: A Rejoinder," *The Journal of African History* 7, no. 1 (1966).
[10] George N Sanderson, "The Foreign Policy of the Negus Menelik, 1896–1898," ibid.5 (1964).The Foreign Policy of the Negus Menelik, 1896– 1898 G. N. Sanderson The Journal of African History / Volume 5 / Issue 01 / March 1964, pp 87 - 97
[11] Ghebeyehou Mekbib, *The Foreign Policy of Emperor Menelik Ii: Its Political and Diplomatic Significance (1869-1910)* (The George Washington University, 1978), 612-13.612-613

reason for his success in monopolizing power.[12] Even though Abota's analysis reveals the use of opportunities the international system offered to emerge triumphant in internal power competition, he only emphasized the shrewdness of Haile-Selassie as a major determinant of Ethiopian foreign policy of the time. Edmond J. Keller analyzed change and continuity in Ethiopian foreign policy of the 20th-century and concluded that the internal challenge Ethiopia faced as the result of the inability to create accommodative multiethnic states was a major determinant of foreign policy which triggered Ethiopia to pursue external recognition as a single political entity. Keller added that assuring continuity of independence and territorial integration was more vital in determining the foreign policy of Ethiopia across regimes regardless of ideological differences.[13]

Regarding the literature on the modernization process, several important works can give us an insight into its importance in the Ethiopian state. The question of modernization or development in Ethiopia is relatively well studied in fields of history, philosophy, art, and economics. Based on the approaches applied in the existing literature about the Ethiopian modernization challenge, we can divide the scholars who studied this subject into three broad groups. The first group includes scholars who tend to argue Ethiopia has its own conception of modernization. This includes scholars like Mesay Kebede, Maimire Mennasemay, and Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes. To briefly cite their ideas, in *Survival and Modernization*, Kebede articulated the modernization dilemma Ethiopia faced in the first half of the 20th-century and argued in support of the need to return back to the domestic conception of modernity which is founded on traditional values as opposed to the Westernization.[14] Mennasemay also sharply criticized Ethiopia's failed attempts to achieve development as the result of the Westernorientation of the modernization path pursued and called it "passive development" that imitated outside modern elements rather than attempting to revive domestic concepts and practices.[15]

Woldeyes also called Ethiopia's effort to achieve modernization a "native colonization" and argued that state formation and endeavors of modernization in Ethiopia

[12] Arka Abota, "Ethiopia's Foreign Policy under Emperor Haile Selassie I: An Appraisal," *Unpublished Masters Thesis* (2002).
[13] Edmond J Keller, "The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 489, no. 1 (1987).
[14] See the introduction section of Messay Kebede, *Survival and Modernization: Ethiopia's Enigmatic Present* (The Red Sea Press, 1999).
[15] Maimire Mennasemay, "A Critical Dialogue between Fifteenth and Twenty First Century Ethiopia," *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies* (2010): 2.

were characterized by the violent imposition of Westernvalues and systems on the domestic traditional setting.[16] The common element of these scholars is their rejection of European modernity as morally corrupt and not suited to Ethiopia, and they give huge importance to the domestic religious, cultural, and political heritage as a basis of contemporary Ethiopia's modernization endeavor. Though these scholars are the result of European education, most of them accord prior importance to the church education system. Since they are nostalgic of Ethiopia's past they consider the attempt to adopt the European model of state and modernization as a sign of failure. Accordingly, the period that marked the emergence of the modern Ethiopian state at the end of the 19th-century is considered by the authors in this group as the peak of the deviation from valued internal traits of Ethiopian civilization.

The second group constitutes authors who are engaged with critical analysis from perspectives of different fields. Among them, the pioneer in analyzing Ethiopia's modernization predicament was *Negadras* Gebre-Hiwot Baykedagn (1886-1919). Studied in Germany and lived during the reign of Menelik II, *Lij* Eyasu, and Queen Zewditu, Baykedagn left critical analysis of the problems of Ethiopia's underdevelopment in the face of colonialism.[17] Elizabeth W. Giorgis is another contributor to this category. Though Giorgis approaches the subject of modernization from the perspective of visual art, her works cover important issues like the nature of the overall interaction of Westernand domestic values, how Ethiopian elites perceived the foreign sphere, and how changes in international and domestic domains brought shifts in the minds of artists and the public. She mainly argued that modernization in Ethiopia was simply regarded as becoming economically developed and Westernized.[18]

Another important scholar in the critical study of the modernization process of Ethiopia is Sara Marzagora who used Ethiopian intellectuals especially authors in Amharic literature as a major source to uncover the evolution of modernization thought in Ethiopia. Marzagora criticized the studies on modernization in Ethiopia for lack of analytical perspective and she focused on the articulation of the shift in Ethiopia's intellectual

[16] Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes, *Native Colonialism: Education and the Economy of Violence against Traditions in Ethiopia* (The Red Sea Press, 2017).
[17]The most extensively used book of him in this study is Gebre-Hiwot Baykedagn, *Atse Menelik'ena Ethiopia* [Emperor Menelik and Ethiopia] (1912).
[18]See for example, Elizabeth Wolde Giorgis, "Charting out Ethiopian Modernity and Modernism," *Callaloo* 33, no. 1 (2010).

development.[19] Another scholar who can be added here is Alemayehu Geda whose work gives particular attention to the modernization-related ideas of early Ethiopian thinkers like *Negadras* Baykedagn from the perspective of development economics.[20] In an insightful article, about the concept of modernity and its beginnings in Ethiopia, Andreas Eshete also analyzed the advent of modernity in Ethiopia and gave credit to the 1960s intellectuals of Ethiopia especially the students of the time for sparking the idea of modernity in their opposition against the monarchy.[21]

The third category of studies on modernization includes works in history, political science, and other fields that either try to provide what took place as precisely as possible or employ the state modernization discourse of the particular period they investigate. From the first type, we find Bahru Zewde's important books like *Pioneers of Change* and the *Quest for Socialist Ethiopia*. Though his works are criticized for lack of theoretical perspective and denying the shortcomings of the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) of the 1960s, his works are invaluable sources of knowledge regarding the pursuit of change by Ethiopian intellectuals since the late 19th-century.[22] Robet L. Hess's *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy* and most of Christopher Clapham's historically founded works that focus on the political economy of the time under investigation are important in making wholistic analysis both on domestic and foreign affairs.[23] Richard Pankhurst's countless contributions in a wide variety of areas of Ethiopian history are also of utmost importance in giving insights on the evolution of modernization endeavors in Ethiopia.

Generally, two things can be said regarding the available literature on the effect of modernization in terms of determining the nature of Ethiopian foreign relations. Firstly, foreign relations of Ethiopia in general and the place of modernization within it are not well investigated. In sharp contrast to the study of modernization in the areas of history and other

[19] Sara Marzagora, "Ethiopian Intellectual History and the Global: Käbbädä Mikael's Geographies of Belonging," *Journal of World Literature* 4, no. 1 (2019).
[20] Alemayehu Geda, "Ethiopian Macroeconomic Modeling in Historical Perspective: Brining Gebre-Hiwot and His Contemporaries to Ethiopian Macroeconomics Realm," in *Development Research* (Addis Ababa2004).
[21] Andreas Eshete, "Modernity: Its Title to Uniqueness and Its Advent in Ethiopia: From the Lecture What Is "Zemenawinet"?: Perspectives on Ethiopian Modernity," *Northeast African Studies* 13, no. 1 (2013).
[22]The history of early Ethiopian intellectuals and their relation with the ruling class is thoroughly investigated in Bahru Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century* (J. Currey, 2002). Zewde has also assessed the socialist orientation of the ESM in *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, C. 1960-1974*, vol. 18 (Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 2014).
[23] The attempt to modernize the monarchy is discussed in Robert L Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy*, vol. 2 (Cornell University Press Ithaca, 1970). ,Christopher Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*, vol. 61 (CUP Archive, 1990).

disciplines, full-fledged and theoretically informed IR work on foreign relations is not available. Secondly, the available few studies on the connection between Ethiopian foreign policy and modernization did not uncover change and continuity and they are confined in explaining the foreign policy of particular Ethiopian rulers and their regimes. There is no theoretically informed study that unearthed the role of modernization issues in fundamental questions in Ethiopian state formation, state-society relations, and the nexus between the domestic and international spheres. This dissertation is an attempt to fill this gap by doing a systematic analysis of the question of modernization and its effect on foreign relations of Ethiopia from 1896-1974.

1.3. Scope of the Dissertation and the Argument

As Eshete noted, European powers' scramble of Africa and the establishment of colonial administration allowed them to impose European values with the destruction of the political, cultural, and socioeconomic attributes of the native African societies. But Ethiopia was free from this direct subordination as the result of its victory against colonialism. This opportunity gave the domestic actors to design the route of modernization that was pursued as an independent state.[24] As a free state, Ethiopia's case was different from the rest of Africa as the ruling class became occupied with the task of preserving domestic traits as well as taming European modernity elements. The period from the assertion of independence to the Ethiopian revolution (1896-1974), which was described in the previous section as the third phase of defensive modernization, witnessed a relatively well-articulated and strongly founded project of selectively adopting European modernity in comparison with the first two phases. The continuous independence of the Ethiopian state while the rest of Africa was under colonization created a scenario in which the ruling class aspired to conquer powerful European modernity elements while preserving fundamental domestic features. Thus, this dissertation emphasizes on defensive modernization pursued during this time which was different from previous phases as it tried to go beyond the military-focused pursuit of modernization by additionally incorporating other goals including building state machinery, expansion of modern education, and adoption of science and technology.

[24] Eshete, "Modernity: Its Title to Uniqueness and Its Advent in Ethiopia: From the Lecture What Is "Zemenawinet"?: Perspectives on Ethiopian Modernity," 20-22.

As Geda observed, in addition to the euphoria brought by the Adowa victory, there were additional factors that made the question of modernization the main agenda after 1896. Among them were the introduction and expansion of modern education and the opportunity of studying abroad which created the first intellectuals who were inspired by the modernization of Europe and Japan. The establishment of the printing press and the debates and articulations of the modernization question on *Birahan'ena Salam* newspaper was also another factor.[25] We need to underline that the question of modernization or development in Ethiopia was also not an issue confined within the domestic realm. It was a lens through which Ethiopian elites looked towards themselves and the outside world. As Clapham correctly observed, the attempt to build a state that could endure domestic and foreign threats of survival had remained the major objective of leaders and elites of Ethiopia. Thus, the attempt to build a modern state has been characterized by a search for a modernization model in the world that could be duplicated domestically. In Clapham's words, modernization in Ethiopia is a "politics of emulation".[26] Taking this trend of looking for a model of modernization into account, this dissertation assesses domestic and foreign circumstances in which modernization was pursued. In doing so, the role of challenges and opportunities of regional and global developments in determining Ethiopia's domestic events is investigated.

Thus, the main objective of this dissertation is to assess the effect of the defensive modernization project pursued by the monarchy and the effect it had on foreign relations from 1896 to 1974. The dissertation aims at making a thorough analysis of the effect of the foreign realm on Ethiopia and the changes introduced from outside as part of this process on the state and society. Accordingly, the main question the study aims to answer is how the quest for modernization shaped foreign relations following the assertion of independence; and how the foreign realm impacted the domestic conditions too. In line with this, the related questions this dissertation intends to answer is the role the pursuit of modernization played both in the contexts from which the Ethiopian state emerged and in terms of determining the features of the resultant state. Thus, the dissertation intends to uncover the role of the modernization agenda in shaping change and continuity in foreign policy and the extent to

[25] Geda, "Ethiopian Macroeconomic Modeling in Historical Perspective: Brining Gebre-Hiwot and His Contemporaries to Ethiopian Macroeconomics Realm," 3.
[26] Christopher Clapham, "Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 44, no. 1 (2006): 140-44.

which the modernization endeavor served as a point of linkage between domestic events and foreign developments.

Based on the objectives set and questions asked, the main argument this dissertation advance is that Ethiopia's foreign relations during the period under investigation was aimed at preserving domestic political and religious settings while selectively adopting elements of European modernity. Thus, the dissertation aspires to show that culmination of the state formation process in 1896 and the foreign relation orientation pursued until the fall of the monarchy in 1974 was mainly determined by the need to ensure the survival of the state and its main domestic features including political and cultural traits through defensive modernization. The dissertation intends to show that earlier pursuit of defensive modernization, at least in a rudimentary sense given central authority was less visible, enabled the internal domain to play a significant role in the formation of the Ethiopian state. Moreover, this dissertation argues that important turning points in Ethiopian history are determined by influences from the foreign domain and the attempt from the Ethiopian side to exploit opportunities and to repel threats relied on foreign resources which proves that the line that divides domestic events and external developments in the period under investigation was not exclusively drawn. Additionally, the dissertation argues that though Ethiopia assured its independence by war, the formation of the state and features of foreign relations were hugely impacted by colonialism and the post-WWII foreign policy was similar to a typical policy of a post-colonial state.

The thematic and temporal scope of the dissertation are carefully circumscribed based on the substantial implications the Ethiopian state endured during the period under investigation. Modernization is one of the widely used but also seriously criticized terms in social sciences. As Dean Tipps pointed out, modernization entails an ideological connotation that is ethnocentric or Eurocentric and treats non-Western societies as uncivilized. Thus, modernization in this regard is equated to Europeanization or Westernization.[27] The second problem with the concept of modernization is its depiction of change as the result of internal dynamics within a society without addressing it within the process of interactions between different societies. Halliday pointed out that a significant portion of the intellectual understanding of modernization is founded on the concepts of "rationalism, secularism,

[27] Dean C Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of National Societies: A Critical Perspective," *Comparative studies in society and history* 15, no. 2 (1973): 206-11.

equality, [and] progress". The central question in the process towards this end of modernization is to what level any society has the agency to choose the courses of the change. Halliday concludes that modernization has four important features: "novelty, change, contradiction, [and] agency" which are rooted in the intellectual movement of the Enlightenment.[28]

In line with the above features of modernization, the concept is used in this dissertation in a generic sense to refer to the attempt of the Ethiopian leaders, elites, and regimes to form and build a modern state. Specifically, it is employed in this study to refer to the articulation and implementation of defensive modernization. As Zewde noted, defensive modernization in Ethiopia's case was an attempt of ensuring the survival of a state by eliminating internal and foreign threats that could lead to the collapse of the system.[29] Chenpitayaton also, in his study of Thailand's quest for modernization from 1855-1931, explained defensive modernization as a type of modernization path pursued with the motive of maintaining internal elements while domesticating some aspects of European modernity. The main feature of this way of modernization route is that it took place in the face of imminent threats of European colonization.[30] As John Hobson pointed out, the contemporary modern world including its political and economic features are the result of the interaction of the values of different societies of the world. Even though Eurocentrism presents it as a sole product of the European experience, the modern international system is also the result of the accumulative contribution of non-Western societies including the Chinese, the Arabs, the Africans, and others.[31] Accordingly, this dissertation upholds the existence of one modernity even though Europe took the leading role in expanding and exploiting its fruits.

In this dissertation, the Sociological understanding of modernity is employed to understand the changes pursued in Ethiopia during the time under investigation. As Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel pointed out, social change from the perspective of modernization entails transformation from the traditional way of life towards a scientific and industrialized society. Accordingly, it represents a shift from rural life to urbanization, from agriculture to industry, from ignorance to science-based setting. Another feature of

[28] Fred Halliday, "The Potentials of Enlightenment," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 5 (1999): 110.
[29] Bahru Zewde, *Documenting the Ethiopian Student Movement: An Exercise in Oral History* (African Books Collective, 2010), 1.
[30] Chenpitayaton, "When Siam Faced the World: Transnational Relations and the Thai Modernizing State, 1855-1932," 16-17.
[31] John M Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation* (Cambridge university press, 2004), 243-80.

modernization is the monopoly or centralization of the means of violence under the hands of the state. This requires eliminating challenges against the coercive power of the state within its territories. Moreover, the institutionalization of state machinery including the bureaucracy is vital for a certain political order to satisfy the requirements of modern understanding of a state.[32] Though these features of modernization are considered in this dissertation, the concept of modernization is used as articulated and employed by the Ethiopian ruling class and intellectuals without imposing a universal definition. Modernization in Ethiopia during the time under consideration was not a vision of sophistication rather it was an endeavor to realize elementary features of a civilized state like centralization of government power and coercive means, introducing a modern legal system, establishing government institutions, abolishing slavery, and building infrastructures including schools and health centers. This should not be also taken as implying the presence of multiple modernities rather it is to refer that the concept is used in the way Ethiopian rulers and elites envisioned to create a modern state by adopting some features of European modernity.

The rationale for the decision on the temporal framework of this dissertation is because of the reason that both the beginning and the end of the period under investigation had witnessed critical changes both in internal and foreign affairs. Rather than beginning from the 19th-century, a period on which most of the studies on Ethiopia concentrate, this dissertation starts from the 16th-century and gives a background on how modernization was pivotal in the relation Ethiopians had with foreigners in the form of pursuing better military technology. Since the mid-19th-century, the process of creating a central authority was taking place accompanied by increasing foreign influence in the region. The Adowa victory in 1896 against Italy which assured the independence of the Ethiopian state and the 1974 revolution were the two most important events in Ethiopia's modern history. The former represents the achievement in the emergence of central authority domestically and in terms of averting foreign threats that were persistently posing survival dangers. It also marks the beginning of the Ethiopian rarity in which underdeveloped Ethiopia became an independent African state in the international system that impose civilizational criteria to recognize states as its viable members. This period also was the starting point of a new and broader phase of defensive

[32] For theories of modernization and dimensions of social change see Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Modernization," *The Blackwell encyclopedia of sociology* (2007).

modernization that sought to maintain the Orthodox Church,[33] the monarchy of the 'Solomonic' Dynasty[34] , and partly the traditional land tenure system called *gebbar*. As the result, this process determined the nature of the relationship with foreign powers especially with Europe and later with the United States of America (USA). The Ethiopian revolution of 1974 which is the closing point of the time framework of this dissertation is presented as the result of the contradiction between the results of defensive modernization and the domestic foundation of the monarchy. It represents the failure of the defensive modernization caused by internal factors which were prompted by the interaction with the foreign domain i.e., the demise of the 'Solomonic' Dynasty, the exclusion of the church from state life, and the naturalization of land as state property. Above all, it brought a period of the search for a new type of modernization based on scientific socialism.

The researcher is cognizant of debates in Ethiopian historiography and politics especially regarding the place of ethnicity and religion. Despite various and contradictory interpretations that envision reconstructing Ethiopian history, this study adopts the mainstream understanding of Ethiopian history. This is because the dissertation focuses on the link between modernization and foreign relations of the Ethiopian state which dictates the researcher to focus only on the trajectory of internal political developments that determined the exercise of power at the state level. Even though ethnic and religious aspects are discussed in this dissertation according to their role in major developments, they are not the primary focus of the subject under investigation. Thus, the consideration of the state-society relations in this dissertation is also treated from this perspective that developments are tried to be presented as impartially as possible.

[33] Tibebu described the nature of Ethiopian Orthodox Church as "Tabot Christianity". Tabot is the term used to refer the Ark of the Covenant which the church claims that it is brought to Ethiopia Queen Sheba after her visit of King Solomon of Israel. The replicas of the Covenant are kept in all Orthodox churches of Ethiopia. Teshale Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974* (The Red Sea Press, 1995), 7-8. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has strong connection with Coptic Church of Egypt. According to Chris Pouty, "the Monophysite doctrine was developed by the Cop Eutichius, who led his followers out of the council of Chalcedon in 451, forever to be divided from the See of St. Peter in Rome. The patriarchate in Alexanderia, though the patriarch usually lives in Cairo. He chose Ethiopia's first Bishop in the fourth century and each bishop thereafter (until 1950) was a Copt." Chris Prouty Rosenfeld, Chris Prouty, and Eugene Rosenfeld, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1981), 39.

[34] The legend of 'Solomonic' Dynasty as reiterated in the 13th century book of *Kibre Negest,* claims that the Ethiopian Kinds since the period of Axumite times were the descendants of Menelik I who is claimed as the son of King Solomon of Israel and Queen Sheba of Ethiopia. This legend was the main legitimizing discourse of rulers of Ethiopia until the monarchy was overthrown in 1974. See Donald Crummey, "Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia (Légitimité Impériale Et Création D'une Idéologie Néo-Salomonienne En Éthiopie Au Xixe Siècle)," *Cahiers d'Études africaines* (1988).

1.4. Methodology

Among other things, studying foreign relations of underdeveloped states like Ethiopia in IR entails huge theoretical and methodological challenges. In determining the theoretical lens through which the study should address the problem, a researcher needs to choose either to deal with the questions of foreign relations through mainstream IR theories or should search for an alternative theory that acknowledges diversity. Unavoidably, both ways have some challenges and advantages. The former enables to benefit from relatively settled and ordered knowledge though the attempt to fit foreign relations of a developing state with the body of this setting remains problematic. The latter allows doing a reflective and multi-disciplinary analysis though it rests on an uncondensed and untidy body of knowledge that is more vulnerable to criticism. This dissertation falls into the second category as it will employ Historical Sociology in IR (HSIR). Compatible with this approach, this dissertation is a reflective analysis of the place of modernization in Ethiopian history. With the utilization of a wide variety of sources, the dissertation engages in interpretative analysis of modernization agenda to get insights about change and continuity in Ethiopian foreign relations in general and foreign policy of leaders and the regimes in particular.

To address the objective set and questions intended to be answered, this dissertation employs the use of a qualitative method of study as it allows to do a historically and socially sensitive reflective analysis. The required data were collected from both primary and secondary sources that are available in English and Amharic languages. Priority was given in consulting primary sources based on their availability and relevance. Accordingly, letters, reports, government documents, autobiographies, memoirs, news releases, memorandums, and newspapers that were published during the period under investigation are consulted. Specifically, *Birhan'ena Selam* newspaper of the 1920s and 1930s, diplomatic communications, and other primary sources available in the Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency (ENALA) were vital in substantiating the analysis parts of the dissertation with primary data. By doing so, it is tried to get closer to contexts that existed during the time under investigation. Secondary sources are also used as input for this dissertation including books, journal articles, biographies, and electronic sources. The collected data was discussed and analyzed qualitatively as per the need to address questions the study aimed to answer.

Ethiopia's emergence as an independent state during the peak of imperialism and its struggle to ensure its survival inevitably made the question of modernization a grand agenda both in domestic and foreign affairs. As it is mentioned in the literature review section, Ethiopian history including its peculiarity in Africa and globally is thoroughly studied by both Ethiopian and foreign scholars. The attention in this dissertation is directed towards extracting the aspects of Ethiopian history that uncover how the idea of change and modernization were perceived and evolved with continuous interactions with regional and international developments. Thus, the dissertation is an attempt to understand the dialogue between Ethiopia's domestic conditions and the foreign domain that revolved around the grand question of modernization. To grasp the change and continuity of foreign relations within this context, emphasis is given to assessing how the foreign realm and its modernity features were perceived, introduced and what effect they brought on the Ethiopian society and the state. Based on access and availability, utilization of primary data produced by the people who were playing different roles in this process is prioritized. As a result, the attempt in this dissertation is uncovering the perspectives of the ruling class and the elite on the challenges and visions of modernization who is particular attention on how they understand Ethiopia's place in the world and the path followed to address domestic and foreign challenges.

1.5. Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters that are thematically and chronologically organized. The first chapter introduces the dissertation. The second chapter provides the conceptual and theoretical framework of the dissertation focusing on the nexus between the Enlightenment, modernization theory, and IR. By doing so, the chapter tries to show the dilemmas faced in the quest for modernization of non-Western societies. Pertaining to this, the chapter discusses conceptual and historical aspects of defensive modernization. This chapter also outlines the challenges of studying Africa and particularly in IR by tracing the origin of the problem within the history of ideas in the Enlightenment movement. Moreover, the chapter justifies the appropriateness of HSIR to address the objectives set and questions intended to answer by this dissertation. The third chapter deals with the first two phases of defensive modernization within the broad interplay between the domestic quest for modern firearms and interactions with foreigners. The chapter also provides the domestic, regional and international backgrounds from which the Ethiopian state evolved.

The fourth chapter deals with the political-economy of the *gebbar* system and domestic and international trades.The chapter begins by assessesing the process of the interaction of the domestic setting when it came in contact with European modernity elements at the end of the 19th-century and the beginning of the 20th-century. This chapter also focuses on the political economy of the Ethiopian land tenure system and trade, focusing on their impact in shaping state-society relations and in the creation of a central authority. Moreover, the chapter reflects on how and why the process of creation of central authority in the face of colonialism succeeded in creating the only African non-colonized state. The fifth chapter focuses on the beginning of the third phase of defensive modernization as the result of the defiance against colonialism in 1896. Thus, the chapter addresses the shift of modernization question from the narrow objective of modernizing the army to broader transformation by the adoption of selected features of European modernity and by preserving the monarchy, the church, and the land tenure. Moreover, the chapter provides how imported elements of European modernity continued to impact the Ethiopian society and state with emphasis on the education sector.

The sixth chapter deals with the process of modernization during the interwar period which was characterized by the rise to power of *Ras* Tafari domestically and membership in the LN externally. Accordingly, the implication of Ethiopia's membership in the LN for the modernization question of Ethiopia and other underdeveloped states is assessed in detail. The chapter also focuses on the second Italian invasion of 1936 and how it created a crisis to the continuity of Ethiopia and the credibility of the LN. The seventh is about modernization and the post-WWII Ethiopian foreign relations. This chapter explores the restoration of the monarchy after the five-year occupation of Italy in 1941 under WWII circumstances and the exploitation of post-war contexts to create development-based relations with developed states and international organizations. Moreover, the chapter discusses the legacy of the Italian occupation, Britain's involvement in Ethiopia's internal and external affairs, and the relation with the USA under the Cold War contexts. The chapter ends by reviewing the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 and presents it as the result of the paradox created by the defensive modernization project. The last chapter provides the findings of the dissertation.

CHAPTER 2

MODERNIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of the study. Modernity is one of the most contested concepts in social sciences. Thus, assessing its origin, how it evolved through time, and clarifying the context it is utilized in this dissertation is necessary. By doing so, this chapter gives the theoretical and conceptual frames that the study employed. Understanding the Enlightenment movement and its conceptualization of modernity based on the idea of "progress" and how this understanding of modernity defined the interaction of Europe with peoples in other regions are important to grasp the modernization question Ethiopia faced. Moreover, assessing the link between modernity and IR is important within the broader context of the effect the Enlightenment movement had on the study of social sciences in general because it helps to understand the challenges of studying African states in IR including Ethiopia's foreign relations. By addressing the above and related issues, this chapter tries to show the link between the interaction of Europe and regions like Africa from a modernization perspective on one hand and it also deals with the effect of the Enlightenment on how IR as an academic discipline treated the non-Western regions and states.

Accordingly, the chapter has six major and interrelated sections. The first section discusses the Enlightenment idea of modernity. This part of the chapter also assesses the impact of the Enlightenment on the conceptualization of European interaction with peoples in other regions and how it was intellectualized in Enlightenment-based studies in social sciences. The second section focuses on the effect of the modernization concept that was rooted in the Enlightenment movement and on the evolution of IR theories and the study of underdeveloped regions. The third part of the chapter is devoted to analyzing the shift in the study of modernization in the post-WWII era by emphasizing the attempt to come up with non-judgmental modernization discourse and the responses against this from Marxist-based approaches that focus on underdeveloped states and regions. This part of the chapter also discusses the strength and limitations of these approaches in filling the gap that exists in mainstream IR theories and terms of understanding features of foreign relations of

underdeveloped states. The fifth part of the chapter assesses defensive modernization by looking at the experiences of different states in the world. The last part of the chapter provides the advantages of the utilization of HSIR, the theoretical framework this dissertation employs, by demonstrating how it resolves challenges of studying underdeveloped states like Ethiopia.

2.1. The Enlightenment and Modernization Theory

The Enlightenment was a period of an intellectual movement that took place mainly in Europe roughly from the middle of the 17th-century to the beginning of the 19th-century. Scholars of the Enlightenment examined the foundations of the society that existed during that time and the past. Based on that, they considered it as unenlightened and uncivilized, and they projected a new phase of human life that would be guided by science and reason. More importantly, they envisaged a society founded on the principle of "progress". The notion of progress was central to uncover the visions of scholars of the Enlightenment, especially it is important to understand what kind of modernity they proposed. Moreover, the idea of progress was also the powerful tenet of the Enlightenment in impacting the assumptions of philosophical and scientific inquiries.[35] Arthur Lovejoy and George Boas defined progress as an idea that views:

> "…the course of things since the beginning - in spite of possible minor deviations and the occasional occurrence of backwaters in the stream of history - has been characterized by a gradual progressive increase, or a wider diffusion, of goodness, or happiness, or enlightenment, or of all of these; that the best time of all is yet to come; and that this progress will continue in the future…"[36]

Founded on the idea of progress defined above, the Enlightenment thinkers produced political, philosophical, and social theories that not only determined the European understanding of modernity but also impacted other societies as the European system expanded gradually. As W. Warren Wagar pointed out, behind every theory that came forth during the Enlightenment and originated from the principle of "progress, lies a conception of the ultimate good and progress [which] is thought to occur in proportion as the ultimate good triumphs in history".[37] Thus, indispensable to the idea of progress is a distinct

[35] Sidney B Fay, "The Idea of Progress," *The American Historical Review* 52, no. 2 (1947): 231-32.
[36] Arthur O Lovejoy and George Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (1936), 3-4.
[37] W Warren Wagar, "Modern Views of the Origins of the Idea of Progress," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28, no. 1 (1967): 55-56.

understanding of modernity which views human history as a journey of continuous and incremental improvement. This improvement in line with the idea of progress is stipulated to realize a steady advance in all aspects of life from ignorance to knowledge based on science and rationality, from poverty to prosperity, from political tyranny to freedom in which the right of everyone is respected and protected from infringement.[38]

The progress-based conception of modernity and human history had also other implications that range from Eurocentric identity formation to the shaping of disciplines and their mainstream theories that dominated knowledge production including endeavors to understand the relation Europe maintained with other regions and societies. In other words, the progress-based understanding of history traced from the Enlightenment brought Eurocentrism which is characterized by a belief in the superiority of Europe and the white race and discriminatory conception of others thereby making the accommodation of difference both conceptually and in practice a serious challenge as Europe became in contact with other societies. According to Edward Said, identity was important in knowledge production, in terms of determining how Europe (the occident) defined other societies (the orient) thereby justifying the imposition of the will of the former on the latter. The non-European became regarded as backward, uncivilized, and barbarian. Accordingly, whatever asymmetrical relations Europe maintained including colonialism were presented as benevolent interventions driven from the necessity of emancipation of the orient from ignorance and backwardness.[39] This is the claim commonly referred as "white man's burden" or "civilizational mission": a burden of civilizing or modernizing barbarians that Europe claimed had shouldered.[40]

Eurocentrism gave Europe exclusive agency in the emergence of the modern world and presented European history as the history of the whole world. As Hobson pointed out, from the discovery of other parts of the world to the inventions in science and technology, Eurocentrism denied the contributions of other societies for the advancement of the prosperity of Europe and the system that expanded globally. In Hobson's view, this emanates from the racist self-conception that situates Europe at the center of the world. For instance, the Eurocentric view claims that the arrival of Vasco Da Gama in India via the Cape of Good

[38] Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*, 7-11.
[39] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin 2003), 3-28.
[40] Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*, 219-22.

Hope around the end of the 15th-century was the first contact with detached and backward people enabled by Europe's advancement. Hobson called this a "myth" and stated that other people including Ethiopians had contact with India long before the arrival of Europeans by saying:

> "…sometime between two and five decades earlier the Islamic navigator, Ahmad Ibn-Majid, had already rounded the Cape and, having sailed up the West African coast, had entered the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar. Moreover, the Sassanid Persians had been sailing across to India and China from the early centuries of the first millennium CE, as did the Black Ethiopians and, later on, the Muslims (after about 650). And the Javanese, Indians and Chinese had all made it across to the Cape many decades, if not centuries, before Da Gama."[41]

In addition to geographical discovery, the advancement of Europe in terms of science, technology, and the industrial revolution was regarded as sole European inventions ignoring the contribution of other societies including what the Chinese and the Arabs did.[42] What deserves our attention concerning the Enlightenment thought of modernization in relation to this dissertation is also how the Eurocentric views facilitated and justified asymmetrical relations that Europe imposed on other parts of the world and how it determined the tenets of dominant perspectives of the disciplines that emerged. It is clear that how such values are in contradiction with the domestic values of Ethiopia and Africa in general. Moreover, as is discussed in the coming chapters, the international system founded on such values imposed a serious threat to the survival of the Ethiopian state. As Wagar pointed out, the Enlightenment thinkers' quest to put human history in a linear and progressive dimension has influenced the emergence of disciplines and their major assumptions that were biased against societies outside of Europe. Thus, progress-based production of knowledge served as the ideational force for European expansion by facilitating and justifying asymmetrical relations between Europe and other regions.[43]

It is mentioned above that the Enlightenment-based disciplines have prejudiced treatment of underdeveloped regions. The study of non-European regions like Africa was considered as a futile endeavor that produces nothing important to understand our world. It is good here to begin with a look at Friedrich Hegel's dialectical analysis of human

[41] Ibid., 21.
[42] Ibid., 257-58.
[43] Wagar, "Modern Views of the Origins of the Idea of Progress," 55-57.

development and history. Hegel, who is one of the prominent Enlightenment thinkers, in *The Philosophy of History,* stated that "…we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it - that is in its northern part - belong to the Asiatic or European World".[44] Hegel divided Africa into three parts and argued these parts have a distinct history with no meaningful interaction between them. The three regions of Africa according to Hegel are the area north of the Sahara Desert which he put it as an integral part of European history, the region below the desert (Sab-Saharan Africa) which he called "Africa proper" and the Nile region.[45] Hegel added that because of its tropical climate and geography, Africa proper is the most isolated region and stated that "…as far as history goes back, [proper Africa] has remained - for all purposes of connection with the rest of the world - shut up; it is the gold-land compressed within itself - the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of night."[46]

It is clear to see the effect such views of influential intellectuals had contributed to the lack of enthusiasm in the study of African politics and foreign relations. In his important work, *Hegel and the Third World*, Tibebu assessed the implications of Hegel's views on how the continent is perceived and stated that Hegel depicted Africa as a territory that was occupied by people who interact with nature in a primitive way. Tibebu added that Hegel views the African consciousness as the "lowest, poorest, and most abstract stage of consciousness."[47] To understand how the Enlightenment determined the way non-Western regions particularly Africa was perceived, it is necessary to have a look at other fields beyond philosophy and history. Among them, Charles Darwin's "Theory of Evolution" is regarded as a central observation for laying the ground for pejorative perspectives in social sciences.

In *On the Origins of the Species,* Darwin explained differences between living things as the result of a ferocious competition in which only capable beings survive while the weakest perish.[48] Darwin stated that the rivalries between living things work based on the principle of "natural selection" favoring "those individuals which are best adapted to the

[44] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and John Sibree, *The Philosophy of History* (Courier Corporation, 2004), 171.
[45] Ibid., 109.
[46] Ibid.
[47]Teshale Tibebu, *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History* (Syracuse University Press, 2011), 171.
[48] Charles Darwin, *On the Origion of Species* (Newyork: D. Apleton and Company, 1859), 15-45.

complex contingencies".[49] A more divisive interpretation of biological evolution was also advanced by other scholars. For example, Robert Chamber, in *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,* divided human beings into five races: the Caucasian or Indo-European (India, Europe, and Northern Africa), the Mongolian, the Negro (Sub-Saharan Africa), and the Aboriginal American. Chamber argued that "each of these is distinguished by certain general features of so marked a kind, as to give rise to a supposition that they have had distinct or independent origins."[50] Such interpretations were employed in social sciences which try to put Europe on the apex of the evolution process and depicted Africans and other underdeveloped regions as less civilized.

Founded on the thoughts of Chamber, Darwin, and others, an approach in social science called "Social Darwinism" emerged and applied the biological evolution assumptions to interpret social, economic, and political aspects of human life. This includes the works of the British scholar, Herbert Spencer, who designated Darwin's notion of natural selection as "survival of the fittest" and explained how it works as the following:

> "…if we regard nature as that which it is, an assemblage of various forces, inorganic and organic, some favorable to the maintenance of life and many at variance with its maintenance - forces which operate blindly - we see that there is no such selection of this or that trait; but that there is a selection only of individuals which are, by the aggregate of their traits, best fitted for living. And here I may note an advantage possessed by the expression "survival of the fittest"[51]

The main problem with all the above notions is that they were erroneously used in the study of racial relationships and presented it as scientific proof for the supremacy of the white race and inferiority of others, mainly blacks.[52] The influence of Social Darwinism is evident in the works of prominent sociologists including Talcott Parsons who viewed modernization as a total abandonment of other ways of life and embracing Western modernity. [53] All this poses a challenge on how acceptably these terms can be employed in the study of changes in societies including inquires in

[49] *Charles Darwin's Natural Selection: Being the Second Part of His Big Species Book Written from 1856 to 1858* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 271.
[50] Robert Chambers, *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation* (J. Churchill, 1853), 277.
[51] Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Biology*, vol. 1 (D. Appleton, 1896), 610.
[52] Rutledge M Dennis, "Social Darwinism, Scientific Racism, and the Metaphysics of Race," *Journal of Negro Education* (1995): 243-46.
[53] Wil Hout, "Classical Approaches to Development: Modernisation and Dependency," in *The Palgrave Handbook of International Development* (Springer, 2016).

IR. The assessment of the prejudiced aspect of the Enlightenment here is not to equate everything associated with it as racism. However, as Tibebu pointed out, it cannot be denied that the Enlightenment thoughts led to the emergence and condensing of notions of biased but globally dominant views. In Tibebu's words, "Eurocentrism is the intellectual rationalization of Western modernity… It reads Western global victory as the victory of humanity itself. It equates the West with the "man" as such. In short, it is a form of racism."[54] And, as Hobson observed, the Enlightenment was important in the creation of European identity as the only civilized society which in turn vindicated imperial relations as missions to civilize barbarians by integrating them into progressive modernity that Europe devised.[55]

Generally, the problem with the Enlightenment, its progress-based understanding of modernization, and the disciplines that are founded on them are that they promote a discourse that does not only deny recognition for diversity but also disregards change and continuity in human history. In other words, such views do not recognize the change and continuity that is embedded in the history of every society and the interactions they had between them in the international system. It is in the international system that was guided by these values the Ethiopian state aspired to survive. As it will be demonstrated in the coming chapters, until the civilizational standard of statehood that is rooted in the Enlightenment values considered Ethiopia's existence in the international system as an aberration.

2.2. The Enlightenment and International Relations

Among other things, IR as a discipline is concerned with understanding the origin of the modern international system. This also involves uncovering the origin of the modern world, understanding change and continuity in states, and the international system. These endeavors require the assessment of the rise of European modernity and how it gradually expanded to engulf almost the entire world. As John Ruggie pointed out, discovering the source of the modern international system, and understanding the change and continuity within it is one of the tasks that IR intends to fulfill.[56] Halliday also stated that IR's link to

[54] Tibebu, *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History*, xx.
[55] Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*, 219-22.
[56] John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International organization* 47, no. 1 (1993): 143-44.

modernization emanates from its purpose of explaining change at society, national and international levels.[57] The challenge in this task of IR is the monopoly of mainstream theories that deny continuity and change. Rather the attempt is to come up with certain principles that can be used not only to explain features of states and the international system of the present but also to predict how they will operate in the future.[58]

The 17th-century success in the fields of 'hard' sciences like Mathematics and Physics had inspired social scientists to adopt scientific research methods in their attempt to establish their fields on robust foundations. Starting from then, the attempt of social scientists to imitate this method has resulted in non-ending paradigm debates.[59] As a branch of social sciences, the study of IR is also not different from this problem. The emergence of IR as a separate discipline in the post-WWI era and features of theoretical debates within it has lots to do with the Enlightenment. The emergence of Realism as a major IR theory in post-WWI was a reaction against Liberalism's normative Enlightenment-based ideals. Moreover, ontological, and epistemological assumptions of the Enlightenment had shaped the character of the debates that emerged consecutively.

The commitment to the Enlightenment values led to the emergence of the liberal study of politics based on the propositions of thinkers like John Locke, Baron de Montesquieu, and Voltaire. The political upheavals and revolutions which include the English Revolution, French Revolution, and the American Revolution were the events that inspired these and other philosophers to speculate about the political aspect of human life. As result, they propagated democracy in the form of a contract between the ruler and the ruled, and they gave huge importance to individual rights and freedoms in their propositions.[60] Thus, the works of such Enlightenment thinkers produced brought the study of politics along with moralists and normative lines which served as a basis for the emergence of a liberal theory of IR. Realism emerged during the interwar period as a reaction against these Enlightenment ideals criticizing them as an unrealistic presentation of human nature, the state, and the international system; and rejected its moralist attempt of dictating

[57] Halliday, "The Potentials of Enlightenment," 110.110
[58] *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*, vol. 4 (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
[59] Louis Dupré, *The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Culture* (Yale University Press, 2008), 153-86.
[60] Michael C Williams, "In the Beginning: The International Relations Enlightenment and the Ends of International Relations Theory," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013).

how to act. Following the emergence of Realism, the normative and moralistic aspects of political thought rooted in the Enlightenment were labeled as "idealism" and this marked the beginning of the first debate in IR.[61]

However, though it was not systematically put into a theory, the emergence of Realist thought was not a post-WWI event. Different philosophers and historians like Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes used realist explanations in their works. What was new about Realism in post-WWI era IR study was it emerged as a systematically coherent and strong theory distinctively aimed at explaining states and their behavior in the international system.[62] For realists, the moralist and normative aspects of the Enlightenment are unable to understand human behavior, and the tragedy of WWI is considered as evidence for the failure of its attempt to prescribe what ought to be done. They contend that morality and rationality which are the central tenets of the Enlightenment process did not prevent a catastrophic war that resulted in the death of millions of people. Realism questioned the normative prescriptions on how politics "ought to be" and proposed that IR should study "what it is" and "why it is". International law, morality, and rationality were argued to be futile from the realist perspective in guiding the relation among states and how the balance of power can be maintained in the international system which is supposed to be anarchic. Realism emerged out of this with the aim of identifying the real causes of war and coming up with solutions to avoid future reoccurrence. Williams added that Realism was not against everything coming from the Enlightenment; rather it was aimed to develop itself "on the virtues of the Enlightenment without succumbing to its potential darkness".[63] Accordingly, the development of Realism was a challenge against the Enlightenment ideals; mainly aiming at freeing political studies from normative values but not from the attempt to do a scientific analysis. Thus, Realism promoted the non-normative/non-moralistic perspective to be used to analyze the international system and behavior of its actors.

As Cynthia Weber pointed out, beyond the Realism/Liberalism debate, the consecutive great debates in IR theory that emerged after WWII also in one way or the other are the result of the Enlightenment effect. In Traditionalist/Behaviorist debate, the latter was

[61] For theory debates in IR see Richard Jackson, Georg Sørensen, and Jørgen Møller, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2019), 39-42.
[62] Williams, "In the Beginning: The International Relations Enlightenment and the Ends of International Relations Theory," 650-55.
[63] Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," 656-58.

keen to implement scientific methods of natural sciences that are in line with the Enlightenment ideals. Post-modern and critical approaches denounced the methodologically monolithic approach of IR. While critical theorists question the existing perspectives to find alternative understanding, post-modernists rejected both the epistemological and ontological aspects of Enlightenment-based science.[64] In other words, they denounced the Enlightenment's singular understanding of the world for insisting on finding precise principles that determine the cause for everything, that can be uncovered through the rational process of reasoning.

Generally, the root of theoretical challenges in IR mainly in addressing diversity and explaining change and continuity is located within the nature of the Enlightenment ideals. Especially the progressive understanding of change and world history has resulted in the rejection of alterity as barbarianism. This in turn has justified asymmetrical relations that emerged between Europe and other regions. As part of the social sciences, IR's attempt to be hard science also impacted how diversity is viewed. Thus, the Enlightenment values did not only trigger the rise of Realism but also the attempt to come with general principles that predict changes within states and the international system also led to the treatment of non-European realms as aberrations. In the next section, the place of underdeveloped states in IR theory is discussed focusing on Africa.

2.3. Modernization and the Study of Underdeveloped States in IR

What brings IR and modernization studies together is their purpose to explain changes in societies, states, and within the international system as well. The question of spatial inclusion and exclusion of features of modernity on one hand and how interaction leads to change in them have been dealt with by modernization studies. If we consider modernization as a journey, it creates a connection between societies through which the experience of some societies that traveled ahead of others is either willingly or forcibly imposed on others as it happened during colonization.[65] On other hand, IR as a discipline envisions to disclose the origin of states and the international system and to grasp the change

[64] For the link between enlightenment ideals and mainstream IR theory see Cynthia Weber, "Why Ir Needs Theory/Practice Debates: Or, from Enlightenment to Romanticism to Enlightened Romanticism," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (2000).
[65] David L Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, "Neo-Modernization? Ir and the Inner Life of Modernization Theory," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 1 (2002): 107-10.

within them. And the overlapping challenge both for IR and modernization studies is how to explain change and diversity across societies, states, and within the international system.

However, as Hobson pointed out, the treatment of diversity in modernization features in IR has remained one of the challenges in the discipline partly as the result of the hegemonic conception of modernity as a progressive change that is rooted in the Enlightenment. This has created a problematic relation between IR theories and the attempt to understand non-Western societies. Firstly, theoretical endeavors do not give serious attention to the states in these regions that put knowledge production in IR under the monopoly of the west. Accordingly, mainstream IR theories are based on Western values and cannot accommodate the salient feature states of underdeveloped regions exhibit in their formation, domestic traits, and their foreign relations. Moreover, if non-Western societies are referred to in mainstream IR theories, they are included to present them as aberrations that should be reconfigured in line with the Westernexperience.[66] Hobson also pointed out that the dominant Western understanding of modernization which is embedded in mainstream IR theories gives the mission to civilize other societies and regions to Europe. This view owes Europe for commencing a long journey that resulted in the rise and expansion of capitalism; and downplays the contribution of non-Western societies for the development of the contemporary international system.[67]

Until the trend was critically questioned in the 1980s, IR was dominated with the attempt of giving dogmatic explanations regarding states' behavior in the international system. This has made fierce theoretical debates among dominant theories that purport to give rule-like principles the main feature of the discipline.[68] In another spectrum, there is a question of inclusiveness that intended to push IR to be a global discipline as its nomenclature claims to be. Given the emergence and evolution of IR was mainly a Western phenomenon, the marginality of non-Western regions in theorization and in inquiries has been raised as one concern in IR.[69] The study of African states has been no different in this regard. Since the early years of independence from colonialism, the study of foreign relations

[66] Discussion on the problematic relations that exist between IR and non-western regions is available in Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction," *International relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (2007): 287-312.
[67] Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*, 239-42.For
[68] Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* (1989): 215.
[69] Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction," in *Non-Western International Relations Theory* (Routledge, 2009), 1-3.

of African states has passed through different stages settling neither on mainstream IR theories nor on African-based unique approaches. Though there are few innovative approaches[70] that tried to analyze foreign relations of African states by emphasizing on peculiarities of the states in the continent, the available literature shows that much of the effort has been concentrated on reconciling the nature of African states and their foreign relations with the assumptions of dominant IR theories.

On the other hand, other perspectives intend to create a more inclusive understanding that recognizes the contribution of non-Western societies in the emergence and expansion of capitalism, the industrial revolution, and globalization. Several alternative theories including HSIR, that aim to fill gaps of mainstream IR theories are found in this category. In both directions, we can observe how strongly IR is concerned with the issue of modernization as the origin of states and the international system cannot be understood without thoroughly analyzing its effect. As Halliday rightly pointed out, the attempt to come with general and "rule-like" principles in IR made the endeavors in the discipline essentially normative and "state-centric". Moreover, dominant theories ignore multiple sources of power and disregard change and continuity foreign relations of states may exhibit depending on state-society relations that are embedded within them; and as the result of the opportunities and the challenges, the international system imposes.[71] Thus, one of the main problems within mainstream IR theories can be put as a problem of trying to standardize everything into certain scientific formulas and the inability to appreciate and entertain diversity.[72]

The problem with the progressive understanding of modernization was it promoted and justified asymmetric relations like colonization as a mission of Europeans to civilize others. However, in the post-WWII era, this understanding of modernity transformed into the development discourse that emphasizes the achievement of economic growth. According to Colin Leys, the term 'development theory' emerged in academia in the 1950s as a discourse of explaining significant changes brought in colonies by European colonizers. As colonization and its philosophical foundations faced serious criticisms, development theory

[70] Among the attempts to utilize Africa's peculiarities as a basis of the study of its foreign relations is the role of collective identity as opposed to assumptions of mainstream IR theories. See for example, Thomas Kwasi Tieku, "Theoretical Approaches to Africa's International Relations," *Handbook of Africa's international relations* (2013).
[71] Fred Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 1994), 19-22.
[72] John M Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-2.

received more attention from the west because of three reasons. These reasons were: the need to define development practically so that it facilitates intervention in the developing states, to provide a scientific explanation of development different from historical and philosophical modernity views, and the creation of Breton Woods financial institutions that focused on national macro-economic management to bring economic growth.[73]

The most influential understanding of development at the time was advanced by Walt Whitman Rostow with his book *The Stages of Economic Growth* published in 1960. Until it was seriously challenged by Marxist and dependency theorists lately in the 1960s and 1970s, it was a dominant conception of economic growth thereby affecting the direction of change sought in underdeveloped states. According to Rostow, every society is in one of five stages based on the level of its development: "the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption". In Rostow's view, traditional society is a society that lacks the "Newtonian" knowledge about its environment and is unable to exploit and use natural possessions for the sake of production. Rostow argued that though some elements of modernization may penetrate such societies from other regions they remain basically traditional because "the potentialities which flow from modern science and technology were either not available or not regularly and systematically applied".[74]

The above conception of development was ethnocentric in the sense that it encourages the imposition of Europe's experience on other regions, and it has no room for an alternative path and the end goal of the change was put as economic development. In addition to this, what is important in Rostow's analysis was how he explained the causes of colonization and decolonization. Rostow argued that "colonies were founded, then, not mainly as a purposeful goal of national policy in pursuit of power" rather as the result of European's interest to "reflex" their power and the need to transform settings in traditional societies so that trade could be easily conducted. Moreover, he argued decolonization which he calls "withdrawal" became possible because colonial societies' transformation towards semi-modernization enabled them to rebel against their colonizers.[75]

[73] Colin Leys, *The Rise and Fall of Development Theory* (East Africa Educational Publishers 1996), 4-7.
[74]Walt W Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* Rostowthe Stages of Economic Growth (1960), 4-16.
[75]Ibid., 110-12.

The post-WWII global environment with the UN Charter that recognized self-determination rights created a conducive atmosphere for the independence of African states in the 1950s and 1960s. However, despite some initial economic and political successes, the African governments faced serious challenges internally and externally. According to Clapham, the first problem was widespread economic decay as a result of the vulnerability of dependent economies and the global oil crisis. The legitimacy of post-colonial governments was also jeopardized by secessionist armed struggles and an increasing number of military coup d'états. Thus, like the economic sector, the political condition in post-colonial states also started to scramble.[76] In the face of this problem, the hope and optimism regarding the performance of African states faded away, and the importance of explaining the failure on external exploitation increased. As it will be demonstrated in the last chapter of this dissertation, though Ethiopia was not colonized, the need for internal economic challenges forced it to resort to development cooperation frameworks like other African states. In this regard, the study of the Ethiopian state has a lot to do with the inquiries of post-colonial states.

The study of African states and states in underdeveloped regions, in general, has been one of the perplexing problems in IR. Many scholars who tried to address this subject have argued that Africa is either ignored or misrepresented in mainstream IR theories. Hence, some mainstream IR theories are accused of explicitly asserting either the irrelevance of Africa to comprehend world politics or for signaling inapplicability of their theories on foreign relations of these states by putting the continent as an exception; nevertheless, it is intriguing that African scholars still struggle to use these theories in their analysis.[77] To uncover the problem that exists between Africa and IR, we need to acknowledge the effect of the Enlightenment ideas discussed in the previous section vis-à-vis the nature of the formation and features of the states in the continent. The problem Africa poses to mainstream IR theories should be understood within the broader context of the emergence and evolution of ideas and disciplines since the Enlightenment on one hand and the extent to which the uniqueness of the history in each region or state is treated in mainstream theories on the other. Thus, the challenge Africa poses to IR is the result of the circumstances states in the

[76] Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 67-72.
[77] See for example, Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw, *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* (Springer, 2001), 1-10.

continent emerged in the decolonization process and internal features they exhibit, both of which are very different from the European experience.

