T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

POLITICAL COMPROMISE AND COALITIONS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF *MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ*

PhD THESIS

Halit TUNÇKAŞIK

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ANKARA 2020

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THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Prof. Dr. Yılmaz Bingöl

Supervisor

ANKARA, 2020

APPROVAL PAGE

The thesis, prepared by Halit TUNÇKAŞIK and titled "Political Compromise and Coalitions in Turkey: The Case of *Milli Görüş*" is accepted as a doctoral thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration by unanimous vote/majority vote.

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PLAGIARISM PAGE

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

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Halit TUNÇKAŞIK

ABSTRACT

POLITICAL COMPROMISE AND COALITIONS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF *MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ*

TUNÇKAŞIK, Halit

Ph.D., the Department of Political Science and Public Administration

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Democracy, which has become the unique source of legitimacy for governments, needs infrastructure elements as well as its formal institutions. Political culture is regarded as the critical element of this infrastructure. Similarly, "Political compromise" is a crucial element of the political culture that is "favourable for democracy." The assumption that "Turkey has a weak culture of political compromise" is prevalent. According to this view, it has a confrontational and polarized culture resulting from ideological, ethnic, and religious distinctions.

Turkey's democracy, until a few years ago, has implemented a parliamentary system that tends to produce coalitions. Since compromise lies at the heart of coalitions, the study of coalitions is convenient for analysing the culture of political compromise. According to the general view, Turkey's coalition governments are like the mirror of said culture of conflict. The starting point of this study is the objection to this generalization. The study's central assumption is that *Milli Görüş* has a distinctive compromising character compared to other political actors and has revealed it in the coalitions it took part in.

The study's research question was developed as "What are the indicators and reasons for *Milli Görüş* movement to have a distinctive compromising character? Around this pivotal problem, other questions arose from it are identified as sub-problems to be investigated: Why political compromise is significant for democracies; to what extent has the culture of political compromise developed in Turkey; what kind of characteristic/difference does *the Milli Görüş* movement have in this cultural environment; how this difference manifested itself in the four coalitions of *Milli Görüş*; and which factors may count for this distinctive compromising character? In this context, the analysis of *Milli*

Görüş coalitions from the perspective of political compromise was determined as the study's focal point, whereas valid answers were tried to be obtained for other problem areas.

The study consists of six chapters apart from the introduction and conclusion sections. The first of these chapters is devoted to the basic concepts on which the study is built; the second part to *Milli Görüş*; three, four, and fifth chapters to *Milli Görüş* coalitions; the last part to the question of how and why *Milli Görüş* is of compromising character. Thus, a conceptual framework has been created in the first chapter, while the basic data of the thesis have been presented in the following four chapters, and the analysis and evaluation of the data have been made in the last chapter.

In the collection of study data, alongside the literature search, it has been benefited mainly from the minutes of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the reports of the major media outlets, and interviews conducted with representatives of *Milli Görüş*. With these semi-structured interviews, the views and understanding of distinguished members of the movement who had served in various influential positions of the parties since the 1970s, including Chairman, minister, general secretary, deputy, were tried to be detected.

The results obtained from the data presented in the study seem to be compatible with the basic assumption of the study. Coalitions in which *Milli Görüş* took part in (1974 CHP-MSP Coalition; 1975 AP-MSP-CGP-MHP Coalition; 1977 AP-MSP-MHP Coalition; 1996 RP-DYP Coalition) showed that this movement had a remarkable difference in terms of political compromise. Many events and developments in the process of establishment, functioning, and dissolution of these coalitions make it possible to see this compromising character. Meanwhile, one dimension of this compromising character is related to non-political actors, namely the military, and this dimension is mentioned as the occasion arose. As the factors that count for this compromising character, the temperament and upbringing milieu of the leader; the Islamic understanding of the movement; rational (realistic and pragmatic) strategy; and the understanding of nationalism with the sensitivity of national unity has been determined.

Keywords: Political culture, political compromise, *Milli Görüş*, coalition.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE'DE SİYASİ UZLAŞMA VE KOALİSYONLAR: MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ ÖRNEĞİ

TUNÇKAŞIK, HALİT

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Ekim 2020, 403 Sayfa

Yönetimlerin en önemli meşruiyet kaynağı haline gelmiş olan demokrasi, yaşayabilmek için biçimsel kurumların yanında altyapı niteliğinde unsurlara da ihtiyaç duyar. Siyasi kültür, bu altyapının en önemli unsurlarından biri olarak kabul edilmektedir. "Siyasi uzlaşma kültürü" ise "demokrasiye elverişli siyasi kültür"ün kritik bir öğesini oluşturmaktadır. Türkiye'de siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün zayıf olduğuna dair görüş yaygındır. Bu görüşe göre, Türkiye, ideolojik, etnik ve dini ayrımlardan kaynaklanan kutuplaşmış-çatışmacı bir kültüre sahiptir. Bu kültür ülkenin demokrasisinin yanı sıra çok yönlü gelişimini yavaşlatmaktadır.

Türkiye demokrasisi, birkaç yıl öncesine kadar esas olarak parlamenter sistemi uygulamıştır ve bu sistem koalisyonlar üretme eğilimindedir. Koalisyonların temelinde uzlaşma yattığına göre, koalisyonların incelenmesi, uzlaşma kültürünün analizi açısından önem taşımaktadır. Hâkim görüşe göre, Türkiye'nin koalisyon hükümetleri ve bu hükümetlerde yer alan siyasi partiler de, uzlaşmazlık kültürünün aynası olmuşlardır. Bu çalışmanın çıkış noktası bu genellemeye dair itirazdır. Çalışmanın temel varsayımı şudur: *Milli Görüş* hareketi Türk siyasi hayatında diğer siyasi aktörlere göre daha uzlaşmacı bir karaktere sahiptir ve bunu içinde yer aldığı koalisyonlardaki tutumuyla ortaya koymuştur.

Çalışmanın araştırma sorusu şudur: "*Milli Görüş* hareketinin siyasi uzlaşma yönünden diğer siyasi aktörlerden farkı nedir ve bu farkı meydana getiren sebepler nelerdir? Bu temel problemin etrafında, siyasi uzlaşmanın demokrasiler için neden önemli olduğu, Türkiye'de siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün ne kadar gelişmiş olduğu, *Milli Görüş* hareketinin bu ortamda nasıl bir özellik/farklılık taşıdığı, bu farklılığın *Milli Görüş*ün dört koalisyonunda nasıl ortaya çıktığı ve bu farklılığın hangi faktörlerden kaynaklandığı soruları da araştırılacak alt problemler olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu çerçevede, çalışmanın odağındaki *Milli Görüş*

koalisyonları siyasi uzlaşma kavramı perspektifinden analiz edilmiş, bunun yanında diğer sorun alanları için geçerli cevaplar elde edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Çalışma, giriş ve sonuç bölümleri dışında altı bölümden oluşmuştur. Bu bölümlerin ilki çalışmanın üzerine inşa edildiği temel kavramlara; ikinci bölümü *Milli Görüş*'e; üç dört ve beşinci bölümleri *Milli Görüş* koalisyonlarına; son bölümü *Milli Görüş*ün nasıl ve neden görece daha uzlaşmacı olduğuna özgülenmiştir. Böylece ilk bölümde kavramsal çerçeve oluşturulmuş, izleyen dört bölümde tezin temel verileri ortaya konmuş, son bölümde verilerin analizi ve değerlendirilmesi yapılmıştır.

Çalışma verilerinin toplanmasında, doküman incelemesinin yanısıra, esas olarak ele alınan kavram ve dönemin kesişimini yansıtan Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi tutanakları, dönemin önde gelen medya organlarının haber ve yorumları ve *Milli Görüş* temsilcileriyle yapılan yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlardan yararlanılmıştır. Mülakatlarla 1970'li yıllardan bu yana *Milli Görüş*'ün siyasi partilerinde başkanlık, başkan yardımcılığı, bakanlık, milletvekilliği, vs. görevlerde bulunmuş önemli isimlerin konuyla ilgili görüşleri irdelenmiştir.

Çalışmada ortaya konan verilerden elde edilen sonuçlar, tezin temel varsayımıyla uyumlu görünmektedir. *Milli Görüş*ün içinde yer aldığı koalisyonlar (1974 CHP-MSP Koalisyonu; 1975 AP-MSP-CGP-MHP Koalisyonu; 1977 AP-MSP-MHP Koalisyonu; 1996 RP-DYP Koalisyonu) bu hareketin siyasi uzlaşma tutumu bakımından ciddi bir farklılık taşıdığını göstermiştir. Bu koalisyonların kurulması, işleyişi ve sona ermesi sürecindeki birçok olay ve gelişme bu uzlaşmacı karakteri görmeyi mümkün kılmaktadır. Söz konusu uzlaşmacı karakteri yaratan faktörler olarak, liderin mizacı ve yetişme tarzı; hareketin benimsediği İslam anlayışı; rasyonel (gerçekçi ve faydacı) strateji ve milli birlik hassasiyetine sahip milliyetçilik anlayışı tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasi kültür, siyasi uzlaşma, Milli Görüş, koalisyon.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK Parti	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
AP	Adalet Partisi (Justice Party)
BP	Birlik Partisi/(Unity Party)
BBP	Büyük Birlik Partisi (Grand Unity Party)
CP	Cumhuriyetçi Parti (Republican Party)
CGP	Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Trust Party)
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
CKMP	Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Peasants' Nation Party)
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
DP	Demokratik Parti (Democratic Party)
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
DTP	Demokrat Türkiye Partisi (Democratic Turkey Party)
DTP	Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
FP	Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
GP	Güven Partisi (Trust Party)
HADEP	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democracy Party)
HEP	Halkın Emek Partisi (People's Labour Party)
HP	Halkçı Parti (Popülist Party)
IDP	Islahatcı Demokrasi Partisi (Reformist Democracy Party)
MCP	Milliyetçi Calışma Partisi (Nationalist Labour Party)
MDP	Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party)
MGK	Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)

MNP	Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)
MP	Millet Partisi (Nation Party)
MP	Muhafazakar Parti (Conservative Party)
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
NF I.	First Nationalist Front Coalition Government
NF II.	Second Nationalist Front Coalition Government
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers' Party)
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SHP	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic People's Party)
SİP	Sosyalist İktidar Partisi (Socialist Power Party)
SP	Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
TİP	Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkey Workers Party)
YTP	Yeni Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party)

INTRODUCTION

Democracy, as a specific political regime, has particular institutional elements. These elements are elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 2005: 188). These indicators can show whether democracy exists, but they do not say whether democracy can survive. It is widely recognized that there should be infrastructure that will feed democracy to survive via regenerating the above institutions. This infrastructure is a political culture. For many political scientists, the political culture of society has significant importance for a democratic regime. Political culture, which reflects attitude, values, and beliefs about political phenomena, is believed to have a significant influence on providing stability and continuity of any democratic regime. (Heywood, 2007; Gutmann & Thomson, 2010)

Political compromise, a significant component of political culture, is a vital phenomenon for democracy since it can reproduce democracy (Bellamy & Hollis, 1998; Şaylan, 2006:1). It is also argued that the reasons for compromise are inherent in the democratic ideal. Compromise can give greater legitimacy to public policy beyond what can be achieved by only majority decision, and not only for the consequences but because of the very fact that the decision was a compromise (Rostbøll, 2017). It also promotes the government's desirable stability and facilitates political urbanities, which make for tolerance and restraint from compelling the opposition into open rebellion or revolution (Colegrove, 1960: 23).

Compromise is inevitable in all types of democratic regimes. In a parliamentary system, for instance, compromises are needed to form coalition governments and keep those coalitions intact in many cases. Democratic legislatures are majoritarian institutions, and as a rule, a majority is required to pass the bills and other texts of norms. Likewise, minority governments are naturally founded on compromise and need the backing of supporting parties. When it comes to presidential governments, such as the US, compromises are required and made between different government branches to evade from deadlock (Rostbøll, 2017: 623). On the other hand, compromises are not merely democratic

conveniences or apparatuses used to secure majority support that is a technical obligation. Sometimes, compromises are put to use beyond passing a law or forming a cabinet. These compromises are rather appealed for having more comprehensive support for legislation and public policy. In this way, enacted laws are more likely to be appreciated by broader public masses and live longer. (Rostbøll, 2017: 623). Thus, considering all these evaluations, the word of Bellamy and Hollis word on compromise (1998) gains much sense: Compromise is as the "lifeblood of liberal democracies" (p.54).

Although it is believed to be prevalent in daily politics, discussions on a compromise have not been seen in political theory and philosophy until recent years. In recent years, however, it is possible to say that there has been a proliferation in the studies on this subject. Among those who are interested in that concept, since 2000, Bellamy, Fumurescu, Gutmann and Thompson, Lepora and Goodin, Margalit, Wiseman, Dixit-Grosman, and Gul and Weinstock come to the fore (Rostbøll, 2017). Central themes in works of those analysts are the conceptualisation of political compromise, producing sub-concepts of the term, the necessity, prevalence, and value of compromise in democratic politics of plural societies, nature and features of compromise, critics of a particular model of compromise, and so on. However, infertility on this crucial matter seems to be ongoing in Turkey, where this situation refers to a much sharp contrast because Turkey is one of the countries which has been experiencing the lack of political compromise heavily. This thesis can be considered an important and assertive initiative within this context as it deals with a subject that has not been studied enough. On the other hand, it may also have a reminder feature for new studies in this field.

There are many established beliefs about particular societies with regard to political compromise. (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros, Jones, 2012) An American tradition, for example, is believed, calls for compromise of internal political issues in the interest of domestic tranquility and public welfare. Some commentators even suggest that the United States has used its capacity of compromise in solving crucial issues such as the abolition of slavery (Wolfe, 1992). According to Fumurescu (2013: 1), "In the English-speaking world at least, most politicians and theorists would agree that "politics is the art of compromise" and that the Americans are particularly good at it."

In the case of Turkey, simply the opposite ideas are quite common. According to that view, Turkey suffers from a lack of political compromise culture. Being described as a

society where ideological, ethnic, and religious divisions cut deep and where the relentless contest between secular and Islamic ideas take place (Huntington: 1993; Grigoriadis, 2009; Kanra, 2009:2; Çarkoğlu, Toprak, 2007, Kiriş, 2011) many problems of the country are deemed as an output of absence of compromise culture. Likewise, for Şaylan, limits and constraints of established political compromise count for problems related to political instability in Turkey. (Şaylan, 2006:1)

Some opposite views suggest that political compromise is not something unfamiliar phenomenon in Turkey's political culture. According to these views, there are many aspects and experiences of political compromise culture, not only in contemporary political life but also in a long history. Within this scope, it is purported, roots of compromise and peaceful coexistence in Muslim societies go up to Islam's emergence. Starting with the "era of bliss" compromise and tolerance attitude lasts for centuries with examples of Madina, Andalus, and Ottoman states. (Atçeken, 2009) Likewise, it is believed that many values that are elements of compromise such as tolerance, humanism, resolution, and peaceful solution are strongly highlighted in the Anatolian Sufi notion, which is a part of the cement of Anatolian society. (Dinçer, 2012) However, taking a look at particularly Turkish political life, including the Ottoman era, which has been dominated by patrimonial political culture, it does not seem possible to say that the culture of compromise has improved a lot. Especially after the Republic, Turkey's political history seems to be full of polarization views rather than compromise. The authoritarian political practice of a single party, which established just after the foundation of the Republic; government crisis which occurred during the democratic regime and military interventions which used those crises as a ground; historical ethnic and religious cleavages which could not be resolved so far are the facts that support this view.

Turkey's democracy has experienced a relatively long tradition of the parliamentary system of government. Parliamentarism, with the proportional election system, has frequently forced political compromise among political parties due to election results, giving no chance for a single party to rule. Those events have provided an experience of compromise for parties whose essential goal is to participate in government. Taking part and working compatibly in coalition governments was strictly related to parties' compromise ability. Indeed, there have been many obstacles and problems during the foundation and working of many coalition governments. Therefore, the duration of them was not long

enough to reflect a strong compromise culture. Due to some coalition's frailty, severe political instability and crisis occurred, some of which were exploited by the military authority to intervene (Heper, 2011; Ortaylı, 2012).

Nevertheless, it would be reductivism to see all Turkish democratic life as a perpetual disagreement and conflict story. There might be fair samples of compromising attitude in the political history of Turkey. There is some notable signs which suggest that *Milli Görüş* could be an exceptional example of Turkey's political compromise culture. First, after the first elections in which Milli Görüş joined (1973), it formed a coalition with the CHP, which was the farthest party regarding the worldview and represented the left ideology. Then, two coalitions of right-wing parties - NF I and NF II - took part (Yalansız, 2006: 325). Milli Görüş established its last coalition in 1996. During this period, Milli Görüş declared that they could establish a coalition with all parties and proved this with their actions (Milli, 8 June 1996).

Coalitions in which *Milli Görüş* parties participate deserves to be analysed from a closer perspective because those parties have represented mainly a core section of religious people who have been incompatible with the essential values of "Republic" (Bingöl & Akgün, 2005). In other words, the "*Milli Görüş*" ideal and its follower's exemplify the farthest social category with respect to the established ideology of State (Vielhaber, 2012, Akşin, 2007). Therefore, analysing the roots of compromise in that category could indicate a compromise potential of the whole society and accordingly reveal Turkey's democratic capacity.

A starting point of this thesis has been that *Milli Görüş* might be a good example of political compromise culture. In other words, the primary assumption is that the coalition practices of *Milli Görüş* submit a good practice in terms of political compromise culture, which is commonly believed to be deficient in Turkey. Within this scope, the extent of the contribution of Erbakan and *Milli Görüş* to compromise culture, social peace, and democratic development is going to be scrutinised.

Erbakan and his *Milli Görüş* ideal have been subject to many assessments, which included opposite views. On the one end, there has been intensive criticism from some circles, which claimed that Erbakan had radical ideas and *Milli Görüş* is of extreme, fundamental, or irreconcilable character (Sunier, Landman, 2015; Rabasa, Larrabee, 2008;

Balı, 1999; Erdoğan, 2012). On the other hand, in many evaluations about Erbakan, it was claimed that Erbakan advocated compromise and peace rather than polarization and conflict in society. According to these assesments, Erbakan prevented the radicalization of Islam (Emre, 2011: 21), carried out the struggle for power within the legal framework (Ilıcak, 2011: 57), brought society and politics together and made a compromise between the state and Islam (Bostancı, 2011: 105), kept rising Islamism within the democratic parliamentary system and secured compromise (Akyol, 2011: 38). Some even criticised Erbakan and his ideal for having too compromising character, and they were charging this political line as submissive and docile (Özkan, 2003).

Even though such opinions will be referred to in the name of presenting different approaches, this thesis will be based on the objective facts and events, which is the only way to analyse on a reliable basis. The compromising character of *Milli Görüş* will be examined through the four coalitions in which parties of this ideal took place. A few valid reasons why coalitions practices are taken as the focus of analysis: First, the best way to understand any paradigm or ideal is to look at how it transformed into practice (Uçar, 2015). Discourse is also a useful indicator of ideals, and therefore discourse of *Milli Görüş* will not be neglected. However, the genuine identity of a person, institution, or ideologies can be diagnosed by their practice better. Secondly, coalition practice is the best sample when it comes to "political compromise" since these practices reflect the maximum potential of different views, interests, and parties. That is, coalition times reveal the maximum boundaries of compromise capacity of political views. Another reason for choosing coalition practices is about the practical requirements of work. Examining any subject needs limitation because time and sources are limited, while any subject has many dimensions. Nevertheless, while analysing the practices of *Milli Görüş* as a partner of coalition governments, when the occasion arose, it became necessary to refer to the worldview, mindset, theoretical background, etc. of this ideal, which lie behind almost all the acts and deeds.

Milli Görüş is taken as a movement, which has been founded and moulded by Necmettin Erbakan. In that sense, all parties established, directly or indirectly, by Erbakan have been named "*Milli Görüş* Parties." Naturally, only parties that took part in coalition governments will be examined. On the other hand, since *Milli Görüş* ideal in total can be deemed as a reflection of the political personality of Necmettin Erbakan, there will be no

distinction between *Milli Görüş* and Erbakan. In that sense, talking about *Milli Görüş* will mean talking about Erbakan's political stance and attitude.

Like all social science research, this thesis rests on a foundation of some ontological and epistemological assumptions. For example, "Democracy is the lesser evil political regime" is one of the thesis' postulates; there will be no criticism or contemplation on the value of democracy. Nor will there be any examination on alternative democratic models. The other assumption will be that "compromise is good." Even though several approaches and criticism (Weinstock, 2013; Ulshafer, 1992; Gutmann, A. & Thomson, D. 2010; Weinstock, 2017) about the value of compromise will be referred, those views will be presented to reveal different aspects of the concept; not for ethical legitimacy of this attitude. Another postulate of the work is the democratic validity and value of coalition governments. In that sense, when the need arises, coalitions are taken as an achievement, since the democratic procedure and general interest requires such a solution.

As a useful reminder, one more thing is that it has been preferred to use its original name for *Milli Görüş* as being the subject of this study, and the movement has been expressed with this original name throughout the study. The first reason for this is that in such a comprehensive study, an ideology and movement that has left its mark on Turkish political history deserves to be pronounced with its original name. Secondly, it seems that there is no uniformity in the English translation of this proper noun in the related literature. Conversely, a wide range of adjective clauses are used to call this movement: National Outlook (Çaha and Baykal, 2017; Yang and Guo, 2015: 6; Yıldız, A., 2003), National View (Yıldız, M., 2017: 357; Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008: 15), National Vision (White, 2014: 14; Arpacı, 2017: 12), National Opinion, (Akın and Coşkun, 2017: 2), National Thought (Öner, 2015: 157). Even some called it Islamic View (Tuğrul, 2017: 248) because of the Islamic identity of this movement. To avoid such a turmoil that is likely to cause blur and difficulty to follow the movement in the literature, *Milli Görüş* has been preferred.

Finally, it would be useful to introduce the parts of the thesis briefly. The study consists of six chapters, apart from the introduction and conclusion parts. The first chapter has been devoted to basic concepts on which the study is built and the relationships between these concepts. In this context, political culture has been examined with its both general dimensions and Turkey aspects. Secondly, political compromise as one component of the political culture has been analysed with its conceptual content, its significance for

democracies and its implications for Turkey. Thirdly, the concept of government coalitions also has been examined in both its general dimensions and in the sense of Turkish experience and these coalitions are interpreted from the perspective of political compromise culture.

The second part of the study has been devoted to *Milli Görüş* independently. The section has been formed under three subtitles in order to evaluate the Movement as a whole: Islam-Politics Relations; Necmettin Erbakan and His Islamist Personality; National View: Ideology and Movement. These headings try to reveal, in a holistic perspective, the pre-Milli Görüş background, the determinant position of Necmettin Erbakan with his personality and mentality in the Movement, and the discourse and actions of the Movement. This part of the study contains essential data in revealing the reasons behind Milli Görüş's "compromise" tendency.

The third, fourth and fifth parts of the study have been allocated to the four coalition experiences of *Milli Görüş*. CHP-MSP Coalition is examined in the third chapter, National Front I and National Front II coalitions are examined in the fourth chapter and RP-DYP Coalition is examined in the fifth chapter. Each coalition has been covered under the following sub-headings:

- political conditions before the coalition was formed
- formation, structure and protocol of the coalition
- operation challenges and dissolution of the coalition

Thus, each coalition has been analysed with the perspective of political compromise from its pre-establishment conditions to its end.

The sixth part of the study has been devoted to analysing the indicators and reasons of the Milli Görüş's compromising attitude. While the data providing evidence of the Milli Görüş's tendency to compromise is presented in the first part of the chapter, the variables behind this tendency are discussed in the second part. The evaluations in the first part are essentially filtered from three parts describing the coalition periods, while the data in the second part are acquired in the light of the data presented in the Milli Görüş chapter as well as the chapters on coalitions.

METHODOLOGY

Importance of the Research

Outstanding theories of democracy, whether they are classical or modern, acknowledge that there is a particular political culture possessed by citizens of a democratic society (Diamond, 1993: 10). Hence, cultural variations are crucial in the determining course of the political development in a given country (Mihaljević, 2013: 11), and its democratic structure.

It is difficult to have established democracy, though it is relatively easy to establish formal institutions of democracy. Therefore, the country with a democratic form in the world is many, but the country that has fully adopted democracy is few. Therefore, the approach that reveals the relationship between the environment where democracy can be grown and live and "political culture" gains importance. The main thing that can make democracy real and permanent is the existence of a political culture that is suitable for democracy, of which political compromise is a critical element.

Political compromise is critical for democracies because all institutions created to provide political activity in democracies are the work of compromise. All political parties, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, unions have been created with a compromise. Likewise, compromise is mandatory for the constitutional bodies of democratic governments to form and function. Laws passed in the parliaments, the process of electing heads of governments, establishment of coalition governments in parliamentary systems, and their functioning are all the product of compromise. Compromise is needed for the formation and change of social rules and institutions that directly affect everyone's interests peacefully and rationally. In a society that does not have a culture of compromise and does not have a consciousness about how vital it is, this rational order will not occur. Instead, a dictatorial regime will rule or conflict, and chaos will occur. Therefore, it is inevitable that a political culture suitable for democracy includes a culture of compromise.

The importance of this thesis is directly related to the above explanations because Turkey's democratic development has not been completed as well as the socio-economic development. As Yılmaz Bingöl pointed out; Turkey's democracy, although relatively old, still has not been able to solve the basic problems in the context of democratic consolidation

(Bingöl, 2011:35). One of the obstacles slowing its democratic development is the political cultural heritage it has taken from history. Turkey, which has a predominantly patrimonial, single-centred and authoritarian political history, has a tradition of politics which is not fed by the culture of compromise but instead resort to the way of using force and imposition. Current research shows that this attitude of uncompromising is unfinished and social polarization continues sharply (Keyman, 2018).

Today there is much need for cohesion instead of polarization, for trust instead of doubt and compromise instead of conflict, as always. Turkey needs democratic maturity, and for this end needs a peaceful struggle in politics, free competition, rational cooperation and compromise. Good examples in this regard are very worthy of attention and examination as they are few. Therefore, this thesis highlights a case, *Milli Görüş* example, in which it sees the potential to be a good example. This study is expected to contribute to the development of political consensus culture in Turkey.

Aim of the Research

This study aims to demonstrate the contribution of *the Milli Görüş* movement to the culture of political compromise in Turkey. To this end, it tries to highlight the difference of *Milli Görüş* from other political actors about compromise and the reasons that cause this difference.

To achieve these goals, political culture, political compromise, and coalitions will be explored in various aspects as basic concepts. These basic concepts will be discussed in two dimensions, that is, firstly their general conceptual content will be explored then the question of what they mean for Turkey will be examined. After the analysis of these concepts, *the Milli Görüş* movement is examined by taking Necmettin Erbakan to the centre because this section will help explain why *Milli Görüş* is different in the last section. In the middle sections where *Milli Görüş* coalitions will be presented, while the development of coalitions is depicted, on the one hand, the discourse, attitude, actions and events regarding the compromising attitude will be put under the scope on the other so that it is aimed to analyse the character of compromise through coalitions.

This thesis also aims to find out the factors that lie behind the difference of *Milli Görüş* in terms of political compromise. After presenting the difference of this movement via coalition practices, all reasons that create this difference will be analysed. This analyse

is likely to involve historical, psychological, cultural, and religious dimensions. As a result of this analysis, it will be tried to reveal how significant the foreseen causes are.

While trying to achieve these primary goals, it will be tried to solve the sub-problems that arise. These sub-problems are these: Why political consensus is vital for democracies; to what extent do political consensus culture has developed in Turkey; how *Milli Görüş* has had a difference in the political atmosphere of Turkey; how did this difference arise in the four coalitions of *Milli Görüş*; and from what factors this difference originated.

Contributions

Scientific studies proceed cumulatively. For this reason, every study has to be linked to previous studies and researches so that there is no mistake in the necessary information on the subject being researched. Therefore, it is inevitable to search the literature. Therefore, during the preparation phase of the thesis, studies on similar topics were identified, examined and benefited. In this process, in order to make that search more useful, attention was paid to the scope, results, strategies and the relation of them with this study.

It was noticed in the literature review that the number of studies on Turkish political life, in general, is very high. On the other hand, there are some theses related to coalitions included in the conceptual framework of this study. Likewise, a considerable number of works have been published in books and articles on *Milli Görüş*, Erbakan, Welfare Party etc. However, many of them have a narrative that describes the historical flow of political events. Works with special focuses were also found. However, it is understood that there are no studies that directly reflect the main problem of this thesis, which is "The distinction of *Milli Görüş* from other political actors in terms of the culture of political compromise and the reasons for this difference". Indeed, the fact that there is almost no comprehensive study on the issue of great importance for democracy in Turkey is quite surprising. This issue is of great importance for Turkey because in a country that has a patrimonial and centralist historical heritage, and democracy of which has been interrupted from time to time, development of political compromise has crucial importance. This study will hopefully be the first step to overcoming this shortcoming in the literature on political compromise.

The sub-problems identified by this study are also capable of contributing to the literature. For example, it is essential to examine the relationship between political compromise and political culture because the number of studies on Turkey's political culture

is also inadequate while there is no comprehensive study on political compromise. Therefore, it will be meaningful to consider these two concepts that are lacking and examining their relationship with each other.

Again, other problems that are among the secondary problems of the study are new. Discussing the development level of political compromise culture in Turkey and considering the negative impact and pressure of social structure of Turkish society on political compromise are among these issues. In particular, the in-depth study of the four coalitions of *Milli Görüş* on the axis of political compromise means approaching *Milli Görüş* from an entirely new dimension. Finally, it is hoped that the investigation of the reasons why *Milli Görüş* developed a compromising attitude will make a meaningful contribution to the literature.

Ethical Considerations and Limitations

First of all, it is not an easy task to identify the research problem because a problem is supposed to be original. Finding a new problem area seems almost impossible at first since it seems that work has been done in every field. However, as you search the literature, you will find the missing area and start to see a new problem area. There was a similar situation in this working process. A special effort was made to make the problem of the thesis unique. In this process, the experience and guidance of the thesis advisor have been a great help. On the other hand, there are risks of the originality of the problem area because a new focus will mean the lack of directly related studies. Indeed, this study, as placing the political compromise in Turkey at the focal point, faced the limitations of the sources in the same field.

One of the basic features of science is that it is objective and does not include personal value judgments. However, in social sciences, both the researcher and the subject of the research are human. As such, the knowledge, beliefs, values and judgments of the researcher are likely to affect the results of the research. (Bahar, 2017:45). As Neuman (2011: 4) puts, over-generalisation, selective observation, premature closure, halo effect and false consensus are some errors that researcher may tend to make.

As stated in the introduction, Erbakan and his *Milli Görüş* ideal have been subject to much assessment, which included opposite views. On the one hand, some say that *Milli Görüş* is extreme and radical. (Sunier, Landman, 2015; Rabasa, Larrabee, 2008; Honey,

1999, Erdoğan, 2012). At the other end, some say that Erbakan is overly moderate, submissive. (Özkan, 2003). It is likely that many of such comments were biased and mainly based on ideological views. It is not easy to reach objective data and make an impartial assessment in this assessment area filled with ideological approaches.

In order to eliminate these risks, firstly, it is necessary to be aware of this risk and act with this awareness in the work processes. For this, as many different data sources as possible regarding the research subject were used. For example, while determining the newspapers to be examined within the scope of archive records, it was paid attention that these newspapers should have different world views. With the same thoughts, resources with different philosophical attitudes were reached. Evaluations and approaches of commentators with different world views were taken into consideration. On the other hand, the truth that while people and institutions engaged in political activities pursue an ideal, they are not exempted from individual and group interests and human ambitions and weaknesses was taken into consideration.

The same concerns have been raised in the face to face interviews. While gathering thoughts and perceptions in the meeting, it is essential not to give any direction to the participants. For this purpose, semi-structured questions, technically called "interview form", were prepared. Thus, on the one hand, profound answers were tried to be received, and on the other hand, interviews were conducted on standard questions. Likewise, it is vital to get the informed consent of the participants and to inform them clearly about the framework of the interview (Yıldırım and Şimşek, 2018: 108). For this purpose, an explanatory presentation text was prepared for the participants and the purpose and content of the interview were explained. An essential challenge of negotiations is setting up appointments, the difficulties of coming together, and time and economic costs. (Neuman, 2011: 339). Indeed, the heavy schedule of the interviewees made it difficult to arrange appointments, yet great efforts were made to overcome this difficulty.

Research Design

Reseach problem and sub problems: The problem of this study is the distinction of *Milli Görüş* from other political actors in terms of political compromise culture and the reasons for this difference. Starting from the point of an assumption that political compromise culture is weak in Turkey, this study focuses on how *Milli Görüş* movement

has a different attitude and what are the factors that count for this distinction. In order to solve the problem of the contribution of *Milli Görüş* to the political compromise, the four coalitions in which this movement takes part will be examined, and in order to find the motives that make the difference, both the coalitions and the general structural features of *Milli Görüş* will be analysed.

There are several sub-problems to help solve the stated fundamental problem. These problems are laid out as follows:

- What is the relationship between political compromise and political culture?
- What is the relationship between political compromise and democracy, and why does it matter?
- How advanced is the political culture of compromise in Turkey?
- How has the social structure of Turkey influenced its culture of political compromise?
- How do coalitions function in determining the political compromise attitude?
- What position did Necmettin Erbakan occupy in *Milli Görüş* movement?
- What is the distinguishing feature of *the Milli Görüş* movement in Turkish politics?
- What are the indicators of the compromising attitude of *Milli Görüş* in the CHP-MNP Coalition?
- What are the indicators of the compromising attitude of *Milli Görüş* in the First Nationalist Front Coalition?
- What are the indicators of the compromising attitude of *Milli Görüş* in the Second Nationalist Front Coalition?
- What are the indicators of the compromising attitude of *Milli Görüş* in the RP-DYP Coalition?
- What are the reasons behind *Milli Görüş* having a compromising character?