2.4. Revisiting Africa's Place in IR Theory

In the post-WWII era, as the result of the establishment of the UN its self-determination and other norms that protect underdeveloped states, and because of the increasing struggle against colonization, the progressive-based modernization discourse did not suit the international context. Still founded on the Western experience, the focus became the achievement of economic growth in regions where European imperialism intervened. As it is mentioned in the previous section, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the understanding of economic growth advanced by Rostow became the focus of academic and policy endeavors. However, it did not take too long when it was started to be seriously challenged by dependency theorists. In Wallerstein's view, the reason for the emergence of a narrow conception of development in this era was:

> "Until 1945, it still seemed reasonable to assume that Europe was the center of the world. Even anti-imperialist movements outsides of Europe and against Europe often tended to assume it. But the world moved inexorably on. To cope this changing world, Western scholars invented development, invented the Third World, invented modernization."[78]

Originated in Latin America and influenced by Marxism, dependency theory and world system theories tried to explain the cause of underdevelopment by external factors mainly with a particular focus on unbalanced historical relations that existed between Europe and other regions emerged as dominant perspective.[79] Among the dependency theorists, Andre Gunder Frank advanced one of the most serious criticism against the notion of development as a process through which traditional societies pass through several stages to reach the level of mass production and consumption like Europe. In *Latin America Underdevelopment or Revolution,* Frank stated that:

> "It is generally held that economic development occurs in a succession of capitalist stages and that today's underdeveloped countries are still in a stage, sometimes depicted as original stage, of history through which the now developed countries passed long ago. Yet even a modest acquaintance with

[78] Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *The Essential Wallerstein* (New Press, 2000), 106.
[79] Joseph L Love, "The Origins of Dependency Analysis," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22, no. 1-2 (1990): 143.

> history show that underdevelopment is not original or traditional and neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resembles in any important respect the past of the now developed countries. The now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped."[80]

Thus, Frank put the difference between contemporary lack of development in non-European regions as a result of deliberate exploitation of Europe while lack of development in the prior history of wealthy states was not the result of external intervention. In *Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment* also, Frank assessed the global political economy since the 16th-century and classified it into three periods based on the process of accumulation of capital that led to the emergence of capitalism. Accordingly, the first was the 'mercantilist' phase (1500-1770) witnessed the increased mercantilist trade activity of Europe globally which brought a trade of "unequal exchanges". In this stage, the slave trade and a shift of domestic production towards extraction of resources for export laid the base of underdevelopment in Latin America and Asia.[81] The second period, according to Frank, was the industrial revolution and expansion of the market (1770-1870) that was possible as the result of the profits accumulated by the cross-continental trade of the first phase.[82] According to Frank, the expansion of commerce necessitated mass production which reinforced the industrial revolution. The last period represents the imperialist period (1870-1930) which witnessed a direct occupation and colonization of Latina America, Asia, and Africa.[83]

Dependency theory was also adopted by several scholars to explain Africa's political-economy predicament. Walter Rodney and Samir Amin are the most influential dependency theorists in analyzing Africa's conditions. In Walter Rodney's book published 1973, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, argued that Europe's economic prosperity was achieved in the expense of the exploitation of the human and natural resources of Africa and other regions; through the exploitation of the latter in asymmetrical relations that include disruption of domestic economic activities, slave trade, and colonization. Rodney stated that underdevelopment has two features. Firstly, it is relative which means when we say a certain state or region is underdeveloped, it is in comparison with other states or regions. Secondly, underdevelopment implies that it is different from other types of lack of development

[80] Andre Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy*, vol. 165 (NYU Press, 1969), 4.
[81] *Dependent Accumulation*, vol. 492 (NYU Press, 1979), 13-14.
[82] Ibid., 25-28.
[83] Ibid., 140-42.

because it is not caused by domestic reasons rather it is the result of external manipulation.[84] In Rodney's words, this feature of underdevelopment refers to:

> "…a particular relationship of exploitation: namely, the exploitation of one country by another. All of the countries named as 'underdeveloped' in the world are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonialist exploitation. African and Asian societies were developing independently until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist powers. When that happened, exploitation increased and the export of surplus ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of their natural resources and labor."[85]

Another prominent dependency theorist, Samir Amin, in *Imperialism and Unequal development* published in 1976 also argued that the economies of Africa and other non-Western regions suffer from underdevelopment because of capitalism's exploitative nature. According to Amin, capitalism passed through three stages. The first phase covers the time from Renaissance to the industrial revolution which was characterized by the accumulation of wealth by Europe from African and American sources. The second one is a pre-monopoly stage of the 19th-century in which the American, Asiatic, and Arab-Ottoman served as a destination for European manufactured products. Finally, Amin designates post 19th-century as a phase when capitalism reached the level of absolute monopoly, in his word "imperialism". Amin's main argument is that Africa and other parts of the world lagged in terms of development because of capitalism's exploitative nature.[86] The international system that is accused of being exploitative historical process was well elaborated by Wallerstein's world-systems theory. Wallerstein presented the international system as a stratified arena of three economic world systems: the core, semi-periphery, and periphery.[87] Regarding the fact that why Europe became a center of this capitalist system, Wallerstein argued that:

> "A capitalist world economy is based on division of labor between its core, its semi-periphery and its periphery in such away that there is unequal exchange between the sectors but dependence of all sectors, both economically and politically, on the continuance of this unequal exchange."[88]

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[84] Walter Rodney, "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa Howard University Press," *Washington DC* (1981): 17-41.
[85] Ibid., 17-18.
[86] Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*, vol. 26 (Monthly Review Press New York, 1977), chapter five.
[87] Wallerstein, *The Essential Wallerstein*, 56.
[88] Ibid., 64.

According to Wallerstein, the semi-periphery which exploits the periphery and itself is channeled towards the enrichment of the core. This addition of semi-periphery as the third tier in the system is what makes his approach different from dependency theory. Walter Goldfrank summarized Wallerstein's criticism against the post-WWII understanding of development which are: ignorance of the historical background of the emergence of the capitalist system, depiction of the Western capitalism as the only development option that every state should pursue, the conception of the state as eternal and only actors in the international system, and the exclusive division of societies based on their development level.[89] In world-system theory, the periphery and semi-periphery are integrated with the core in a way that enriches the center. This social framework according to Wallerstein began with the industrial revolution which:

> "Expanded enormously the demand for sugar and cotton production in the Western hemisphere which in turn expanded the demand for slaves…the new scale European production required a world-wide market for purchase and sale. It was this point in time that Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania began to be systematically incorporated into the new single global capitalist system, in almost all cases as part of the periphery."[90]

Even though inquiries that utilized dependency theory and the world-system approach were successful in revealing how Europe's involvement played a role in hindering Africa's development prospects, they were not able to beak the domination of mainstream theories. Moreover, there are inherent problems within such approaches. Firstly, they consider all states in Africa and other underdeveloped regions as homogenous entities. However, despite the relatively similar historical context they passed through since the 15th-century, significant differences in domestic conditions and development potentials are undeniable. Secondly, as Cirino Ofuho stated, dependency theory gives total responsibility for the underdevelopment of Africa, Asia, and Latin America to external factors and ignores the role of domestic dynamics. By concentrating upon external sources of dependency, it also failed to consider the particulars of the domestic political upheavals that engaged the continent during the 1970s and the 1980s.[91] At last but not least, despite uncovering the

[89] Walter L Goldfrank, "Paradigm Regained? The Rules of Wallerstein S World-System Method," *Journal of world-systems research* 6, no. 2 (2000).
[90] Wallerstein, *The Essential Wallerstein*, 61.
[91] Cirino Hiteng Ofuho, "Africa: Teaching Ir Where It's Not Supposed to Be," in *International Relations Scholarship around the World* (Routledge, 2009), 73-75.

weakness in mainstream theories they could not give us viable approaches for the study of states in general.

In the case of Ethiopia, dependency theory has limited relevance in comparison with post-colonial states in Africa and other regions. Firstly, given the lack of the colonialism factor in Ethiopia, it can be said that dependency theory cannot be used to explain Ethiopia's underdevelopment since we can argue Ethiopia's underdevelopment was the result of an internal problem not because of European exploitation. This argument can be strengthened by adding that the slave trade and other commercial connections of Ethiopia were not mainly connected with the "triangular slave trade" that connected Africa, Asia, and Europe; rather it was mainly tied with Arabia. But this should not be taken as denying dependency on foreign powers and interventions that impacted both the internal and foreign affairs of Ethiopia. Secondly, it is also clear how Ethiopia's case poses a challenge regarding the formation of states since it was internally motivated unlike most of the states underdeveloped regions which are the result of decolonization

Dependency theorists provide the arbitrariness of the formation of colonial states as one factor for socio-economic and political challenges post-colonial states faced. In the case of Ethiopia, the internal element played a significant role in the formation of the state even though the consequent state was trapped with severe socio-economic problems even more than colonized African states. Ethiopia also did not escape from internal political turmoil, ethnic factions, and coup d'état that ravaged most of the African post-colonial states. However, though not colonized, Ethiopia cannot be an exception from other historical relations Europe had with other regions since the 16th-century. In this case, explanations provided by both dependency theory and a world-system approach are important perspectives to explain aspects of Ethiopia's socio-economic and political conditions.

2.5. Understanding Defensive Modernization

Several societies in different parts of the world with long historical roots like Ethiopia were also able to evolve into modern states by preventing colonialism. Though the ways and the extent these states resisted foreign influence and assured their survival is different, their common feature is that they followed a path of defensive modernization which aimed at protecting major internal features and accepting some important foreign modernity elements without absorbing the whole notion of "progressive" modernization. Nevertheless the degree

is different even societies that defied not only domination militarily but also that rivaled against it had to reconfigure their domestic features per European standards so that they could be accepted as a member of the civilized international community. For instance, As Gerrit W. Gong assessed that even Russia and the Ottoman Empire resorted to the Europeanization process at some part of their history and at different scales. Russia witnessed an extensive modernization process in line with European standards under Tsar Peter the Great at the end of the 17th-century. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the civilizational standard and relation with Europe were more complicated. Firstly, the Ottomans had themselves considered Europe as inferior in comparison with their culture and religion. Thus, until the economic and military might of the Empire eroded, there was no interest to adopt European values as it was an evident lack of reciprocation in terms of diplomatic representations. Secondly, despite the above differences, the Ottoman Empire was part of the European balance of power that aimed at countering Russia, which makes it difficult to see it as a non-European entity. However, with a gradual decline of the Empire, European-modelled reforms started to be introduced in different areas including administrative, education, and justice systems.[92]

As William Halley Pointed out, the process of adopting European elements by the Ottoman Turkish Empire began in late 18th-century as it started to lose it is influence over the territories it had ruled. At the peak of its power, the Ottoman Empire had tecnological, military, administrative and econonmic features that were as advanced as its European counterpart. Following the weakening of the power of the Empire, the European powers were also exerting their influence on the Empire based on different pretexts including the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. the empire was forced to inter a process of re formation or reorganization known as *Tanzimat* for the sake of saving the Empire from internal failure and foreign influences. This process of reformation included the introduction of legal, add administrative and military reorganisations in line with European features. In this process, priority was given for preserving internal features of identity including religion.[93] Even though the threat against the Ottoman Empire from European powers was not direct core and azatian threat, it faced survival threats in its late history. Thus, despite the disintegration of the Empire after WWI, its attempts to assure

[92] Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society (Oxford Clande Press, 1984), 100-19.
[93] William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 (Routldge, 2013), 8-12.

survival by preserving internal elements is while conducting performance based on European standards can be regarded as an endeavour of defensive modernization.

Another state that escaped colonialism is Iran. Like the Axumite Civilization of Ethiopia, Iran had a glorious past of Achaemenid Empire (from 550-330 BC), a literate and politically organized power that had trade, religious and other forms of interactions with the outside world. Similar to the effect of foreign travelers in Medieval Ethiopia, European travelers depicted Iran as a land of treasure which created the interest of foreigners towards it. Going fast forward, in their pre-modern history, both Iran and Abyssinia possessed strategic locations which were important for the political and economic interest of world powers of that time. As Farah Ghaderi pointed out, because of its location in the middle of Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf which connects Asia and the Middle East, Iran had attracted the attention of regional and global powers. Positioned near to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East, Ethiopia also held modest strategic importance for Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and lately for European colonizers. However, Ethiopia was far less strategically important as it is evident in the initial lack of interest into the interior territory except for the area adjacent to the Red Sea. Ethiopia's relatively limited strategical importance especially for the 19th-century great powers was proved by Britain's exit without establishing permanent presence in 1868 after freeing their citizens by defeating Tewodros II. In the case of Iran, as Ahmad Seyf pointed out, to protect British interest, the value accorded to Iran was so strong that was expressed in the form of preventing Russian encroachment towards British India. Thus, though Iran was not directly colonized, its domestic political and economic affairs were heavily penetrated, and its survival was continuously threatened by the Anglo-Russian rivalry.[94]

Looking at the foreign influence in Iran, even in the absence of colonialism, Iran's economy was peripherally integrated with in the global capitalist economy in the 19th-century as a producer of raw silk and other primary products. Both Russia and Britain, though they did not directly occupy Iran, they interfered hugely in its domestic affairs. Moreover, foreign trade mainly with Russia, Britain and France was subjected to different concessions made in favor of these powers. The involvement of Britain and Russia in Iran's banking industry also gave them the opportunity to monopolize the financial sector. Later,

[94] Ahmad SeyfIran, "Foreign Trade and the Economy of Iran in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Persian Studies* 34 (1996).

the oil resource attracted the attention of world powers in post-WWII era which paved a way for another phase of foreign intervention, this time mainly from the USA.[95] As John Foran argued, socio-economic transformation in Iran under Qajar Dynasty (1900-1925) was a "dependent development" that relied on foreign powers and it was characterized by "negative repercussions on standards of living, balance of payments, inflation, the state budget, employment" despite the increase in "population, gross domestic product, foreign trade".[96]

Both Iran and Ethiopia passed through relatively similar events in their political structure and their relationship with foreigners in their 20th-century history too. Like the Ethiopian revolution ended centuries-old monarchial system, four years later the Iranian Revolution overthrew the Pahlavi Dynasty though there were significant differences between the two revolutions especially about the place of religion in pre-and-post revolutionary periods. Generally, despite the absence of colonial occupation in Iran it did not prevent the fall of its economy from being peripheralized as a raw material source, like what happened in economies in colonized regions of Africa, Asia, and the USA. The case of Japan is different from both Iran and Ethiopia, after transforming the base of its economy from agriculture to manufacturing, it became the major non-Western industrialized state which eventually turned itself into one of the colonizers. Japan was a feudal state when it faced international influence threatening its security and economy. Thus, as Yasuzo Horie pointed out, preservation of independence and socio-economic transformation had remained the core of Japan's internal and foreign policies in the face of foreign powers that pose serious threats. The Meiji Dynasty (1968-1912) was basically anti-foreign and framed the need for modernization blended with nationalism. Accordingly, it was able to industrialize the economy and build a strong army. Thus, it implemented a "foreign trade policy aiming at the recovery of the balance of trade, that it was a system of national unity, and that it was a system of nationalism".[97] This combined with the success in transforming the feudal economy to industrialization, all of which enabled the building of a modern army made the path of Japan's modernization different from other non-colonized people like Iran and

[95] Ibid.
[96] John Foran, "The Concept of Dependent Development as a Key to the Political Economy of Qajar Iran (1800–1925)," *Iranian studies* 22, no. 2-3 (1989).
[97] Yasuzo Horie, "The Problem of the Modernization of Japan," *The Kyoto University economic review* 26, no. 1 (1956): 3.

Ethiopia. Thus, when Ethiopia became easy prey for Italy slightly before WWII, Japan joined the league of industrialized and major world powers of the world.

Generally, defensive modernization is a path of modernization that sought to preserve domestic features while accepting powerful elements of foreign modernity. As it is illustrated in the experience of Ottoman Turkey, Iran and Japan defensive modernization was a means of addressing internal and external challenges. Though the success in terms of building a modern and capable state is different across different cases, the process of defensive modernization aspired to enable a state to be part of the international system without losing its identity. Ethiopia's experience has fitted with this experience since its history was defined by the attempt to avoid internal and foreign threats that posed dangers on its unique internal features. Thus, defensive modernization and this dissertation is employed to represent the process of modernization with the aim of avoiding European subjugation. With the same token, this dissertation employs this concept to imply Ethiopia's attempt to enter into the modern world as an independent state by preserving its values while exploiting the advantages of foreign modernity.

2.6. Theoretical Framework: Historical Sociology in IR

Lack of willingness to consider diversity and other limitations in the explanation capacity of dominant IR theories has led to the proliferation of several alternative theories and approaches that aim to do a more inclusive and emancipatory analysis. HSIR is one of such multi-disciplinary approaches that became significantly influential in IR since the 1980s.[98] However, the call for a historically sensitive and multi-disciplinary analysis in IR was not unique to the 1980s. The first scholar to coin the term 'historical sociology was the French citizen Raymond Aron (1906-1983) who pointed out the need to integrate history and sociology in the study of world politics.[99] In article published in 1959, *International Relations: The Long Road to Theory,* Stanley Hoffmann criticized Morgenthau's realist

[98] George Lawson, "The Promise of Historical Sociology in International Relations," *International studies review* 8, no. 3 (2006): 415-16.
[99] Bryan-Paul Frost, "Forward to the Past: History and Theory in Raymond Aron's Peace and War," in *The Companion to Raymond Aron* (Springer, 2015), 67-69.

notions for being statist, power-centered and obsessed with national interest.[100] Regarding the importance of historical sociology in the study of world politics Hoffman stated that:

> "The search for timeless propositions and the deductive method are, at present, disappointing. We must inductively and, before we reach any conclusions about trends manifest throughout history, we should resort to a historic systematic research.[101]

In the late 20th-century, HSIR became one of the important approaches in IR that envisioned correcting the weaknesses of mainstream theories. But, despite its wide utilization in IR, what constitutes HSIR, and its principles are not provided by scholars in the field. For instance, the most prominent scholar that succeeded in integrating historical sociology with IR, Fred Halliday (1946-2010), abstained from precisely defining HSIR and was reluctant to provide principles on which his analysis was founded.[102] Though Halliday has written extensively about the Middle East including a book and an article about the Ethiopian revolution, he refrained from providing the principles of his analysis and faced challenges in addressing this concern when he was directly requested. It is only in *For an International Historical Sociology* that he outlined the issues he believed are the tenets of HSIR. Accordingly, he underlined the stratified nature of agency, the role of revolution in understanding states and the international system, the need to balance heterogeneity and homogeneity as important pillars in the study of IR.[103]

Like other alternative approaches, HSIR established itself on the objective of fulfilling the flaws of mainstream IR theories especially the limitations of Neorealism. One of the sharpest criticisms of neo-realism and the potential of HSIR are made by Hobson which is summarized in Table 2.1. provided below. Hobson called the ahistorical and 'asociological' analysis of neo-realism as "chronofetishist" or time-fetishism borrowing the term "fetishism" from Marx. Marx used the term to criticize the capitalist attempt to present goods as if they have no values attached with the relation of production. In the same fashion, Hobson criticizes mainstream IR theories for their attempt to 'naturalize' time and deny the

[100] Stanley H. Hoffmann, "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *World Politics* 11, no. 3 (1959): 349-52.
[101] Ibid., 367.
[102] Benno Teschke, "Advances and Impasses in Fred Halliday's International Historical Sociology: A Critical Appraisal," *International Affairs* 87, no. 5 (2011): 1087-89.
[103] Fred Halliday, "For an International Sociology," *Historical sociology of international relations* (2002): 249-57.

constituent and unique features of the states and the international system at a given period.[104] Several authors have tried to define HSIR, for the purpose of this dissertation we use a definition given by Hobson. According to Hobson, HSIR is:

> "…a critical approach which refuses to treat the present as an autonomous entity outside of history but insists on embedding it within a specific socio-temporal place, thereby offering sociological remedies to the ahistorical illusions that chronofetishism and tempocentrism produce."[105]

As it is evident in the definition given above, unlike Neorealist assumptions that ignore social forces and history, HSIR gives social and historical factors into consideration. Moreover, how HSIR views the interplay between the international system and a state within it is one of the most important features that allows us to give attention to sociological and historical change and continuity without spatial limitations. As Halliday pointed out, the understanding of the international sphere in mainstream IR theories claim its inescapable role in determining the behavior of states. Halliday suggests a well-adjusted analysis that takes into account the role of the international in shaping issues that are traditionally considered as confined to domestic issues is necessary and vice versa.[106]

[104] John M Hobson, "What's at Stake In'bringing Historical Sociology Back into International Relations? Transcending 'Chronofetishism 'and' Tempocentrism' in International Relations," ibid., ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (New York: Cambridge University Press), 5-9.
[105] Ibid., 14.
[106] Halliday, *Rethinking International Relations*, 1-4.

Table 2.1. Limitations of Neorealism and Remedies of HSIR

Limitations of Neo-realism	**Solutions of HSIR**
The problem of considering the present as clearly separated from the past and presented it as "static, self-constituting, autonomous and reified entity".	Views the present as flexible edifice founded on history, intends to reveal "processes of temporal continuity and discontinuity with previous social practices"
Views the present as if it came out of necessities "thereby obscuring the historical processes of social power, identity/social exclusion and norms that constitute the present".	Shows the present did not naturally emerge rather it is the result of "processes of power, identity/social exclusion and norms".
Considers the present as resistant to structural change "thereby obscuring the processes that reconstitute the present as an immanent order of change".	Aims to show the present is in "transformative (morphogenetic) processes that continuously reconstitute present intuitions and practices".
The past is used to draw conclusions about the present and claim "all historical systems as 'isomorphic' or 'homologous', resulting in the failure to recognize the unique features of the present".	Focuses on interactions and tries to disclose "differences between past and present international systems and institutions, to thereby reveal the unique constitutive features of the present".

Source: Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson. *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7.

Regarding introducing historical sociological approaches in IR and in terms of clearly identifying research agendas within it, Stephen Hobden and John Hobson are important in terms of providing the latest update. Hobden tried to "break the boundary" between historical sociology and international relations by reviewing the works of Theda Skocpol, Immanuel Wallersein, Maichale Mann, and Carless Tilly with a particular focus on how these scholars articulated states and the international system in a historically sensitive manner and with consideration the role of social forces.[107] Hobson did a more critical analysis and classified the works of historical sociologists in IR into two waves: the first and second wave of Neoweberian historical sociology. Hobson demonstrated how the early attempts of historical sociologists to denounce the state-centric and structure-based neo-

[107] Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries* (Routledge, 2006).

realist analysis rather asserted realist notions. In Hobson's view, there is no difference between Skocpol and Waltz as both give significant agential power to international structure in shaping state behavior. Hobson's justification for this is Skocpol's emphasis on war as an initiator of revolution because citizens cannot shoulder the increasing cost of war with other states. In Hobson's view, this argument gives importance to structure as a fundamental agent in IR as opposed to the domestic realm. Hobson classifies himself, Stephen Hobden, and Michael Mann as the second wave of Neoweberian historical sociologists which he appreciates for acknowledging a balanced agency of societies, states, and the international system.[108]

About the challenge of the utilization of alternative multi-disciplinary approaches in IR like HSIR, Hobson analogously demonstrated the response of "gate-keepers" of mainstream IR theories by stating that when such researcher tries to:

> "…gain entry into the traditionally defined 'legitimate' terrain of international relations, is taken discreetly aside by 'international relations immigration officers' at the border, and told that she needs a visa, the conditions of which stipulate clearly that her baggage must be quarantined, but that it will be returned on departure conditional upon satisfactory behavior during her stay (i.e., behavior that conforms to the 'real international relations'). 'You *can* be seen,' say the international relations immigration officers, 'but you must *not* be heard'. And she 'will be told that any violation of these rules will be met with the usual refrain, 'you're not an *international relations* scholar', and will, therefore, lead to her immediate deportation (understood as permanent excommunication from the international relations discipline)."[109]

Hobson called this theoretical allegiance in IR "disciplinism" that wrongly labels the practices of multi-disciplinary analysis like HSIR (which combines historical and sociological elements into account) as impure and unacceptable IR works.[110] As it is mentioned above, like other alternative theories HSIR founds itself on the weaknesses of mainstream IR theories. In *The Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations*, Hobson tried to debunk the main tenets of classical realism. In the same fashion like Morgenthau's six principles of political realism, Hobson

[108] John M. Hobson, "The Two Waves of Weberian Historical Sociology in International Relations," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 70-77.
[109]John M. Hobson and Stephen Hobden, *On the Road Towards an Historicised World Sociology*ibid., 267.
[110]Ibid.

outlined the six principles on which HSIR should be guided.[111] *In Politics among Nations,* Morgenthau claimed universal laws that govern society and politics, national interest to amass power, the fluidness of national interest in accordance with various circumstances, the relativity of moral appropriateness and irrelevance of universal moral principles, the difference between the moral ambition of states and moral principles, and the independence of world politics.[112]

It is the above principles of HSIR that made the approach suitable to address questions this dissertation intends to answer. As a remedy of mainstream IR theories' treatment of the underdeveloped states, there are five major reasons for choosing HSIR as an emancipatory theoretical framework. Firstly, HSIR enables us to explain the role of the international system in the formation of African states and the behavior of the consequent states. As Hobson clearly stated, in the evolution of IR discipline, there was an erroneous trend of viewing the domestic and external spheres as clearly separated domains.[113] Halliday also argues that there existed an imbalance of attention given to the role of the general (international aspects) and the role of the specific (the state). On one hand, the overstated emphasis on the international aspect creates an impression as if the international system came into existence immediately after WWI. However, though the degree varies the internationalization of world politics is not new to the post-WWI era and should not be taken as the only subject matter of IR; rather the focus should be towards the understanding of the interplay between international circumstances and the domestic contexts and how they change through time. On the other hand, the state is thought of as if it emerged detached from the international context. The international nature of the Thirty Years War that brought the state system in Europe is ignored in the analysis of state formation in Europe. Mainstream theories of IR have failed to utilize historical and sociological knowledge of states and the

[111] John M Hobson, "Debate: The'second Wave'of Weberian Historical Sociology-the Historical Sociology of the State and the State of Historical Sociology in International Relations," *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 2 (1998): 286-95.
[112] Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Kenneth W Thompson, and W David Clinton, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York City: McGraw-Hill Education, 1985).
[113]John M. Hobson, "What Is at Stake in Brininging Historical Sociology in to International Relations'? Transcending 'Chronofetishism' and 'Tempocentrism' in International Relations," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Stephen Hobdon and John M. Hobson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16-17.

world because of denial of the role of the international in the formation of the state and lack of consideration for how both the state and the international change through time.[114]

Table 2.2. The six Principles of HSIR

Principles	**Explanations**
History and change	Disclosing the historical root of the international system and exploring political, economic, and social changes within the international system, regions, and states
Multi-causality	Change is the result of diverse sources of power including military, ideological, social, and economical
Multi-spatiality	Changes occur in overlapping and intersecting manner at international and state levels
Partial autonomy	Sources of power are not autonomous in that one affects the other and the whole picture of change cannot be comprehended without appreciating the role of all sources.
Complex change	Changes in international system and in states do not take place in ordered manner rather they involve both change and discontinuity.
Non-realist concept of state autonomy	HSIR contends the notion of partial autonomy all spheres.

Source: Hobson, John M. "The historical sociology of the state and the state of historical sociology in international relations." *Review of International Political Economy* (1998): 284-320.

Hobson, referring Waltz states that the neo-realist view holds that the state emerged first and considers the international as if it came to existence "spontaneously through the unintended consequence of state interaction".[115] In the case of Africa, the state system is an external imposition in the form of colonialism. However, in the consolidation and sustainability of African states, the African elite has played a great role. As Wallerstein showed, the leaders of newly liberated African states created the Organization of African Union (OAU) with particular interest in maintaining colonial borders with the formation of

[114]Fred Halliday, "The Pertinence of International Relations," *Political Studies* 38, no. 3 (1990): 503.
[115]Hobson, "What Is at Stake in Brininging Historical Sociology in to International Relations'? Transcending 'Chronofetishism' and 'Tempocentrism' in International Relations," 8.

the continental organization rather than demolishing the post-colonial state.[116] Concerning Ethiopia, whether domestic or international forces play the primary role in the formation of states has been a point of debate. As it is discussed in the next chapter, the formation of the Ethiopian state can be more accurately explain ed by rejecting the distinction between the domestic and international contexts and by emphasizing on the interplay between them.

The second advantage of HSIR emanates from its view towards the state. In HSIR, the state is defined as an amalgamation of coercive and administrative institutions. In line with this, the state comprises only these institutions and the people working within them. This view is fundamentally different from the realist tradition which considers the state as the entire sum of society and territory. Looking at the state as only institutions and people within them opens a possibility of reconsidering how we study states and their behavior in the international system.[117] Unlike the neo-realist view, HSIR does not regard the state as a homogenous entity rather it views it as a fragmented entity in which a variety of interest groups operate within it. Moreover, it considers the state as a changing actor across time and space. These alternative views of the state allow us to reconsider the concepts of state in Africa, national interest, nationalism, sovereignty, and state-society relation; moreover, it enables us to investigate the implication of economic underdevelopment and the quest for modernization on these important domestic issues.[118] In the period under investigation, ethnic identity has been another central factor in domestic political dynamics. As Hobson stated, this can be addressed with constructivist historical sociology which gives emphasis to identity and ideas in shaping foreign relations of the state.[119]

The third rationale for using HSIR is its view about agency in IR. HSIR enables us to consider the role of diverse actors that range from non-state actors within states to the international system. HSIR enables us to include multiple determinants in our analysis in accordance with the level of their influence in the events unfolding. The influence of individuals, interest groups, states, and the international system in determining foreign relations of states based on the degree of their impact on the specific events can be

[116]Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Early Years of the Oau: The Search for Organizational Preeminence," *International Organization* 20, no. 4 (1966): 774-87.
[117]Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda," *The Study of International Relations* (1989): 227.
[118]Hobson, "What Is at Stake in Brininging Historical Sociology in to International Relations'? Transcending 'Chronofetishism' and 'Tempocentrism' in International Relations," 15-16.
[119] Ibid., 24-25.

accommodated comprehensively. About this fact, a theory that has a room for the role of a state agency (states and interest groups within it); and at the same time that appreciates the role of global factors in affecting domestic events in the African states is essential. HSIR enables us to combine different actors within states and influences of international factors.[120] With regard to modernization, this provides the opportunity to understand the interaction of internal and external actors revolving around it.

The fourth rationale for choosing HSIR is the importance it accords to revolutions and their international dimension. Halliday states that structural analysis in IR is nowhere more appropriate than in revolutions. In revolutions, we can trace the international effect that ranges from the dissemination of radical ideas to material support to revolutionaries which eventually will disturb internal conditions in states. From the opposite direction also, revolutionary regimes tirelessly try to export their revolutionary prototype because they think that the survival of the revolution domestically depends on the existence of similar regimes externally. Thus, revolutions give us a framework to us to analyze the interaction between revolution in specific states and the international contexts.[121] In the case of Ethiopia, this setting is important not only it enables to understand the external effect on the revolution of 1974 and how the revolution changed foreign policy orientation, but we can also assess the role of the modernization question in state-society relations and was important in the revolution.

At last, but not least, the interconnected domestic-international assumption of HSIR regarding state-formation, the way the state is defined in HSIR, its recognition of the importance of interest groups working within states, its conviction on stratification of agency makes it a proper theoretical framework for analyzing how the problem of modernization influenced domestic politics and external relations. Though historical sociology as a perspective has been mainly employed to analyze wars, revolutions, state-building, the role of economic factors in these processes and in the international system is not new. As assessed by Hobden, for instance, Theda Skocpol emphasized economic and political aspects combined with historical circumstances in her study of the Russian and Chinese Revolutions. Charles Tilly concentrated on the role of coercive and economic forces in the process of state

[120]Fred Halliday, "For an International Sociology," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations, Ed. Stephen* ed. Hobdon and John M. Hobson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).16-17), 249-51.
[121]Ibid., 252-55.

formation. Michael Mann also focused on the sources of social power and underlines economic capacity as an important source of power.[122]

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter discussed the link between the Enlightenment movement and modernization that is rooted in the idea of progress. It investigated the link between the Enlightenment movement and IR discipline with particular attention to how theorization in IR is impacted by it. Moreover, the chapter assessed the relationship between studies of modernization and IR. Moreover, the chapter provided their common objective of understanding changes within societies, states, and the international system. The problematic relationship that exists between IR theory and the study of African states and states in other underdeveloped regions was also assessed including the attempt to revise the place of Africa in IR through Marxist and post-colonial approaches. By doing so the chapter illustrated the origin of European modernity thought and its interpretation of world history. The implication of this for the study of Ethiopian foreign relations and the reason for the problem justifying the relation Europe maintained with societies in other regions including Africa is also addressed. The chapter has also assessed the experience of different non-colonized societies in terms of maintaining their internal features while adopting important features of European modernity through defensive colonialism. Finally, the chapter has discussed the origin and relevance of HSIR in IR inquiries simultaneously demonstrating the suitability of this approach to answer questions that this dissertation aspires to answer.

On the problem of how Africa and other non-Western regions are dealt with in IR, condemning mainstream perspectives simply as racist interpretations is a shallow criticism. As it is clearly illustrated in this chapter, we need to uncover the origin of the problem and identify where the fault line lays. From Hegel to Morgenthau, their argument that Africa has no history cannot be countered by accusing them of being a racist, rather we need to point out the assumptions which made their views inapplicable on Africa's case and find alternatives to resolve it. From the beginning, the problem was embedded in the Enlightenment driven interpretation of history which attempted to present European history as a history of the world; in other words, the problem is a rejection of alteration in history,

[122]Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries*, 167-73.

culture, civilization, modernization level, and other differences in societies as a basis for inquiries in IR. Thus, when Africa is ignored by mainstream IR or any other Eurocentric perspectives in social sciences, the action can not be accorded as a simple racist view against Africans. The trend of conceptualizing human history in a progressive and single-line direction propagated by scholars of the Enlightenment dictates to disregard the role of societies in other regions. Thus, the fundamental remedy is the utilization of an epistemologically transcending theory that acknowledges variance while recognizing commonality across societies. In this regard, as we have seen in the last section of this chapter, HSIR enables us to do an inquiry that takes into consideration the role of forces working at domestic and at the international levels; and the interaction between them.

As its evident in its name, IR claims to be an international discipline. However, IR's problem of being a Western dominated subject is well documented in the available literature. The study of African states and states in other non-Western regions in IR has been one point of debate. We have seen in this chapter that authors who dealt with Africa's case in IR mainly claim that Africa is ignored; and if it is addressed, it is in a way that misrepresents the realities of states of the continent. The widely sought remedy for this problem was the attempt to integrate Africa with domain IR theories has been especially with the wide use of neo-realist perspectives to analyze the foreign policy of African states. Those who believed in the fruitlessness of trying to reconcile Africa and mainstream IR theories resorted to look for alternative theories that are founded on the salient features of the continent. Though this direction may help to capture the relation between African states, it inevitably fails to incorporate the place of Africa in the international system. It is necessary that in the study of foreign relations of African states, attention should be given to alternative theories that are devised to fulfill the tasks that mainstream IR theories could not achieve.

The study of the foreign relations of Ethiopia is more challenging than the rest of Africa. as Ethiopia's uninterrupted independence makes some of the assumptions of postcolonial approaches limited in their explaining capacity. It is true that Ethiopia's historical roots and its continuity as an independent state are unique, however, salient features of Ethiopia also give us the opportunity to reflect on important issues like the contexts of domestically driven state formation in the face of colonization. The role of external involvement in the formation of African states is determinantal. Regarding the Ethiopian state also, in terms of the interaction of domestic and international spheres in the

state formation process and other important events, as it shown in the coming chapters, it is difficult to treat Ethiopia as an extreme enigma since colonization and expansion of the capitalist system facilitated its emergence as an independent state. Rather Ethiopia's uniqueness is in the area of modernization as it was expected to integrate with the capitalist world as it strived to maintain the monarchical system domestically and avert the threats of political independence i.e., defensive modernization. All these realities about Ethiopia makes HSIR a suitable approach to study continuity and change in Ethiopian society and state.

CHAPTER 3

DEFENSIVE MODERNIZATION AND ETHIOPIA'S LONG ROAD TO STATEHOOD

This chapter assesses the domestic, regional, and international backgrounds since the 16th-century that directly and indirectly impacted the formation of the Ethiopian state around the end of the 19th-century. The chapter investigates the effect of the interaction between domestic political landscape and the foreign realm had on the emergence of the strategy of defensive modernization to ensure continuity both through eliminating internal challenges and by surviving foreign threats. Accordingly, the chapter discusses the first two phases of defensive modernization which were focussed on realizing military changes. The first phase was triggered by the 16th-century religious war in which foreign powers were involved and in the second phase the military modernization was part of the project of creating a unified state that started in the middle of the 19th-century by Tewodros II. By doing so, the chapter draws trajectories of change and continuity to show historical roots of the modern Ethiopian state and to disclose the role of the foreign realm in internal developments by emphasizing on the developments that gave ground for the emergence of independent Ethiopian state at the end of the 19th-century.

The chapter begins by assessing domestic and international contexts to show the historical background of the Ethiopian state focusing on the interaction with the Middle East with particular attention to the role of religion in the relation with Egypt. The second part of the chapter discusses the first phase of defensive modernization focusing on internationalization of the 16th-century conflict between the Christian Kingdom and Adal Sultanate as the result of the involvement of Portugal and the Ottoman Empire in the 16th-century supporting the two sides, respectively. It also discusses how this involvement triggered the quest for modern firearms by Ethiopian leaders and contenders of power. Moreover, it assesses the effect of the 16th-century conflict in the weakening of the Christian Kingdom eventually leading to the period of the Era of Princes and the attempts of creating relations with foreign forces by rivaling domestic actors. The third part of the chapter deals with the second phase of defensive modernization. Accordingly, it deals with the starting of

creating a modern Ethiopian state by Tewodros II in the 1850s including the effect of his confrontations against Egyptians in the pursuit of the production of modern weaponry. Furthermore, this section discusses the emergence of central authority in Ethiopia and assesses the aversion of Italian colonial ambition in 1896 which enabled Ethiopia to emerge as the only free African state. The chapter ends by reflecting on the reasons for Ethiopia's independent statehood with particular attention on its peculiarities in comparison with the rest of Africa.

3.1. The Domestic and International Background

The present Ethiopian state is neither the result of a mere external intervention nor an isolated creation of a domestic dynamic. Rather it is the result of a long historical process marked by continuity as well as unexpected shifts. The priorities of defensive modernization of Ethiopia's foreign relations of the late 19th-century cannot be understood without grasping the interlinked events taking place in its previous history. Though change and continuity are available across all times, there are key turning points that are emphasized here since they significantly shaped the character of the contemporary Ethiopian state. Accordingly, the shift in the interaction of Christianity and Islam which invited intervention from great powers, the religious and ethnic dimension of the domestic politics, the internal struggle for power which resulted in the emergence of central authority, and the coming of colonialism determined the background from which the Ethiopian state emerged at the end of 19th-century are discussed in detail.

Among other things, three internal and three external developments defined the background from which the Ethiopian state emerged. The war between the Christian Kingdom and Muslim Sultanate of Adal under the leadership of Ahmad al-Ghazi in the first half of the 16th-century, the expansion of the Oromo ethnic group from South to the hinterlands of the Christian Kingdom in the north, and the beginning of the project of creating a unified Ethiopian state were the three most important internal developments. External developments that impacted conditions in the region and in Ethiopia were the involvement of Ottoman Turkish and Portuguese forces in the 16th-century, confrontations against Egyptian forces in the Western part of Ethiopia that bordered with Sudan, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 which led to the increasing presence of European powers with their project of colonialism that became official just a decade later in Berlin Conference.

These three events represent the most important foreign influences that shaped both the internal and foreign affairs of Ethiopia. Before addressing these issues, it is reasonable to put the Ethiopian prior history in brief.

Though the exact time is debated, the Abyssinian civilization is believed to be around three thousand years old. The Axumite civilization (100 BC-900 AD) which was the result of the interaction between Semitic peoples who immigrated from Southern Arabia and indigenous Cushitic peoples is regarded as the zenith of the glory of Abyssinia as it was one of a handful of world civilizations of the time and had trade and other forms of interactions with Greeks, Romans, Arabs, and Persians. The secret for the prosperity of Axum was traded since its geographical location enabled it to put itself as a link between Africa, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean regions. Moreover, the arrival of Christianity in the 4th -century and the advent of Islam in the 7th -century were among important developments that have long-lasting effects on the Ethiopian state and society and their relations with foreigners.[123] Islam also entered peacefully into Ethiopia following the coming of followers of Prophet Muhammed including his daughter Ruqayyah to escape prosecution in Mecca. Since then, though the highlands of northern Ethiopia were traditionally strongholds of the Christians, as Islam slowly expanded in the Red Sea region including the Eastern and Southeastern lowlands of Ethiopia, clashes between Christians and Muslims became a defining feature of the domestic environment thereby being one of the determinants of foreign relations.[124]

As Taddesse Tamerat pointed out, the peaceful encounter between Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia gradually turned into conflictual relations. The source of this shift in religious dynamics in Ethiopia was part of the Middle Eastern developments. The Fatimids came to power in Egypt in 969 A.D. thereby replacing Mesopotamia as a center of Islam. Since Islam entered Ethiopia in the 7th-century, its followers were gradually increasing especially in the Red Sea region and lowland areas where the power of the Ethiopian rulers was less felt. Following the revival of commercial interest of the Fatimids in the Red Sea region and as the number of Muslim residents increased including through conversion of Ethiopians, the question of religious coexistence emerged. As a result, influential Muslim traders approached the Fatimids to pressure the Abyssinian Empire for more religious

[123]Paul B Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia* (Springer, 2000), 22-37.
[124] Mukerrem Miftah, "Key Dimensions in Abyssinia-Ottoman Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: A Critical Review of Literatures," *Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies* 10, no. 1 (2017): 265-66.

freedom. Thus, Egypt emerged as a protector of the Muslims' interest in Ethiopia, and it tried to realize this through the patriarchs sent to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church from Alexandria. This inevitably put patriarchs between the interest of Fatimids to protect Muslims and the anti-Muslim policies of Christian monarchs of Abyssinia. The Mamluk became rulers in Egypt and Syria in 1250 and the influence of Muslims on the Christian Kingdom grew as an increasing number of people were converted in addition to the control of trade by Muslim merchants.[125] After Axum, the center of political power shifted from the northern Tigre to the Agaw in the South with the emergence of Zagwe Dynasty (1150-1270) which continued the legacy of Axum in three aspects: commitment to the monarch as a representative of God, dedication to the Christian religion; and interest in architecture. In 1270, Zagwe Dynasty ended when Emperor Yikuno-Amlak from Amhara came to power and established the 'Solomonic' Dynasty: a legend that claims that his lineage from the Axumite kings descended from Queen Sheba of Ethiopia and King Solomon of Israel some three thousand years ago. By this, Yikuno-Amlak, established a new dynasty that would endure well into the 20th-century.[126] Yikuno-Amlak's reign ushered a period of a strong relationship between the church and the state as articulated by the 13th -century text *Kibre Negest* ("Glory of Kings") which became the guide of worldly and spiritual life; and gave the power to the rule Ethiopia to 'Solomonic' Dynasty i.e., to male and Orthodox Christian heir of Emperor Yikuno-Amlak. Thus, the period from 13th to 15th-century witnessed the strengthening of Abyssinia with the expansion of territory and relative stability.[127]

Religion played important role in determining the regional and international dimension of Ethiopia's domestic evolution. As Tamrat Tadesse pointed out, the protection of minorities was important in the relation between Ethiopia and Egypt. Moreover, the same as Egypt sought uninterrupted flow of Nile River which Ethiopia contributed significant share as its source, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was dependent on the Coptic Church of Alexandria for the leader of the Church known as *Abun* (bishop) until the first Ethiopian bishop was named in 1959.[128] Next to the Middle East, Ethiopia's foreign relations were tied

[125] Tamrat Taddesse, "Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527" (University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies (United Kingdom), 1968), 79-101.
[126] Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*, 44-107. For ideological aspect of the 'Solomonic dynasty see Crummey, "Imperial Legitimacy and the Creation of Neo-Solomonic Ideology in 19th-Century Ethiopia (Légitimité Impériale Et Création D'une Idéologie Néo-Salomonienne En Éthiopie Au Xixe Siècle)," 13-15.
[127] Taddesse, "Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527," 227-95.
[128] Detailed discussion of the role of religion and Nile River in the relation between Ethiopia, Egypt and Nile is available at: Ḥagai Erlikh and Ỳ Hagai Erlikh, *The Cross and the River: Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 35-144.

with Europe. The link with the Middle East combined with early encounters of Ethiopians and Europeans at individual levels as pilgrims, adventurers and migrants created the view of Europeans who admired Ethiopians for their devotion to Christianity thereby linking it with a legend of Prester John. The legend of Prester John was s story about the existence of a powerful Christian kingdom out of the Middle East that would liberate Jerusalem which was fantasized in the face of Ottoman expansion towards Europe. Despite its disparity with the real character of Ethiopia, it did really matter in shaping the attitude of Europeans.[129]

As Hawi Tilahune pointed out, the Horn of Africa was well known to Europeans since the 16th-century. Especially the Abyssinian region which mainly represented the northern part of contemporary Ethiopia that is dominantly inhabited by Amhara and Tigre ethnic groups including the provinces of Tigray, Begemdir, Gojam, Shewa, and Wollo had relatively significant interactions with the Middle East and European powers.[130] The war between the Abyssinian monarchs and the Adal Sultanate created a scenario in which great powers of the Ottoman Empire and Portugal were involved as part of their rivalry in the Red Sea region and based on religious sentiments. The involvement of these powers siding the conflicting parties was very important beyond deciding the outcome of the conflict. Above all, it installed the passion for modern weapons in the minds of Ethiopian rulers which continued as their primary concern in the coming centuries.[131]

Located in East Africa adjacent to the Red Sea, Ethiopia is positioned at the crossroads of the Middle East and Africa. Its location and the religious dynamic within it had significantly attracted the attention of great powers. The internationalization of domestic conflicts, in turn, created both challenges and opportunities for the state formation project. Central in the interaction between Ethiopia and foreigners was the gap in terms of military technology and socio-economic conditions. The intention to import foreign inventions for domestic use and the perception of the foreign realm as a resource to be exploited is not something that started late in Ethiopia. For instance, the prominent Enlightenment historian Edward Gibbon had stated the interest of Ethiopian rulers to learn from the progress made

[129] See the role of the Legend of Prester in Europe's perception towards Ethiopian in Charles E Nowell, "The Historical Prester John," *Speculum* 28, no. 3 (1953).
[130] Hawi T Tilahune, "Imperial Ethiopia: Conquest and the Case of National Articulation," *Tapestries: Interwoven voices of local and global identities* 5, no. 1 (2016): 11.
[131] Richard Pankhurst, "Guns in Ethiopia," *Transition*, no. 20 (1965).

in other societies. Regarding the relation between the Roman Empire and Abyssinia during the reign of the Roman Emperor Theodosius II (421 AD - 450 AD), Gibbon stated that:

> "Conscious of their own indigence, the Abyssinians had formed the rational project of importing the arts and ingenuity of Europe; and their ambassadors at Rome and Lisbon were instructed to solicit a colony of smiths, carpenters, tillers, masons, printers, surgeons, and physicians, for the use of their country. But the public danger soon called for the instant and effectual aid of arms and soldiers, to defend an unwarlike people from the Barbarians who ravaged the inland country…"[132]

As Paul Hirst rightly observed, changes in military technology have played a vital role in the emergence and consolidation of sovereign states in Europe. The widespread use of gunpowder in the 16th-century and the industrialization of military technology since the middle of the 19th-century were the two most important technological revolutions that changed the form of warfare thereby leading to the rise of modern states and the creation of world order as we know it.[133] In Hirst's view, changes in military technology emanate "from a set of social conditions and social pressures for new technical adaptations."[134] Charles Tilly also argued that inventions in military technology enabled Medieval European states to expand by a means of violence and gradually consolidate their sovereignty within their territories.[135] More than any other goals, the pursuit for improved military technologies emerged as the main objective in the relation with foreigners as the result of its necessity in the domestic power struggle and in the attempt to remain intact in the face of foreign threats.

Until this effort paid off late in the second half of the 19th-century, the Ethiopian army was not familiar with advanced weaponry. As John Dunn noted, until the introduction and effective utilization of firearms gradually improved, the Ethiopian army relied on traditional armaments including "spears, or javelins…small round shields plus a variety of razor-sharp daggers, straight swords and the double-edged sickle-shaped *gorade* (scimitar)".[136] Merid Welde-Aregay also pointed out that before the arrival of firearms at the

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[132] Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: And Other Selections from the Writings of Edward Gibbon*, vol. I-VI (Washington Square Press, 1963), 1998.
[133] Paul Hirst, *War and Power in the Twenty-First Century: The State, Military Power and the International System* (John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 7-8.
[134] Ibid., 8.
[135] Charles Tilly, "War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime in Bringing the State Back in,(Edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol)," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 172-75.
[136] John Dunn, "'For God, Emperor, and Country!'The Evolution of Ethiopia's Nineteenth-Century Army," *War in History* 1, no. 3 (1994): 284-85.

beginning of the 16th-century, the Ethiopian army was fundamentally traditional in the sense it relied on spears and shields as main weaponry both for infantry warriors and for knights. The need to benefit from foreign military innovations as the main tenet of defensive modernization emanated from this relative backwardness of the Ethiopian army. Medieval Ethiopian technology in the areas of textile, architecture, and weaponry was lagging far behind that of Europe, India, and the Middle East.[137]

Joao de Barros, a member of a Portuguese mission in Ethiopia in the 16th-century, explained the fact that rulers of Medieval Ethiopia were not keen on technology by saying:

> "Generally, all that people is barbarous in things scientific; for, except in those which pertain to the ceremonies of their priesthood (and even these barbarized), in everything else no learning whatsoever can be found in them, nor do they strive for it. And if a skilled foreigner goes to them, they do not let him come out; however, not to make use of him in things other than the building of their churches. For amongst them there are no masons, carpenters or painters who could build for them, and these which they have are workers of foreigners."[138]

The Ethiopian medieval economy was fundamentally agrarian that depended on the exploitation of land for farming. The agricultural activity also included animal husbandry that was taking place both in highlands and lowlands. The other most important aspect of the economy was the trade that was conducted domestically, regionally, and internationally. All these activities were geared under hierarchical political and social exploitation mechanisms that define the organization of the society.[139] Thus, compared to the military sector, the agriculture sector was in a shape to fulfill the needs of the population and the ruling class. The army was in retarded position compared to the threats Ethiopia started to face from regional and global powers. The next section discusses how Ethiopian rulers pursued military modernization as a means of asserting their power internally and averting external threats thereby becoming the priority of the defensive modernization project.

3.2. The First Phase of Defensive Modernization

The first phase of defensive modernization (1529-1855) was characterized by foreign involvement, increasing awareness about the potential of firearms, and internal power rivalry

[137] Merid Wolde Aregay, "Society and Technology in Ethiopia 1500-1800," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 17 (1984): 127-28.
[138] Ibid., 129.
[139] Anaïs Wion, "Medieval Ethiopian Economies: Subsistence, Global Trade and the Administration of Wealth," in *A Companion to Medieval Ethiopia and Eritrea* (Brill, 2020), 395-96.

that led to provincialism. Firearms arrived in Ethiopia during the reign of Emperor Yeshaq (r. 1414-1429). However, they were first used in battles during the reign of Dawit II (r. 1508-1540). Before this time, modernization of warfare was pursued especially through the importation of weapons and technologies from Egypt and Arabia mainly aimed at improving the cavalry.[140] The foreign impetus for this was increased the interest of world powers in the Eastern Africa region, particularly it was the result of the rivalry between the Ottoman Turkish Empire and Portugal which eventually led to their involvement in Ethiopia which was a turning point in the perception of Ethiopian rulers towards modern weapons.[141] Given Ethiopia's proximity to the Middle East, the two major eligions in the world made their way into Ethiopia much earlier than other regions.

Ibn Ahmad al-Ghazi of the Adal Sultanate destroyed the forces of the Christian Kingdom with the support of Ottoman and Arab soldiers. The rise of Ahmad al-Ghazi whose army included several hundreds of Turkish soldiers with efficient cavalry and firearms was invincible to the disproportionally huge army of the highlanders thereby becoming a turning point in the quest for firearms. In this regard, the battle of Shimbra Kure in March 1529 which was fought between Emperor Dawit II and Ahmed Obn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi was a turning point in the search for ways of modernizing the army. [142] Ahmed Al-Ghazi was able to defeat the huge army of the Christian kingdom with a relatively well-equipped army that constituted only 12,000 fighters. Despite his eventual defeat with the support of the Portuguese army in 1543, Ahmad al-Ghazi' controlled most of the territory of Abyssinia and forced its Emperor to be a fugitive who was only able to revive with the help of the Portuguese army.[143]

The Portuguese had discovered the Cape of Good Hope in 1492 and made their way towards the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions and established themselves in Yemen at the end of the -century. The trade route that connected China and India with Europe was vital in determining the Portuguese interest in the region. The Ottoman Empire had controlled Egypt in 1517 and the lucrative trade route inevitably brought a confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the Portuguese forces. The Portuguese were fighting with Mamluks before the

[140] Merid W Aregay, "A Reappraisal of the Impact of Firearms in the History of Warfare in Ethiopia (C. 1500-1800)," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 14 (1980): 100-01.
[141] Pankhurst, "Guns in Ethiopia," 26.
[142] Paul B Henze, "Layers of Time," in *Layers of Time* (Springer, 2000), 37-39.
[143]EG Martin, "Mahdism and Holy Wars in Ethiopia before 1600" (paper presented at the Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 1974), 110-13.

control of Egypt by the Ottomans mainly through a war conducted by ship fleets at sea. The Ottoman-Portuguese rivalry in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean region continued until the 1550s when the Portuguese presence was eliminated.[144] The involvement of the two great powers in Ethiopia was part of this broad context and combined with religious solidarity which prompted Portugal to support the Christian Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire sided with Ahmed Al-Ghazi. Following the defeat of Dawit II by the forces of Ibn Ahmed al-Ghazi Portugal sent and an expedition force under the leadership of Cristovao da Gama (the brother of the famous explorer Vasco da Gama) which helped the Christian Kingdom to revive and defeat al-Ghazi in 1943.[145] The involvement of the two great powers taught power contenders in Ethiopia about the significance of utilizing modern firearms. The involvement of the two great powers was also the first major event that shows how domestic events in Ethiopia were affected by regional and global developments.[146] Thus, this event hugely defined the evolution of defensive modernization which became the policy of Ethiopian leaders in their search for options of securing the support of foreign great powers to acquire modern weapons and other innovations.