Qualitative Approach: The problem of this study is the difference of *Milli Görüş* movement in terms of political compromise culture and the reasons that make this difference. In connection with the assumption that the culture of political compromise in Turkey it is weak, the differences of *Milli Görüş* movement in this environment and factors explain these differences were explored. The framework for working on the solution of the

problem is based on *Milli Görüş* and on the four coalition governments in which it involved.

The study was designed as "case study", one of the research patterns included in the qualitative research tradition. It is useful to recall the qualitative research tradition and case study briefly to reveal the reason for this. Qualitative research has gained importance in the social sciences that deal with human and group behaviours, which are the subject of social sciences, especially in the last thirty years. (Bahar, 2017: 39). Qualitative research is a research in which qualitative data collection methods such as interview, observation and document analysis are used, and a qualitative process is followed to reveal perceptions and events realistically and holistically in the natural environment (Yıldırım and Şimşek 2018: 41). The philosophy underlying qualitative research advocates the opposite of positivism and emphasizes a post-positivist, hermeneutic philosophical approach. In this approach, theses such as relativity and mutual causality are defended instead of a single mechanical, unidirectional and singular line (Yeşil, 2017: 57). In qualitative researches language of cases, contexts and of cultural meaning is dominant, and the emphasis is on "conducting detailed examinations of specific cases that arise in the natural flow of social life" (Neuman, 2011: 165).

Given the above explanations, this study has a qualitative research orientation because the study has a post-positivist and interpretive philosophy. It carries a claim about the compromising character of *Milli Görüş* movement and reveals it in a descriptive and explanatory way through coalitions. It has an awareness that the same event is open to interpretation in different ways with different perspectives. In the research, specificity to the subject is at the forefront rather than the concern of universality. In other words, it does not claim that its position in coalitions is valid at all political stages of *Milli Görüş*. The primary purpose of the research is to understand the events and situations in the natural development course. For this, the events are depicted according to their historical flow and importance, and their relationship with the relevant concept has been pointed out. The data of the research are qualitative because document review, archive records and interview method were used in collection of data. In the data analysis, the inductive thinking method was used, and some generalizations about the compromising character of *Milli Görüş* and the motives behind it were tried to be reached from the sum of the events in the period of coalitions.

The qualitative character of the research is also evident in the following aspects. The objectives of researchers in qualitative research are mostly description and explanation. In

the description, the events and objects are depicted as they are and an answer to the question of how it is sought. The explanation, on the other hand, answers the question of why (Yeşil, 2017: 58). Again, according to Yıldırım and Şimşek, the qualitative researcher tries to reveal how and why dimensions of the relationships between the variables that dominate a situation. (2018: 54) In this respect, the two main elements in the research question of this thesis are related to exactly "how" and "why". As stated in the beginning, the first of the two main questions of this study is: What is the difference of *Milli Görüş* in terms of political compromise culture? The answer to this question will emerge by describing the events that took place in the four coalition periods. The other main question is, what factors make up this compromising character? This question is about explanation, that is, to investigate the causality relationship.

Case Study Design: After specifying the qualitative research feature of the study, it can be mentioned that it has a "case study" pattern. It will be remembered that case study research dealt with several features of a few cases. Individuals, groups, organizations, movements, etc. can be taken as cases. These cases generally entail detailed, extensive and variety of data. "Case study research intensively investigate one or small set of cases, focusing on many details with each case and the context." (Neuman, 2011: 42). These features describe precisely the events that this thesis deals with. Along with the features of *the Milli Görüş* movement, it discusses and interprets the four coalitions in which the movement takes place, from a perspective. Moreover, these coalitions are depicted in the political atmosphere in which they develop, so that the contexts in which they are located are better understood. Indeed, one of the features of the case study is that it "examines both details of each case's internal features as well as the surrounding situation." (Neuman, 2011: 42). For example, especially before the first coalition, the CHP-MSP coalition, the current political landscape was depicted and general information was given about the political party spectrum. The same preliminary information is presented in a more limited way in other coalitions. Later, the preparation and negotiation stages of each of these coalitions, the establishment works, the crucial events in their operation and their distribution are explained in detail. Thus, in all these processes, it was followed how *Milli Görüş* behaved differently from its interlocutors in terms of political compromise attitude.

Data Collection

Information, documents, facts and clues on which the results of the research are based are called data. Data are classified in a way as factual (independent of personal judgment) and judicial (people's opinions, thoughts, feelings and values). There are both types of data in this thesis. For example, many historical events during the period of coalitions are factual, and they are given extensive coverage. On the other hand, the thoughts, discourses and perceptions of individuals, groups and political figures in the case study are also included. These elements took their place in the thesis as judicial data.

However, the distinction of the data is mostly made according to the quantitative-qualitative classification. The data expressed in numbers by measuring are quantitative. Qualitative data, on the other hand, express features and situations, including concepts, thoughts, actions, attitudes, etc. that are not in the form of numbers. (Yeşil, 2017: 64-66). As is known, the primary purpose in qualitative research is not to reach the results through numbers. The primary purpose is to present a descriptive and realistic picture to the reader on the subject under investigation. To this end, the collected data must be detailed and in-depth, and the opinions and experiences of the individuals subject to the research are presented as directly as possible (Yıldırım and Şimşek, 2018: 48). The data collected in this study is qualitative because it is not based on numerical and mathematical measurement. The thesis makes sense and conceptual analysis of concepts, thoughts, actions and expressions, verbal and written expressions that have qualitative features. There is an analysis based on the discourse, action, events and processes of *Milli Görüş* through two concepts such as political compromise and coalition.

Qualitative data are collected by various techniques such as document review, observation, interview etc. A research design can be made with only one of these. However, in this thesis, more than one data collecting techniques were used, which is also called as "triangulation". The data collection techniques used in the research consists of 1) Document review, 2) Archive records, 3) Face to face interview. Some aspects of collecting these data can be listed as follows.

Document review is a continuous process from the preparation stage of the study. There are some questions that should be considered during the research for the review to be efficient: What are the aims of the research? What is its scope? What have the consequences

been? Which strategy was used? How is it related to my research questions? (Murray, 2018: 145). A literature review was carried out considering these questions. Firstly, problems and sub-problems have been developed by taking a close look at the previous studies on the subject. In this process, books, articles, academic theses, reports, encyclopaedias, dictionaries, symposium papers, official and non-official websites have been scanned extensively, and the necessary records have been made to the extent of the subject's focus. In this context, texts such as political party bylaws and programs, coalition protocols, government programs, laws, legislative proposals, government correspondences were used. In the meantime, special attention has been paid to autobiography, biography and memoir books, which provide direct information about the events and perceptions of the period. Among these, books, written by Necmettin Erbakan, Kemalettin Erbakan, Şevket Kazan, Bülent Arınç, Süleyman Arif Emre, Oral Çalışlar, Erol Çevikçe, Fehmi Çalmuk come to the fore.

It has been seen in the literature review that many more chronological works have been written on Turkish political life. However, there is very little work on "political culture" while the subject of "political compromise" has hardly been studied. There are several academic studies on Turkey's coalition governments. The literature on *Milli Görüş* and Necmettin Erbakan is not small. Of these, especially Fuat Uçar's *Nationalist Front Governments in Turkish Political Life*, Nedim Yalansız's *Coalition Government of Turkey 1961-2002* and Isil Arpacı's *Erbakan in Turkish Politics* stands out, which has been benefited from a lot.

The electronic library of Yıldırım Beyazıt University was used as the most basic database for literature review. Numerous articles from large databases related to the subject were scanned; those related to the subject were downloaded, examined, records were taken and evaluated through this electronic library. Besides the Library of Hacettepe University, the National Library and Library of Grand National Assembly of Turkey were widely benefited from.

Archive records research, which is one of the data collection techniques, has taken a large place in this study. It is essential to examine the archive documents in order to understand the period under scrutiny in its historical context and to analyse the action and discourse. In this context, two main data sources were examined. The first of these is the minutes of the plenary meetings of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The Assembly

minutes of the period between 1970 and 2000, where *Milli Görüş* movement was significant, were scanned and especially those related to the compromise and coalition processes were identified, removed, recorded, classified and evaluated within the scope of the study. The fact that the GNAT Library has transferred these archive documents to the electronic environment has provided an essential convenience for the researchers.

As the second archive research, newspapers of the relevant period were scanned. Since the electronic records of the newspapers were not sufficient for this case study, which dates back to the 1970s, the rich microfilm archive of the TBMM library was used. In this framework, newspapers with different trends according to world views were determined (particularly *Milli, Tercüman, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet*) and scanned. Details of the events of the period were followed from the news of these dailies. On the other hand, it was looked at how columnists interpret daily political developments. Thus, the attitude of the press of the period in terms of democratic culture and a political compromise was determined. Finally, another factor that should be counted among the archive recordings is the video recordings that contain the speeches of Erbakan. A rich bundle of speeches made by Erbakan throughout his political life is available on the internet in several forms such as sessions, interviews, conferences, discussion programs etc. From the scope of the thesis, these video recordings were also scanned, watched, notes were taken and processed in the thesis.

The last of the data collection techniques used in this study is face to face interviews. The interview is defined as a mutual and interactive communication process based on a pre-determined way of asking and answering (Yıldırım and Şimşek, 2018:129). Through the interview, the participant is more likely to answer all questions, which is taken as a significant advantage of this survey. Moreover, interviews "allow interviewers to observe the surroundings and to use nonverbal communication and visual aids" (Neuman, 2011: 339).

Representatives who served at critical levels of this movement were selected as a sample from *Milli Görüş* universe. As such, the sample of the study is among the "purposeful sampling methods" and corresponds to the "homogeneous sampling type" included in the methods.

It can be said that the people in this sample, which are selected for the objectives

pursued within the scope of the study, have similar characteristics in terms of being in the influential positions of *Milli Görüş*. The sample has been made up of seven representatives of *Milli Görüş*. It was particularly preferred that the elected persons were in the management of *Milli Görüş* movement because this cadre has had a significant impact on the experiences put forward by *Milli Görüş* in the thought and action plan. Therefore, it was expected that these people would provide essential data on the development of the political attitudes and behaviours of *Milli Görüş* movement and the motives behind the participation of the coalition governments at the time they were represented in the parliament. In this context, the people who are planned to meet face to face are as follows:

1. Abdüllatif Şener
2. Bülent Arınç.
3. Fethullah Erbaş,
4. Mustafa Kamalak,
5. Oğuzhan Asiltürk,
6. Recai Kutan
7. Temel Karamollaoğlu

Necessary appointments were made with the relevant people for the interviews, and the venue and time were determined. At the beginning of each interview, the participants were informed about the purpose of the interview, the subject of the thesis and the nature of the research. Participants were allowed to express their questions and reservations openly if any. It was stated that the interview would be recorded with a voice recording system, the data would be used in the PhD thesis, and a name would be used in the places that refer to the interview in the thesis, so the content of the interview would not be confidential.

The questions to be asked for this survey, which was held with "interview form approach", were prepared in advance, and an interview was mainly based on these questions. However, due to the nature of the interview type, secondary questions were asked with the "sounding" method in matters that come to mind during the interview process, as to deepen the answers and obtain additional details. In this method, which can provide flexibility in ordering questions and topics, it is aimed to reveal all aspects of the research problem. Therefore, first of all, the opinions of the participants about the relationship between political compromise culture and democracy were tried to be revealed, and it has been tried to learn

what they think about the general situation in Turkey. Then it was asked what they were thinking about *Milli Görüş* in terms of political compromise. In these questions, the objective opinion of the participant was tried to be obtained by avoiding the guiding expressions and emphases.

During the interview process, the approach of *Milli Görüş* parties in the formation and termination of the coalitions in which it took part has been examined, and the factors affecting Erbakan's political attitude in the coalition establishment processes have been tried to be revealed. In the last part of the meeting, factors that might have an impact on Necmettin Erbakan's political attitudes and behaviours were asked. In this context, it was tried to determine what they think about the effects of elements of Erbakan's childhood, religious understanding, strategic approach etc.

With the applied "interview form approach", more systematic, comparable and suitable information for analysis was obtained compared to the "conversation-style interview". With this method, methodological advantages such as flexibility, high response rate, detection of non-verbal behaviours, researcher's control over the environment, variability in the order of questions, recording instant responses, confirming the data source, answering questions in full and obtaining in-depth information were provided. The interview records, which were collected with all these advantages, were transcribed into the text; the critical findings and were analysed, processed in various parts of the thesis, either directly or indirectly, and interpreted within the context of the concept of political compromise.

Data analysis

Descriptive analysis method was used in the analysis obtained during the study. Descriptive analysis is critical in qualitative research because the researcher has to base the validity of the results on these descriptions. (Yıldırım and Şimşek, 2018: 86).

The data is mainly organized according to the themes posed by the research questions. These themes include political culture, political compromise, the relationship between political culture and political compromise, the relationship between political compromise and democracy, coalitions, *Milli Görüş* coalitions, Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*'s compromising attitudes, factors affecting the attitude of compromise. Due to the nature of this analysis, events are given in detail in the causality relationship, along with their backgrounds; on the other hand, direct quotations are often made to reflect the views of the

people in the focus of the study. The views of the representatives of *Milli Görüş* interviewed were also reflected within the theme they were related to.

While presenting and describing the data, attention was paid to keep the personal opinions and comments out and to reveal the data set objectively. The data were recorded and processed according to their sources and accurately. However, after the obtained data has been revealed in detail, comments and evaluations regarding these findings have been made. Thus, it was shown what did the collected data say about the research problem or what results did it show. While making these determinations, the underlying events and discourses were evaluated in the context and environment in which they developed. Thus, the meanings, approaches and attitudes behind the factual data were tried to be revealed.

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: POLITICAL CULTURE POLITICAL COMPROMISE AND COALITION

In this part, the concepts of political culture, political compromise and coalition have been analysed. The concepts of political compromise and coalition are two main concepts on which this study is based because this study examines the difference of *Milli Görüş* concerning attitude towards political compromise in Turkey and address the four coalition governments in which the movement is involved to demonstrate this difference. Hence, the concepts of political compromise and coalition will be the two most utilized concepts throughout the thesis. To better comprehend these two concepts, the concept of political culture is needed because the political culture has a strong relationship with established democracies, and therefore with political compromise and coalitions. Political culture is a kind of infrastructure that determines how healthy democracy, political compromise and coalitions will be.

Each of the three concepts in question will be examined by dividing them into two main sections. In the first part, the concept will be discussed in general. In the second part, concepts will be discussed in terms of Turkey. While the concept is generally discussed, various dimensions will be mentioned. In this context, the semantic content of the concept, its historical development, what kind of discussions are made on it, and its relation with democracy will be examined. In the section on Turkey, each concept will be examined in terms of Turkey's historical legacy and current political situation.

1.1. Political Culture

1.1.1. Political Culture in the Abstract

A strong relationship between human behaviour and culture has been one of the critical determinations of social sciences. It is widely acknowledged that human beings are the reflection of their cultural environment, and their activities are widely influenced by their subjective cultural features (Zhong, 2018: 3). Likewise, the impact of culture on politics as one of the main activities of human beings has long been discussed. During the first half of the twentieth century, there has been a wide range of studies that focused on the relation between political personality and culture. This relation has been sought at the intersection of

psychoanalytic views and cultural anthropology. This school tried to find the reasons for taking political roles such as aggression, antagonism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and the like in the concept of socialization of children, that is infant nursing, authoritarian parenthood, the shape of family, etc. This school was very influential because it included many preeminent names such as Harold Lasswell, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Erich Fromm. Those researches on "the national character" of some people such as Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States etc. were famous particularly in the atmosphere of war. However, as the social science disciplines expanded and professionalized after the war, those theories proved unconvincing and gradually disappeared from political science (Almond, 1993: x).

During the three decades following the war, in opposition to psychological-anthropological reductionism, modern and professional approach, adopting a more subtle methodology and comprehensive statistical data, sophisticated construction and analysis of interview schedules, content analysis and other means, was developed (Çalışkan, 2016: 24). Under these developed conditions, it is used to be accepted, political culture, as a comprehensive theory, have entered to political science with the *Civic Culture* of Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (Erdem, 2019: 230)

It is acknowledged that although political culture was a new term, the history of its conceptual content goes far back. Kavanagh, for example, accounts the "political culture" as a new concept found for an old idea. That means political thinkers have been producing ideas on the relationship between political regimes and value systems that bolster them (Çağla, 2017: 85). He counts among the premises of political culture the referrals of Aristoteles' to State Mind, Burke's cake of custom, Alexis de Tocqueville, Dicey and Bagehot's emotional and political values (Çetin, 2014: 422). Almond himself accepts that political culture is a notion, component of which can be seen in works of several historical figures: Antic medieval historians of Greece and Rome with their comments on their societies' features and culture; Aristo, with his classification of the patterns of government and socialization experiences of the individuals and politicians; Machiavelli, with his emphasis on the significance of belief on Rome and his awareness of ethical values, sense of identity, political power, frailty, etc; Montesquieu, with his application of sociological, anthropologic, and socio-psychologic variables in explanation of national history, political institutions, and their

functioning, all contributed to and prepared the ground for political culture (Kurt, 2014: 424).

Nevertheless, the publishing of the famous book of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, in 1963 was a significant development in the sense of a cultural approach to politics. Almond and Verba have mainly focused on why the same political system does not have the same results in different countries. They have found the answers in the cultural approach to policy. They have defined the political culture as the political orientations, that is attitudes toward both the political system and the role of the individual in that system (Mihaljević, 2013: 10). As the pioneers of political culture surveys, they construct three ideal-typical political cultures: Participant, subject and parochial (Pavone, 2014: 2).

Participant culture is that exists in established democratic countries such as the UK and US where, citizens are aware of being a citizen, proud of their political system and have the aspiration to join the political process. Knowing the power of acting together, they take joint action and have a belief of being effective. In other words, they have a sense of political competence and influence. Participant culture is virtuous/civic culture, and strong and stable democracies are likely to live in the fields where this culture is dominant (Yayla, 2015: 346).

Subject culture is less valuable than the participant culture. Even though people realize they are citizens, they are not elated with their citizenship, and they do not have a strong sense of loyalty. Since they do not believe political participation has profound implications, they are not committed to participating in politics. Subject culture is exemplified in the nations of Germany and Italy. Societies, in which this type of culture is dominant, are not appropriate soils to develop strong and stable democracies (Yayla, 2015: 346).

In parochial cultures, an ideal example of which are African tribes, citizens have a low cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation towards the political objects (Pavone, 2014: 2). They have little knowledge of politics; they are not interested in political objects; they are not proud of their country or political system. They have no sense of political competence and influence. Land on which parochial culture is widespread is not suitable for producing a democratic political system, neither is it possible to get democracy lived, even if it is formally constructed (Yayla, 2015: 346).

Developed as “ideal types” Almond and Verba remark, they cannot be found purely in a given society. This categorization is appealed because of simplification or reduction is needed. In reality and a given society, a dominant culture would be the mix of those three types. Moreover, Almond and Verba, hold that even pure participant culture would not meet the cultural infrastructure of the democratic system because it has some risks generating from the potential of mass participation in any event of acknowledged shortcomings and might become a source of instability. At this point, Almond and Verba assert that the favourable political culture model, for a stable democratic system, would be a blend of *subject* and *participant* models which they name as *a civic culture.* In civic culture, citizens have a good command of information about the political process, they are powerful enough as political actors, yet they are respectful to the right and legitimacy of the decisions of elites as well. Elites, in turn, are supposed to be sensitive through the need and demand of the citizens (Çağla, 2017: 87).

With this epochal book, work on political culture has boomed. However, with this orientation, strong criticism of the concept began too. It was claimed that the studies that make generalizations about political culture are not objective and have ideological backgrounds, that they were serving for the exploitation of ethnic elements, proletariats, and the Third World (Almond, 1993: x) Another effective attack to political culture studies had come from the discipline of economics, the introduction into political studies of market and bargaining models. “Rational choice”, “public choice”, and “positive political theory” were flourishing concepts underpinning the voting behaviour, cabinet formation, bargains in committees, coalition formation, diplomatic relations and war decision. Rationality and maximization of short-run interests were mere drives of voters, politicians, diplomats, and military leaders (Almond, 1993: x).

However, in time, public choice theorists backed down gradually seeing that they fell into the track of reductionist quandary. They realized that the rational self-interest models need to be put in a context of institutions, in other words, laws, traditions, beliefs and values (Almond, 1993: xii). Thus the return of the concept, as the phrase goes “the renaissance of political culture” happened, and it took its due place which is supplementary for the perfection of political science (Çalışkan, 2016: 25). As Chai and Wildavsky (1994: 173) put in the conclusion of their article: “Just as humans need culture in order to make sense of the world, rational choice needs culture in order to make sense of human behaviour.”

Thus, political culture theory retained its viability and had accomplished supporters in later years. In this direction, Lucian Pye published a seminal study, "The Key Part of the Asian Power and Politics: The Culture Dimensions of Authority" (1985). Analysing Asian political culture, he observed that the key elements of Asian culture were the relationship of superior-inferior, and the superiors are very sensitive to somebodies' effort to undermine their status. Thus in this part of the world, authoritarian norms were prevailing; while the opposition, as the essence of democracy, could not flourish under these conditions. So Pye concludes: "Cultural variations are crucial in the determining course of the political development." (Mihaljević, 2013: 11). Thus, the 1990s have been years of recrudescence of theoretical debate about the political culture and new applications in a variety of academic disciplines (Welch, 1993: 1). Ronald Inglehart, Christian Welzel, Harry Eckstein, Robert Putnam, Henry Milner were important names who had similar premises in several works related to political culture and made a contribution to the development of this concept adding new aspects and dimensions to it (Mihaljević, 2013: 12).

After explaining the historical development of the concept of political culture, it can be looked at the content and various dimensions of this concept. As might be expected, there is not a unique definition of political culture, so it is better to take a glance at a few classical definitions to figure out what content it mainly includes and how it might be demarked.

Almond and Verba, defines political culture as "orientation pattern of the members of nations toward political objects". They mean, by "political objects" not only concrete institutions like parliaments and political parties but also less concrete objects such as the memory of nation or the traditional narrative of history (Çağla, 2017: 85). The concept is defined in the Concise Dictionary of Politics as "the attitudes, beliefs, and values which underpin the operation of a particular political system." (Grant, 2009: 414). Larry Diamond's definition includes almost the same elements: A people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country, and the role of the self in that system (Diamod, 1993: 8).

Yayla (2015: 345), defines the political culture "the aggregate of thought, opinion, belief, and manner which are related to the political system, political institutions, political symbols, and political values." He reminds that the culture of one nation cannot be the same as that of the other. There will be a difference between two even though they look like each other. For example, despite sprouting from the same roots, there are differences between the

cultures of Britain and the US alongside with similarities. Yayla touches on long sociologic, psychological and historical roots of political culture, paralleling it with other branches of culture as it does not come into being at once and does not disappear suddenly. Another point he makes is that culture is not a biological event but a social phenomenon, therefore transferred through generations not via genes but by human relations.

David Robertson (2004: 385) in *A Dictionary of Modern Politics*, describes the concept as "The totality of ideas and attitudes towards authority, discipline, governmental responsibilities and entitlements and associated patterns of cultural transmission such as the education system and even family life." Robertson states the reason why those elements are taken together in the concept of political culture is its benefits: All these factors give an overall profile of how people are likely to react in case of several political events happen.

These definitions, all of which highlight individuals' persistent value judgments about politics, seem to be functional in revealing political culture in general. However, it is necessary to look at a few different dimensions related to political culture so that the concept can be examined more deeply. One of them is making a comparison between "political culture" and "public opinion". Indeed those concepts are interrelated because both are related to attitude toward politics. However, their scopes are different in that political opinion is narrower than the other is. While political culture is interested in elementary, general values on politics and government, public opinion is about a specific event, leader or policy. From that perspective, public opinion seems to be the short and flexible state of political culture. These two have also similarities and differences in their methodologies. For instance, while both use the random samples of the population for asking a question, the question type is not the same. A political culture survey is likely to ask how much you trust other people when public opinion question might be if he/she thinks the president is successful. Furthermore, the studies of political culture are likely to go beyond surveys and use methods of anthropology and psychology to get a deep insight into an individual's life, thought and feelings (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros and Jones, 2012: 119).

Another dimension to be remembered about political culture is the existence of political subcultures. A society, when compared with another society, may look like monolithic; however, there is no purely uniform society and any society has several differentiations within itself. Moreover, there is not a monolithic and uniform political culture of any nation. Several social fractions of a nation are likely to be defined with distinct

cultures that are different from each other and the mainstream culture. In the course of a long time of generations, rigid differences among political values and expectations within a country bring about the formation of several subcultures. In that sense, members of different ethnic, religious groups, and classes form different subcultures (C. Sokullu, 2013: 112).

One of these separations is made between elites and mass. Elites, having better education, higher income, and more influence are much more interested in politics and more participatory. They tend to show political behaviour such as voting, protesting injustice, forming groups, and running for office more than the society's grassroots (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros, Jones, 2012: 126). Elite culture also reflects its difference in terms of taste, aesthetics, intellectual level and behavioral patterns. Even though the mass may have limited access to some elements of elite culture over time, the elite seeks new ways to manifest difference (Erdem, 2019: 227-228). The other division line that produces subcultures is the minority-majority distinction. When there are ethnic, religious, and regional groups within a specific nation and have distinct differentiating qualities, these groups are taken as subcultures. African Americans in the US, French-speakers of Quebec in Canada, the Bengalis of East Pakistan, the Basques of Spain, Roman Catholics of Northern Ireland, and Albanians in Kosovo are a few examples of subcultures. (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros and Jones, 2012: 128). Likewise, Alevis, in Turkey, forms a political subculture. Small ethnic and religious minorities might prefer to stay passive or being silent in politics, while the majority tend to develop a sense of self-confidence because they are likely to have features of a "good citizen" and regard themselves as the owner of the political system (Yayla, 2015: 349). As Yayla points out, some other fractions based on gender, inland-coastal, and class can be added to these subcultural groups (Yayla, 2015: 350).

The importance attributed to political culture stems mostly from the relationship of this concept with "democracy". One of the first questions to which concept of political culture was applied is what the relationship between political culture and democracy is, and this has indeed continued to be a central issue of political culture research. It is possible to say that *The Civic Culture of* Almond and Verba dealt with the relationship between political culture and democracy (Welch, 1993: 14). Diamond (1993: 1) also, implies that outstanding theories of democracy, whether they are classical or modern, assume that there is a particular set of political values, and orientations such as tolerance, moderation, civility, knowledge, participation… possessed by citizens of a democratic society (Diamond, 1993:

10). Therefore, it can be said that the central importance of political culture comes from its ability to produce democratic rule.

A pure stereotype of political culture theory alleges that there is almost causal determinism between political culture and political design and political behaviour. On the other hand, it is emphasized that political culture is resistant to change. However, there are reasonable opinions asserting that this resistance should not be exaggerated (Önen, 2015: 41). Nevertheless, it is seen that the opinions that the political culture has a long life and that it has a strong relationship with the political order are dominant. Although a crude determinism is not appropriate to characterize the political culture theory, many works have such evaluation. This kind of culturalist interpretation can be encountered through literature, particularly about Latin American politics. It is widely purported that the authoritarian, hierarchical, and monistic cultural heritage of this region counts for its handicaps on the way of liberal democracy (Diamond, 1993: 9).

Political culture studies examine the relationships between the stability of regime and beliefs, values, and the structure of traditions at a given time. What put forward in these studies is that political culture limits people's perception affects their behaviours and plays a vital role in participation in politics. Thus, political culture affects the political behaviours of a mass, which in turn affect the political system. However, this circle does not end here because the political system also transfers a political culture to individuals via political socialization. This chain of effect is spiral, and if it works as supposed, it will provide the stability of the regime (Çağla, 2017: 85-86).

It is difficult to establish democracy, but it is easy to establish formal institutions of democracy. For this reason, although many governments in the world have not been able to establish democracy, they try to make it appear as if they have democracy, which is seen as the source of legitimacy. To this end, they establish formal institutions of democracy by creating legislative, executive and judicial bodies and giving place to elections, political parties, social and political rights and freedoms in their legal texts. However, the existence of these institutions does not guarantee democracy. As a matter of fact, in many countries outside the established democratic order, despite these institutions, democracy was not implemented in real terms or was soon put aside (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995). Therefore, the approach that reveals the relationship between the environment where democracy can be grown and live and "political culture" gains importance. The main thing that can make

democracy real and permanent is the existence of a political culture suitable for democracy. There is no standard list of what features this political culture has, but some key elements have been generally accepted.

The most important element of the participant culture, which is accepted as suitable for the development of democracy, is the sense of the activity of citizens and its implementation. This sense of activity is directly related to the ability to act together on political issues. At this point, political compromise becomes critical because citizens know that efficient political activity is only possible by cooperating. Compromise is a critical key at every stage of democratic life. All institutions created to provide political activity in democracies are the work of compromise. All political parties, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, unions have been created with a compromise. Likewise, compromise is mandatory for the constitutional bodies of democratic governments to form and function. Laws passed in the parliaments, the process of electing heads of governments, establishment of coalition governments in parliamentary systems, and its work are all the product of compromise. Compromise is needed for the formation and change of social rules and institutions that directly affect everyone's interests peacefully and rationally. In a society that does not have a culture of compromise and does not have a consciousness about how vital it is, this rational order will not occur. Instead, a dictatorial regime will rule or conflict, and chaos will occur. Therefore, it is inevitable that a political culture suitable for democracy includes a culture of compromise.

In addition to compromise, there are other essential elements in the culture suitable for democracy, one of which is tolerance. "Tolerance in its briefest definition is explained as the respect for diversity" (Corneo & Jeanne, 2009, p.691 as cited in Bilgili, 2010: 36). It is emphasized by many scholars that there is a strong relationship between tolerance and democracy. (Gibson, 2006; Inglehart, 2003 as cited in Bilgili, 2010: 37). The competition in political life in a society of tolerant people will be reasonable and balanced, like sports competitions. People will tolerate the other's winning and differences. Because the party who cannot win the competition in this appropriate competitive environment will not be afraid of suffering heavy material and moral losses. (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995). The second factor is to trust others. Interpersonal trust has been accepted by many scholars as an "attitudinal prerequisite of an establishment of stable democracy." (Almond and Verba, 1963; Dahl, 1971; Inglehart, 1988, 1990 as cited in Bilgili, 2010: 31). In a society where people trust

each other, there is an opportunity to work towards common goals. The formation and work of political parties, unions, non-governmental organizations depends on the trust and pulling together of different people. The other factor is that people trust democratic institutions and organizations. If the legislative, executive and judicial organs, politicians and civil servants of the democratic order are trusted, democracy will also be trusted. Having information about political life, and carrying the necessary attention for it are also considered among the elements of the democratic political culture (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995).

1.1.2. Political Culture of Turkey

Political culture can be described as a political infrastructure that originates from the historical origins of society but can be shaped by the effects of essential events experienced by society. Political institutions, processes and behaviours that form the visual dimension of political life in Turkey are strongly associated with this infrastructure. The features existing in this infrastructure bear the traces of Turkish history before and after Islam. However, the elements that gave this infrastructure its main feature stemmed from the Ottoman Empire and its late-term traditions.

It is improbable to make an exhaustive list of the elements of political culture which flow from far and near periods of the history toward Republican Turkey and have severe effects to date. However, there are some critical components in this vocabulary that are almost compromised on. The patrimonial characteristic of the state, the understanding of personal government, the intolerance of political power to the opposition, the centralist and firm belief in the state, the elitist conception of government, the influence of the army on politics, the priority of society to the individual and lack of compromise are among them.

Patrimonialism[1] in fact, seems to be a mother of other characteristics; because patrimonial understanding is a critical feature that has the potential to generate centralism,

[1] Max Weber who adopted the term as a label for his ideal-type model of traditional authority describes patrimonialism as follows: It takes place within the traditional authority; the public feels compelled to follow the leader's command because his order is sanctified, his power was eternal and traditionally maintained; the relationship between him and administrative staff is based on personal loyalty; if there is a resistance, it is considered to have been made to the leader, not to this system; important economic resources are in the hands of the leader and the ruling class; production activities are set towards political orientation; the two factors necessary for the rational functioning of economic activities (foreseeable tasks and private ownership) are lacking; one reason for arbitrary intervention in economic life is to satisfy the subjects in order to maintain the legitimacy.(Kanadıkırık, 2019: 129).

intolerance to the opposition, the desire for a strong state, elite understanding, and uncompromising attitude. Halil İnalcık sees patrimonialism as the main structure of the political body in the classical age of the Ottoman Empire (1992, as cited by Kanadıkırık, 2019: 131). In the Ottoman Empire, which had a patrimonial character, the sultan, who held absolute authority, made it dominant over the whole society with the help of a bureaucratic apparatus. Moreover, members of the palace and army, and other public officials, who were members of this apparatus, were defined as the vassals of the sultan. All other elements of society did not have a role in the administration of the state and did not have the chance to become a centre of power of any kind against the government. Thus, a strict ruling- ruled distinction was formed. This distinction was reinforced by the "janissary" and "timar" system, which makes the land and soldiers the assets of the state (Özbudun, 1995: 3). As a product of this patrimonial understanding, the state has always had a transcendental and sacred meaning (Şen, 2015: 344). The administrative model of the Ottomans close to "eastern despotism; did not resemble Western Europe with its autonomous institutions, such as feudalism, hereditary aristocracy, autonomous church organization, a powerful merchant class, and self-governing cities. The most important element of the political culture created by this structure was absolute respect and glorification of authority (Özbudun, 1995: 3). Ahmet Insel thinks that this patrimonial culture is of the value of the key for understanding Turkey's political and economic stance and the interventions deemed "appropriate" to society, particularly in times of crisis (Insel, 1996: 43). The state tends to see itself outside and above society. This understanding leads to the supremacy of the superiors' self-appreciation, rather than the validity of the rules in the state (Akarçay, 2016: 401). This tradition and culture that glorifies the state have manifested itself through the political dimension of the "statism" principle of Republic. This mentality has placed "state" in the centre of politics in Turkish political culture and led to the realization of all politics through the state (Şen, 2015:314). The manner of the people working in public administration as though they are the servants of the state rather than the servants of public and therefore looking down on the citizens while fulfilling the public service is another manifestation of this political culture. The expression "Let people live so the state can live" which is expressed by public officials quite often and attributed to Sheikh Edebali, shows that the structure of 700 years ago influences today's perception of the state-people relationship.