Thus, conflicts that involved the utilization of better military technologies, though with devastating effect, were important in triggering the enthusiasm of Ethiopian leaders towards modern weapons, mainly towards the import and possible production of firearms. Though the pursuit of firearms helped Ethiopia to be in a relatively improved military shape to avert foreign threats including colonialism, its introduction also fueled the existing power rivalry between contenders of power. As we shall see in the next section, the power of the monarch was undermined by provincial kings as they started to build relatively well-equipped armies even in comparison with the *king of kings*. As Pankhurst pointed out, beyond their relevance in the military sphere, firearms became an important component of the Ethiopian culture gradually. Thus, holding firearms became a symbol of social status and a means of securing opportunity by serving as a warrior which was followed by rewards economically and politically. Firearms also became a central part of social and religious spheres that the number of accompanies that are armed with firearms and the number of

[144] Kirti N Chaudhuri, "The Portuguese Maritime Empire, Trade, and Society in the Indian Ocean During the Sixteenth Century," *Portuguese studies* 8 (1992): 58-70.
[145] Henze, "Layers of Time," 85-90.
[146] Aregay, "A Reappraisal of the Impact of Firearms in the History of Warfare in Ethiopia (C. 1500-1800)," 109-13.

shots fired for celebration became expressions of status including in weddings and religious ceremonies.[147]

The war between Christian monarchs and Adal Sultanate left the former weakened and vulnerable to religious and population migration influences. The weakness especially contributed to the expansion of the Oromo ethnic group from the south into the interior of the Christian Kingdom in the north. This was facilitated by the age-based hierarchical political, military, and social system of the Oromos called *Gadda* that enabled them to rapidly conquer new territories and assimilate the people. This process brought demographic and political changes in the Semitic and Christian Empire as it became deeply intermingled with ethnically Cushitic and religiously Muslim peoples. A section of Oromo elites was able to play a central role in the Gondarine Period (1632-1769) with a dynasty called Yejju. Gondar, which was located in the Northwest was the capital established by Emperor Fasiledes (r.1632-67) in 1635 until Emperor Tewodros II moved his seat to Mekdela in 1855, was the de facto capital since the central power had no control over regional rulers.[148] The power of Christian monarchs was gradually eroding and Ethiopia entered a period of instability commonly known as the Era of Princes that spanned from the deposition of Emperor Eyoas I by *Ras* Mikael Sehul of Tigray in 1769 to the coronation of Emperor Tewodros II in 1855. The Era of Princes was a period of chaos as provincial leaders effectively challenged the center power of the kingdom creating anarchic conditions.[149]

The effect of lack of central authority was also reflected in the foreign relations sphere in different ways. Given the political landscape of the time lacked one central power; attempts to contact European governments and to forge meaningful relations were conducted by multiple domestic actors. Several contenders of power attempted to establish relations with the same government with the rationale of getting foreign fortunes that would enable them to dominate the internal power struggle. However, regional leaders lacked the knowledge regarding how global politics was unfolding and about the interests of foreign powers with whom they sought to have a relation. Thus, lack of clear knowledge about the motive of European powers and regarding the contexts in which a strong alliance could be formed, made Ethiopian rulers solely justify their quest based on religious solidarity.

[147] Pankhurst, "Guns in Ethiopia," 33.
[148] Ibid.
[149] See Harold G Marcus, "Ethiopia. The Era of the Princes. The Challenge of Islam and the Re-Unification of the Christian Empire 1769-1855," (JSTOR, 1970).

However, the religious similarity was not the only motive for the actions of great powers of the time as it was seen in different instances.[150]

Usually, contact with foreigners was destructive unlike the attitude towards them that developed later as a source of innovation. Even before the Era of Princes, Ethiopia witnessed one of the darkest points in its history as the Portuguese involvement in Ethiopia shifted from military assistance to the mission of installing Catholicism in the place of Orthodox Christianity. Though initial attempts were rejected, with a renewed interest of Philip II of Spain encouraged the Catholic missionaries in Ethiopia (the Jesuits) in religious conversions thereby they were able to convert Emperor Susyneos of Ethiopia (r. 1606-1632) in 1622. This ushered the beginning of revolts of the clergy and the nobility against him which led to destructive civil war between him and the loyalists of the Ethiopian Church.[151] This promoted the son and successor and successor of Susyneos, Emperor Fasiledes to expel the Jesuits in 1633 and terminated almost all types of relations with foreigners when he came to power. Because of this, the foreign policy of Fasiledes is commonly referred to as "close door" foreign policy and it continued until the central rule was disrupted during the Era of Princes. In that period, except few European travelers, there was no significant contact between Ethiopia and Europe.[152]

The second feature of foreign relations of this epoch of Ethiopian history was the inability to control sea outlets which in turn resulted in difficult and limited contact with Europe. Ethiopian rulers were hindered by the geographical location as it was detached from the international routes by the control of the Red Sea region by different foreign and unfriendly forces. This made the conduct of foreign relations focus not only on how to persuade Europeans to extend their support but also on getting a passage to Europe. Concerning this, two problems of the attempt to contact foreign powers can be pointed out. Firstly, because of a lack of direct contact with the rulers of Ethiopia and foreign powers, middlemen that included missionaries and merchants were engaged with diplomatic activities. Even if some of these middlemen genuinely tried to create communications

[150] Mordechai Abir, *Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes: The Challenge of Islam and Re-Unification of the Christian Empire, 1769-1855* (Praeger, 1968).
[151] Victor M Fernández, "The Jesuit Mission to Ethiopia (1557–1632) and the Origins of Gondärine Architecture (Seventeenth–Eighteenth Centuries)," in *Archaeologies of Early Modern Spanish Colonialism* (Springer, 2016).
[152] Ashley Alemayehu, "Closing Doors: Ethiopia's 17th Century Foreign Policy Strategy Bet," https://berbereisthenewchipotle.com/2014/08/21/closing-doors-ethiopias-17th-century-foreign-policy-strategy-bet/.

between Ethiopian rulers and Europe, the probability of the letters from Ethiopia passing the Red Sea and Mediterranean regions was low. Secondly, even after passing this barrier the probability of the messages getting the attention of European rulers was very low as foreign relations officials review and respond when they found something that could serve the interest of their country.[153] As it is discussed in the next section, this was especially true in Emperor Tewodros II's attempt to create a friendship with the British Empire: an attempt of creating an alliance that ended with disastrous results. Generally, the first phase of defensive modernization (1529-1855) created a fertile ground for the militarization of the Ethiopian society which was exploited in the face of colonialism later in the 19th-century.

3.3. The Second Phase of Defensive Modernization

The second phase of defensive modernization was a short but critical epoch of Ethiopian history. It began with the rise of Tewodros II in 1855 and ended with a triumph over colonialism in 1896. In this period, the pursuit of modern weaponry combined with the domestic political and social dynamic resulted in a foreign relation direction that revolved around securing a means for the war that was taking place among domestic actors and for clashes with foreign forces. The second half of the 19th-century witnessed the end of the Era of Princes and the emergence of central authority accompanied by the expansion and consolidation of the territory of the state. Tibebu called this epoch of Ethiopian history the "long 19th-century" which covered important events that took place from the inception of the Ethiopian state by Tewodros II in 1855 to its finalization by Menelik II in 1896.[154] We have seen in the previous section that the war in the first half of the 16th-century has initiated a huge interest to modern weapons. Gradually, the influence of technologies introduced by Turks and Portuguese faded away, despite the attempts of Ethiopian rulers to produce gunpowder and armaments, the Ethiopian army almost returned to its pre-16th-century conditions.[155] The quest for military modernization was taken to a whole new level by Emperor Tewodros II in the 1850s.

[153] Takle-Tsadik Mekuria, *Ate Tewodros Ena Ye-Ethiopia Andinet ('Emepror Menelik and the Unification of Ethiopia')* (Addis Ababa: Kuraz Asatamy Dirjit, 1981).
[154] Richard J Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since C. 1800* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 39-84.
[155]Aregay, "Society and Technology in Ethiopia 1500-1800," 131.

Tewodros was entangled by both the chaotic conditions of the Era of Princes domestically; and external threats mainly coming from Egypt. Building a strong army was a central tenet of Tewodros's policy. In this regard, though his domestic vision in modernizing Ethiopia and his foreign policy is usually viewed from his attempt to produce weapons and from his last war in 1868 against British forces, his encounter with Egyptian forces at the Battle of Debarqi in 1848 that took place when he was a rebel in the area bordered with Sudan was vital in creating the impression he had regarding the potential of a modern army. After the Ottoman ruler of Egypt Mohammed Ali controlled power in 1805, he tried to expand towards the Middle East though his dream was frustrated by the British refusal. Then he turned his face to south and controlled Sudan which is Ethiopia's western neighbor. Since then, the Egyptian forces and Ethiopian rulers continued to engage in wars with the intention of controlling the source of the Blue Nile. This was especially evident during the reigns of Tewodros II and his successor Yohannes IV.[156] Tewodros II was impressed by the organization and the use of canons by the Egyptian army. From then, to his death in 1868, *self'ena medif* (discipline and canon) became the two central things that he pursued.[157] In addition to his clashes with Egyptians, his rise to power was characterized by confrontations with regional nobles of the Era of Princes who he defeated one after the other. In 1852, he defeated *Dejjach* Goshu Zawde of Gojjam who died in the battleand *Ras* Ali of Wollo's Yejju Dynasty in 1853 destroying not only his army but also eliminating his influence on the weak monarch, Yohannes III who resided in Gondar. After defeating *Dejjech* Webe of Semen in 1855, he was crowned as *King of Kings*, Emperor Tewodros II of Ethiopia.[158] This marked the end of the Era of Princes and the beginning of the project of creating a united Ethiopian state.

As Zewde observed, despite foreign threat was not new for Ethiopia, Tewodros II was the first leader to sufficiently comprehend the danger from the regional and international contexts and followed a foreign policy that aimed to create a modern army and alliance with strong states. To this effect, he tried to reform the army in terms of its organization, discipline, and armaments. In terms of organization, he put the fragmented military forces which were previously under the control of regional noblemen under national command

[156] George N Sanderson, "Conflict and Co-Operation between Ethiopia and the Mahdist State, 1884-1898," *Sudan Notes and Records* 50 (1969): 15-40.
[157] Fantahun Ayele, "Revisiting History of Gafat: Was Emperor Tewodross Military Reform an Attempt at Translative Adaptation of Western Technology?," *African Journal of History and Culture* 8, no. 4 (2016).
[158] Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991* (Ohio University Press, 2002), 28-11.

chain. By doing this he tried to weaken the regional loyalty of regiments by improving their belongingness to the national army. Moreover, he reorganized the army hierarchically and reduced the number of non-fighting companions and started a 'professional' army that receives a salary. Beyond reforming the military, he sought to reform Ethiopia by abolishing slavery, limit the power of the Orthodox Church (by reducing the number of priests and land at the disposal of the clergy), and building roads. Zewde added that what makes Tewodros II exceptional both from his predecessors and successors was not his interest in modern weaponry but his readiness for a greater mission, his military skills, his interest to try new things, and the policies that transcend domestic affairs.[159] Central to all this was, he understood the link between power and technology, the only means that could enable the implementation of domestic and foreign policy objectives. Thus, his relationship with foreigners especially with Europeans was focused on exploiting their military expertise. Regarding this, William Simpson who traveled to Ethiopia during the time of Tewodros stated that:

> "He could raise an army, but he had no artillery, and without artillery he felt himself powerless for such an undertaking. The first question Theodore asked when any European arrived was, "can you make a gun?" If they said "No" he demanded, "Will you try to make guns?" If they refused to try, he kept them as prisoners in the job that they would try. He did manage to have a big mortar made…"[160]

Thus, it is visible that the foreign relation of Tewodros II was the reflection of his domestic agendas. However, Ethiopia at the time was not able to attract the interest of Europeans as much as Ethiopian rulers were passionate about Europeans; and his interest in creating an alliance and getting technical support from British Empire was not welcomed which impelled him to arrest the British consul Charles Duncan Cameron and missionaries and forced them to produce the weapons he desperately needed. In a letter he written to the British Queen Victoria, he expressed that:

> "I am sending Mr. Flad to Europe. I am seeking skilled artisans. I shall gladly receive all artisans who come to me. If they stay, I shall ensure that they live

[159] *Ye-Ethiopia Tarik Ke 1847-1983 ('History of Ethiopia from 1855-1983')* (Addis Ababa Addis Ababa University Press 2007), 31-36.
[160] Stanislaw Chojnacki, "William Simpson and His Journey to Ethiopia 1868," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 6, no. 2 (1968): 199.

> happily. If they wish to return to their country once they have taught their skills, I shall pay their salary and let them leave, happy and with escort."[161]

Following his refusal to release these captives and in the absence of a diplomatic solution, Britain sent an expedition force that fought at the battle of Mekdela in April 1868 where Tewodros II lost the fight and committed suicide.[162] Despite his quest for modern technology, Tewodros II's foreign policy and treatment of foreigners was inadequate from the point of diplomatic standards by far. His violence and savage treatment of foreigners which triggered Britain to send expedition force and led to his death is a good illustration of this remark. A missionary priest Theophilus Waldmeier who was under the arrest of Tewodros II stated that the emperor told them that he wanted them "to make me a gun which will discharge a ball of 1,000-pound weight. If you say that you do not know how I shall regard you all as liars, and you know what I have done with those that deceived me."[163] Another firsthand information of Henry Blanc tells us that Tewodros II mistreated and imprisoned missionaries and diplomats of Egypt, France, and Britain which led to the death of a significant number of foreigners. Blanc, who was one of the prisoners who were forced to produce artilleries, left detailed information regarding how the frustrated and weakened Emperor eventually resorted to violence against natives and foreigners alike.[164]

As it is mentioned above, before coming to power, Tewodros II was defeated by Egyptian forces which left an impression on him regarding the importance of the discipline and weapons of his enemies. Accordingly, his pursuit for modern weaponry was a defining feature of his policies: this pursuit explains not only the circumstances in which he came to power but also the contexts of his demise. We can see this in the letter he wrote to Robert Napier on 11 April 1968, who was a commander of the British expeditionary force that defeated Tewodros II in 1868. In the letter, Tewodros stated that the difference between his army and the British expedition forces was discipline. He blamed his followers and his countrymen for abandoning him when he faced external enemies and for their refusal of taxes imposed by him. To quote his words, he expressed the reason for his failure by saying

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[161] Girma-Selassie Asfaw et al., *The Amharic Letters of Emperor Theodore of Ethiopia to Queen Victoria and Her Special Envoy: Preserved in the India Office Library and the Public Record Office: Together with an Appendix* (David Brown Book Company, 1979), 336.
[162] Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century*, 35-42.
[163] Theophilus Waldmeier, *The Autobiography of Theophilus Waldmeier, Missionary: Being an Account of Ten Years' Life in Abyssinia; and Sixteen Years in Syria* (SW Partridge, 1886), 94.
[164] See for example, Henry Blanc and Henry Jules Blanc, *A Narrative of Captivity in Abyssinia: With Some Account of the Late Emperor Theodore, His Country and People* (Psychology Press, 1970), Chapter Three.

"I said pull the people off my country that they should submit to the discipline of taxes, they refused and quarreled with me. but your people who are governed by the discipline you conquered me".[165] As we will see in the next section, what is the British expedition tragically ended the reign of Tewodros II, it brought an opportunity for Yohannes IV since he has acquired modern firearms that helped him to emerge triumphant against his contenders.

The end of the Era of Princes and the emergence of the Ethiopian state was partly the result of the rise of powerful rulers since the second half of the 19th-century. Thus, the three monarchs who confronted both domestic and foreign challenges in the process of Ethiopian state formation were Tewodros II, Yohannes IV, Menelik II. These rulers faced the same challenges and rivaled one against the other despite defiance against foreign occupation was one of their commonalities. Following the death of Tewodros, *Ras Wagg Shum* Gobeze of Lasta assumed the throne as Emperor Tekle-Giorgis (r.1969-72) after defeating his opponent Tesso Gobaze from Wolkaite. According to Zewde, this proved the fact that no puppet king could remain on power holding the title of *king of kings* under the 'Solomonic' Dynasty like what happened during the Era of Princes unless he earned it by force. The result of the confrontation between Tekle-Giorgis and Yohannes IV of Tigray was the effect of the latter's weapons that he acquired from the British expedition force of 1868. The army of Emperor Tekle-Giorgis comprising 60,000 fighters was easily defeated at the Battle of Assam on 11 July 1971 by the well-equipped 12,000 fighters of Yohannes IV which enabled him to assume the throne on 21 January 1972.[166] These events remind us of the role of firearms in determining the results of the fight between Ahmed Ibn Al-Ghazi of Adal and Emperor Dawit of the Christian Kingdon. Both Ahmed Ibn-Alghazi and Yohannes were able to defeat huge army than their own by utilizing firearms they gained from foreign sources.

One year after the British expedition and death of Tewodros II, the Suez Canal was opened thereby shortening the distance between Europe and the Red Sea region. This did not only facilitate the opening of Ethiopia for Europe. It also increased Ethiopia's strategic importance as a gateway to Africa and because of its location adjacent to the Red Sea, which became important in the international trade and security issues. Regarding the effect the opening of the Suez Canal had on Ethiopia, Mekbib noted that "more than any other factor

[165] Richard Pankhurst, "Two Unpublished 19th Century Ethiopian Letters: From Emperor Tewodros to Sir Robert Napier, and from Däğğazmač Nəguśe to Naib Hasän Bey," *Aethiopica* 11 (2008): 26.
[166] Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991*, 42-43.

in Ethiopian history, the coming into use of the Suez Canal in the second half of the nineteenth -century has "opened up" Ethiopia to European influence and penetration".[167] The opening of the Canal, as a result, facilitated the presence of European powers into the region especially the advent of Italy in the Red Sea Port of Assab from which it aspired to control the whole of Ethiopia.

Emperor Yohanes IV continued the project of building the Ethiopian state started by Tewodros but employed a different approach. He sought religious homogeneity as a basis of his internal policy and tolerated the power of provincial nobles as long as they recognized him as *king of kings*. The reign of Yohanes IV was a time when Ethiopia faced several external threats at the same time. Egypt in the west, Italy in the north, and the Dervishes in the west were among the enemies he had to fight. Yohannes fought two battles against Egyptians at Gundet in November 1875 and Gura in March 1876; and emerged triumphant in both.[168] As it is mentioned above, his advantage was the weapons he received from the British expedition force, Yohannes was in a relatively advantageous position to get firearms from abroad given the proximity of his base to the Red Sea. Moreover, the change in warfare which relied on the use of well-built fortresses unlike previous battle trends that focused on attacking enemy bases with a little defensive strategy enabled him to defeat strong foreign powers. With the changes in organization and armaments with their effective utilization, Yohannes's reign witnessed a revolution in the Ethiopian army.[169]

His major contender of power was Menelik, the king of the lately established Shewan branch of the 'Solomonic' Dynasty. Nothing has played important role in the rivalry between Yohannes as Italy did. Italy had a presence in the port of Assab in the 1870s and gradually it started to involve itself in the politics of mainland Ethiopia. In 1879, Italian diplomats offered a treaty of friendship and commerce both for Yohannes and Menelik which the latter signed in 1883. According to the Treaty, Italian diplomats were to serve as middlemen in conducting foreign relations of Shawa and the treaty also provided that the parties would exchange consuls. This was taking place while Meneilk had agreed to recognize Yohannes as *kings of kings* and to remain only a *king* of Shawa under the treaty of Liche signed in

[167] Mekbib, *The Foreign Policy of Emperor Menelik Ii: Its Political and Diplomatic Significance (1869-1910)*, 149.
[168] See for example Richard A Caulk, "Religion and the State in Nineteenth Century Ethiopia," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 10, no. 1 (1972).
[169] Pankhurst, "Guns in Ethiopia," 29-30.

1878. However, Menelik used the gap created by Yohannes's delay in signing the treaty and he continued to amass firearms including 10,000 rifles from Italy. Moreover, Menelik abstained from supporting Yohannes in his fight against Dervishes and Italians, which made Yohanes believe that he was betrayed. Yohannes IV died in the fight against Dervishes at the battle of Mattama on 10 March 1889.[170]

As Robert Woolbert pointed out, unlike Britain and France who were involved earlier both in Africa and in the Red Sea region, Italy was a late comer to the rivalry in the partition of Africa. After finalizing its unification in 1870s, Italy showed interest in Libya in North Africa; Ethiopia, and part of Somalia.[171] The conflict between Ethiopia and Italy started thereafter initially along the Red Sea coast. In 1882, Italy formalized its commercial presence at the port of Massawa into a colony; the move to control the hinterlands from there was frustrated because of the struggle of *Ras* Allula of Eritrea who was a vassal of Yohannes IV. In this early conflict between Ethiopia and Italy, the latter's forces were defeated at the battle of Dogali in 1887. According to Bairu Tafla, this incident had attracted the attention of European governments and the press; and it was an eye-opening moment for Europe which signaled the project of effectively controlling Africa like Americas and Asia could not be as easy as they thought.[172] Despite its effect in shaping foreign policy of Europeans; the victory was insignificant in determining Ethiopia's status as a state and in determining its foreign relations.

Menelik was coronated on 3 November 1889 and his reign coincided with the peak of the European partition of Africa which he effectively exploited the rivalry among them combined with his military strength domestically. However, his friendship with Italy took a different direction following Italy's interest to be a protectorate of Ethiopia. The controversy began with the Treaty of Wuchale signed on 2 May 1889. The dispute regarding the meaning difference between the Amharic and the Italian versions of the treaty finally brought the two states into war (see Appendix 1). The controversy was because of Article 17 of the treaty. In the Italian version that provided Menelik must conduct his foreign relations through Italian diplomats while the Amharic version made it dependent on the consent of Menelik to use or

[170]Edmond J. Keller, "Making and Remaking of State and Nation in Ethiopia," in *Borders, Nationalism and the African State*, ed. Ricard Rene Laremont (Lynne Reinner, 2005), 90-91.
[171] Robert Gale Woolbert, "Italian Colonial Expansion in Africa," *The Journal of Modern History* 4, no. 3 (1932).
[172] Bairu Tafla, "The Impact of Dogali on the International Policy of the Central European Powers," *Aethiopica* 5 (2002).

not to use Italian nationals as intermediaries.[173] Menelik protested against this and as Italy insisted on its protectorate claim the disagreement led to the war that ended at the battle of Adowa on 1 March 1896 from which Menelik II emerged triumphant: a war that turned away Italian colonial ambition.[174]

The battle of Adowa was the final confrontation that brought the total defeat of the Italian forces and there were several conflicts before this moment. As it is mentioned above, *Ras* Alula who was Yohannes's vassal in Eritrea has defeated Italian forces at the battle of Dogali in 1887. Another major battle between Ethiopia and Italy took place on 9 October 1895 at the battle of Debre Aila where *Ras* Mengesha of Tigray was defeated. After Menelik II protested the terms of the Wuchale Treaty, the first major defeat of the Italian forces was at the battle of Amba Alage on 7 December 1896. On 1 March 1896, the Italian army under the command of General Oreste Baratieri was defeated by Ethiopia which led to the fall of the Italian government of Francesco Crispi after a week.[175] The total number of fighters under the Ethiopian army at the battle of Adowa was estimated to be more than 120,000. From the Italian side, General Barateri commanded more around 15,000 even though there arrived a higher number of soldiers after the Adowa battle has decided the outcome of the war.[176]

When we look at the trend of building a modern army and confrontation against foreigners, Tewodros II tried to modernize the military and to establish a strong central government; and followed assertive foreign policy directions even towards European powers that he sought alliance based on religious similarity. His successor Yohannes IV employed a relatively different strategy with the attempt to establish a 'federal' unity, demanded provincial rulers to recognize his authority and faced multiple foreign threats which he fought one after the other. However, both died while fighting with foreign forces without achieving their visions. The two rulers dreamed to unify the Abyssinian provinces but Menelik II succeeded by incorporated more territory in the South to succeed the advent of colonialism, calmed down the instability that has been around since the war of Ahmed Ibn

[173] Wilhelm Bernhard Stern, "The Treaty Background of the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute," *American Journal of International Law* 30, no. 2 (1936).
[174] Regarding the causes of the 1896 Ethio-Italian war see Raymond, "The Battle of Adowa: African Victory in the Age of Empire," 90-108.
[175] Sean McLachlan, *Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896: The Italian Disaster in Ethiopia* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011), 6-7.
[176] Ibid., 11.

al-Ghazi in the 16th-century, and made the contending power of Oromo ethnic group under his domination.[177]

The Adowa victory assured the continuation of an independent Ethiopian state in the face of the European scramble of Africa and earned international fame and recognition to Menelik II and to the state.[178] Menelik II was also able to acquire new territories through expansion to southern, southwestern, and eastern regions which took place at the end of the 19th-century alongside with occupation of Eastern Africa by European colonizers. The goal of Ethiopian rulers that began in the second half of the 19th-century to consolidate their domestic base and to deal with these regional and global forces to avoid direct occupation was successfully accomplished by Menelik II. There are two common features that can be deducted from the foreign relation of this formative period of the modern Ethiopian state. The first is the absence of centralized and regular diplomatic communications, which was a reflection of domestic political conditions. Secondly, most of the foreign relations which were directed towards getting support from European states; mainly from the British Empire and France were frustrated by the control of the Red Sea region by foreign powers.

To begin with the first, like what happened during the Era of Princes, domestic power struggle and rivalry to create friendship were conducted even at a higher scale at this time. Violence had been the main aspect of Ethiopia's domestic politics and contenders of power were fighting among themselves and against foreign forces alike. Domestically, though the right to rule Ethiopia is given to the lineage of the so-called 'Solomonic' Dynasty theoretically, practically anyone who was able to assert his power over others could become officially *king of kings.* The church coronated whoever emerged triumphant in the struggle for power as the rightful heir of the 'Solomonic' Dynasty. The three prominent makers of the Ethiopian state during the second half of the 19th-century were rivaling both domestically and in their relations with foreign powers. Yohannes IV, who was a rebel against Tewodros II and controlled the northern Tigray and Eritrea, granted safe passage to the British expedition force against the latter and he received thousands of rifles for his collaboration. Menelik II benefitted in terms of rising to power by avoiding involvement in Yohannes IV's confrontation with foreign enemies and he even used it as an advantage to receive military

[177] Mekbib, *The Foreign Policy of Emperor Menelik Ii: Its Political and Diplomatic Significance (1869-1910)*, 18-55.
[178]Henze, *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*, 180-85.

support from his enemies. Both Yohannes IV and Menelik II were kept under the prison of Tewodros to avoid possible challenges from them even though they were able to escape and rule Ethiopia one after the other.

Developments in the Red Sea were very critical in determining Ethiopia's conditions. The control of the Red Sea and Mediterranean region by foreign powers that were not welcoming to the interest of Ethiopian rulers was not only a security threat; it also impacted the opportunity to adopt foreign technologies which prompted Ethiopian leaders to rely on the smuggling of firearms. The problem created because of lack of passage towards Europe on Ethiopia's pursuit of modernization was well elaborated by Menelik II's letter written to the British Quenn in 1880s when was a ruler of Shewa province in which he stated that:

> "We had written to you so many times. But we did not receive a single reply…what happened you ignored our plea? What we are requesting from you is nothing other than a light [modernity or civilization]. The significance of European institutions is well noted by our government. …but the Egyptians are jealous of Ethiopians, and they are barriers between Europe and us. All the gates to Ethiopia are controlled by them. They forbid everything which they thought is valuable for us…"[179]

However, the interest to establish relations with Europe diminished to be a one-sided hunt as Europe also started to approach Ethiopia with a renewed interest. This move was part of the general interest of Europeans towards Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Though the revival of the interest was motivated by different factors, establishing a commercial relationship was the main objective. The Industrial Revolution which started at the end of the 18th-century led to the emergence of a new type of relation with Ethiopia and Africa in general late in the 19th-century. The abundant production of industrial products which was possible by the 'industrial revolution necessitated new trade destinations. Thus, like what happened in other non-European societies, Europeans who came to Ethiopia at that time intended to form trade relations. The treaties signed between Ethiopian leaders and Europeans illustrate this point. The trade agreement signed between *Ras* Ali of Gondar and the British Consul Walter Plaudin in 1860 is a good example. The other reason that pushed Europeans towards Ethiopia was the revival of missionary activities in the 19th-century. Though Ethiopia has accepted Christianity since the 4th -century, this did not prevent Europeans from conducting their missionary activities in different regions of the country.

[179] Gebru Tareke, *Yohannes Iv: Neguse Negest of Ethiopia: An Appraisal of His Reign* (University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1968), 29.

The increasing interest in missionary activity this time was important in shaping Ethiopia's relation with Europe until the second half of the 20th-century. The other group of Europeans traveling to Ethiopia at this period was researchers in the fields of geography, biology, etc.… However, all the commercial, missionary, diplomatic and scientific activities were not exclusively attached with a single purpose. Rather, they supported and complemented each other.[180]

3.4. Explaining Ethiopia's Independence

Addressing the question of why Ethiopia exceptionally maintained its independence unlike the rest of Africa is of utmost significance not only to understand the internal features but also to reflect on how the foreign realm contributed to it. Specifically, we need to point out why underdeveloped Ethiopia emerged triumphant in its fight against advanced European power while the rest of Africa was easily subjugated. As thoroughly discussed, survival in the face of foreign threats remained the main goal of Ethiopian rulers even before the advent of colonialism. What made colonialism critical was the magnitude of the threat and the momentum it got by engulfing the whole continent. Even after 1896, as Keller correctly pointed out, following the consolidation of the Ethiopian state, the main objective in Ethiopia's internal politics and foreign policies of regimes that came to power ever since was ensuring the continuous existence of the state.[181]

Different scholars have provided a wide range of justifications regarding the reason for Ethiopia's endured independence. For instance, Pankhurst argued that the reasons for the victory at the battle of Adowa were "geographical, political, diplomatic and economic".[182] Sven Rubenson, denounced the simplification of explanations of Ethiopia's uniqueness and provided three groups of factors. According to him, the reasons are "firstly, diplomatic, political and military conditions on the European side; secondly, the actual and military conditions from Ethiopian side; thirdly, serious and repeated miscalculations of Ethiopia's strength" by foreign powers.[183] Others prioritize the role of identity in setting the ground for

[180] Stanislaw Chojnacki, "Some Notes on Early Travellers in Ethiopia," *University College Review* 1, no. 1 (1961): 71-89.
[181] Keller, "The Politics of State Survival: Continuity and Change in Ethiopian Foreign Policy."
[182] Pankhurst, "Guns in Ethiopia," 20.
[183] Sven Rubenson, "Some Aspects of the Survival of Ethiopian Independence in the Period of the Scramble for Africa," *University College Review* 1, no. 1 (1961): 9.

the uninterrupted continuation of independence i.e., a unique identity that is the result of a long history that spanned around three thousand years. Regarding this, Woldeyes argued that the rich cultural values of Ethiopia as a result of the unique form of Christianity, the effects of *kibre-negest* and indigenous alphabet were important in forming self-awareness thereby creating a base to confront colonialism. In Woldeyes's view, Ethiopian identity was "the antithesis of the colonial worldview".[184]

However, the depiction of Ethiopian identity as unique is not shared by all scholars. For instance, Kebede argued that Ethiopian identity is not created in isolation from the events that took place in the Middle East and in the world in general. Accordingly, he argued that viewing Ethiopian identity as exceptional is exaggerated given the significance of foreign elements in determining domestic contexts including identity especially in terms of culture and religion. In Kebede's view, Ethiopia's survival can be taken as a paradox given the magnitude of domestic centrifugal forces and foreign threats; and he contends that survival was possible because the pulling forces including internal diversity and foreign threats were interacting continuously in a balanced manner. He sums up the reasons for the survival of the Ethiopian state as religious, social, and the benefits of individual heroism.[185]

Others prioritized the skill of Ethiopian leaders as the main factor behind Ethiopia's victory over colonialism. For instance, Endalcachew Bayeh asked *Why Ethiopia survived free from the yoke of colonialism?* and argued that Ethiopian leaders' commitment to maintain independence and their foreign policy skills were the main reasons for continuity of independence. In relation to this, he accords huge importance to the diplomatic skills of Menelik II and his wife Empress Taytu for ensuring independence.[186] Richard Reid also observed that the skill of successive Ethiopian rulers was important in securing long-term independence.[187] In Reid's words:

> "The 'modern' Ethiopia that came into being in the last twenty years of the nineteenth -century was the product of a restless, cumulative militarism. The political system rested heavily on the effective deployment of armed force; this was a political culture, and a social system more broadly, that was the outcome

[184] Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes, "124 Years Ago, Ethiopian Men and Women Defeated the Italian Army in the Battle of Adowa," https://qz.com/africa/1811232/how-ethiopians-defeated-the-italian-army-in-the-battle-of-Adowa/.
[185] See introduction of Kebede, *Survival and Modernization: Ethiopia's Enigmatic Present*.
[186] Endalcachew Bayeh, "Why Ethiopia Survived Free from the Yoke Colonialism? Foreign Policy Justification," *Global Journal of Art and Social Science Education* 3, no. 1 (2015).
[187] Reid, *Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since C. 1800*, 90.

> of prolonged violence. It was, in turn, a fragile, volatile polity in which arms had come to play a dangerously inflated role in political and indeed economic development"[188]

It is unquestionable that success in dominating the domestic political ground and shrewdness in the exploiting regional and international environment was important for Menelik II in finalizing the project of creating the Ethiopian state. Menelik II was in a better position to learn from his predecessors who died fighting with foreign forces, and he has benefitted from the internal changes brought by his predecessors, both of which enabled him to accomplish the main objective of defensive modernization successfully. At the same time, coincidence with the process of colonization encouraged him to make a bold move to expand Ethiopian territory. Despite the all the factors mentioned above had their own contributions, it is essential to see Ethiopia's formation from a broad perspective in which local and international factors interacted continuously. Competitive internal dynamics and multiple foreign threats increased the need to acquire modern military technology which worked combinedly towards the creation of the Ethiopian state. Seen from another direction also, the gradual militarization of the Ethiopian culture since the 16th -century, in turn, created conflicts between domestic agents and against foreign forces. The interest to dominate internal power struggle and to subjugate others brought the rivalry to secure the friendship of foreign powers for the sake of benefitting from their military advancements.

Despite the retardation in modern weaponry, there existed a hierarchical warriorhood that was deeply embedded in Ethiopian society. In the 19th-century Ethiopia, with exception of religious leaders, merchants, and judges the other sections of the society were expected to train militarily. According to Tsehai Gebre-Selassie, the Ethiopian army was divided into three main parts: the *werari* (invaders), *gadam* (the major body), and *dejen* (the backup force). The first group is led by *fitawrari* (the attack commander) who leads his forces in advance and faces the enemy first, represents a forefront battle commander and advances surprise attacks. When the *negus* or *neguse-negest* is taking part in the war higher military positions of *ras* and *dejazmach* were supposed to abide by the leadership of the *fitawrari* as *kegnazmach* and *girazmach* fighting on the right and left at the front, respectively. The *gadam* constituted the *neguse-negest* with the army commanded by *negus* and *ras.* The backup force called *dajan* is led by *merid-azmach* (vice leader) and had the responsibility of

[188] Ibid.

securing the region from rebellion or attack from the enemy and replaces the *negus* or the *neguse-negest* in case he died in the battle.[189]

The above was the organization of the army during war. However, at peaceful times life at the local level was highly militarized as military skills and participation in battles were important to get economic rewards and political promotion. The warrior class represented the sophisticated and respected section of society, and despite the right to rule was regarded as the right of the 'Solomonic' Dynasty, the system was open as one could get up in the ranks and became *negese-negest* by force. Accordingly, the major self-trained local warrior class who were called *chewa* or *neftegna* (gunmen) constituted three groups of military men. The first category is called *shifta* (bandits) who were fugitives from the law or those revolted against local authorities or against the *neguse-negest.* The second group *fanno* (hunters) who were self-motivated and leaderless groups of gunmen that extract resources from forests. Mekuanents (nobles) constitute the third group of the *chewa* warriors, and they were government officials with their own gunmen called *ashkers*. Normally all the three had a positive relation with the local population as its protector and either a competitive or collaborative relationship with the center. Though their immediate affiliation is local they had a consciousness of *hager* (country), and they were easily mobilized against foreign invaders. What state formation endeavors by the late 19th-century monarchs tried to do was centralizing these diverse warrior categories under the national army and equipping them with relatively modern weapons. Regarding the process, Gebre-Selassie correctly observed that:

> "Weapons acquisition by these monarchs played a large part in strengthening the regional tribute collectors, administrators and other 'masters' loyal to the state. Curbing the emergent warriors' assertion of rural authority over land required blocking the warriors' practices and processes of acquiring military skills, social rootedness and networking capacities."[190]

On the other hand, the rivalry between world powers pushed them to create allies which contributed to Ethiopian political agents in terms of acquiring better military technologies. The rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Portugal in the 16th-century and competition between European powers during the time of colonialism created a scenario in

[189] Tsehai Berhane-Selassie, *Ethiopian Warriorhood: Defence, Land and Society 1800-1941*, vol. 41 (Boydell & Brewer, 2018), 8-26.
[190] Ibid., 45.

which Ethiopian rulers acquired military supports. The rivalry among foreign powers also enabled Ethiopian rulers to play one against the other. For instance, the interest of France to avoid Britain from gaining ground in Ethiopia facilitated for Menelik II to get the French support both before and after Adowa. The Italian presence in the region was facilitated by the British support starting for the first presence in the Assab Port. Even though it had no colonial establishment in the region, Russian support was important for Menelik II in a relation initiated by Ethiopia based on religious similarity. Thus, the influence of Britain and Italy was effectively countered by the support of France and Russia.[191]

Generally, factors that led to the emergence of the Ethiopian independent state can be divided into domestic and external. Among domestic factors, diplomatic and military skills of Ethiopian leaders, the militarization of the Ethiopian society, the emergence of central authority, a strong sense of identity, and the presence of hierarchical political and economic structure that made extraction and war-making possible were important. Among external factors included imported ideational forces and military technology that strengthened the power and the will to fight, the relative weakness of Italy in comparison with other colonial powers, and the advent of colonialism were important. Working from inside out and vice versa, the second phase of defensive modernization that began in 1855 focused on building and expanding the domestic structure while defending it from external threats which brought the emergence of an independent state in 1896. The emphasis was on utilizing and imitating foreign military technology thereby making the foreign policy of Ethiopian leaders to be directed in line with this objective. These all developments enabled Ethiopia to face colonialism in a better shape than the rest of Africa.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter assessed the domestic, regional, and international circumstances since the beginning of the 16th-century that facilitated the emergence of the Ethiopian state at the end of the 19th-century divided into two phases of defensive modernization. Accordingly, the chapter has illustrated the effect of the international system on domestic events in the emergence of defensive modernization by discussing the role of the intervention of the Ottoman Empire and Portugal in internal religious conflicts. In this regard, the effect of this

[191] Mekbib, *The Foreign Policy of Emperor Menelik Ii: Its Political and Diplomatic Significance (1869-1910)*, 197-210.

involvement in triggering the quest for modern firearms as a central part of defensive modernization is assessed. Moreover, the chapter has shown how internal religious conflicts and population movements weakened the Christian kingdom thereby bringing the Era of Princes which was characterized by the weakening of the central authority. The rivalry to create a friendship with foreign powers among contenders of power during this era was also discussed. Then the chapter has given attention to the rise of Tewodros II in terms of ushering the project of modern state formation and a higher level of interest towards building a modern army. The chapter also illustrated how the rivalry between Tewodros II, Yohannes IV and Menelik II accompanied by the arrival of colonialism facilitated the emergence of central authority thereby making Ethiopia the only independent African state in 1896. At last, the reasons why Ethiopia remained intact at the age of colonization are provided in detail.

Though the first phase of defensive modernization was rudimentary in the sense that it lacked central authority that articulate and pursue defined objectives, it left fertile ground for the second phase in terms of triggering the interest for military innovations and the necessity to deal with foreign opportunities and threats. The modernization of the military sphere especially in the first phase was insignificant despite the existence of awareness regarding the potential of modern firearms. Gradually also, the introduction of firearms brought the emergence of powerful provincial rulers who effectively challenged the central authority of the *king of kings.* The second phase of defensive modernization emerged out of this scenario by focusing on the creation of centralized authority and defending it from imminent threats of foreign powers posed on Ethiopia. This phase was also accompanied by the increasing presence of great powers in the Red Sea region and the advent of colonialism. Internally, three consecutive emperors Tewodros II, Yohannes IV, and Menelik II rivaled one another while at the same time dealing with the foreign powers both diplomatically and by force. At the end of the -century, the latter succeeded not only in creating central authority but also territory was significantly expanded, and colonialism prevented thereby marking the end of the second phase of defensive modernization and the beginning of the third one.

Four things can be said about the quest for defensive modernization during this epoch of Ethiopian history. Firstly, about the source of the quest for modernization and ideas of change pursued during this historical period, internal power competitions and foreign threats were the two determinants. Accordingly, defensive modernization was pursued in the form

of the introduction of foreign elements of modernity especially change in the military was vital input to defend the system both from internal and external threats. Secondly, despite the pursuit of military innovation, the attempt of state-building in other aspects was absent until the 1850s. Tewodros II's attempt to build a professional army, to organize the administrative apparatus, and his effort to manage the role of the Church and other reforms introduced made him a pioneer in the formation process of the Ethiopian state. Before this time, the quest for modernization was only aimed at preserving domestic features like religion and the expansion of territory. Thus, defensive modernization in a broader sense of building a modern state and protecting it from its internal and external enemies was started at this stage though on a limited scale.

Thirdly, despite the interest to imitate a wide range of foreign technologies as part of the defensive modernization strategy, it is difficult to find something that has the same status in Ethiopia's long road to statehood as the priority given to the import and utilization of military innovations. This created a view that perceived defensive modernization as a mere introduction of foreign advances gradually creating an obsession with the scientific and technological progress of Europe. Thus, military technology became the main objective sought by Ethiopians made the pursuit for changes in other areas secondary. At last, despite the initial interest for improved military resources, foreign military inventions did not give absolute advantage for those who possessed them until Yohannes IV and Menelik II started to effectively exploit such resources. For instance, despite his limited access to firearms, Tewodros II was able to defeat his adversaries one after the other. Thus, it was late in the 19th-century that the effective utilization of military technology was achieved: a fact that explains the military superiority of Yohannes IV and Menelik II over their internal and foreign enemies.

CHAPTER 4

THE GEBBAR SYSTEM, TRADE, AND THE ETHIOPIAN STATE

This chapter assesses the Ethiopian political economy and its impact on the process of state formation. It is true that no society completely emulates the other and no society remains eternally in solitude, which makes taming influential and compatible foreign elements either through modest hybridization or huge scale assimilation an inevitable intersocietal phenomenon. As Hobson pointed out, inter-civilizational interactions were one part of human history, and it was important in the evolution of the contemporary international system. He illustrated this by figuring out the contribution of the eastern societies like the Arabs and the Chinese in philosophy and science which helped the realization of the industrial revolution and the emergence of the contemporary modern world in general.[192] Halliday also pointed out that intersocietal adoption of innovations is unavoidable, and any attempt to reject rather than exploiting a more powerful element from the foreign sphere brings "fatalism" which accepts subjugation by the powerful as a destiny. The other alternative which Halliday called "voluntarism" is an attempt of employing indigenous but not comparable options in the face of powerful foreign modernity features which he argued that such alternative leads to disaster.[193] This chapter focuses on the project embarked by Ethiopia to introduce elements of modernity during the immediate post-independence years.

The first part of this chapter gives details of socio-economic conditions at the beginning of the 20th-century. The second section focuses on the dialogue between domestic conditions and newly introduced European modernity elements thereby illustrating the consequences of the interaction. The third part of the chapter analyzes the land tenure system of Ethiopia and tries to uncover its link with the political, economic, social, and military aspects of the Ethiopian state. The fourth part of the chapter focuses on the role of the domestic and international trade system in the process of state formation in Ethiopia. The chapter ends by

[192] Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*, 283-322.
[193] Halliday, "The Potentials of Enlightenment," 110.

concluding the nature of the interaction between foreign and domestic traits and on economic foundations of the Ethiopian state formation.

4.1. Socio-Economic Conditions at the Beginning of the 20th-Century

Before directly jumping to the nature of Ethiopia's domestic context, it is good to see how Ethiopia's condition was articulated by scholars who are opponents of the advent of European modernity in Ethiopia. These scholars regret the failure to come up with comprehensive modernization based on domestic traits and that could prevent looking towards copying Europe. For these scholars, the Ethiopian domestic traits go beyond being an expression of religious convictions and political thoughts. For instance, Kebede argues that it represents a distinct type of modernity and world view which is anti-thesis of European modernity. Kebede does not only argue for sustaining these features while interacting with European modernity but also argues renaissance of contemporary Ethiopia should be brought by reviving traditional values not by imitating the European modernization path. For Kebede, inclination towards European modernity and deviance from the domestic tradition is being corrupted and self-denying. He defined the modernization he envisions for Ethiopia as "the renovation of tradition under the supervision of impersonal rules, the conviction being that only the revival of the forces of Ethiopian survival can promote the drive towards modernization."[194]

Another prominent scholar who depicts Abyssinian antiquity as morally superior to European modernity is Mennasemay. For him, the consolidation of the Ethiopian state in the late 19th-century and the consequent hunt for Europeanization was the beginning of a decline.[195] The main problem of this perspective, as it is indicated in the Introduction Chapter is that they could not substantiate their arguments by providing alternative sources of power that could replace some influential characteristics of European modernity like rationality, science, and industrialization. As Pankhurst pointed out, though the Industrial Revolution had started to be felt in Egypt and the Red Sea region in the 19th-century, Abyssinia was being ravaged by instability and backwardness. Moreover, coastal areas were controlled by forces which either had their imperial interest or were not voluntary to let the

[194] Messay Kebede, "Survival and Modernization: Ethiopia's Enigmatic Present," (1999): 9.9 Argument on peculiarity of Ethiopia's identity and political thought can be found at "The Ethiopian Conception of Time and Modernity," (2013).
[195] Maimire Mennasemay, "Adowa: A Dialogue between the Past and the Present," *Northeast African Studies* 4, no. 2 (1997).

entrance of foreign innovations towards Ethiopia.[196] However, cognizant of advancements in Europe and other regions, Ethiopian rulers' attitude towards modernization was directed towards importing foreign innovations: a trend that continued even after independence.

The ruling class and reforming intellectuals of the early 20th-century had faced and felt the power of 'modern' Europe and opted for reconciliation with an attempt to embrace it without losing core domestic values. Thus, they pursued the European model without absorbing the whole notion of progressive European modernity rooted in the Enlightenment. Accordingly, the newly centralized Ethiopian state resorted to defensive modernization: adapting some elements of European modernity while retaining the core of indigenous features. The quest for modernization that took off after the consolidation of the state territory and incorporation of the ethnically and religiously diverse population was faced simultaneously with the tasks of building the state and its identity. Ethiopia at the dawn of the 20th-century was the only independent African state free of direct occupation but territorially encircled by European colonial establishments.[197]

Accordingly, Ethiopia was bordered by Sudan in the west and southwest, Kenya in the south, British Somaliland in the southeast which were under British East Africa. Eritrea under Italy and Djibouti under France bordered Ethiopia in the north and east, respectively. Another Italian colony, Italian Somaliland, was also a Southeastern neighbor. Because of the strong grip of the surrounding peoples by European colonizers, it was locked after emerging as an independent state than it was ever before (see Figure 1.). We have seen in the previous chapter that the project of unifying Ethiopia that began as the result of Tewodros II's rise in the 1850s was finalized with Menelik II's victory over Italian forces in 1896. Until this time, the priorities of defensive modernization were centralizing the means of coercion and averting foreign threats. Events of the late 19th-century were a continuation of a domestic but internationalized conflict unleashed in the 16th-century, and military modernization was

[196] Richard Pankhurst, "Economic Change in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Ethiopia: A Period of Accelerated Innovation" (paper presented at the Annales d'Éthiopie, 2004), 195.

[197] In addition to Ethiopia, Liberia is usually mentioned as another non-colonized state in Africa. Liberia was a settler state of African descent slaves sponsored by American Colonial Association (ACA) in the second of 19th century. The political arrangement and the link with US (though not directly with the USA government) kept it out of the radar of European colonizers. Moreover, there is a great deal of literature which treats the creation of Liberia as a means devised by the USA to remove ex-slaves and administer them as colony in Africa. See for example, Tom W Shick, "A Quantitative Analysis of Liberian Colonization from 1820 to 1843 with Special Reference to Mortality1," *The Journal of African History* 12, no. 1 (1971).

the main instrument sought to achieve both objectives. The culmination of this project surfaced challenges in other aspects of the state and socio-economic conditions.

Figure 1: Map of the Horn of Africa in 1930



Source: https://Corne_de_l%27Afrique_-_ann%C3%A9es_1930.png

The Ethiopian state formed in this way had a population of around 12 million at the dawn of the 20th -century inhabiting 1,104,000 km^2 territory. The population of Addis Ababa at the time was also estimated to be 60,000.[198] Menelik II's reign was relatively stable since he had consolidated his power domestically and externally. This had reprieved him from moving from one place to the other like his predecessors did since the 16th-century; and enabled him to establish a permanent capital city, Addis Ababa (which mean new flower in Amharic), which became a diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural hub throughout 20th-

[198]Tadele Bitul Kibret, *Azaz Hakim Wokeneh Eshete (the Life of Doctor Workneh)* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Printing Press, 2009), Biography.

century.[199] The establishment of Addis Ababa was important since it served as a nucleus of the modernization project for Menelik II and his successors. As we will see in the next chapters, Addis Ababa started to serve as an economic, political, cultural, and educational center; and it attracted intellectuals trained domestically and abroad.

Though subsistence agriculture was vital for the economy, it was highly vulnerable to the effects of geographical and climatic determinants. Surrounded by lowlands, mainland Ethiopia was an island of rainy highlands located in the arid region of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopian topography ranges from rainy northern and south-western highlands to low precipitation deserts in the east and southeast that include one of the globally hottest places and lowest in altitude (the Denakil Depression in the northeast). Agriculture in the highlands mainly cultivated during the rainy season (June-September) was the vertebrate of the economy.[200] The produce did not only sustain the life of farmers, but it was also a source of export goods, and it was also paid as tax and the army predatorily depended on it. While controlling this productive area was at the center of some of the internal rivalries and attracted foreign invaders, crop failure in this region due to drought also remained a destabilizing problem that upset socio-economic and political stability throughout Ethiopian history. The reason famine emerged as the other face of Ethiopia globally in the 20th -century was the result of starvation during this pivotal epoch of Ethiopian history.

Ethiopia at the beginning of the 20th -century was not only a vulnerable state that European imperialists conspire to diminish to a colony, but it was also a state on which nature 'conspired' with devastating natural disasters.[201] A severe famine commonly referred to as *Kifu-Qen* (depraved days) occurred from 1888-1892 caused by animal disease that came from Italy with animals through the port of Massawa. The disease was so severe that it killed more than 90% of livestock which paralyzed the engine of the agriculture sector. The famine that followed this animal pandemic was so severe by mass death. According to

[199] Shimelis Bonsa, "The Historiography of Addis Ababa: A Critique and a Discussion of The'ethiopian City'," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* (2012).
[200] The role of agriculture in 19th and 20th Century Ethiopia is explored by James C McCann, *People of the Plow: An Agricultural History of Ethiopia, 1800–1990* (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 1995).
[201] Ethiopia was cited as an example in Oxford Dictionary's definition for famine, a point that caused serious uproar until it was deleted in latest editions. How famine connects Ethiopia and Westerners is available in Peter Gill, *Famine and Foreigners: Ethiopia since Live Aid* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

Pankhurst, one-third of the population died because of this famine.[202] Given the criticality of the time, the implication of this famine in the ongoing process of state formation cannot be oversimplified. In the face of such a drought Menelik II's decision to stop the war at Adowa without liberating Eritrea can be taken as a pragmatic move. If it is seen from the perspective of this problem[203] If we take the Adowa victory as the most vital incident that shaped Ethiopia's image globally, famine added with poverty and civil war framed Ethiopia's place in the world negatively.