The personal style of administration is also a political, cultural feature that was inherited from the Ottoman Empire and continued its influence during the Republican

period. The tradition that "The sultan is everything for the Empire" continued in the Republican period as disproportionate forces of the people. As Heper pointed out, Ataturk fulfilled his duty of Presidency as a disproportionate source of authority. Later, İsmet İnönü proclaimed himself as the National Chief and took over all the essential powers in the state. Adnan Menderes, who became the head of the government in 1950, and Süleyman Demirel who was the head of the party between 1965-1980 and 1987-1993 acted as the sole authority rather than the chairman of the parties (Heper, 2011: 43). Similar things can be said for Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan, Alparslan Türkeş, and Turgut Özal. The AK Party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who left his mark on Turkey in the last 18 years, has been one prominent example of the personal management culture. As can be seen in all these examples, in both single and multi-party periods, political party leaders created conditions in which nobody can rival them within the party so that they could not be removed from the top of the party unless they have their will. Political party leaders, acting as leaders of a political movement, emphasize their preferences rather than the party program. Following this attitude, voters counts on the political leader rather than the party (Heper, 2011: 44).

The political power which cannot tolerate the opposition is another element of a political legacy inherited from the Ottomans. Unlike the Western feudal structure, in the Ottoman political structure, the sultan represented the whole political power, the power was concentrated in a single centre, civil society institutions did not develop, and there was no tradition of conflicts of interest between the political power centres. The occasional social outbursts were stigmatized by the central government as "sedition/malice and quelled mercilessly (Durdu, 2013: 68). In this mono focus and one-way political life, the state expected unconditional obedience from society and all kinds of steps and formations contrary to this were seen as separatism and treason. Under these circumstances, respect and glorification of political authority, and conviction of opposition, has become an element of political culture (Türköne, 2005).

Similarly, with the establishment of the Republic, the opposition was liquidated from the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and the single-party regime did not want to extend even the "controlled opposition" experiments. During multi-party periods, military tutelage overthrew the political powers that attempted to compete with it. When the heads of government, who grew up in this culture, had the opportunity, they tried to choke the opposition, and the political party leaders did not want rivals within the party. Constitution

makers, legislators and public administrations have also tried to keep the public as far away from the rule-making and political decision-making as possible (Algan, 2015:136).

The elitism, which is considered as another feature of the Turkish political culture, was transferred from the classical era of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. The elite class, which had a singular structure in the Ottoman period, was separated as innovative and traditionalist in the nineteenth-century reforms and started to struggle which the innovative wing won (Özbudun, 1995: 5). This innovative wing had made a tactical compromise to the other wing during Turkey's war of independence, but the traditionalist wing, with the consolidation of the government, has been wholly liquidated following the will of Mustafa Kemal. Thus, a homogeneous class of state elites held political power in hands by the Second term of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. These elites, all of which have a bureaucratic background, attempted to liquidate the Islamic rules and institutions, create a society with western culture and appearance, and establish a suppressive secular regime (Bingöl, 2004:33). However, with the government change in 1950, the elite class began to regain diversity and business people, traders, self-employed and men of local influence joined the elite. This change created an atmosphere of tension instead of creating a compromise between the state elite and the political elite, resulting in the elimination of the political elite through the military coup of 1960. In the following periods, the control of the state elite over the political elite sometimes gave the appearance of compromise and sometimes continued with interventions that led to coups.

In the meantime, this characteristic, expressed as elitism, coincides with the centre-periphery dualism formulated by Şerif Mardin and the dualism of the "Westernist/civilizationist" bureaucratic tradition front and the "Oriental/Islamist" public front formulated by İdris Küçükömer (Küçükömer, 2007: 2). However, the tension that existed between these two structures in the last century of the Ottoman Empire, as stated above, became more intense during the Republican period. This is because the centre at this time aimed at transforming the party ideology (Kemalism), into the way of life of the society, not only to rule the country (Bostancı, 1996: 60). With the multi-party period, it is claimed that transformation took place in one element of political culture. According to this idea, the most critical opening that DP has brought to Turkish political life is to carry the periphery into politics (Kahraman, 2012: 253). However, efforts of the periphery to consolidate its position in the centre have been prevented by military coups from 1960 onwards. In the

process that continued until the 2000s, political culture continued to take shape under the competition of political power between this state/centre and society/periphery. In this competition, the society/periphery, which has the advantage of the democratic political sphere, was regressed by military interventions in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and re-compressed into the limited space assigned to it in the political area. Thus, in the period of multi-party life, on the one hand, a democratic political culture flourished in line with the increase of political participation, on the other hand, a political culture which became inured to and internalized a "restricted democracy", because of the permanent tutelage, was formed (Durdu, 2013: 127).

One of the crucial elements of Turkish political culture is the perception of the place of the army in political life. Generally, in less developed countries, the army tends to maintain its political effectiveness in later periods due to its role in the struggle for independence (Şen, 2015: 236). The army, which undertook social and economic functions together with defence, during the classical period of the Ottoman Empire, played an essential role in the political developments in the late period. When it comes to the Republic, they were the members of the military who created the core of the state elite who was influential in the foundation of the country, the formation of the political regime and efforming the political life (Arslan, 2004: 16). Together with the multi-party political life, within the new conditions of the government style, the army has differentiated itself from the political elite and has been directly in contact with the "state". The army stepped aside with the initiation of democratic life when the rules determined by itself were not followed gave warning; if not enough, stopped the game, entered the field, dictated the rules, changed the players if necessary and started to watch again because it considers itself to be the owner of the field where the political game was played. S. E. Finer lists the stages of military intervention as follows: penetration and persuasion, pressure and threat, change of government and seizure of government. All kinds of these stages in Turkey has been raised at different times. Finer has linked these levels of intervention to the mature, developed, weak and minimal of the political culture of societies (Şen, 2015: 330). Given this, Turkey's political culture tends to legitimize any military intervention, which indicates a weak democratic political culture. The historically superior and robust position of the army before society has led to awe and a sense of surrender to the army in society. The distrust and fear created by the single-party regime and the military coups were reflected in the surrender and approval of social behaviour (Şen, 2015: 334).

One of the striking elements in Turkish political culture is that individual lags far behind society and the interest of society is well above the individual in the individual-society relations. The understanding that individual and group interests are balanced and that the individual has an autonomous field of the initiative is not accepted. The state-individual relationship built on inequality is reflected in a sub-layer that is in the group-individual relationship, and hierarchical culture manifests itself in every layer of society. Due to the secondary position of the individual before the society, a tendency to overdependence to the groups such as party, community, organization, etc. forms. Excessive attachment to the group leads to excessive alienation of people outside the group. Thus, the tendency to perceive the world through in-group and out-group concepts has become another feature of Turkish political culture. While loyalty and sharing are prominent in intra-group relations, people outside the group are viewed as enemies (Şen, 2015: 337). When this group sense and attitude was conceived on the level of political power, intolerance to the opposition, another element of political culture, comes up. In this context, the individual-group relationship, centralized understanding, intolerance and authoritarianism of the opposition give the appearance of intertwined patterns of attitude.

Lack of compromise culture stands out as one of the critical elements of Turkish political culture. The lack of a culture of compromise is a phenomenon that can be observed from the peak of politics to the relations on the street. In Turkish political life, when there was a balance between the political forces, the conflict has occurred, and when there was no balance, the authoritarian management attitude has come to the fore. Therefore, circles that demand justice, equality and law when they are in opposition, take these values less seriously when they come to power and tend to reduce participation in political decisions. This winner-takes-it-all game makes the power-opposition relationship very rough and destructive. On the other hand, data on certain phenomena such as murders, traffic accidents, and domestic violence, stand out as indicators of uncompromising attitude in daily life. Three factors come to mind when it comes to the reasons of this antagonism, which is a critical feature of political culture.

The historical reasons should be considered as the first factor for political conflict. The fact that class-based social conflict in Turkey has not taken place, so negotiation and compromise processes required by these conflicts have not been realized, contrary to the

Western World, caused to missing the compromise and negotiating experience in Turkey (Aydın, 2016: 19).

Another reason is related to the upbringing and education style of children. In traditional family and school relations, authority and hierarchy have been at the forefront. The decisions of the head of the family, the decisions of the teachers and the administration in the school, are not negotiable. These are instructions that must be obeyed without discussion or evaluation. These relations, which exclude negotiation, discussion and balanced relations, prevent the formation of a culture of compromise.

Finally, another obstacle to the culture of compromise is "distrust" which has been found to be very common by several researches in Turkish society (Akdoğan, 2006:162). To approach a compromise in a society where trust to the other is at almost the lowest level in the world would mean being willing to be deceived, trapped and damaged. Those who do not want to take such a risk will try to impose their will and preferences in order to feel safe. Thus, instead of compromise, a landscape in which power and fraud relations are active emerges.

Data revealed in researches on Turkish political culture, confirms that the existence of formal democratic institutions is not sufficient to transform into a democratic society and political order, at least in the short run. Still, some commentators argue that socio-economic structural transformations, especially after multi-party life, put pressure toward the democratization of political culture. According to this idea, institutional democratization in politics, urbanization in demography, industrialization and other production relations in economy, integration with the international system via relations with the outside world has a specific effect in the direction of relative enlightenment, awareness, secularization, prioritization of economy, political interest and participation, liberalization and thus influenced citizens' thoughts and attitudes, in a democratic sense, towards politics (Turan, 1998: 826-829). To be sure, it can be expected that these factors contributed to the culture of democracy in Turkey. Tevfik Erdem also argues that, in parallel to increasing influence of civil society throughout the world, in Turkey, sometimes civil movements which works in the same area are able to act on behalf of "the other" leaving their ideological references aside, which signals that a culture of tolerance and democracy can develop (Erdem, 2013: 373). Indeed, various researches have shown that people of Turkey have reached a certain level in terms of interest in politics, participation sense of influence, etc. However, the same

research reveals that the human capital or cultural infrastructure required for the consolidation of democracy is still weak.

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu has revealed the following in an article he wrote many years ago over Turkey's political culture. Turkey compared to other countries, is in a good position regarding the trust to socio-political institutions and political operativeness. However, when it comes to tolerance and trust in others, it is at the bottom. Kalaycıoğlu sees intolerance and distrust as a reason for the extreme harshness of the struggle in political life. Very negative attitudes such as hatred, exclusion, betrayal, brawl occur between the political elite and their followers for the same reason (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995: 52-65). More up to date, the research titled *Culture of Democracy*, coordinated by Yasin Aktay, also showed some contradictory results. According to the research, citizens' trust in political institutions, their interest in politics and their feelings of political activity seems to be high. However, some findings of it were contrary to the development of the democratic culture. For example, there is an inverse relationship between educational level and democratic attitudes. This firstly suggests that the education system is inadequate to grow democratic values. Secondly, people care more about having a strong economy than having a democratic government which means that democracy is taken as subordinate value. On the other hand, the expression of the army as the most trusted institution indicates that the militarism in society continued and the trust in the political institutions was low in this sense (Aktay, 2007: 79-81). Indeed several opinion polls conducted in different times manifest the fact that trust in politicians and the parliament is pretty low, which is regarded as one of the most critical perils for democratic regimes (Bingöl, 2009: 1).

Finally, the survey, made in 2012, on world values provides a comprehensive analysis of the data in terms of Turkey's democratic culture. The most striking of these data is that trust between individuals in Turkey compared to other countries is deficient. Drawing attention to the importance of interpersonal trust, Yılmaz Esmer says that interpersonal trust is the fundamental element of social capital[2]. What should be understood by the interpersonal trust is the relations between people who do not know each other either insular or abroad, rather than local people from the family, relatives, neighbours. At this point, it should be

[2] Social capital can be defined as "the norms and networks that facilitate collective action" or as OECD accepts "a resource for facilitating co-operation within or among social networks with shared norms, values and understandings" (Kolev, 2018: 10).

remembered that Fukuyama attributes modern, rational large firms of states such as the USA, Japan, and Germany to interpersonal trust, and asserts that democratic institutions also need it to work effectively. Ronald Inglehart also mentions the relationship between trust and democracy in various publications and highlights the intense link between the level of interpersonal trust in society and the sustainability of democracy. Yılmaz Esmer reminds that all scientific studies conducted since 1990 (around 15 scientific researches conducted in different years with a lot of different samples) present that the rate of people in Turkey who say "most of the people are trustable" is only %10. Atlas of Turkey's Values published in 2012 has confirmed this finding. Interpersonal trust rate is 76% in Denmark, 75% in Norway, 71 in Sweden, 65 in Finland and 30 in Russia. As Esmer puts it, those who care about social capital and its main element of trust see this as an essential source of the problems of Turkish democracy. However, when it comes to the opposing viewers, it is possible to get out of it by writing a good constitution (Esmer, 2012: 19-22). However, it is essential to remind the understanding of Alexis de Tocqueville, who is known for his keen observations on democracy: "I am convinced that the most advantageous situation and the best possible laws cannot maintain a constitution despite the manners of a country; whilst the latter may turn the most unfavourable positions and the worst laws to some advantage." (Tocqueville, 2003: 295).

1.2. Political Compromise

1.2.1. Political Compromise in the Abstract

Although it is believed to be prevalent in daily politics, discussions on a compromise have not been seen in political theory and philosophy until recent years. "In more than a century, barely a dozen of books and articles have more or less seriously dealt with this concept." (Fumurescu, 2013:3). In the last years, however, a rise in the value of compromise concerning politics can be monitored. Among those who are interested in that concept, since 2000, Bellamy, Fumurescu, Gutmann and Thompson, Lepora and Goodin, Margalit, Wiseman, Dixit-Grosman and Gul and Weinstock come to the fore (Rostbøll, 2017). Central themes in works of those analysts are the conceptualisation of political compromise, producing sub-concepts of the term, the necessity, prevalence and value of compromise in democratic politics of plural societies, nature and features of compromise, critics of a particular model of compromise and so on.

Before delving into the analytic search of a "compromise" as a term, it is better to have a look for its dictionary meaning. Several definitions of the word "compromise", including both verb and the noun form of it, has taken place in Cambridge Dictionary as such;

1) an agreement in an argument in which the people involved reduce their demands or change their opinion in order to agree 2) to accept that you will reduce your demands or change your opinion in order to reach an agreement with someone 3) to allow your principles to be less strong or your standards or morals to be lower 4) to risk having a harmful effect on something 5) an agreement between two sides who have different opinions, in which each side gives up something it had wanted 6) to lower or weaken standards 7) to agree to give up something you want if the other side, which has different opinions from yours, gives up something it wants 8) a situation in which the people or groups involved in an argument reduce their demands in order to reach an agreement 9) to reduce your demands in order to reach an agreement (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).

Through the analysis of the concept, it will be seen that 5, 7, 8 and 9th explanations are quite close to the context of the compromise as a political term, because, it mainly includes the fact arguing people or groups reduce their demands for the sake of reaching an agreement.

Although the meaning of "reconciliation" is slightly different, it still has a notable common ground with compromise. The reconciliation is defined as follows:

1) a situation in which two people or groups of people become friendly again after they have argued; the process of making two opposite beliefs, ideas, or situations agree 2) the process of making two people or groups of people friendly again after they have argued seriously or fought and kept apart from each other, or a situation in which this happens (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).

It is understood from these definitions that reconciliation is the process of agreement between disagreeing groups or ideas. This dimension constitutes an important similarity between the two concepts. However, the difference of this word is that there is a prior emphasis on discussion or conflict. Nevertheless, it can be said that the term reconciliation is very close to the concept of compromise, and therefore the two concepts can be confused from time to time.

"Concession" is also related with "compromise", and need to be compared with it. In the Cambridge dictionary, "concession" is defined as:

1) something that is allowed or given up, often in order to end a disagreement or the act of allowing or giving this 2) the act of admitting defeat 3) a reduction in the usual price of something, made available to students, old people, etc. 4) a special right to property or land 5) something that you agree to give someone or allow them to do, especially in order to end an argument or disagreement (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018)

As can be seen, here, the meaning of *giving up, ending the discussion, waiving the right* come to the fore. This feature reveals the different aspect of this term than the term of compromise.

In the meantime, a synonym word "consensus" which worth comparing with "compromise" for the sake of clarification is defined in the same dictionary as follows:

1) a generally accepted opinion or decision among a group of people 2) a generally accepted opinion; wide agreement 3) a generally accepted opinion among a group of people 4) agreement among a group of people (Cambridge Dictionary, 2018).

Despite not reflected clearly in the dictionary, the critical point which separates consensus from compromise is that "when all sides believe that the position agreed on is superior to the one that they had at the beginning of entering decision-making process, then agreement on this position is a "consensus". As for similarity, like a compromise, consensus results from the exchange of reasons and arguments but not from the use of force or distribution of strategic considerations. There is a sort of respect and reciprocity in consensus, which can be seen when people give consent to be governed by decisions that result from deliberation (Weinstock, 2017:638). However, a difference of consensus is clear when it arises on the basis of prior disagreement because consensus means people have changed their minds about what is optimal and they believe that the last agreement is superior and optimal concerning their first option, while in compromise, they think the last agreement as the sub-optimal course of action, and it is accepted for the sake of other values. (Weinstock, 2017: 639). In other words, while consensus implies that there is no longer disagreement and that all parties' idea is that the solution reached is the best one; for compromise, disagreement is nothing to do away with; on the contrary, it embodies disagreement. Because parties do not deem the compromise solution as a true or better

solution than what is brought to the table as the first offer, but it is still adopted as a legitimate solution for several reasons related to the disagreement (Bird, 1996: 93).

When it comes to the nature and features of compromise, Rostbøll (2017) describes the compromise as "an agreement in which all sides make concessions in order to be able to act together, and in which the concessions are motivated by the presence of disagreement". He points out three main dimensions of this concept: Reciprocal concession is the first aspect of it. All parties need to sacrifice something of value and make a shift in their position in the cause of reaching an agreement that is preferable in proportion to the status quo. The second feature of compromise is that despite a position of compromise is lesser than the position which was taken before the process, it is better than inertia which means the continuation of existing circumstances. Political compromise signifies a shared evaluation of parties which accept the necessity of change even if it is not as good as they initially predicted. The third aspect of compromise is what makes it different from the consensus, that is, compromising sides are not completely happy with the solution that emerged as the production of deliberation (p. 621-622).

Rostbøll's (2017) typology of compromise also contributes to comprehending the concept more clearly. He assumes two types of compromise depending on the reasons of a compromise. First, one can be named "pragmatic" and the second one as "intrinsic". According to this division, when a political party compromise because it is needed to reach a majority to get a program through or to stay in power, the compromise of this case is taken as pragmatic. Likewise, if a party consents participation of an opponent in order to guard itself against its antagonism or to abstain from resentment, which may lead to unrest or revolution, then this compromise is within the pragmatic type. When it comes to intrinsic compromise, it refers to cases in which "the compromise is valued in itself rather than because of its "useful" consequences, that is, because the very fact of compromise expresses or embodies something that is of value in itself." At this point, it is worth noting that the overwhelming majority of compromises in political processes are aimed at the benefit. Consensus made on the virtue of compromise is minimal. However, the aim of benefit does not prejudice the value of compromise. According to Rostbøll, the distinction between pragmatic and intrinsic compromise helps people to decide when and why to compromise. If the compromise is based on pragmatic reasons, then one should make careful calculation whether this compromise will meet the minimum goals that are sought. Pragmatic reasons

for compromise are conditional upon individual causal relationship to hold true or on the existence of specific institutions. In return, intrinsic or non-instrumental reasons for compromise are independent of institutional and causal elements so long as the demand to compromise is situated on a principle that is honoured by the very act of compromising, independently of the consequences (Rostbøll, 2017: 624).

Bellamy's "shallow and deep compromises" seems to be symmetrical with Rostbøll's "pragmatic and intrinsic" differentiation. By shallow compromises, he means a model of compromise which is instrumental and mainly confined to policy issues. As for deep compromise, it is moral and includes mutual respect for, and accommodation of, the different principles and ends of parties involved (2012: 8-9).

He connects shallow compromises with an optimal point where each party believes that the compromise is an improvement on the status quo. This point reflects the level under which they would refuse to descend. For instance, when political parties consider taking part in the government coalition, they think that partnership is acceptable as long as they will be able to implement some of their programs, and this partly application of program would be better than none of it. This pragmatic approach which is related to a minimum level of expected gain reflects "shallow compromise". Bellamy, liken the shallow compromises to trade-off. In that sense, the most straightforward practice of trade-off is to split the difference, which is widely appealed by buyer and traders when they agree. The preferences of both trader and buyer are generally fixed, and bargain arguments do not affect them. The point where the difference is split depends on the ease and wants of parties. (Bellamy, 2012: 8-9).

If priority or most favoured policies of one party is something that other groups feel less strongly about then political compromise is not too far to reach. In that kind of positions, parties have a chance to barter. As in trade, bartering is resorted as an instrument regardless of being moral or immoral. There is no need for parties to understand each other, contemplate on interlocutors' arguments or grievances. Nor the deal need to be equitable and fair, that is one party might be advantageous than other parties and can use its power to get more share, not in proportion to its position. What all parties watch out is whether the meeting point is still over the status quo concerning their own benefit and therefore, preferable or not (Bellamy, 2012: 9).

When it comes to deep compromise, here what are taken into consideration are not only policies but also principles. Preferences of one party reflect reasons which can be reshaped to accommodate the reasons of other parties by way of deliberation and negotiation. Therefore such preferences are not regarded as fixed and exogenous. Parties try to reach an agreement by offering mutual sacrifice and making particular modification in their demands. In a deep compromise, neither party looks at compromise itself as an instrument to come to closer its original targets. On the contrary, parties aim to appreciate the moral aims of the other as much as possible by connecting it to their similar aims. (Bellamy, 2012: 9).

Bellamy makes contact between deep compromise and workable coalitions. That is, if coalitions are expected to be stable, they need to include the reason for a deep compromise into the process of coalition formation and keep it along with the governance. (Bellamy, 2012: 15). Minority governments, in return, can be associated with shallow compromise because each party is likely to adopt a purely pragmatic attitude. This makes minority government vulnerable and prone to dissolution as soon as any party finds an opportunity of more interest. Coalition agreements, in that sense, are different from minority government agreements. Coalitions are founded much on a commitment by both parties to govern or to act together for all parliamentary term. Cooperation during a term needs to develop a joint program, which necessitates a deep compromise (Bellamy, 2012: 9).

Gutmann and Thomson's (2010) analysis also contributes to the understanding of political compromise in depth. Emphasizing the importance of political compromise for democracy, they produce two sub-concepts called *compromising mindset* and *uncompromising mindset* (1130).

The uncompromising mindset, is said, has two characteristics: *principled tenacity* and *mutual mistrust.* For principled tenacity, sides of compromise tend to resist sacrificing that is required to reach an agreement, because sacrifice means unpleasant concession of firmly held principles. They are concerned that their deeply held core values are being bargained. Under this condition, uncompromising minds resort to dividing compromises into two: Compromises of interest and compromises of principle. According to this division, one can accept the former while the latter should be rejected. Interest is regarded as material assets such as income, wealth, and things that money can buy. Moral principles are taken as values to which parties are committed as part of their identity and are the matter of firm ethical conviction. Within this framework, it is believed that when interests

are at stake you can give up some claims but when principles are at issue, giving up your claims is more than you can do. That approach is summed in that maxim: Never compromise your principles, only your interests (Gutmann and Thomson, 2010: 1130).

However, such a distinction and legitimating one of them does not seem meaningful because principles and interests are not far from each other, consequently it is not easy to draw a line between them. Everything under discussion in making a compromise is likely to be assigned to the category of interest or principle. Universal health care coverage is one example that can be interpreted in both ways. Social security, unemployment insurance, foreign aid etc. are all two dimensional -material and moral- issues which take place among major issues of democratic politics (Gutmann and Thomson, 2010: 1131).

As for *mutual mistrust*, this is a kind of prejudice toward the contenders, and because of this feeling, each party believes that the main motive of the rival is to harm their principles. Since there is doubt about the motives of the opponent, the idea that better compromise could have been achieved occupy their mind. Thereby each side falls into a hope that more could be gained if it persists on more. Furthermore, it generates doubt about the motives of those who tend to accept less. This doubt is not held only by adversaries but also by partisan supporters. When after elections, politicians realize that their campaign promises are difficult to actualize, and change their manner in favour of compromise; this brings about the accusation, by their followers, of selling out and appealing every convenience to hold on power (Gutmann and Thomson, 2010: 1133).

When it comes to compromising mindset, it is explained by terms of *principled prudence* and *mutual respect.* Principled prudence is to recognize that in democratic life, compromise is an inevitable way to improve the status quo. By this pragmatic and rational stance, principled prudence helps to go beyond intransigence of principle. However, this attitude must not be taken as being unscrupulous. This attitude is also not in contrast with partisanship. On the contrary, partisanship necessitates making principled concessions, where it is inevitable; to reach a better condition. As for mutual respect, it is avoiding sinister suspicion about the motives of your adversaries. With mutual respect, parties approach each other in good faith. They acknowledge that the motives of a rival are their desire to do right according to their outlook, as well as political gain. By mutual respect, parties believe that they got as much as they can under given conditions. Making sure of adversaries good faith,

they have enough confidence in deciding how much to concede (Gutmann and Thomson, 2010: 1135).

Gutmann and Thompson claim that an uncompromising mindset fits with the campaigning term of an election while the compromising mindset would be more proper for a post-election term and at the time of governing. This is because politicians on the eve of elections need to make significant campaign promises; otherwise their campaign will suffer, and their commitment will be questioned. Nevertheless, after elections, especially when they are not able to win the elections to come to power single-handed, then they are obliged to break their promises, to some degree, because changing the status quo necessitates such flexibility. Therefore, to reach a compromise, politicians have to figure out this situation, be able to change their approach and make the necessary psychological shift. (Gutmann and Thomson, 2010: 1130).

Political compromise is vital in the formation of democratic governments. In other words, political compromise is an indispensable factor in the formation, development and sustainability of democratic government. Nations, as a modern form of societies, are heterogeneous with divided loyalties. Different social backgrounds, attachments, values of judgments, and moral codes drive people to conflicting values and purposes. Those differences are mainly forged in the forms of ideology, ethnicity, gender, religion and locality (Bellamy, 1999: 1). Despite several means of forging emotional and ideational unity among its citizens, modern states, or liberal democracies encounter policy challenges that place the value pluralism that characterizes them in stark relief (Weinstock 2017: 640). Should abortion and euthanasia be allowed, should adult people be permitted to use mind-altering drugs for enjoyment, should requirements of religious people be satisfied by arranging schedules, eating choices, dress codes etc. to their needs in the public sphere or public institutions? Should citizens take care of their own health and medical needs by purchasing privately provided medical insurance or should states be in charge of their citizen's health requirements? Many such questions put forward questions of fundamental moral and political value about which reasonable people might disagree. Some people may claim that individuals should live their own destiny which they create by themselves and the whole society is not responsible for their idleness or sluggishness while others would stress the disadvantageous mass and lack of equality of opportunity. While some people may prefer a secular state which would not tolerate any religious demonstration in the public sphere,

others may bring forward the religious appearance is a part of human identity which cannot be separated. (Weinstock 2017: 640).

As it is seen, there are so many different opinions; yet people have to live together. Therefore, it is worthwhile to study the formula of coexistence with differences. Indeed, one of the working fields of contemporary political theory is how people who have opposing worldviews can live together? Modern societies, within which pluralism is gaining more strength as time goes on, need a full answer for this critical question. Compromise is the first answer to be offered because its nature and features help to suggest a relatively better solution for this dilemma (Rostbøll, 2017: 620). When we confront some issues that require a collective reaction, and we think that a course of action would be suboptimal response about our first intention, however, better than the absence of agreement, then compromise will come to fore (Weinstock, 2017, 636).

Within this framework, defining politics as the "art of compromise" may not be an exaggerated description. This definition is particularly correct for democratic politics. Elected members of parliaments meet in legislatures to mould policies that will affect the lives of all citizens. Since no politician or political party have an absolute power to shape all norms on their own, they must sacrifice something to other parties in the process, which is called in the public choice literature "logrolling" (Boudreaux and Lee, 1997: 365).

"Democracy and compromise are somehow, perhaps intimately, related to one another." (Kuflik, A. as cited in Fumurescu, 2013: 3). In democratic regimes, decision-making processes are intertwined with compromise processes between different powers and peoples. Decisions, taken in parliaments, governments, public administration and local governments, emerge as the product of a compromise in one way or another. Beyond all these, constitutions that form the basis of democratic political life today are essentially texts of compromise. Democratic constitutions are not products of a wish of a person, group, or even majority; but they are compromise products that include the rights of the whole society, including the minorities (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020).

Perception of democratic politics as a compromise can be traced from the texts of Aristoteles, in particular his "polity" concept which refers to gathering aristocratic and democratic elements. However, one of the important representatives of this idea is Bernard Crick. He defines politics as a compromising activity of differentiated interests by giving

them their due share from the government in proportion to their vitality for welfare and sustenance of society (Heywood, 2007: 11). Acknowledging the inevitability of conflict, Crick purports that social groups and interests cannot be suppressed, yet a compromise is possible for having their lot from the government. He, therefore, depicts politics as "solving a problem of the order by compromise rather than violence and oppression (Heywood, 2007: 12).

However, the need for compromise does not necessarily emerge from technical or quantitative requirements, that is, receiving official quorum is not the sole matter. Indeed, in many countries, which adopted the proportional election system, parliaments are frequently so fragmented that the majority is secured by more than one party. On the other hand, even if one party is of majority in the legislature, it cannot make law at its own discretion. This is so, especially in democratically developed societies. Rostbøll, as it is remembered, called such compromises "non-instrumental compromises". While he acknowledges the indispensability of compromise when it is required to secure the majority or to adopt a legislative regulation, he, nevertheless, believes that there are reasons for a compromise that are inherent in the democratic ideal. That means compromise adds much more legitimacy to public policy beyond what could be accomplished by a mere majority decision. In that sense, the benefits of compromises are not necessarily because of the consequences but of the very fact that the decision is a compromise (Rostbøll, 2017: 623).

Gutmann and Thomson points out the value of compromise and the "compromising mindset" which encourage it are particularly significant in the law-making process and therefore stress that "it is an especially important virtue that a critical mass of legislators and leaders should cultivate" (Gutmann, andThomson, 2010: 1130).

Compromise is so vital for politicians that who are chary of compromising attitude are labelled "ideologues". This label has not positive connotations, nor is it regarded as insignia of honour among the political class. Since such politicians are not likely to gain good to share with voters, they mostly fail to win and hold on office. On the other hand, successful politicians wisely acknowledge the vital importance of compromise for political survival (Boudreaux and Lee, 1997: 365). Economist Donald Witman (1995: 154) therefore, correctly notes, "That is what good politicians do: create coalitions and find acceptable compromises." Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain also breezily stresses out the same theme: "Compromise is not a mediocre way to do politics; it is an adventure, the only way

to do democratic politics." (Boudreaux and Lee, 1997: 365) Another specialist reiterates the same idea in different words: "Political success for elected representatives requires these officials to compromise early and often" (Mitchell and Simmons, 1994: 52).

Gutmann and Thompson (2010: 1129), emphasise the significance of compromises, purporting that, the resistance to compromise impairs practices of mutual respect, the value of which is acknowledged in various theories of democracy. Resistance to compromise means accepting the continuation of the status quo; because, in democratic politics, major changes are likely only by major compromises. Any politician who figures out the urgency of change and getting rid of the status quo is likely to understand that compromise is imperative. To them, a compromise needs to be supported and encouraged because it is commonly under criticism from all sides and therefore vulnerable. This is because there is a common outlook that regards compromises as an output of unscrupulous bargaining, ideological laxity and even lack of integrity. Thus, anyone who realises the complexity of political life, and dares to take responsibility of advent for finding a way out of status quo should meet a challenge of criticism (Gutmann and Thompson, 2010: 1130).

Different government systems reveal different compromise conditions. In parliamentary systems, for example, in many cases, compromises are needed to form coalition governments and keep those coalitions intact. Democratic legislatures are majoritarian institutions, and as a rule, a majority is required to pass the bills and other texts of norms. Likewise, minority governments naturally founded on compromise and need the backing of supporting parties. When it comes to presidential governments like US compromises are required and made between different branches of government to evade from deadlock (Rostbøll, 2017: 623). On the other hand, compromises are not merely democratic conveniences or apparatus that is used for securing majority support which is a technical obligation. Sometimes, compromises are put to use beyond passing a law or forming a cabinet. These compromises are appealed rather for having broader support for legislation and public policy. Thus, enacted laws are more likely to be appreciated by broader public masses and live for a longer time. (Rostbøll, 2017: 623). Thus, considering all these evaluations, the word of Bellamy and Hollis word on compromise (1998) gains much sense: Compromise is the "lifeblood of liberal democracies" (p.54). Kenya's former Coalition Prime Minister Raila Odinga's warning of compromise seems to be distilled from more

painful experiences. “If you do not hang together, you will be hanged separately.” (Beardsworth, 2016: 749).

1.2.2. Political Compromise Culture in Turkey

The share of political compromise in the success of Turkey’s independence war and the establishment of a new state is determinant. Mustafa Kemal brought together the social, economic and political potential of Anatolia despite differences in region, ethnicity and belief and managed to focus this potential on a common goal. However, it soon became apparent that this compromise was tactical, not principled (Atatürk, 1994: 25). Mustafa Kemal had resorted to a temporary compromise in the face of Anatolia’s conservative/religious identity. After the independence and sovereignty of the country was achieved, Mustafa Kemal and the nearby cadre had put aside compromise efforts[3] to create the national-secular state they devised rapidly and followed an authoritarian and uncompromising path (Esmer, 2006: 225). When the decisive attitude of the ruling elite was confronted with the governed majority, there was a deep divide within society, or rather between the state and society, which could not be reconciled for a century. To overcome this divergence and alienation, the Kemalist elite established a single-party regime and consolidated the authoritarian regime. According to Mete Tunçay, there is no doubt that the single-party administration of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/Republican People’s Party) during the period 1923-1945 was a dictatorship, which was based on violence and had no limits (Tunçkaşık, 2015: 16). This regime placed feelings of fear and insecurity against the state in the shared memory of the society, which in time turned into either surrender or a vengeful attitude (Kite, 2017).

The authoritarian government, by 1945, partly under the influence of international developments, attempted a “compromise with the society and allowed for the establishment of opposition parties (Koçak, 2016). Particular importance, in terms of political compromise in Turkish history, is attached to the fact that the ruling single party had allowed the emergence of a new opposition party and handed over the power to this new party voluntarily (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020). The intimidated majority under the single-party regime, taking

[3] Metin Heper attributes this uncompromising attitude and rigidity to the fear of state officials that the country may break up at any time (Heper, 2011: 43). However, this finding does not seem accurate because the main reason for social polarization and conflict occurred was the administration's goal of building a new society. Thereby the tension and conflict caused by the effort to change the society in a revolutionary manner quickly led the state to establish an uncompromising, authoritarian regime.

advantage of the democratic elections in 1950, brought the opposition party to power and loosened the authoritarian and radical secularist practices of previous years (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 31). However, Kemalist commentators who favoured transforming society, if necessary, through oppression, were described these developments as a kind of counter-revolution (Akşin, 2014: 186).

During the DP period, the efforts of the new political elites to broaden the political boundaries set for them and the perception of the state elites on this issue showed the fragility of the compromise ground between the two sides. While the DP administration claimed that it had made initiatives towards democracy and freedom, the CHP described these attempts as counter-revolution and carried out a destructive opposition (Kutan, Interview, Feb 2020). The attitude of the CHP in the protection of the military also caused the democratic power to stiffen its measures, thus entering into a spiral of political tension (Eroğul, 1990: 75). According to some comments, the DP, which complained of the authoritarian rule while in opposition, showed authoritarian tendencies (Parslow, 2007: 31) ignored the warnings of the opposition party, bureaucracy, universities and the media; and over time, tried to silence them with pressure (Turan, 2008: 31). While these comments mostly reflect the perspective of the statist elitist section, they also gave essential clues that the new elites approaching the centre are not prone to the culture of compromise. The breakdown of compromise between the political elites that divided into two poles resulted in the intervention of the armed elements of the dominant side (Sunar, 1983: 2086).

The traditional Kemalist-conservative distinction, represented by two opponent parties in the 1950s, intertwined with the right-left distinction, which became evident in the 1960s, so that lines of the social division took on new forms. In fact, while the left side is close to Kemalism, the right side is more intertwined with the conservative tradition. This situation, on the one hand, brought up the problems of the synthesis of the CHP with the left and on the other hand, led to the diversification within the right because the radical nationalist movement embraced Kemalism. In the late 1960s, apart from these two traditional dichotomies, Alevis and Kurdish identities, Islamism, radical left and radical rightist movements and parties emerged, and polarization lines became more diverse. (Kiriş, 2010: 238). The formation and partying of *the Milli Görüş* movement coincided with this period. This movement has been seen as one of the right parties in the broader frame, although it describes itself in particular with Islamic values.

Therefore, even though the polarization heightened in the 1970s gives the impression that it was based on the socio-economic ground, it involved many ethnic and religious dynamics (Parslow, 2007: 31). The socio-cultural demands of Alevis and the resulting conflicts and the Kurdish movement's adoption of violence and the parliamentary activity of Islamism point to this situation (Kiriş, 2010: 239). As a result, the violence produced by the society that did not have a culture of compromise between 1970 and 1980 and the endless seat ambitions of their political representatives called for a new coup. The 1980 military coup, in the name of ensuring social serenity, crushed the extremes of the left and right and pushed underground ethnic and religious demands. Thus, the society, which was battered by three military interventions within twenty years after the long one-party regime, moved away from politics (Bingöl, 2009: 13) and again took the intimidating position.

However, the disagreement was not only seen between the state elite and the political elite. Despite their coup experiences, the political elite, like the children of an authoritarian father who imitated him, could not show solidarity and reconciliation among themselves. Though they formed various coalition governments, even under the compulsion of military tutelage, the stages of forming the government were significantly delayed and painful; governments have failed to give the appearance of a principled, trust-based compromise. That's why they did not last long. Political party leaders often tried to take the lead by tearing each other out to seize the "limited" power allocated to them. Even in times of socio-economic and political crises, they were unable to limit their personal ambitions, subordinate voting concerns and make a real compromise.

Through the restoration of the democratic regime during the term of ANAP (Anvatan Partisi/Motherland Party), cultural and religious identities which were suppressed by the military regime, found a more liberal atmosphere to express them. Larger masses utilized this liberal environment to manifest their identity preference. Kurdish movement then began to move from leftist politics of national scale, while moderate Islamic identity became more apparent and radicalized (Ünal, 2013: 46). During the political and social conjuncture of the 1990s instead of classical socio-economic ideological differentiation that grounded on politics of economy, new political and social life determined mainly by ethnic identity, nationalism, secularism and Islamism emerged (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2008:110). In fact, the mid-1990s has led to an opportunity for the closure of the polarization of ethnic and religious fault lines where the polarization was acute and for compromise along these cleavages.

In these years, while the Kurdish movement strengthened its representation in the legitimate political platform (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 47) namely the Turkish Grand National Assembly, RP, the party of *Milli Görüş* movement, came to power as the great partner of the coalition. The fact that the RP and Islamic/conservative tradition which was represented by this party of being a partner of political power, despite all the obstacles, has led to optimistic assessment in terms of Turkey's democracy. The article by Heper in 1997 is sort of an expression of this hope: "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?" According to Heper, the marriage of democracy with Islam can be consummate on one condition. "If the radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred lifestyle and set of values, and the Islamists, do not attempt to undermine by word or deed the basic tenets of the secular democratic state in Turkey". However, the twofold growth of Kurdish movement in terms of escalation of violence and increasing parliamentary representation and the growing strength of Islamic demands and representation was perceived as two serious threat to orthodox Republic regime by "radical secular" (Heper, 2011: 224) segment of society and their military patrons. Thus, this segment ended the compromise process with a new military intervention (Ünal, 2013: 46).

Political specialists are almost unanimous on social cleavage lines in Turkey: Centre-periphery, right-left, secular-Islamist, Alevis-Sunni, and Turkish-Kurdish polarization. (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016: 31). Public opinion researches have been proving the situation stated by specialists. These axes are mainly generated from identity politics. Consistent with this situation, there is no significant difference among parties concerning economy politics. Identity's coming into prominence became the primary source of party choice of electorates (Kiriş, 2010: 239). However, it would be useful to lay stress on that Republican/Secular and Conservative/Religious/Islamist differentiation which emerged from the very beginning of modernization has been enduring determinant and still maintains its importance (Ünal, 2013: 47). Karpat's assessment of the subject justifies this emphasis. According to him, the history of change in Turkey is shaped by the struggles of the reformist secular groups with religious conservative groups (Karpat, 2010: 80).[4]

[4] According to Karpat, with the occupation of the centre by the modernists, opposition at the periphery was able to come to consensus which included a religios dimension, and this opposition was tried to be benefitted by the elites who were struggling for he power. In 1908 the Liberty (Ahrar) Party, in 1911 the Freedom and Accord (Hürriyet ve İtilaf) Party, the Second Group in the First Parliament, the Progressive Republican (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet) Party in 1924, the Free (Serbest) Party in 1930, the Democrat (Demokrat) Party in 1946 and then the Justice (Adalet) Party in 1960s and 1970s should be considered in this context. On the

However, Turkish-Kurdish nationalism next to this fundamental distinction has taken place on the map of polarization of Turkey (Röth, Kaiser, Varol, and Sadioğlu, 2016: 587). These two critical lines of separation also reveal which lines of compromise should be prioritized.

Constitutions of Turkey are clear manifestations of the fact that in Turkey, the imposition of power is a dominant tradition rather than compromise. There have been three constitutions adopted during the 97-year history of the Republic, and none of these constitutions are the product of social and political compromise. On the contrary, the Constitution of 1924 was adopted by a substantially homogeneous one-party parliament after the dissolution of the opposition in the 1st Turkish Grand National Assembly, which worked between 1920-1923. The 1961 Constitution and the 1982 Constitution which is still in force today, were put into force by the military administrations that demolished the democratic order. While the 1961 Constitution was being prepared, the DP, which was in power before the coup, was excluded, and all political parties were closed during the construction of the 1982 Constitution. The fact that the constitutions that were dictated to society and politics in this monophonic period could not be changed in democratic periods is a clear indication of how incomplete the culture of compromise in politics is. Although local revisions have been made in the last two constitutions, these changes have been minimal, and no political compromise has been reached for the total amendment of these coup constitutions. As Akartürk points out, unless a culture of political compromise is established, it is not possible to make a new constitution that can establish the rules of living together with a social contract model (Akartürk, 2013: 234).

It is seen that Turkey has a tradition of politics which is not fed by the culture of compromise but rather resort to the way of using force and imposition (Kutan, Asiltürk, Karamollaoğlu, Kamalak, Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020). Current research shows that this attitude of uncompromising is unfinished and social polarization continues sharply. Keyman summarizes this situation in the recent research report on the social cohesion of Turkey. He states that Turkey has been experiencing an atmosphere in which polarization problem is deepening, the culture of living together is diminishing, and every identity is feeling safe within itself but does not perceive confidence toward different identities (Keyman, 2018).

other hand, the Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki) Party, the Republican People's (Cumhuriyet Halk) Party and the military and civil bureaucracy of May 27 Coup are located in the centre (as cited in Kiriş, 2011, 45).

Turkey appears like the *weak country of identities* concerning the creation of shared values, participation to civil society, and looking at different people trustfully (Keyman, 2018). It is interesting, however, for Keyman to link these results to economy, technology and urbanization because, as explained in detail above, these results have a deep historical background. The distrust of traditional fault lines is the main obstacle to a stable social peace. Again, it is a strong possibility that political culture will have a significant impact on these results. On the other hand, it should be remembered that economic and technological change and urbanization is a phenomenon that not only Turkey but also the whole world just passed through.

Various international studies have demonstrated the weakness of Turkey's social capital, which is required for political compromise. Turkey is ranked as 120th among 155 countries with regard to social cohesion index held by OECD. In other words, Turkey is 35th country among the most polarized societies. This index measures compromise among different identities that countries host, the inclusion of different identities into society, social polarization among ethnic, religious, political groups and so on. This ranking exhibits that the social capital of Turkey is weak (Sak, 2016). Likewise, Turkey is particularly vulnerable in terms of social conflicts with respect to the OECD countries and is recorded as one of the few countries with the highest potential for social conflict (Çilingir, 2016).

Yılmaz Esmer's observations in 2019 confirm that the polarization in Turkey is still intense, whereas the culture of compromise remains quite weak. Esmer describes her friends' attitude towards him after a debate on a TV show, as a striking example: "I was scolded not because of what I said or did not say but, as one friend put it, for "sitting around the same table with these guys." Such is the degree of the profound polarization that Turkey is faced with." According to Esmer, both elite and mass data lead us to the conclusion that Turkey's level of polarization is one of the highest among both consolidated and new democracies. This situation gives vital damages to the functioning of democracy in Turkey. Esmer justifiably says that all international rating agencies in recent years are recording the decline in the quality of democracy in Turkey, and it is difficult to deny the relationship of this situation with the rise of polarization (Esmer, 2019: 122).

As demonstrated by several researches, the lack of a culture of compromise and sharpness of polarization in Turkey is also has been expressed as precise observation, from

time to time, by many journalists and political commentators who put the finger on the pulse of the society.

Güneri Civaoğlu, for instance, explains the need to compromise culture in Turkey with a case narrated in his column titled "Oh... Compromise Culture" in 2016 (Civaoğlu, 2016). Here, he touches upon the disagreement in the choice of place regarding the convening of the judiciary and other power at the opening ceremonies of the judicial year. Furthermore, he stressed that even in such a simple matter; no solution could be produced because of the wording problem. Deniz Kavukçuoğlu associates the lack of compromise culture with murder data. The number of people murdered in 2016 in Turkey was 1948.[5] On the other hand, in Japan, with a population of 126 million, the number of murders committed in the same year was 200. It seems that Turkey's people, because of the culture of compromise is not developed enough, resort to violence and brute force (Kavukçuoğlu, 2017).

Haldun Gülalp believes that the behaviour of citizens in traffic shows the lack of a culture of compromise and democracy. He states that instead of showing mutual respect and compromising attitudes in the traffic environment, people persistently try to impose the desired result on the other side and use brute force in disputes (Gülalp, 2018: 129). Mehmet Barlas says common non-political elements that will unite the citizens of Turkey are quite powerful. However, differences in political views overwhelm these commonalities, and therefore there is much more need for compromise in this area. The political world, however, highlights features that make society hostile to one another. For example, a habit has been going on for years to produce a fight over the differences in what is felt about Atatürk and to make the difference of ethnic origins the subject of a fight. Barlas recalls that in order to soften this discriminatory discourse of politics, the circles following the politicians should not provoke them and emphasize the common points (Barlas, 2018).

Fatih Altaylı states that political and social compromise is uttered too much but that this culture does not exist at all, and that when some need it, they pretend as though it exists (Altaylı, 2007). Ayşe Sucu believes in Turkey, provocative, intemperate, divisive, insulting, othering language is used. This language, which descends from top to bottom, ignites the fight, damages the unity and integrity, and degenerates morality. Therefore it is inflicting significant damage in Turkey (Sucu, 2017: 93). Oktay Aydın states that "compromise is not

[5] These figures increased to 2187 in 2017 (CNN Türk, 2018) and to 2279 in 2018 Euronews, 2019).

an established culture and behaviour in our society; we try to solve conflicts or conflicts in the family, at school, on the street, in the workplace by force, not by compromise; physical power, authority, psychological repression, money is dominant; parents, children, teachers, students, managers, employees, spouses trying to convince each other by applying power games (!) Within this cultural environment, instead of relations dominated by reason and conscience, relations dominated by ego and power make life unbearable." (Aydın, 2015).

The view, voiced by academia and media, that political compromise culture is not developed enough in Turkey is also confirmed by the politicians that were interviewed within the scope of this thesis. For example, Abdüllatif Şener says that the political parties' perspectives, styles and ways of doing politics are factors that constitute political culture. When politicians follow a line based on separation and marginalize other parties and voters and try to consolidate its voter base, then a culture of compromise does not develop in the society. Today, there is significant separation in society, and the main reason for this is the way politics works. According to Şener, in Turkey, when a party is strong, it does not want to compromise, but when the conditions force, only interest-based compromise is made (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020).

Bülent Arınç also implies that Turkey has a low mark concerning political compromise culture. Arınç, referring to the reign of the one-party regime until 1946, brutal conflict between DP and CHP during the 1950s, military coup of 1960, division within the AP in 1960s, coalitions with lack of harmony, disagreements on the elections of the Speaker of the National Assembly and the President of the Republic, 1980 military coup and subsequent military regime and constitution, holds that the report card of a century-long Turkey's political history is full of bad marks in terms of compromise. When this history is reviewed, it will be realized that there are very few examples of compromising attitude between political parties or between power and opposition (Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020).

Temel Karamollaoğlu also considers that political compromise culture has remained weak throughout the history of Turkey. He believes that the single-party regime after the foundation of the Republic, the right and left polarization that followed, and the coups that suspended democracy at certain intervals, the constitutions made by juntas, and the ambiguous secularism concept imposed by these constitutions show the weakness of the culture of political compromise. Moreover, he says, there is no culture of compromise today

and power acts with the mentality of a single-party regime (Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020).

When it comes to the question of why Turkey has a weak culture of political compromise, various reasons could be put forward. However, if these are generally classified, it is possible to classify them as historical, sociological, ideological and personal reasons (Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020). Historical reasons, as they have been explained in detail in the previous chapter, are to do with the severe tension generated by the fact that society kneaded with Islamic tradition for centuries were forced to be transformed into a non-religious life rapidly. The imposition of a revolutionary understanding of secularism from the beginning of the Republic has been one of the main reasons for the extreme polarization of Turkish society (Erbaş, Kamalak, Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020).

One of the factors included in sociological reasons is ethnic diversity and the problems created by the state policy on this issue (Erbaş, Interview, Feb 2020). Policies adopted at this field, during decades since the beginning of the Republic, which were alternated between cultural and racist nationalism (Başkaya, 1996: 94-95; Aytürk, 2011: 312; Bilgili, 2010: 67; Yıldız, H. 2013: 199) has occupied the Turkish political agenda as Kurdish issue for long years and has formed the critical dimension of social polarization for decades. On the other hand, the cultural features mentioned in the section of the political culture of Turkey, namely patrimonialism, personal style of administration, state administration habit of ruling without opposition, elitism, perception on the role of the army in politics, the insignificance of the individual against society should be considered in this context. Another element of sociological reasons is that children are raised in the family and school with the most traditional way of authority relations.

Ideological reasons, as a third group of the factors, are mainly related to the leftist-rightist conflict which since the transition to multiparty political life in Turkey in parallel to the hostility between capitalist and communist blocs globally. Turkey, from World War II to collapse of the communist bloc, has become one of the theatres of this ideological polarization (Karamollaoğlu, Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020).

Finally, a reason for the weak culture of political compromise culture in Turkey is related to personal qualities (Kutan, Interview, Feb 2020). The ambitious attitude of political party leaders and their divisive rhetorics generated from this attitude has been a significant

cause of political antagonism (Arınç, Kamalak, Interview, Feb 2020). When people at the top of the parties are hostile to each other, people who are members of a party become enemies to each other (Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020). The political elites' excessive passion for power lies behind this hostility. It is possible to see this voracity from the fact that most of the prominent political leaders have tried to keep their position in the political movement or party and ruled it by jealousy until the end of their life. It should be added that an important factor feeding the ambitious attitude of the leaders is the partisans located near them. People close to the leader can provoke and direct the managers not to leave the seat of power so that their positions and interests bound to the leader continue (Kutan, Interview, Feb 2020).

1.3. Coalition

1.3.1. Coalition in the Abstract

The reminder that "There is no agreement among scholars on the definitions of concepts largely because their usage is both circumstantial and contextual." (Kapa, 2008: 341) is useful. However, the usefulness of definitions in clarifying the content of concepts cannot be denied too. So the identification of the concept can be started with these definitions: "A coalition is the temporary cooperation of different individuals, groups, or political parties to achieve a common purpose, which can be either short term or long term." (Colomer, 2011: 286).

Gathering various aspects of the concept, Altman's definition is also illuminating: Temporary combination of groups or individuals formed to pursue specific objectives through joint action. Specifically, it is a set of parliamentary political parties that agree to pursue a common goal or a set of common goals; pool their resources together in pursuit of this goal; communicate and form building commitments concerning their goals; (and) agree on the distribution of pay-offs to be received on obtaining their goal (as cited in Oyugi, 2006: 53).

It can be said that all politics involve some coalition. Minor and major political events need this or that sort of coalition. Not only political parties, but also interest groups, and social movements can be considered as coalitions of individuals who are chasing a common interest. On the other hand, coalition governments are formed in many parliamentary systems, but they are not confined to only this system because presidential and semi-

presidential government systems require forming some sort of coalitions during and after elections too. In some cases, the formation of broad coalitions is needed for creating political stability or ending religious or ethnic conflicts. While conflict is one of the critical concepts in politics, the coalition is also significant because almost all conflicts happen between different coalitions (Colomer, 2011: 286).

Despite its use in a wide range, the term "coalition" mostly refers to the coalition governments of the parliamentary system formed by two or more political parties (Strøm and Müller and Bergman 2008: 6). This study, also, focuses on Turkey's government coalitions, which were formed during the term of the parliamentary system that lasted up until 2018. Therefore, the *coalition*, here, is examined in terms of coalitions in parliamentary government systems rather than its broad meaning. However, in the other two democratic systems, that is, presidential and semi-presidential systems, the importance of coalitions or alliances in political life cannot be ignored. The influence of coalitions in presidential elections and parliamentary work cannot be denied in the countries of Europe, which are considered as semi-presidential systems and in the Latin American countries which have a presidential system. Likewise the importance of coalition and alliance in the Turkish political life, even with the newly founded quasi-presidential system, continues.

US former President Woodrow Wilson, once with the intent of indicating its prevalence, referred to British-style parliamentary government as "the world's fashion" (Lijphart, 2012: 10), Borrowing this term and updating it for the prevalence of coalitions in contemporary democratic countries, it can be said, "coalitions are the democracies' fashion". Newton and Van Deth (2005, 228) states that the multi-party systems of Western Europe, including Germany, France, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy, have been associated with coalition governments. It is stated that, from the end of World War II until the end of the 1990s, only 13 per cent of the governments in Western Europe were formed by a single party while the others were comprised of different forms of coalition governments (Strøm, Müller and Bergman 2008: 207).

Latin America also has become a fruitful land of coalitions between parties of identical ideological orientations. In Chile, even coalition, comprising among others the Christian Democracy, the Socialist Party, the Radical Party, became the tool of removing dictatorial power (i.e. General Augusto Pinochet) and founding a democratic regime. This coalition, in subsequent years, was able to win democratic presidential elections. Coalitions have also

been an essential and pervasive factor in sub-Saharan African democratic developments. Several countries of Africa also exemplify the emergence of coalitions or alliances of many parties which have been instrumental in ousting different types of authoritarian regimes and one-party systems in Africa. The Movement of Multiparty Democracy (MMP) in Zambia; the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in Kenya; and the United Democratic Front (UDF) in Malawi were successful coalitions that put an end to decades-long terms of former autocratic regimes (Kapa, 2008: 340).

There are different arguments on whether coalition governments are more democratic or if this kind of government has more advantages. The idea that in favour of coalitions purport that coalitions represent a broader range of people and a comprehensive portfolio of views and put them all in the process of decision-making and policy-making. Therefore, it becomes more democratic and fairer. A coalition government offers a chance for voters of different parties to represent in the machine of government, and this provides more satisfaction with democratic systems. This feeling supports their belief in political effectiveness and thus encourages their political participation, which is critical for the maintenance and stability of democratic systems. Another benefit of the coalition is that it entails public policy be produced by negotiation and debate which is quite useful to see different aspects of an issue, consider its positive and negative sides and reach a well-evaluated political decision (Oxbridge Applications, 2018).

When it comes to the opposite idea that put forward the disadvantages of coalition governments, it is alleged that coalition governments can be regarded as less democratic. This is because minor parties can barter for more political gain than they have succeeded proportionally. In other words, a party with little popular support might be able to impose its policy preferences on the majority and be offered positions, which does not correspond to its real public background. Another criticism on coalitions is that promises made by political parties are left aside, and parties try to find a middle way to go through the process of seizing power. This change in the direction of political ideas and given promises is likely to be regarded as a betrayal to its electorates. One more argument opposing the coalition government is that coalitions generally take a short-term point of view because they would not think to be re-elected in the same form. This short-sightedness prevents cabinets from undertaking radical reforms and finding robust solutions to problems of society. Another risk of coalitions is asserted as coalitions are relatively unstable and can devastate without

much political success. This is believed to be highly likely because ideological cleavages, as well as conflict of interests, have the inherent potential of disagreement and this becomes apparent as a time of partnership passes (Oxbridge Applications, 2018).

Evaluations against the coalition can be considered valid if it concerns government stability because coalition governments tend to last less long than single-party majority cabinets. This is because members of coalitions want to maximize their political interest in every incumbent event, and this competition is likely to happen throughout the partnership term. Moreover, when the ideological range of partners is wide or when the number of political parties is high, the coalition would be more vulnerable to splits and departures (Colomer, 2011: 288). However, it is difficult to argue that coalitions are less democratic. For democracy is not only the rule of the majority; but more importantly, it is the regime in which the standard rules enacted should meet the needs and demands of every segment of society as much as possible. Better meeting the needs and demands of different segments is possible with their representatives being partners in the management. Thus, coalitions are indicative of more democracy, but not less democracy.

Here, it should be remembered that coalitions are related to the consensus model of Lijphart who contrasts it with "majoritarian model". Lijphart reminds that majoritarian translation of democracy "government by the majority of people." which simplifies democratic functioning implies the exclusion of the minority. Against this rough definition, there is another approach, which propounds that democracy primarily means, "All who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that decision either directly or through chosen representatives." Majoritarian defence, in turn, may allege that two situations can alleviate the risk of exclusion of minorities by the majority. First, today's minorities have a chance of becoming the majority and coming into power in subsequent elections. Second, while the social structure of the society is relatively homogenous, the majority group would not be very far apart from a minority group in their political view because the majority is not far from the centre and try to stay around the centre of the political spectrum. (Lijphart, 2012: 31).

However, as Lijphart aptly puts it, the conditions which might tolerate the drawbacks of a majoritarian rule are not available in many societies which are "plural". In contrast, most national borders are divided with invisible borders which might be even stricter than that of national. Religious, sectarian, linguistic, ethnic, racial, regional, or ideological, features of

groups are likely to be dividing into many countries. The deeper the division of such groups, the more separated they are. In such conditions, people are strictly bound to "their" parties, their affiliation is regarded as a matter of loyalty, and the changing party is relatively less likely than homogenous societies. Therefore, the majority and minority part of society turn to be stable; that is, an alternation of them in coming to power is not prospective. Since the divisions are rigid, in other words, political positions are quite apart from each other, second mitigation condition is also absent: The ruling party does not care the minority as much as those of homogenous societies, and that means minority is condemned to be deprived of services offered by the ruling government (Lijphart, 2012: 31).

In such societies, the solution is "consensus democracy" which emphasise compromise but not conflict, brings to fore inclusion rather than exclusion, and seeks to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of narrow majority (Lijphart, 2012: 32). Consensus model tries to share, diffuse and limit power in a variety of instruments instead of concentrating power in the hands of the majority. Here the critical points come to fore. The first instruments to create the consensus model is forming a broad coalition cabinet in order to share executive power. The consensus principle is in favour of including as much as possible coalition partner into the cabinet. If society is pluralist by structure and if the election system is proportional, then the multi-party system is quite likely, which is expected to culminate in a coalition government.

However, there is another point to remember here. Lijphart's coalition-based governments for pluralist societies do not always produce the expected results because the representatives of these societies may not be very eager to manage together. Therefore, it is not easy for coalitions to run. This is where the culture of political compromise comes into play. In order to achieve more democracy, the political parties joining the coalition must have a culture of political compromise. Otherwise, blockage and even government crisis come to the agenda, which has often raised political crisis during the coalition eras of Turkey. Indeed, coalition periods has marked in memory of the people of Turkey as "troubled times" because mostly coalitions were delayed, coalition parties could not be harmonised, and the lives of the coalitions were short.

Nevertheless, "healthy coalitions" based on the culture of political compromise are likely to provide crucial gains for democracy. Coalition governments are more likely to induce a balanced interinstitutional relationship between the executive and legislative

branches of government. Since political parties, take part in the cabinet, require bargain and reaching agreements for political resolutions and making law, they learn to take a step in the way of negotiation and sharing power. Ministers of different parties also realise the necessity of cooperation, listening to each other's apprehension, and working together. On the other hand, the prime minister of coalitions has no chance of prevailing cabinet or parliament, which is the usual situation in single-party governments. He or she pays regard for the functioning of the multiparty government, tries to prolong the life of the government and therefore even tends to pander to the other parties' whims (Colomer, 2011:288). Such developments that are in favour of including different policy preferences of parties and social categories are quite critical for the development of democratic behaviours and attitudes. Besides, in parliamentary systems, coalition government periods are the times when parliaments increase their power, and their roles thrive.

There are two fundamental dilemmas experienced by the parties involved in the coalition: First one, while coalition government provides for a political party to obtain control over political offices and to enact policies; the party is constrained by its coalition partner and cannot take a stance as independent as in case of being the single majority party. The second dilemma is that: On the one hand, a political party, in order to ensure the stability of the cabinet and govern together effectively need to cooperate with other partners and pursue collective goals. Governing together and adopting joint policy targets entails subtle compromise. On the other hand, political parties need considering the electoral competition. Since electoral success is related to clarifying and differentiating their policy profile, they have to maintain their distinct political identity through coalition partnership. "Thus, while coalition parties govern together, they compete for votes alone". These two dilemmas are political realities, which are supposed to be regarded together by political parties, which should prove their talent as a master of the art of politics (Sagarzazu and Klüver, 2017: 333).

Political communication is an essential instrument concerning coping with one of the dilemmas abovementioned. Governing in coalitions requires a compromise because partners have different policy preferences. Therefore, partners frequently adopt legislative regulations which accommodate the choice of their partners but do not fit the expectation of their electorates. Here political communications take place in that political party can express its political stance and legislative priorities directly to their voters. This communication constitutes a beneficial channel because, by this open dialogue, which is not constrained by

parliamentary rules or coalition partners, a political party can keep its relationship with followers intact (Sagarzazu and Klüver, 2017: 333).

The formation and expiry of coalition cabinets are analysed as cooperative game theory, in political science. Politicians, when trying to form a coalition, chase the best post and the most effective position in order to influence public policies and reach their ideological goals. Politicians' search of these goals is accepted both realistic and legitimate. Parties, likewise, while thinking to be a part of the government, want to accumulate as much power as possible. This culminates in forming a coalition with the minimum viable size. Thus there have been several coalition formulas that include different aspects of political conditions such as maximizing power, ideological consistency, duration of the coalition, and voter's attitude toward the manner of a political party (Colomer, 2011: 287).

According to early coalition theories, particularly that pioneering work of William Riker's The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962) politicians prefer to form coalitions just big enough to ensure a majority in parliament. This was because they are motivated primarily by ambition for power or prestige, and that means sharing cabinet posts among more parties than is necessary is senseless. This kind of coalitions would be called a *minimum winning coalition*. However, later studies presented that contrary to this first theory, coalitions made of more parties than necessary, namely "oversized coalitions" was formed between 1955 and 1998 in parliamentary democracies (Kapa, 2008: 343).

Lijphart, in his constructive book *Patterns of Democracy (1999)* attached particular importance to coalition governments as critical form and reflection of a better pattern of democracy, i.e. "consensus democracy". Considering the coalitions as much more beneficial and democratic devices, he cleared the coalition theories in quite an eloquent way. According to Lijphart coalition theories are about predicting which particular cabinet will form in case we know the strength of different parties in parliament. There are several theories, which, focusing on different variables, propose probable cabinet under particular conditions (Lijphart, 2012: 80-81).

Minimum winning coalitions: William Riker's Minimum Winning Coalition Principle (MWC) seems to be one of the earliest theories on coalition forming. According to Riker, politicians think form coalitions with the smallest necessary total number of votes of winning and no larger (Zhang, 2018:152). Despite many opposite arguments and several contrarian

data, Riker's theory was quite useful in illustrating the "office-seeking" priority of political parties, which means that parties want to get as much power as possible. For any party reaching power means taking part in the cabinet but reaching maximum power means holding as many chairs in the cabinet as possible. Consequently, parties joining the cabinet would have an impetus to keep other parties outside that are not compulsory for gaining a bare majority of the parliament (Zhang, 2018:152).

Minimal size coalitions: This theory follows the same rationale that each party seeks to reach maximum power. However, in this theory, the motive of maximization of power is pushed the further point. That means, parties not only aspire to minimize the number of parties joining in the cabinet but also desire to keep the total size of partnership as small as possible that is the cabinet shall be based on the narrowest possible parliamentary majority. This is because a minimal size coalition would offer a chance for each party of gaining more seats in comparison to the other coalition alternatives (Lijphard, 2012: 83).

Coalition with the smallest number of parties/Bargaining proposition: This theory was developed by Michael Leiserson and argued that when there are several alternatives of minimal winning coalitions, it is likely that the smallest possible number of parties will form a coalition. This is because negotiation and bargaining among the lesser number of parties are more comfortable to complete. Also, this situation is expected to ease the functioning of the coalition. (Lijphard, 2012: 83).

Minimal range coalitions: This coalition theory draws attention to the political preferences and programs of political parties rather than their number and size. This approach is logical because the variable of political similarity is not something that can be overlooked. On the contrary, a collaboration of ideologically close parties can be expected at the expense of lesser seat in the cabinet, while ideologically hostile parties are not likely to cooperate (Lijphard, 2012: 84).

Minimal Connected Winning Coalitions: Proposed by Robert Axelrod, this theory assumes that "parties will try to coalesce with their immediate neighbours and that other adjacent parties will be added until a majority coalition is formed." It is clear that this theory, like minimal range coalitions, prioritizes world view or ideological position of political parties rather their size or holding office; yet the size is also not overlooked (Lijphard, 2012: 84).