4.2. The Encounter Between Domestic Contexts and European Modernity

After the consolidation of the state formation process in 1896, Menelik became immediately engaged with the task of importing European innovations even though they could not fill the overall gap. With his internal and international fame as the result of Adowa victory, the import of few European innovations created an attitude that viewed him as an extraordinary modernizer.[204] Regarding Menelik's interest in modernization Hess observed that:

> "Like the rulers of Japan and Thailand, Menelik learned from his experience with Europeans that in order to maintain its independence in the face of European imperialism, Ethiopia must learn much from the imposing body of Western technology. Such knowledge would also be the greatest usefulness in ruling an empire size had doubled in a very short time. For these reasons, Menelik employed European advisers to modernize his army, to introduce modern communication and transportation and to graft into traditional semi-feudal government more modern bureaucratic institutions."[205]

However, reconciling modern innovations with domestic religious and cultural values was not easy. Mersi'e-Hazen Wolde-Kirkos, who recorded major events of the early 20th-century tells us that every technology coming from Europe was considered as a miracle that was brought by the visionary and modernizing majesty to his subjects. For instance, the import of a single car in 1897 which Menelik became its first driver, attracted the attention

[202] Famine occurs in Ethiopia at least once in a decade. The worst but not the last famine in Ethiopia is discussed by Richard Keir Pethick Parkhurst and Richard Pankhurst, *The History of Famine and Epidemics in Ethiopia Prior to the Twentieth Century* (Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, 1990).
[203] Ahmed Hassen Omer, "Emperor Menelik's Attempts Towards Political Integration: Case Study from North-Eastern Shoa (Ethiopia), 1889-1906" (paper presented at the Annales d'Éthiopie, 2002), 31-35.
[204] For different innovations imported by Menelik, see Tekle-Tsadik Mekuria, *Atse Menelik'ena Ye Ethiopia Andinet (Emperor Menelik and the Unity of Ethiopia)* (Addis Ababa: Kuraz, 1990), 593-98.
[205] Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy*, 2, 59.

of the society as if it could alone solve the transport problem of the country. Some of the reactions towards imported technologies also show the pervasiveness of lack of awareness about modern technology. For instance, when a Swiss engineer and Menelik's adviser, Alfred Ilg built a water pipeline upwards from Filwuha to Menelik's palace in Arat Kilo, it triggered the clergy to condemn it as an action against God's orders and as manipulation of nature. In other words, they were saying water flows downwards and it is a sin to force it to flow upwards. When the first cinema in Addis Ababa was opened, people considered the moving black and white picture as a window through which the world of evil could be seen; then they called it *Seytan Bet* (house of the devil).[206] Similar reactions towards imported European innovations like telephone, automobile, and other technologies are well documented.[207]

The clergy and the aristocracy were the forces that put strong resistance not only against European innovations but against reforms in education and other policy areas too. This was not surprising because when technologies were imported, they came into contact with politically feudal, economically agricultural, and culturally conservative society. Orthodox Christianity and the 'Solomonic' Dynasty were the two main features sought to be retained when following the path of European modernization. Thus, even early modernizers who were trained in Europe and 'baptized' by the progressive notion of the Enlightenment were careful not to criticize these elements of the nationalist discourse in their endorsements.

Based on the attitude towards foreign entities and the extent to which they want Ethiopia to open itself to the outside world, the ruling class became divided into "progressive" and "conservative" groups that existed well through the first half of the 20th-century. As Henze pointed out, this categorization was not precise given that all aspects of European modernity features were not embraced by the progressive group. But progressives were called so because of its relative openness to adopt new things from Europe including its interest to import modern administrative, legal, education, and technological elements. Moreover, it advocated opening Ethiopia for strong friendship with foreigners. This was contrasted with the suspicious attitude of the conservative group that viewed everything foreign as

[206]Mersi'e-Hazen Wolde-Kirkos, *Yehayagnaw Kifle Zemen Mebacha Yezmen Tarik Tizitaye Kayehutina Kesemahut (the Dawn of 20th Century: Things I Remember from What I Have Seen and Heard)* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa printing press, 2015), 21-23.

[207]A detailed discussion of the technologies brought from Europe and the reaction of the aristocracy and the clergy is available at: Richard Pankhurst, "Menilek and the Utilisation of Foreign Skills in Ethiopia," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 5, no. 1 (1967).

unauthentic and a threat to a traditional heritage that was preserved in Ethiopia for centuries. They justified their rejection of foreigners and their products partly because of their devotion to maintaining religious purity and culture.[208] Since the conversion of Emperor Susneyos to Catholicism in 1622 that led to bloodshed, foreigners were seen suspiciously, and Ethiopians educated abroad were accused of being Catholics if their actions and attitudes were negating any of domestic values.[209]

Thus, the introduction of selected elements of European innovations into Ethiopia resulted in a clash of two different political and socio-economic settings. The fact that people considered these things as works of evil shows that how much they were alien to the indigenous setting. The clash of indigenous and European values was regrettably expressed by Ethiopians who studied abroad. For example, *Negadras* Baykedagn mentioned different instances in which individuals were attacked by angry mobs and persons punished by the government for expressing their views which were in line with the European values but against the widely held religious and cultural views.[210] As we will see in the coming sections and the next chapter, the friction between the internal setting against Europe made the latter an echo that deflected without penetrating the core of the domestic sphere. Thus, the domestic dynamic was not voluntary even for selective modernization as part of the selective modernization project. This made Ethiopia's quest for modernization an endeavor characterized by the inconsistent introduction of foreign innovation.

4.3. Locating the Ethiopian State within the Political Economy of *Gebbar* System

The process of state formation of Ethiopia and the nuances of modernization trajectory pursued including its interaction with the broader external contexts cannot be grasped without addressing the land-tenure system which is called *gebbar sirat* or *gebbar* system.[211] Tibebu put the influence of the land tenure system in Ethiopia by plainly stating that "Ethiopian history is essentially the history of the" *gebbar* system.[212] As Crummey underlined, land was precious property and knowing how it was defined, distributed, and

[208] Sara Marzagora, "Alterity, Coloniality and Modernity in Ethiopian Political Thought: The First Three Generations of 20th Century Amharic-Language Intellectuals" (SOAS, University of London, 2016), 21-24.
[209] Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991*, 108-13.
[210] Gebre-Hiwot Baykedagn, "Atse Menelik'ena Ethiopia (Emperor Menelik and Ethiopia)," (1912).
[211] The term *gabar* which means one who pays tax etymologically comes from *gibir* (tax/tribute). It is used to refer a system of land-tenure in the imperial Ethiopia.
[212] Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974*, 5.

redistributed is vital in understanding the political, economic, and social aspects of Ethiopia. Crummey added that given the economy was agrarian, land ownership of the *gebbar* system was a broad and complex system that determined the nature of land ownership right. This right was "the most important kind, because access to produce of the land was the basis of livelihood for most of the country's citizens and because access to the product of land was essential to the survival of the country's ruling classes".[213]

As a result, the *gebbar* system defined the foundation of production and extraction which in turn represented the constellation of power relations between elements of the ruling class on one hand and their relationship with the society on the other. The power relation of three elements of the ruling class: the *bete-mengist* (the crown/palace), *mesafint'ena mequant* (the princes and officers), and *bete-kihnet* (the church/clergy) was founded on *gebbar* system as its economic base that sustained their functioning. At the top was the *neguse-negest*, which expects tributes at least once a year. The emperor and the royal family, his warlords, princes, officers, and soldiers constitute the nucleus of the ruling class. Then provincial rulers were either war lords or hereditary kings of their region. Within the provincial level, hierarchical governance agents exist. Thus, there were *mislene* (representative), *melkegna* (overseer or administrator) and *chika shum* (appointed officer) from top-to-bottom, respectively. All these maintained a significant number of *ashker* (servants) that give root-level services that include agricultural, military, and household activities. Below this hierarchical ruling class, we find masses of the Ethiopian population mainly peasants who were either *gebar* (taxpayer) or *chisegna* (tenant). The difference between the two is while the peasant working in the former owns the land, the latter refers to a peasant who works on rented land temporarily.[214]

Land ownership was of two kinds: *rist* and *gult. Rist* which roughly means inheritance refers to represents hereditary ownership of land which was transferred through inheritance but could not be sold. This kind of right entailed the duty to pay tributes in return for ownership. *Gult,* on the other hand, gives a right to collect tributes from tenants who were tilling a land owned by the members of the ruling. Unlike *rist,* land owned under *gult*

[213] Donald Crummey, *Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia: From the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century* (University of Illinois Press, 2000), 8.
[214] Tenkir Bonger, "The State, the Peasantry and Rural Class Formation in Prerevolutionary Ethiopia," *Africa Development/Afrique et Développement* (1992): 92-95; Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974*. 71-73.

rights is not subjected to inheritance and it was emperors who granted a *gult* land to the nobility and the church, while the nobility is expected to render military and administrative service in return for the land,[215] the church used to serve as the main source of legitimizing the throne in return to the land it owns. This *gult* of the church is additional to the tribute it collects called *asrat.* This is what every believer owes the church in the form of one-tenth of annual income, agricultural produce in the case of peasants. According to Tibebu, agricultural produce and other outputs that were paid as tax included grain crafts, livestock spices, mining products, wood, honey, and ivory. In addition to the tax paid in kind, the peasant was subdued to render compulsory labor services. This was collected by intermediaries with military and political powers that include *mislene* and *chika-shum.*[216]

The main difference between *rist* and *gult* was that the former was a kind of appropriation that was hereditary; a land transferring from one generation to the other based on blood relationship. But the other does not. Hereditarily transferred *rist* rights did not only define the relationship between the state and peasants, but it also influenced relations between family members in the rivalry to inherit the *rist* land.[217] The *gebbar* system goes beyond being an economic relationship and it was also a foundation of power relations among elements of the ruling class and their relationship with the society. Thus, the Ethiopian political economy was founded on the two types of ownership of land: one giving a right to hereditary right to land while imposing a duty to pay tributes and the other giving a right to collect tributes from the land granted by the state. The *gebbar* system created elaborated structure power relations and organization of resource extraction.[218]

Power relations founded on the *gebbar* system put peasants who constitute the majority of the population at the bottom of the ruling . Thus, the state-society relation in this system was characterized by the wide range of privileges of the former but voicelessness of the latter i.e., it was a relationship between a strong state and weak society. Though it does not show the complexities it involves, its redistribution of production is evident in common Amharic saying people still reiterate, *siso larash, siso lekedash, siso lenegash* (one-third to the peasant, one-third to the priest, one-third to the king); the peasant was obliged to give up

[215] Discussions on the nature of land ownership are available in Muradu A Srur, "State Policy and Law in Relation to Land Alienation in Ethiopia" (Phd, University of Warwick, 2014), 55-69.
[216] Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974*, 85.
[217] Ibid., 73-78.
[218] The political-economy of the *gebbar* system and the exploitation it entailed is analyzed in

two-third of the products to the political and military authorities and the church. According to *Negadras* Baykedagn, after such distribution of the agricultural product, the peasant and his family were left a portion that could barely sustain them until the next rainy season. In addition to this, both the emperor and provincial rulers maintain their army and the army-peasant relation manifested the worst face of power relation in the *gebbar* system. Despite attempts to establish a professional army since the reign of Tewodros II, because the army had no ration, even well into the 20th-century feeding the army was the responsibility of peasants. Thus, armies of the emperor and nobilities depended on peasants to fulfill their basic needs. A village after a visit of soldiers during peaceful times and villages where a fighting army passed by during wartime was robbed like adversaries. As a foreign-educated Ethiopian, *Negadras* Baykedagn comparatively stated, the army in other states protected peasants from the attack of enemies, the army in Ethiopia was the enemy of peasants.[219]

In the absence of a salary-based army, peasants were obliged to feed soldiers; usually mercilessly looted and abused. Moreover, farmers themselves were forced to join the army at the time of war especially in the event of external invasion. Though subsistence was possible in the highlands given the three-month rainy summer season and relatively land, in the case of drought or animal pandemic, famine was common. Moreover, farmers depended on thousands of years old animal-based plowing and by every standard the life of Ethiopian peasants was miserable.[220] Like Baykedagn, Richard Clauk, in his study that investigated the relationship between soldiers and peasants in Ethiopia also stated that soldiers feast on and pack the available foods and loot anything they consider valuable in the peasants' houses. Soldiers also used to rape women, burn down their homes and agricultural produce. Thus, the relation between soldiers and peasants was the worst manifestation of the *gebbar* system which can be taken as a relation between that of the oppressor and the oppressed, respectively.[221] State-society relations, power-relations, and economic extraction are summarized in the diagram below.

We should indicate here that the characters of *gebbar* system that existed in the northern highlands and southern areas were different. While hereditary rulers were reinstated

[219] Baykedagn, "Atse Menelik'ena Ethiopia (Emperor Menelik and Ethiopia)," 17.
[220] Temesgen Gebeyehu Baye, "Poverty, Peasantry and Agriculture in Ethiopia," *Annals of Agrarian Science* 15, no. 3 (2017): 420-21.
[221] Richard A Caulk, "Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia C. 1850-1935," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 11, no. 3 (1978).

by Menelik II in the former, political and military ruling class from northern Ethiopia that comprised the nobility, the church and soldiers that served as an intermediary between the central government and the local setting in the latter. The problematic relation of the ruling class with the residents of this area has triggered scholars and politicians in contemporary Ethiopia to argue that the formation of the Ethiopian state by Menelik II as 'expansion of Abyssinia' and/or "Abyssinian colonization".[222] As we have seen in previous chapters, rulers in the northern provinces were rivals among themselves, they revolted against the central government, and they also conspired with foreign forces against the central government. Unlike the northern hereditary rulers who usually sought to engage in power competition in this way, the agents in the South were loyal to the central government to ensure the continuation of economic privileges they get from the *gebbar* system. As Daniel Ambaye observed, in this ethnically very diverse region, the agents served as intermediaries between the emperor and subjugated traditional ethnic-based leaders. The degree of severity of the *gebbar* system and autonomy of local political structures depended on whether they were annexed peacefully or by force. In areas incorporated by force, local administrations were dismantled and taxation was severe.[223]

Thus, the monopoly of power by monarch-nobility-church triplet did not only impose the "predatory state"[224] structure from above, but it also gave no opportunity to the new class that emerged as the result of the modernization process (including intellectuals, merchants, urban dwellers) to determine the conditions of their lives and nature of the state. Moreover, the state-society relations were characterized by exploitation with the unlimited power of the former and insignificant agency of the latter in making decisions that affected their lives. The structured ladder of extraction and power relations were imposed with force as the main legitimization tool. About this, the church was one legitimizing tool, but its sole preaching was not enough to get the subjugation of the society.

An amalgamation of church and state was the main feature of Ethiopia's history. At some periods, Church's relation with the state was also hostile. The arrest of the archbishop

[222] This interpretation is the highest form of the question in relation with lack of ethnic and religious inclusiveness in 20th century Ethiopia. See for example, Asafa Jalata, *The Oromo Movement and Imperial Politics: Culture and Ideology in Oromia and Ethiopia* (Lexington Books, 2020).
[223] The exploitative nature the *gebar* system in Southern Ethiopia is discussed in Daniel W Ambaye, *Land Rights and Expropriation in Ethiopia* (Springer, 2015).
[224] Several authors present the imperial Ethiopian state as a predatory state based on the political economy of the *gebar* system. For example, Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974.*, Caulk, "Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia C. 1850-1935."

of the church by Tewodros II following the formers' resistance to Tewodros II's reforms is a good example. The church represents only a peaceful tool of legitimacy that enjoyed economic privileges by teaching that the soul of those who dissent against the 'God-Elect' monarch would suffer in hell. In other words, the church disciplined the peasant by dictating that revolting against the emperor is revolting against God. This absolute power given to the monarch is evident in the Amharic saying *nigus aykeses semay aytares* (as it is impossible to plow the sky, it is impossible to indict a king). As Pankhurst pointed out, though features of state-society relation that existed during the time of our interest in Ethiopia comprised diverse economic activities which also reflects the disparity in topography and climate, the focus here is on the sedentary and agrarian part of the society. In addition to the section with the society engaged with agriculture, there were other segments that constitute a significant number of the population including slaves, smiths, merchants, and people engaged in related economic activities. At the end of the 19th-century, slaves were estimated to constitute more than one-third of the total population.[225]

State formation in Ethiopia was the synthesis of simultaneous and combined processes of foreign influence and internal forces. As the *gebbar* system was a base on which internal political economy was founded, the character of the state that emerged after the assertion of 'independence' in 1896 reflected the interest of those who played a major role in winning the war against colonialism. As it is stated in the third chapter, in addition to his quest to import foreign military expertise, Tewodros II domestically sought to reduce the economic power of the church by confiscating most of the land under its control; and tried to eliminate the political and economic influence of hereditary provincial rulers by appointing his trustees. But the succeeding emperors did not antagonize the church and the nobility and focussed on the *gebbar* systems' solidification after state formation and centralization of power should be seen from the increasing demand to endure patrimonial relation between the central government and the nobility; for the sake of internal power consolidation and to encounter foreign influence. By doing this, it also partly determined the defensive modernization elements the ruling class selectively pursued: preserving the monarchy and the feudal economy of *gebbar* system while introducing foreign scientific and technological innovations.

[225] Richard Pankhurst, "The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888–1892: A New Assessment," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 21, no. 2 (1966): 281-88.

As Charles Tilly rightly illustrated in the case of state-making process in Europe, actors employed effective means of resource extraction for the sake of funding war and assert their power in occupied territories.[226] The *gebbar* system was a resource pool that enabled Ethiopian war makers to extract resources not only in the form of tax paid by peasants. For the land right, they enjoyed the nobility provided soldiers that fought alongside emperors. The reward for military services also mostly came in the form of land rights which was one motive to join the army. Thus, in addition to the sense of patriotism expressed by the loyalty to the monarch and the church, this economic incentive was an important factor. As John Dunn noted the call for a war known as *kitet* (war march) was declared in terms of a quest of affirming "loyalty to *geta* (master), *hagar* (country) and *haymanot* (religion).[227] Thus, the significance of this appeal in mobilizing peasants should not be overlooked. Given the exploitation of peasants both in human and material terms, it is plausible to say *gebbar* system made it possible for the ruling class to engage in wars. In turn, war made Ethiopia's emergence as a 'free' state possible. For instance, Menelik II's decisive victory was the result of his success in accumulating resources and effective mobilization.

The interconnectedness of war-making and taxation in Ethiopia is well presented by the following remark of Pankhurst.

> "Menilek, who was by this time [1896] Emperor and about to wage war against the Italians, is reported to have ordered a special levy to raise funds for the purchase of arms and other war material from abroad. …farmers were ordered to pay a dollar [Maria Theresa dollar] for every ox, horse or donkey used by them in ploughing, a dollar for every four-manual laborer's in their employ, two dollars for every piece of land held by persons not owning oxen, and four dollars for every owner of *gult* land. This tax is said to have been imposed throughout all Ethiopia…"[228]

The formation process of the Ethiopian state aggravated the need for an economic foundation for the wars fought for internal subjugation and external threat elimination, which pushed the ruling class to engage in severe extraction of the peasants. The increase of international influence since the 1850s provided opportunities (modern firearms and other weaponry) and challenges (foreign occupation) for the emergence of the Ethiopian state. The

[226] For the nexus between war making and state making see Charles Tilly and Catherine Besteman, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," *Violence: A reader* (1985).
[227] Dunn, "'For God, Emperor, and Country!'The Evolution of Ethiopia's Nineteenth-Century Army."
[228] Richard Pankhurst, "The Trade of Northern Ethiopia in Hfgfgthe Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 2, no. 1 (1964): 106.

pursuit of defensive modernization by the ruling class was aimed to consolidate its force domestically and to cope up with the increasing economic and security influence. Thus, the opportunities pursued from the foreign domain beyond military-focused modernization are expected to preserve this land tenure system in addition to the political, cultural, and religious values. Until the main features of the *gebbar* system were destroyed first by the Italian invasion in 1936 and later by the revolution of 1974, it was a ground for the interaction between domestic and foreign domains.

4.4. Trade and the Ethiopian Political-Economy

Next to understanding the agricultural extraction under the *gebbar* system, addressing the role of trade in the Ethiopian political economy and state formation is important to know its role in the state formation process and its place in the political economy in general. It is stated by several authors, especially in studies that adopted post-colonial and dependency approaches that Africa's integration into the world economy started when it was made a source of manpower for plantations in America. The raw material produced in this way was processed in Europe and shipped to Africa and other parts of the world for trade. This is what is commonly referred to as "triangular trade" that connected the continents of Africa, the USA, and Europe. As the profit from the slave trade declined, Africa was directly occupied and arbitrarily crafted as colonies integrating them as a source of raw material and marketplace in the emerging global capitalist economy.[229]

Trade was the second most important economic activity in Ethiopia, and it was of two kinds: local trade and import-export trade or long-distance trade. After assessing the travelers' accounts of the 19th and the early 20th-centuries, Pankhurst concluded the following points about domestic trade. Firstly, domestic trade was conducted largely through bartering. Secondly, side by side with bartering, the two main 'currencies' used were Maria Theresa Dollar[230] and *amolie* (bar of salt). At last, Pankhurst underlined the importance of

[229] For critical reflection on state formation see Pierre Englebert, "Feature Review the Contemporary African State: Neither African nor State," *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (1997).

[230] Maria Theresa Dollar was Austrian coin made up of silver that was extensively used in Ethiopia and the region since early 19th century and continued until homogenization of currency in post-WWII era under the rule of Haile-Selassie I. The first currency was printed in France immediate aftermath of Adowa victory by Menelik II, but Ethiopia lacked consistent currency throughout the first half of 20th century. The change at the early 20th century is discussed in Mekuria, *Atse Menelik'ena Ye Ethiopia Andinet (Emperor Menelik and the Unity of Ethiopia)*, 588-90.

local markets in terms of creating cohesion among different ethnic groups by providing the case of the market in Aliyu Amba where traders from a wide range of geographical and ethnic backgrounds were participating.[231] Among the most important developments that led to the increasing significance of trade was the establishment of Addis Ababa which became a commercial center in a short period, the establishment of the Bank of Abyssinia which introduced monetization, and the Ethio-Djibouti railway which made cheap and fast access to foreign trade route possible.[232] Though markets were events of the countryside in the 18th-century, gradual expansion of trade encouraged urbanization and the emergence of new sections of society. The increasing interaction with the outside world and the awareness increased the taste for luxury goods thereby expanding Ethiopia's imports beyond basic goods. Even with increasing demand for the import of firearms, the value of Ethiopia's exports of coffee and other primary products were more than the imports during the 19th-century. But 20th-century witnessed a gradual trade deficit as the import surpassed the export.[233]

Slave trade was also one of the features of the Ethiopian social and economic activities and in the area of international trade too. Regarding trends of the slave trade in the 19th-century, Pankhurst observed that:

> "First, in the provinces of the south and west which constituted the principal source of slaves. Secondly, in the provinces of the north and east which were simultaneously importing areas and regions of transit across which slaves passed before being conveyed abroad. Thirdly, at the Red Sea and Indian Ocean ports and at the markets on the Sudan frontier from which the slaves were exported to other lands."[234]

Despite different measures taken by Ethiopian rulers since the mid-19th-century to discourage the slave trade, the measures were not aimed at radically ending the practice because of the cultural embeddedness and economic advantages it offered. Pankhurst estimated 25,000 slaves were annually exported (1.25 million from 1800-1850) from the

[231]Richard Pankurst, "Trade in Ethiopia in Ancient Times," https://www.linkethiopia.org/article/1-trade-in-ethiopia-in-ancient-times/.
[232] Bahru Zewde, *Ye-Ethiopia Tarik (History of Ethiopia)* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2006), 122-24.
[233] For the historical role of this railway line in Ethiopia see Michał Kozicki, "The History of Railway in Ethiopia and Its Role in the Economic and Social Development of This Country," *Studies in African Languages and Cultures*, no. 49 (2015).
[234] Richard Pankhurst, "The Ethiopian Slave Trade in the Nineteenth and Early Twenthtienth Centuries: A Stastical Inquiry " *Journal of Semetic Studies* 9, no. 1 (1964): 211-12.

total population of less than 9 million.[235] The role of foreigners in domestic trade was also an important factor. Even after the establishment of Addis Ababa in the late 19th-century, French, Greeks, Armenians, Indians, and Arabs dominated trade as economic activity. Though trade as economic activity was vital its social stratification was not an esteemed one. As we have seen about state-society relation of the *gebar* system, merchants constitute the lower rank in a society with other prejudiced professions. This prejudice was surfaced when members of the ruling class started to participate in commercial activities. The involvement of the royal family in such activities during Menelik II was scrutinized by elements of the ruling class. However, new things continued to be imported and in addition to the first European school, the Bank of Abyssinia was opened because of the agreement with Britain, the first hotel (Taytu Hotel) was also opened, all taking place during the first decade of the 20th-century.[236]

Ethiopia's geographical location near the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions made it pivotal in the trade that connected Africa, Asia, and Europe. Pankhurst observed that throughout Ethiopia's history domestic and foreign trade were intertwined. The long-distance merchants or caravans were used in big groups based on the items they trade. If they want "ivory, gold, civet musk, and slaves would journey to the rich lands of Ethiopia's south-west". The foreign or import-export trade was conducted through different routes that take to "the Red Sea port of Massawa, the Gulf of Aden ports of Tajurah, Zeila and Berbera, or to the Sudan frontier in the far west".[237] We have seen in this chapter that resource extraction through *gebbar* system enabled war-making that resulted in the emergence of central authority. From the perspective of enabling internally motivated state formation, trade, especially regional and international trade was also vital in accessing coercive apparatus that was used against internal and external enemies. This is because military resources that the internal power base used for dominating the rivalry and to legitimize taxation of the *gebbar* system could not be realized without the import of firearms.

Thus, acquiring coercive means from external sources contributed to conducting extraction of resources from agriculture. In the absence of direct access to the sea in the 19th-century and with the continuous occupation of the gates of foreign trade by powerful foreign

[235] Ibid.
[236] Bonsa, "The Historiography of Addis Ababa: A Critique and a Discussion of The'ethiopian City'."
[237] Richard Pankhurst, "The Trade of Northern Ethiopia in Hfgfgthe Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," ibid.2, no. 1 (1964): 61.

forces, the access for commercial means of coercion was difficult. As Robin Luckham and Dawit Bekele observed, the fact that Menelik's province, Shewa, which was distant from the sea than other competing Ethiopian provinces was able to control routes of foreign trade. This enabled him to buy one million rifles and a significant number of other types of weapons. Moreover, he hired French and Russian military experts which finally enabled him to win the war against Italy by mobilizing an army comprised of 100,000-150,000 men.[238] Cognizant of this advantage, controlling lucrative trade routes was one of the motives of the wars fought among provincial rivals. The process of establishing a central government was also manifested in the rivalry to control trade routes that generated significant revenue. For example, the war between Menelik and the King Tekle-Haimanot of Gojjam at the battle of Embabo on 6 June 1882 was decisive to control the revenue from Gojjam-Gondar-Tigre-Eritrea through Massawa. According to Pankhurst, this was one of the most important caravan trade routes in northWestern Ethiopia.[239] This victory helped Menelik II to emerge powerfully and to shift his attention southwards. After the southeast expansion of the Ethiopian territory and construction of the railway that connects Ethiopia with Djibouti, it emerged as Ethiopia's main door to the outside world until which continued until now.

In addition to this global phenomenon, Ethiopia's success at the battle of Adowa also shaped the trade activity. When Ethiopia's independence became actual, colonial powers shifted their interest to integrate resourceful parts of Ethiopia with their colonies through trade. Germany and the USA focused on benefitting from the trade that taking in central Ethiopia as the periphery was already under the influence of European colonizers.[240] These treaties gave extraterritorial and legal immunities for foreign nationals, not only to diplomats but also to merchants. The trade relations established made Ethiopia a destination of manufactured products while primary products were exported with little involvement of Ethiopians in the process. The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway was constructed by a French company from 1908-1917 and the strong trade relations with the Italian colony of Eritrea became the two blood vessels of Ethiopia's foreign trade. This was putting pressure on Ethiopia to use currency as opposed to the traditional taxation of the *gebbar* system which

[238] Robin Luckham and Dawit Bekele, "Foreign Powers and Militarism in the Horn of Africa," *Review Of African Political Economy* 9, no. 30 (1984): 20-22.
[239]The nature of trade during the time of our interest is well discussed by Pankhurst, "The Trade of Northern Ethiopia in Hfgfgthe Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries."
[240] Zewde, *Ye-Ethiopia Tarik (History of Ethiopia)*, 108-12.

was collected in kind. With the increasing influence of foreign trade, monetization was pursued since the 1920s, though it only became successful in the post-WWII era.[241]

Approaches of political economy focuses on underdeveloped states like dependency theory and post-colonial theories explain some aspects of Ethiopia's fate after it emerged as an independent state, but all suffer from misrepresentation of certain vital aspects. For instance, dependency theory's justification of underdevelopment as a result of the exploitation of the European capitalist system does not apply because foreign capital in Ethiopia was insignificant before WWII. Moreover, reliance on external explanation prevents us from addressing the interplay between domestic political and economic spheres manifested in the *gebbar* system that maintained subsistence agriculture even in the absence of foreign influence. At last, we can also add Ethiopia's lack of involvement in the "triangular trade" which extracted slaves from Africa. As several authors who studied the slave trade in Ethiopia documented, it was mainly geared toward Arabia.[242] However, dependency theory still explains the way Ethiopia's trade became under the domination of European forces through 'monopoly capitalism' that took place through concession treaties and huge influence in internal affairs including in the political sphere. State formation and the consequent centralization of government power brought two changes from the perspective of trade. Firstly, it paved the way for centralizing the income gained from domestic activities. Secondly, it necessitated confronting or conceding to the involvement of European powers in commerce. Specifically speaking, though European states failed to establish a directly colonial rule, they used unfair trade treaties or concessions to benefit from Ethiopia's economy thereby integrating Ethiopia's economy within the broad global capitalism.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has provided the conditions the independence of the Ethiopian state created as the result of the success in averting colonialism and the emergence of central authority. The chapter assessed the implication of independence on modernization as

[241] Ibid.
[242] Pankhurst, "The Ethiopian Slave Trade in the Nineteenth and Early Twenthtienth Centuries: A Stastical Inquiry ".,Giulia Bonacci and Alexander Meckelburg, "Revisiting Slavery and the Slave Trade in Ethiopia," *Northeast African Studies* 17, no. 2 (2017)., Janet Ewlad, "The Nile Valley System and the Red Sea Slave Trade 1820–1880," *slavery and abolution* 9, no. 3 (1998).

agendas of in Ethiopia in comparison with colonized African states. In this regard, the chapter has demonstrated the urgency felt in the wake of independence not only for the sake of answering domestic demands for change but also to avoid future foreign threats. The backwardness of socio-economic conditions at the beginning of the 20th-century and the dialogue of the domestic traits with imported elements of European modernity were also assessed. The chapter also has analyzed the Ethiopian land tenure of *gebbar* system on state-society relations and its role in giving the opportunity of extraction and structure in the state formation process. At last, the role of foreign trade in the state formation process of Ethiopia was assessed.

The test the international system posed at this epoch immediately after independence was a civilization criterion, the 'civilizing mission' which was embedded in the Enlightenment thought of modernity that we have seen in the second chapter was knocking on the door of Ethiopia even after its territorial formation. It was clear that multiple questions related to the need to create a modern and strong state were faced following the culmination of the internally motivated and internationally facilitated state formation process. The result of this process was a challenge of taming foreign elements of modernization while maintaining the main tenets of the domestic political, cultural, and economic setting. The pressure on the foreign sphere and the domestic dynamics put Ethiopia into a half-hearted top-to-bottom tracing the European experience as part of the defensive modernization project. However, as is illustrated in the chapter the domestic conditions were not in a position to absorb elements of European modernity.

The indigenous political economy of the *gebbar* system, its power relations, its sole subsistence production became an island in the colonized and increasingly economically integrated world. The exploitative state-society relations in which the ruling class monopolized power by depriving the agency of the masses were coercively implemented to sustain the internal political and economic formations and to possess a resource to defend foreign threats. The anti-scientific, progress-impeding and submissive cultural and religious features were not in a position neither to originate nor to tame transformation. It is in this condition, the quest for modernization continued as the form of defensive modernization by selectively adapting certain features that were thought would not jeopardize the main elements of the domestic setting.

Though the wealth disparity between the peasants and landlords was not extreme in comparison with feudalism in Europe, the structure of the *gebbar* system was a semi-feudal political economy on which the state structure rested. It had supported a hierarchical power relation of the ruling class in a way that remotely resembled the bureaucracy of the modern state. Moreover, it sustained the reproduction of interdependent but viciously locked social formations. The ruling class was in no material and ideal resource that could enable it to break the cycle and transform the economy. Combined with subsistence agricultural production with little surplus to be extracted, peasants who constituted the mass of the society shouldered political and economic privileges of the ruling class. Thus, the relation between the state and the society was antagonistically marked by a huge gap in agency between members of the ruling class at the top and peasants at the bottom.

CHAPTER 5

INDEPENDENCE AND STATE-BUILDING

This chapter assesses the effect the assertion of independence had on the question of modernization. Though Italian colonization ambition was averted, European modernity was not something that Ethiopia could abandon. Hence, defensive modernization of selectively domesticating European modernity continued with a relatively broader context to benefit from European modernity while retaining core values of the domestic setting. After independence, the necessity of establishing state institutions that go beyond the military-focused modernization objective was felt. In doing so, like what happened in other societies when they became in contact with European modernity, the process of adopting European modernity in Ethiopia created dilemmas, contradictions, and new sources of power and knowledge. The finalization of the state formation process that brought a shift in foreign policy priorities towards building a modern state in line with the European model encouraged the adoption of several elements of European modernity while maintaining major domestic traits. Thus, this chapter assesses the effects of this process which was pursued by a relatively progressive section of the ruling class against the interests of the clergy and other conservative elements who were not willing to open the country for foreign influence.

The first part of the chapter focuses on the shift witnessed in foreign policy as the result of independence. In this regard, the change from a military-focused view of modernization to the quest of building a modern state that sought to realize a relatively broader transformation is discussed. The second section of the chapter gives a closer look at the reforms introduced based on European models following the assertion of independence in 1896 and their interactions with the domestic setting. Accordingly, changes introduced in administrative, education, and other sectors are discussed. The third part of the chapter discusses the Ethiopian worldview as it is embedded in the domestic political, cultural, and religious setting and as it is presented by early and contemporary scholars. The fourth part of the chapter investigates the interaction between the traditional education system and the modern education imported from Europe focusing on the shift it brought as a source of knowledge within the state. In the last part of the chapter, the visions of Ethiopian modernizers regarding the direction Ethiopia ought to follow are analyzed. In this regard,

the search for a modernization model by Ethiopian elites is dealt with by comparatively analyzing the attempt to imitate Japan and Europe.

5.1. The Shift in Post-Independence Foreign Relations

The effect of the finalization of internally motivated but externally hastened state formation can be broadly divided into two spheres. The first effect was witnessed in terms of asserting Ethiopia's independence through the recognition it brought to the state and to Menelik II as a leader. The second was the change it brought in the perception of the foreign sphere in the minds of Ethiopian rulers and reformers which prompted to pursue modernization agendas in a relatively broader context. While the effect of Adowa in terms of bringing international recognition is discussed in this section, the latter is addressed in the next section as part of changing objectives of modernization after independence. The Adowa victory was an international event as it was a domestic development. It defined the fate of Ethiopia as a state and became one of its main faces globally. Regarding the historical prominence of Adowa, Woldeyes stated that "Adowa's respective symbolism of victory/defeat has been transformed into an icon, a historiographical monument, unassailable and immovable".[243] However, like the little attention given to the role of the international aspect in Ethiopia's path towards state formation, Adowa's effect on foreign relations is not well comprehended. In other words, in the analysis of the implications of Ethiopia's victory, its effect on domestic affairs is highly emphasized than its foreign aspect. For instance, Mennasemay argued that:

> "Adowa may be considered as having two aspects-internal and external. The external aspect deals with the relation between Ethiopia and Italy, the internal aspect refers to the constitutive meanings and practices that made the victory possible. From the internal perspective, Adowa may be seen as one of the crucial turning points of Ethiopian history, the break and the bridge between ancient and modern Ethiopia, bearing within itself like the turning points, elements of the past as well as of the future, the decline of old interests and ideas, and the birth of new one. Consequently, the internal aspect raises issues more fundamental than the external one…"[244]

Mennasemay's observation is incomplete if not wrong. Among other things, this view limits Adowa's foreign relation aspect only in terms of change it brought in Ethiopia's

[243] Woldeyes, "124 Years Ago, Ethiopian Men and Women Defeated the Italian Army in the Battle of Adowa".
[244] Mennasemay, "Adowa: A Dialogue between the Past and the Present," 43.

relation with Italy, it accords the credit enabling factors for the victory merely for internal factors, and it denies the continuity of past political and socio-economic dynamics by depicting it as a point of exclusive division between the past and the present. Above all, it gives primacy for the internal domain as if it was a detached island operating in a disconnected manner from regional and global dynamics. The end of the formation of the Ethiopian state as the result of the Adowa victory had global features as important as their domestic dimension. Without the gradual changes in the military sphere since the early 16th-century and the better posture Ethiopian rulers acquired as the result of long interactions with foreigners, the emergence of the Ethiopian state during the advent of colonialism would remain impossible. The colonial partition of Africa was an external impetus for the culmination of the process of forming the Ethiopian state without which Ethiopia would continue as a loosely defined political entity.

The Adowa victory also had impacted the foreign policy pursued by Emperor Menelik II and the general features of the foreign relation of 20th-century Ethiopia. The Adowa victory brought a dramatic change in Ethiopia's relation with Italy and other European powers that had colonies in the area adjacent to Ethiopia. Mekbib argued that Menelik's diplomacy was characterized by his background which was expressed in the form of "Christian philosophical doctrine of uprightness, magnanimity in spirit and nobleness in mind".[245] Menelik II's immediate foreign policy was directed towards consolidating the Ethiopian territory by gaining recognition internationally. There were also other states from around the world that had a strong relation with Ethiopia in addition to the relationship between Britain, France, and Italy. According to Mekbib, these states included Germany, Russia, Belgium, Austria, and Ottoman Turkey.[246]

The attempt to have smooth relations with European powers and to get recognition was Menelik II's first strategy even before the war against Italy broke out. However, as Paulos Raymond and Jonas Milkias pointed out, before Adowa European powers were not interested in seriously considering Ethiopia as an independent state. Though they had signed a friendship and commercial treaties that did not mean they had recognized Ethiopia's independence genuinely as their interest in scrambling the region was continued. This

[245] Mekbib, *The Foreign Policy of Emperor Menelik Ii: Its Political and Diplomatic Significance (1869-1910)*, 130.
[246] Ibid., 154.

changed immediately following the decisive victory against Italy. Italy and Ethiopia signed an agreement–the Treaty of Addis Ababa signed on 26 October 1896 in which the two states declared the end of the war and Italy agreed on the annulment of the Wuchale Treaty thereby dropping its protectorate claim over Ethiopia.[247] Italy had recognized Ethiopia's independence and Ethiopia accepted Italy's control of Eritrea under the Treaty of Addis Ababa, signed on 23 October 1896. Italy opened its consulate in Addis Ababa and pursued commercial integration of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland with mainland Ethiopia.[248] This pushed an increasing number of states to establish official diplomatic relations with Ethiopia. Thus, it is after Italy's defeat that states including European colonizers recognized Ethiopia as an independent state and commenced formal diplomatic relations.

One year after the Adowa victory, France sent Leonce Lagarde to conclude treaties including the treaty regarding the border between Ethiopia and French-Somaliland. Moreover, France became the major partner in Ethiopia's modernization efforts by involving its citizens to provide different expert services and by commencing the building of a railway that connects Ethiopia with its major gate to the outside world-Djibouti that ended in 1917. Accordingly, French advisers became vital in Menelik's administration and experts in different fields including engineering, health, postal and telegraph services. Before the Adowa victory, Menelik had a problematic relationship with Britain as the result of the latter's alliance with Italy against France and Russia. Moreover, Britain had recognized the protectorate status Italy claimed over Ethiopia under Wuchale Treaty.[249] But this was changed after Menelik emerged triumphant against Italy. The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement which was signed in 1897 addressed the border issues between Ethiopia and British Somaliland. According to the preamble of the treaty, the two "kingdoms" were committed to strengthening the "friendship". Moreover, the treaty also dealt with trade between British-Somaliland and Ethiopia on one hand and between Britain and Ethiopia on the other. The treaty also addressed the privileges of British nationals in Ethiopia and on Ethiopia's non-

[247] Paulos Raymond Jonas Milkias, " The Battle of Adowa: African Victory in the Age of Empire," (Oxford University Press, 2013), 31-33.
[248] Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia. *The Battle of Adowa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory against European Colonialism*. Algora Publishing (2005): 71-72.
[249] Mekbib, *The Foreign Policy of Emperor Menelik Ii: Its Political and Diplomatic Significance (1869-1910)*, 187-88.

involvement in support of Mahdist movement in Sudan who were fighting against the British occupation.[250]

Ethiopian rulers since Tewodros had shown a huge interest towards creating an alliance with Christian states of Europe and this interest was particularly higher towards Russia because of religious similarity of Orthodox Christianity. This was realized after the Adowa victory. From the Russian side too, after the first contact in 1889, there were several trips of Russian delegates to Ethiopia sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church. While Ethiopia was at war against Italy, Russia sent a Red Cross mission, and it opened a hospital in Addis Ababa after the war. Russia, like Britain and France, commenced official relations in 1897. In comparison with other foreign powers that had colonial and political interests, the Russian presence in Ethiopia was motivated by religious sympathy.[251] The support of France and Russia enabled Menelik to counter the influence of Britain and Italy. Generally, post-Adowa victory Ethiopia's foreign relation was far-reaching that it changed not only its relationship with Italy but also it brought reconfiguration of Ethiopia's relation with great powers in a way that asserts Ethiopia's status as a free state.

5.2. The Post-Adowa Quest for Modernization

Pankhurst claimed that modernization in Ethiopia began during the first decade of the 20th-century i.e., during Menelik's last decade on power. Pankhurst argued this on the ground that lots of foreign modernity elements including secular schools, hospitals, postal service, railway, etc. were introduced during this period.[252] For others, Tewodros was the unmatched modernizer and reformer of the Ethiopian state.[253] Nimrod Raphaeli gives the credit for modernizing Ethiopia to Haile-Selassie given he effectively centralized the state administration, introduced the first constitution, built major state institutions, expanded education and modernized the army which most of them took place after WWII.[254] It is true that like his predecessors, Menelik was enthusiastic about foreign innovations and

[250] See the Preamble of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement (1897).
[251] Mekbib, *The Foreign Policy of Emperor Menelik Ii: Its Political and Diplomatic Significance (1869-1910)*, 206-09.
[252] Richard Pankhurst, "The Beginnings of Ethiopia's Modernisation," (2003), https://richardpankhurst.wordpress.com/2003/04/15/hello-world/.
[253] See for example, Donald Crummey, "Tēwodros as Reformer and Modernizer," *The Journal of African History* 10, no. 3 (1969).
[254] For modernization endeavors of Haile-selassie see Nimrod Raphaeli, "Ethiopia: Emperor, Elites and Modernization/Ethiopie: Empereur, Elites Et Modernisation," *Civilisations* (1967).

introduced several technological facilities mentioned above. In an attempt to benefit from European expertise, Menelik had foreign advisers and experts in different fields.[255] However, though debate regarding which Ethiopian leader was more successful in terms of modernization achievements is common, such arguments are problematic as they unfairly compare leaders without taking into account the opportunities and impairments of their respective periods. Above all, such remarks deny the change and continuity of modernization that worked in an accumulative manner from one leader to the next.

The assertion of independence is an important moment, but not as the beginning of defensive modernization; rather it is key both domestically and in foreign relations areas because of its effect in the shift in the intensity and priorities of modernization and because of the change it brought in the methods employed to achieve them. During the late 1890s and early 1900s, though the external threat that persisted for centuries seemed resolved, for now, another problem that could not be resolved through war emerged as the main agenda. This chronic challenge that started to shape both domestic and foreign policies was the widespread socio-economic underdevelopment.[256] As it is discussed in the first chapter, dealing with the question of development in the colonized Africa was an affair of colonizers. Ethiopian rulers and thinkers realized that by averting colonialism, they are also shouldering the responsibility of dealing with developmental challenges. Among Ethiopians who articulated this question in depth was *Negadras* Baykedagn. He argued that if military victory is not accompanied by internal socio-economic transformation, the freedom earned by war could not be maintained for long as Ethiopia would turn into defenseless land for external threats. He took his argument further by suggesting that it was good to have a developed colonized country rather than having an independent but improvised state.[257]

In this epoch of Ethiopian history, it was not the introduction of some foreign modernity elements that had critical implications for Ethiopia's future. Rather the main issue was that the military-based understanding of modernization that began in the 16th-century shifted to the challenge of resolving multi-dimensional problems of the Ethiopian state. In terms of modernity visions, Menelik II finalized the vision of his predecessors. Strong

[255]Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia, *The Battle of Adowa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory against European Colonialism* (Algora Publishing, 2005), 184-85.
[256] Geda, "Ethiopian Macroeconomic Modeling in Historical Perspective: Brining Gebre-Hiwot and His Contemporaries to Ethiopian Macroeconomics Realm."
[257] For analysis of Baykedagn's arguments see Matteo Salvadore, "A Modern African Intellectual: Gäbre-Heywät Baykädañ's Quest for Ethiopia's Sovereign Modernity," *Africa* (2007).

internal base and coincidence with the peak of the colonization process enabled him to complete the unification of the Ethiopian state and significantly accomplished expansion of territory that almost gave the current shape of Ethiopia. Beyond this success, progress in terms of reforming the traditional basis of life and building institutions of a modern state was very slow. According to Harold Marcus, while Menelik was able to command an army that exceeded the Italians in the battle of Adowa both in the number of soldiers and rifles, the Ethiopian army remained basically traditional. In the new territories annexed, soldiers executed both military and administrative services which in many instances alienated the local population with ruthless activities and elevated demands.[258]

As it is stated in the previous chapter, triumph over colonialism strengthened the belief in the domestic values and the question was how modernization could be achieved without jeopardizing the power of the monarch, the church, and the tradition. In other words, the question was how to reform the socio-economic aspects without touching the defining features of the monarchy. This was the opportunity earned as the result of the victory against colonialism. As Andreas Eshete pointed out, this was not a question in the rest of Africa where colonial powers were implementing their projects without consideration of domestic traits. But Ethiopia's independence necessitated figuring out how to become a member of the international system while retaining internal features. Regarding the path selected by the ruling elite, Eshete observed that:

> "Gaining entry into the modern world posed peculiar problems for Ethiopia, problems that did not readily arise in the rest of Africa. Although colonial rule had exploited cultural diversity and authority to white supremacist advantage, its overriding mission was to abolish African traditions, institutions and identities. In contrast, the limited foothold of modern institutions in imperial Ethiopia served not to supplant but rather to strengthen the relics of a pre-modern past. An absolutist crown, an established religion, an official language and privileged public culture became constitutionally entrenched, institutionally bolstered by a standing army and a bureaucracy and their claim to legitimacy cultivated and instilled through modern schools and media."[259]

The total enclosure of Ethiopia by European colonizers initiated a grand agenda which was rapid modernization to assure survival. Despite facing this huge challenge, it was also an opportunity since Ethiopians were in a privilege to craft the future of their state unlike the

[258] Harold G Marcus, "The End of the Reign of Menilek Ii," *The Journal of African History* 11, no. 4 (1970): 571-73.
[259] Eshete, "Modernity: Its Title to Uniqueness and Its Advent in Ethiopia: From the Lecture What Is "Zemenawinet"?: Perspectives on Ethiopian Modernity," 22.

rest of Africa. Thus, building a modern state infrastructure emerged as one of the major features of defensive modernization. The way modernization in relation to Ethiopia's new statehood was understood is best summarized by Marzagora as a movement "meant introducing a series of institutions to deal with what the international system recognized as the basic prerogatives of the state". This included diplomatic, financial, bureaucratic, taxation, justice, constitutional, and related areas which were "associated to political and administrative institutions able to efficiently match the requisites and perform the functions that defined a sovereign state in the new (at least for Ethiopia) international system".[260] Thus, it was necessary for the ruling class to redirect centuries-old obsession with military modernization towards other sectors since it solely could not ensure the survival of the state. However, this does not mean reforming the military sector was ignored. Tekle-Hawaryat Tekle-Mariam, one of the early reformers, expressed in his autobiography that even while he was in his death bed, Menelik II was enthusiastic about producing firearms. Since he had studied military science in Russia, Menelik misunderstood this as if he could help to manufacture canon but when Tekle-Hawariat Tekle-Mariam told him the financial and technical requirements, Menelik immersed in sorrow.[261]

Next to his main preoccupation of advancing a foreign policy based on the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ethiopia, this is one important factor that had engaged Menelik to a considerable extent with European and other powers. His efforts to modernize Ethiopia, (ranging from the introduction of running water, electricity and the motor car to the construction of hospitals, the establishment of a system of posts, telegraph and telephone, a national currency, banks, the introduction of a railway linking the port of Djibouti on the Red Sea coast with his capital, and the institution of a relatively modem system of governmental bureaucracy), are some of the important milestones in the history of the Empire.[262] One of the most important achievements in terms of modernizing the state bureaucracy was the establishment of the ministerial system in 1907. The system was rudimentary in the sense that there was confusion regarding the division of responsibility between different ministerial posts and the lack of a centralized

[260] Marzagora, "Alterity, Coloniality and Modernity in Ethiopian Political Thought: The First Three Generations of 20th Century Amharic-Language Intellectuals," 103.
[261] Fitawrari Tekle-Hawariat Tekle-Mariam, *Fitawrari Tekle-Hawariat Tekle-Mariam* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2015), Autobiography, 153-55.
[262] Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy*, 2, 153.

institutional system made its importance only symbolic. However, its introduction was an important step for the future establishment of the state machinery.[263]

The establishment of the cabinet can also be regarded as a mere symbolic gesture to satisfy the internal quest for modernization by few educated Ethiopians and external pressure on the question of modernization in Ethiopia and to show that Ethiopia was qualified to have a kind of government structure that existed in Europe. As Zewde observed, beyond assigning individuals as ministers they even did not have their own offices; and they were 'executing' their duty using their homes as their workplace. Moreover, there was confusion among the division of responsibility creating hostility among ministers as they clash on the scope of their ministries. Among them was *Negadras* Haile-Giorgis Wolde-Mikael who was the Minister of Foreign Relations and Trade.[264] However, it was a departure from the past because it created a governmental body detached from the traditional hierarchical administration bodies that executed the bureaucracy of *gebbar* system. Its establishment means the unlimited power of the monarch is lent to these highest state-level executives at least theoretically. The fact the ministers were elected based on merit, though from the affluent nobility, was also different from hereditary power transfer that defined the politics under the 'Solomonic' Dynasty. Moreover, it brought centralized decision-making of important government activities at least in principle. However, in the absence of grassroots change and within a feudal system, the mere establishment of the ministerial system could not bring significant effect.

The other important change was the beginning of modern education. The first Europe-styled school, *Dagmawi Menelik Timirt Bet* (Emperor Menelik II School), was opened in 1905 by teaching foreign languages. Because of the suspicion towards secular education and foreigners, Orthodox Christian teachers were brought from Egypt.[265] This shows that the aim was not to radically transform the traditional setting rather it was to reconcile European modernization with indigenous knowledge. However, the harmonization attempt ended in the former labeling the latter as undesirable and backward. The introduction of European education was by far most far-reaching than the ministerial system. Firstly, it paved a way for the emergence of a relatively larger number of educated Ethiopians

[263]Milkias and Metaferia, *The Battle of Adowa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory against European Colonialism*, 183-84.
[264] Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974* (Ohio University Press, 1991), 114-15.
[265] Messay Kebede, *The Roots and Fallouts of Haile Selassie's Educational Policy* (Good Press, 2020), 10.

domestically which previously necessitated going abroad to receive such education. Hence, it was important for the emergence of the intellectual class who gradually became an important force in the quest for modernization. Secondly, it was a turning point in Ethiopia's intellectual history because of its effect on the church. As we will see later in the next chapter since education was under the monopoly of the church and the beginning of secular school unleashed the friction between indigenous and foreign knowledge production.

5.3. The Ethiopian World View

Several scholars argue that Ethiopians had their own socio-economic and political system, and they blame the failure to fully rely on the values of this structure and adoption of European values as a responsible factor for the lack of development in contemporary Ethiopia. In his analysis of how Ethiopians understand time and modernity, Kebede argued that time has a central place in self-awareness and the purpose of life for Ethiopians. In his view, time and modernity for Ethiopians is regarded as circularly moving rather than a linear one. This world view originates from domestic historical, cultural experiences, and most importantly from *Kibre-Negest* and it is fundamentally different from the European conception. Unlike the European understanding of time which divides it into past, present, and future, the Ethiopian conception regards time as circular. *Zemenawi'net* (modernity), is understood as something that is contemporarily valued and pursued. Accordingly, the socio-economic retardation of Ethiopia compared to its glorious past is regarded as temporary that will wither away to be replaced by prosperity. Thus, unlike the linear European understanding of modernity which views history as a journey towards progress, the Ethiopian view of modernity regards history as a journey comprised of ups and downs. In line with this perspective, Ethiopia's renaissance is inevitable as Europe's decline will not be avoided.[266]

The Ethiopian conception of modernity is also available from arts to literature, from media to political discourses. It is common to find the motto *"Tilik Endeneberin Tilik Enhonalen"* (we were great, and we will be great again) everywhere. However, it is important to emphasize that in contrast with nostalgia about the Ethiopian past, the quest for

[266] Mesay kebede, "The Ethiopian Conception of Time and Modernity," *The African Languages and Societies Commons, Other Languages, Societies, and Cultures Commons, and the Philosophy Commons* (2013), https://ecommons.udayton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1111&context=phl_fac_pub.

modernity in the 20th-century did not aim to revive domestic traits. Though Ethiopian defiance against colonialism and continuous independence gave ground to some scholars to argue the existence of Ethiopian conception of modernity, they admit that the path followed in modern Ethiopia was imitating European modernity. As Maimire Mennasemay observed in the modern history of Ethiopia, rather than attempting to revive indigenous modernity traits, the quest for modernization resorted to imitating foreign models, specifically speaking, it strived to follow the footsteps of westernization.[267] Kebede Mikael who was one of the renowned Ethiopian authors and higher government officials in the post-WWII era, in *Ethiopia ena Mirabawi Siltanie* (Ethiopia and the Western Civilization) claimed that:

> "During ancient time, Ethiopia did, by crossing oceans using ships she built, by conquering territories, by civilizing peoples and erecting monuments, contributed for the world to transform from ignorance to civilization. Now it is the turn of the other people to help Ethiopia."[268]

It is true that the Adowa victory and Ethiopia's independence was a unique and remarkable event. As McVety clearly stated, the victory of Adowa was a challenge to scientific racism that originated in the Enlightenment conception of modernity. In McVety's words: "by showing that black men could wield the tools of empire as effectively as white men, Adowa challenged "scientific" racism…"[269] However, a prosperous past, unique identity, cultural richness, and victory over colonialism cannot convince us to show the existence of a distinct form of modernity that could effectively counter the effects of European modernity. For the first Ethiopian reformers who emerged in the late 19th-century and early 20th-century, the victory against Italy was taken as temporary end of the foreign threat and they contended that permanent independence was not granted unless a domestically driven capacity was achieved. They anticipated future challenges posed on continuity of independence if rapid changes were not introduced. Early modernizers who were frustrated about the domestic political and economic setting entered into what I call independence-versus-development dilemma. Against the widely valued ideals accorded to the success in averting colonialism, few early Ethiopian thinkers dared to express the "worthlessness" of being politically free unless it could bring development. For them, the highly celebrated uninterrupted survival, the designation as the "only black independent

[267] Mennasemay, "A Critical Dialogue between Fifteenth and Twenty First Century Ethiopia," 1-3.
[268] Kebede Mikael, *Ityopya Ena Me'erabawi Selitane* (Berhane'ena Selam Printing Enterprise, 1949), 63.
[269] Amanda Kay McVety, *Enlightened Aid: Us Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia* (Oxford University Press, 2012), 36-37.

state" and the freedom from racial segregation should be accompanied by development. They argued the independence should have done nothing more than consolidating the power of the ruling class.

Negadras Baykedagn in his 1912 book titled *Atse Menelik'ena Ethiopia* (Emperor Menelik and Ethiopia) praised developments in the British colony of Sudan by comparing it with the stagnation in Ethiopia as the following.

> "If we look at societies around us, we can observe that people with intellect [European colonizers] are courageously modernizing them. If we see the land of Dervishes [Sudan] which was destroyed by war, we can see that because of the wise governance of British officers, it is transforming the desert into a paradise of happiness. The intellect of colonizers that occupied the people around us will continue to proceed to destroy obstacles that will come to its path. So, you can not hinder [colonizers] by anything other than by intellect. Sadly, people who sit idle with ignorance will be destroyed one day! We Ethiopians had a long friendship with foreigners. But we did not learn anything until now. Therefore, it is likely that our country will be destroyed."[270]

Negadras Baykedagn argued that ignorance was the queen of the ancient world which later on faced an invincible enemy which is European intellect. He added that a society that welcomes European intellect prospers. The one that closes its door against her perishes. And advised that if Ethiopia accepts European intellect, she will be unconquerable. If not, she will disintegrate and kneel into slavery.[271] We can say he correctly predicted what happened when Italy invaded Ethiopia for the second time. What makes his book a policy recommendation rather than academic accomplishment were the suggestions he provided at the end. Among other things, he recommended reforming and centralizing the army, the financial sector and system of taxation, government administration hierarchies, establishment of secular schools, reforming the justice sector, and grant of religious freedom. He urged immediate implementation of his reforming proposals and repeatedly underlined these measures should follow European models.[272] His ideas were aimed at establishing modern state institutions that he saw in Europe and to facilitate the ground for building an industrialized and capitalist economy which in turn targeted economic and political characters of the *gebbar* system. Moreover, as an intellectual trained in Europe, his views of modernization were based on the Enlightenment conception of progress. Power for him

[270] Baykedagn, "Atse Menelik'ena Ethiopia (Emperor Menelik and Ethiopia)," 19.
[271] Ibid., 24.
[272] Ibid., 20-25.

represented mastering European knowledge. His strong belief in incremental development that could be achieved through science and the importance he accorded to individual rights including freedom of religion show his convictions. In the same book, he went too to the extent of critiquing the hegemonic cultural and religious beliefs under the Orthodox Church and suggested for religion to guide a relation between individuals and God.[273] About the irrelevance of fixation with firearms and boasting about military victory and the necessity of building an all-round modern state, *Negadras* Baykedagn stated that:

> "We did not realize the ultimate wisdom of people is placed in our intellect. We do not know anything else other than carrying a firearm and trail behind a chief like a dog. All our fellow citizens claim they are soldiers. The mutilated, the blind, the one that use stick-support to walk, the elderly, even children, all say they are soldiers."[274]

It was fascinating for Ethiopia to defy colonialism and became the only independent black state at the peak of European colonialism. However, the absence of modern state infrastructure and catastrophic socio-economic conditions were dominant. Abstained from jeopardizing main tenets of the domestic political, religious and cultural values, the ruling class sought a defensive modernization to boost the capacity of the state by selectively adopting changes. Thus, when territorial formation ended in 1896, the question of modernization unfolded in the form of the building of modern state machinery, transforming the economy, and familiarizing with technology but as long as they are not against the above-mentioned internal features. The paradox here is the love-hate relation with foreigners. After fighting European colonialist forces and because of past experiences the attitude towards foreigners was suspicious, However, Europe continued to be viewed as a source of civilization. Thus, imitating European modernity elements was pragmatically pursued without compromising the pillars of the domestic setting.

5.4. Interaction of the Indigenous and European Education

The interaction between indigenous and modern education was fascinating as it was vital in determining the 20th-century developments in Ethiopia. Modern education was the major medium that European modernity penetrated non-European societies thereby creating a new class of intellectuals as a new source of power and knowledge. The same was true in

[273] Ibid., 24-25.
[274] Ibid., 17.

Ethiopia in that despite ancient literate civilizational roots and well elaborated indigenous education system, European education gradually gained ground pushing the domestic education system aside. As we shall see in the coming chapters, the fruits of modern education became major forces in propagating ideas of change and modernization. The designation of indigenous education as "traditional" and the exalted status for European education as "modern" clearly shows the declining role of the former in the state. In this section, features of indigenous education and the advent of modern education, and the interaction between the two are investigated.

The Orthodox Church education was a highly organized and hierarchical system producing graduates that serve in political, religious, and social areas. Woldeyes states that church education has "well-developed curriculum, textbooks, and method of instruction".[275] He elaborates tires of the church schools as the following:

> "The ordinary level of study includes the House of Reading (*Nibab Bet*), and the House of Mass (*Kidassie Bet*). The advanced level of study includes the House of Hymn (*Zema Bet*), the House of Poetry (*Qine Bet*), and the House of Books (*Metsehaf Bet*). Each school has multiple stages and branches of learning that enable students to develop religious and secular skills and knowledge."[276]

According to Woldeyes, even though the church education was an unending lifelong journey, one may be named "*arat-ayna* (the four-eyed)" after spending 28 years in the study in reference to the completion of the four stages stated above. At this stage, the graduate who is called *dabtara* is expected to be well equipped with spiritual and worldly knowledge, expected to know about the past, present, and future being able to serve the church and the society.[277] This hierarchical training was given in churches and monasteries. In addition to fulfilling the religious service of the church, graduates who passed through this hierarchy were important members of the ruling elite in the court of the emperor and in the lives of the people. Next to the church and monasteries, imperial courts were also the center of traditional education. In addition to collecting church intellectuals and *tsehafe-tizaz* (chroniclers who records the life and deeds of the emperor), rulers also sponsored the pursuit of knowledge and the establishment of imperial archives. For instance, when the interest in military technology reached its peak, Tewodros II was in searching for the capabilities of

[275] Woldeyes, *Native Colonialism: Education and the Economy of Violence against Traditions in Ethiopia*, 61.
[276] Ibid., 61-62.
[277] Ibid.62

producing them domestically. Accordingly, he established the 'technical school' at Gafat and library at Mekdela which was founded as a full-fledged collection of books by the standard of the time.[278]

The emergence of the first Ethiopians trained abroad was not related to a state policy or efforts. These intellectuals studied abroad either by chance or by their own personal efforts.[279] Simultaneous with the international influence and centralization of the state, individuals exposed to European education emerged as a new class of intellectuals who were close to the ruling class and became influential in the articulation of modernization and Ethiopia's place in the international system. The increasing role of secular intellectuals at the time was a departure from the historical reliance of the state on church elites who were the exclusive source of knowledge and worked hand in hand with the state. Adowa victory was a turning point in the education sector since it gradually changed the focus from the military sector towards producing educated Ethiopians that could fill the newly-emerging government institutions. For this purpose, schools that teach European curricula were set and many more young Ethiopians went abroad to study. Bahru Zewde estimates until the second Italian invasion in (1936) a few hundred Ethiopians had studied abroad.[280] The education sector in general and the intellectuals were the bridges that connect the Ethiopian state and society with the foreign domain, influencing the perception of the ruling elite and the public about the outside world in one hand and influencing the modernization route on the other hand.

In addition to the first European-styled school opened in 1905 by Menelik II, *Ras* Tafari School was opened in 1925 to be followed by Empress Mennen School in 1931, both in Addis Ababa. Though initially, the expansion was slow, other schools were gradually established in different provinces following the same suit.[281] The starting of secular

[278] Rita Pankhurst, "The Library of Emperor Tewodros Ii at Mäqdäla (Magdala)," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 36, no. 1 (973).
[279] For example, *Negadras* Gebre-Hiwot Baykedagn, *Hakim* Workneh Eshete travelled to Europe in the second half of 19th century as a child by chance, hiding in a sheep and with British expedition force of 1968, respectively. Both came back during the reign after graduating medicine, from universities of Berlin and London, respectively. *Negadras* Gebre-Hiwot was the emperor's translator though he became the most insightful political analyst until he died in 1918 because of the Spanish Flu at the age of 33. Baykedagn *Hakim* Workneh Eshete became physician of Menelik II, under the successors of Menelik served as diplomat and served at different government posts.
[280] Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974*, 179.
[281] Building of schools and expansion of European education were among top agendas that received attention by the *Berhane'ena Selam* newspaper. See for example, Aleka Haile-Selassie, "Besidamo Timihirt Bet

education under the sponsorship of the government was new and it was not welcomed by the nobility and the church. The involvement of the state in the education sector which previously was under the domain of the church was initially resisted. However, Ethiopian rulers never sought to totally eradicate the traditional and religious base of life, rather their aim was to harmonize the two. This objective was reflected in the speech of *Ras* Tafari excerpted below made during the inauguration of *Ras* Tafari Mekonnen School.

> "I established this school not only for the teaching of foreign language and wisdom. Our country is a place where sacred books are preached. A person who is ignorant about his own language and scripture, cannot grasp the foreign wisdom. I urge you to bravely study our language and wisdom."[282]

As *Ras* Tafari became more active in the expansion of secular education, the aristocracy and elites of the church continued to resist his actions. In his biography, he explains that the increase in the number of secular schools was so slow for the sake of gradually familiarizing its importance for those who were opposing it. He said that since Ethiopian people were living in 'darkness', it necessitated exposing them to knowledge step by step.[283] Defending the increasing role of the government that was opposed by the conservative elements, *Hakim* Workneh Eshetie argued at the time that the level of education in one country determines its place in the world system. He added that lagging in education means falling behind other states in terms of wealth, power, and wisdom. He advised the expansion of education as a solution for foreign threats citing that without modern education, Ethiopia would not be respected by other states and it would not be able to build modern state institutions.[284] European education entered in this way sponsored by the state and defended by early modernizers. In introducing his autobiography, Ras Tafari underlined the attention he gave to the education sector. He mentioned legal reforms, printing machines, the establishing of newspapers, the beginning of secular education and foreign languages, hospitals, and the military academy as his major achievements.[285]

Mekefetun Asmelkito Yetederege Nigigir (a Speech at the Openening Ceneremony of a School in Sidamo Province)," *Berhane'ena Selam* 1930.

[282] Ras Teferi, "Speech at the Openeing Cerremony of Ras Teferi Mekonnen School," *Berhan'ena Selam* 1927, 2.

[283] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, vol. 1 (Addis Ababa: Berhanen'ena Selam Printing Press, 1959), Biography, 49.

[284] Hakim Wokneh Eshste, "Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Teferi Mekonnen School," *Berhan'ena Selam* 1925.

[285] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, 1, 46-54.

Though other published and unpublished sources (mainly in Amharic, English, and French) which documented the dynamics of the late 19th and early 20th-century are available, the dilemmas of modernization and the questions of nationalism were nowhere debated extensively as on *Berhane'ena Selam* (Light and Peace) newspaper. *Berhan'ena Selam* was established in 1924 by *Ras* Teferi and became the main platform for debate on a wide range of issues until it was replaced in post-WWII by *Addis Zemen* (new period) and became a daily newspaper from 1958 to the present.[286] As the owner of the printing press and the newspaper, *Ras* Tafari's role was clearly placed as maxim below its title: *ኢትዮጲያ መንግስት ኦልጋ ወራሽ ልኡል ራስ ተፈሪ መኮንን ባገራቸው ብርሀን እና ሰላም እንዲሆን የሚፍልጉ ስለሆነ ይህንን ጋዜጣ ብርሀንና ሰላም ብለው ሰየሙት* (The crown prince of Ethiopia, *Ras* Tafari Makonnan, since he wants his country to be enlightened and peaceful, he named this newspaper light and peace). No question that the newspaper was the main propaganda instrument that built a cult of *Ras* Tafari as a person and as a leader gradually contributing to his emergence as the most powerful ruler. However, published every Thursday consisting of four pages, it was a significant source to get an insight about what the elites of the time understood their place in the international system and how they articulated the state-building process combined with the questions of nationalism and modernization.

In this pivotal time of intellectual development, the reaction of the church elite against the increasing significance accorded to modern education is available in the views of several contributors of *Berhanen'ena Selam* newspaper. The first years of the newspaper were mainly dedicated to publicizing the achievements of *Ras* Tafari in expanding modern education and introducing other European experiences. The opening of *Ras* Tafari school, from its construction and inauguration to the daily activities of students became news that received significant coverage. This was not welcomed by the church who were losing their place as the main source of knowledge. But the influence of European education cannot be oversimplified as it received more attention from the ruling class encouraged by reformers who were able to study abroad. Regarding this development, Marzagora observed that:

> "The necessity to ideologically situate Ethiopia in the rapidly globalizing international environment, an environment to which Ethiopian intellectuals

[286] Sara Marzagora, "Alterity, Coloniality and Modernity in Ethiopian Political Thought : The First Three Generations of 20th Century Amharic-Language Intellectuals" (Phd, SOAS, University of London, 2016), 36.

were exposed in drastically higher numbers and to a drastically more extensive degree than in the past, gave a renewed prominence to philosophical debates."[287]

Though serious debates came to the front gradually, the monarchial system of the government and the role of the Orthodox Church in the state was furiously defended even by those who welcomed European education. The monarch was immortalized, his power equated to a supernatural force, and regarded as the driver of modernity. Haile-Giorgis Wolde-Sema'et wrote verses below in 1927 underlining two things that whose infringement would bring serious punishment - God and the Emperor.

"God gave man conscience,
So that man gets wisdom through learning.
But when you passionately pursue wisdom,
Fear [respect] the king.
A fear [respect] of the king,
Because his laws give life and death.
What about the words of God? They endure till the time comes."[288]

Wolde-Sema'et which was one of such depictions of the monarch was based on expressing his Biblical provisions, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,"[289] he blended the fear of the authority with this Biblical verse on the fear of God and argued that the emperor deserved such obedience. He justifies the reason analogously, by saying the emperor determines who should live and who should die as God does. He also calls for submission to the power of the emperor, in line with the religious teaching that God gives power and whoever opposes authorities is rebelling against God's will; and should be punished. There are some points that we can infer in relation to the religious element of notions of the tenets of the domestic traits.

First, as the defensive modernization project aimed to preserve them, the monarchy and the church were reinforcing the ideology of each other thereby creating hegemonic indigenous political thought that challenge the reception of foreign political or modernity experiences. Second, the discourse, in turn, normalizes the socio-economic underdevelopment by promising a prosperous future. The bold claim of *Kibre-Negest* put Ethiopia at the center of global history arguing that Ethiopia would prevail at the end and other societies would peripherally convoy this fulfillment.[290] Thus, deficiency of the present

[287]Ibid., 102.
[288] Haile-Giorgis Wolde-Sema'et, "Yemitekim Bilhat (the Useful Wisdom)," *Berhan'ena Selam* 1927.
[289] Bible, Proverbs 9:10.

is extrapolated with past and future abundance; by presenting Ethiopia's past as a glorious epoch that would come again. It also acknowledges persistent foreign threats against Ethiopia and justifies them by the protection of supernatural means. The inherent contradiction between these beliefs and European modernity based on the Enlightenment ideals is clear.

It was true that Ethiopia as a state existed in a hostile regional and international environment with eminent threats. It was also true that the combination of the power of the monarchy and other domestic values significantly instilled absolute submission of the society thereby legitimizing the political economy of the *gebbar* system. Beyond this, world history was not heading towards Ethiopia's glory as claimed by *Kibre-Negest*. Rather European imperialism was absorbing the whole world by incorporation of non-European societies integrating production relations into the capitalist economy, and Ethiopia's survival within it as an independent state was an anomaly but vulnerable and practically very open for foreign economic and political interference. Regarding the religious-driven immortalization of Ethiopia, *Negadras* Baykedagn says that by justifying Ethiopia's existence through religious intervention, Ethiopian princes and officers sit idle in laziness.[291] It is this religiously cultivated hegemonic political atmosphere that modernizers were forced to use the monarch as a central agent in the process of defensive modernization. Thus, even those who studied in Europe were very cautious to avoid remotely criticizing these two subjects through the ultimate clash was inevitable.

European education was inherently antagonist to indigenous political and religious values. However, a small section of the ruling class and Ethiopians trained abroad felt that the lack of modern education that teaches science was a reason for overall socio-economic backwardness, dependence on traditional subsistence farming, and for lack of strong government institutions. Europe's success in modernization was attributed to the use of education: the application of science and technology in all aspects of human life. The main argument forwarded was 'if we import Europe's education, Ethiopia would be civilized as Europe'. Eshete went further and argued that the European state system, the emergence, and consolidation of states was the result of the attention given to education and survival as a

[291] Baykedagn, "Atse Menelik'ena Ethiopia (Emperor Menelik and Ethiopia)," 19.

state would be at risk if Ethiopia could not expand European education.[292] Generally, European education was presented as a cure for *dinkurina* (deafness), *sinfina* (laziness), *mehayimnet* (illiteracy), and *tseb* (aggression). Being enrolled in it was considered as a journey from *chelema* (darkness) to *berhane* (light). On the other hand, the church elites denounced those who studied abroad as mere language translators that will eventually facilitate the colonization of Ethiopia by European states. Accordingly, the church elites criticized the role Ethiopians educated abroad. In one of the first newspapers published in Amharic called *A'emro* (mind), an anonymous writer suggests that those educated abroad had no significant role other than serving as language translators.

> "…those who incurred their parents lots of cost to study in Europe, what had they learnt and brought other than a language skill? Did they go abroad to study foreign language and to serve as translators when Europeans control our country?"[293]

Generally, the shift from traditional to modern education was instrumental which the ruling class, mainly *Ras* Tafari, exploited both internally and internationally. As we will see in the next chapter, in addition to undermining the position of indigenous education, the emerging secularly educated intelligentsia was mobilized by *Ras* Tafari to consolidate his power. The other development related to Western education was their articulation of the then political economy. They considered Ethiopia a corridor of backwardness in the increasingly modernizing world. Thus, though they refrained from criticizing the monarchy, they targeted the *gebbar* system as an obstacle to modernization.[294] European education though passionately defended by Ethiopian intellectuals and pragmatically pursued by the ruling class; it was clear that expansion of European education would eventually operate against the values that defensive modernization sought to protect. Generally, the relevance of *Berhan'ena Selam* newspaper on intellectual development in Ethiopia can be classified into two points. Firstly, it promoted the expansion of European education as the owner, *Ras* Tafari, was enraged with the spread of European education. The attention given for building new schools gradually the nobility followed their master and started to build schools in their respective provinces thereby contributing for the expansion. Secondly, the debates were remarkable in Ethiopian intellectual history though the monarchy and its religious

[292] Eshste, "Speech at the Opening Ceremony of Teferi Mekonnen School."
[293]Anonymous, "Yawropa Kuankua Temrew Yemetu Temariwoch Tikim (the Benefit of Ethiopians Who Studied Foreign Language)," *Aemro* 1925.
[294] With few exceptions like *Negras* Baykedagn and *Hakim* Eshete, educated Ethiopians kept their analysis in line that defends the traits the defensive modernization sought to preserve.

legitimization myth were untouched. The debates here were forerunners for the coming generations as discussion of modernization, Ethiopia's place in regional and global contexts, the appropriate form of governance, and related questions resumed.

5.5. Modernization Quandary

Like what happened in other non-Western societies, complications as the result of the encounter of Western values in Ethiopia's quest for modernization is visible. Since 1850, defying attitude against the foreign forces was limited to the political sphere. The *faranj* (a general Amharic term used to call white foreigners) is regarded as civilized people who could do everything. This perception is also mixed with the suspicion that was installed in the minds of Ethiopians since bloodshed was unleashed following the Jesuits' conversion of Emperor Susenyos to Catholicism. Thus, though usually skeptical towards faranj and the *wuch-hager* (the external world, states) were considered as prosperous. Japan held a central place in the minds of Ethiopian rules and modernization thinkers.

Regarding the question of the development model, it is presented as if Ethiopia's modernization path had faced a dilemma of choosing either the course of Europe or Japan. For instance, Clapham argues that 'Japanization' was one of the development models Ethiopians pursued as they did towards Europeanization.[295] Kebede also argued that Japan is an example how states could modernize by going back to their traditional values. He added that "Japan started her path to modernity not by following Europe, but by returning to the source of her own history".[296] This is a misleading observation because rather than being different modernity of its own, the peculiarity of Japan's transformation was its success in accepting European modernity by adopting science, technology, and education by preserving some elements of the indigenous political and cultural setting. Ethiopians were interested in Japan not only because of Japan's modernization as a distinct entity of its own. Thus, Japan represents a success story of taming European modernity rather than peculiar modernity of its own. The obsession of Ethiopian rulers and modernizers who are called by some "Japanizers" is well documented.[297]

[295] Clapham, "Ethiopian Development: The Politics of Emulation."
[296] Kebede, "The Ethiopian Conception of Time and Modernity," 15.
[297] Dilebo, *Ye-Ethiopia Yegbar Siratina Jimir Capitalism (the Ethiopian Land Tenure and the Infant Capitalism)*
62-66.

Japan was an inspiration for Ethiopia, a living example that a non-European society could Europeanize its military and economy without surrendering indigenous political, religious, and social characters. This was evident in the argument of Kidane-Mariam Abera who argued that education was a key tool for Europe that made it possible to build sovereign states, explore other parts of the world and rule non-European societies. He figuratively said education for Japan opened their impaired eyes and made them see the light. Thus, he claimed that the success of Japan in absorbing the wisdom of Europe which enabled it to transform from traditional to a civilized society is a good example that shows the role of education in the achievement of modernization.[298]

It is true that Japan and Ethiopia at the time had some commonalities. Both had a history that spanned around a thousand years, they were disinterred under the monarchial system of government, their medieval history was characterized by provincialism and instability, and both faced increasing foreign threats during the 19th-century. Donald Levine comparatively presents the similar modernization contexts these two societies faced in the 19th-century as the following:

> "…both peoples mounted major efforts to defend themselves against encroachments from European powers. These resulted in the defeat of Italian forces by Ras Alula at Dogali in 1887 and by Emperor Menilek's armies at Adowa in 1896, and in the defeat of Russian forces, after two years of intense combat by Emperor Meiji's troops, in 1905. Their military prowess made Ethiopia and Japan the first two non-European powers to negotiate treaties with European nations at the turn of the -century. The internal history of both societies since the late 19th-century includes numerous efforts to promote modernization from above that were legitimated by the imperial throne."[299]

Thus, the ruling class in both understood that failure to build a modern and strong state invites existential threat. At the same time, Tewodros II was being engrossed by the sophistication of the army of Ottoman Turkish and British empires, Britain was trying to force Japan to sign concessional trade treaties. This fact combined with military and economic power made building a strong centralized army and industrialized production core objectives of the Meiji dynasty which came to power in 1866. Japan followed the same path of defensive modernization which Ethiopia tried to do, imitating European science and technology while maintaining important domestic features. The difference is Japan emerged

[298] Kidane-Mariam Abera, "Yehager Fikir (Patriotism)," *Berhane'ena Selam* 1925, 3.
[299] Donald Levine, "Ethiopia and Japan in Comparative Civilizational Perspective," *Passages* 3, no. 1 (2001): 7.

as one of the great powers by successfully implementing it while Ethiopia's industrialization was insignificant even late in the 20th-century. Thus, the core of Japan's modernity was Europe's asset, the main success of Japan was, its fast mastery of the European game both in military and economic areas.

Given some important similar conditions that existed both in Ethiopia and Japan, then it is reasonable to ask why Ethiopia failed in transforming its socio-economic setting, unlike Japan. The answer is there were significant differences that outweigh the similarities. Firstly, the main difference we observe is that while Japan dismantled feudalism simultaneously with the adoption of science and technology it was preserved in Ethiopia by Menelik and his successors. For instance, *Ras* Tafari avoided taking radical modernization measures against the political economy of feudalism. His alliance with progressives was only used to fight the challenge of conservatives but reform the feudal system (the political economy of the *gebbar* system) was untouched once he grasped power. Secondly, as Levine pointed out, the internal socio-economic conditions in Ethiopia were not similar to what was in Japan in terms of easily adopting European science and technology. The significant initial base of urbanization, centralization of administration and financial sector, and internal stability in Japan were among the reasons that enabled the implementation of the European experience.[300] Thirdly, though allegiance in localized religious traits was visible in both, the two societies are extremely different in terms of the implications of religious diversity and the implications of the values towards modernization. Shinto, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism were the main religions in the former while Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are for Ethiopia.[301]

Fourthly, the pace of modern education expanded and integrated into the state and ~~the~~ in the production process i.e., industrialization was very different as Ethiopia's success lags far behind from Japan. As we shall see, in the coming chapters the Ethiopian economy continued largely agrarian in the 20th-century. Underlining the social and cultural roles of these differences and their effect in absorbing foreign modernity is also necessary. The world view rooted in domestic values in Ethiopia was suspicious towards things coming from abroad labeling them as not authentic, and science was considered as a work of devil or sin.

[300] Dilebo, *Ye-Ethiopia Yegbar Siratina Jimir Capitalism (the Ethiopian Land Tenure and the Infant Capitalism)*
[301] Ibid., 1.

This was evident in the reactions towards imported technological innovations and the beginning of European education. At last, Ethiopia's unfavorable geopolitical realities (encircled by colonizers with no sea outlet) can be cited as one difference that limits its opportunities of importing European modernity elements and benefiting from international trade. However, it cannot be denied that Menelik and Ras Tafari were successful in introducing and expanding modern education, respectively.

5.6. Conclusion

This chapter assessed the dialogue between the domestic features of Ethiopia and the imported elements of European modernity. The results of the process of defensive modernization including the contradictions it created and the achievements it realized are assessed in detail. Moreover, the effect of the assertion of independence and measures under the project of defensive modernization had on the foreign relations of Ethiopians was discussed. Attention was given to how the narrow military-focused modernization objective expanded into the purpose of building a capable state in different aspects. The chapter also assessed the Ethiopian worldview that was founded on domestic religious, cultural, and political features especially as it was expressed in *kibra-Nagast.* In doing so, the chapter has shown the inherent continued interaction between European modernity and domestic features. The chapter also has devoted a huge portion to analyze the advent of European education and its overall effect on the Ethiopian state and society. At last, the chapter has cleared out the modernization model at the beginning of the 20th-century was Europeanization even though the existence of some similar features made the Ethiopian elites obsessed with Japan.

Ethiopia's defensive modernization endeavor pushes us to underline the dilemma it faced in terms of what to select from European modernity and what to maintain from domestic traits. Contributing to this complex scenario was a relatively significant agency the domestic domain played in shaping the state formation process, a strong sense of identity that centrally locate Ethiopia in a global space and time, and the centuries-old monarchial system of governance sustained by a well-founded agrarian political economy. All of which combinedly defied the imposition of European modernity but also became vulnerable and less powerful in the face of European imperialism. In other words, Ethiopia was not a blank page on which European modernity was to be drawn on it freely. Rather, it was a complicated

traditional society in the world that was engulfed by European dominance. Reduced into two, the Orthodox Church and the monarchy coalesced under the ideology of the 'Solomonic' Dynasty were the main domestic and mutually reinforcing agents that determined the path of modernization Ethiopia followed in the 20th-century.

Since the late 19th-century, the threat from European colonial powers posed a serious threat that pushed Ethiopian rulers and the elite to find ways to avoid falling in the hands of these powers. As part of the defensive modernization strategy, the means sought as a solution to avoid European domination was Europeanization, at least adopting some elements of European modernity. However, the attempt to build a state with a European model became limited only with taking superficial measures that could not bring significant change at the ground; rather it concentrated on measures that would not jeopardize the domestic religious, cultural, and political features which emerged as the foundation self-conception of the newly centralized state. Moreover, measures were intended to serve external purposes by creating an impression as if Ethiopia was civilized and the monarch was the center of this advancement. Confidence and allegiance to domestic features were also emboldened by a victory against a European power.

Assertion of independent statehood as the result of the military victory in 1896 against Italian colonial forces was not the end of persistent Italian colonial ambition to colonize Ethiopia. Rather the Battle of Adowa was a starting point of new but different projects for both states. For Italy, it was a time to transform its capacity and to distract Ethiopia's domestic and foreign affairs so that the latter's attempt to affirm its existence could not succeed. For Ethiopia, it was a period of searching for the means that could reinforce its survival in the international system; mainly by building a modern state and by exploiting the relation with great powers. Specifically, to assert its existence in the international system and to avoid the failure of the system internally, defensive modernization was employed with the aim of preserving the political and cultural setting while modernizing the other aspects. This was a foreign policy as it was a domestic one. Beyond being the affairs of Ethiopia's relations, assuring independence took the form of engagement with European modernity for the sake of benefitting from its fruits while avoiding integrating it.

The result of the modernization path on the domestic setting was mixed. To begin with the positive results, the administrative reforms especially with the establishment of the

ministerial system was a turning point. This was important not in terms of its effectiveness, but it served as a steppingstone for the reforms of centralizing government power. The other most important aspect was the education sector. The introduction of modern education and the increasing role of Ethiopians educated abroad who became in close relation with the ruling elite was important in the articulation and implementation of defensive modernization. The education sector gradually became the most valued element of the modernization process next to the military sector. From the intellectuals' side too, they sought to play important role in the Ethiopian state as they needed a leader who could implement the modernization ideas they were envisioned for Ethiopia. Their obsession with the modernization of Japan emanated from this fact.

CHAPTER 6

MODERNIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE LN

This chapter assesses Ethiopia's membership in the LN and how it impacted its modernization agenda. In 1916, two decades after the assertion of the independence of the Ethiopian state against colonialism, the succession problem relatively subsided following the coronation of Menelik's daughter Zewditu as a queen and young Tafari as her regent and crown prince. Zewde pointed out that this was done to accommodate the interest of conservative and progressive groups by assigning two leaders that represent them, respectively.[302] The modernization endeavor of this time, like the previous period, was not only pursued as a domestic necessity but also as part of preventing the colonial interests of Europeans. Moreover, the instrumentality value of modernization can not be oversimplified since a section of the ruling class employed the support of pro-modernization elites and the influence of the modernizer image to target rivals in the conservative camp. The effective exploitation of this scenario is self-evident in *Ras* Tafari's rise to power which was part of the combined exploitation of both internal and foreign domains for consolidation of power especially the engagement with the LN. The LN was established in 1920 following the end of WWI and Ethiopia became one of the member states in 1923: an event that consequently affected not only Ethiopia's domestic and foreign affairs, but also emerged as one of the disasters in the LN following its failure to resolve the Ethio-Italian conflict of 1936.

Before looking at the above scenarios, the chapter begins by assessing the reign of *Lij* Eyasu (r.1913-16) focusing on his initiatives of domestic change and his foreign policy within the context of WWI. The second part of the chapter focuses on how *Ras* Tafari consolidated his power out of the context of instability that was caused by Menelik II's death and *Lij* Eyasu's failure to assert his power. This part of the chapter focuses on the unprecedented centralization of political power at the hands of *Ras* Tafari. Moreover, the legal and administrative reforms, mainly the adoption of the first constitution in 1931 are assessed. The third part of the chapter discusses on the establishment of the LN and its

[302] For Ras-Tafari's initial pro-modernization inclinations see Bahru Zewde, "Hayla-Sellase: From Progressive to Reactionary," *Northeast African Studies* 2, no. 2 (1995): 103-06.

implication on the concept of statehood in comparison with the 19th-century conception of the state and the international system. This section also explores how the Ethiopian membership in the LN was impacted by the civilization standard and how it contributed to the change in the conception of statehood. The fourth section focuses on the nexus between membership in the LN and domestic politics. Moreover, this section focuses on the foreign threat as a continuation of the Tripartite Treaty of 1906. The last two parts of the chapter focus on how the LN handled the Ethio-Italian conflict of 1936 focusing on the responses and Ethiopia's appeal, respectively.

6.1. Ethiopia Under *Lij* Eyasu and WWI

It is difficult to find a coherent modernization policy in such a short reign of *Lij* Eyasu, dates his rule. However, an interesting internal political rivalry that simultaneously took place at the time of WWI brought a shift in domestic politics and foreign relation orientation. *Lij* Eyasu's reign was short but witnessed a major shift both in internal and foreign policy directions. From a foreign policy perspective, the reign of *Lij* Eyasu was a shift from stabilized relation Menelik II built with European colonizers to a new alliance with Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Since peaceful power transition in Ethiopia was a rare event, it was expected that Menelik II's illness might usher another internal power struggle in Ethiopia thereby undermining continuity as a state. The fear was not groundless as European colonizers had arranged how to put Ethiopian territory under their influence without getting into conflict among themselves.

Immediately following Menelik II's health deteriorated, Italy, Britain, and France entered an agreement which is known as the Tripartite Treaty of 1906. The provisions of the treaty sorted out the main interests of the three states and how they would incorporate the territory of Ethiopia with their colonies. Thus, while Britain wanted to merge the source of Blue Nile with Sudan, France was to control the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway which was Ethiopia's main external trade route. Italy's interest was to connect Eritrea with Ethiopian northern province Tigray and to build a railway southwards to Italian Somaliland.[303] This

[303]For details of the Tripartite Treaty of 1906, see Edward C Keefer, "Great Britain, France, and the Ethiopian Tripartite Treaty of 1906," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 13, no. 4 (1981).

shows that despite the international recognition given to Ethiopia as an independent state, survival was still vulnerable.

As his health continued to deteriorate and in the absence of a male heir, Menelik II selected his grandson Iyasu to replace him in 1909. Since *Lij* Eyasu was only 12 years old, *Ras* Tessema Nadew was assigned as his regent. However, *Lij* Eyasu was never coronated as Menelik's wife (Empress Taytu Bitul) continued to decide main governmental issues in the name of her sick husband. Even after the death of Menelik II in 1913, *Lij* Eyasu failed to get the approval of the powerful Shewan aristocracy, principal supporters of the reign of Menelik II, and the church.[304] Then, his reign was internally characterized by confrontation against the Empress and the Shawan aristocracy. He deviated from domestic values that defensive modernization sought to protect by his close alliance with relatively peripheral ethnic groups in Ethiopian politics like the Afar, Somali, Oromos (who were at the periphery of power centers), constructed mosques, even his enemies accused him of converting to Islam.[305]

There was a shift in foreign relations areas too because of *Lij* Eyasu's close relation with Ottoman Turkish Empire and Germany. *Lij* Eyasu made several trips in Afar and Ogaden, Ethiopian territories bordered with Djibouti and French Somaliland, and he was keen on obtaining a gateway to the Red Sea. Especially his visit to French-Somaliland and support to nationalist elements in Italian-Somaliland angered France and Italy. Britain was at war with Ottoman Turkish and German forces to keep Suez Canal under its control and *Lij* Eyasu's close relations with these countries with the intention to secure sea outlets[306] pushed the former to play a leading role in the deposition of *Lij* Eyasu by allying with his domestic enemies.[307] Thus, *Lij* Eyasu faced mortal enemies both internally and externally which worked together and removed him from power in 1916.

Stability during Menelik II was established by entertaining the privileges of the aristocracy and the church. Externally also, the relation he established with European powers

[304] Wolde-Kirkos, *Yehayagnaw Kifle Zemen Mebacha Yezmen Tarik Tizitaye Kayehutina Kesemahut (the Dawn of 20th Century: Things I Remember from What I Have Seen and Heard)*, 127-28.
[305] Zewde, *Ye-Ethiopia Tarik (History of Ethiopia)*, 135.
[306] Ibid., 136-37.
[307] Especially the role of the British diplomat T. E. Lawrence in Harar who went to Addis Ababa and instigated opposition of the Shewan aristocracy and the church is discussed in detail by: Tilahun Birhane-Selassie, *Yehayagnaw Kifle Zemen Ethiopia (the 20th Century Ethiopia)*, vol. I (Addis Ababa: Kurza Priniting press, 2003).

was based on careful exploitation of the rivalry among them and by creating common understanding. This is evident in how he was able to deal with Britain and France amicably by only fighting against Italy. However, this should not be taken as saying Menelik II did not concede to the interest of colonizers that negatively shaped Ethiopia's future. For instance, his recognition of Eritrea as an Italian colony and Djibouti as a French colony left Ethiopia with no sea outlet. Moreover, as we have seen in the previous section, unfair trade treaties that minimized Ethiopia to semi-colonial status show the degree to which he was forced to maintain the interest of colonizers. *Lij* Eyasu failed in the internal power play by antagonizing the strong Shewan aristocracy and the church. His contempt for Menelik's associates was so grave that Wolde-Kirkos said he used to call them *yayatie kilib begoch* (my grandfather's fattened sheep) and prohibited them from accompanying him during campaigns.[308]

Though *Lij* Eyasu confronted his adversaries with the support of his father *Negus* Mikael who was the ruler of Wollo province, he was defeated and put into prison where he dies in unclear circumstances in the 1930s. Bahru Zewde observed that *Lij* Eyasu's modernization efforts are overlooked as he was replaced by *Ras* Tafari, a man with the most durable reign (1916-1974) and lasting influence. The challenges he faced internally and externally hindered him from engaging in meaningful modernization endeavors. However, he had still taken important modernization measures by uprooting barbarous traditional practices that existed at the time. He is also credited for his reforms in the justice sector by aborting *lebashay*, a practice in which an intoxicated child is left in the village and a house where he falls is considered as a thief of something lost. He prohibited *kuragna* which was a practice in which the accuser and the defendant were chained together without consideration of who committed the crime until the final verdict was given. He also introduced ways of regulating government spending or auditing in its rudimentary sense. [309]

Lij Eyasu's reign was brief and domestically controversial, but it should be seen also from regional and international perspectives to grasp his domestic and foreign policies. His desecration of the cultural hegemony set by cultural and religious homogeneity inevitably frustrated the well-established and influential power holders at the time: the Shewan

[308] Wolde-Kirkos, *Yehayagnaw Kifle Zemen Mebacha Yezmen Tarik Tizitaye Kayehutina Kesemahut (the Dawn of 20th Century: Things I Remember from What I Have Seen and Heard)*, 128.
[309] Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974*, 121-22.

aristocracy, a strong base of support foR Menelik, and the church. He lost the support of kingmakers and a powerful legitimacy tool, respectively. The antagonism of Allied Powers gave his domestic rivals a momentum to depose him, especially Britain played the leading role in conspiring with the Shewan base against him.[310] In one sentence, *Lij* Eyasu was removed from power because he failed to either to preserve or successfully modify internal and external arrangements that Menelik II built after the battle of Adowa.

Unfortunately, Eyasu's personal idiosyncrasies are given more attention than his wise move to read the global power constellation and to use it to extend Ethiopia's presence in the Red Sea. As his policies deviated from the tenets of domestic values, his interest in ethnic groups that inhabited Eastern Ethiopia and his close relationship with the Ottomans is only seen from a religious perspective. His intention to secure access to the sea for his land-locked state is not given attention.[311] Though deviations in both areas are undebatable, *Lij* Eyasu's interest in non-Shawan and non-Orthodox Christian cultures which were relatively peripheral to the power center was considered as a threat. Contemporarily, *Lij* Eyasu's move is regarded as an attempt to build an ethnically and religiously inclusive empire. But it is difficult to conclude whether his domestic and foreign policies were deliberate moves as argued by contemporarily religious and ethnic affiliated scholars or whether they are just reactionary following his antagonistic relationship with the aristocracy and the church.

6.2. Modernization and Domestic Politics: The Rise of *Ras* Tafari

The tension between conservative and reformist forces was evident even before the death of Menelik II. As it is mentioned earlier, the coronation of Queen Zewditu (daughter of Menelik II) and *Ras* Tafari as a regent on 27 September 1916 was considered as a compromise reached to represent the interest of *wag-atbaki* (conservatives) and *taramaj* (progressives or reformists). While the reformist block constituted *Ras* Tafari and educated Ethiopians, the conservative block was made up of most of the aristocracy, the Queen, and the clergy. Among the prominent conservative figures were the Minister of Defense *Fitawrari* Habte-Giorgis Dinagidie and another prominent Adowa veteran Aba Wukaw who

[310] Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut, "Great War Intrigues in the Horn of Africa," *The First World War from Tripoli to Addis Ababa (1911-1924)* (2018): 37-58.
[311] Ibid.

was an influential warlord during the reign of Menelik II.[312] Despite his claim as a reformer, *Ras* Tafari by rallying Ethiopians educated abroad and other supporters made the question of modernization as an instrument of internal rivalry by depicting himself as a center of change. In his autobiography, *Ras* Tafari explained the causes of the difference between progressives and conservatives as a mere problem created by people who were engaged in back-biting. He claimed that individuals who were against him were misinforming the Queen and blamed the aristocracy and the clergy for opposing his good intentions to modernize Ethiopia. Accordingly, he mentioned that members of the aristocracy, the clergy combined with the queen resisted his attempt to expand modern education, extract natural resources, and introduce the aviation industry, all of which in collaboration with foreign governments and companies.[313]

Though he was assigned as a regent, he made the Queen a puppet as he was the one who exercised the highest power. He almost completely took government functions at his hands including the authority to create relations with foreigners and the responsibility to conduct foreign relations. According to him, when he was assigned as a regent and a *Ras,* he was conferred with the authority of overseeing overall governmental institutions and activities, to appoint and dismiss military officers, and to decide on cases as the highest judge of the land.[314] Thus, the power of the queen was nominal in the first place. *Ras* Tafari portrayed himself as a progressive leader and there were different actions he performed in this regard. These were his interest in the expansion of European education, achieving membership in LN, the 1924 foreign travel, legal and administrative reforms including the 1931 constitution. Success in these areas helped him which briefly highlighted below helped him to emerge as the most powerful leader in Ethiopian history.

Ethiopians educated abroad and the ruling class was mutually interested to each other from the perspective of modernization. Educated Ethiopians wanted a reformist leader who could implement their vision of reformation so that they would also get a fitting place in the state. Those who were in power wanted it to dominate the domestic power rivalry and to mitigate the external influence with the help of intellectuals.[315] Himself well acquaint with

[312] Zewde Reta, *Ye-Kedamawi Haile-Selassie Mengist (the Government of Emperor Haile-Selassie)* (New Delhi: Laxmi Publisher 2012), 18-47.
[313] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, 1, 36-37.
[314] Ibid., 42-45.
[315] See the second chapter of Paulos Milkias, *Haile Selassie, Western Education, and Political Revolution in Ethiopia* (Cambria Press, 2006).

European education and languages (French and English) by private tutors, *Ras* Tafari became a sponsor and a fatherly figure for educated Ethiopians both domestically and abroad. After the establishment of Tafari Makonnan School in April 1925, he closely followed up the day-to-day activities of the school watching them grow up with the impression of his generosity and power.[316] In a speech made at the inauguration ceremony of the school on 2 May 1925, *Ras* Tafari expressed his vision of establishing a European-styled school as the following.

> "I have seen in Europe the ways in which very many scholars are taught and boarded in great schools. This progressive result has been achieved by the possession of wealth, for which knowledge is the instrument. But however ambitious the desire and intention may be, a great enterprise cannot be carried through all at once. Thus, from small beginnings we shall arrive at great results and benefits for our country."[317]

The visits he usually made at dinner time were combined with gifts given individually for each student thereby creating a mentality of devotion to him. Moreover, he attended the opening and closing of academic semesters, graduation ceremonies, national holidays and his own birthday in the school with the presence of diplomatic delegates and notables. For instance, his 33rd birthday was celebrated on 23 July 1925 in the compound of the school, with students singing a song that praised him as guardian of Ethiopia's unity and agent of modernization.[318] Thus, this period ushered the beginning of a new phase in Ethiopian intellectual history by instilling the idea that put the monarch in the minds of the students as an agent of progress who introduces European modernity.

In addition to commencing of European schools domestically, Ethiopians headed to Europe and other parts of the world to study. Most of the students who got this opportunity were from nobility and affluent families. Their departing and arrival after the study was big news which was the headline of newspapers. They had farewell and welcoming ceremonies in the palace with *Ras* Tafari. They also used to meet and discuss with him during his foreign trips.[319] Since modernization was considered as a foreign entity that should be imported, these students were believed to lead the achievement of this mission. USA, France, and

[316] Richar Pankurst, "The Tafari Makonnen School," https://www.linkethiopia.org/article/the-tafari-makonnen-school/.
[317] Ibid.
[318] Anonymous, "Yseselam Bizatin Yebirhan Mdmek (the Abundance of Peace and Brightness of the Light) " *Berhane'ena Selam* 14 May 1925.
[319] Anonympous, "Leol Ye-Ethiopia Mengist Algawerash Teferi Mekonnen Yetelewel dubet Ken Metasebita Beal " *Berhane'ena Selam* 1925.

Germany were among the main destinations for Ethiopians going abroad to study.[320] However, the cultivation of educated Ethiopians domestically and abroad was also part of the power rivalry. This is because the alliance with the reformers was also meant to consolidate power by eroding the economic and political foundations of the rivals.

Ras Tafari's rise to power was realized through monopolization of all powers that were exploited from the foreign sphere as the result of the inclination towards opening Ethiopia to the outside world. Even though defensive modernization of the third phase detached itself from the obsession with the military areas, it was not ignored. *Ras* Tafari was able to commence modernization of the army in 1917 while he was a regent. In that year, with the help of Belgium, the first modern standing army called Imperial Bodyguard was established. In 1935 with the support of Sweden the first military academy called Holeta Military Academy was established. It is possible to say Haileselassie culminated in the centralization process that has been undergoing by his predecessors. From his coronation until his rule was interrupted by the Italian invasion in 1936, Haileselassie took measures that centralized the Ethiopian state and that eventually gave absolute power to him.[321] However, nothing had a strong impact in bringing Haile-Selassie to the apex of power than his 1924 foreign visit and the 1931 constitution which are discussed below, respectively.

Ethiopia by the efforts of *Ras* Tafari was able to join LN in 1923 which was the first international intergovernmental organization. As we shall see later in this chapter, Ethiopia's engagement in the LN had critical implications on modernization agendas, its survival as an independent state, and its relations with Italy and other European powers. Domestically, as it is discussed in detail later in this chapter, *Ras* Tafari used the success of joining an international organization to build his image as a leader that equated Ethiopia with civilized states at the international stage. He also used the incident to advance restructuring of government administration and to introduce legal measures against the slave trade that was difficult without such precedent. *Ras* Tafari was also the first Ethiopian leader to effectively exploit the fruits of the battle of Adowa in his foreign policy. He used the Adowa victory not only as a leader of a victorious African state against colonialism but also as a son of one

[320]Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century*, 80.
[321]Keller, "Making and Remaking of State and Nation in Ethiopia," 93.

of the generals that led the Ethiopian army at decisive battles that assured Ethiopian independence.[322]

When *Ras* Tafari traveled to Europe in 1924, he was met by an enthusiastic crowd as a young leader who is ambitious to modernize his 'backward' country.[323] This was also one of his tools against his rivals internally as this event boosted his image. Previously, diplomats used to go abroad on behalf of Ethiopian rulers. *Ras* Tafari's visit was the first time for an Ethiopian leader to go abroad for an official visit. Accordingly, his intended visit was opposed by the nobility and the military which forced him to arrange a meeting and convince them of the importance of conducting foreign relations at the level of heads of government. *Ras* Tafari said that he justified visiting civilized states that were ahead of Ethiopia based on its importance to facilitate trade, military, and public relations.[324] Then he did a three-month-long foreign visit in 1924 accompanied by dozens of notables and intellectuals including *Ras* Hailu Teleke-Haimanot, *Ras* Seyoum Menegesha, *Dejazmach* Nadew Aba-Wollo, and others. His first destination was Jerusalem and arranged Ethiopian monasteries then he went to Alexandria. Then the first European city he visited was Paris, travelling back and forth from Paris he visited other five European states including Italy.[325]

Ras Tafari's interest in visiting Europe was the result of his father's travel to France for the coronation of King Edward VI in 1902. As one of the generals that led the war at the battle of Adowa, *Ras* Mekonnen was warmly received by the French government and the public alike.[326] In his autobiography, he also mentioned that his father was very much interested in the civilization of Europe and in foreign languages. He claimed that his trip was the result of the invitation that he received from the governments of France, Italy, Britain, Belgium, Greece, and Egypt and he described the aim of the travel was looking at the prosperity of these countries and to learn a lesson that would help Ethiopia's modernization efforts. More specifically, he mentioned three objectives that he wanted to achieve as a result of his visit. Firstly, he expressed his excitement about the visit because he wanted to see the beauty and prosperity of European states and their cities which he was familiarized with in

[322] His father *Ras* Makonnan Wolde-Mikael who was a cousin of Menelik II was one of the generals in the war against Italy and he was the ruler of Harar province until his death in 1906.
[323] Boris Monin, "The Visit of Rās Tafari in Europe (1924): Between Hopes of Independence and Colonial Realities" (paper presented at the Annales d'Éthiopie, 2013), 385.
[324] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, 1, 63.
[325] Monin, "The Visit of Rās Tafari in Europe (1924): Between Hopes of Independence and Colonial Realities," 384-85.
[326] Ibid., 383.

his studies. Secondly, he wanted to look at the advancement of Europe in different areas personally and to try to replicate at least one of them domestically. Thirdly, he mentioned discussing with European states the possibilities of getting access to the sea.[327]

The three European powers that had colonial establishments in East Africa were central in his visit for the sake of negotiating with them so that Ethiopia could get a sea gateway. Thus, sea outlet and averting future foreign threats gave *Ras* Tafari's visit two interrelated main objectives that were also linked with the efforts of building a modern state infrastructure. Access to the sea could serve as a gateway for importing foreign civilization, the necessity to modernize, and to establish close friendship aimed at sustaining independence. Though the objective to get a sea outlet was not materialized after the negotiation,[328] the visit was a landmark that ushered the trend *Ras* Tafari's dominant place in the domestic political landscape and internationally. The reason we need to give huge importance to this trip is because of two reasons. Firstly, seen from the perspective of internal power struggle, the visit made *Ras* Tafari an undisputed Ethiopian leader internationally which also was internally used by him to emerge as the central figure of the reformist voices. By doing so, the visit earned him the support of reforming Ethiopians. Second, the visit determined *Ras* Tafari's perception of the foreign sphere. It made him be passionately interested in the lifestyle and power of European rulers which he tried to do the same in Ethiopia.