Policy viable coalitions: This theory takes the consideration policy preferences on its extreme end. It is assumed that the pivotal party is the core party, and this party contains the median member of parliament on a policy scale. Since other parties taking place on the right and left of this core party cannot enact any policy contrary to its wishes, this core party has a chance of dictating policy (Lijphard, 2012: 85).

These theories are useful in that their assumption is based on a robust base, which reflects the critical drive of political actors that is power maximization. Therefore, their main predictions revolve around minimal winning coalitions of any kind. However, this is not the whole part of politics, and there have been many actual minorities and oversized coalitions that are formed in parliamentary democracies. For example, Laver and Schofield (1990, 70-71) have presented that among 196 cabinets formed in minority situations (no majority party in parliament) in twelve European multiparty democracies from 1945 to 1987, only 77 of these (% 39.3) were minimal winning coalitions; 46 were oversized, and 73 were minority cabinets. Lijphart presented similar data in his work, which investigates thirty-one parliamentary systems. Excluding single-party majority cabinets; 38.9 per cent of cabinets are minimal winning; % 32.6 of cabinets are oversized coalitions, and 28.5 per cent of all cabinets are the minority (Lijphard, 2012: 86-88).

Such oversized or minority coalitions can be formed for various reasons. For example, the party may not want to enter the coalition to enter the next elections more strongly (*parties' time perspective).* As another reason, during negotiations of cabinet formation, parties might be doubtful about how loyal other parties will be to the coalition cabinet, and therefore they might prefer to include more parties than necessary for minimal winning *(information effect).* B party, when thinking about coalescing with C party will probably support the participation of A party to equilibrate E party and stay in the centre of cabinet politics *(parties' policy preferences)*. Defending the country and democratic regime against any threat, be it external or internal, is one of the factors that might cause oversized coalitions. Besides, in some countries, constitutional rules may lead to broad coalitions or minority governments. One of them can be the absence of investiture requirement. In some countries, as a rule, a new cabinet can take office without formal approval of parliament by vote. Minority cabinet also can be expected in countries where the parliamentary majority can tolerate it rather than give apparent support. "Constructive vote of no confidence" is another tool, which generates the possibility of minority rule under the conditions when the

majority of parliament is too divided to offer a new cabinet. A provision in the French Constitution is of a feature of encouraging minority cabinet. According to this regulation, the cabinet has the right to make its legislative proposals matters of confidence. This rule includes the process, which is arranged in favour of the current cabinet because it is stipulated in relevant provision "Solely votes cast in favour of the no-confidence resolution shall be counted and the latter shall not be passed unless it secures a majority of the Members of the House." (Article 49). The strength of parliamentary committees is another factor that has an impact on the drive to join the cabinet. When committees are powerful and have a chance to make essential amendments on proposed bills, their respective parties will be less craving to enter cabinets. Finally, like the instance of Belgium, there might be particular provisions in constitutions or agreements which tend to enlarge the cabinet to the extent that can be called "oversized". (Lijphard, 2012: 89-91).

1. 3. 2. Coalitions in Turkish Political Life

The one-party regime, which has begun since the foundation of the Republic, has led to the convergence of the social, economic and political dynamics against it. Therefore, it can be said that with the transition to multi-party life, an opposition coalition against one party was formed (Karpat, 2010: 521). The first of the three groups that formed this coalition consisted of intellectuals who believed in the change in the way the CHP was governed and who wanted innovation in political life. The second was the landowners who controlled the economy of the countryside, opposed the land reform envisaged by the CHP. The third group was the broad masses, and their representatives, who rejected the socio-cultural revolutions embarked by the Republic, upheld traditional Islamic values and were suppressed during the single-party regime (Mumcu, 1994: 174). Hasan Bülent Kahraman, because of these characteristics, says that DP, which was the champion of democratic life, was of a pragmatic-eclectic structure (2012: 242).

However, thanks to this social coalition, DP remained in power as a single party for a decade with 53%, 58% and 48% of the votes in three elections held in the 1950s. The majority system of the single-party regime provided the DP with an extraordinary advantage in parliamentary representation. For example, it received 85% of the parliamentary seats in return for 53% of votes taken in the first election (Yeni Şafak, 2019). The military regime, which deposed the DP with a military coup, brought a proportional representation system

that almost equalized the rate of the votes and the rate of seats won in parliament. This new system, together with the increasing number of political parties, paved the way for coalition governments (Sarıkoca, 2005: 147). Because with this proportional representation, on the one hand, the parties with the smallest percentage were able to be represented (Yalansız, 2006: 21).

On the other hand, for a party to come to power alone, it had to get almost 50% of the total votes, which is very difficult to achieve in parliamentary systems. Especially in countries like Turkey, where social cleavages are multiple and deep, this system might make it almost impossible for a single party to come to power.[6]

The new system introduced by the 1961 Constitution gave the expected result, and no party could come to power alone. Thus began the era of coalitions (Demirtaş, 1998: 68). In the face of single-party governments not paying attention to democratic conventions and compromise, coalitions had the potential to be an opportunity for compromise of different social segments, demands and interests. In that sense, the good functioning of these coalitions was depended on how many political actors would be able to compromise, the answer of which was not promising at the time. Because major parties representing centre right and centre left proved to have a profound uncompromising manner, minor parties could play an active role which is not proportionate to their size of representation (Sarıkoca, 2005: 180). In the words of Emre Kongar, the first coalition was either crippled or injured in its establishment, because the partners (CHP-AP) were enemy brothers (Kara, 2015: 31).

From 1961 to 1965, three coalition governments were established, which lasted 7 months, 18 months and 8 months respectively. After the first two coalitions, a minority government was formed because the compromise was not reached to form a coalition, which remained in office for about 14 months. As such, four governments were established in this period within 4 years (Tunçkaşık, 2017: 3-4).

[6] The fact that the DP received more than 50% of the votes in the first two elections is an exceptional event that can be explained by the explosion of the political pressure created by the 27-year single-party regime in the society. Apart from such explosions, the economic performance of governments and the charisma of political leaders can be seen as important factors in obtaining similar high votes. It is possible to evaluate the general elections of 1965, 1983, 2007 and 2011 in this context.

The elections held in 1965 and 1969 ended the coalition period with the fact that AP, the party of Süleyman Demirel, received the high rates of votes such as 53% and 47%.[7] However, with the military intervention in 1971, in the three years between 1971-1974, four interim regime governments were established. These governments were able to remain in office for only 8 and a half, 5 and a half, 11, and 9 and a half months respectively (Tunçkaşık, 2017: 5-7).

The general election held in October 1973 initiated a new coalition period that continued until the 1980 coup. The first coalition government was formed by CHP and MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi/National Salvation Party) parties. However, this government was ended with the resignation of Prime Minister Ecevit about 8 months later. The reason for Ecevit's disruption of the coalition with this early resignation was the hope of going to power alone by going to an early election. However, this plan went wrong and a new coalition government, called Nationalist Front, was formed after 4 and a half months of a supra-party government which could not get the vote of confidence from the parliament.

The coalition, which was formed by the addition of three parties to the AP, remained in office for a relatively long time, approximately 27 months. In the early general election held in June 1977, the CHP came close to the number of chairs required to form the government single-handedly with 41% of the vote but did not reach to this end. After CHP leader Bülent Ecevit's 1-month minority government, a new coalition government was established (Kardaş, 2017: 81).

In this coalition government called National Front II, AP was accompanied by the MSP and MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/Nationalist Movement Party). However, this coalition government was able to serve for only 5 and a half months. At the beginning of 1978, Ecevit transferred 11 deputies from the AP, made the National Front II Coalition government fall and formed his own. This coalition government, during which severe economic, social and political crises took place, remained in office for 22 months in 1978-1979. After Ecevit's resignation, AP leader Demirel formed a minority government with

[7] Since the full proportional representation system was softened before the 1969 elections, AP has been able to come to power single handedly with 47% of the votes.

1. Coalition Governments During a History of the Republic of Turkey

Order of Coal.	Gov. order	Prime Minister/ Name of Government	Coalition Parties	Date Range of Office	Period of Office
1	26	İsmet İnönü (VIII. İnönü Gov.)	CHP-AP	20/11/1961-25/06/1962	7 months 5 days
2	27	İsmet İnönü (IX. İnönü Gov.)	CHP-YTP - CKMP	25/06/1962-25/12/1963	1 year 6 months
3	29	Suad Hayri Ürgüplü	AP-MP-CKMP+YTP	20/02/1965-27/10/1965	8 months 7 days
4	37	Bülent Ecevit (I. Ecevit Gov.)	CHP-MSP	26/01/1974-17/11/1974	9 months 22 days
5	39	Süleyman Demirel (IV. Demirel Gov/I.MC)	AP-MSP-CGP-MHP	31/03/1975-21/06/1977	2 years 2 months 21 days
6	41	Süleyman Demirel (V. Demirel Gov, II. MC)	AP-MSP-MHP	21/07/1977-05/01/1978	5 months 15 day
7	42	Bülent Ecevit (III. Ecevit Gov.)	CHP-DP-CGP	05/01/1978-12/11/1979	1 year 10 months 7 days
8	49	Süleyman Demirel (VII. Demirel Gov.)	DYP-SHP	20/11/1991-25/06/1993	1year 7 months 5 days
9	50	Tansu Çiller (I. Çiller Gov.)	DYP-SHP	25/06/1993-05/10/1995	2 years 3 months 10 days
10	52	Tansu Çiller (III. Çiller Gov.)	DYP-CHP	30/10/1995-06/03/1996	4 months 6 days
11	53	A. Mesut Yılmaz (II. Yılmaz Gov.)	ANAP-DYP	06/03/1996-28/06/1996	3 months 22 days
12	54	Necmettin Erbakan	RP-DYP	28/06/1996-30/06/1997	1 year 2 days
13	57	Bülent Ecevit (V. Ecevit Gov.)	DSP-MHP-ANAP	28/05/1999-19/11/2002	3 years 5 months 21 days

the outer support of the MSP and MHP. After 10 months, when the socio-economic and political crises continued to worsen, the government was overthrown with the coup of September 12, 1980 (Tunçkaşık, 2017: 8-10).

After returning to democratic life with the general elections held on 6 November 1983, the ANAP (Anavatan Partisi/Motherland Party) ruled the country for 8 years. The election law adopted since 1982 has a significant effect on this (Yalansız, 2006: 24). The military administration, which considered a multi-party parliament and coalition governments as harmful, had shaped the electoral system in favour of the big parties and reinforced this with a 10% electoral threshold (Kara, 2015: 35). However, these measures were efficient only for the first two elections and the elections held on 20 October 1991 opened the third period of coalitions. (Sarıkoca, 2005: 182) This coalition period, lasted for 11 years, continued until the election held on 3 November 2002. A characteristic of this period of coalitions was that the distribution of votes was balanced among four to five parties, unlike the previous periods. In the previous terms, the basic table was that there were two large parties (AP-CHP) based on the right and left axis and three or four small parties. This situation also reflects the differentiation of the political picture of the 60-70s and 90s. The 60-70s were the periods when the main social division was based on the ideological right-left axis, and identity politics such as religion, nationalism, and ethnicity remained marginal and tried to find a place within the right-left division (Zubaida, 2000: 72). However, after the 80s, politics based on the right-left separation weakened, and identity policies came to the fore. It is possible to see this transformation in two dimensions. First, the votes of the parties representing the left entered a rapid downward trend (Bingöl, 2009: 12) and reduced from 35-40 to 25 while the centre-right was divided into two large parties in itself [ANAP-DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi/True Path Party)]. Second, Islamism, Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism proved broad-based, independent political categories and became the notable political parties in the parliament.

In the October 1991 General Election, the distribution of votes was 27% for the DYP, 24% for the ANAP, 21% for the SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti/Social Democratic People's Party), and 17% for RP (Refah Partisi/Welfare Party). The DYP-SHP coalition government, which was established under Demirel's prime ministry, lasted about 18 months. In June 1993, DYP-SHP Coalition was formed under Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, the successor of the Süleyman Demirel who was elected as President. This government remained

in office for 27 and a half months, despite severe economic crises during its time and cohesion problems between the two parties. Nevertheless, the cabinet had to be revised for 13 times. In October 1995 Çiller formed a minority government that could live one month, which was followed by another DYP-CHP coalition, again under the leadership of Çiller. Declared as an electoral government, it remained in office for four months (Tunçkaşık, 2017: 11-13).

The general election held on 24 December 1995 confirmed the fragmented political picture described above. RP was the first party with 21% of the votes. ANAP received 20%, DYP 19%, DSP 15% and CHP 11%. These results, according to normal democratic practices, required the establishment of a coalition in which RP would be included. However, due to the negative attitude of the military and other parties under its influence, the first coalition was established between ANAP and DYP. However, this coalition, because of disagreement between two leaders, lasted roughly for four months. In June 1996, a coalition was formed between the RP and the DYP. This government was only able to last for a year because of the campaigns orchestrated by tutelary forces against RP. Following this government, by the will of the military and other circles of tutelage, ANAP-DSP-DTP coalition, under the premiership of the Mesut Yılmaz, founded and remained in office for about 18 and a half months. After the dismissal of the Yılmaz government with a no-confidence motion on corruption, a minority government was formed by the DSP, which has a size of 4 among the parties in parliament. This government, with the support of MPs from ANAP and DYP, led the country to the election and served for about four and a half months.

The votes of DSP, MHP, FP, ANAP, and DYP, which exceeded the threshold in the general elections held on 18 April 1999, were 22%, 18%, 15%, 13%, and 12%, respectively. The coalition required by this distribution of votes was formed between the three parties (DSP-MHP-ANAP). This coalition is regarded as one of the most harmonious coalitions in the republic's history, as its long life spans almost three and a half years, shows. This coalition government, labeled by the critical events of suppressing the conservative segment of society, progress in relations with the EU and adopting democratic harmonization packages, and significant economic crises, remained in office until the AK Party came to power after the 3 November 2002 election.

Two variables have more influence on the formation of coalitions in parliamentary systems. One of them is the multiparty system, which is caused by social plurality. As

discussed under the heading of political culture, Turkey is a country that includes many social cleavages, and the number of parties is therefore more. The other variable is the electoral system. Some of the electoral systems increase the number of political parties represented in parliament, while others have a reduction effect; for example, the majority system in the UK reduces the representation of parties.

Apart from these two universal factors, the military factor has influenced the formation of the coalition in Turkey sometimes. The 1960 coup and the 1970 intervention influenced the distribution of votes after the coups and necessitated the formation of coalitions (Kara, 2015: 37). Therefore it can be said that the first two terms of Turkey's coalition experience were shaped under these three factors. One striking point about the coalitions of the 60s and 70s is that, since the social division line crossed between the right and the left, the centre-right and centre-left parties stood too far apart for the coalition possibilities in this period, except that the army forced them. The ideological distance of the leaders of both sides and the ambition for personal power did not allow convergence needed to prevent the social conflict of this period.

The third coalition periods starting in 1991 can be explained with the variation of the division lines and the addition of new lines to them, as mentioned before. The division of the centre-right and left within itself and the rise in Islamism and in particular the Kurdish Issue increased the dynamics of social conflict. These divisions and diversity formed the infrastructure of numerous coalition governments that were formed and demolished during the 1990s. However, there is a salient point in the context of the social polarization of this period and its relationship with coalitions. The hostility of the centre-right and centre-left towards each other has eased off. This moderation has also reduced the density of each side within itself, so both the right and left could split in itself. A new line of deep division was formed in response to the softening of the left and right within itself. This line emerged between rising political Islam and other parties. The depth of this line was manifested by an uncompromising attitude of the political and state elites towards *Milli Görüş* (National View) and its party RP after the 1991 and 1995 elections. DYP + SHP, DYP + CHP, ANAP + DSP, DSP + MHP coalitions showed the convergence between the right and left, the softening of the personal attitudes of their leaders to each other and the joint position taken by these two sides against the rising Islamist politics. As a matter of fact, after the 28 February process operated by the state and the political elite against Islamist politics, with

the 2002 election, the Islamist movement, defeating the coalition that stood up against it, succeeded in coming to power, by softening its Islamist discourse and with the help of the economic failure of its adversaries (Yalansız, 2006: 502).

As Turkey's experience displays, coalitions are inevitable in Parliamentary systems, mainly where the lines of social division are ample, and where proportional representation system is applied. Because these two factors make it difficult for a single party to reach a majority when in democracies, the consent of the majority is needed for governance. Indeed, in most of the developed European countries, coalition governments are widespread, and this is not the cause of a political crisis (Ehrenberg, 2015). This is because the lines of social division are not deep, and there is a culture of compromise in political parties. However, the good functioning of coalitions is as crucial as their establishment because political stability and efficient governance are possible under the healthy coalitions. When x-rayed the coalitions in Turkey in this context, it is difficult to say that they are very healthy. Various data on coalitions reinforce this view the critical one of which is their life-time. Of the 13 coalitions established, only three remained in office for more than two years. The average tenure of 13 coalition government in Turkey between 1960 and 2002 is 1 year and 4 months. Indeed, this period is not the exact time that they were virtually in power, but includes the timeframe in which the government was officially assumed to be in charge of the government which lasts until the formation of the new government. Therefore, the actual time in which the coalition Works officially is much briefer. Short-lived governments, naturally, can only deal with daily problems instead of long-term policies (Kiriş, 2011: 41).

On the other hand, problems and long delays in the establishment of coalitions are other indicators of inefficiency. As can be seen in detail in the examples of coalitions that are the subject of this study, sometimes it took six months to establish a coalition government that received a vote of confidence. In Turkey, where distrust to the others have been a significant element of culture, this element is seen to spread apparently to the peak of the society where democratic rules oblige the parties to compromise (Eralp, 2015: 121).

CHAPTER 2: MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ

In this chapter, *Milli Görüş* as the subject of the thesis will be introduced. This section devoted to the introduction of the *Milli Görüş*, and it consists of three parts. In the first part, the conceptual content and the story of Islam-politics relations, particularly in Turkey, before the emergence of the *Milli Görüş* will be summarized. This is because in order to understand the *Milli Görüş* thoroughly, it is necessary to see political Islam as a whole, part of which is *Milli Görüş*. In the second part, Necmettin Erbakan and his Islamist personality will be explained since Erbakan is the principal figure of the re-emergence and development of political Islam in Turkey and he institutionalized this movement with his "*Milli Görüş*" ideology. *Milli Görüş* as an ideology will be introduced in the last part in which its political practice will be explained mainly through its political parties and coalitions, while its theory will be explained via basic themes such as religion, politics, economy, etc.

2. 1. Islam-Politics Relations in Turkey

Islam-politics relations refer to the enormous time and geographic area about which countless work has been done (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 14). However, to draw a general picture of the Islam-Politics relations in Turkey, it would be useful to sketch the general perspective of these relations. To begin with, two general findings on the subject appear to be appropriate. The first is, Islam cannot be considered as separate from politics. In contrast to faith, which is a spiritual-individual phenomenon, Islam is a system that covers the whole individual-social, and material-spiritual field. Since politics constitutes an area of social life, it falls within the scope of religion (İzzeti, 2014: 150). The other finding is this: Institutional politics, leadership and state-building were all perceived by Muslims as a religious and social necessity after the death of Prophet Muhammad. However, the understanding that "The formal elements of institutional politics are not available in the Qur'an and this is not a religious issue" has been accepted by the vast majority of Muslims (Güler, 2010: 70).[8] On the other hand decrees of Qur'an and the practice of Prophet Muhammed (as far as it is transferred correctly) has included a few principles (freedom, consultation, justice, merit,

[8] One of the opponents of this view is Abul Ala Mawdudi, a Pakistani Muslim philosopher. According to Mawdudi the Qur'an is a book full of political orders. Accordingly there are many orders and rules in the Qur'an on matters such as state administration, caliphate, obedience to the government, the qualifications of the rulers, the government's rights and responsibilities to citizens, etc. In addition, the political society formed by the Islamic prophet showed the way these rules were applied (Mawdudi, 1982: 13-85).

etc.) that are related to politics. These concepts do still constitute the core of Islamic politics today (Sağlam, 2017: 44-47). After the term of the Prophet and particularly following the time of four Caliphs, the essence of the Islamic governance system has changed. The characteristics attributed to the period of the Prophet and the four caliphs were abandoned. These features were the election of leaders by consultation, leaders' direct contact with the public, the use of the state treasury for the benefit of the public, freedom of opinion, independence of the judiciary, consultation in making policy, the avoidance of racism and tribalism and the rule of law. Since the period of Muawiya, necessities of politics have been superior to the orders of religion. In other words, politics no longer served religion, but religion served politics (Mawdudi, 1982: 207-241).

The domination of politics on religion, which was valid from the 8th century to the end of the 19th century, influenced the thought and intellectual domains as well. This means Islam-politics theories produced by then were by the most part following the political practices and seeking to legitimate and rationalize the current political environment and political power (Arpacı, 2017: 32). As Arpacı proposes, the examination of Islam-politics relation can be divided into three basic terms. The first term lasts from the 8th century to the 15th century main attribute of which is the theorization of Islam-politics relation. Preeminent thinkers of this term are Mukaffa, Farabi, Maverdi, Nizamülmülk, Gazali, İbni Rüşd, İbni Teymiyye, Barani and İbni Haldun. The second term begins with 15th century and ends in the 18th century when Islam became one element of politics. Leading thinkers of this term are Tursun Bey, Devvani, Hunci, Katip Çelebi, Koçi Bey, and Dehlevi. (Arpacı, 2017: 32).

The third term begins with the 19th century and remains until today. It is mainly sparked by the confrontation of the Islamic world with West via colonialism. (Arpacı, 2017: 33). From this century onwards, the relationship between Islam and politics has evolved into Islamism, and the most critical factor in this is modernization and secularization in the Islamic world (Gencer, 2013: 69). In this period, the Islam-politics relation, in the Islamic world and Ottoman as its centre, was dominated by the Islam-Western relationship. From the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman government, whose backwardness became apparent against the West, initiated the process of westernization to preserve its existence against the West. This process first started with military and administrative institutions, but in time, it began to include political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. The reason why westernization gained different dimensions was that when the military and

administrative regeneration processes did not produce the expected results, some elites began to argue that the superiority of the West arises not only from its military and administrative organization but also from the secularization of science, politics, society, education and culture. Thus, the way for Muslim societies to get rid of backwardness is through the secularization of all social structure and functioning. This understanding, which developed and spread between the military and civil bureaucracy and certain intellectuals, was generally called Westernism. The spread of westernization thought, and practice by gaining social and cultural dimensions gave rise to a strong reaction in the society which has been kneaded with Islam for a thousand years and its intellectual spokesmen (Dağı, 2015: 2).

According to this opposite view, the reason for the backwardness of the Muslim regions could not be attributed to Islam, which came from God and demanded that goodness, justice and prosperity should prevail on earth. On the contrary, the reason behind the backwardness of the Muslim world is their deviation from the true belief. From this point, it has been tried to answer critical questions such as what is the essence of Islam, how to go to pure Islam, what are the main principles of Islam, what should be done to revive Islamic civilization. The suggested remedies have also begun to build the modern Islamic identity of Muslims who want to challenge the West (Dağı, 2015: 2). The central assumption of this new approach was that the West had developed material (science, technology, industry, economy, military power, organization, etc.) values, but its spiritual (moral, ethical, cultural, social) values are corrupt. Therefore, it tries to exploit and vitiate the whole world and Muslims. Muslim communities must return to their essence in the spiritual sphere and benefit from the material values of the West in the material sphere in order to regain the high position they deserve.

This reaction and revitalization efforts gained more legitimacy with the acceleration of Western colonialism and the invasion of Muslim countries by the 19th century. This thought movement strengthened by anti-Westernism and was called Islamism. It began in a fragmented manner within the constitutionalist wave before Abdulhamid II, but it essentially has gained a prominent place among the post-constitutional ideas of the Second Constitutionalist Period. Şehbenderzâde Ahmed Hilmi, Ahmed Hamdi Akseki, Said Halim Paşa, Mehmed Âkif, Mustafa Sabri, Ferit Kam, Mehmet Ali Ayni, İsmail Hakkı İzmirli, İsmail Fenni, Said Nursi, Mûsâ Kâzım, Halim Sabit, Seyyid Bey, M. Şemsettin, and

Muhammed Hamdi Yazır, were reputed figures of this movement (Kara, 2001:7-8). With the Second Constitutionalist Period, Islamist thought manifested itself in certain journals and newspapers such as Sırât-ı Müstakîm (Sebîlürreşâd), Beyânülhak, Livâü'l-İslâm, Hikmet, İttihâd-ı İslâm, Tasavvuf, İslâm Mecmuası, Volkan. However, this movement, until World War I, has kept in itself the nationalist-Turkist vein too. That is why Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Halim Sabit have been mentioned in the same environment until 1914. The same movement was represented by names, such as Jamal-al-din Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Sayyid Ahmad Khan in Egypt and India (Özcan, 2001, 70-71).

It seems that in the period between the declaration of the Second Constitutionalism (1908) and the proclamation of the Republic (1923), the content of the concept of Islamism was enriched. One of the reasons for this was the accelerating disintegration of the Ottomans and the Western invasion of the Middle East during this period which increased the anti-Western sentiment. The other reason, particularly for Turkey, was that oppressive governments, at both ends of this period, constrained the movements of thought (Özcan, 2001, 70-71). Therefore, it is appropriate to give some details about the content and definition of Islamism which is said to be mentioned for the first time in the articles of Ziya Gökalp, "Three Movements" published in the "Homeland of Turks" in 1913 for the first time.

However, before delving into these details, it is necessary to compare the terms of "Islamism" and "political Islam". Apart from some occasions when they are contrasted with cultural, traditional, and civil Islam where 'political Islam' appears to be more convenient to prefer; it seems there is not a considerable difference between "Islamism" and "political Islam". Looking at the literature on this concept, it can be seen that these two terms are used interchangeably mostly without any conceptual explanation.[9] Only Graham E. Fuller, at the beginning of his book, explains his view and intention in using these two terms in the same meaning (Fuller, 2004: 22). Işıl Arpacı also touches the use of these terms and states that there is no difference between them, but the matter may have arisen from the problem of

[9] For these uses see Roy, O. (1994). *Siyasal İslam'ın İflası.* İstanbul: Metis, p.40; Manaz, A. (2005). *Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamcılık.* Ankara: Ayraç, p.94; Nebati, N. (2014). *AK Parti Teşkilatlarının Demokratik Değerlere Bakışı Üzerine Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz: Milli Görüşten Muhafazakâr Demokrasiye*, Phd Thesis, Kocaeli University; Akdoğan, Y. (2000). *Siyasal İslam Refah Partisi'nin Anatomisi*, İstanbul: Şehir, p.203; Aktay, Y. (2005). Türkiye'de İslamcılığın Siyasal Marjları, in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 6-İslamcılık*. İstanbul: İletişim, p.18.

naming (Arpacı, 2017: 35). Therefore despite usually, Islamism is going to be used for the phenomenon in this work, political Islam will refer to the same phenomenon as well.

As for the content of the term, several definitions seem to be worth knowing for they shed light on the content of the concept in different ways, thus reveals different dimensions of the term.

"Every Muslim entity, irrespective of what kind of interpretation of Islam is accepted, which puts Islam at the centre of its political practice is Islamist" (Aktay, 2005: 18).

"Political Islam is a movement that holds Islam as a fulcrum and tries to transform or change the established political regime according to the frame of Islamic rules by either legal or illegal ways (Duman and Üşenmez, 2016: 258).

"Anybody, irrespective of method or organization, who believe the idea that Islam is a political, legal and economic order and strive to change the society and the state according to this idea is called political Islamist; the ideology they have is political Islamism." (Manaz, 2005: 40).

The definition of İsmail Kara and the definition in Islam Encyclopaedia contain almost the same elements. According to Kara, "Islamism is a movement, in the 19-20th century, that encompasses all of the political, intellectual and scientific studies, quests, proposals and solutions with its activist, modernist eclectic character, in order to make Islam sovereign 'again' with its whole aspects (faith, worship, morality, philosophy, politics, law, education…) and to rescue, with a rational method, Muslims and the Islamic world from Western exploitation, cruel and oppressive rulers, captivity, imitation, superstition….and to civilize, unite and develop them." (Kara, 2001: 9). The definition in the Islam Encyclopaedia is as follows: Islamism is the search for religious, political and scientific solutions for civilizing Muslims by re-dominating Islam as a whole life order in the fields of faith, worship, ethics, philosophy, administration, politics, economics, law and education; saving the Islamic world from backwardness, Western domination, cruel and despotic rulers and arbitrary rule; purifying the religious thought from imitation, superstition and concoction, all of which are expressed by concepts of correction, renaissance and revival, (ıslah, tecdid, ihya) and can be seen in different parts of the Islamic Word; or movement of thought that includes these searches (Özcan, 2001, 70:71).

According to Yalçın Akdoğan, political Islam is a concept, which pushes forward the political aspect of Islam, and it is interpreted within the frame of Islamic messages that are directed to political area. However, political Islamism as a movement, is understood as a concept which aims at the state device and strives to regulate socio-economic and political space according to the principles of religion. For Akdoğan, political Islam concept includes armed organizations, violence, suppressive movements, as well as groups which endeavour to increase the impact of religion via democratic and cultural ways (Akdoğan, 2000: 203). In this respect, political Islam is contrasted with two other concepts: Cultural Islam and Social Islam. Cultural Islam has no relation with politics directly, it is rather a challenge at the intellectual scope, and its area of interest is an epistemology which is grounded on a new world imagination that is based on the oneness of God. Social Islam is a strong movement, the roots of which goes back to the historical tradition of the society. In big cities, this movement is fed by religious communities. Within the scope of Turkey, Nurculuk and Süleymancılık can be counted among this movement (Akdoğan, 2000: 192-195).

Graham Fuller's (2004: 22) description is similar to the description of Akdoğan: Islamists are those who believe that Islam as a faith system has something important to say about how politics and society are to be organized and who strive to somehow put into effect this idea. The term political Islam, in that sense, has to be taken as neutral in character; neither pejorative nor judgmental. Only specific ideas of the particular Islamic movement, after the definition of its means and goals are analysed and defined in a more detailed way, can be criticised. The term political Islam is practical and broad enough because it involves all sort of Islamic manifestation including fundamentalists and moderate, pro-violence and peaceful, democratic and authoritarian, traditional and modernist.

Olivier Roy draws attention to the observation that political Islamists have an imagination, and it is the paradigm of the first believers at the time of Prophet and four caliphs (Era of Bliss). This paradigm, irrespective of its historical reality, offers the ideal of Muslim society. In this society, Prophet Muhammed as an envoy and interpreter of the divine message was leading to all activities of this society. This was an egalitarian, undifferentiated society, which was living under the patronage of a man who did not found the rule of administration but reporting the revelation. There was no separation among social, private, ritual, politics, economy etc. This paradigm of unity and this primary society was to be the missing of Islamists and the primary determinant of the relations between Islam and politics.

This paradigm has been the source of themes adopted by Islamists, and the critical one is that religious, judicial, political field are not likely to be separated. Islamic law and sharia should be the only source of legal order and the norm of both governing and the governed ordinary people. There cannot be an autonomous political space and positive law, which has its own values. Ultimately, the state is never a country the border of which is circled according to nation, race, or ethnicity; it is instead a region where all Muslims are involved, but the virtual order may be founded for a part of Muslim yet this should be regarded contingent and provisional. (Roy, 1994: 29-30).

A critical point should be recalled is that despite some asserts that political Islam refers to 'radical Islam'(Sarıbay, 1995: 98) many analysts agree that political Islam contains both moderate and radical Islamists and all of them have the same cultural background and belong to the same political range. While radical groups resort to violence, moderate intellectuals preach to change the worldview of people; so despite their methods are different, they have a common goal, that is, a state based on religious principles (Çalışlar, 1997: 59). In relation to that, it is proposed that there are four versions of political Islam: Revolutionist (Iran and the groups take it as a model); putschist (Pakistan-Ziya ül Hak, Jordan Hizbut Tahrir movement); democratic (Pakistan: Cemaati İslami Party, Turkey: *Milli Görüş* parties and Algeria Islamic Salvation Front); Compromising (Egypt Ihvan movement, Turkey organised religion (Akdoğan, 2000: 204). Akdoğan also holds that political Islam is undergoing a process of evolution, gaining experience and is conscious of the political reality as time goes on. If the range of political Islam is transforming in favour of radicalism, this is for its exclusion from the legal political system. Had it been allowed to take part in the political system, it would have been modernised and evolved faster and had a chance of understanding the modern requirements (Akdoğan, 2000: 211).

After giving these details on the conceptual content of Islamism, development adventure of this thought and action in Turkey can be retraced. The Turkism and Westernism movements left their mark on the movement the Committee of Union and Progress which was the most influential political structure between the Second Constitutional Monarchy and the foundation of the Republic, although the idea of Ottomanism was first seen in it (Hanioğlu, 2001: 476-484). However, this movement reckoned Islam as a critical instrumental component of social coalescence which could be used for the process of nationalisation. Indeed, there seems to be a discrepancy between religion and nation, but

religion was taken as a valuable unifying component of a nation by this cadres. Within this scope, the 'milli/national' term was used including religious connotation[10] rather than pure "national". (Zürcher, 2004: 261).

Likewise, Islam and thought of Islamism as unifying power on society was used as a cement throughout the Independence War of Turkey in the process of the foundation of the Republic. Many examples of this religious apparition could be followed in Mehmet Akif's call of jihad in mosques, Atatürk's sermons, prayers and call for saving the Khalifa in critical days, in hanging the "şura" (consultation) verse of Qur'an on the wall of parliament etc. (Nebati, 2014: 99).

In fact, the elite cadre that led the liberation war consisted of the union of pro-Westernism and pro-Islamism. These two groups cooperated to save the country, the Sultanate and the Caliphate (Kara, 2013: 27). However, the value of Islam and Islamism for the Western wing within this cadre was as much as it would contribute to the establishment of the new state. In the words of Taner Timur, Mustafa Kemal had used Islam tactically and in a revolutionary way during the War of Independence (1993:112). "After the war, the Kemalist cadre, who took over the state power, adopted a hostile attitude towards Islam." (Karatepe, 2011: 27). This wing, called the First Group (Çoker, 1994: 301-304) in the 1st term of Grand National Assembly, gradually seized political control and abrogated the Sultanate by the end of the War of Independence. Within 1923, very critical events took place regarding the identity and structure of the new state (İnalcık, 2013: 185). In April it was decided to renew the elections. Election, which secured the liquidation of the Islamist wing that was effective in the First National Assembly, was held in June (Demirel, 1994: 584). In August, the second Grand National Assembly was opened, which approved the Lausanne Treaty within two weeks. In September, the People's Party was founded. In October, the law for the establishment of the Republic was adopted, and Mustafa Kemal was elected President (Demirel, 1994: 598-603).

2nd Grand National Assembly which had become ideologically largely homogenized, having increased its power by 1924, continued its revolutionary steps. Within this scope, it abolished the Caliphate in March and adopted the new Constitution in April (Karatepe, 2011: 27). In the same year, while the pressures towards the social visibility of Islam became

[10] The term 'milli' involves this flexibility because its noun form 'millet' means "religion" in Arabic, which makes the meaning of milli "religious". This double meaning was valid also in the Ottoman period.

evident, an opposition party, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası/TCF) was established in November 1924. However, this party was closed in 1925, on the ground that it encouraged reactionaryism with its Article 6 of the party program: "Party respects religious beliefs and opinions." (Zürcher, 2013: 86,142). The "the reactionaryism" accusation, which has been the effective instrument to suppress the opposition during the history of the Republic, began in this way (Karatepe, 2011: 29). From this date onwards, the process of orientation to the West and the destruction of Islamic institutions and values gained momentum. Secularism, in its radical positivist term, as the central value of westernization was placed in all political, economic, social and cultural fields. In line with this, all historical/traditional institutions of religion in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres were systematically liquidated in the following years (Akyeşilmen and Özcan, 2014: 37).

Within this scope, many values and symbols deemed to be associated with backwardness, oriental, and religion, have been eradicated from public space. The government closed all tariqas, which were representing the institutional bodies of the mass Muslim society all around the country, and all Sufi orders were pushed underground. (Edelman, Cornell, Lobel and Karaveli, 2015: 13). Within 15 years, rapid and intensive legal regulations on administration, civil life, culture, art, education, trade, organization, civil society, language, entertainment, dressing were enacted. All these revolutionary changes, made in the way similar to 'enlightened despotism' were tried to be protected by rigid penal codes, harsh administrative scrutiny and extraordinary judicial machinery (Ertem, 2010: 72). These precautions were considered inevitable because there were very wide defiance and protestation against new 'wholesale change'. Many insurrections reflected this widespread objection of grassroots all around the country, but the power of the state was enough to control and crush all of them. Moreover, these riots were used as an appropriate tool to get rid of the opposition who considered being a nuisance (Köker, 2009: 151). Thus, Islamic leaders, groups and thoughts were excluded from the centres of power (Dağı, 2015: 3).

However, all this process was indicating that the radical modernization project of Republican elitists was not acknowledged by people (Köker, 2009: 151) Though some consider that secularist Jacobinism of Republican elitists was *extremely successful,* (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 22) in reality it brought a break between ruling power and the people, which would endure for many decades. From the early years of Republic to

1945, the founding will of the Republic acted with the belief that its ontological condition was eliminating the Islam from all aspects of political, social, economic and cultural life. One of the crucial reasons for this attitude was that Islam was assumed to be the elemental cause of backwardness of Turkey (Nebati, 2014: 105).

Despite all this suppression implemented by the government, "in the provinces, in the backstage, the old structures were maintained ... the embers seem to have contained more fire than could be observed (Mardin, 1993: 216). During this underground time, Islam was organized primarily around Sufi orders such as Naqshbandiya, Mevlevi, Qadiri and new movements such as the followers of Said Nursi and Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (Edelman, Cornell, Lobel and Karaveli, 2015: 13).

After this uncompromising revolutionary administration lasted about a quarter-century, Islamism began to gain visibility again. *Hareket* (Movement) Journal of Nurettin Topçu, first published in 1939, was the first example of this, albeit limited. (Doğan, 2013: 121; Yalçın, E. 2014: 64). Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who started to publish *Büyük Doğu* (Great East) Journal in 1943, made an essential contribution to expanding the field of Islamist thought in popular culture in the long term (Altun, 2013: 243). Kısakürek was propounding for the first time, after a long time, the Islamist ideology, straight from the shoulder: "They say we are propagandizing the Islamic order; do you have doubts? We do not just do this job; we live to do it. We are against all thoughtless Europeanization and imitation movements since Tanzimat and have been doing only this for fifteen years." (Kısakürek, 1992: 285).

To the extent permitted by the given political atmosphere, Islamism manifested itself only as demand for religious-cultural restoration against the excessive pro-Westernization revolutions of Kemalism. Another characteristic of Islamism at this term, mainly because of anti-communism, was the intersection of it with Turkish right. In that respect, the prominent thinkers of this term like Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Nurettin Topçu have pointed out quite often the perils of Communism (Duran, 2005: 133). Turkism was another thought that Islamism intertwined with (Kara, 2013:28). Revolutionary practices of the Republic which removed Islam from public space accounts for this unity. Since opposition under the label of Islam was not possible, Islamists used the Turkish nationalism as a shelter (Duran, 2005: 135). This convergence manifested itself as Turk-Islam synthesis and despite the emphasis was on Islam, the special place of Turks has been conspicuous. This relation would be seen

in the view of Erbakan and his ideology *Milli Görüş*. Sufism was another essential component of this Islamist line and Kısakürek in accordance with this approach, objected the innovation effort of Islam labelling them as "pursuit of reformation". Therefore, Afghani (Afghanistan) and Abduh (Egypt) who were trying to create a modern explanation for Islam, have been blamed. Likewise, Sayyid Kutb (Egypt), Mawdudi (India) and Hamidullah (India) were reckoned harmful. (Duran, 2005: 134).

The emergence of the DP in 1950 together with multiparty life revealed the reaction of the society which had been subjected to the Jacobin rule for a quarter century. (Sayarı, 2007: 384). In fact, the DP administration was a fraction separated from the CHP and did not oppose the fundamental values of the Republic. However, this opposition party's rhetoric, which promised freedom on economic and religious issues, had been enough to bring it to power. (Keyder, 1993:170). DP's moderate policy toward religious issues, such as reading the call to prayer in Arabic, transforming the Imam Hatip courses to formally organized educational institutions, opening new mosques, increasing the budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, etc. brought great relief to a vast part of society which showed its contentment with support to DP in successive elections (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 24).

In this "free" period, the Islamic elements, which ceased to be taboo, gained visibility in the social sphere; the literature, which emphasized the social and political dimension of Islam, began to express itself more comfortably. On the other hand, against the wave of communism, which increased its influence through these years, the western-oriented right-wing parties who came to power considered it more appropriate not to silence the Islamist elements. Religious instruction was thought to be the best antidote to communism. (Edelman, Cornell, Lobel and Karaveli, 2015: 14). Under these circumstances, the governments, after 1950, embraced fraternities, which contented themselves with operation within the state system and expanding their influence within the centre-right parties.

Among the influential Islamic movements in this period, Nurculuk and İskenderpaşa Community were particularly prominent. However, while Nurculuk preached a non-political Islamic awakening, the İskenderpaşa Community made an opening in the field of politics and economy. Mehmet Zahit Kotku, who came to Istanbul from Bursa in 1952, created a significant religious focus until 1980 as the guide of this movement (Özdamar, 2008: 100). Kotku changed the classical approach of the Naqshbandi sect on the political issue and

argued that the power of government and politics was needed to increase the influence of Islam in society. Hence, during his active term between 1960-1980, he encouraged a generation of pious Muslims to take positions in the state bureaucracy and politics. In this direction, many disciples of Kotku attained prominent administrative and political positions, but Necmettin Erbakan, who was to have the most significant impact on the direction of political Islamism in the country, has been the fixture on Turkey's political scene for three decades (Edelman, Cornell, Lobel and Karaveli, 2015: 15).

2.2. Necmettin Erbakan and His Islamist Identitiy

As an ideology and movement, *Milli Görüş* has been molded by Erbakan's personality. The movement, which is deemed to have started with Erbakan's entry into politics, continued under his leadership, though not necessarily official, as long as he was alive. Therefore, Fehmi Çalmuk describes the *Milli Görüş* as "Erbakan's invention" and speaks of "Erbakanism" (2005: 552). Similarly, Ruşen Çakır states that it would be correct to define the *Milli Görüş* movement as an "Erbakan Movement" (2005: 568). Therefore, the examination of Erbakan's religious and political personality is of special importance for this chapter, which deals with the *Milli Görüş.*

Erbakan was born into a distinguished family as his ancestors, the Kozanoğulları, a branch of the Saldjūḳ Turks, reigning as an autonomous principality during the Ottoman period, in the coastal area between Fethiye and Adana at present. Erbakan's great grandfather's older brother was the last Kozan Prince. When Sultan Abdülhamit terminated the principality, the Prince of Kozan and his brother were brought to Istanbul. Erbakan's father, Mehmet Sabri Bey, born in 1872 (Çalmuk, 2017: 36) studied law in Istanbul. He started to work as an Ottoman judge (*ḳāḍī*). Beginning as a judge in 1905, he worked for more than 30 years in cities such as Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Erzurum, Musul, Elazığ, Bitlis, Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kastamonu, Sinop, Afyon, Kayseri, Trabzon (Çalmuk, 2017: 40). After the Republican period, he served as the judge of the criminal court. While working in Erzurum, Mehmet Sabri Bey made his first marriage with Mrs Sabire and had two sons named Nizamettin and Selahattin. After Sabire's death, he had her second marriage with Mrs Kamer in Sinop. Sabri Bey had four children, Necmettin, Kemalettin, Akgün and Atıfet, from his second wife (Gündoğan, 2019: 20).

Necmettin Erbakan was born in Sinop on 29 October 1926 (Çalmuk, 2017: 17). Because of his father's assignments, he spent his childhood in Afyon, Kayseri and Trabzon. His family register was recorded in Afyon and then transferred to Istanbul. Erbakan's first childhood memories are related to Kayseri, where they came after Afyon and stayed for 5 years (Çalmuk, 2017: 77). The sound of the call to prayer (adhan) on a Friday at the age of 3-4 has remained in his mind. Laleli Mosque, a Saldjūḳ monument, has a special place among these childhood memories. "We spent our childhood playing in the courtyard of the Laleli Mosque." He has not forgotten that during the Ramadan days, many older people were in and out of the mosque with tranquility and dignity (Akbay, 1977).

Necmettin lived in Kayseri until the age of 6. Here, he started Cumhuriyet Primary School. A month later they moved to Trabzon. He went to Gazi Paşa Primary School in Trabzon. He stayed in Trabzon for 5 years. His childhood friends described him as a smart, inventing child with a leadership spirit (Uçar, 2012: 19). In his own account, he said that they established a game world full of rich dreams with their friends in the garden of their mansion during the primary school years in Trabzon, and they gave place to trade, education and military service in this world (Dündar, 1991).

Despite his parents were devout, it was not easy for him to receive religious education outside the home due to the political conditions of the term. These issues were banned in the newly established state, so it was necessary to be careful about these issues. (Gündoğan, 2019: 21). Nevertheless, Mehmet Sabri Bey, who was a pious person, felt close to the prominent people of sufi circles in Trabzon where several such lodges, such as Kadiri, Halveti and Gümüşhanevi, were located. Mainly, he benefited from two notables named Abdurrahman Beşikçi and Mehmet Rüştü Aşıkkutlu, who belonged to the Gümüşhanevi sect, on religious matters, and provided their children to benefit from them.

Necmettin Erbakan said in a conversation held much later, "My father entrusted me to Sheikh Abdurrahman Efendi at the age of nine. We took our first lesson there." (Çalmuk, 2017: 99). This period was the first time that Necmettin Erbakan met with the Sufi circles that he would have close relations with in the future. However, Mehmet Sabri Bey tried to give religious education principally to his children at home. It was said, rather than applying a harsh discipline on this issue, smart ways of orienting were applied. For example, he was praying with a light voice, in a way that they could hear him and learn these prayers, and placed the books he wanted them to read in the place that it would easily catch their eye, and

spoke about a book and its contents appropriately. He tried to attract children's attention with natural methods, and he succeeded in this. It was stated that Mr Sabri had a patient personality that he patiently waited for their children to be corrected in the face of their mistakes, that he carried out his domestic manners through persuasion and did not scold his children (Gündoğan, 2019: 21).

Necmettin Erbakan began his secondary education in Istanbul, (Istanbul Boys High School) to where he went on his father's retirement by 1937. In the same year, he began to read the Qur'an taught by his father and mother, and a year later he started to perform his prayers regularly (Akbay, 1977). His father, Mehmet Sabri Bey, was also taking his sons to the mosques where he was going regularly since his retirement and to the Naqshbandi lodges that he had been interested in for a long time. During this period, particularly the Gümüşhanevi, Kelami, Mustafa İsmet Efendi and Kaşgari[11] lodges were known in Istanbul (Çalmuk, 2017: 112). The fact that his father took Necmettin to these spiritual environments and he was growing in these environments had, naturally, a significant influence on the formation of his religious personality. As a reflection of this religious sensitivity, in spite of the official prohibition, he found a way to open a small mosque in his high school. He attended this mosque regularly with the son of a religious official (imam). Necmettin, who grew up as a religious person since his early childhood,[12] attracted attention as a special student with his outstanding success in secondary and high school, memories of his brilliant success during his secondary and high school were not forgotten by his friends and teachers even after many years. As a matter of fact, he graduated from this school in 1943 as a top student (Çalmuk, 2017: 127-136).

Erbakan's educational success was very bright during his university (İstanbul Technical University)[13] years too. Although he could enter the technical university without examination, he took the exam and competed with nearly two thousand students. In 1943, he entered the university with the top 10 degree among the 120 people admitted to the school. Erbakan was admitted to the second class where Süleyman Demirel was also a student. So

[11] These lodges were later named as İskender Paşa, Erenköy, İsmail Ağa and Işıkcılar.

[12] Another point worth noting about his high school years is that he was also influenced by the Turkism movement that was quiet effective at the time. He defined himself as "Turkist" in his reply to a questionnaire published in the *Çınaraltı* journal, which was published by the school. (Çalmuk, 2017: 143). This influence, which has been partially sustained in university years, would always show its trace in the *Milli Görüş* thought of Erbakan.

[13] In the years before Erbakan, the name of the university was Higher Engineer School (Yüksek Mühendis Mektebi). (Çalmuk, 2017: 147).

Necmettin and Süleyman have been classmates. In 1948, Erbakan graduated from the Department of Engines, while Demirel graduated from the Department of Construction in 1949 (Akbay, 1977).

Years of university education has been a period in which the religious personality of Necmettin Erbakan consolidated and gained depth. In the school yearbook of Istanbul Technical University, which was prepared at the term of Erbakan's graduation, it is noted by his friends that, "he is ascetic and industrious; his life's half is occupied by praying, and the other half is by his project."(Yalçın, 1994: 16). However, the fact that piety and nationalism were intertwined in those years had some effect on Erbakan during university years, as well as in his high school years. As Yalçın puts it, racist Turanist movements had come into fashion during these years, which were led by Reha Oğuz, Nihal Atsız, Fethi Tevetoğlu etc. Though not as much as Turgut and Korkut Özal brothers, Necmettin Erbakan is said to be influenced by these movements and looked at them with sympathy (Yalçın, 1994: 18). However, during his university education, despite the persistent calls of his friends, his keeping away from the places of entertainment and indulgence caught attention; furthermore, he rebuked his conservative friends for their attendance of such places.

Recai Kutan, who was a student in the construction faculty of the same university, depicts the socio-cultural environment of the conservative students of this term with the following words:

> There were two groups at the technical university. One group's name was revolutionists; the other group's name was reactionists. We were in the group of reactionists, they said so ... Although we were few in the meantime, we achieved the management of the Student Union of the Technical University. The revolutionists harassed both the students and the university administration. We said that we would organize lectures at this university from time to time. One of the most prominent intellectuals of that time, Prof Ali Fuat Başgil, accepted our request. He even said, come with your friends every 15-20 days to talk. The second important name was Nurettin Topçu. We, together with him, were a member of the Turkish Cultural Centre (Türk Kültür Ocağı). Therefore, we stayed together for 2-3 years. Meanwhile, there were some prominent persons. Some were students. Among them were those who were in the position of our elder brothers. Fethi Gemuhluoğlu, Rahmi Eray, Faruk Kadri Timurtaş… we were with them. We were reading the Büyük Doğu journal of Necip Fazıl. We never missed his conferences, with such people…" (Kutan, Interview, Feb 2020).

Since the early years of his university term, Erbakan has frequently participated in religious conversation with some spiritual personalities in Istanbul, together with a small

group of friends attending the school masjid. Religious interpretation of these circles has strongly influenced the religious personality and political thought of Erbakan. Gümüshaneli lodge, which is a branch of the Naqshbandi sect, was the leading one. This tariqa, despite there was not a direct transfer from faith to ideology, stand up to a belief that Islam faith by itself would naturally carry a person to the area of political struggle (Mardin, 1993: 94). It is stated that Naqshbandi Tariqa has two essential features. One is that after accomplishing their spiritual/moral education acolytes (*mürit*) can open new lodges without receiving approval from their sheikh. This characteristic of decentralization expedites the adoption of the new institutions to time and space. The other feature of this tariqa is its preference of organization mainly in the urban rather than rural places (Yaşar, 2005: 332).

What Kutan says gives essential clues about the relationship between Erbakan and other religious students with this environment:

> In the meantime, we asked Rahmi Eray questions about some religious issues. He said: "Do not ask me these. Come tomorrow; there is a small mosque in Fatih, Zeyrek. The imam of that masjid ... his house is also there, there is a large hall under his house, he talks there two or three nights a week. The mosque is small, so it is full. However, only assistants, associate professors and students attend there. Therefore, the sermon is always at a high level. I went there." The first names that caught my eye are Necmettin Erbakan and Nurettin Topçu. They had also been coming to the sermons regularly. Thus, until we graduated in 1952, with the master Abdülaziz Bekkine, Kazanlı ... this was the lodge of Gümüşhaneli Ahmet Ziyaettin Efendi. Before Abdülaziz Bekkine, in this lodge, there was a man named Hacı Hasip Efendi, a great scholar who came from Serez, in his 70s. Necmettin Erbakan had started with his sermons ... It was said that there was a great scholar in Bursa, Muhammed Zahit Kotku. All three of them were friends. When Abdulaziz Bekkine passed away, he came from Bursa in 1952. First, he came to this mosque and then to the İskender Pasha mosque. Until he passed away ... Of course, their influence was enormous. All of them together… (Kutan, Interview, Feb 2020).

As it is stated by Kutan, Erbakan first met with Sheikh Abdullah Hasip Efendi from the Sheikh series of the Gümüşhanevi sect.[14] After the death of Hasip Efendi in 1949, he followed the preachings of Sheikh Abdülaziz Bekkine with his close friends. It has been noted that he was very impressed by the conversations of these two sheikhs and quoted their words many times. Both sheikhs advised Erbakan and his friends to come to their

[14] Ahmet Ziyaüddin Gümüşhanevi is the first sheikh of the Gümüşhanevi Lodge, an offshoot of the Halidism branch of the Naqshbandi order. The Sheikh who took the helm after him was Mustafa Feyzi Efendi, who authorised three names as sheikh of the Lodge after him: Serezli Hasib (Yardımcı) Efendi, Kazanlı Abdülaziz (Bekkine) Efendi and Bursalı Mehmed Zahid (Kotku) Efendi. Sheikh Hasib became the sheikh of Gümüşhanevi-İskenderpaşa Lodge between 1926-1949, Sheikh Abdülaziz between 1949-1952 and Sheikh Mehmet Zahit 1952-1980 (Çalmuk, 2017:150).

conversations, to stay in the university, become a teacher, and to train students instead of choosing high-salaried engineering (Gündoğan, 2019: 23-24). However, it is said that Abdülaziz Bekkine was not in favour of engaging in politics and therefore he responded to Necmettin Erbakan on the occasion that he asked to give permission for entering the politics: My dear friend, politics looks like a bowl of a bathhouse, which pass from hand of the impure to the other. It is not for us; let us look at our own business (Yaşar, 2005: 328).

Until 1949, while Erbakan listened to the hadith conversations of Sheikh Hasip Efendi in Beyazıt Mosque, he was following the imam of Ümmügülsüm Mosque, Sheikh Abdülaziz Bekkine in Fatih Zeyrek. However, he also took religious lessons from many other religious scholars of the period. For example, he took tafsir, hadith, akaid, fiqh and Arabic lessons from scholars such as Hüseyin Saffet Efendi, Ömer Nesefi, Numan Kurtulmuş, Ali Osman Tatlısu, Hüsrev Efendi, Abdurrahman Şeref Güzelyazıcı (Çalmuk, 2017: 151).

Erbakan, while "being enlightened" in spiritual atmospheres, on the one hand, was trying to instil religious sensitivity to those around him on the other. Through his graduation from university, he and his religious friends also conducted a series of studies in the faculty to improve the religious knowledge of several students, one of whom was Süleyman Demirel, and to make them perform prayers ritually. They taught them ablution, prayer, and gave religious books. They did that because "They deplored the fact that Süleyman Demirel and his friends were wasting their time with singing American songs and learn foreign dances." (Akbay, 1977).

Erbakan, who had an intense relationship with this spiritual environment, graduated from the university in 1948 as department's top student and started working as an academic in his department, which marked another milestone in his career. In 1951 he got an ITU fellowship and was sent to Aachen Technical University, in West Germany, for scientific work. He prepared three theses in three years. One of them was his doctoral thesis, the second one was associate professorship thesis, and the third was on "Economy in Engines" written for the German Ministry of Economics. This thesis, which expounded how to make an engine burn less fuel, was acclaimed among German academic environment (Kızıltaş, 2011: 28).

In addition to his academic success, Erbakan draws attention with his religious personality in the years he spent in Germany. In the meantime, he observes and draws lessons

from the industrialization and rapid development of Germany after the war, and organization, discipline, determination and diligence through this process. He narrates in detail with long letters to Sheikh Abdülaziz Bekkine, whom he longed for, his observations and evaluations about the recovery of Europe in the material field and its situation on spirituality. Explaining how the river waters are best evaluated in Germany, he says: "Seeing their treatment to the river with honour, I would say this is how one should be thankful of God" (Çalmuk, 2017: 173-185).

Şeyh Abdülaziz Bekkine, to whom Erbakan was emotionally attached, died in 1952, just before his return to Turkey from Germany where his academic work had ended. Instead, Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku came from Bursa with his advice. Thus, the qualified community left by Bekkine turned to Kotku and began to follow his religious conversations. Kotku, after Ümmügülsüm Mosque in Zeyrek, his first duty place, was transferred to a new mosque in Fatih district of Istanbul, named Iskenderpasa and served there from 1956 to 1980. His community, therefore, began to be called the Iskenderpasa Community (Kemikli, 2018: 91).

1954-1955 were the years he served as a lieutenant in the army in the scope of compulsory military service (Akbay, 1977). After his military service, Erbakan returned to his post at the university in 1956 and continued his close relationship with the community. Mehmet Zahit Kotku, as the spiritual leader of the community, was encouraging his followers in investing in economics and industrial initiatives for the economic development of the country as well as advised them to serve in the state institutions and politics. In his book *Davam* (my cause), Erbakan describes Kotku's advice and recommendations in this direction as follows:

> In his conversations, the Master talked about the importance of establishing a national industry. Pointing to the cars in front of the lodge, 'I wish, instead of these cars brought from abroad, we could establish manufacturing factories and provide jobs to our poor people.' He said Turkey's economic dependence on the West would bring about cultural dependency. He would advise the conscious Muslims to unite for development and to bring their forces together. He emphasized that our country could be developed only if people who are not fond of position and authority come to power. These incentives and conversations have had great effects on us. (Erbakan, 2014: 9).

In line with these recommendations, Erbakan led the establishment of the "Silver Engine" factory, which was also related directly to his academic field. The factory, named

after Gümüşhanevi Community started production by 1960 (Gündoğan, 2019: 35). However, importers and foreign motor companies, who believed that domestic production would harm their markets, forced the Gümüş Factory to be bankrupt by lowering the prices of the engines by half. Add to that the devaluation and the bureaucratic obstacles, the factory had great difficulty in operation. Finally, Turkey Sugar Company, buying the majority of factory's shares, took over the management of the factory and, continued production with a new name "Pancar (Beet) Engine" (Gündoğan, 2019: 39-44). Erbakan left the factory in 1963 and continued his post at the university. Erbakan's attempts at industrialization were not confined to this. In 1961, he had joined the national program of producing a national car as an expert and took part in several works (Arpacı, 2017: 51).

Erbakan became a professor in 1965, the next year he was appointed as the Industry Head of the Union of Chambers, then stepped up to General Secretary of Union of Chamber. The Union had a central role in the distribution of import quotas and allotment of foreign currency to corporations. Therefore it was the field of clashes between different business factions (Edelman, Cornell, Lobel and Karaveli, 2015: 16). During his work in this post, he tried to regulate the distribution of loans in favour of small- and medium-scaled businesses in rural areas rather than urban-based big businesses, but this attitude was not what government wanted, and thus it was often obstructed (Erbakan, 2014: 11).

Erbakan elected the president of the Union of Chamber in 1969, but the process of his election became a matter of legal dispute between him and the old president of the Chamber and the Trade ministry of Demirel Government. This disagreement ended up with Erbakan's dismissal from the position (Çakır, 2005: 545). As a result of the government's decision, Erbakan was forced to leave his post with the force of the police (Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020).

Seeing that he could not get the results he hoped from the experience of industry and bureaucracy, Erbakan decided to carry out his struggle in a more practical field, that is, in politics (Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020). In fact, apart from the private sector and bureaucracy, he had the option in the academy. It was not difficult to predict that a bright future was waiting for Erbakan in the scientific world. However, Erbakan turned to politics. A statement of Erbakan about why he preferred to enter the politics instead of the academy is illuminating because in this statement the social sensitivity and the religious motivation behind this feeling come to light:

> Someone asks, referring to my capability in the scientific area, why I did not stay in the academic area as a scientist and did not seek great inventions so that I could serve humanity by science. The answer is that you may be a professor at a university, you may get Nobel prizes but if your country's people are hungry and in misery and are living in difficulties, if 300 thousand children are dying from poverty and famine Nobel prize worth nothing. What is important is to be able to serve your nation and to the whole humanity in the world, completing this life test as a Muslim who made jihad with his life and property, because life is faith and jihad. (Erbakan, 2014: 12).

Erbakan applied to AP (Adalet Partisi/Justice Party) for the candidacy of Member of Parliament in the 1969 election. However, his application was vetoed by the party administration (Kızıltaş, 2011: 101). The reason for rejection was explained as "He opposed openly to the leader of AP Süleyman Demirel, he was mentioning holy matters despite the prohibition by Political Parties Law, and he was causing division in the party." (Sencer, 1971: 366). It is said that Erbakan had known that his application would not be accepted. However, he foresaw that if he had applied independently in the first place, he would be blamed by conservative-religious people on the ground that he caused division (Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020). For this reason, he made this application before the public to avoid such criticism. Then he stood for an independent deputy from Konya and was elected in October 1969 General Election (Sencer, 1971: 366).

In a short while after being elected, Erbakan founded his first political party MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi/National Order Party) on 26 January 1970. This party was representing the idea of *Milli Görüş*, the content of which would be elaborated and broadened in the following years, and was representing mainly the freedom of belief and interests of town-scale small industrialists and traders (Sencer, 1971: 375). The leading names among party founders aside from Erbakan were A. Tevfik Paksu, Ali Haydar Aksay, Süleyman Arif Emre, H. Tahsin Armutcuoğlu, Ekrem Ocaklı, Saffet Solak, Hasan Aksay, Ali Oğuz, İsmail Müftüoğlu, İ. Fehmi Cumalıoğlu (Poyraz, 2006: 100).

The establishment of the MNP, the first party of the *Milli Görüş* ideology, is directly related to the religious personality of Erbakan and the religious environment around him. For one thing, the religious people who came together with the Silver Motor initiative from inside and outside of the community played an important role in the establishment of this party. The community of shareholders, operators, tradesman and workers, gathered around this industrial venture was the core of this party (Yalçın, 2013: 59).

What is quoted about the proposal of founding a new party and the response of Erbakan, also reveals Erbakan's religious background at the time. It is stated that YTP deputy of Adıyaman, Süleyman Arif Emre, broach the subject saying that "Our cause does not have headquarter and a leader, people who think like us are dispersed among different political parties. You are capable of this post. Let us found our party". Erbakan replies: There are my elders to whom I have to consult and friends. I have to think about that. If necessary, I will call you later" (Emre, 2002a: 172). Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku was the most important person that Erbakan said I should consult. Sheikh Kotku's view on the establishment of a new party was as follows: "After the Sultan Abdülhamit Khan was deposed, the administration of the country passed into the hands of the masons who were western imitators. These are a minority. They cannot represent our nation. It is an inevitable historical task for you to work by establishing a political party within the framework of laws so that the administration can pass to the real representatives of the nation. Participate in this initiative and, if your friends want it, be in the saddle. Start working. Not before time." (Emre, 2002a: 186).

Mehmet Zahit Kotku, the sheikh of the community of the Naqshbandi Tariqa, strongly encouraged the establishment of the MNP (Yalçın, E. 2014: 68). It is possible to follow the critical influence of the community Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku on the MNP and the following parties of *Milli Görüş* from some of the points he raised in his sermons. In his preaches and religious conversations, he was urging certain points which were quite significant in that these very points would be heard very often in the political program of Necmettin Erbakan and his *Milli Görüş* ideology as well: Industrialization is necessary and even urgent for development of Turkey (Erbakan, 1976: 11), interest should be removed from economic functioning (Erbakan, 1975:152), rulers must be fair and soft-hearted while the ruled needed to be industrious (Erbakan, 1975: 31). The union of Islam have to be founded. Islamic countries have to develop strong trade ties between themselves. The state is not an enemy. Radical Islamism is not a correct way to go through; on the contrary, for the Islamization of society, evolutionary and soft methods should be followed (Yaşar, 2005: 330-331).

According to Soner Yalçın, although the main sponsors of MNP were Naqshbandi Tariqa, Nurists also supported the foundation. Indeed at the foundation, apart from Erbakan who was representing the Naqshbandis, two other deputies -Hüsamettin Akmumcu and

Hüseyin Abbas- that were joined MNP leaving their former party, were from "Yazıcılar" branch of Nurculuk, the leader of which was Hüsrev Altınbaşak (Yalçın, 2013: 115) However, over time, Erbakan made several arrangements which aimed to lower the efficiency and role of this wing and this has been a matter of dispute within MSP (Yalçın, 2013: 129). In the establishment of the MSP, a compromise had been reached with the Nurists. However, during the coalition with CHP, Nurists carried out strong opposition. After the coalition was formed with the insistence of Erbakan, it became an insoluble problem for Erbakan to convince Nurists about the general amnesty law. Nurists insisted that they would not collaborate in forgiving the communists. This difference in the attitude of the Nurist wing within the party resulted in a break before the 1977 election. This rupture cost one-third of the votes of the MSP and half of the number of deputies (Erbaş, Interview, Feb 2020).

MNP as the first political party of Necmettin Erbakan was reflecting the Islamic character of its founders. They wanted Turkey's cultural and political life to be Islamized. For them, the reason why Turkey was culturally degenerated and economically backward was secularism and Westernism. Party program, known as *Milli Görüş*, was emphasizing the industrialization and removal of interest. Strong relations in terms of culture and economics with Islamic countries were desired. On the other hand, the political and security-related relations with the Western world would be loosened and even fell apart. Education policies should be based on morals. Party bylaw was declaring that anybody who does not pray and does not fast may be a member of the party, but such a people were not allowed to take place in the administrative ranks of a party (Yalçın, 2013: 64). The foundation declaration of the party was starting by emphasizing the decree of God which urges the securing of good and preventing the evil, which is taken as the one of the most essential principle of the religion (Yalçın, 2013:66).

The impact of the Naqshbandi/Gümüşhanevi Tariqa or in more specific terms the Iskenderpaşa lodge on Erbakan looks apparent. Erbakan's Islamist political personality has shaped mainly by this environment at the time. It appears that the sensitivity of Erbakan on particular issues such as Abdulhamid II, economic view, compromising attitude toward State instead of enmity, the foundation of the Islam Union, evolutionary method of Islamization is not immune from the similar arguments pronounced in the conversation of Zahit Kotku (Arpacı, 2017: 107) The closeness with Iskenderpasa, which had an impact on the

establishment of MNP, continued to a great extent during MSP (Yıldız, 2003: 195). However, it is asserted that reading the whole Islamist political personality of Erbakan by this inception would be a reductive interpretation (Edelman, Cornell, Lobel and Karaveli, 2015: 17). According to this view, Erbakan's Islamic view transcended the Iskenderpaşa view. Erbakan, as years passed, behaved in a more autonomous manner, developed his theory independently, regarded himself as a centre of Islamic cause and followed the policies in a way he deemed appropriate. This gap widened especially after the death of Zahit Kotku and at the time of his son in law, Esat Coşan, his successor, come to light (Arpacı, 2017: 108).