Following the death of Queen Zewditu on 2 April 1930, *Ras* Tafari was crowned as "the Conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I, King of Kings, Lord of Lords, Elect of God"[329] on 2 November 1930. He was accorded with the title of King in 1928 and the death of the Queen formalized his authority that he was exercising since 1916. Ethiopia became a constitutional monarchy with the adoption of the first Constitution on 16 July 1931. The reestablishment of the ministerial system after the abolition of the first cabinet in 1917 was also another important development. The foreign ministerial post which was exercised by the Crown Prince was assigned to *Blattengeta* Hiruy

[327] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, 1, 57-60.
[328] Monin, "The Visit of Rās Tafari in Europe (1924): Between Hopes of Independence and Colonial Realities," 386-89.
[329] Official title of Emperor Haile-Selassie.

Wolde-Selassie this time.[330] According to Zewde, the coronation involved a lavish ceremony attended by foreign representatives including France, Britain, and Italy. This extravagant ceremony unseen in the coronation of his predecessors is regarded as the result of his taste of the luxurious lifestyle of the rulers he observed during his visit to Europe in 1924.[331]

Was this a radical shift in Ethiopian political history? The answer is yes, but the vision of creating a centralized government was already there since the 19th-century. Haile-Selassie followed the dreams of Tewodros II. Taking a lesson from the disastrous end of the latter attempt to eliminate the power of provincial kings, Yohannes IV and Menelik II had followed a compromising approach. Haile-Selassie followed the example of Menelik II when he protected the economic privileges of the nobility, the difference was he deprived their political power through a constitution. Unlike Tewodros II, Haile-Selassie did not totally rely on using force to centralize government power, as he was able to use legal measures. He used the constitution of 1931 to achieve three purposes. Firstly, the constitution granted the right to rule Ethiopia only for him and his family thereby solving succession rivalries which had been one of the major features of Ethiopian politics. Secondly, as we shall see below, he addressed the problem of provincialism taking the right to appoint provincial rulers to himself. At last, he tried to mitigate Ethiopia's uniqueness in the international system by portraying it as a civilized state.

The 1930 Constitution of Ethiopia was similar to Japan's 1889 Constitution. As it is mentioned earlier, Japan held a central place in the minds of Ethiopian leaders and intellectuals of the time. In 1930, a Japanese mission was invited for Haile-Selassie's coronation which also signed a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship. From November-December 1931, the Ethiopian diplomatic mission led by the then Foreign Minister *Bilattengeta* Hiruy Wolde-Selassie visited Japan with the aim of encouraging the latter to have diplomatic seat in Addis Ababa, to request military support, and to strengthen trade relations. The same year witnessed the zenith of Japan's place in Ethiopia's quest for modernization with the adoption of the constitution of Ethiopia modeled from theConstitution of the Meiji Dynasty. The constitution provided that "supreme power rest

[330] It is a widely held roomer that Haile-Selassie got the Queen murdered. Zewde Reta one of his closest aides says he could not get tangible evidence for this allegation. See, Reta, *Ye-Kedamawi Haile-Selassie Mengist (the Government of Emperor Haile-Selassie)* 3.
[331] Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974*, 139-40.

on the hands of the Emperor"[332] and created a bi-cameral parliament-the Chamber of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Members of the former were to be appointed by the emperor among big men that such as ministers, judges, army officers, and princes. The Constitution stated that since the people could not elect, members of the Chamber of Deputies were to be elected by the nobilities and notables. Despite this arrangement, the Constitution clearly stated it out that the highest power was to be exercised by the emperor who was claimed to be "descendant of King Sahle-Selassie, whose line descends without interruption from the dynasty of Menelik I, son of King Solomon of Jerusalem and the Queen of Ethiopia, known as the Queen of Sheba".[333] The way the personality and power of the emperor were expressed was as the following:

> "By virtue of his imperial blood, as well as by the anointing he has received the person of the emperor is sacred, his dignity is invaluable and his power indisputable. He is consequently entitled to all the honors due to him in accordance with tradition and the present Constitution. The law decrees that anyone so bold as to seek to injure His Majesty the Emperor will be punished."[334]

There were direct similarities between the constitution of the Meiji Dynasty and its Ethiopian counterpart. The legitimization of the rule of the royal families, the power provided to the emperor, and the establishment of two houses are among the similarities. Among the differences is the Meiji constitution provides that members of the lower house were to be elected by the people and grants religious freedom (though practically Shintoism was playing a significant role in state life as Orthodox Christianity did in the case of Ethiopia). Though the two constitutions had the same seven chapters, the Ethiopian constitution was relatively compact since it avoided details in different spheres. The adoption of the 1931 constitution was the expression of the final defeat of conservative forces and their opposition against the introduction of modernization measures. However, the success in consolidating internal power was not repeated in consolidating Ethiopia's survival in the international system. The progress of the progressives was only an instrument accumulating domestic power rather than bringing radical socio-economic and military advancements even as it was understood in defensive modernization projects. Though the nationalist

[332] The 1931 Constitution of Ethiopia, article 2.
[333] Ibid, article 3.
[334] Ibid, article 5.

discourse denies it Ethiopia's existence as an independent state ceased to exist in 1936 because of the second Italian invasion.

Moreover, the extent to which the constitution framed the power of Haile-Selassie and the right of his family is one of the main points of criticism against the attempt to create a constitutional monarchy. The progressive inclination of Haile-Selassie and his alliance with intellectuals who sought modernization is regarded as an aborted project that ended with legalizing of the absolute power of an emperor. For instance, Kebede, criticized constitutionalizing of the exclusive right of Haile-Selassie's descendants for terminating the competition that existed within the 'Solomonic' Dynasty. For Kebede, Ethiopia is a center of Ethiopian history, and the amplification of the emperor more than the Ethiopian nationhood was not acceptable.[335] In other words, Haile-Selassie's dominance in Ethiopia was regarded as similar to the actions of King Louis XIV of France. Haile-Selassie promoted his power to the level of thinking Ethiopia's fate was dependent on him. Like King Louis XIV of France, Haile-Selassie reached the extent of thinking "I am the state, and the state is me". Zewde also mentions that this conviction of him is evident in a discussion he made with Tekle-Hwariat Tekle-Mariam. Haile-Selassie said the fate of Ethiopia is dependent on him and there was nothing called Ethiopia that somebody could envision without putting him at the center of her existence.[336]

6.3. The LN and the Civilization Criteria of Statehood

As we have seen in chapter two, the Eurocentric interpretation of world history founded on Enlightenment values utilized the European experience as a frame of reference to judge other societies as inferior or barbarian. Accordingly, the interaction between Europe and other societies was inevitably accompanied by the question of acceptable civilizational standards for equal treatment. As Gerrit Gong pointed out, Europe had imposed its standards on other societies both peacefully and violently. European values were disseminated into non-European societies not only by military confrontation but also through a reconceptualization of ideas as the result of the interactions with Europe, including concepts of what constituted power and good life. He added that though the military superiority of

[335] Kebede, "The Ethiopian Conception of Time and Modernity," 8.
[336] Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century*, 170.

Europe was inescapable, irreversible changes were already brought by Europe-imported diseases, religion, and concepts.[337]

Hobson also observed that since the European state system evolved out of the historical process of the 16th and 17th-centuries, it gradually penetrated other regions and societies with powerful ideational and material forces. Hobson added that the problem in this process was that the expansion was not a benevolent inter-civilizational exchange. The rise of Europe was accompanied by the formation of a racist identity that played a significant role in building European military and economic power and was later used to justify imperialist imposition on other societies. This was expressed in the designation of non-European societies as "uncivilized" or "barbarian" that must have taken out of ignorance and backwardness with European intervention.[338] As it is indicated in chapter two, the problem with Eurocentric interpretation of history is it presents European history as the history of the world and expects other societies to welcome reconfiguration according to the European experience. This perception had undeniably affected the interaction of Europe with societies in other regions including in bringing the colonization process thereby affecting the characters of the states and the nature of the international system. The end of the 19th-century witnessed the peak of the stratification of the international system that motivated Europe to subjugate other regions into colonialism. Though underlying political and economic motives are undeniable, the imposition of European political, cultural, and other values was justified by the 'white man's burden' to civilize others mainly involving Christianizing and 'modernizing' them. This positively connoted conception of colonization presents it as a generous project of emancipating other societies from barbarianism. This was expressed in the designation of non-European societies as 'uncivilized' or "barbarian" that must have taken out of ignorance and backwardness with European intervention.

The Ethiopian experience triggers us to ask important questions regarding how it confronted European modernity despite a military victory that averted colonialism. This includes the endeavors to make Ethiopia in line with the requirements of the LN and the international system by reconfiguring its internal features. As it is indicated in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the interaction was rather complex since non-European societies had

[337] Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford Clanden Press, 1984), 97-100.
[338] Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010*, 219.

their lenses through which they saw themselves and others. However, no matter the extent non-European societies viewed their settings as civilized and the degree to which they are committed to defending their values, they preferred adopting some elements of their powerful adversary like what Ethiopia tried to do under the project of defensive modernization. For instance, one of the limitations in the process of defying the power of science was, as it happened in Ethiopia's case, the lack of other sources of power that was equivalent or superior to European modernity that can be used for self-defense and survival. Thus, despite the problem with the notion that regards science as solely European property which denies the contribution of other societies, its instrumental importance in imposing civilizational standards cannot be denied. Thus, the interaction with the foreign realm became focused on avoiding confrontation against it, and if it is possible, to domesticate and own it. As a continuation of defensive modernization, the Ethiopian state in the interwar period followed the same suit. It is important to ask here whether civilizational standards that existed in the 19th-century changed with the establishment of the LN and the implication of full membership of non-European states, the recognition of states like Ethiopia as peers to European states.

The LN has brought new norms aimed at guiding relations between states including the right of minorities and the right to self-determination. These new norms were concerned with territories that were under the control of defeated powers of WWI. However, since Allied Powers mainly Britain and France, continued their colonial design, the application of these norms was not uniform. Compared to the international system that came to existence under the auspices of the UN, the world after WWI under the LN was characterized by inconsistency about the concept of statehood. Moreover, the Covenant of the LN itself provided inconsistent and conditional criteria regarding the status granted to the societies which were previously under the control of defeated powers. Article 22 of the Covenant of the LN described these societies as "peoples [that are] not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and provided that arrangements based on the principle of "sacred trust of civilization".[339]

The arrangement made was a mandate of different types based on "the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic

[339] League of Nations, *The Covenant of the League of Nations*, vol. 3 (World Peace Foundation, 1920), Article 22.

conditions and other similar circumstances". Based on this the Covenant provided some people that were under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire needed only "administrative advice" while it proposed direct administration by "advanced nations" on others until they can face "the modern world by themselves". Thus, the people of South-West Africa and South Pacific Islands were to be an extension of the territories of "advanced nations".[340] Accession in the LN was shaped by post-war settlements. Accordingly, states that participated in the Paris Peace Conference were original members. Except those peoples residing in areas listed as enemy territories, membership to others was open based on invitation by great powers and after deliberation of a body of LN known as Sixth Committee and vote of the assembly. In another body known as the Fifth Committee, the adopted questionnaire that was used to assess characters included the existence of recognition by other states, the nature of the government and territory, the status of autonomous rule, and the capacity to fulfill international obligations especially the requirement of the LN on armaments.[341] These were additional requirements that are related to the contents of the Covenant but represent an expanded form of standard to be accepted as an eligible member of the international system.

Thus, there is a direct link between colonialism and civilization standards in that both the emergence and demise of colonialism were related to the conception of civilization. While colonialism was justified by a 'civilizing' mission, its end also required deconstruction of the view that considered non-European societies as inferior at least by those who were under the domination. Before the decolonization process got momentum, the end of WWI and the establishment of the LN presented opportunities for Ethiopia and other non-European states to become viable members of the international society. However, both the provisions of the Covenant and implicit practical requirements of the time that were imposed civilization criteria of different sorts. Generally, the LN brought a new but inconsistent context in which states were recognized in the international system thereby affecting their interactions too. As Megan Donaldson observed, the post-WWI era witnessed "construction of new political and territorial orders, grounded in sometimes conflicting logics of historic right, self-determination on national or ethnic affiliation, and plebiscitary democracy; but

[340] Ibid.
[341] Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*, 126-29.

inflected too by power politics".[342] However, it cannot be denied that like full membership of post-colonial states gained in the UN in the post-WWII era, the LN enabled to give recognitions to weak states like Ethiopia and Haiti with no capacity to affirm their continuous existence by themselves. Thus, the establishment was a critical move as it triggered the place of weak states within it and their relations with European imperial powers to be questioned. Though the standards of civilization were not as detailed and coherent as the pre-WWII international system, the LN brought both explicit (by the Covenant) and implicit (the practice of major powers) criteria of statehood. The next section gives a closer look at Ethiopia's process of accession in the LN shows that civilization criteria were the major point of debate.

The question of whether Ethiopia qualifies to join the LN was directly related to its domestic conditions. Ethiopia's attempt to assert its vulnerable but devotedly pursued independent existence through membership in an international organization is a pertinent case to reflect on the concept of statehood and the nature of the international system during the interwar period. Though independent in principle, Ethiopia was practically an outsider to a family of 'civilized' states.[343] Thus, the complication that occurred within the accession process demonstrates features that states were required to possess for their existence to be tolerated in the international system at the time. Socio-economically underdeveloped, militarily weak, and racially black, but the only African state free from colonization, Ethiopia was a challenging entity to fit into the standards of international legal and political conditions of the time. Ethiopia was not under the absolute domination of colonial powers, and it was not free from interventions in its domestic affairs including full-scale occupation threats. Surrounded by powerful European powers, the urgency from the Ethiopian side was realizing defensive modernization by asserting independence by rapid internal reconfiguration and by exploring advantages in the foreign domain. But the feeling towards Ethiopia was mixed in that despite Christianity and continually preserved independence, equal treatment at the international level was by far less probable. Regarding Ethiopia's existence as an independent state, Gong observed:

> "the Abyssinia question was … dilemma faced by the nineteenth and early twentieth--century international lawyers. Was it better to apply international

[342] Megan Donaldson, "The League of Nations, Ethiopia, and the Making of States," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 11, no. 1 (2020): 6.
[343] Ibid., 1.

> law universally by making all states its subjects, or to limit its scope to only those countries which fulfilled the standard of civilization"[344]

Ethiopia's membership in the LN, realized in 1923, was not only an extraordinary achievement domestically, but it was also unintended by great powers. As Donaldson pointed out, Britain and Italy had agreed in 1919 not to allow Ethiopia, in the international organization that was set to be established as part of the Versailles Treaty. The US also did not anticipate Ethiopia to be part of the family of 'civilized' nations.[345] Seen from the standard of civilization that used to guide relations among states in the 19th-century, Ethiopia's joining to the LN was an obvious deviation. Though there were several non-European states like Liberia and Haiti among members of the LN, the colonial attempt Ethiopia averted and the continuing threat even after it assured its independence by foreign forces proves this truth. The support it received from European powers including Italy once after the accession process started is also intriguing. Zewde Reta, who was the Ethiopian Ambassador in Italy in the post-WWII era argued that Italy supported Ethiopia's membership after it realized that its opposition could not hinder the process.[346]

Normally, the accession process into the LN involved an open debate on whether candidate states satisfy the requirement to be full members. It is this process that brought the discussion on civilization criteria that states like Ethiopia was expected to fulfill. France took the leading role in inviting Ethiopia to the LN though at the level of observatory status. Ras Tafari took the opportunity to make a formal membership request which was unanimously approved in August 1923. The French initiative was seen by Britain as an attempt to use Ethiopia against British colonies in East Africa. In Britain, Ethiopia's quest for membership in the LN was debated in relation to its effect on the global campaign against slavery. The dominant view in Britain was the realizing of Ethiopia's membership would help to free slaves in Ethiopia and modernization of the country even with the support of foreign powers.[347] Though Ethiopia joined the LN with a unanimous vote in 1923, two requirements were imposed: to end illegal arms trade and slavery.[348] The first requirement that triggered questions on the status of Ethiopia's statehood was the absence of a monopoly of coercive

[344] Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*, 126.
[345] Donaldson, "The League of Nations, Ethiopia, and the Making of States," 6.
[346] Zewde Reta, *Ye-Kedamawi Haile-Selassie Mengist (the Government of Emperor Haile-Selassie) [in Amharic]* (New Delhi: Laxmi Publisher 2012), 83-93.
[347] Donaldson, "The League of Nations, Ethiopia, and the Making of States," 14-15.
[348] Antoinette Iadarola, "Ethiopia's Admission into the League of Nations: An Assessment of Motives," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 8, no. 4 (1975): 611.

means under a central authority. We have seen that fierce power rivalry was a defining character of domestic politics in Ethiopia. Rivalries to assume the title of king of kings among rulers of provinces were common. This feature coupled with the absence of modern state infrastructure that could facilitate mobilization and communication, the influence of central administration in geographically remote areas was minimal. In this regard what the LN required from Ethiopia was one of the major tenets of sociological state conception: centralization of coercive apparatus under the control of the state. In other words, the LN was seeking what the ruling class in Ethiopia was pursuing but failed: establishing a strong central government.

Linked with the ability of the state to exercise sovereignty within the territory under its jurisdiction, other requirements were also presented to challenge Ethiopia's membership was control of arms trafficking. We have seen that the fall of the Mediterranean and Red Sea regions under the control of colonialist powers in the 19th-century had made it difficult for Ethiopian rulers and competitors of power to import weapons very difficult which forced them to rely on irregular actors that smuggle arms into the region. This problem was exacerbated by the absence of a sea outlet which in turn made Ethiopia the destination of the illegal arms trade. The ability to control illegal firearms trading is one of the issues the Fifth Committee investigates before it sends the application for membership to the Assembly for approval. According to Jean Allain, the Committee concluded that Ethiopia's application was in order, recognized by several states, and constituted a well-defined border. But the Committee questioned Ethiopia's status as a self-governing state on the ground of lack of assertion of central power over the provinces. As part of fulfilling international obligations, Ethiopia was made to declare to obey treaties on the abolishment of slavery.[349] The issue of self-governance indicates the level of asserted governance within the borders of the territory: whether the government can control non-state actors within its boundary. This also directly affects the requirement for the government to monopolize coercive means since the illegally traded firearms may give rivals to challenge the state.

But nothing was a more serious obstacle against Ethiopia's membership like the problem of the slave trade did. Slavery and dire socio-economic conditions were also part of the debate in the LN about Ethiopia's status as a state. While the possible flow of resources

[349] Jean Allain, "Slavery and the League of Nations: Ethiopia as a Civilised Nation," *Journal of the History of International Law/Revue d'histoire du droit international* 8, no. 2 (2006): 219-23.

and knowledge were to be taken as advantages to facilitate the transformation of political and socio-economic conditions, preconditions were serious challenges as it was impossible to meet those demands in a short time. As it is evident in the speech made by a British thinker and politician Lord Noel-Buxton at Chatham House on 23 May 1932, Ethiopia's internal overall traits were regarded as exploitative and uncivilized that must be reformed. The embeddedness of slavery and slave trade in all spheres of life including in the religious practices was by far severe in comparison with other states that were yet to abolish slavery. Moreover, ending the exploitative features of the *gebbar* system and effectively integrating the territory of the state under central administration were among the issues that determined negative perceptions about Ethiopia.[350] The preconditions that Ethiopia was expected to fulfill to be eligible to the family of states prove that the existence of civilizational criteria despite the formation of an international intergovernmental organization. Thus, the evolving international system was the expansion of the European state system that imposed its Eurocentric barrier internationally hindering other societies from being a free actor within it. Even colonization, the apex of European subjugation of other societies, was claimed as a civilization mission.

Though Europeans were entrepreneurs of the cross-continental slave trade, this time they brought it as an expression of civilization that a member of the LN should not be in contact with. The Slave trade was presented as an expression of Ethiopia's barbarism. It was the major issue that made Ethiopia connected with the standard of civilization. It is indicated that at the beginning of the 20th-century that slavery was a widespread economic and social phenomenon. In his autobiography, Haile-Selassie also expressed the fact that slavery was widely practiced despite his predecessors' attempt to discourage it by formulating proclamations. About the failed attempts of Ethiopian rulers to abolish slavery he noted that Emperors Tewodros, Yohannes, and Menelik had adopted different decrees against slavery and the slave trade, but because of the deep rootedness of the practice and the vastness of the territory to supervise, slavery was a problem that continued unabated.[351]

In March 1924, Ethiopia adopted regulations that aimed at ending the slave trade. However, the issue of slavery continued to be a point of contention in the relation between

[350] Lord Noel-Buxton, "Slavery in Abyssinia," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 11, no. 4 (1932).
[351] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, vol. 1 (Addis Ababa: Berhanen'ena Selam Printing Press, 1959), Biography, 46-54.

Ethiopia and the LN which was evident in the establishment of the Temporary Slavery Commission which was set to investigate the status of slavery in Ethiopia. The finding of the Commission acknowledged Ethiopia's efforts to end slavery and expressed the difficulties to accomplish it in a short time. The case of Ethiopia was taken as a lesson in the LN to put commitment to abolish slavery as one of the prerequisites expected from candidate states. In 1926, the LN adopted a Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery and Ethiopia's name continued to be coined with slavery in the process of preparing and adopting the convention. In 1931, a new body of Experts on Slavery was established in the LN to work on states like Liberia. To avoid further problems, Ras Tafari asked the British Anti-Slavery Society to support Ethiopia's efforts of ending slavery. The involvement of the Society and the understanding reached to end slavery in two decades saved Ethiopia from another contention on this issue.[352]

Regarding the need for domestic reform and the requirements of the LN, Ethiopian rulers knew that it would create a problem for Ethiopia if it failed to improve itself. Therefore, requirements expected from Ethiopia in terms of reforming different domestic practices were not unexpected. Once after Ethiopia's application started to be a point of debate, rather than denying the membership on the ground of Ethiopia's backwardness, the trend became to push intervention in Ethiopia to implement projects of modernization sponsored by the LN.[353] Thus, slavery and lack of modern state features should not be seen only from their effect on Ethiopia's membership application since they were employed to justify a new type of relations between Ethiopia and foreigners. The conclusion seems that Ethiopia was unable to transform the retardation by itself and European powers should do it so that it could fulfill the standards of a modern state. The problem with this approach was the lack of guarantee that these powers might it as a pretext to advance their colonial ambitions.

As we shall see later in this chapter, the state of the LN 'barbarism' that it claimed to exist in Ethiopia was a major argument of Italy in its attempt to justify its intent to control Ethiopia when the LN was attempting the conflict between the two states. Features of Ethiopia's politics, socio-economic, cultural, and legal aspects were labeled by Italy as the expression of barbarousness. Thus, the establishment of the LN also had brought powerful

[352] Allain, "Slavery and the League of Nations: Ethiopia as a Civilised Nation," 233-34.
[353] Donaldson, "The League of Nations, Ethiopia, and the Making of States," 13-14.

states mainly European colonizers and poor states like Ethiopia in into one stage. Thus, friction was inevitable when states with such disparity of capacity come together. Though Europe was a latecomer in terms of embracing Christianity and in terms of developing a sophisticated civilization, it did not prevent it from designating societies with a glorious past like Ethiopia. Christianity entered Ethiopia in the 4th -century and Islam made its way through with the immigration of followers and family members of Prophet Muhammed to escape prosecution. Ethiopia had also a literate civilization that had trade and other forms of interaction with other civilizations. Christianity has shaped Europe's attitude towards Ethiopia. If there was one thing that was considered as civilized, it was Christianity. We have seen that the legend of Prester John played a role in the involvement of Portugal by the side of the Christian monarchs of Ethiopia. This sympathy continued in the 20th-century and rulers continued to depict Ethiopia as a "Christian Island" surrounded by enemies, in their attempt to be free from colonization and to earn Europe's support. The letter of application for membership in the LN also cited this justification to claim Ethiopia deserved to be a member of civilized states.

6.4. The Domestic Aspect and Continued Trouble of the Tripartite Treaty

Like other main issues that connected Ethiopia with the outside world, membership to the LN was immediately a subject of debate between conservatives and progressives. For members of the progressive group, since they were happy in close relations with foreigners, joining the LN was regarded as a steppingstone to bring Ethiopia as a peer with developed states. From Ethiopia's internal perspective, joining the LN was a remarkable victory for the progressive group which sought to open Ethiopia to the outside world. The event can be taken as a move from suspicion and fear of the external sphere to increased interest in integrating with foreigners. Though Ethiopia did not take part in the war, Ras Tafari expressed that he had intended to participate in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.[354] Wolde-Kirkos tells us that after discussing with his immediate circle, *Ras* Tafari sent a Telegram message to Secretary of the LN, Sir Eric Dromond, on 01 August 1923 expressing interest to join the LN. After a week, a formal letter that made a formal request to join the LN was sent. The letter presented Ethiopia as an ancient Christian civilization surrounded by non-Christian enemies. In the letter, Ras Tafari tried also to detach Ethiopia's connections

[354] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, 55.

with defeated powers and denounced *Lij* Eyasu's move to change Ethiopia's internal and foreign policies as a dangerous move that could have led to conflict with neighboring governments (colonizers of the adjacent regions). Moreover, it mentioned Ethiopia's successes in commencing modernization projects and expressed interest to continue to integrate domestic systems of governance with the European model. Expecting possible serious opposition from conservative groups, Ras Rafari opted to convince the Queen first. The Queen summoned influential figures and explained it would be very important to be a member of an association of civilized states and expressed that membership would not affect the long-lived religious and political settings. By doing this, he avoided confrontation against conservatives.[355]

More than any other objectives, the opportunity of joining the LN was taken as a guarantee to avoid threats of colonialism. Though Ethiopia was recognized globally as an independent state following its victory against Italy in 1896, the independence was the only nominal as it was evident in different aspects. The first aspect was related to the interests and actions of colonial powers. Colonial powers signed treaties that could determine Ethiopia's fate as a state in the absence of the latter. The Tripartite Treaty signed between Italy, Britain, and France in 1906 is the most serious one in this regard. Ethiopia was indeed concluding treaties with European and other states, but it did not imply Ethiopia was treated as a peer and full member of civilized states since the contemplation of how to scramble its territory continued.

Second, Ethiopia was forced to accept unfair commercial treaties that gave extended privileges to Europeans and their companies. From the economic perspective, Ethiopia's status can be regarded as semi-colonialism. The control of the Ethio-Djibouti railway by France, the role of Britain in the trade of Western and Southern Ethiopia demonstrated this fact. Ethiopia's acceptance of Europeans' economic advantages without direct colonization, was partly taken as profitable by European as it allowed them to secure their economy without incurring costs of colonial administration. Generally, though great powers had recognized Ethiopia's independence practically it was not meaningful as they had engaged in actions that compromise Ethiopia's ability to act freely. Added with limitations in internal capacities, it is possible to see the extent of the foreign challenge against the continuity of

[355] Mersi'e-Hazen Wolde-Kirkos, *Yehayagnaw Kifle Zemen Mebacha Yezmen Tarik Tizitaye Kayehutina Kesemahut (the Dawn of 20th Century: Things I Remember from What I Have Seen and Heard),* 252-253.

the Ethiopian state. This makes it clear the importance accorded to joining the LN. Ethiopia's expectation about the LN was very high especially regarding its potential in preventing confrontation with colonizers. In his autobiography, *Ras* Tafari expressed his belief that the establishment of the LN was important to bring order in the relationship between states. He was hopeful that after the LN, powerful states would not invade and impose reparations on weak states. He added that he learned this from discussions with foreign diplomats and nationals who were residing in Addis Ababa.[356] Since he knew the weakness and vulnerability of Ethiopia's independence, it is not surprising that he considered the establishment of the LN as a good opportunity to assert Ethiopia's independence by international action.

Even though Ethiopia was an independent state since 1896, it was limited at the rhetoric level since its independence was practically violated in different aspects. The most serious threat against Ethiopia's independence was posed by the continued interest of European powers who had colonial establishments surrounding Ethiopia. This threat was expressed in the Tripartite Treaty signed in 1906 among Britain, France, and Italy; and continued to haunt Ethiopia until the 1930s. The provisions of the Tripartite Treaty also reveal the fear of the danger the three powers wanted to alleviate in case they unilaterally acted to secure their interest following possible disturbance of Ethiopia's internal conditions. Avoiding the clash between colonial powers provided in this Treaty was a continuation of the clash between France and Britain that occurred in their rivalry to scramble African territories. The two powers had signed the Entente Agreement signed in 1904 for the sake of avoiding conflict of interest between them. Though the Agreement dealt with the conflict of interests between the two states in Europe and other parts of the world, the immediate cause was the conflict at Fashoda (which is referred as the Fashoda Incident) that occurred following the interest of France to control Sudan.[357] The Tripartite Treaty prohibited each of the three states from interfering in the internal affairs of Ethiopia and expressed their commitment to preserving the territorial integrity of Ethiopia. Seen from this perspective, cognizant of conflicting interests over Ethiopia, the Treaty seems aimed at leaving Ethiopia as a buffer zone that prevents confrontation among the three European powers. But below that, it put the common interest of the three states the precondition to interfere in Ethiopia.

[356] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion),* 55.
[357] Edward Keefer, "Great Britain, France, and the Ethiopian Tripartite Treaty of 1906." *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-80.

Accordingly, the Treaty included specific interests of the parties, Britain took the western part of Ethiopia to build a dam on Lake Tana, Italy was set to connect Eritrea and Italian-Somaliland, and France was provided the area where the Ethiop-Djibouti railway passes through.[358]

Ethiopia under the rule of Menelik II has agreed not to interrupt the flow of the Nile (known as Abay in Ethiopia) including its tributaries and the Sobat River which flows towards Sudan and Egypt. While Ethiopia was to be entitled to yearly payments for this, Britain has also requested to build a dam in Ethiopia to it as a reservoir during dry seasons. Haile-Selassie stated that during his trip to Europe in 1924 Prime Minister Macdonald requested the implementation of the agreement on the Nile River. But Haile-Selassie proposed the assessment of possible effects of the dam by experts from a country of his choice, a plan which was accepted by the British government. Accordingly, a US company was selected to do the investigations.[359] As we will see later in this chapter this has brought the US to the hydro politics in East Africa. However, the agreement between Britain and Ethiopia to invite the US companies was not welcome by Italy. Thus, Italy initiated a dialogue and concluded another agreement with Britain that asserted its prior interest agreed by parties to the Tripartite Treaty and revolted against any new arrangement. In the agreement, Britain affirmed the Italian interest provided in the Tripartite Treaty was not subject to discussion with Ethiopia. Rather, the contact with the Ethiopian government was presented as a cautionary move to prevent possible intervention by the non-signatory state to the Tripartite Treaty. Like the Tripartite Treaty, the new agreement asserted how the colonial powers would continue to integrate Ethiopia's resources and trade with their colonies. The agreement allowed Italy to build a railway that connects its colony of Eritrea in the North and Italian-Somaliland in the South and granted the train route as her economic zone. Ethiopia was treated as a colony of Italy. Though it mentions the existence of the Ethiopian government several times, it proposes agreements with Italy regarding the use of water resources in mainland Ethiopia. The interests of colonial powers were not designed to take effect only if Ethiopia's internal status quo was disturbed. Rather these claims were

[358] Harold Marcus, "A Preliminary History of the Tripartite Treaty of December 13, 1906." *Journal of Ethiopian Studies* 2, no. 2 (1964): 28-34.
[359] Getachew Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*. Algora Publishing, 2009: 28-31.

expected to be maintained even with the continuation of Ethiopia's statehood, justifying protectorate status by their own respective in tests and the need to modernize Ethiopia.

This was taking place almost three decades after the culmination of Ethiopia's state formation and while it was recognized as a full member of the LN. Though Ethiopia was recognized as an independent state and it has secured a membership in the LN, an agreement like the above is the expression of the limitations of its independence. To avoid possible implementation of the Tripartite Treaty, the Ethiopian government expressed its dissatisfaction regarding the reviving interest from Britain and Italy. After the two countries notified the LN regarding their agreement over Ethiopia, Ethiopia expressed its concern to LN. Ethiopia's letter to the LN complained that Britain and Italy had no right to enter into an agreement that would jeopardize the interest of another free member of the LN and requested an explanation from the two governments. The response from the two governments through their diplomats in Addis Ababa communicated separately to Ethiopia affirmed their interest to divide and integrate with their colonies. Despite they did not explicitly provide Ethiopia would cease to exist, the plan's severe implication for Ethiopia's independence was clear.

The move of the two states to revive the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty shows Ethiopia's hope for equal treatment and prevention of foreign threats evaporated in the face of such direct threats. This fact was plainly expressed by Ethiopia when takes the matter to the LN. Ethiopia said, "when we were allowed to join the League, we were told all government are equal, independence of government would be protected, and its ultimate purpose was said be promoting and sustain peace globally." Knowing that the move by foreign states is on the ground of expanding civilization, Ethiopia expressed the inappropriateness of such like agreements since it has started to modernize its internal conditions step by step; and asserted the need to be given sufficient time to transform its domestic socio-economic conditions. Moreover, Ethiopia expressed it would not accept such-like arrangements even though they are presented as purely economic matters; expressing that economic and political issues are intertwined. [360]

After the British and Italian governments notified the LN that their agreement was misunderstood by Ethiopia and had no intention to pressurize Ethiopia to accept anything

[360] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion),* 111.

that would endanger its interest, Ethiopia reasserted treaties concluded without her being one party are against the provisions of the Covenant that jeopardize her right to decide on issues that affect domestic affairs.[361] The attempt to revive the Tripartite Treaty during this period was problematic because of several reasons. First, Ethiopia had already secured a seat in the LN which made it an equal member with European powers protected by the provisions of the Covenant. Accordingly, any attempt to forcefully control or attack Ethiopia triggers the collective security measure of the LN, at least in principle. Secondly, European powers were engaged with dividing Ethiopia and merge with their colonies while they were engaging in diplomatic relations with Ethiopia at the same time. For instance, Ethiopia signed a Treaty of Friendship with Italy in 1928; the second of its kind after the first treaty signed during the aftermath of the Adowa victory. Agreements that exclude Ethiopia were aimed at preventing possible conflicts among themselves in scrambling Ethiopia which implicitly denies Ethiopia's independent state.

The challenges of the Tripartite Treaty against the interest of Ethiopia which continued to influence its foreign relations throughout the 20th-century emanates from the issue of hydro-politics. Given the water resource it possesses in comparison with the surrounding lowlands, Ethiopia is called the "water tower of East Africa". Especially, Ethiopia's more than half contribution to the Nile River has made Ethiopia's foreign relations deeply involved with water security issues of these countries. We have seen in the previous section that hydro-politics is one of the major issues that affect Ethiopia's foreign relations since its establishment as a state; following the interest of the British Empire to assure an uncompromised flow of the Nile River towards Sudan and Egypt. Moreover, we have seen that Britain had a plan to build a dam on Lake Tana, the largest lake in Ethiopia which is a source of the Blue Nile. *Ras* Tafari proposed the study of building a dam on Lake Tana Nile to be conducted by a USA Company. This led to the involvement of the US in Ethiopia's dam-building politics started following the departure of Workeneh Eshete to enter a contract with White Engineering Corporation in New York.[362] Generally, the Tripartite Treaty was one of the main manifestations of Ethiopia's contested independence during the interwar period.

[361] Ibid, 114-115.
[362] Getachew Metaferia. *Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*. Algora Publishing, 2009: 28-31.

6.5. The Ethio-Italian Conflict and the Response of the LN

The post-1896 relationship between Ethiopia and Italy was mainly determined by the military victory of the former at the battle of Adowa. Contradictory to its interest in Ethiopia, Italy has also supported Ethiopia's quest to join the LN. A Treaty of Friendship was signed on 2 August 1928, at the time of increasing encroachment against Ethiopia's independence despite its full membership in the LN. The beginning of the conflict took place on 5 December 1935, following the clash of forces of the two states at Wal Wal which was located in Ogaden region of Ethiopia bordering the Italian-Somaliland.[363] This marked the onset of the problem that became controversial in the LN, an event that affected the relation between European powers during the interwar period, and a disagreement that eventually led to full-scale war between Italy and Ethiopia thereby bringing Ethiopia's independent existence into a five years halt until Italians were forced out in 1941 with the support of the British army.

Understanding the response of the LN to the conflict which eventually determined the fate of the Ethiopian state in the international system requires consideration of interwar developments in Europe. As Byron Hunt pointed out, though WWII culminated with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919 between the Allied and Central Powers, the agreement brought neither stability nor economic development for all the signing parties. The world, in particular, was under economic recession since the late 1920s which contributed to the emergence of ultra-nationalist governments in the 1930s in Europe. Accordingly, the rise of the Fascist party in Italy under the leadership of Benito Mussolini and Nazi under the leadership of Adolf Hitler in Germany was partly the result of their ultra-nationalist discourse mainly fueled by the economic recession; and issues related to war settlements. While the Versailles Treaty severely punished Germany for triggering WWI, postwar settlements also disappointed Italy because of the frustration of its interest to huge territorial reward in Africa from Britain and France following its involvement by the side of Allied powers.[364] Since the period was characterized by political instability and economic recession, these leaders followed a direction of externalizing the economic and political problems of their respective states. Then, like Hitler's measures against the Jews, Mussolini

[363] Byron Walfred Hunt. "The League of Nations and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict." *Unpublished Masters thesis* (1957): 7.
[364] Antoinette Iadarola. "Ethiopia and the European Powers." *ASA Review of Books* 6 (1980): 44-48.

targeted Ethiopia to assert Italy as a great colonial power and for the sake of eradicating the legacy of the Adowa victory.

The inter-war period was an epoch of diplomatic and military preparation for Italy which made controlling Ethiopia one of its ultimate objectives. When Italy's interest in Ethiopia became overt and violent, the response of Britain and France was founded on using Mussolini against Hitler, or at least avoiding cooperation between them. As colonial powers bordered with Ethiopia had a huge interest that they expressed in their 1906 treaty, one may expect changes in Ethiopia might shape their response. However, the approach of Britain and France was largely determined by events at the European interwar developments.[365] We can see the correlation that as Germany took actions against the terms of the Versailles Treaty, Italy was also intensifying its interest to control Ethiopia parallelly. Within this scenario, Britain and France selected sacrificing Ethiopia to appease Italy not only as major powers but also influenced the stance of the LN regarding the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Thus, neither Britain nor France was willing to prevent the emerging war between Italy and Ethiopia. Their focus was using Italy and their leverage in the LN to prevent war in Europe; a decision both failed to prevent another world war and destroyed the LN at the same time.

We have seen that the Tripartite Treaty posed a serious threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity and independence. Treaties between European powers regarding Ethiopia also continued during the inter-war period. Another treaty that dealt with Ethiopia was signed on 7 January 1935 between France and Italy. Signed between French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, the agreement is also known as Mussolini-Laval Accords. Several authors who investigated the details of the meetings of the two leaders concluded that France had given a green light to Italy to advance its interest in Ethiopia in return for the continuation of the French status quo concerning the control of the Ethio-Djibouti railway. Moreover, the French Prime Minister conceded to the interest of Mussolini for the sake of keeping Italy away from Nazi Germany.[366] Zewde Reta stated that the other two most important parts of the deal between the two European states about Ethiopia was the plan to hinder the import of weapons to Ethiopia through strong inspection

[365] Byron Walfred Hunt. "The League of Nations and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict." 12-13.
[366]Reta, *Ye-Kedamawi Haile-Selassie Mengist (the Government of Emperor Haile-Selassie):* 80-82.

of Ethiopia's foreign trade via Djibouti and how the Ethiopian economy could have been integrated with the Italian-Somaliland in the South and Eritrea in the North.[367]

Generally, Italy had several motivating factors to advance its colonial interest over Ethiopia for the second time. Firstly, invading Ethiopia was one way out of the internal economic and political crisis as new territories help to boost access to resources. The rivalry among European powers in Africa and elsewhere can be taken as a second factor. The last reason is related to the Italian loss at the Battle of Adowa; an event that is regarded as an event of shame for the Fascist Party that sought the renaissance of Roman greatness. As Reta pointed out that Benito Mussolini considered the defeat of Italy by Ethiopian forces as a sign of shame that should be erased.[368] Despite the above generalized motivations, the immediate cause of the conflict emerged as a border claim between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland before it turned in to full-scale Italian invasion of Ethiopia.

Even before the surfacing of its inability to handle the Ethio-Italian, the LN was facing several problems that signaled its eventual failure. Failure to secure membership of the US, and withdrawal of Germany and Japan had lowered the optimism about the LN that it would assure peaceful coexistence of states. The LN took no meaningful action when aggressions were committed. This includes the annexation of Vilna by Poland, Korfu by Italy, and when Manchuria was invaded by Japan in 1931.[369] The failure of the LN in addressing these aggressions inevitably encouraged Italy to continue its move to control Ethiopia. What makes Italy's invasion of Ethiopia different from the above cases was that it took place between European and African states that were full members of the LN; Italy working for the demise of Ethiopia as an independent state and Ethiopia trying to use the collective security promise of the LN as a shield against Italian colonial ambition and other foreign threats.

After the Wal Wal incident, the Italian government demanded from Ethiopia a formal apology, compensation, and punishments of involved soldiers. Ethiopia responded claiming that the incident happened within its territory and wanted to resolve the problem under the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship of 1928. Following the Italian refusal, Ethiopia

[367] Ibid, 119.
[368] Ibid, 94.
[369] Byron Walfred Hunt. "The League of Nations and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict." 2.

requested the Council of the LN to discuss the matter.[370] Since then, the strategy followed by Italy was avoiding the issue from being a subject of discussion in the Council of the LN. For other efforts of resolving conflicts, Italy neither rejected the endeavors nor it showed full cooperation. As the result, the issue entered a prolonged failed attempt of resolution which secured enough time for Italian preparation of war. Avoiding the LN from directly engaging with the issue was not pursued by Italy only, Britain and France also followed the same suit. Both states suggested that the problem could be addressed by the Ethio-Italian Agreement of 1928.[371]

The Treaty of Friendship had the potential of solving the conflict. According to Article 5 of the Treaty, the two states had agreed to use arbitration in the case of possible conflict of interest arising between them. However, following Italy's refusal to be abided by the Treaty and Ethiopia's repeated notifications on the issue, on 17 January 1935, the Council decided to discuss the matter within two days. This changed Italy's resistance to employing the Treaty to resolve the conflict under the Treaty. An arbitration body comprising two individuals from each state was established, which Ethiopia requested to be granted with the task of identifying in which state the area of Wal Wal existed, deciding who was the aggressor and coming up with recommendations that avoid other conflicts of a similar kind. However, Italy rejected the inclusion of deciding where Wal Wal resides by the arbitration commission continued military build-ups in Eritrea and Italian-Somaliland. In the Stresa Conference of 14 April 1935 that took place among French Prime Minister Pierre-Étienne Flandin, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, and Italian Prime Minister completed focusing on Germany without addressing Ethiopia's case. Since this was a time Germany violated recruitment restrictions imposed by Versailles Treaty, Ethiopia's concern was not able to outweigh the gravity of the threat from Germany.[372]

The Council has resorted to facilitate the arbitration process since June 1935. After the commission comprised of four members was trapped in a deadlock, one more arbitrator was added, and on 4 September. The commission provided its result that none of the states was an aggressor and decided Wal Wal as part of Italian Somaliland. However, Italy expressed dissatisfaction with the finding of the commission and changed the debate to the

[370] John Spencer, "The Italian-Ethiopian Dispute and the League of Nations." *The American Journal of International Law* 31, no. 4 (1937): 614.
[371] Byron Walfred Hunt. "The League of Nations and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict." 2.
[372] Ibid, 14.

features of the Ethiopian state claiming that Ethiopia was a barbarous state that could not fulfill its international obligations. Continuation of slavery, internal political and economic problems, and conflict with neighboring powers were provided by Italy as evidence for the barbarousness of Ethiopia. Moreover, Italy declared it was no more bound to the treaties signed with Ethiopia and would no longer be willing to treat as equal. Italy also claimed that Ethiopia's membership in the LN was conditional on the reforms it would implement to modernize its internal features, and accused Ethiopia of failing to do so and for deceiving members of the LN.[373]

Following this, British Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare and French Prime Minister Pierre Laval met in Paris, and they bilaterally proposed a solution commonly known as Hoare-Laval Pact that focused on territorial exchanges and providing economic and political privileges to Italy mainly in Southern Ethiopia. This plan also failed the two states to resolve the conflict and on 5 September 1935, the Council established the Commission of Five (Britain, France, Poland, Spain, and Turkey) to study the problem and make recommendations. In less than two weeks the Commission reported that the problem could be solved with territorial adjustments and the involvement of the LN in assisting the modernization efforts of Ethiopia. Thus, Ethiopia was to be given a Sea outlet through British Somaliland and it was required to abandon the Ogaden region and the Danakil depression bordering Eritrea to Italy. Moreover, regarding the question of modernization, Ethiopia was expected to open for the LN-sponsored reconfiguration of security, economic and administrative areas.[374]

Unlike Ethiopia's immediate positive response, Italy again rejected the proposal. The Council expanded the Committee of Five to thirteen members on 26 September through Ethiopia officially announced mobilization for war after two days which was followed by the Italian declaration of war on 3 October. On 18 November 1935, the LN imposed an arms embargo on both states. Moreover, economic sanctions were imposed on Italy that focuses on financial flow and foreign trade. Before this, Britain had imposed an arms embargo on both states on 25 June 1935 and the LN followed the same suit except it expanded the sanction on Italy by including economic and financial issues.[375] However, the sanctions were

[373]League of Nations, Memorandum by the Italian Government on the situation in Ethiopia. Genva (1935).
[374] Byron Walfred Hunt. "The League of Nations and the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict." 45.
[375]George Baer, "Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936," *International Organization* 27, no. 2 (1973): 165-167.

too late to affect the course of actions on the ground. However, the weak Ethiopian army was crumbling in the face of a more sophisticated Italian military. After leading the Ethiopian army in the Northern front, Haile-Selassie fled to England in May 1936 via Djibouti. The Ethio-Italy conflict was a complicated crisis that tested the effectiveness of the LN in defending the principles, ended with the successful merging of Ethiopia with Italian colonies in the north and south. The implications of the way the LN tried to deal with the conflict are discussed in the next section.

6.6. Ethiopia's Appeal to the LN

Even before the invasion, Italy was trying to influence the internal affairs of Ethiopia using its colonial establishments of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland as a base especially after the coming into power of Benito Mussolini. In his autobiography, Haile-Selassie stated that though Italy was trying to appear like a friendly state for Ethiopia, deeply Italy's colonial interest and avenging the Adowa defeat was clear. Though both Italy and Britain had recognized Ethiopia's independence, they continued their attempts to implement the Tripartite Treaty. Within the frame of this Treaty, Britain planned to build a dam on the Blue Nile in northwest Ethiopia and Italy wanted to build a railway that connects Eritrea and Somaliland across the heartland of Ethiopia from north to south. Ethiopia protested this agreement to the LN in and requested her independence to be fully respected. Moreover, Italy was interfering in the internal power rivalries, especially it was instigating Haile-Selassie's rivals even before 1930. The *Ras* Gugsa of Begemidir, *Ras* Kassa Hailu of Gojjam and the escape of *Lij* Eyasu from the prison in Fitche located north of Addis Ababa are good examples. Italy was successful in triggering revolts against the reforms Haile-Sellasie intended to introduce based on European models. The educational and legal systems were portrayed by Italy as an attempt to spoil Ethiopia's traditional heritage.[376] Though Italy itself was European state, the conservative figures believed Italy's propaganda about the evils of introducing European modernity elements into Ethiopia. For instance, Italy was against Ethiopia's strong relation with Japan thereby disseminated false information about the nature of the friendship. The first incident that led to the war took place shortly before the Swedish Crown Prince Gustav Adolf and Crown Princess Louise visited Ethiopia.[377]

[376] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, 1, 158-71.
[377] Ibid., 172.

How the LN dealt with the Ethio-Italian conflict is a typical case that allows us to reflect on several important concepts. Above all, it illustrates the strong nexus that existed between Ethiopia's domestic modernization agenda and the evolving international system of the interwar period. Modernization-related preconditions that were imposed on Ethiopia in the process of accession and the continuation of the agenda of modernizing Ethiopia throughout the process of addressing the conflict in the LN. This makes it clear the urgency of building a modern state felt by the ruling class not only as a solution to answer domestic demands but to avoid external interventions. The way the LN dealt with the conflict was affected by different factors. Ethiopia's reliance on the LN as a means of survival, the shift of Italian discourse about Ethiopia from conflict resolution to the matter of a civilizing mission, and the effect of great power politics as the result of Germany's defiance of post-WWI settlements were among major factors that deserve our attention. Firstly, the compromise Ethiopian rulers were willing to make for Italy illustrates the effect of limitations in internal resources had in exacerbating foreign threats. Beyond accepting a modernization project sponsored by the LN, Ethiopia was willing even to alter its territorial structure so that war could be averted. Thus, the fact Ethiopia stuck with the LN to deal with the Italian colonial threat shows that Ethiopia pioneered the trend of exploiting the foreign domain in which weak states used in the post-WWII era under the auspices of the UN and other multi-governmental organization.

The second point is related to the civilization criteria the international environment required from the states during the interwar period. The intended project of the LN to modernize Ethiopia's internal features proves that states were expected to adopt European modernity so that their existence could be tolerated. The shift of the debate in the LN from being an issue of a conflict between two states to Ethiopia's lagged modernization status indicates the existence of implicit and explicit civilization criteria to be considered as a state. Turning the focus to the topic of lack of modernization in Ethiopia helped Italy not only to buy time for war preparation it also convinced the LN to interfere with Ethiopia's internal issues for the sake of eradicating 'barbarianism' which was also accepted by the Ethiopian government. Dominated by the imperial powers of Brian and France, the lack of meaningful measure showed to Italy as a civilizing agent in Ethiopia is not surprising. In one of the memorandums submitted by Italy to the LN, Italy's role in Ethiopia is explained as the following:

> "Since the middle of the last -century, Italy has been in relations with the countries forming the present Ethiopian State, and has materially contributed, through her travelers and explorers, her missionaries, her scientists and her diplomatists, even at the cost of their blood, to a knowledge of Ethiopian territory and to the endeavors made to exercise a civilizing influence in those regions."[378]

Thirdly, the question of why the LN failed to save Ethiopia deserves particular attention. We can list several factors that contributed to this failure. Limitations of the LN as the first international organization and the legacies of WWI and its punishing settlements were important in general terms. Different conceptual and practical inconsistencies contributed to its failure in safeguarding a weak Ethiopian state. The LN comprised member states that range from colonies like India and weak states like Ethiopia to powerful empires of Britain and France. The international legal norm that protects all states regardless of their modernization status was yet to be developed. Very critical to the Ethiopian case was the conflict became a plaything between the three powers (Britain, France, and Italy and partly their relationship with Germany), a scenario that made the LN a stage of great power politics rather than an international organization guided by its founding principles.

A closer look at Haile-Selassie's appeal to the LN is important to understand Ethiopia's expectations from the LN, the actual response of the LN, and its influence in restoring the 'Solomonic Dynasty' within WWII circumstances. Haile-Selassie delivered the speech on 30 June 1936 in Geneva, almost two months after he exiled himself and started to live in Bath, England. The speech made in Amharic was aimed at seeking justice for the abrogation of Ethiopia's independence and the atrocities committed including the use of poison gas. Haile-Selassie put the advantages his government expected membership in the LN. He stated that he pursued membership because he believed it could give Ethiopia "a new guarantee for the maintenance of her territorial integrity and independence, would help her to reach a higher level of civilization."[379] Haile-Selassie was frank about the backwardness of his state and what he demanded was to give him more time to modernize rather than using it as a pretext to deny Ethiopia's right to exist as an independent state. Accordingly, wanted recognition of the efforts he had achieved so far in modernizing Ethiopia by saying that "it does not seem that in Ethiopia today there is more disorder and insecurity than in 1923. On the contrary, the country is more united, and the central power

[378] League of Nations, Memorandum by the Italian Government on the situation in Ethiopia. Genva (1935): 5.
[379] Speech by Haile-Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, at the League of Nations. Geneva 30 June 1936.

is better obeyed".[380] This illustrates modernization was a loophole that invites foreign threat, and it was a process that was pursued to be achieved by exploiting the external sphere including the LN itself.

As we have seen in the previous section, initially Ethiopia insisted that the LN should condemn and took actions against Italy under the collective security pact provided in the Covenant. As the possibility of strong action by the LN faded away Ethiopia had also lowered its expectations. Acknowledging the fact that powerful states in the LN had their stakes concerning measures against Italy, Haile-Selassie expressed that he never expected other Governments to shed their soldiers' blood to defend the Covenant when their own immediate personal interests were not at stake."[381] He put financial and military assistance could have played important role in helping Ethiopia to encounter Italy's aggression. He cited several instances in which he requested "for financial assistance for the purchase of arms. That assistance has been constantly refused me. What, then, in practice, is the meaning of Article 16 of the Covenant and of collective security?"[382]

Haile-Selassie put it clear that collective security was a shield for weak states to ensure their existence in the international system as the following:

> "It is collective security: it is the very existence of the League of Nations. It is the confidence that each State is to place in international treaties. It is the value of promises made to small States that their integrity and their independence shall be respected and ensured. It is the principle of the equality of States on the one hand, or otherwise the obligation laid upon small Powers to accept the bonds of vassalship. In a word, it is international morality that is at stake. Have the signatures appended to a Treaty value only in so far as the signatory Powers have a personal, direct, and immediate interest involved?"[383]

Haile-Selassie reminded that the inability of the LN to uphold the collective security principle of the Covenant would eventually endanger the security of all member states. Accordingly, he states that 'today it is us, tomorrow it will be you'. This became true when consecutive events and aggressions against independent states led to the disaster of WWII. As George Baer pointed out, despite Italy's relentless attempt to depict Ethiopia as savage in the face of the world, the endeavors of Haile-Selassie to build Ethiopian state per European

[380] Ibid.
[381] Ibid.
[382] Ibid.
[383] Ibid.

model had earned him international fame which was evident in his designation as 'the Man of the Year' by Time Magazine in 1936.[384]

6.7. Conclusion

This chapter has assessed the domestic modernization predicament Ethiopia faced and the interaction with the foreign domain focusing on the engagement with LN that took place from the time of WWI to the fall of Ethiopia under the control of Italy in 1936. By doing so, the chapter has also demonstrated the trajectories of domestic politics and foreign relations following the illness of Menelik II. The chapter has shown how *Lij* tried to change both domestic foundations of power and to shift the alliance towards Ottoman Empire and Germany. How the modernization agenda divided the ruling class into progressives and conservatives and how *Ras* Tafari as a leader of the former emerged triumphant was also assessed. The rest of the chapter was devoted to addressing Ethiopia's engagement in the LN focusing on how it contributed for the reconsideration of the conceptions of states and its failed attempt to utilize collective security in the face of the second Italian invasion in 1936.

Ethiopia's membership in the LN was overshadowed by two major and related issues: domestic characters of the Ethiopian state and eminent external threats. In other words, challenges of modernization (especially the question of slavery) and the Italian colonial ambition, respectively, were the two main issues that determined Ethiopia's experience in the LN. The foreign threat was mainly the result of encroachments from colonial powers expressed in the form of the Tripartite and other treaties signed by these powers focusing on their interest in Ethiopia and the explicit Italian colonial interest. What made Italy's revised interest over Ethiopia was the resentment as the result if of the initial failure in 1896. These salient features of the state accompanied by global interwar contexts, made Ethiopia's membership in the LN a point of debate, especially following the second Ethio-Italian conflict. This chapter assessed Ethiopia's adventure in the LN focusing on demonstrating the nexus between domestic modernization challenges and the opportunities the membership brought.

[384] George Baer, "Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936," 168.

Among the reasons that Ethiopia's membership in the LN deserves serious attention is that it helps us to understand the concept of statehood and the features of the international system in the interwar period. It also helps to compare and contrast the notions of these issues of the interwar period with their understanding in the 19th-century and post-WWII era. The interwar period was unique as the values of the 19th-century were evolving slowly which gave a foundation for the post-WWII international system which witnessed the proliferation of states under the auspices of the UN. The LN revised the standard of civilization that states in the 19th-century were required to exhibit through the Covenant, accession procedures, and the effect of imperial powers. Though the membership of weak states like Ethiopia was a remarkable shift, accession procedures and the Covenant ensured continuity of European modernity as a necessity for membership directly and indirectly. It was unsuccessful in protecting weak states through collective security promises and failed to prevent another global-scale conflict.

It was a plain fact that Ras Tafari wanted to join the LN to benefit from collective security promise given continuous threats posed by European colonizers that encircled Ethiopia. The willingness Ethiopia showed towards proposed modernization projects with the sponsorship of the LN and under the leadership of European colonizers also shows, that the membership in the LN was seen as an opportunity that should be exploited to mitigate internal challenges against modernization agendas. However, both advantages sought by Ethiopia from the LN did not come true and Ethiopia was left by the LN and great powers to rely on its own. Since 1906, Ethiopia faced continuous pressures from colonial powers, and it was practically marginalized to semi-colonial status despite it was theoretically recognized as an independent state. Agreements by these powers on how to protect their interest mostly regardless of its effect on Ethiopian statehood prove this fact. But, when the Italian ambition to colonize Ethiopia became overt, it went beyond from being a problem between the two states as a result of its implications on the interests of three powers and their relationship with Germany: thereby making it not one of the crises in the LN but an issue of contention between colonizers. Accordingly, it emerged as a challenge for the LN that was a new international organization established to ensure peaceful resolution of conflicts between member states.

The Ethio-Italian conflict became meaninglessly consumed in the relation between powerful states rather than becoming an agenda of the LN in general. Italy's strong colonial

interest and the abstaining of Britain and France from disappointing Italy so that Italy could be used against expansionist Germany was fundamental in determining the nature of the response of the LN to the conflict. Thus, implementing the provisions of the Covenant against Italy became dependent on the interest of few powerful states rather than a normative necessity of the principles of the Covenant of the LN. Accompanied by other weaknesses of the LN and consecutive aggressions in Europe and Asia, the Ethio-Italian conflict became one event that eventually led to the annihilation of the LN and the outbreak of WWII. Beyond becoming all these global and international affairs, the conflict interrupted Ethiopia's existence as an independent state which was treated as an exception at the time of colonization. Ethiopia's attempt to use the membership to fill the gap of its internal domain became unsuccessful and the modernization project initiated by Haile-Selassie was halted.

Generally, Ethiopia's domestic modernization predicament was a center of gravity both in its confrontation against Italy and its involvement in the LN. It was the major domestic agenda that revolved around building a modern state but sought to be realized through foreign means and adaptation. From top-to-bottom, it affected how Ethiopia was viewed by the LN and the way the conflict with Italy was handled. From bottom-to-top, the powerlessness determined the nature of Ethiopia's response including insistence on the LN as means of averting falling in the hand of Italy. Internal modernization problems of Ethiopia gave leverage to Italy that range from avoiding the League from discussing the issue for several months to the proposition of civilizing intervention. and the limitations of the sanctions imposed illustrate this fact. Thus, until WWII constellation of power brought British support, Ethiopia's independent existence become interrupted until it was liberated in 1941.

CHAPTER 7

LIBERATION AND POST-WWII FOREIGN RELATIONS

This chapter addresses the nature of Ethiopian post-WWII modernization path and its effect on the nature foreign relations direction pursued regionally and internationally. Though Ethiopia could not obtain the collective security promise of the LN in the face of the Italian invasion in 1936, it eventually got the support of Britain to end the five years of occupation as the result of WWII contexts. Upon his return, Haile-Selassie continued from where he left before the invasion but this time with different internal and external contexts. Internally, the Italian occupation had both positive and negative impacts. From the perspective of the modernization agenda, the occupation had cleared some barriers of state-building by dismantling provincial armies, ending slavery, and the construction of infrastructure like roads. Internationally, WWII and its aftermath witnessed a shift from the contexts of the interwar period in different aspects including the establishment of the UN and the end of civilization standard on statehood, the rise of the USA as a world power, the emergence of development cooperation in the relationship between poor and rich states, decolonization, and the Cold War. This chapter analyzes how domestic conditions in Ethiopia and these international events worked in coalesced manner revolving around the question of defensive modernization from 1941-74.

This chapter begins by discussing the legacy of the Italian occupation in terms of eroding structural barriers of modernization and infrastructural development and the destructive legacies that it instilled. The second section of the chapter focuses on the restoration of the power of Haile-Selassie and the continuation of the endeavors of building a modern state. Moreover, this section discusses how WWII conditions enabled Haile-Selassie to get the support of Britain to restore his throne. The third section deals with the role of Britain in the post-liberation domestic and foreign affairs of Ethiopia and how Haile-Selassie used the support of the USA to encounter the serious influence Britain had on Ethiopia's territorial, political, and foreign affairs. The fourth part of the chapter assesses the Ethio-USA relations which was forged under the contexts of the Cold War. The fifth part of the chapter assesses how Ethiopia adopted the post-colonial development discourse on the

issue of modernization and how it became the voice of the newly independent African states at the international level. The last part of the chapter deals with the Ehiopian revolution and the end of the monarchy. This section presents the revolution as a result of contradiction between the changes introduced and domestic values.

7.1. The Effect of the Italian Occupation

As we have seen in the previous chapters, the encroachment of several foreign powers in the East African region since the 16th-century and the scramble of Africa by colonizers in the late 19th-century defined circumstances in which the Ethiopian state emerged and features of the resultant state. Especially colonialists' advent in East Africa in the late 19th-century and their establishments that encircled Ethiopia brought direct diplomatic, security, economic and political influences. Survival of Ethiopia was under threat by European colonizers even in the post-Adowa era since rivalry to dominate Ethiopia continued and because of Italia's unabated interest towards Ethiopia. The defensive modernization pursued to preserve the system from both internal and external threats was not effective in bringing the required result and the long-stayed rivalry to control Ethiopia seemed over when Italy defeated and control Ethiopia in 1936. Until Ethiopia was liberated in 1941 with the support of the British army, Italy ruled Ethiopia for almost five years. However, this period is not considered as a colonial administration by most of the authors and the legacy of Italian occupation is a seldom-discussed subject and commonly it is discussed in an oversimplified way as either *yetelat gizie* (period of the enemy) or *yarbegninet zemen* (a period of patriotic resistance). It is true that the patriotic resistance based in rural areas took place for five years and restored Haile-Selassie with the support of British forces; however, the pros and cons of Italian rule should be evaluated from the perspective of changing the centuries-old internal political economy, building modern state institutions and construction of infrastructure. Seen from this perspective the occupation brought advantages that were unthinkable to be realized under Haile-Selassie's Ethiopia.

Italian East Africa (*Africa Orientale Italiana*) was established constituting Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian-Somaliland. This was divided into four big administrative regions. Even established authors ignore the legacy of the Italian occupation or present it in a prejudiced manner. For instance, Tibebu stated that what Italy left after five years of rule was "a network

of roads and prostitution".[385] It is true that the Italian five-year rule had destructive effects some of which continued to be felt today. For instance, to avoid possible resistance, Italian colonial policy worked to weaken the legacy of Menelik II thereby targeted diminishing the role of Amhara ethnic groups in the colonial administration. To counter the influence of the Orthodox church, Italy promoted negative rivalry between Christians and Muslims. Both in ethnic and religious spheres, Italy employed a divide and rule policy. This policy of Italy is blamed for sowing the roots of ethnic-based politics in Ethiopia. Italy's massacre of educated Ethiopians after the failed assassination attempts against Italian colonial administrator Marshal Rodolfo Graziani created a generation gap in Ethiopia's intellectual history.[386] Like what happened with other colonial powers, the Italian occupation of Ethiopia was not intended to serve the economic and political interest of the local population; and it created racially segregated and exploitative administration. Above all, it terminated the continuation of independent Ethiopian statehood that endured for millennia.

However, the Italian colonial occupation was also an opportunity to eliminate the predatory political economy of the *gebbar* system which was an obstacle for the growth of capitalism domestically and to Ethiopia's national integration as a politically and economically capable state. Therefore, there were radical changes occurred as a result of the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. The defeat and exile of Haile-Selassie demolished the feudalistic features of the Ethiopian state. In addition to making peasants landowners by liberating them from this hierarchical exploitation of the ruling class, with the eradication of the traditional hierarchy of power and its economic foundations, slavery was abolished. Moreover, the imperial army and forces of the nobility that served as coercive means withered away.[387] By doing this the state-society relations that rested on the *gebbar* system which was the economic foundation of an absolute state was removed.

[385] Tibebu, *The Making of Modern Ethiopia: 1896-1974*, xxvi.
[386] As it was an occupation of colonial ambition, Italy's rule had left several problems that are left in contemporary Ethiopia. For negative consequences of the Italian occupation, see Alberto Sbacchi and Marimba Ani, *Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935-1941* (Red Sea Press (NJ), 1997).
[387] Dilebo, *Ye-Ethiopia Yegbar Siratina Jimir Capitalism (the Ethiopian Land Tenure and the Infant Capitalism)*
67-68.

Table 7.1. Road Construction during the Five-Year Italian Occupation

Road	Distance in KM	No. of bridges	Workers		Expenditure (in Italian Lira)
			Italian	Ethiopian	
Asmara-Gondar-Addis Ababa	1246				
Asmara-Dessie- Addis Ababa	1093				
Assab-Dessie	531				
Gondar-Dessie	496				
Asmara-Tesenay-Assab	382				
Addis Ababa-Jimma	350				
Addis Ababa-Nekemte	333				
Total	4421	8334	60,000	43,000	2,967,300,000

Source: Dilebo, Lapiso. *Ye-Ethiopia Yegbar Siratina Jimir Capitalism* (the Ethiopian Land Tenure and the Infant Capitalism), 68.

Looking at specific areas of social and economic spheres, we find varied legacies of the Italian occupation. In the education area, as Pankhurst investigated, the Italian education system was aimed at producing manpower that could only serve the colonial administration. Accordingly, it was racially segregated and prevented Ethiopians from participating in training of important fields like engineering for the sake of avoiding future challenges from them.[388] In the area of agriculture, colonial administration could not establish itself in the rural region because of the continuing resistance. This limited its activity in this sector despite Italy had a strong interest to implement improved agricultural practices that could transform subsistence farming into surplus production as part of the colonial project.[389] However, in terms of infrastructural and industrial expansion, the Italian occupation brought radical changes. Industries were set in different cities some of which intensively used the Ethiopian labor force. Especially, the achievement in building roads was so huge (look at table 7.1.). The effect of Italian legacy in political, economic, and social conditions of the

[388] Richard Pankhurst, "Education in Ethiopia During the Italian Fascist Occupation (1936-1941)," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 5, no. 3 (1972).
[389]Haile M Larebo, "The Italian Background of Capitalist Farming in Ethiopia: The Case of Cotton," *Northeast African Studies* 2, no. 1 (1995).

post-liberation era was so tense. The mobility which became possible because of a network of roads enabled Haile-Selassie after the restoration to centralize the administration and to mobilize coercive forces in a short period. Economically it created a conducive condition for domestic trade thereby increasing interactions between peoples who previously had limited or no contact. Given the mountainous and difficult terrain of Ethiopia, some of the roads that connected different provinces were unthinkable by domestic resources and knowledge of that time.[390]

Generally, from the perspective of building modern state infrastructure, the Italian occupation gave him a blank sheet to rewrite the structure of the Ethiopian state. We have seen in the previous chapter that though the 1931 constitution granted the emperor absolute power on internal and foreign affairs, Haile-Selassie could not achieve the level of centralization he wished. After the restoration, despite there were few members of the nobility who revolted against him only to be punished, Haile-Selassie was free to set up complementary pillars of a modern state structure. As we will see late in this chapter the main challenge for Haile-Selassie came from the British as it wanted to treat Ethiopia as "controlled enemy territory".

7.2. Liberation and Resumption of Defensive Modernization

Italy entered WWII as part of the Axis Powers by attacking colonies of France and Britain in Eastern Africa, as a result of the wrong prediction that the fall of France under the hands of Germany would end the war with the defeat of Allied Powers. However, with the joining of Soviet Russia and the USA, the balance of power shifted to the side of the latter. Thus, the British East African colonies targeting Italian forces in Africa including in Ethiopia.[391] This was an extraordinary opportunity for Ethiopian *arbegnoch* (patriots) who were fighting Italian occupation with limited resources. After the Italian defeat, Haile-Selassie entered Ethiopia through Sudan accompanied by British forces and reclaimed the throne in January 1942, ushering a new challenge of building a modern state and confronting a new kind of foreign influence, now of Britain. Let us save, the British involvement for the


[390] Dilebo, *Ye-Ethiopia Yegbar Siratina Jimir Capitalism (the Ethiopian Land Tenure and the Infant Capitalism)*
68.
[391] For a context in which Britain supported Ethiopia's liberation is discussed by PSM, "Britain's Relations with Ethiopia," *The World Today* (1946).

next section and continue the process of defensive modernization resumed after five years of interruption.

Though the involvement of Britain after the restoration posed a serious challenge against Haile-Selassie's freedom to act both in domestic and foreign affairs, it did not hinder him from building a relatively well-structured state bureaucracy. A relatively enlarged ministerial system was established, dozens of proclamations that included legislations and regulations regarding justice, military, administrative, religion, education, economic sectors were adopted. Vibrant statesmen also emerged in Ethiopian politics that influenced Ethiopia's domestic and foreign affairs. This included prominent figures like Foreign Minister Aklilu Habte-Wold and Minister of Finance Yilma Deressa.[392] As we have seen in the previous chapter, modern state bureaucracy was introduced by Menelik II in 1907, ended in 1917, and re-established in 1930 to avail no significant practical implications. The attempt to instill state bureaucracy that started during this time came true after the restoration. The bureaucracy was built at two levels. Firstly, the establishment of the ministerial system and other government institutions at the center took place in a way that put defense, justice, foreign affairs, and other important areas under the power of the monarch.[393]

[392] Among the proclamations are the Criminal Code and Civil Code of Ethiopia which continued to be used until now with amendment late in 20th century.
[393] Dilebo, *Ye-Ethiopia Yegbar Siratina Jimir Capitalism (the Ethiopian Land Tenure and the Infant Capitalism)*
75-89.

Figure 2: Administrative map of Ethiopia in 1950s



***Source*:** Rosenfeld, Chris Prouty, Chris Prouty, and Eugene Rosenfeld. *Historical dictionary of Ethiopia*. No. 32. Metuchen, (NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1981): x.

The other area of building modern state project was creating structured state administration. *Yagar Gizat Denb* (Proclamation of State Administration) adopted in 1941 and amended in 1946 created twelve provinces, 60 *awrajas* (zonal administration), 339 *wereda* (counties) and 1176 districts. The provinces were Shewa, Arsi, Harargie, Sidamo, Gamo Gofa, Keffa, Illubabor, Wellega, Gojam, Begemidir (now known as Gondar), Wollo, and Tigre. This arrangement appears to be based on different criteria including geography, language, and feasibility of administration. Some of the ethnolinguistic groups were instituted in several provinces. For example, though the Haragie, Wellega, Elubabor, and Arsi were established separately, these territories were inhabited by Oromos. Shewa, Gojam, Begemidir, and to a high extent Wallo were mainly inhabited by Amharic language speakers.

The northernmost province of Tigray was mainly inhabited by ethnic Tigres. The Southern most province called Gamo Goffa constituted dozens of ethnic groups with their languages.

Until Eritrea was federated in 1952 then annexed as the 13th province in 1961, this arrangement continued intact. This arrangement served as the skeleton of local administrative structure for successive regimes after the fall of the monarchy, though state structure and constitutional changes affected the power distribution and its foundation. Dozens of other proclamations that dealt with different issues were declared just in the first decade after the restoration. Centralization took place at an unprecedented level with the establishment of different organs that intended to oversee the implementation of policies. In addition to the two houses established by the 1931 constitution, different bodies were organized like the Ministerial Cabinet and the Crown Council.[394]

The military sector also received significant attention this time. We have seen in the first section of this chapter that following the defeat of the Ethiopian army by Italian forces in 1936, the army of the central government and of the nobilities which was a coercive wing of the *gebbar* system was demolished. Thus, after the restoration in 1941, reestablishing security apparatuses was necessary. Accordingly, an army comprising of 30 regiments was established. More than 10,000 soldiers who were part of the defeated Ethiopian army were also incorporated. As we will see, in the next section, the training and management of this force were undertaken by the British East African Command. In 1948, a police force was established mainly functioning in Addis Ababa and with a presence in few cities in the rest of the country leaving the responsibilities of maintaining security to the forces under local administrators. Generally, a police force comprising a total number of 20,000 officers was organized with a significant number of British officers and British Police Commissioner at its highest hierarchy of command.[395]

[394] *Ye-Ethiopia Yegbar Siratina Jimir Capitalism (the Ethiopian Land Tenure and the Infant Capitalism)* 80.
[395] "Report on Defence and Police," (Imperial Ministry of Information, 1952).

Table 7.2. Major Urban Centers and their Populations in 1960

Teklay-Gizat	Capital City	Inhabitants
Addis Ababa city		450,000
Wollo	Dessie	40,000
Harergie	Harar	25,000
Diredawa city		30,000
Begemeder	Gondar	25,000
Gojam	Debre-Markos	15,000
Tigray	Mekele	15,000
Arsi	Assela	12,000
Sidamo	Gedeo	16,000
Gamo-Gofa	Gidole	10,000
Welega	Nekemt	12,000
Keffa	Jimma	20,000

Source: State Bank of Ethiopia

Education which was one of the major sectors before the occupation became one of the priority areas again. There were only four schools in Addis Ababa before the Italian invasion. This was in addition to non-governmental schools that included schools of the Orthodox Church, the Muslim Madrasahs, and missionary schools. After the restoration of the monarchy, the education sector which also received special attention from Haile-Selassie in the pre-occupation period continued to expand. In 1958, there were 508 primary schools, 5 secondary schools, 3 vocational schools, and 11 evening schools. In addition to Haile-Selassie I College established in 1950 as the first university, students were also sent abroad to continue their studies which was also a trend in the pre-occupation period. Mostly pursued fields of study included medicine, engineering, and law. But the number was still insignificant. Only around 273 students were studying abroad in 1958.[396]

[396]"Yetimirt Mesfafat (Report on Education)," (Addis Ababa: Imperial Ministry of Information, 1952).

Table 7.3. Number of Students Enrolled from 1943 to 1950

Year	Number of students
1943-44	19, 000
1944-45	20,000
1945-46	32,324
1946-47	40,954
1947-48	45,438
1948-49	52,963
1949-50	60,943

***Source*:** State Bank of Ethiopia

7.3. The British Era

The first ten years after liberation are commonly referred as the *Ye-Englizoch Zemen* (the British Decade, the British Interlude, or the British Period). This name is given as a result of the huge influence Britain had on matters affecting Ethiopia's political and economic conditions including its territorial integrity and foreign relations. After Italy was cleared from East Africa, Britain established the administration of the "Occupied Enemy Territory" that constituted Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland. Thus, the influence of Britain in this period was the result of the circumstances in which Ethiopia regained its independence.[397] This scenario influenced domestic political conditions and the nature of the immediate post-liberation foreign policy. Since itself was a European colonizer, the role played by the British in the war against Italy was not genuine support solely provided to liberate peoples under the control of colonial powers. Post-war developments showed that its interest to exploit Ethiopia's geopolitical importance. Thus, now it seemed that the rivalry with Italy and France to dominate Ethiopia became finalized with the success of the latter.

[397] The initial responses of Britain officials in Ethiopia against assertive power of Haile-Selassie is discussed on: Reta, *Ye-Kedamawi Haile-Selassie Mengist (the Government of Emperor Haile-Selassie)* 424-25.

There were two treaties that gave ground for British intervention in Ethiopia signed on 31 January 1942 and 19 December 1944. The first treaty explicitly gave the British the upper hand both in the domestic and foreign affairs of Ethiopia. It provided a special status for the British ambassador, assigned British nationals in different posts of the government, only British war generals and political experts were to serve as Haile-Selassie's advisors. Determining the fate of Italian captives and civilians and administering the Ethiopian army was put under complete control of the British administrators. In relation to this, British military officers were given the power to force the emperor to declare war, and even the right to wage war was granted to the British forces. British airline was the only carrier allowed to fly to Ethiopia, controlling Ethiopian air space and the Ethio-Djibouti railway, regulating foreign trade and monetary policy were also under British authority. Moreover, the Ethiopian government was not allowed to hire any foreign nationals.[398] Generally, provisions of this treaty situated Ethiopia's status almost as a protectorate of Britain by putting economic, political, and foreign relation issues under the hands of the latter.

One of the most important agendas that emerged in Ethiopia after the liberation was returning the territorial status quo to the period before the Italian occupation. This included the return of the Ogaden region since Italy had already annexed it with Italian Somaliland during its five-year occupation of Ethiopia. Thus, the post-liberty era did not only paved a way for intervention in domestic affairs it also undermined Ethiopia's territorial integrity. In addition to looking for ways that could reduce or eliminate the British influence, returning Ethiopia's territorial structure to the pre-Italian invasion period became the main agenda. While the British trusteeship of Eritrea was tolerable given Eritrea was under Italian colony since 1889, based on historical and economic reasons interest to use Italy's defeat to annex Eritrea was there. According to Richard Reid, though unsuccessful, Ethiopia openly presented its interest to regain control of Eritrea to London Conference of the Allied Powers that took place in 1948. Mereb-Milash (Beyond Mereb river) was the name of Eritrea and its ruler referred as Bahire Negash (king of the sea) before Ethiopia lost control first to Ottoman Turkey, Britain and then Italy.[399] It should be noted that Italy's two invasions of Ethiopia came through Eritrea and by regaining control over Eritrea. Ethiopia did not only

[398] Ibid., 438-44.
[399] Historical relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea is discussed in Richard Reid, "The Trans-Mereb Experience: Perceptions of the Historical Relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 1, no. 2 (2007).

answer the question of access to the Red Sea by unifying Eritrea but it was also important for security reasons.[400] The provisions of the above treaty were no less than the Wuchale Treaty signed between Menelik II and Italy on 2 May 1889 which became the cause of the battle of Adwa. As we have seen in chapter three, Menelik II's protest not to be obliged to make foreign relations through Italy was the cause of the battle of Adowa. In a detailed and clear fashion, the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty deprived all fundamental political, economic, military, and diplomatic power that a free state should exercise to say it is independent. During this period, different countries including the USA resumed their diplomatic relations which were interrupted by Italian occupation thereby affirming their recognition of Ethiopian as an independent state. This was used to counter the British dominance by the emperor who wanted only military support to defeat Italy, not a protectorate status that undermines his power.[401]

Haile-Selassie and his associates were pushing for abrogation or the modification of the terms of the treaty and after a brief reluctance, Britain agreed to sign another treaty that dropped many of the privileges Britain enjoyed in Ethiopia. Privileges of the British ambassador were annulled, Ethiopia was left free to hire foreign nationals without consulting British officials. Moreover, the British agreed to establish a military mission in Ethiopia with the role of training, organizing, and administering the Ethiopian army. Moreover, Ethiopia regained control of the Addis Ababa Djibouti railway. Ethiopia gained full control of Ogaden until Britain withdraw from the region in 1948 as a result of persistent US influence and the decline of colonialism.[402] This shows that Ethiopia's territorial claim was answered not by its efforts but by exploiting the friendship with the USA and as the result of the global demise of imperialism.

While getting access to the sea was one of the foreign policy objectives since the Adowa victory, this agenda emerged in post-WWII with the attempt to get control of Eritrea. Though the quest to regain Ogaden was successful, the question of Eritrea became more complicated and internationalized. Unable to resolve the question neither among themselves nor by consultation with Ethiopia or Eritrea, great powers took the issue to the UN in 1952. A commission that constituted members from Pakistan, Burma, Guatemala, South Africa,

[400] Reta, *Ye-Kedamawi Haile-Selassie Mengist (the Government of Emperor Haile-Selassie)* 489-513.
[401] Henze, "Layers of Time," 35-37.
[402] Zewde, *Ye-Ethiopia Tarik (History of Ethiopia)*, 187-93.

and Norway was established to come up with recommendations. After deliberation between the options of unity and separation, the UN commission recommended Eritrea to join Ethiopia under a federation arrangement.[403] However, the federation was accepted neither by Ethiopia nor by pro-independence forces in Eritrea. Thus, while the former sought to completely unite Eritrea, the political forces in the latter started the long struggle to establish Eritrea as an independent state.

The British influence was not limited to their overall dominance in the internal and external affairs of Ethiopia, they also took different resources left by the defeated Italian forces. According to Amanda Kay McVety, British forces robbed factories and other types of machinery and transported them out of Ethiopia.[404] Generally, the decade after the restoration of the monarchy was characterized by Britain's overall influence on Ethiopia's domestic issues and foreign relations. The aftermath of the war brought back Ethiopia to the task of ensuring territorial consolidation, a question which was successfully answered by Adowa victory and the treaties signed thereafter. Moreover, it showed the foreign threat was not resolved once and for all. Ethiopia found itself from self-acclaimed Italian colonial occupation to British legal interference only with a puppet emperor with no power. Attention given to build a modern state was thus diverted to maintain territorial integrity. Thus, Haile-Selassie found himself between pressing internal and external challenges. As a foreign solution for a foreign problem was employed to avoid the British interference by forging a close friendship with a fresh international power which was the USA. Again, opened Ethiopia to the influence of another foreign power.

7.4. Cold War and the Ethio-USA Relationship

As decolonization in the decades after WWII brought the emergence of post-colonial states, the international system became an arena where states with significant wealth and power discrepancy exist similarly claiming the doctrine of sovereignty. As weak and underdeveloped states joined the international system, the civilization standard that troubled Ethiopia in the pre-WWII era withered away. States with a limited capacity which were referred by using different names including post-colonial states, third world states, and

[403] Andargatchew Tiruneh, "Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Federation (1941-1952)," *Northeast African Studies* (1980).
[404] McVety, *Enlightened Aid: Us Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia*, 71.

developing states proliferated.[405] Thus, the relationship between wealthy and poor states started to revolve around development cooperation. This paved the way for a flow of aid from powerful to weak states thereby creating a conducive international environment for Ethiopia to get access to foreign resources that could compensate for domestic shortcomings. Considering this fact, this section tries to figure out how Ethiopia used the Cold War context to further its internal modernization agendas and its survival challenges.

Discussion so far in this dissertation has shown that the influence of international actors in important domestic events was so prevalent which makes it impossible to draw a clear line that distinguishes what is domestic and what is international. Most importantly, 20th-century Ethiopia's survival became dependent on carefully reading the regional and international constellation of power and searching for an alliance that could be exploited to advance domestic agendas and to ensure protection from external threats. Until decolonization became a global phenomenon, and the British influence was repelled, this was also the nucleus of post-WWII foreign policy. Haile-Selassie's exploitation of the rivalry among great powers, and now the Cold War to advance domestic agenda was understandable given the limited resource he had to satisfy demands for survival and modernization. The exploitation of the British support in the struggle for liberation against Italy's occupation and the exploitation of the influence of the USA against the British shows that he was able to get what he wanted by playing one great power against the other.

As the influence of the USA in post-WWII was growing globally, and as colonialism started to fade away, its involvement in the Horn of Africa was also increasing. The relationship between the USA and Ethiopia goes back to the late 19th-century. In 1899, an American businessman William H. Ellis signed an Agreement of Amity and Commerce with Menelik II though it did not take effect. An American diplomat, Robert Peet Skinner, concluded another treaty on 27 December 1903 with Menelik II. By entering an official treaty, the USA became one of the world states that recognized Ethiopia's independence following the victory of Adowa and opened its consulate on 6 July 1909. Menelik was also officially invited by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906 to visit the USA. In the first half of the 20th-century, because of the isolationist policy of the USA, its relationship with

[405] Robert H Jackson and Carl G Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Pol.* 35 (1982).

Ethiopia was limited in commercial activities.[406] However, as it became engaged with assertive foreign policy especially because of Cold War, it attracted the attention of Haile-Selassie who was looking for a source of resource for resumption of building a modern state and a guarantee against a foreign threat.

When we see the link between development, politics, and external relations; the restoration of the monarchy in 1941 marked the dawn of a new era. With the context of the war, Ethiopia portrayed itself as a source of food supply for the Horn and the Middle East as drought and the war conditions led to a severe shortage of food in the region. In 1943, the then Vice Minister of Finance Yilma Deressa took part in the international conference on food and agriculture. Though the UN was yet to be established, the conference was referred as the United Nations Food Conference to represent nations that were fighting the war. After taking part in the conference, Deressa conveyed to the State Department the priorities of Ethiopia's government and requested the USA's support to achieve these objectives, especially in agricultural and technical assistance spheres. According to McVety, President Roosevelt showed interest after he read a two-page note handed over to the State Department by Yilma Deressa and he was convinced that Ethiopia had the potential of becoming a "breadbasket" for East Africa and the Middle East.[407] Yilma Deressa put what Ethiopia had and what the USA could support in the following manner.

> "The variety of elevation, climate and the fertility of the soil, as well as the geographical situation qualify Ethiopia as one of the producing countries which should of Middle East and Europe during the immediate period following the war… Ethiopia has today fifteen thousand kilometers of good truck roads. But vehicles, tires and spare parts are very much lacking. Given these facilities the farmers of Ethiopia could be counted to play a good part in helping to win the battle of nutrition just as her soldiers have done with their swords."[408]

Yilma Deresa was saying Ethiopia is naturally gifted for agriculture, but he was also asking for technological assistance from the USA to improve production. Following the initiative from the Ethiopian side, a successful meeting between Emperor Haile-Selassie and President Franklin D. Roosevelt was realized on 13 February 1945 in Egypt. In the meeting,

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[406] Getachew Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and Analysis* (Algora Publishing, 2009), 13-24.
[407] McVety, *Enlightened Aid: Us Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia*, 147; Getnet Bekele, "Food Matters: The Place of Development in Building the Postwar Ethiopian State, 1941-1974," *The International journal of African historical studies* 42, no. 1 (2009).
[408] Yilma Deressa, "Statement of the Ethiopian Delegation " news release, 1943.

Haile-Selassie frankly requested that he needed the help of the USA in development endeavors especially in the modernization of the agriculture sector, which President Roosevelt found it worthy of consideration. Moreover, Haile-Selassie pleaded military assistance and diplomatic support to regain Eritrea and Ogaden.[409]

The support of the USA in the financial sector was immediate. After the restoration, Ethiopia had faced a currency problem in international trade. Italy had introduced its own currency (Italian Lira) to replace the Maria Theresa dollar which was serving as the main means of exchange until 1935 along with bartering. The introduction of the Italian Lira which did not fully replace Maria Theresa and Ethiopian coins that were used before, added with the introduction of Shilling in British East African colonies, created chaotic transactional problems. Farmers were not interested to exchange their products for any currency other than Maria Theresa. After liberation, Ethiopia could not import enough amount of this dollar to normalize domestic and regional trade because it was not produced anymore in Austria. To get out of this problem, a lend-lease agreement was signed with the USA that granted more than 5 million ounces of silver used to mint coins and homogenize currency in Ethiopia.[410] In using the newly forged relationship with the USA against the British influence, the lend-lease agreement was regarded as the USA's confirmation of Ethiopia's independence thereby discouraging the British dominant role.[411]

Ethiopian foreign relations objective of allying with wealthy states and the USA foreign policy coincided when President Harry S. Truman's "Point Four" objectives in the areas of development cooperation were announced. It was named so because it was put as the fourth point in his inauguration speech of 20 January 1949, next to strengthening of the UN, building European economy and collective security. Accordingly, development-focused assistance was announced as a direction the policy of the USA towards developing regions including Africa. In his inauguration speech, he presented the motive of the program as supporting the least advantaged for the sake of promoting good life for all humanity.[412] Ethiopia was one of the candidates of this program and it started to be implemented in 1952. According to a document published on the tenth anniversary of the technical and economic

[409] Reta, *Ye-Kedamawi Haile-Selassie Mengist (the Government of Emperor Haile-Selassie)* 489-513.
[410] Gerard J Gill, *Readings on the Ethiopian Economy* (Institute of Development Research, Faculty of Arts, Haile Selassie I University, 1974), 316-17.
[411] Zewde, *Ye-Ethiopia Tarik (History of Ethiopia)*, 189.
[412] McVety, *Enlightened Aid: Us Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia*, 1-3.

cooperation between the USA and Ethiopia under the Point Four framework, the assistance of the USA to Ethiopia during its ten-years operation amounted to 45 million dollars in economic assistance, 47 million dollars in loans, 7 million dollars of agricultural commodity grant, totally amounted 100 million. Under the agreement with Point Four signed in 1952, the Oklahoma State University built three institutions in Ethiopia which became important in agricultural research. These are the College of Agriculture and Mechanical Arts in Alemaya, the Agricultural and Medical School in Jimma, and another one in Debre-Zeit. Next to agriculture, the education and health sectors received a significant amount of funds. With the fund gained from the Point Four cooperation framework, teacher training centers at Debre-Berhan, Harar, Addis Ababa and Asmara, a secondary school at Dessie, a school for women in Addis Ababa, a public health college at Gondar, and a nursing school at Asmara were established.[413]

Even though the relationship was first initiated from the Ethiopian side, as the rivalry between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War intensified, Ethiopia became important strategically to the USA. Facilitating for the above scenario, Ethiopia's close geographical location to the Middle East adjacent to the Red Sea was important to draw the interest of the USA and the consequent close relations. As it is mentioned above, the USA was the major international actor that Haile-Selassie sought to align with as it emerged as the most powerful state especially in the post-WWII era. Thus, in addition to the agricultural diplomacy discussed above, Haile-Selassie was willing to take measures as a good gesture of his interest in strong relation with the USA. In 1951, the Ethiopian military force named Kagnew Battalion was sent to Korea under the UN to fight alongside the USA and other contributing Allied states. The battalion was named after Kagnew station, a radio listening station established by the USA in the early 1940s in Asmara, Eritrea.[414]

In addition to the agricultural and geopolitical interest of the USA in Ethiopia, Haile-Selassie's increasing role in regional and global governance, especially his place in the establishment of OAU in 1963 made him the best candidate for a close alliance. As a result, Ethiopia became the first major recipient of the USA's military and development assistance.

[413] "Tenth Annicersary of Point Iv in Ethiopia," in *Report on Economic Conditions and Market Trends* (1961).
[414] The success and failure of US military support in Ethiopia during Haile-Selassie and the succeeding regie is discussed in Louise Prentis Woodroofe, "" Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden": The United States, the Horn of Africa and the Demise of Detente" (London School of Economics and Political Science (United Kingdom), 2007).

Even before this role of Ethiopia in Africa, the two states had taken important steps that strengthened their relations. In 1953, the two states signed Mutual Defense Agreement in which the USA agreed to provide equipment and to train the Ethiopian army. In 1954, Haile-Selassie visited the USA for the first time and pleaded for a close friendship between the two states citing the strategic importance of Ethiopia. Since the early 1950s, Ethiopia was the major recipient of development and military aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.[415] Regarding the military and other supports the USA provided to Ethiopia, Lemmu Baissa observed that:

> "Besides providing effective training for the army, the United States supplied valuable hardware like the F-5 jet fighter for the Air Force. Its technical assistance in training civilian manpower was also impressive in addition to its contribution to building the infrastructure, airlines and aviation, banking, and other sectors of the economy to promote development. Simultaneously, the United States benefitted successfully from use of Ethiopian facility for communication, defense, and political purposes to enhance its foreign policy objectives in the region."[416]

Like George Kennan's arguments determined a Cold War foreign policy aimed at containing the expansion of communism, the letters of the Ethiopian diplomat in Paris (Haile-Selassie's favorite European city) gives us insight into how Ethiopia perceived Cold War rivalry and the objectives aimed to be achieved within it. This diplomat was Tesfaye Tegegn who was a member of the delegates during Haile-Selassie's visit to Europe in 1924, probably as a translator for the delegation. Though his role in Haile-Selassie's government was only as a government bureaucrat, his letters are invaluable sources to understand Ethiopia's perception of the Cold War including the challenges they anticipated and the opportunities they sought. The letters focused on the analysis of developments in Europe and internationally and his recommendations on how to advance Ethiopia's national interest in these scenarios. Handwritten in Amharic (see Appendix 7.1.) and available at Ethiopian National Archives and Library Agency, some of them contain Haile-Selassie's personally written notes expressing his takeout from the letters. Though we cannot say his arguments were as decisive as Kennan's influence in the foreign policy of the USA, their relevance in influencing Haile-Selassie was expressed directly in the letters.

[415] Metaferia, *Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*, 42.
[416] Lemmu Baissa, "United States Military Assistance to Ethiopia, 1953-1974: A Reappraisal of a Difficult Patron-Client Relationship," *Northeast African Studies* (1989): 68.

About the division of the world into two rival groups and the reason why these blocks opted for war of words rather than direct confrontation, he observed that:

> "For now, three of them [USA, Europe, and USSR] do not want or wish to fight another war. Though the USA has developed an atomic bomb, it seems she has no full preparedness. Moreover, it is less likely for her to attack though defensive war, if she is attacked, will inevitably happen. Moscow also, since being an accuser has more advantage for her, unless a radical event suddenly forces her to start a war or unless she got a sufficient ground of its own, she will not be the first to begin a war either. By causing troubles, Russia will continue the current trend by testing their patience, by disappointing them. It will also reduce disruptive activities and use Eastern European states as an instrument to push towards the West when conditions exacerbate…"[417]

As the Cold War rivalry intensified across the world, strategic aids that included economic, military, technical assistance, and other forms of support became an instrument of capturing the orientation of developing states. USSR's interest in expanding communism in Europe, Middle East, Asia, South America, and Africa became an opportunity for developing states to receive foreign aid. By referring to the commitment the west showed to assist members of the Baghdad Pact established in 1955, Tesfaye Tegegn suggested that Ethiopia could use the Cold War rivalry to mitigate pressing problems of her own. He underlined the need to systematically study how to exploit this global reality and suggested three things to guide Ethiopia's foreign policy until more comprehensive strategies are adopted. He also recommended returning Ethiopian forces who were deployed in Korea. He said this would send a warning signal to the west that they need to offer more to keep Ethiopia by their side, and it will prevent criticism from Asia and Middle Eastern socialist states which might come as the result of involvement by the side of the west.

Secondly, he suggested upgrading the Ethiopian consul in Moscow to an embassy with strong diplomats. Though Ethiopia was already cultivating friendship with the USA and the west in general, he argued that it should also create strong relations with USSR and benefit from its assistance. Thirdly, he recommended creating economic and social relations with Asian states like Japan and India which he argued would benefit Ethiopia transfer science and technology and build a positive image. Under one of the letters, Haile-Selassie himself wrote a note that acknowledged the need to maneuver within the Cold War context to get the possible economic and military benefits. The note by Haile Selassie confirms that

[417] Tesfaye Tegegn, "Sile-Internasional Poletika (About International Politics)."

some of the recommendations were very important and would be considered. Tesfaye Tegegn also assessed the implication of communist political movements in Europe and recommend urgent socio-economic transformations for the sake of avoiding ground for such movements in Ethiopia.

7.5. The proliferation of the Post-Colonial States and the End of Ethiopia's Rarity

As we have seen in the third chapter, Ethiopian rulers viewed the foreign realm both as a threat and a resource pool. In the post-WWII era, with wise exploitation of foreign allies, Haile-Selassie finalized the project of establishing a strong central government which was started by Tewodros II almost one -century ago. The difficult endeavor to get a sea outlet which was one of the main foreign policy objectives succeeded when Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952. Previously competition among European powers was exploited to maintain independence from European colonialism. This time foreign relation was characterized by exploiting Cold War rivalry to mitigate internal economic and security problems. Tekle observed that despite Ethiopia's active participation in the NAM, it forged close relations with the USA as a source of economic and military support. Ethiopia was also successful in securing economic assistance from the USSR.[418] Gradually, the economy was liberalized, and foreign investment was encouraged. As a result, foreign capital which was trying to penetrate the Ethiopian economy long ago was showed a green light at this time. At the same time, the problems under *gebbar* system continued now shifted to another type of economic exploitation as a huge size of the land was sold to private ownership and awarded for loyal elites of the monarch thereby increasing the number of landless tenants. Thus, manifestations of the exploitative character of the Ethiopian state-society relations continued. The resentment of peasants was aggravated by reforms focused on changing land distribution and an increase in taxation in the late 1960s. [419] The overdependence on foreign aid and the alienation against the society, uprooted from the domestic resource and society as a result of foreign military and development aid.

The post-WWII era witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of multi-governmental and international agencies that were aimed at promoting development in poor states. This

[418]Amare Tekle, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Revolutionary Ethiopia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 27, no. 3 (1989): 481-82.
[419] Zewde, *Ye-Ethiopia Tarik (History of Ethiopia)*, 198-205.

was the first event of its kind in the international system. In the LN, though Ethiopia was socio-economically lagging from wealthy states, there was no legal or moral ground in which it could present its demands for support until it came from the side of wealthy states as part of fulfilling the civilizational criteria. Development aid as a foreign policy tool of wealthy states and the task of specialized UN agencies brought two things that Ethiopia desperately sought since the beginning of the 20th-century. Firstly, the agendas of self-determination, recognition of independence, and non-interference doctrine that was affirmed with the establishment of the UN system gave comparatively strong assurance for the Ethiopian independence which was highly vulnerable to foreign threats. Secondly, with the emergence of almost a hundred states as a result of decolonization, the internationally conducive environment for the existence of poor states eliminated at least a direct occupation threat.

Jackson correctly observed that Ethiopia pioneered a kind of statehood that the international organizations provided for "quasi-states" that mushroomed in the post-WWII era. He elaborated that the second half of the 20th-century international system welcomed states that claimed "positive sovereignty"; unlike the "negative sovereignty" that imposed obligations not to interfere, this kind of sovereignty presupposed that states could not "reciprocate" both in military and economic terms should be protected and it encouraged support from wealthy and powerful states.[420] Clapham also explored how the international system dominated by the USA and the UN facilitated the smooth entry of poor post-colonial states into the family of world states.[421] In other words, the new international atmosphere brought states into existence that otherwise could not. Colonialism has lost currency discouraged by the USA as the new global power and freedom from colonization was immediately followed by a seat in a relatively solidified international organization that assured survival if not interference in the internal affairs. Thus, Ethiopia as a founding member of the UN which relived the persistent problem of colonization that haunted it since late the 19th-century.

Secondly, the benefits that Ethiopia was pursuing to import for its modernization endeavor now became international agendas in the relationship between developed and developing states, with the emergence of international and national organizations that

[420] Robert H Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," *International Organization* (1987): 34-40.
[421] Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, 244-66.

facilitated resource and knowledge transfer from the former to the latter. Thus, the time when Ethiopia was the only 'non-civilized independent state ended as a result of the proliferation of post-colonial states in Africa and other regions. Thus, experienced in finding a loophole that could make him and his state stronger than the domestic resource offered, Haile-Selassie became an international figure even more than Menelik II as a crafter of an African state by a decisive military triumph over colonization did not earn. Until 1960, he made five tours, visiting more than thirty-five states. His role in foreign relations was expressed by him as a responsibility to travel around the world and promote his country to others. The government propaganda also underlines his international accomplishments are more remarkable than the domestic ones thereby building a positive image for Ethiopia globally.[422] Haile-Selassie's interest to benefit from an alliance with global powers was visible even before he became *neguse-negest.* In his autobiography, he mentioned that he asked the aristocracy when he was a regent to the throne at the end of WWI to send some logistics in support of the Allied forces to appease Ethiopia's colonial neighbors. But he could not achieve that as the aristocracy opposed. He added that he sent diplomats to Britain, France, and Italy with a congratulatory message after the end of the war.[423] The type of foreign relation he envisioned seemed a reality in the post-WWII international environment. However, as we shall see later in this chapter, the domestic economic problems especially the condition of peasants and the political problems that dissatisfied the newly emerged classes and the question of self-determination right of ethnonationalism were taking a different route as they were laying the ground for landslide opposition.

7.6. International Development Cooperation

Jackson put the issue of development in post-WWII as the second most international agenda next to peace and security.[424] This was observed in two ways. First, the concern given to development was witnessed with the establishment of specialized development-based bodies within the UN aimed at bringing development in poor states. Second, wealthy states established their separate agencies that engaged with implementing development operations in poor states. Both were warmly welcomed and became increasingly active in Ethiopia

[422] Ye-Ethiopia Negestat Talakinetina Tibeb Felaginet (Greatness and Pursuit of Wisdom by Ethiopian Emperors) ", *Addis Zemen* 1969.
[423] Haile-Selassie, *Hiwotie'ena Ye-Ethiopia Ermija (My Life and Ethiopia's Excursion)*, 1, 39-40.
[424] Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," 112.

gradually. Haile-Selassie put his conviction about the necessity of assistance of international organizations and wealthy states in mitigating economic problems of developing states as the following:

> "It is well known that international economic and social organizations established at and operating at various underdeveloped countries in the world are helping the economically backward countries in different ways. Some wealthy countries also manifesting their goodwill through granting loans and technical assistance… Fully supporting this idea, Ethiopia has participated in disarmament conferences and is unfailingly struggling for world peace and man's welfare and prosperity. A nation can make rapid economic growth only when it makes use of foreign economic and technical aid and, if the people make every effort towards the proper exploitation of their natural resources."[425]

Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were among major development agencies with extensive activities in Ethiopia including in agricultural, education sectors, and technical assistance areas.[426] As it is shown in the table below, specialized agencies of the UN were also highly involved in the implementation of these plans. In addition to hosting OAU, Addis Ababa was a seat of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Gradually, Addis Ababa became a diplomatic center of diplomacy in Africa, and globally ranking third following New York and Brussels.[427] Though Ethiopia was not colonized, Haile-Selassie adopted the discourse of post-colonial states and became the voice of these states in his engagement with developed states and international organizations. He put the moral obligation of wealthy states to provide aid for poor states as the following.

> "While the affluent industrial society is busily engaging in the "Great Chicken War", we in the developing countries are laboring with the hope, many times with little success, of realizing at least some of the pressing primary needs of our respective people."[428]

From 1958-1962 different UN specialized agencies spent 3,684,103 Ethiopian birrs (1,792,130 US dollars) on different development projects in Ethiopia. Specifically, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provided more than 15.5 million dollars,

[425] "Second Five Years Development Plan ", (Addis Ababa1962), 7.
[426] "Report on Economic Conditions and Market Trends ", (Addis Ababa: State Bank of Ethiopia (SBE), 1963), 1.
[427] Mulatu Wubneh, "Addis Ababa, Ethiopia–Africa's Diplomatic Capital," *Cities* 35 (2013).
[428] Yewend-Wessen mengesha, "Developing Countries and International Economic Cooperation," news release, 1963.

assigned 521 foreign experts, and trained 211 experts from 1962-1967.[429] The development-dominated international atmosphere was geared towards domestic economic planning. Thus, as a continuation of Ethiopia's strategy to use the international environment for the sake of answering the domestic development agenda, the government adopted consecutive five-year development plans. These plans were aimed at integrating the international and domestic resources and answering pressing development questions. Generally, all the plans share objectives of transforming sectors of infrastructure, education, agriculture, industry, and finance. The First Five Year Development Plan (1957-61) had objectives of increasing the national income by 3.7% and to increase foreign trade by 25%. The assessment showed that the implementation was successful except slightly lower result in the national income objective. The second plan (1963-1967) aimed at bringing 6% annual economic growth rate, increasing per capita income by 3% per year.[430] It might be because the regime was at the brink of disintegration, it was impossible to get the assessment of the implementation of the third five-year plan (1968-73) from the available government documents.

Generally, the interaction between the domestic domain and the foreign sphere in the post-WWII era was characterized by development cooperation. The establishment of the UN and close relations with the USA guaranteed security from foreign threats. Development assistance from wealthy states and international agencies provided the opportunity to mitigate domestic socio-economic problems. Though Ethiopia had no colonial history to blame for its underdevelopment, the shrewdness of Haile-Selassie made Ethiopia the aid recipient champion and regionally important actor. This introduction of foreign modernity was taking place in traditional and retarded agrarian socio-economic situations under the absolute power of the monarchy. The development-focused international environment and transfer of a huge sum of aid from Western states and agencies could not transform the lives of the majority of Ethiopians. Thus, this was creating a paradox between the new system introduced under the project of defensive modernization and the nature of the old regime. This was a contradiction that the state-sponsored defensive modernization was cultivating the forces that eventually stood against the very existence of the monarchy.

[429] "The Un Technical Aid to Ethiopia," in *Quarterly Bulletin* (Addis Ababa: State Bank of Ethiopia (SBE), 1967), 1.
[430] "Third Five Years Development Plan ", (Addis Ababa: Berhane'ena Selam Priniting Press, 1960), 35-39.