Milli Görüş has continued its path, along with the initial reference points, by digesting the political conditions of the country, the experience of the movement, the accumulation of its leader and the social transformations that the society went through. However, these limited transformations were not enough to change the religious identity of Erbakan, the Islamic reference in his political journey, and the sufi yeast he had acquired during his childhood, youth and early adulthood. Islam has been the ground for his political discourse, political fiction, administration principles and practices that were adopted within *Milli Görüş*. (Arpacı, 2017: 101). Out of Islam, he says, there is not any source of truth and right. Any knowledge and technic, which is not inspired by Islam, cannot be the means of goodness and cannot be deemed as to be purified from evil and harm (Erbakan, 2014: 33). If total knowledge of humanity had been piled up and compared with the indefinite knowledge of God, it would not be as much a spot in the sea, Erbakan says (Erbakan, 2017: 30).

Since 1970, Erbakan, with his religious identity, entered the political scene, as one of the most important figures of Turkish political life. With his experience, he developed both the practice and the theory of the political ideology called the *Milli Görüş*. Therefore, the theory and practice of the *Milli Görüş*, which will be explained in the following section, in a sense, refers to the second half of Erbakan's 84-year life.

2.3. *Milli Görüş*: Ideology and Movement

The ideology definition of Heywood is explicit: Action-based system of belief; the whole of interrelated thoughts, which guide political activity or provide inspiration for it. Heywood for a more satisfactory description of ideology refers to the Seliger's definition, which expresses the term's main aspects: A more or less consistent set of thoughts, which

aspire to protect, change or overthrow the existing power relations and form a base for organized political action. In that sense, all ideologies a) Proposes the evaluation of existing order in the form of worldview, b) Promises the desired future by offering a vision of a good society, c) Draws the map road of how to change the current order and arrive the ideal order. (Heywood, 2007: 60). In light of this description, *Milli Görüş* can be taken as an ideology because it includes all component of an "ideology".[15] It is seen *Milli Görüş* is of broad criticism on the current political system; it has its own "ideal order", and elaborates the way to reach this "ideal order". Since *Milli Görüş* hinges all its criticism, ideals and method of struggle upon Islam, it is duly regarded as "Islamic ideology" (Arpacı, 2017: 149). It is more than "Islamic movement" because movement term generally refers to political structures, which are not institutionalized and have a narrower meaning than ideology (Baker, 2005: 88). However, *Milli Görüş* has its theoretical infrastructure, notions and values, rules, targets, a particular method, political experience, and broad organizational structure (Arpacı, 2017: 150).

Before moving on to the theoretical aspect of *Milli Görüş*, it is better to look at its political practice because this practice will also mean that, the story of Necmettin Erbakan, the subject of the previous chapter, will continue from where it is left off. Thus, it will be possible to figure out how Necmettin Erbakan's religious personality is reflected in his political practice. On the other hand, it can be said that the practice of *Milli Görüş* has preceded its theory because the beginning of *Milli Görüş* is accepted to coincide with the entry of Erbakan into political life. In fact, Erbakan expressed the first representation of *Milli Görüş* in parliament as 24 October 1969. However, the ideas and concepts of this ideology have been shaped in later years by the experiences that have been formed over time.

From the very beginning, *Milli Görüş* was based on the struggle around a legal, political party (Çakır, 2013: 755). Therefore, Erbakan founded his first party, MNP, by 26 January 1970, that is within three months following his being parliamentarian (Erbakan, 1971a: 1). MNP was the first political party with explicit Islamic references (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 31). Considering the founding declaration, party program and regulation of the MNP, the issues that stand out are morality, spirituality and industrial work, which will remain at the centre of *Milli Görüş* until the end (MNP Program, 1970: 2). However, there

[15]In line with this view, Özbudun and Hale (2010: 35) and Yıldız (2003: 191) refer to the "ideology" of *Milli Görüş*.

is no *Milli Görüş* as a distinct concept yet. Close to this concept, some other expressions such as national conscience, national thought and national will were taken place. Nationalism is emphasized in the texts, although it does not mean a specific race.

On the other hand, *capitalist view* and *materialist view* were mentioned as the current views of the period referring to *communism* by materialism. The other parties were also regarded as *imitating views* derived from these two main views. Industrialization, development, fair income distribution, non-entry into the European Economic Community, rejection of the hegemony of the West was the elements most included in party discourse (Gündoğan, 2019: 58).


It was Islamic values what meant by concepts such as morality and spirituality, which were emphasized in the program of the MNP and the declaration of foundation; however, such an indirect language was used because a direct reference to religion was politically and legally prevented. However, Turkey's regime, which has imposing secularism mindset, would not tolerate the political thought and practice-based, even though indirectly, on Islamic values. Therefore, this party could not live long. MNP was charged with violating the Political Parties Law in terms of anti-secular activities, and under the political atmosphere of the Military Intervention of 12 March, was closed by Constitutional Court on 21 May 1971 (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 31).

This closure was the first attack of the regime against *Milli Görüş*, but it was not the end. *Milli Görüş* parties have always been threatened by the regime the main force of which was military (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020) Erbakan and his friends founded the second party of *Milli Görüş*, MSP on 11 October 1972. The program of the MSP was mainly based on two pillars, *morality and spirituality first* and *industrialization.* The slogan *material and spiritual development* was bringing these pillars together. The MSP program as such seemed to be a different expression of MNP. Since Erbakan was banned from official political activities, the leader of the party was his friend Süleyman Arif Emre, who one week after the election left his post to Erbakan. The party got 11, 8 % votes in the general election held in October 1973 and gained 48 seats in the National Assembly.

The MSP became a partner of the three coalition governments from 1974 to 1977, as discussed in detail in the following chapters. The first was done with the CHP and the second and third with the AP and other minor partners. The first coalition of the MSP is a historical

indicator of the compromising character of *Milli Görüş*. This coalition corresponded to the mission of bringing together the Republic and the religious people (Muradoğlu, 2011, 26). Erbakan took a significant risk with this historic compromise. He formed a coalition with Ecevit's party, who was accused of being communist, then, by his base and right-wing voters, and became a partner in important actions (Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020). However, he also paved the way on which Ecevit made a critical assessment declaring that the Republic's view of religious people was a "historical misconception" (Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020).

2. Milli Görüş Coalitions and Terms of Office



Ecevit, however, broke the coalition after 8 months because he believed he would come to power alone in a consecutive election because his popularity had risen mainly because of the military operation of Cyprus. In the circumstances, Erbakan took part in the Nationalist Front Coalition (First NF) government established under Demirel's prime ministry. This coalition consisted of Justice Party, MSP, Nationalist Movement Party and Republican Trust Party (AP, MSP, MHP and CGP) (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 32). This four-party coalition government has lived for more than two years. This government, too, did not complete its natural tenure because AP supported the initiative of CHP, which was pressing for bringing the election date earlier. However, when the election in 1977 did not give Demirel the single-party power he hoped for, he agreed to form a one more National Front Coalition (NF II) government. This government, which was the third coalition experience of *Milli Görüş*, consisted of AP, MSP and MHP. However, NF II government

could only serve for five months, as Ecevit transferred MPs from the AP, allowing the CHP to reach a majority in parliament. Looking at the whole process of establishment, operation and termination of these coalition governments, it seems, *Milli Görüş* has played a much more compromising and constructive role than the other parties. Erbakan as a leader of MSP displayed a compromising attitude to take part in the coalitions, did his best to make the life of these governments longer, and endeavoured to overcome the problems of compliance and avoided from being the party that breaks the coalition. Erbakan's constructive and compromising attitude was seen in the last government before the 1980 coup. Erbakan, at this political crisis time, supported, though externally, Demirel's minority government. However, while supporting the AP government, he went on warning of anarchy, poverty, unemployment, income inequality and cultural corruption (*Milliyet*, 7.6.1980).

An essential feature of the MSP, which represents *Milli Görüş* between 1972 and 1980, is that it remains away from violence, which is the main character of this period, and keeps its base under strict control in that sense (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 36). While the ideological conflict, which was used as the most crucial reason of the military coup in 1980 and the right-left fights continued, the MSP administration has always used a peaceful and moderate language and has repeatedly warned its base not to be a party to these conflicts. This feature, which avoids polarization and hostility, continued in the later years of *Milli Görüş* (Münir, 2011: 66).

Erbakan's success is regarded as preventing the radicalization of Islamism that became independent of right-wing politics (Emre, 2011: 21), not allowing militarization of Islamist politics (Akyol, 2011: 38), drawing the Islamic opposition outside the system into the system and making it a component of the struggle for democracy (Yağcı, 2011: 70). Particularly in the context of the increasing violence in 1979, with the effect of the Iranian Revolution, there arose a feeling within the youth of *Milli Görüş*, that "This does not work with the election box, it is revolution what is needed." However, Erbakan did not open the door to this tendency and never carried out the struggle for power in an illegal manner (Ilıcak, 2011: 57). In many Islamic countries, political Islamism is mentioned with radical, marginal organizations, armed groups while in Turkey, democratic parties came to the fore, the leader of these parties put political Islamism on the democratic basis, held the rising Islamist energy in a democratic regime, made his struggle against the system by staying within the system (Akdoğan, 2011: 101).

Following the 1980 military coup, the MSP together with other parties was closed down, and all assets were confiscated under the Law No. 2533 on the Dissolution of Political Parties dated 16.10.1981 issued by the National Security Council, which undertook the administration of the country (Arpacı, 2017: 257).

The third party of *Milli Görüş* movement, the RP, was founded on 19 July 1983 by Ahmet Tekdal. The Welfare Party tried to keep up with the 1983 General Election through a rapid organization process. However, the National Security Council, composed of soldiers, did not allow the RP to participate in the 1983 election. Therefore, the RP was only able to participate in the local elections in March 1984 (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 32).

The Welfare Party has slowly increased its power over the 15 years from 1983 to 1998 and has enabled *Milli Görüş* to gain a strong position in Turkish political life (Dinç, 2008: 3). At the beginning of this process, with the rate of 4.4 % in the March 1984 local elections, it approached the rate of 4.8% that the MSP received in the 1977 local elections. What is striking is that in these elections, the percentage of votes received from the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia has doubled Turkey's average (Arpacı, 2017: 275).

The fact that a movement bearing the name National View received twice the votes of the Kurdish population once again proved that the party was perceived to be based on religious reference rather than a national one.

Party Chair Ahmet Tekdal, re-elected in 1st Grand Congress of RP held by 30 June 1985, reiterated the claim that RP was not the continuation of the MSP. However, the media and the judiciary have shown that they were not convinced. The work and activities of the party, allegedly, were associated with *fundamentalism*, and various convictions were issued.

With the referendum held on 6 September 1987, the leaders who were banned from political activities by the coup administration gained their political freedom. In this context, Erbakan turned to politics and was elected as the Chairperson of the RP at the Grand Congress held in October 1987 (Gündoğan, 2019: 117).

In the general election held in 1987, RP was unable to find a representation in parliament as it was below the 10% national threshold. However, Erbakan and his party, despite the 7.2% of the votes received, conducted a significant extra-parliamentary opposition (Gündoğan, 2019: 118). During this period, RP's main criticism was about the

freedom of thought and belief in the context of human rights, the economic policy carried out by ANAP, moral degeneration, the effort to join the European Community and the Gulf War. Criticism on these issues reflects the traditional *Milli Görüş* perspective: restrictions on freedom of belief; the headscarf ban; the moral corruption of media and tourism policies; the regulation of economic policies such as interest, tax and external debts against low-income citizens; and the lack of independence from the US and Europe (Arpacı, 2017: 280-281).

3. The Rise of Milli Görüş (RP 1984-1995)

Date	Party	Election type	Votes (%)
1984	RP	Local	**4.4**
1987	RP	General	**7.2**
1989	RP	Local	**9.8**
1991	RP	General	**16.9**
1994	RP	Local	**19.1**
1995	RP	General	**21.4**

Source: Data compiled from YSK (High Election Board)

The local elections of 1989 produced results showing the rise of the RP. In these elections, the RP increased the number of mayors from 15 to 74 (Arpacı, 2017: 275) and managed to increase the provincial assembly's rate of votes to 9.8%, which was 4.4% in the previous local elections (State Institute of Statistics, 26.3.1989).

In the general election held in 1991, RP developed various policies to achieve better success. One of them was to expand and strengthen the organization network. The other was to emphasize socio-economic themes rather than religious ones in political discourse. In this context, the Convention in 1987 effectively presented the *Fair Order* model to the public with strong socio-economic emphasis (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 39; Erbakan, 1991). On the other hand, in order to guarantee to exceed the threshold, it made an election alliance with the Nationalist Labour Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi/MÇP) and the Reformist Democracy Party (Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi/IDP). Thus, in 1991, with the support of these two small parties, RP received 16.9% of the vote and won 62 seats in the parliament. After a while, the

parliamentarians of the two other parties left and thus RP with 40 deputies took its place among the opposition parties of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 32).

The 1991 election once more revealed the compromising identity of *Milli Görüş*. In order to avoid any misfortune as in 1987, the RP found a way to compromise with two nationalist-conservative parties and succeeded collaboration in the election. In fact, Erbakan wanted the alliance to maintain in parliamentary work. Therefore, after the separation of the two parties, he regretted this decision and expressed his hope that his separated *brothers* would rethink and reunite (Arpacı, 2017: 285).

During the period between 1991-1995 elections, the RP carried out significant opposition but paid attention to using constructive language in its criticism. In his speech at the beginning of this period of opposition, Erbakan said that they must warn government on the critical issues; whomever they serve for the happiness of the nation, they will help them and treat them with love, brotherhood and philanthropically (Erbakan, GNAT, 28.11.1991).

The main criticism directed to ruling parties during this period contained the following topics: Deployment of the foreign military troops of US and its allies (Operation Provide Comfort), in Turkey, development of economic and political relations with Israel, the approach by the state to the Kurdish problem through military means, the adaptation process to the European Union, and applied economic policies (Arpacı, 2017: 287-288).

The local elections in March 1994 reflected the encouraging upward trend of the RP. The fact that it won 19.1% of the votes and that it won mayoralties of 28 provinces, including Istanbul and Ankara, showed how *Milli Görüş* reached a turning point (Dinç, 2008:3).

In the general election held in December 1995, RP reached the highest rate of votes (21.4%) and became the first party with 142 deputies. As such, it was supposed to be in the most comfortable position to form a coalition. On the other hand, Erbakan's traditional attitude towards cooperation and compromise could make an RP coalition high probability. Nevertheless, the *established order* of the state did not want to give consent to such a government (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 33). Military bureaucracy, left-wing parties, business world, mainstream media and universities openly rejected such an alternative; propagated the belief that Welfare was a significant threat to the country and sought to shape public opinion in that direction.

So at first, the second and third parties, ANAP and DYP, formed a coalition that lasted less than four months. Then the RP DYP coalition was formed. However, opposing circles exerted tremendous pressure during one year of this coalition, and Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to resign under a military threat (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 33). Erbakan, within the period of one year in office from June 1996 to June 1997, carried out critical activities in the economy, domestic and foreign policy issues. Despite the heavy pressure and threats on the government, he tried to maintain his compromising, and moderate attitude toward those showed hostility. Instead of the coalition that was destroyed by the military, a minority government was formed under the leadership of ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz. In the meantime, The Constitutional Court decided to close the RP by 16 January 1998 on the grounds that the RP had acted contrary to the principle of a secular republic. Necmettin Erbakan and a few other executives were disqualified from politics for 5 years (Arpacı, 2017:333).

On 17 December 1997, Erbakan established the fourth party of *Milli Görüş*, the FP (Fazilet Partisi/Virtue Party), foreseeing the closure of the Welfare Party. İsmail Alptekin was the first leader of the party. As the Welfare Party was closed by 16 January 1998, 147 deputies passed to the FP. Recai Kutan became the chairman of the party at the congress held on May 14, 1998 (Timetürk, 27. 2. 2011). Under the pressure of secularist tutelage, the FP was obliged to emphasize the difference from the RP in an environment where the RP was closed (Gündoğan, 2019: 266). According to one comment, it softened its discourse on anti-EU membership, headscarf demand, and freedom of belief (Narlı, 1997; as cited in Arpacı 2011: 341). It was even described, by some commentators, as a "post-Islamist party because of this change in its mode (Yılmaz, 2011: 257). Under these circumstances, the FP period became the period in which *innovative sect* as it would be called soon increased their power. Innovative people and ideas, in terms of differentiation from RP and liberalization, began to be influential in the party management and its organization structure (Gündoğan, 2019: 164-168).


In the local elections held in 1999, the FP became the leading party with 18.4% for mayors. However, in the general election held in the same year, FP received 15.4% of the vote and became the third party in the parliament with 111 deputies (Gündoğan, 2019: 170). During the same period, the innovative-traditionalist distinction within the FP became evident (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 33). A year later, on May 14, 2000, at a Grand Congress

of the party, Abdullah Gül received 521 votes from the innovative wing, and Recai Kutan won 633 votes from the traditional wing. Thus Recai Kutan, supported by Erbakan, could maintain his post (Arpacı, 2017: 348).

On 22 June 2001, the Constitutional Court decided to close the FP. The reason for its closure was actions contrary to the principle of a secular republic, as usual. Thus, this fourth party of *Milli Görüş* survived only three and a half years (Gündoğan, 2019: 175).

The SP (Saadet Partisi/Felicity Party) was founded by Erbakan, as the successor of the FP on 20 July 2001. The leader of the party was Recai Kutan. 48 of the MPs in the FP joined the SP. The remaining MPs remained in the innovative movement and moved to the AK Parti (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/Justice and Development Party), after it was established on 14 August 2001 (Gündoğan, 2019: 176)

4. Evolution of Religious/Conservative Parties in Turkey



I. Erbakan and friends as independent MPs
MNP Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)
MSP Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
NP No political parties allowed by National Security Council
RP Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
FP Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
SP Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
Source: (Rabbasa and Larrabee, 2008: 46)

As a result of parliament's decision, the general election was held 1.5 years before the regular date. In the election, held on 3 November 2002, only two parties, Ak Parti and CHP were able to enter the parliament. The rate of the AK Party's vote was 34.4% and the CHP's

was 19.4%. The remaining 45% of the vote was split among the other parties, but none of them had the opportunity to represent in parliament as all of them remained below the 10% threshold (Tuncer, 2003) The SP vote was 2.5%. The SP's vote has remained below 3% in the elections held until 2018 (YSK, http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/milletvekili-genel-secim-arsivi/2644).

Erbakan, whose ban on political activity expired at the time, was elected the leader of the SP in the Great Convention of the SP on May 11, 2003 (Erbakan, 2003). Six months later, however, due to the legal reasons, he was forced to resign on 30 January 2004, and Recai Kutan became president once again. After four years, Numan Kurtulmuş was elected as party leader at the Grand Congress held on 29 March 2008 (Arpacı, 2017: 357). An extraordinary congress was held on July 11, 2010. With this congress, Numan Kurtulmuş created an administration that would reduce the influence of the traditionalist elite of *Milli Görüş*. However, with the legal initiatives of the traditionalists, the congress was declared invalid. On October 17, 2010, a new extraordinary Convention convened and Necmettin Erbakan was elected as the Chairman. After Erbakan's death on 27 February 2011, the 4th Ordinary Convention of SP convened on 17 July 2011. Mustafa Kamalak was elected as party chairman in this congress. Kamalak handed over his duty to Temel Karamollaoğlu in 2016 (Arpacı, 2017: 359). Karamollaoğlu was re-elected as the president at the 7th Grand Congress held on 3 November 2019 (Habertürk, 03.11.2019)

As the practice of *Milli Görüş* has been explained, the intellectual foundations of this ideology can now be looked into. According to Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, whose political practice is described above, began to be represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly for the first time on 24 October 1969 (Erbakan, 2014: 174) the date that he became a member of parliament. Erbakan founded the first party of *Milli Görüş* party three months after this date. Eşref Edip, who insisted that the name of this party should be the Milli Nizam (National Order), is vital in terms of seeing the core of *Milli Görüş*. "I am ninety years old. For seventy years, I have believed that this nation will return to its original state… I have lived this day now, and now I can die. Because, the cause I have lived for and believed for seventy years, has been realized today." (Erbakan, 2014: 174). Following this quote, Erbakan adds that: "The first days that we reinitiated *Milli Görüş* movement which is the true spiritual root of our nation, after a century-long recession…"

It is understood from these statements that, as of the date of its emergence, *Milli Görüş* counts the last hundred years as a deviant and lost period; considers the previous period as the *original* and sees itself as the maker of this return to the essence (Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020). As a matter of fact, Erbakan says that in the period before this lost time, *Milli Görüş*, the mentality of holding the right superior, dominated Anatolia and this domination started with the victory of Malazgirt Victory in 1071 (Erbakan, 2014: 174).

What is this *essence* or *spirit root* that existed a hundred years ago and will be revived by the MNP? Here, the answer has been given implicitly or indirectly. Because the political conjuncture and legal basis of the country are not suitable to present this essence openly. Had it been appropriate, it would be called *Islam*. However, under the current conditions, this was called *Milli Görüş* as an indirect expression of Islam. This situation looks like the case once Turkey experienced. In order for children to be registered as citizens and to enjoy their citizenship rights, it was compulsory that the parents must not give a name that *state* deemed *inappropriate* (*Hürriyet*, 24 Sept 2003). "Islam" was a name that was not allowed by the state. Therefore, the name of this "rebirth" became "*Milli Görüş*". In Bulaç's words: "Necmettin Erbakan and his "*Milli Görüş* line were not *nationalist*, but *Islamist* and *ummahist*. He used the term *national* as a substitute for the religious because of legal, that is, compulsory legislation. If conditions were available, he would say, *Islamic View* (Bulaç, 2011: 83).

The question that should be asked here is that: What is the phenomenon that was considered as a deviation from *Milli Görüş* and caused a century-lasting loss? The answer is Westernism. Erbakan says:

> The ideas, systems and politicians who want to go in ways that are contrary to the nature of our nation are responsible for our exposure to material and spiritual crises… The reason for all of this is Western imitation that was applied imprudently… All of this is the result of the wounds inflicted in our nation's intact structure by the corrupt mentality that does not value morality…Therefore, we are against Westernism that imitates the customs and traditions of Western countries and sees those countries as superior to our own country. Turkey cannot be melted in Western countries leaving its national identity…Our nation find itself in *Milli Görüş*, find what it is looking for. *Milli Görüş* represents the self of our national structure." (Erbakan, 2014: 168).

According to Erbakan, the country should abandon Westernism, toward which it has turned its direction for 100 years, and re-enter the path of "*Milli Görüş*. Because Westernism did not fit the country's structure, it caused the society to enter into crisis financially and

morally. It is possible to eliminate these temporary effects that are not approved by the majority of the nation, so long as the administration should emerge according to the history and the essence of the nation. All problems await such administration (Erbakan, 2014: 167).

As summarized so far, *Milli Görüş* is the name of the mentality that opposes Western orientation and sees Western orientation as the cause of material and moral losses; on the other hand, it proposes a social order with Islamic reference a solution. Thus it is clear that Islam is at the heart of *Milli Görüş* ideology. However, its Islamic reference only depicts the silhouette of the mind map of *Milli Görüş* but not the clear picture of it. This is because there are many examples of ideologies and movements that identify themselves with Islamic references but differ from each other in terms of political thought, working method, and movement style worldwide. Therefore, it is necessary to take a closer look at the essential elements that make up *Milli Görüş* and differentiate it from the others.

The main elements that make up the structure of *Milli Görüş* also reflect the *Islam* understanding of *Milli Görüş*. In other words, *Milli Görüş's* basic concepts and ideas revealed on religion, politics, history, nation, economy, etc. are the manifestations of its understanding and interpretation of Islam because it is Islam what *Milli Görüş* took as the primary reference to all its thought on these subjects.

Islam: Religion of Islam is the phenomenon that is the basis of the idea of *Milli Görüş* and is considered as the source of thoughts on all subjects. Religion is the real *cause*. Therefore, the subtitle of Erbakan's book *Davam* (my cause) is "Whatever I did, I did it for God's sake." (Erbakan, 2014). Erbakan's idea of religion in this book can be summarized as follows: God, the creator of the universe, unlike other beings, has given human a mind and freedom of choosing good and evil. Therefore, people are held responsible. There are two aspects to this responsibility. One is against the creator, and the other is against the created. While there is a duty to know and glorify the Creator, there is also a duty toward the people of struggling for the better life and development of all people in good conditions. The name of this second assignment is jihad.

Emphasizing that the word Islam comes from the silm which means peace (Erbakan, 2014: 38) the following terms of Erbakan reveal the view of *Milli Görüş* on Islam.

> There is no source of rights and truths other than Islam. Even science and wisdom, art and industry are within Islam and a branch of it. Any science and technique that does not receive inspiration

> from the Qur'an can never be a means to good, free from evil and harm. "Reason is a comparison and reasoning tool. However, the Islamless mind alone cannot know the absolute truths and cannot determine good and evil. A scholar and a drunk have a mind. However, the mind of the scholar works in that way: "How to warn and guide these people, so that they could get to the two world happiness" The mind of the drunk is works in that way: "How shall cheat the shopkeepers of the neighbourhood and get a bottle of alcohol." What matters is the mindset at the ground of this mind… "Mind, if at the disposal of Islam, is the greatest blessing, but if it is subordinated to ego and devil, then it will be the worst disaster. (Erbakan, 2014: 33-34).
>
> Of course, the creator of this universe is our Lord, free from all kinds of defects and owner of infinite perfection(Erbakan, 2014: 15). For people of reason and conscience, it is impossible not to look at this enormous universe and remember and admire the supreme creator of all this… Allah created people in order that they know him (Erbakan, 2014: 13). One of the essential virtues given to humanity is the free will. Special will power sets people free to make a choice between good and evil, which makes necessary to be tested. Therefore, God has created the life of the world as a square of the struggle between the truth and the void (Erbakan, 2014: 17). The first and fundamental duty of all Muslims is to struggle *(jihad)* for justice. Jihad is to work with all our strength and without any worldly expectation in order for the truth to prevail and for all humanity to have peace and freedom. It means to take responsibility for our nation, the Islamic Ummah and the whole world of humanity (Erbakan, 2014: 18).

As we have seen, *jihad* is a crucial concept in the religion/Islam understanding of *Milli Görüş*. This positioning of jihad may suggest a similarity with other Islamic movements and radical ideas. However, the meaning that is given by *Milli Görüş* to the concept of jihad clearly distinguishes *Milli Görüş* from other movements. As such, Erbakan's definition of jihad is idiosyncratic, and this definition is nothing to do with that of implied by contemporary Western jargon. The concept of jihad in *Milli Görüş* understanding does not evoke harshness, violence and repression. On the contrary, it includes a tolerant manner, moderate discourse and a compromising attitude. With these features, the jihad of *Milli Görüş* is a peaceful, fragile and longsuffering path that does not lead to any fight against state and society. Erbakan says jihad means "to struggle at ones best as a disciplined society with intent to make Truth become the rule for the happiness of all humans." (Arpacı, 2017: 121).

The concept of jihad, strictly related to another concept that is "eternal struggle between truth and falsehood". Because jihad derives from this concept. Whereas there is a struggle between truth and falsehood on the earth, a Muslim cannot stay indifferent, which means irresponsibility. On the contrary, he must side with the truth and do its best for the superiority of the truth against falsehood, and this means doing jihad (Erbakan, 2014: 18-

19). He asserts that there is no difference between not striving for the domination of truth and striving for domination of the falsehood (Erbakan, 2014: 25).

As stated above, *what kind of Islamist ideology* is a critical question to understand *Milli Görüş* as Islamist ideology. This is because the way Islam is understood has led to the emergence of very different Islamic ideas and movements. Understanding the "Islam" interpretation of *Milli Görüş* is, on the other hand, possible with the recognition of Erbakan's Islamist identity because he has always been the indisputable leader of the movement, and his ideas always had a defining and guiding meaning (Ay, 2011: 190). He was nourished by a robust Sufi tradition from his early youth until his middle ages, he also followed the contemporary interpretations of Islam and blended these sources and knowledge with his political knowledge and experience.

The influence of the Naqshbandi/Gümüşhanevi community and the sheikhs of this order, Sheikh Abdullah Hasip Efendi, Sheikh Abdüaziz Bekkine, Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku, on Erbakan's worldview is determinant. Erbakan's scholarship at the university, the adventure of establishing a factory, his experience of bureaucracy and finally his entry into political life have always been in consultation with this spiritual environment and paying regard to their consent. This strong bond between Erbakan and his close circle continued until the death of Zahit Kotku in 1980 when Erbakan was in his 50s. This long and deep-rooted influence of Sufism is likely to be a decisive factor in the Islamic understanding of *Milli Görüş* leader and his core cadre. Comprehension of Islam via sufistic perspective by *Milli Görüş* has been the primary source of its peaceful, democratic and compromising character.

It should be added that the same cadre, most of which came from the engineering sector, knew the value of reason and positive sciences in human development. That is why it was said, "Religion does not allow to believe things that are not rational and logical" (Erbakan, 2014: 40). This cadre was aware of modern Islamic approaches. Erbakan's view, in that sense, that the "door of *ijtihad* (juristic reasoning) remains open" has particular importance (Arpacı, 2017: 101). On the other hand, their national and international political experiences were continually accumulating. Therefore, while respecting the İslamic jurisprudence developed for the problems of the past through former centuries, they have also been optimistic about the reinterpretation of Islam to find "reasonable" solutions to the

current issues of the world. Thus, rational and innovative as well as democratic and compromising, understanding of Islam was developed.

Nationalism: The idea of *Milli Görüş* on nationalism has been ambivalent from the very beginning. There are two reasons for this. First, the political and legal environment did not allow it to express Islam publicly, which it embraces and carries as a mission. For example, in the Constitution, it is stated that the statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties, shall not be contrary to the principles of the secular Republic; that dissolution of political parties shall be decided finally by the Constitutional Court after the filing of a suit by the office of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals when this provision is violated. (article 68,69).

On the other hand, the following provisions exist in the Law on Political Parties (Law Number: 2820. Adopted on: 22.4.1983).

> Political parties shall not engage in propaganda, exploitation or abuse, in any way whatsoever, by taking advantage of religion or religious feelings or things considered to be sacred by religion, in order to even partially reconcile the social, economic, political or legal regime of the state with religious principles and beliefs, to achieve their political aims or to ensure political gain and interest (Article 87). It is prohibited to establish a political party under a name including the words communist, anarchist, fascist, theocratic, national socialist or any other words denoting a religion, language, race, sect or region or any other names having the same meaning, these words shall not be used in the title of the political party (Article 96).

Such provisions caused *Milli Görüş* parties to have difficulty in expressing their thoughts and programs and to use an indirect expression. One of the tools of this indirect expression is the use of *nation* and *nationalism*.

The word "mille" means religion in Arabic. Thus "milli" means "religious". However, in Turkish, the first word means nation while the second means national. This dual meaning gave a chance to Erbakan to claim that *Milli Görüş* means "*Milli Görüş*" in the presence of official authorities and secular investigations, while he refers to the Arabic meaning of it before his supporters (Arpacı, 2017: 117-119). In this context, Ali Bulaç states that Necmettin Erbakan and *Milli Görüş* movement he commenced was not "nationalist" but Islamist and ummahist[16]. He was using "milli/national" subject in substitution for "religious" because of coercive legal regulations, if the conditions had allowed he would say "Islamic

[16] "Ummah" is a unifying term referring to total of Muslim people including all Muslim societies and countries.

View" (Bulaç, 2011: 83). Therefore, there is no doubt that what is meant by the "*Milli Görüş*" is the "Islamic view" (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 34).

Işıl Arpacı's view reiterates this idea; stating that there was a risk of being excluded from given system as long as Erbakan's discourse and practice showed affinity to Islam and this reality prevented Erbakan from expressing his world of thought openly (Arpacı, 2017: 97). The same idea is confirmed by M. Hamdi Yıldırım, who cites from Erbakan that "We are speaking in eggy- peggy language. When we say *Milli Görüş*, they took it, Islam. When we say our faith is the faith of Sultan Fatih, they got it as Islamic order." Whoever does not know this language cannot understand Erbakan correctly. (Yıldırım, 2012).Mustafa Kamalak confirmes this idea as well: "Erbakan always used eggy peggy language. That means he could not get his point across clearly." (Kamalak, Interview, Feb 2020). Erbakan's description of *Milli Görüş* justifies these interpretations: *Milli Görüş* means our nation's own opinion. When Sultan Fatih conquered Istanbul, the belief in his heart was *Milli Görüş*. Our nation has dominated the world for a thousand years with *Milli Görüş*. Today, *Milli Görüş* is the remedy of all our troubles (Uçar, 2012: 77).

Another reason for the ambivalence of *Milli Görüş* of nationalism is the tendency towards nationalism from time to time, despite the rejection of nationalism by Islam, which is the foundation of ideology. The reason behind this is that the Islamist ideas were wholly suppressed after the foundation of the Republic, and even at the time multiparty regime came, Islamism could only find a shelter in the centre-right parties with a nationalist understanding, but not an independent ground. "The coexistence of nationalism and Islamism is one of the reasons "why Islamism emerged in the form of Islamic nationalism even when it gained an independent existence." (Yılmaz, 2011: 258).