7.7. The Revolution as the Paradox of Defensive Modernization

If we take the 1896 assertion of Ethiopian independence as the beginning of the third phase of defensive modernization, the 1974 revolution represents the deconstruction of the domestic traits that were sought to be preserved in the face of European modernity. Ethiopia had repelled colonialism off, revived from the five-year occupation of Italy assisted by global developments, and assured its territorial integrity in the face of foreign irredentism threats. Internally, the project of defensive modernization had given the monarchy some modern features. However, two decades after Haile-Selassie restored his power, these started to clash with the overall underdeveloped characteristics of the Ethiopian state and society. The education sector had produced a small but vibrant section of society that articulated Ethiopia's condition in comparison with the newly emerged independent African states and with that of the broader global context in general. Other sections of the society which are the results of the modernization project had also emerged including urban dwellers, workers in the manufacturing sector, civil servants, and the army. And the peasants that constituted the majority of the population were still in miserable conditions unable to own the land and its produce. In addition to their opposition, other classes have their interests, struggling to change the life of Ethiopian peasants had become a confessed slogan of those who sought change.[431]

These all headed to a radical change in the Ethiopian state and society i.e., the revolution. The Ethiopian revolution is a relatively well chronicled and studied subject and there is no question the ending of the monarchy in 1974 had brought fundamental changes. Regarding this, Clapham pointed out that the revolution had resulted in "fundamental and irreversible changes in the organization of society; the destruction, often rapid and violent end of previous form of social and political organization together with the myths which sustained its and the ruling group which it sustained". Clapham added that the Ethiopian revolution in terms of the change it brought is comparable with the change brought by the French and Russian revolutions in their respective states. He provided more than a dozen fundamental changes which can be grouped into ideological, economic, social, political, and foreign relation areas. The ideological transformation was the shift from the monarchy and its myth of the 'Solomonic' dynasty to Scientific Socialism. Nationalization of land,

[431] For the role of the elite in the Ethiopian revolution see Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, "Ethiopia's Revolution from Above," *MERIP Reports*, no. 106 (1982).

prohibition of ownership of private property, and the creation of cooperatives of peasants, and control of the economy by the state in general were the major economic changes. Politically, almost the entire rank of the monarchy including Haile-Selassie were exterminated thereby bringing a military government with some civilian elements into power. From the foreign relations perspective, the major change was the shift from the close reliance on the USA to dependency on the USSR.[432]

The time towards the revolution coincided with the zenith of the success in foreign relations in comparison with the domestically witnessed gradual contradiction between introduced changes and the overall reality of the state. As Hess pointed out, in the 1950s Ethiopia was already playing an important role at the global and international stages. Haile-Selassie was elevated to an African figure of diplomacy, a symbol of reconciliation and above all he was considered as the voice of underdeveloped states. He was also contributing to the African struggle by using Ethiopia's membership in the UN as a platform to promote decolonization. This was also a time that Ethiopia started to show strong commitment towards Pan-Africanism. Since Haile-Selassie participated in the first conference of independent African states in Accra in 1958, Ethiopia's image as the only non-colonized state paved a way to play increasing roles and he evolved as one of the fathers of Pan-Africanism commenced. The same year the UNECA was also established with headquarter in Addis Ababa. Despite dependence on the USA, Ethiopia was also playing important role in promoting the agendas of NAM. These whole regional and international developments led to the establishment of OAU in Addis Ababa in May 1963. Despite the growing contradiction of interest and lack of meaningful change under the defensive modernization project, Haile-Selassie was traveling around the world and his fame was growing globally. For example, in 1950 alone, he made visits to the USA, Soviet Union, India, Japan, Yugoslavia, France, and other several Arab states.[433]

However, success in foreign relations was not repeated in the domestic scene. As Zewde pointed out, blinded by his international fame, Haile-Selassie reached the level of forgetting the domestic troubles his government was facing.[434] The elite which was the result of the modernization in undertakings was dissatisfied with the overall condition of the

[432] Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*, 61, 1-2.1-2
[433] Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy*, 2, 73-74.
[434] Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991*, 203.

country articulated a new phase of modernization endeavor and became the enemy of his regime. Even though Ethiopia was claimed to have more than 3000 years old uninterrupted history, it was by far lagging from the newly independent African states. The Ethiopian economy was still agrarian, the standard of living was very impoverished, the new sections of the society were not effectively integrated with political and economic spheres, and though the army was supported by the USA Ethiopia was also militarily weak in comparison with states in the Middle East.[435] As we have seen in this chapter, as the most favored and personally followed up the endeavor, the education sector had produced a vibrant class of educated Ethiopians. Despite its weakness in relative with states in the Middle East like Egypt, the military was also in sharp contrast with the overall backwardness of the country. As Clapham noted, the attention given to the military sector and the support of the USA had made Ethiopia a number one military power of Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1960, Ethiopia had 45,000 military servicemen that were organized under the IBG, the mechanized division, the air force, and the navy.[436]

In the post-WWII era, Ethiopia was in dire social-economic conditions even in comparison with the newly independent African states. For example, in 1959, more than 90% of the population was dependent on agriculture, and foreign trade was dependent on the export of primary products especially coffee which comprised 50% of annual exports. Gross national product was around 800 million dollars and per capita income of $47. This was very low from African average per capita income off the time which was $120. In 962, industrial manufacturing contributed less than 2% of the GNP. The major project was the construction of an oil refinery at Red Sea Port of Assab with the sponsorship of the USSR which was considered as a sign of modernization and prestige and was given huge attention. Qoqa hydroelectric dam was the only source of electric power and only around 1% of the household were provided with electric power.[437] As Clapham observed, the political sphere had evolved towards absolutism following the abolition of traditional administrative hierarchies and granting of unlimited power to the emperor by legal reforms. The legal measures introduced including the 1931 Constitution destroyed the role of the nobility as a traditional basis of political power to the parliament that was dominated by the emperor, the

[435] Andargachew Tiruneh, *The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987: A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 34.
[436] Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*, 61, 28.
[437] See John J. Onufra, "Ethiopia: The Search for Stability " (US Army War College 1966), 45-51.

government eliminated the channels that connect it with its constituency at the grassroots level because it failed to establish a connection in other ways. Even though Haile-Selassie started his political power as a progressive agent, he ended up exercising absolute power with a legal basis. The 1955 revised constitution expanded his powers rather than giving more space for institutions created and posts of government that could create a limited monarchy.[438]

Thus, the Ethiopian revolution was the result of the contradictions created by the process of defensive modernization. The project failed to meaningfully transform the country's political and socio-economic conditions. It only allowed penetration of the ideas of modernity with some successes while the overall picture of the country was under dire conditions. Thus, the revolution was the result of gradual antagonism of the interest of the emerging classes against the foundations of the monarchy. As Hess noted, even though the new classes which we can call the fruits of modernization comprised a small fraction of Ethiopian society, they became the center of the opposition against the monarchy. These classes were the results of the modernization process which the emperor himself advanced. As a result of the urbanization, expansion of trade, industrialization, education, and the state machinery, "military servicemen, workers, salaried employees, secondary school and university students" emerged as an important section of the society.[439] Within the project of defensive modernization, the new sections of the society that had opposite values from the traditional base of power were emerging since the early 20th-century. Haile-Selassie's government was cultivating a force that it could not tame. Dissatisfaction with Ethiopia's conditions almost by all sections of the society shows that the government was indeed without a foundation to rely on as a robust constituency. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Haile-Selassie's rise to power was characterized by his cooperation with educated Ethiopians. It is the same class of the society that waged the most serious opposition against his rule because they were dissatisfied with the conditions the country founded itself in. The intelligentsia immersed in Western knowledge was envisioning another phase of modernization that does not tolerate preservation of the domestic trait. Neither religion nor monarchy was seen positively in this context.

[438] Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*, 61, 35-36.
[439] Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy*, 2, 79.

7.8. From the 1960 Coup Attempt to the Revolution

The 1960 coup attempt was the first bold internal opposition against Haile-Selassie, and it ushered consecutive internal and foreign challenges not only hostile to the regime but also against the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian state. Master-minded by Brigadier General Mengistu Neway who was the commander of Imperial Body Guard and his younger brother Girmame Neway, the attempt took place while Haile-Selassie was on an official visit in Brazil. Though the coup plotters were able to get the support of Colonel Warqenah Gabayahu who was Security Chief and Tsige Dibu who was Police Commissioner of the state, the attempt was ill-planned, did not support of an important section of the army, and lacked clear vision direction to which they wanted to take the country.[440] The plotters sought to establish constitutional monarchy by assigning Haile-Selassie's son Crown Prince Asfa-Wasan to the throne as the king Haile-Selassie's cousin *Ras* Imiru Haile-Selassie, who was known for his reformist inclination, was given the position of a prime minister. However, even though they were able to control the Capital and high-level officials within it, the coup failed since important elements of the army remained loyal to Haile-Selassie and the plotters died in action or were executed later.[441]

As Tareke pointed out, the road towards the revolution was set off by the 1960 coup attempt which was an eye-opening moment in the opposition against the monarchy. It was the first major proof that indeed the centuries-old rule of the 'Solomonic' Dynasty could be challenged.[442] It was proof that the saying *semay aytares nigus aykeses* (a king is never indicted, as the sky cannot be tilled) was false. As Hess noted, the proclamation of the coup plotters constituted 11 points and promised a new era that would take Ethiopia out of backwardness. Accordingly, the question of modernization i.e., the inability to transform political and economic conditions which put Ethiopia even in bad conditions in comparison with post-colonial African states cited as the main reason to remove Haile-Selassie from power.[443] After this coup attempt, there came questions of change that revolved around justice, economic, political, ethnonational, and religious issues thereby ushering the beginning of the unmaking of the monarchy and the state it has made. The challenge against

[440] Details of the events unfolded during the coup attempt is provided in Christopher Clapham, "The Ethiopian Coup D'etat of December 1960," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 4 (1968): 395-97.
[441] Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution* (Yale University Press, 2009), 11-14.
[442] Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy*, 2, 134.
[443] For the extent the coup attempt affected the legitimacy of Haile-Selassie's regime, see Harold G Marcus, "1960, the Year the Sky Began Falling on Haile Sellassie," *Northeast African Studies* 6, no. 3 (1999).

the monarchy gained momentum after the coup attempt as it ushered an open opposition by ethnonationalism, educated Ethiopians, and reformist members of the monarchy itself.[444]

Opposition against the monarchy was taking place after the restoration of the monarchy in 1941 in a way unseen before the Italian occupation. Peasant and pastoral rebellions took place in several provinces including the 1943 rebellion in Tigray, the 1960 Gedeo uprising in South Ethiopia, the 1963 Balle rebellion, and the 1968 Gojjam rebellion were among the opposition's that the government was indeed note found it on the support of the peasants which comprised majority of the population and contribute the largest amount to the economy. These rebellions were caused by antagonism with the government as the result of injustices in taxation, land ownership, and governance problems.[445] The year 1960 also witnessed the decolonization of Somalia thereby ushering its "irredentist" claim over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in its attempt to establish "Greater Somalia" by incorporation of ethnic Somalis including those who were residing in Ethiopia's Ogaden region, southern Kenya, and Djibouti. This brought a threat for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and the first border conflict was fought in 1961 and 1964 that was followed by a full-scale war of 1977.[446] The coup was also immediately followed by the militarization of the ethnonationalist question in Eritrea. The establishment of different political movements in Eritrea dates to the period of the British mandate in Eritrea following the defeat of Italy in the region (1941-1952) when different political groups proliferated. However, following Haile-Selassie's unilateral annulment of the 1952 federation, the armed struggle for independence of Eritrea was started in 1961. The international dimension of the question of Eritrea was the moral and material support from Arab states which was very important in the Eritrean struggle for independence.[447] The Middle East was the hub for the emergence and articulation of Eritrean nationalism. In this regard, Eritreans who were studying in the Middle East mainly in Cairo were important in crystalizing Eritrean nationalism and anti-Ethiopian mobilizations. Mainly the Eritrean Student Club at al-Azhar University that was established in 1952 was significant in this aspect. These and similar movements established in different Arab countries had strongly affected domestic political movements in Eritrea

[444] Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991*, 209.
[445] Edmond J Keller, "Gebru Tareke. Ethiopia: Power and Protest; Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century.(African Studies Series, Number 71.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Pp. Xxi, 272. $49.50," (Oxford University Press, 1993).
[446]Belete Belachew, "Ethiopia in African Politics, 1956-1991" (PhD Dissertation in History. Addis Ababa University, 2012), 117-52.
[447] Haggai Erlich, "Ethiopia and Islam in Postrevolution Perspective," *Ethiopianist Notes* 1, no. 1 (1977): 9.

and served as a bridge to facilitate cooperation between Eritrean nationalists and leaders of the Muslim World.[448]

Thus, the 1960 coup attempt was a landmark in the proliferation of internal and external challenges against Haile-Selassie's government. As Clapham pointed out, in the wake of the 1960 coup the emperor did not resort to widespread suppression rather he opted for neutralization of potential sources of opposition. To do so, he systematically neutralized potential instigators of opposition by assigning them to ask governors of provinces far from Addis Ababa, tried to appease with the provision of promotion and land grants, and send some out as ambassadors in different countries as a means of detaching them from involving in the internal politics. In return, he brought young and abroad educated Ethiopians into important governmental positions.[449] Clapham added that these measures combined with the modernization endeavor of the Haile-Selassie produced three problems that worked against the empire. Firstly, Haile-Selassie was not able to deal with these mass social movements since he had become only engaged with avoiding opposition from the elite. Moreover, the politics in Ethiopia became only concentrated in Addis Ababa particularly in the court of the emperor without being deeply rooted in the mass constituency. This inn turn had the effect of creating a rule that was detached from a more robust political and social constituency.[450]

Even though the pace and the extent Haile-Selassie's government was willing and able to do in terms of making reforms, there were some changes even before the 1960 coup attempt. Among such changes was the revision of the constitution in 1955. Among the changes made in the new constitution was the establishment of the post of the prime minister even though the right to elect and dismiss the prime minister was provided as the right of the emperor. This has brought the coming into power of reformist and West-educated technocrats who were influential in the latter days of Haile-Selassie's rule. Prime-Minsters Aklilu Habte-Wolde (17 April 1961 to 1 March 1974) and Endalkachew Mekonnen (1 March 1974 to 22 July 1974) served within the tension between the autocratic conviction of the emperor and the demand for change that gradually started to threaten the functioning of the whole aspects of the government. In addition to the addition of the prime minsters' post, the revised constitution allowed the election of members of the lower house by universal

[448] Joseph L.Venosa, "The Eritrean Muslim League and Political Mobilization During the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation (1952-62)," *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review* 3, no. 1 (2013): 43-46.
[449] Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*, 61, 36.
[450] Ibid., 33.

suffrage. This right was given to the affluent and the nobility under the 1931 constitution. The rationale for revising the 1931 constitution was also motivated by the need to integrate Eritrea into the legal and administrative structure of Ethiopia. Eritrea under Italian colonialism and the British mandate has gone too far with the liberal constitution that it adopted while it was under British administration. Thus, there was a need to reconcile this with the contexts of the mainland.[451]

As it is mentioned above, the new social forces were the results of the projects under defensive modernization project also questioned the legitimacy of Haile-Selassie's regime. This includes students who were the result of the expansion of modern education, the army which Haile-Selassie invested too much in it, the civil servants who comprised the bureaucracy and other sections of the society like urban dwellers, taxi drivers, teachers, and workers unions. To begin with first, as Legesse Lemma observed the students and the intelligentsia studied domestically and abroad which were most affectionately cultivated by Haile-Selassie since he was a regent became the vocal opposer of the monarchy. Their political activities are known as the Ethiopian Students Movement (ESM) which refers to the opposition of the associations and organizations of students of Haile-Selassie I University College and Ethiopian students who were studying in the USA and Europe. Moreover, high school students were also actively engaging in the domestic movement of the students. The first major opposition from the students came immediately following the announcement of coup plotters of 1960. The ESM had three foreign or external dimensions. The first was the effect of the interaction with students of other African states that were enrolled in Haile Selassie I university as part of the promise of the emperor in 1958 meeting of independent African states to grant scholarships. As the result of this interaction, Ethiopian students were comparing realities in Ethiopia with that of other post-colonial Africa and they were dismayed by the performance of Haile-Selassie's government.[452]

The second foreign aspect was the role of Ethiopian students studying abroad who played important role in terms of articulating the rationales of opposition against the monarchy and in determining post-revolutionary scenarios. Ethiopian students had unions both in Europe and the USA that were actively integrated with the opposition at home. The

[451] Edmond J Keller, "Making and Remaking State and Nation in Ethiopia," *Borders, Nationalism, and the African State* (2005): 95-101.
[452] Legesse Lemma, "The Ethiopian Student Movement 1960-1974: A Challenge to the Monarchy and Imperialism in Ethiopia," *Northeast African Studies* (1979).

third external aspect of the ESM was its acquisition of Marxist-Leninist ideology as the ideational force of the opposition, and it is solidarity ways are revolutionaries of other societies that were in a relatively similar situation. Among other things, the ESM had three major effects in relation to the revolution and in determining post-revolutionary conditions in Ethiopia. The first was the mobilization for the land ownership rights of the peasants echoed by their famous slogan *"Meret Larashu"* (land to the triller) which was realized with the nationalization and redistribution of the land immediately after the fall of the monarchy. The second was the question of nationalities which pressed for self-determination rights of the ethnic groups that comprise Ethiopia. This led to the emergence of armed ethnonationalist struggles that led to the secession of Eritrea in 1991 and that brought the emergence of political organizations that have dominated the Ethiopian political scene since then.[453] The other aspects of ESM were its "radicalization" with the proliferation of Marxist-Leninist political groups that fought each other in addition to their conflict with the government. This led to the bloodshed known as "Red Terror" and "White Terror". While the first represents the execution of the members of opposing political parties by the Derge mainly of the first party established by the educated Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the second refers to the attack of EPRP against government officials including its assassination attempt against the leader of the military regime.[454]

The other important section of the Ethiopian society that grew dissatisfied with the deeds of Haile-Selassie's government was workers in the manufacturing and service sectors. As Hess observed, though industrialization was at its infancy stage workers were among vibrant sections of societies that waged opposition against the government. The first workers union in Ethiopia was established in 1947 and demanded changes in working conditions and engaged in strikes. However, the union faded in the early 1950s and despite the 1955 Constitution allowed the establishment of worker unions, the regime was very cautious against such organizations. In 1962, Labour Relations Decree was adopted on 5 September which dealt ways working conditions and the relationship between employer and employees. This was taking place while most of the population was engaging in agricultural products and only 200,000 of the population were out of this sector. In 1962, the confederation of

[453] Zewde, *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement, C. 1960-1974*, 18.
[454] "Comrades against Comrades" is a title given by Tareke in the chapter that addressed the bloodshed between ideologically identical political parties that emerged in the wake of the revolution both among themselves and against the military government. Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution*, 45-147.

Labor Unions was established. Since then, the number of workers' union strikes has increased.[455] The role of taxi drivers who were unhappy with the increase in the oil price of 1974 and the effect of teachers' union who demanded better working conditions should be underlined. Concerning the former, a very small increase in oil price was responded with large-scale protesters especially from taxi drivers. Teachers were demanding an increase in salary and for an improved work environment.[456]

Despite its role in the 1960 coup attempt, the military was a latecomer in the Ethiopian revolution. In the absence of the organized body that could take responsibility for leading the revolution, *Derge* ("committee") that was organized to propagate salary increment intervened suddenly acquiring the highest power in Ethiopia. The intervention of the military was preceded by cross-class oppositions that trembled the foundations of the monarchy. The last two years were a time of multiple challenges that proved that Haile-Selassie I was not in a position to effectively suppress the opposition or to bring the reforms sought by different sections of the society. Problems in Eritrea and Somalia were growing. As it is mentioned above, different sections of the society were waging their opposition against the regime. In the presence of such oppositions and the absence of an organized body, conditions were giving a way for intervention by the military. In the attempt of the 1960 coup to topple Haile-Selassie's government, the military took a leading role in both plotting and foiling coup attempts. But this time, the military was not a mastermind behind the revolution. It was voicing a salary increase and had organized a committee (known as Derge in Amharic) mostly comprised of low-rank officials to propagate this. Cognizant of the opposition against the regime and the 1973-74 drought in Wallo which killed more than 200,000 people, Derge directed its attention from a salary issue to addressing national challenges. While this was ongoing, the 82 years old Haile-Selassie was barely able to comprehend what was taking place. Haile-Selassie was deposed and imprisoned by Derge on 2 September 1974 and died the next year. The climax of the attack against the monarchy was 23 November 1974 with the execution of 60 officials of Haile-Selassie's government.[457]

[455] Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy*, 2, 80.
[456] Edmond J Keller, "The Revolutionary Transformation of Ethiopia's Twentieth-Century Bureaucratic Empire," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 19, no. 2 (1981): 326-27.
[457] For more on the role of the military both in pre and pots revolutionary period, see Haggai Erlich, "The Ethiopian Army and the 1974 Revolution," *Armed Forces & Society* 9, no. 3 (1983).

7.9. Conclusion

This chapter has assessed the post-WWII foreign policy of Haile-Selassie emphasizing on how the changing internal and international circumstances affected the modernization agenda. Even though Italy massacred almost one generation of educated Ethiopians and instilled religious and ethnic mistrust, its legacy in terms of eradicating obstacles of modernization and in the expansion of infrastructure is provided in detail supported by data. How the WWII contexts enabled Haile-Selassie to reclaim his throne and its effect in bringing the interference of Britain in domestic and foreign affairs of Ethiopia is also investigated in this chapter. How decolonization and the emergence of post-colonial states ended Ethiopia's uniqueness in the international system is also demonstrated. Moreover, the chapter assessed the forging of strong relations with the USA under Cold War contexts, and its role in Ethiopia's interest to exploit foreign resources is discussed. The development-based post-WWII environment with the establishment of development agencies of the UN and aid organizations of wealthy states is also dealt with in this chapter. At last, the chapter illustrated the failure of defensive modernization from inside as the alienation and dissatisfaction of sections of the Ethiopian society led to the overthrow of the monarchy.

This period witnessed an attempt of building a modern state with a relatively broader spectrum including industrialization in the economic sector, air and naval force in the military sector, the opening of universities and colleges in the education sector, and the establishment and broadening of the state bureaucracy. This was also a period that Haile-Selassie as a leader and Ethiopia as a state succeeded in playing important role in exploiting the foreign domain. With his influence in non-colonization and the OAU headquartered in Addis Ababa and as a founding member of the UN, Haile-Selassie did not only become one of the fathers of Africa but also became increasingly involved in propagating the interests of underdeveloped states in general. The age-old question of access to the sea was also answered with the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 thereby Ethiopia directly interacting with the outside world. Since the colonial threat was replaced by internal secessionist movements and border conflicts, the success in regional and international organizations was geared towards assuring the territorial integrity of the state. Concerning objectives of defensive modernization, even though success in comparison with previous

phases cannot be denied, the attempt to reconcile tradition and progress was becoming more challenging as the demand and the reality were not meeting.

The epoch assessed by this chapter also represents the peak of foreign intervention in determining the domestic conditions. The context Haile-Selassie regained his throne is one the most remarkable internal development that came true as a result of international influence. Haile-Selassie tried and failed to benefit from the collective security promise of the LN because major powers did not want to antagonize Italy until it became their enemy by joining the Axis Powers. But following Italy's joining of the Axis powers, Britain played a major role in liberating Ethiopia and restoring the monarchy in Ethiopia. As compensation for this, Britain wanted to enjoy a decisive role in Ethiopia's foreign and domestic issues which forced Haile-Selassie to look for the support of the USA so that he could regain control of the powers and pejoratives as a leader of an independent state. Even though Ethiopia was freed from Italian occupation with the support of Britain in 1941, the latter imposed its own protectorate-resembling influence in Ethiopia. Then, when this influence diminished after a decade, Ethiopia's foreign relations headed to dependence on another great power i.e., the USA. Thus, the foreign aspect of defensive modernization was dependence on foreign powers both for security and economic reasons.

For four decades Ethiopia strived to be a member of the family of states in the international system despite its underdeveloped and unstable domestic domain combined with persistent foreign treats. Defensive modernization as a path of finding European solutions for European problems failed to build a state that could survive by its own means. Membership in the LN could not guarantee protection from colonial occupation, which interrupted Haile Selassie's reign by five years. The occupation swept the domestic centuries-old political-economy and restoration gave Haile-Selassie a relatively conducive setting to draw new political configuration with unmatched centralization. After the internal power struggle was finalized in this way, the international system came up with a new superpower, with a new organization and norms that safeguard the survival of states with no distinction of wealth and power. Ethiopia found itself in an international environment that it wished to exist at the beginning of the 20th-century, a system that transfers capital and technology through the form of development and technical assistance without imperial threat. Though not colonized, Ethiopia adopted the justification of post-colonial states and became a major beneficiary of development aid. Even though European colonial rule did not

take a root in Ethiopia, post-WWII Ethiopian foreign policy followed a typical post-colonial foreign policy of the state. Accordingly, Ethiopia became a forerunner in shaping the relationship between the West and Africa as the result of the diplomatic success of Haile-Selassie as an international figure and one of the founders of the OAU. During this period, Ethiopia used international development assistance under the auspices of the UN and with wealthy nations to mitigate its domestic socio-economic challenges. Despite border contestations like other African states continued to affect Ethiopia, the persistent foreign threat which was the result of its rarity ended with the proliferation of post-colonial states that were protected by the principle of non-interference rather than by their capacity to reciprocate.

Defensive modernization as a project of preserving fundamental domestic features and averting colonialism finally entered a crisis phase both from internal and external directions. Internally the pace and the extent of the change brought by the modernization endeavor fell short of satisfying the interests of the emerging elites and the society in general. Accordingly, the military was the first to wage serious opposition by attempting to remove Haile-Selassie in 1960. But the military left the leading role to the intelligentsia, especially to the ESM. Ethiopian students articulated economic questions especially the land rights of peasants, the question of ethnicity, and protested against the autocracy of the monarchy. The students gradually rallied urban dwellers, workers unions, teachers, and taxi drivers. Given the opposition lacked formal organization, the military intervened bringing a bloody end to the monarchy and adoption of socialism as an ideology of the state. The land was naturalized, the church retracted from polticial life and the foreign relations directions also shifted from dependence on the USA to alliance with the USSR. In its last decades, defensive modernization was facing challenges from the external perspective mainly with the border contention with Somalia. The Eritrean and the Ogaden problems became the two pressing problems that threatened the territorial integrity of the state. Pressured from both internal and external directions, the monarchy lost legitimacy bringing its tragic end leaving serious challenges against the continuity of the state.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This dissertation investigated the trajectory of defensive modernization of Ethiopia and the interaction between domestic and foreign domains from 1896-1974. The study revolved around the puzzle in the success of the internally initiated state formation of Ethiopia which was finalized by creating the only independent African state following the advent of colonialism at the end of the 19th-century. Accordingly, the study has concentrated on the project of defensive modernization which was pursued for the sake of creating a modern state by maintaining important domestic features while adopting elements of European modernity. The review of the literature on Ethiopian foreign relations revealed that while Ethiopian foreign relations is a less investigated subject, full-fledged IR study that addresses the coalescing role of the agenda of modernization between domestic and foreign spheres is not available. Accordingly, this dissertation was aimed at investigating the effect of the defensive modernization project Ethiopia on the foreign relations direction the country followed from late 19th-century to late 20th-century. Moreover, to a solution of avoiding the challenge of studying underdeveloped states in IR, the study intended to uncover the link between the domestic and foreign domains in the process of the formation of the Ethiopian state and it sought to uncover the effect of the foreign realm in determining vital internal events of the resultant state. Through the utilization of HSIR and consultation of primary and secondary sources, the dissertation conducted an interpretative and reflective analysis to address the above issues.

Accordingly, the dissertation found out that Ethiopian history beginning from the 16th-century true to the late 20th-century can be divided into three phases of defensive modernization. The first phase of defensive modernization began at the beginning of the 16th-century with the involvement of the Ottoman Turkish and Portuguese forces supporting the Christian Kingdom and the Adal Sultanate, respectively. This period was characterized by the formation of the awareness and interest towards modern firearms, the weakening of central authority, religious conflicts both within the Christian Kingdom and between Christianity and Islam, and internal population movements. This phase ended with the rise of Tewodros II in 1855 who embarked on a project of creating a unified Ethiopian state. This

point in Ethiopian history also marks the beginning of the second phase of defensive modernization which was characterized by another phase of pursuit of modern weaponry, and an increasing presence of foreign powers in the Red Sea region as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal. Moreover, with the rise of powerful leaders in Ethiopia who rivaled against each other and fought consecutive wars against foreign invaders. In this regard, their success in acquiring foreign military technologies was important in shaping the domestic dynamics and the fight against foreign invaders. The end of this period was marked by the advent of colonialism which led to the Italian ambition to colonize Ethiopia. However, the Italian interest in controlling Ethiopia was aborted by the latter's final military victory at the battle of Adowa on 1 March 1896 thereby bringing recognition for independent statehood globally. This event marks the beginning of the third phase of defensive modernization that continued until the monarchical government was overthrown by the Ethiopian revolution in 1974.

This dissertation thoroughly investigated the link between defensive modernization and foreign relations that took place during this third epoch i.e., from the assertion of independent statehood in 1896 to the fall of the monarchy in 1974. For the sake of giving a historical background for the Ethiopian state formation and its modernization question, the dissertation has assessed the domestic, regional, and international developments since the early 16th-century that led to the emergence of the Ethiopian state at the end of the 20th-century. Accordingly, the dissertation concludes that the first two phases of defensive modernization were important in setting the ground for the fight against colonialism. The interaction with the foreign real facilitated the preconditions which enabled Ethiopia to emerge triumphant against colonialism and to pursue a domestically initiated path of modernization project.

Ethiopia was able to avoid falling under colonialism as the result of centuries-old domestic dynamics that prioritized ensuring continuity of internal features and averting foreign threats. This experience enabled Ethiopia to face colonialism in better conditions and contributed significantly to its emergence as the only independent African state. The competitive political and military internal dynamics with a strong sense of identity gradually evolved into the process of creating a modern state in the face of colonialism. The interest to dominate this competitive political scene and the necessity of surviving external threats were constantly pushing the pursuit for better military technologies. The introduction of

firearms as the result of the involvement of the Ottoman empire and Portuguese in the 16th-century and the encounters of Tewodros II with Egyptians in 1848 were the two most important events in inculcating the importance of modern weapons in the minds of Ethiopian rulers. These moments were vital among dozens of wars fought in Ethiopia because of their effect on the perception of the foreign realm as a source of military innovations. The former triggered the commencing of the first phase of defensive modernization while the latter prompted Tewodros II's vision of unifying divided Ethiopian provinces accompanied by his unquenching interest in modern weaponry.

Thus, Ethiopia's independence was enabled by both internal and external factors. The relative weakness of Italy in comparison with other colonial powers and its underestimation regarding the capacity of Ethiopia had also contributed to the victory. Italy missed the fact that the militarization of the Ethiopian state and society which emanated from the competitiveness of the domestic realm also could work against foreign threats too. This is evident in its provision of firearms to Menelik II in his rivalry against Yohannes IV. Moreover, the idea of change pursed in the two early phases of defensive modernization which was mainly revolving around building a strong military finally had brought the militarization of the political structure and the society. It is incontestably a paradox to say an improvised African people defeated one European power and survived as the only independent state of black people. The secret for this unlikely result was the interaction between violent internal political terrain and threatening foreign domain acted combinedly towards the formation of the Ethiopian state that was finalized by defeating the attempt of colonial imposition. This was the result of the increased awareness of the potential of firearms as the result of encounters with foreigners gradually facilitated the militarization of Ethiopian society and the state. However, as it is illustrated in this dissertation, it was late in the 20th-century that the Ethiopian military witnessed significant improvement with Yohannes IV's change in warfare and the modern weapons he acquired from British expedition forces. Moreover, Menelik II's effective leadership, accumulation and utilization of modern firearms created a formidable force under central leadership.

The modernization path that was pursued before the second Italian invasion was aimed at strengthening the domestic political, cultural, and economic systems as the foundation of the state. The victory against colonialism is a turning point in Ethiopian history since it was a time when the highly pursued modernization in the military area was replaced

by a broad endeavor of building a modern state. Thus, consolidation of the Ethiopian state formation process in 1896 that took place simultaneously with the European scramble of Africa underlined the need to build a modern state as a solution to domestic and foreign challenges emerged as the undisputed agenda of the time. Accordingly, the third phase of defensive modernization embarked upon a more complex objective as it took place in the face of continuous threats from colonial powers. Defensive modernization of this stage was the pivotal process that served as a platform for the interaction of domestic and foreign settings. Regarding this, the dissertation has uncovered that the endeavors of modernization in Ethiopia in the wake of the Adowa victory became a state-sponsored introduction of some elements of European innovations without jeopardizing fundamental internal traits. However, though the rulers and elites were very enthusiastic about repeating Japan's modernization in Ethiopia, measures aimed at transforming Ethiopia's conditions were far less significant in terms of changing the country's political economy.

The modernization path that was pursued before the second Italian invasion was aimed at strengthening the domestic political, cultural, and economic systems as the foundation of the state. Accordingly, rather than reforming the internal setting, the changes introduced strengthened the monarchy by eroding the power of hereditary power of traditional rulers, gave the church an increasing role in the public and social life of the society. The Ethiopian ruling class found itself in a special position that required the crafting of the path of modernization that the country should follow in its engagement with the modern international system. Even though the foreign threat was dealt with successfully for the time, the persistent threat from colonial powers that completely encircled Ethiopia was not over. As a result, the ruling class resorted to employing hybridization of domestic and foreign traits in the project of defensive modernization. The dissertation has identified that the monarchical political structure, the *gebbar* system, and the Orthodox Church with its cultural, social, and political roles were the three most important features that defensive modernization sought to preserve. On the other hand, features of European modernity that were adopted as part of the defensive modernization project included education, institutions of the state machinery, legal apparatus and so military sector.

The primacy of the question of modernization during the time under investigation was very decisive that dictated not only change and continuity in foreign policy, but it was also a grand concern that determined the internal political and socio-economic dynamics.

The ruling class became divided into progressive and conservative camps based on their attitude towards the introduction of European modernity elements. Modern education also collided with centuries-old and highly sophisticated Church education as the church-trained elite wanted to maintain their role in the state and societal life against the newly emerging secular class of intellectuals. The traditional administrative hierarchy was also alien to the European state machinery introduced at the time. However, dealing with European modernity was a necessity and the progressive block headed by *Ras* Tafari rallied educated Ethiopians and reformist sections of the ruling class thereby introducing European modernity became the defining features of Ethiopian foreign relations in the aftermath of the victory against colonialism. Moreover, the success of this group in dominating the foreign relation provided it leverage over the conservative forces. This enabled *Ras* Tafari (the latter Haile-Selassie) it to dominate Ethiopia's politics until the late 20th-century. As the effort of building a modern Ethiopian state was going through defensive modernization, it should be underlined that this group also sought to preserve main internal traits in the face of European modernity.

The question of modernization was a grand agenda that was aimed to ensure survival and enter the international system as an independent state. Thus, the question of modernization was a comprehensive subject that encompasses other vital political, economic, and security issues. Cognizant of the weakness of the internal capacities, the ruling class carefully maneuvered in search of the loopholes in the international system that could embolden their strength and diminish threats posed against the highly vulnerable Ethiopian state. Ethiopian rulers were aware of the link between European modernity and political power. Modernization in Ethiopia was regarded as an instrument that sought to fill internal deficiencies and to deal with regional and international pressures. Hence, the pursuit of defensive modernization was a pragmatic decision that was made to reconcile two interests. On one hand, there was a need to win the domestic rivalry and remain politically free from external domination including against the threat of European colonialism. European modernity had become a source of power that could not be sidelined. On the other, there was a need to preserve features of the domestic setting. A pragmatic path both from an internal necessity and from the pressure exerted from outside, but neither the ruling class nor the society could harmonize it with their interest and values, resulting in a perplexed reaction to look like a modern state with deeply rooted underdevelopment despite some success in introducing modern education and administrative areas.

The assessment of the contexts in which the Ethiopian state tried to survive especially in the pre-WWII era shows that an underdeveloped state with similar or worse domestic features with the rest of Africa was trying to be recognized as an independent state in the international system that only the "fittest" could survive. In other words, at the peak of European imperialism, a poor Ethiopian state deteriorated by war, famine, and poverty was seeking equal treatment from European nations which was a fact which is intriguing by all standards. The incongruity of Ethiopia's status as an independent state was an obvious truth as the result of a discrepancy in the features of the international system of the time and the domestic conditions. The latter one refers to Ethiopia's stagnant domestic setting combined with limited military capacity and subsistence agricultural economy that reproduced dire socio-economic formations. Thus, the paradox of Ethiopia's existence was that it was a state that was trying to survive in a time and space where a state that could not assure its survival and sovereignty by its own means was doomed to be subjugated. This was especially true after Ethiopia sought to ensure its survival by using the collective security promise of the LN as a guarantee.

Thus, during the period that extend from the victory of 896 to the WWII era, Ethiopia's survival was an aberration given the international system of the time allows subjugation of the weak by the powerful. This kind of existence presumed a sort of sovereignty what Jackson calls the "old sovereignty" doctrine to imply that was fundamentally different from the kind of sovereignty that emerged after WWII. International organizations and norms of the "new sovereignty" in the second half of the 20th-century made possible proliferation of weak states which otherwise could not.[458] Ethiopia attempted to survive in the international system that was operating by the principle of "old sovereignty": in a system, only the fittest could survive. Ethiopia during this period was the island of traditional society in the ocean of European imperialism and it was not a buffer zone deliberately left between colonial establishments of world powers. Rather, the scramble of Africa that engulfed the whole continent had tried to subjugate it but survived after a war against Italian colonial attempt; with little guarantee that the victory could be repeated. Thus, Ethiopia's endeavor to survive at the zenith of colonialism was a prototype that gives us the

[458] Discussion regarding the shift in sovereignty regimes and its implication on the emergence and survival states of non-European regions available in Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World."; *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, vol. 12 (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

opportunity for the study of states and the international system in IR since it enables us to reflect on how other African or any other non-Western state would be treated if it had existed in this system.

In the international system dominated by imperialism in which European states were colonizing peoples in other regions in the name of 'civilizing' purpose, features of Ethiopia and requirements of the system were fundamentally unfitting. Thus, the dawn of independence was the beginning of a new phase of an attempt to cope up with capabilities that could enable to deflect the unending survival threats imposed by European powers that had colonies surrounding Ethiopia. The gravity of the challenge, however, is not always well perceived to the fullest scale. Though the attempt to build a capable army never stopped and attempts to modernize different sectors was ongoing as part of the third phase of the modernization project, meaningful preparedness that could sustain foreign attack was lacking. Citing the Biblical verse, "Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God",[459] no matter the power of her adversaries, it was believed that Ethiopia would prevail against all odds with the help of God. The uninterrupted independence, as it is provided in *Kibre Negest*, was justified by Ethiopia's predetermined destiny to become the center of the world which other societies would gradually serve for the fulfillment of its greatness.

Ethiopia's independent existence was not founded on robust roots as it was evident in continuous troubles both in domestic and foreign affairs. Despite the supernatural discourse, *Ras* Tafari and his associates had grasped the vulnerability of the state, especially this was true the rationale of the engagement with the LN. Ethiopia's attempt to exploit the first international organization allows us to understand the concept of statehood and state-making in underdeveloped regions in the first half of the 20th-century. The establishment of the LN had introduced changes in the making of states as it forced the Ethiopian ruling class to reform and reorganize the domestic characters of the state. The study has assessed that the international circumstances were taken as an advantage and disadvantage by Ethiopia to address pressing domestic and foreign agendas. The expected advantage was collective security which was regarded as a shield against colonial threats. The second anticipated advantage was resource flow that would help restructure government machinery and infrastructural conditions. This opportunity was surfaced in the process of accession as

[459] Bible, Psalm 68:31.

Ethiopia's backwardness was cited against its quest for membership which brought the question of supporting Ethiopia in its modernization endeavor. From the foreign relations perspective, membership in the LN was mainly intended to discourage imperial motives of mainly Italy and Britain. Internally also the membership in the LN had enabled the progressive camp headed by *Ras* Tafari to emerge as undisputed Ethiopia's leader at the international state as he became considered as a legitimate Ethiopian leader even while he was in exile after the second Italian invasion.

This dissertation has demonstrated that the foreign realm posed persistent threats against Ethiopia's existence. Simultaneously, the foreign realm was considered a source of opportunities. The international system was mainly a source of military technology for several centuries until wide range of transformations through emulation of European modernization became a professed agenda since the early 20th-century. Moreover, the attempt to rely on the collective security promise of the LN was another example of the perception of the foreign realm as a resource. In this way, the international system was an arena of opportunities that was exploited by Ethiopia to emerge more powerful than the domestic capabilities could provide. The perception of the LN from the perspective of domestic political actors should be seen from this direction. As part of an increased opening of Ethiopia to the outside world, the success of accession in the LN was manipulated by the progressive group to dominate the domestic politics. Centralization of coercive apparatus and expansion of state administration and infrastructure which were required from Ethiopia in its attempt to be accepted as a full member in LN were also important issues of domestic politics. It reinforced the trend the Haile-Selassie's government was following after the adoption of the first constitution in 1931 which abolished the political power of provincial hereditary rulers.

The expansion of modern education, the introduction of the first constitution, and attempts to centralize taxation were among the major reforms. However, these modernization projects were met with resistance from domestic religious and political perspectives requiring Haile-Selassie to look for dominance in the internal political stage through the exploitation of the foreign relations area. The effect of the expansion of modern education was so important as it enabled Haile-Selassie to mobilize the new educated class against conservative classes of the aristocracy and the clergy. But, the designation of Haile-Selassie as progressive falls short of fulfilling what the term connotes as his reforms were

not sustainable beyond consolidating his power. On the other hand, while the persistent foreign threat motivated the quest for membership in LN to exploit the advantages of collective security, international developments were used to justify domestic reforms citing the need to cope up with the modern world. The dissertation has also illustrated that though the foreign realm was an instrument effectively exploited for the sake of dominating the internal power struggle, Ethiopia's independence could not be sustained following the second invasion of Ethiopia in 1936. This shows that though the foreign realm was regarded as a resource center for domestic modernization and the emergence of strong central power, it also continued as the main threat for Ethiopia's statehood bringing a temporary halting of Ethiopia's survival as an independent state. However, before falling at the hands of Italy, Ethiopia under the rule of Haile-Selassie was able to lay down some basic state machinery in different sectors.

Huge significance is accorded to the defiance against colonialism in modern Ethiopian history, using it as the ultimate expression of Ethiopia's destiny to be eternally free from external domination. However, the investigation of how great powers treated Ethiopia and how Ethiopian rulers maneuvered to use the narrow chances they had got to ensure the survival of the states demonstrates that Ethiopia was neither destined to be a free state by supernatural force nor it was dependent on its capacity to alleviate foreign threats. Moreover, time from victory against Italy in 1896 to the second Italian invasion 1936, though Ethiopia was independent in principle it practically lacked features of a free state. When the LN was dealing with the conflict, Italy was reiterating the "white man's burden" of civilizing 'barbaric' Ethiopia, and it was working against Ethiopia's diplomatic relations. Ethiopia's continuous existence and commencement of diplomatic relations with other states was an insult for Italy and the huge magnitude of the quest for modernization was for the sake of debunking Italy's depiction of Ethiopia in the LN. Looking at how the LN dealt with the war between Ethiopia and Italy in 1935/36, we observe indecisiveness in its decisions to consider Ethiopia as a full member. The case of Ethiopia was a test for the LN principles, provided in its Convention of the LN. Unable to prevent war when a strong Italy invaded Ethiopia, no matter Ethiopia's underdevelopment, it was among the first signals international organizations would not prevent future war between other member states. From this perspective, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia is regarded as the beginning of WWII, not when Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. The failure of Ethiopia under Italy was proof

that its existence as an independent state could no more be achieved by itself. Italy's attempt to occupy Ethiopia succeeded exactly after four decades of its defeat in 1896.

With Ethiopia's inability to defend itself and the failure of the LN to employ the collective security promise, Ethiopia was occupied by Italy in 1936. Until Ethiopia was liberated as the result of domestic resistance and opportunities of WWII it remained under Italy's occupation for five years. The problems created in the engagement with the LN were extensions of prior problems in the relations with European powers. Even though Ethiopia was an independent state in principle, it was prone to different kinds of influences from great powers which made its statehood nominal in practice. In less than a decade after European powers recognized Ethiopia's independence, they arranged of how to scramble it into their spheres of influence so that they could exploit the economy without establishing a direct colonial rule. The 1906 Tripartite Treaty which was signed between Britain, France, and Italy without the participation of Ethiopia was the most serious arrangement that haunted Ethiopia even after it had become a full member of the LN. Other bilateral agreements between the three powers during the LN crisis in the absence of Ethiopia also illustrate that independence was not seriously considered by great powers. The treaties signed between Ethiopia and Britain in 1942 and 1944 gave latter an upper hand both in internal and external affairs put Ethiopia almost at the level of occupied enemy territory. After Britain also, the Ethiopian foreign relation shifted to huge dependence on the USA since the 1950s. Generally, independence without a strong state with economic and military capacities, Ethiopia was theoretically a free but practically semi-colonial state set was submissive to all kinds of influences from great powers.

Moreover, independence of the state without a strong economy and military foundation made it is foreign relation mainly directed nearly towards exploiting the external domain for the sake of filling the internal gap. The aversion of colonialism indeed gave a privilege to the Ethiopian ruling class to devise a project of modernization that sought to preserve fundamental domestic features and prevented a direct imposition of European values. However, as the adjacent area falls under the grip of imperialism, the Ethiopian state became encircled by the colonial establishments of European powers. This condition gave no option other than dependence on foreign powers for the achievement of the goals of defensive modernization. Unfortunately, the state formation process and territorial consolidation finalized with the creation of a huge but landlocked state which made its

attempts to communicate with the external sphere dependent on the whims of others. This problem was solved when Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 1952 even though it didn't continue as part of Ethiopia because of its secession after the fall of the monarchy. No problem was as serious as in the state of the Ethiopian formation to the inability to get access to the sea despite having a territory that falls less than 100 kilometers of distance from the Red Sea. This fact made Ethiopia dependent on very small states like Djibouti and Eritrea.

Throughout the time investigated under this dissertation, the international realm has played a critical role in determining Ethiopia's vital internal developments. The agency of the external sphere on issues whether pursued by domestic or issues imposed externally had determined turning points in Ethiopian history. From the beginning, the advent of colonialism was important in giving momentum in the state formation process and in bringing territorial expansion and consolidation of the state at the end of the 20th-century. The exploitation of the support of France, Russia, and to some degree Germany against the British and Italian influence shows the extent to which Ethiopia's emergence as an independent state involved the huge role of foreign powers. During WWI, *Lij* Iyasu's attempt to reorient Ethiopia's foreign relations towards the Ottoman Empire and Germany has incurred him his power and his life following the collaboration of Britain and France with the Shawan nobles to oust him. Though unsuccessful, with the support of Ottoman Turkey and Germany, *Lij* Eyasu envisioned breaking a circle of colonial powers and get access to the Red Sea. Ethiopia's membership in the LN had brought the necessity to reconfigure internal features of the state including slavery which was a defining feature of Ethiopia's socio-economic reality during the time under investigation. The British support of the struggle against Italian occupation which restored Haile-Selassie to his throne in 1941 represents the zenith of the role of the international developments in determining domestic condition. Since then, for almost a decade Britain exercised enormous power in determining Ethiopia's internal and external affairs. It is with the increasing involvement of the USA that the British influence faded thereby opening a new era of Ethiopian foreign relations that relied on the newly emerged global power. From this trend, we can infer that the foreign realm was both a threat as well as an opportunity pursued to address domestic agendas.

As it is demonstrated in the last chapter, in the post-WWII era and with the emergence of post-colonial states, Ethiopia's rarity as an underdeveloped but independent state ended. The establishment of the UN and the simultaneously evolving international

norm of non-interference in states regardless of their wealth and power status ensured the survival of states like Ethiopia. The post-WWII international system was a scenario that Ethiopian rulers dreamt of since Ethiopia's emergence as a modern state in 1896. The division of the world into two blocks of rivalry under the context of the Cold War also enabled Ethiopia to establish a strong relationship with the USA and to benefit from huge military and development assistance. In addition to assuring survival, the development-filled international environment that facilitated the flow of knowledge and resources to poor states in the post-WWII era was in line with the objective of Ethiopia's foreign relations pursued in the interwar period. Unlike the pre-WWII era when imperialism was a major foreign threat, internal ethnonationalist movements with their implications on the territorial integration of the state became major security threats domestically in the 1960s. With the motivation of assuring territorial integrity of the state Ethiopia facilitated the formation of OAU and continued to play an active role in international organizations including in the UN. Even though Ethiopia was not colonized, Haile-Selassie became the voice of underdeveloped states.

Both with the internal effort and fortunate coincidence that brought exploitable opportunities, Ethiopia was able to avoid falling into the hands of foreign powers except the five years occupation of Italy. In this regard, the objective of defensive modernization to avoid falling on the hands of foreign powers was successful. However, it was internally catastrophic despite its success in giving some modern features to the state. This inadequacy was felt by none other than the new classes that emerged as the result of the modernization project. The pace and the extent of modernization efforts by the monarchical regime were not sufficient in comparison to the quest for change by these sections of the society. These very small but influential sections of the society were able to wage oppositions that eroded the legitimacy of Haile-Selassie's government in the eyes of the society in general. The common approach of addressing survival challenges with the support of foreign support could not be employed in this context as the problem faced was not a particular body that could be targeted neutrally. Though some sections of society took the leading role, the opposition against Haile-Selassie's regime united all citizens despite class differences. This brought the revolution of 1974 thereby resulting in radical changes both in internal and external affairs. Thus, the monarchy which sought to retain both the domestic tradition and adopt foreign progressive modernity elements was neither able to save the internal values nor it was able to modernize Ethiopia in line with the European model. This brought an end

to the third phase of defensive modernization and the adoption of Scientific Socialism which in turn led to the naturalization of the land and exclusion of the church in state affairs.

Generally, through the investigation of the link between modernization and foreign relations, this study has attempted to shed a light on the nexus between the domestic and foreign realms. The question of modernization was a grand question in Ethiopian history that determined both internal and external affairs. By addressing the role of this critical subject in the evolution of Ethiopia, the dissertation has attempted to place the study of Ethiopian foreign relations within the broader domestic and international contexts. In this regard, the study may contribute its own share given the scarcity of IR studies on Ethiopian foreign relations especially in terms of making sociologically and historically sensitive assessment. In light of addressing the interaction of Europe with societies in other regions and framed in relation with the challenge of studying non-Western states in IR, the study may also give insight to comprehensively understand the process of state formation, domestic politics, and foreign affairs in Ethiopia which is a unique African case. Moreover, the study has shown that careful exploitation of the foreign sphere was the basic foundation of the success of the Ethiopian state during the time under investigation. As an underdeveloped state, capitalizing on this objective of foreign relations will have importance in addressing domestic challenges and foreign threats that contemporary Ethiopia is facing. In this regard, the study may be used as input for future studies that are aimed at revealing the change and continuity of Ethiopian foreign policy across the regimes.

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
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. The Amharic excerpt of the Adowa Treaty's article that caused the war between Ethiopia and Italy



ጉሠ፡ ነ ር ቱ፡ ኒ ጢ አ ት፡ የ ሰ ራ፡ ሰ ው፡ ከ ግ ዲ፡ ጓ ዝ
ት፡ ወ ዲ፡ ፅ ጓ ዛ ት፡ ስ ፐ ቄ፡ የ ሂ ጂ፡ እ ግ ዲ ሆ ነ፡ ሪ ት ም፡
እ ያ ሰ ፈ፡ ይ ል ካ ሉ።

፲፭ ተ ኛ፡ ክ ፍ ል፡

የ ጣ ር ያ፡ ጎ ጓ ዯ፡ በ ከ ር ሰ ቲ ያ ን፡ ሃ ይ ማ ኖ ት፡ የ ተ
ከ ለ ከ ለ፡ ስ ለ ሆ ነ። የ ኢ ት ዮ ጵ ያ፡ ጎ ጉ ሠ፡ ነ ገ ሥ ት፡
በ ሚ ቻ ላ ቸ ው፡ ነ ገ ር፡ ሁ ሉ፡ በ ጎ ራ ቸ ው፡ በ ር ያ፡ እ
ግ ዲ ይ ነ ግ ዯ፡ ይ ከ ለ ከ ለ ሉ።

፲፮ ተ ኛ፡ ክ ፍ ል፡

ይ ህ፡ አ ሁ ን፡ የ ተ ጸ ፈ ው፡ ው ል፡ ለ ኢ ት ዮ ጵ ያ፡ ሁ ሉ፡
መ ን ግ ሥ ት፡ ው ል፡ ነ ው።

፲፯ ተ ኛ፡ ክ ፍ ል፡

ይ ህ፡ ው ል፡ በ ተ ጸ ፈ ገ፡ ካ ፅ ፊ መ ት፡ በ ኋ ላ፡ ከ ፀ ቱ፡
መ ን ግ ሥ ት፡ እ ግ ዯ ቸ ው፡ ው ል፡ ለ መ ጫ መ ር፡
ወ ይ ም፡ ለ መ ለ ወ ጥ፡ የ ፈ ለ ጉ ቸ ው፡ እ ግ ዲ ሆ ነ፡
ከ ፊ መ ት፡ በ ፌ ት፡ አ ስ ቀ ዯ ሞ፡ መ የ ግ ር፡ ይ ግ ባ
ቸ ዋ ል። ነ ገ ር፡ ግ ን፡ የ ግ ሌ ጉ ን፡ ው ል፡ ሀ ም፡ ማ
ረ ም፡ ማ ስ ጠ ፋ ቱ፡ ይ ቻ ለ ኖ ዋ ል፡ እ ግ ዚ፡ ዛ ሬ
የ ተ ለ የ ው ን፡ የ ዱ ም በ ር፡ ወ ሰ ን፡ ማ ፍ ረ ስ፡ እ ይ
ቻ ለ ቸ ው ም።

፲፰ ተ ኛ፡ ክ ፍ ል፡

የ ኢ ት ዮ ጵ ያ፡ ጎ ጉ ሠ፡ ነ ገ ሥ ት፡ ከ እ ዋ ሮ ፓ፡ ነ ገ
ሥ ታ ት፡ ለ ሚ ፈ ል ጉ ት፡ ጉ ዲ ይ፡ ሁ ሉ፡ በ ኢ ጣ ሊ
ያ፡ መ ን ግ ሥ ት፡ እ ን ጻ ኒ ት፡ መ ላ ላ ክ፡ ይ ቻ ላ ቸ ዋ
ል።

፲፱ ተ ኛ፡ ክ ፍ ል፡

የ ኢ ት ዮ ጵ ያ፡ ጎ ጉ ሠ፡ ነ ገ ሥ ት፡ ከ ሌ ላ፡ መ ን ግ ሥ

Appendix 2. A copy of a letter of Tesfaye Tegegn served as a diplomat in the Ethiopian Embassy in Paris during the Cold War