Some of Erbakan's words evoke this synthesis. In his discourses and writings that his longing to Ottoman and Selçuklu states and his ideas about the pioneering and leadership role of Turkey among all Muslim countries bring into mind that he is slightly inclined to nationalism. It can be seen in his rhetoric that there is a visible emphasis on Turkishness (Arpacı, 2017: 117-119). He says for example, "…We are going to build a Great Turkey again. After that, we will found a new world. Because the Turkish nation is the most honourable of history in proportion to its service to Islam. Our nation has all features for reaching these supreme goals…Under the guidance of the leader Turkey you will found a Fair World." (Erbakan, 2014: 242). "Turkey is the most important country on earth. Not only

of great importance for the people living in our country but also in terms of all humanity ...Because the foundation of the peaceful and just world expected by all humanity is possible only under the leadership of Turkey" (Erbakan, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ai4j2YdbQu0). "Our nation is the biggest, most honoured nation in history. It is the nation that has established exemplary civilizations, shed light on humanity, taught all humanity what morality and virtue is, and has managed the order of the world" (Erbakan, 1975: 17). These statements justify the Ergun Özbudun's interpretation "The "*Milli Görüş*" Islamism includes a hefty dose of Turkish nationalism." (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 36).

Considering all this, it can be said that "View" is at the forefront in the concept of National View, which is an indirect expression of İslam; while "national" has the secondary role. Moreover, even at this subordinate position, it refers to being a part of the *ummah* (Muslum society) rather than connoting any ethnic entity. In the words of the Yıldız, Erbakan tended to see *Milli Görüş* as the expression of the Turkish part of the world Muslim community that is the Ummah (Yıldız, 2003: 190). However, it should be added that this *part* of the ummah, is believed, having lived in Anatolia, has a "speciality" of being the heir of Ottoman which gives it the privilege of leading the *other parts of the ummah* (Arpacı, 2017: 152).

Politics: Religion is also at the basis of the political understanding of *Milli Görüş*. According to this understanding, religion orders people to establish a peaceful and fair order for all humanity in the world. It orders to struggle for the establishment of this order which is named *jihad*. Jihad requires discipline and organization. This organized work includes politics because politics is the most effective way of jihad.

Politics is also made for this great goal for jihad. "If you say that politics does not concern me, half of the Qur'an does not concern me, you say. Because jihad is the worship commanded by the highest number of verses in the Qur'an. Therefore, we do not do politics but jihad. A person who does not make jihad cannot win the world test." (Erbakan, 2014: 20). In order for humanity to lead to happiness, for domination of not wrong but right, not ugly but beautiful, not bad but good, not harmful but beneficial, not oppression but justice, we have to work with all our strength and organization (Erbakan, 2014: 25). It is clear that the tiny communities that are organized are more potent than the millions of uninformed masses." (Erbakan, 2014: 29).

While putting forward the opinion of *Milli Görüş* on religion and politics, it is worth touching a claim directly related to these two concepts. Erbakan has often been accused of using religion as an instrument for politics, but this is not true. Maybe the correct determination is the very opposite. In other words, it might be said that Erbakan used politics as an instrument for religion (Tuncel, 2018: 134). It is quite natural because *being an instrument for something else* is inherent in politics. In other words, politics is a mean rather than an end. Politics is not made for its own sake, but for some other ideals or interests (individual or social, material or spiritual). Erbakan also had the ideal of bringing bliss to his nation and humanity, and he carried out a peaceful and compromising democratic political struggle, which are critical components of this ideology.

Another criticism Milli Görüş and Erbakan faced is that Erbakan and his political movement have resorted to a rigid and confrontational pattern (Mecham, 2011: 73). Based on particular speaches attributed to Erbakan and a few who served in the Milli Görüş (Manaz, 2008: 254-260), the compromising character of the movement was questioned. The persons in question were also those whose names were mentioned in the Welfare Party closure case in 1998 and were deemed to have caused to the party's closure. (Şevki Yılmaz, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, İbrahim Çelik, Şükrü Karatepe, Ahmet Tekdal, Şevket Kazan) (Constitutional Court Decision, 16.1.1998).

Those who put forward these claims, kept them on the agenda, and tried to impose them on the public, highlighting a few exceptional incidents, were the groups that wanted to maintain their economic and ideological privileges, provided by the status quo (Aydın, Taşkın, 2014: 435) These allegations were mainly touted by media groups which were sharing these privileges (Erbakan, 1997: 189) If a more objective approach was adopted, the following would draw attention:

- During the 40-year political struggle, Erbakan and *Milli Görüş* have embraced the concepts of peace, brotherhood, compromise, justice, coexistence, democratic order, etc. in terms of both discourses and actions. Therefore, these concepts have permeated all aspects of the movement. The peaceful attitude adopted in the right-left polarization of the 1970s (Yıldız, 2003: 197), four coalition governments, the countless speeches Erbakan made inside and outside the parliament (Erbakan, 2014), the practices carried out by Milli Görüş political parties, and Erbakan's patience against the anti-democratic and hostile attitude of the armed forces (Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 164) have sufficiently demonstrated this feature. In the face

of this entire corpus, several selected sentences or a few speeches are not important enough to evaluate the whole movement with them.

- The order in which Erbakan and *Milli Görüş* acted was not "a legal order", as Osman Can argues, but "a stack of norms" produced by the junta (Can, 2011: 63). The movement, which fought to exist under these authoritarian norms, was subject to the attack, threat and punishment of tutelary and privileged forces (Erbakan, 1997: 146). Therefore it is typical for Erbakan and his party to rarely show emotional reactions in this atmosphere of oppression, hatred and lynching.

- It is not possible for people to be perfect for life. Perfection is a feature that can only be attributed to the prophets. It is possible that Erbakan also had faulty words and actions. However, it would not be fair to define his political line through these "natural" and exceptional defects.

- There have been a few people in the National Vision movement who made some harsh statements because they were not as patient and forbearing as Erbakan against the pressures and threats. However, the number of these people was too low in the political movement to be taken into consideration.

- AK Party management, which came to power since 2002 and approached the centre to meet the concerns of even the established tutelary order, emerged from the Milli Görüş. The ideology and practice of the Milli Görüş led to the emergence of such a moderate political movement. As Quinn Mecham has stated, the policy form adopted by Erbakan has led Turkish Islamists to ideological moderation and pragmatism and enabled them to marry the centre (Mecham, 2011: 75).

It is an essential feature of Milli Görüş to adopt a peaceful path in politics. Erbakan has always talked about peace, goodwill, democracy and law against the anti-democratic legal order and tutelage forces he confronted since 1970. He did not allow his social power to turn to brute force and violence (Muradoğlu, 2011: 26). He warned his party and base of being neutral and unarmed against the social polarization, violence and anarchy that peaked in the 1970s. Even in the bloody conflicts between the right and the left, particularly by the second half of the 1970s, Milli Görüş strictly maintained this anti-violence attitude (Yıldız, 2003: 197). He did not promote the militancy of Islamic politics. He did not allow Islamist politics to militarize (Akyol, 2011: 38).

In the face of the closure of the MNP and the MSP, he emphasized only law and democracy and did not use a confrontational language. Although he was put in prison with his friends after the 1980 coup and his political rights were taken away, he did not act aggressively. In the period when the impact of the coup diminished, he established a new political party. When the political ban was over, he took over the party and continued the democratic struggle. In the 1990s, while his party was on the rise, he patiently confronted the repression and intimidation policies of the tutelage regime. Although he was the first party in the election, he chose a soft style against the total attacks of tutelage institutions in order not to take part in the government. He had to resign from the government, which he founded with great labour, under the intense pressure of the soldier. He maintained his composure in the face of the 28 February military intervention and made a significant contribution to circumvent the process undamaged (Sambur, 2011: 15). Despite the closure of the RP and the FP, which was founded in the next three years, he did not give up the democratic political struggle.

One of the main components of Milli Görüş is a compromising attitude in politics. The compromising character of Milli Görüş draws attention in several dimensions. One of them is to compromise its ideals with the real world in which it lived. In other words, it had to compromise thought and practice. Because it believed that if it abandoned idealism, it would lose its identity, character, raison dĕtre; if it abandoned realism, it would lose the opportunity to carry this ideal to society. In this case, it tried to draw the two worlds close together. As a result, it has reduced the tone of ideal discourse where real conditions have become more challenging while putting forward its ideal discourse more clearly, where material conditions have softened. As a factor facilitating this internal compromise, Milli Görüş believed that real conditions would change and transform against the idea in the long run. So it thought that those who are hostile to Islamic values and goals are hostile because they do not fully understand them. If these values and goals are explained patiently and nicely, the interlocutors will be convinced, and the contrast will disappear. This belief and hope, with exceptions, helped to avoid deepening the present conflict, to act close to adversaries and to use a compromising language.

One dimension of the political compromise character of *Milli Görüş* is the actions it presented throughout political life by its political parties. This movement took part in three coalition governments in the 1970s. It initiated the formation of these coalitions and made

the most serious attempts. The first of these, namely the CHP-MSP coalition, meant the destruction of a taboo at the time because these two parties were seen as enemies to each other in society. This historic compromise has cost the MSP severe decrease of votes. However, Erbakan has always regarded this compromise as a valuable service. In the next two coalitions, he took part in coalitions as one of four parties and one in three, respectively. In order to overcome the government crisis just before the 1980 military coup, it offered its support to AP, which found a minority government externally. In 1991 election, he entered into an election alliance with two small parties and thus had the opportunity to be represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. When it became the first party in the 1995 election, no party wanted to form a coalition with it because of the military's negative attitude. However, RP has shown that it can form a coalition with all parties, regardless of whether it is left-wing or right-wing. In 1996, it formed a coalition government as a major partner. During this period, it insisted on his compromising rhetoric in the face of the intense attack of the army and elites supported by the army. Even after it was finally removed from the government by the army and the Welfare Party was closed down, the leader of *Milli Görüş* continued his democratic political struggle for the rest of his life with his moderate and compromising attitude (Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 184-185).

Many analysts have expressed this compromising action and discourse of Milli Görüş as the most critical feature of the movement. According to one of these comments, a positive legacy of Erbakan in our political history is that he kept rising Islamism within the democratic parliamentary system and reconciled it (Akyol, 2011:38). Another commentator says that one of Erbakan's significant influences on our politics and social life is the compromise of Islam and the state in the process of a painful journey. Today, if it can be seen that in the nation-state of Turkey, the distance between society and politics has been closed significantly, and bonds between them have tightened, no doubt Erbakan has a significant role in that outcome (Bostancı, 2011: 105).

The concept of *external powers* plays a vital role in the political analysis of *Milli Görüş*. With this concept, *Milli Görüş* means particularly western powers, be state or non-state, who do not want Turkey to develop, therefore, interfere in Turkey's macro policies. While bringing forward the political, legal and economic issues, it also criticises the national actors but argues that the real actors who caused the fundamental problems are *outside*. The actors inside are mostly their unconscious puppets and need to be awakened. However, what

is going on in Turkey, as well as the prevailing political order is *designed* by *external powers*.

> "First, let us confess that these parties are not governing Turkey. Let us not deceive ourselves. Turkey always stays under external influences. There are military revolutions, and constitutions landed by parachutes. When parties convened and debated the constitution in Turkey during fifty years? There is a regimented democracy. There is external control. They are not leaving us. This is the principal big issue of this country. I am sure; when we sit down and talk, we will constitute a perfect order. However, so far, this has not been left to us (Erbakan,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9W5htNUHFdo).

In internal politics, directed by sovereign foreign powers, parties competing for power were considered indistinguishable from each other. This is because all of them were deemed as western-oriented and were working in their service in turn. There was only one party outside this circle: *Milli Görüş*.

"There are three main thoughts in Turkey: 1) Leftist- socialist view; CHP, DSP and SHP have been the political parties of this view. 2) Liberal, colourless view; AP, ANAP, DYP AK Party have been the political parties of this view. 3) *Milli Görüş*. All views and political parties, other than *Milli Görüş*, are not different from each other. Even they have to be counted as a single party because they are all the imitators of the West and therefore have the same tributes: 1) They are the collaborators of West 2) They are usury practitioners, 3) they are unjust in tax levying, 4) They suppress the poor people and protect the rich" (Arpacı, 2017: 156).

Although *Milli Görüş* believes that domestic political actors are controlled by foreign powers, it did not label them as *traitors* but think that they were ignorant and in need of enlightenment. Therefore, it developed a weariless rhetoric. According to this rhetoric, these actors and society will see the *truth* by speaking and explaining. Because, the power of the word, the benefit of dialogue, the self-disclosure feature of truth is believed (Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020). Both political actors and society as a whole were, therefore, not *marginalized* and it was emphasized that one day they would become pro-*Milli Görüş*.[17]

Political parties other than the SP are, unconscious and assuming they do well, a tool for racist imperialism and they are cooperating with it. Our citizens consist of two parts: Those who confess being pro-*Milli Görüş* and those who wait for their turn. If we make a

[17] Özbudun and Hale are of the view that Erbakan's these words, which are aiming to be inclusive and sympathetic, are contrary to pluralist understanding of society. (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 37).

general classification, 75-80 per cent of our population have a *Milli Görüş* mindset whether they confess or not. 20-25 per cent of the population who call themselves leftist are also pro-*Milli Görüş* but since they do not know what *Milli Görüş* is, they form a different group. The AK Party came to power under the influence of racist imperialism and was used for the imperialist powers. AKP supporters are our children, we love them, but they went astray and were caught by the enthusiasm of "Let us govern Turkey." (*Hürriyet*, 29 Nov 2010).

Milli Görüş describes the internal and external order of politics and presents a broad critique of them. Nevertheless, it does not just criticise the problem but suggests the solutions to them. Like all ideologies, there is an image of an *ideal order* called *fair order*. In this fair order, the *better* state of politics, with other institutions such as economics, is depicted.

First, the state as the most critical institution of politics will put the truth above all else. The main elements of the political order are securing the peace and security; rights and freedoms; and justice. There will be a constitution which will pay regard to the balance between security and freedom. Everybody will have a right to think and live in accordance with his faith. The system of the state, legislation and executive will reflect the national character and tributes of the society (Arpacı, 2017: 178-181). The best government system is presidential. The parliament is with a single chamber. The number of deputies should not be much, and 300 are appropriate. Several ways of consulting the will of the nation should be brought into being such as a referendum, citizen initiatives, recall etc. Election system and its reflection into the parliamentary chair are in favour of the winner party, that is the number of chairs of the winning party will be as double regarding its rate of electoral success. This caution is predicted as a solution for political instability that brings about several political/governmental crisis during the multiparty history of the country.

On the judicial area, the moral and virtue of judge should be high, the laws of the country should be made pursuant to the national ethic, and the lawsuits should be accelerated. About army also there are several suggestions. The number of soldiers should be lowered, and the army should be more professional. Nevertheless, there will be a potential power of the whole nation which should the need arise will hold the arm; thus, it will be the army-nation cooperation. The army will possess high technological arms and these arms will be produced domestically. The army will bound to the will of civil rule, and it will take place in the pact, which will be founded among the Muslim countries (Arpacı, 2017: 181-184).

The national intelligence and arm intelligence will never cooperate with foreign intelligence institutions, especially with MOSSAD and CIA (Arpacı, 2017: 184).

In Fair Order, decentralization approach is a bit reserved despite the fact that it is not refused clearly. Indeed, what is offered is the enhancement of the delegation of the governance power to local authorities so that the bureaucratic procedures which retard the submission of services will be prevented. However, this delegation does not reach to the point of autonomy which entails the federative structure of the state (Arpacı, 2017: 185). Although this ideology shuns from the federation, its thought on legal pluralism is interesting. Even though its details and system are not elaborated enough, there is a general acceptance that legal plurality for subcultural structures of society is better and this idea takes its root from the practice of Ottoman Empire, the organization of which is usually hailed. In this system, every cultural-religious minority will live and judged according to its own belief (Yayla, 1997: 19).

Economics: *Milli Görüş* is aware of how decisive the economy is on human life and politics, and therefore has both a broad critique of the current situation and a detailed description of economics in its Fair Order.

While propounding the economic problems at the national level, special attention is given to the international economic system. In order to get to the root of the problem, an international network of economic exploitation is x-rayed, and thus the root cause of the disease is diagnosed.

> When we look at the world map, we see 200 painted countries. If I lift the skin of your face, veins will emerge from underneath, nerves, and bones will emerge. When you remove this paint from the world and look at the anatomy of the world, you will see the hoses, pumps, pools, valves that racist imperialism placed underneath. Humanity is exploited with this mechanism of exploitation (Erbakan, 2016: 52).

In this system, also called da usurer capitalist system, societies in the world are exploited with five *microbes*: 1) Interest, 2) Unfair taxes, 3) Printing unbacked money 4) Exchange (arbitrary change of the value of money) 5) Injustices in credit allocation and banking system. (Kızıltaş, 2011: 293).

In Turkey and other underdeveloped countries, while people are producing a value worth 200 liras, they are given only 100, but this is even formal. However, due to the microbes mentioned above, this 100 goes down to 16. It means that when a blacksmiths

pound six times, he can take only one of them and pay 5 of them to racist imperialism. A taxi driver who navigates six times a day can take the money of one navigation and gives five to racist imperialism. The ruling co-operative powers of these countries serve to maintain this usurer-capitalist order (Erbakan, 2016: 52-54).

The way out of this circle is the spiritual and material struggle. Spiritually, Muslim societies are obliged to be enlightened and become conscious; while materially they need science and technology and to achieve their economic independence. It is possible because we have the roots of not only spiritual development but also material development (Erbakan, 1971b: 14). The principles of Islam were applied to society, in the *era of bliss*, then during the centuries and finally during the Ottoman era. In this way, justice, human rights and high human values were manifested in the whole society. *Milli Görüş* is the name of the re-implementation of these principles and thus the restoration of spiritual development. On the other hand, the first and foremost representatives of science, which has been the reason why the West has conquered the world in the last three hundred years, have been Muslim scientists (Erbakan, 2017).

Therefore, Muslims are not against science, but rather its real owners. Muslims must protect and redevelop science that has been under the control of the West for the last three hundred years. Staying away from science and technology has been the main reason for exploitation by the West (Erbakan, 4.7.2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzP9WA9wLks). The "heavy industry move" that the MSP used as a slogan in the 1970s was seen as a cure for ending centuries of exploitation (Erbakan, 1975: 195-220).

Erbakan says the primary goal of *Milli Görüş* is the nation's reaching safety by developing in the spiritual and material field. Spiritual development can be possible in this way: people should gather around the national conscious and aims, human rights and freedoms should be secured, democratic and peaceful setting should be created, the state and nation should be integrated, a society based on ethic and virtue should be formed (Arpacı, 2017: 154).

When it comes to the material development, the formula is that: Securing the welfare level for everybody befits human dignity, encouraging the legitimate ways of earning, respect for a property right, removing the wastefulness, eradicating the interest, rapid

industrialization, eliminating the economic inequality between different classes and geographic parts of the country, fair and straightforward taxes system, development attempt made with national conscious and passion. (Arpacı, 2017: 155).

According to *Milli Görüş*, the real adoption of Islam will automatically ensure material development. That is why this slogan is so famous. "Morality and spirituality first". The emblem of *Milli Görüş* party, the RP's emblem, is meaningful in terms of showing the relationship between these two concepts: an ear of grain from inside the crescent. "Thus, a zul-cenaheyn (two-winged) understanding of development constitutes the core of the political discourse of *Milli Görüş*: (1) "spiritual development" (Islam) and (2) "material growth" (industrialization)" (Yıldız, 2003: 189).

Heavily criticising the current economic order, *Milli Görüş* proposes a Fair Order's economic system in which there is no room for the oppressor and oppressed. An economic Fair Order is a kind of "balance" between capitalism and socialism (Erbakan, 1991). In words of its proponents, it sorts out the positive and beneficial components of the two economic systems. It regards "private property, profit, and free-market" as favourable components of capitalism but sees the "interest" as an unfair and exploitative instrument of it. Another bad implementation of capitalism is allowing the formation of monopolies. When it comes to communism, it is against the "interest" which is correct and useful for economics. However, its opposing to the private property and the profit is in contrast with the nature of human being; planning the whole economy from one centre causes the devastation of the economic system (Erbakan, 2016: 75). Therefore in Fair Economic Order, private property, and profit is accepted, but monopoly and interest are rejected. In this order, there is no exploitation, everybody takes its due share, there is an equal opportunity for people, useful and beneficial enterprises are supported all barriers before economic developments are removed (Erbakan, 2014: 215).

Economic Fair Order has three general principles: First is that private individuals run economic activities. As for the state, it prepares national and regional development plans. It makes general services and regulations related to economics. The second principle is that the main tasks of state are security, administration, justice, providing energy, water, road, infrastructure, health, education, transportation, communication etc. Third, everybody can consume only as much as he produces. To realize that, there will be the limited emission of

the money, that is the money in circulation will be as much as the goods, and there will be no interest (Kızıltaş, 2011: 298-300).

Credit system also is of great importance in this order. To whom it will be given and under which conditions it will be distributed is bound to strict rules because this economic tool can be misused in favour of influential people which tend to exploit the society. The tax problem is also emphasized, and there are particular principles for tax administration and procedure. Tax should be single type, and it should not be taken from income. Social security is another serious issue that should be handled, and the primary rule is that all citizens should be provided with social security (Erbakan, 1991: 32-66).

In Fair Economic Order, it is critical to maintain the balance of income distribution and to soften the class distinction. In this respect, *Milli Görüş* has a strong "social justice" vein. Erbakan, even at the time he was serving in the Union of Chambers between 1966-1969, showed his pro social justice identity. During his work in several posts in this institution, he tried to regulate the distribution of loans in favour of small- and medium-scaled businesses in rural areas rather than urban-based big businesses. (Erbakan, 2014: 11). This attitude has been valid in all parties of *Milli Görüş* starting from the MNP. "It has been *Milli Görüş* who defended the vast poor society against the hardcore of the traditional system." (Bulaç, 2011: 82). Its proposals and commitments in this regard have an essential share in the rise of *Milli Görüş* parties in both 1970s and 1990s. Primarily through the municipalities, it gained after 1990, the practices embracing the urban poor, shantytowns and new migrants deprived of social security have created a belief that the promises made are not empty. During these periods, when the "Fair Order" discourse reached its peak, there was a significant increase in the public's support for *Milli Görüş* (Bölükbaşı, 2012: 169).

West and Zionism: According to *Milli Görüş* ideology, during the last three hundred years, while the West increased its material power, Muslim states did not defend their moral values and therefore fell behind materially. In this case, the West has done its best to prevent the recovery of Islamic societies, which it regards as its greatest rival. To this end, he tried to turn these countries into servants of their interests by occupying them during the period of colonialism, then making them economically dependent and degenerating their culture (Erbakan, 2017).

Western civilization, according to *Milli Görüş*, is not a just order, but a system based on the oppressor-oppressed relationship. This civilization has persecuted humanity with the capitalist system and its communist system for three hundred years (Arpacı, 2017: 160). Capitalism led to the exploitation of all workers and humanity by certain capital holders and crushed the masses of people. The economic suppression that capitalist system caused, bring about significant social upheavals and endless wars. This conflict also became the cause of communism. It looked like this: You turn the steering wheel too far to the left to save the car that is about to fall to the right of the road, and this time you roll the car to the left of the road (Erbakan, 2016: 118). However, communism could not heal the grievances of humanity because it was materialist as well and reckoned the brute force supreme. In any event, communism has collapsed. However, capitalism is surviving with its grave conflicts and at the brink of bankruptcy. Economic inequality is peaking in the world, a small number of world countries are controlling a vast proportion of world wealth while people of the others are living in grave misery and wretchedness, with only a minor proportion of war expenditures humanity could deal with famine and poverty problem, recent reports on wealth and poverty are not promising, on the contrary, they are drawing a dark picture of the future (Erbakan, 2016: 22-28). In an "unbalanced world" currently it is estimated 1 billion people are destitute, 800 million people are hungry, 600 million are obese and 1.4 billion tons of food is wasted every year, 34 countries have food, and 80 countries have water shortages (Adak, 2018: 1). The West does not want Turkey to be strong for the continuation of this exploitation. Because if Turkey became powerful, then it will not allow their exploitation and will prevent their false ambitions. They do not want Turkey to have a fully democratic regime also. They talk about democracy, but they do not care about democracy. What they pay regard is only their material interests (Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020). Democracy is applied if it is suitable for their interests; they burn and destroy if their interests change (Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020). Besides, a powerful Turkey will also mean strong Muslim and undeveloped countries which have strong relations with Turkey because Turkey will affect them with its attitude (Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020).

Milli Görüş argues that the real power behind that Western order of destruction is Zionism. Therefore, it attaches importance to the knowledge of Zionism's ideology, working style and objectives. Erbakan calls Zionism usually as "racist imperialism" because in Zionism there is a belief that Jews are superior to other races, that other people exist to serve them, and that they must establish absolute domination over the world (Tuğrul, 2016: 58).

The Zionists seized the economy as the most influential force of material domination to establish world domination and established an exploitative economic order. The US dollar is used as the most crucial instrument of world domination. Therefore, the symbols of world sovereignty were placed on the pyramid-shaped organization of Zionism on a dollar (Erbakan, 2016: 46). The Zionists who take control of world imperialism exploit all humanity through the usurer capitalist order and maintain their political dominance through the imperialist states (Arpacı, 2017: 162). With this economic and political control, a kind of *Secret World State* was established (Erbakan, 2014: 97).

Although the new generation is more cautious about *Milli Görüş's* perception of the threat to Zionism, these views, frequently raised by Erbakan and the core staff, have been widely accepted in the grassroots (Ay, 2011: 191).

In many of his speeches, interviews, and writings, Erbakan describes how Zionism forms a global network of economic and political control and thus governs the world. The remarkable points in this narrative are: falsified Torah (Old Testament); the mysterious Kabbalah doctrine previously developed by the clergy; that Kabbalah forms the basis of Masonic teaching; the Talmud, consisting of a commentary on the Torah of the rabbis; The Messiah, the supremacy of the Jewish race, the world domination of the Jews and the promised lands in the Talmud; colonialism in the last three hundred years for world domination; the establishment of usurer capitalism; controlling the economy through the banking system; controlling political governments after the economy; gaining dominance over the media and strategic research institutes; The establishment of the Secret World State; Illuminati lodge established in 1776; three Kabbalist rabbis and the Sanhedrin council below; 70 kabbalist rabbi and sworn group of 70s, many sub-organizations under them; control of the UN by the same organization; The Bilderberg Group, founded in 1954 and gathered elites from politics, media, secret organizations and business; the impact of this group on every significant event worldwide; The Rome agreement laying the foundation of the EU at the Bilderberg meeting; Conroll of NATO and US foreign affairs council and CIA by the same centre; Zionist lobby being determining factor in US election results; that the central banks of not only US but also many other countries are in their hands, that the IMF and the World Bank's indeptment system feeds the Secret World State bankers; powerful families such as Rockefeller, Rothschild's, Agnelli, Mitsubishi; that via this system the borrowing countries are funnelling billions of dollars to the Secret World State, that only US is paying 500 billion

dollars per year as interest payment; that Secret World State causes economic crises all around the world and manipulates the stock markets so that earns hundreds of billions of dollars (Erbakan, 2014: 87-112).

According to Erbakan, this centre has dealt exclusively with the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Because the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, are considered the heart of the Muslim community. In this context, the points he tried to draw attention are: The first Zionist congress in 1897, the plan of the abdication of Abdulhamid in this congress, the decision of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the destruction of Islam, the appointment of Rabbi Emanuel Karaso in Thessaloniki, the establishment of Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in Thessaloniki and the opening of the Mason lodges, opening of the Parliament in 1908, dethronement of Sultan Abdulhamid, government of the Country by Committee of Union and Progress which became the political party, Ottoman Empire's going to First World War, that the Treaty of Sevres is the Greater Israel that project, that when this project could not succeed in because of the War of Independence by 1920 Egypt Rabbi of the Zionist Haim Nahum doctrine, which included the material and moral collapse Turkey, was put into action, that they want Turkey to become dependent to West by membership of European Union and then be a part of Israel (Erbakan, 2014: 87-112).

After this portrait of West and Zionism, Turkey's losses and harm, caused by this front, are handled. It is claimed that imperialism and Zionism engrafted the affliction of the imitation into Turkey. There are several symptoms of this nuisance:

1) Seeing the West superior to himself, 2) Lagging in the field of science and technology and unproductivity, 3) Taking credit and thus becoming dependent and being exploited, 4) Becoming a slave, 5) Joining in European Community and annihilation.

Turkey's political parties are the imitator, and they work like the subcontractor of the imperialism and the Zionism. They propose the receipt of the West for social and economic issues; consequently, only reinforce the exploitation (Arpacı, 2017: 166-168).

Turkey's industrial production, agricultural practices, payment of the public officers are all decided with the consent of IMF and other international committees. In return, the public interest, common good and national sovereignty are by-passed. The political decisions that define the fate of the country are negotiated with outsiders by telephones (Arpacı, 2017: 169).

Milli Görüş proposes its *ideal order* against the Western and Zionism-based order outlined above. The proposals in this order are also related to the lessons learned from the wars, oppression and conflicts experienced by mankind throughout the 20th century. In this system, the following elements stand out (Erbakan, 2006: 21-24):

1. There should be peace instead of the rule of brute force
2. There should be cohabitation and dialogue instead of the enmity
3. There should not be the double standard in the implementation of justice and welfare; these values must be valid not only in our country but in the entire world.
4. There should be a sense of equality instead of supremacy
5. There should be sharing instead of exploitation
6. There should be human rights and freedom instead of oppression and authoritarianism

For all these changes, the coalescence of the Muslim states is critical. Erbakan's enterprise in forming D-8 Convention in that respect was of critical step. After this step, there should be a D-60 system, and thus the circles will be widened (Erbakan, 2016: 42). Institutions such as UN, World Bank, IMF, UNDP etc. are serving for *racist imperialism*. All of them defend the *monopolist capitalism* (Erbakan, 2016: 44). Therefore, the new system, which will be formed by Muslim countries, takes a central place. This will formally resemble the abovementioned institutions, but it will be completely different in quality because it will bring the world the peace, tranquility and justice (Arpacı, 2017: 174). On the other hand, when the Muslim World forms its organizations, the relation with the West will be more equitable, and under these conditions, the bridge of dialogue and understanding will be built. If they understand Islam clearly they will renounce their bias against Islam and the world peace will be accomplished (Erbakan, 2014: 226).

CHAPTER 3: CHP-MSP COALITION GOVERNMENT

This chapter examines CHP-MSP Coalition Government, the first coalition government which Milli Görüş joined. The subtitles of the chapter have been arranged as "Political Conditions before the CHP-MSP Coalition" "Formation Structure and Protocol of the CHP-MSP Coalition" and "Operation Challenges and Dissolution of the Coalition". This arrangement aims to demonstrate the political actors' attitudes towards political compromise during the coalition's establishment, functioning, and termination while tracing the critical events and developments during the coalition. Other coalitions discussed in the subsequent two chapters have also been examined within the same framework.

3. 1. Political Conditions before the CHP-MSP Coalition

Following the interim regime of the 1960 Military Coup, when political activities were allowed, new political parties began to form as a signal of a return to democratic/civilian rule. There were CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/Republican People's Party) and CKMP (Cumhuriyet Köylü Millet Partisi/Republican Peasants' Nation Party), which were available before the interim regime. Besides these parties, AP and YTP (Yeni Türkiye Partisi/New Turkey Party) were founded as successors of DP (Demokrat Parti/Democrat Party), which was closed by the Military Regime. Indeed, through the 1961 Election, three parties CKMP, AP, and YTP were assertive about representing the grassroots of DP. However, in the long run AP with its charismatic leader Süleyman Demirel would consolidate its political power and became the centre of right politics, CKMP would transform into an MHP of far-right politics and YTP would remain its declining survival until 1973 (Özdemir, 2007: 341). The number of political parties rose as offspring parties hatched out of CKMP, AP, and CHP in 1962, 1967, and 1971. This reproduction with the foundation of new parties like MSP caused the very fragmented party system, particularly by the 1970s, during which MSP could participate in three coalition governments. These parties and other considerable parties, which had a relatively crucial political effect before the CHP-MSP coalition government, had better be familiarized in a nutshell.

AP (Adalet Partisi/Justice Party): It was founded on 11 February 1961. Despite its founders and supporters were close to DP (Demokrat Parti/Democratic Party), they gave consent to the leadership of Ragıp Gümüşpala, the former general, perhaps as a political

tactic. Like DP, AP was a liberal-conservative mass party, showed sympathy to society's religious demands, became responsive to demands of agricultural people, and defended free trade and enterprise. On 15 October 1961, Election DP gained 35% of votes and became the second party after CHP. In November 1961, it formed a coalition with CHP, mainly at the army's instance, but this lasted only six months. After Gümüşpala died in 1964, Süleyman Demirel was elected leader of the party and retained this post until the closure of the party by the military regime in 1980 (Heper, 2011: 196).

The general election of 10 October 1965 was a great victory for AP. Despite the absolute proportional election system, it came to power with 53% of the votes, and Demirel became the Prime Minister. In the next election, the party came to power again, this time with 47% votes. During these years, AP was strong in cities and rural areas where the market economy was improving. Party could build intimate relationships with business circles and with notables and landowners in districts and towns. Besides, petty tradespeople and artisans were supporting AP (Heper, 2011: 197).AP remained in power up until 12 March 1971 when a second military intervention happened. Army forced the AP government to resign. Nevertheless, AP deputies took place in subsequent four governments of "interim regime" and were called "supra-party governments", between 1971 and 1973.

CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi/Republican People's Party): CHP, the oldest party of Turkey, was founded in 1923 by Atatürk. Its mission was declared as guarding the national unity and territorial integrity. Its members mainly consist of military and civil bureaucrats, intellectuals, and landowners. It ruled the country from the declaration of Republic until the end of World War II with a single-party regime. By 1931 six party principles were determined as republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism. For Atatürk and his fellows believed that Islam was a barrier before the progress, they put great emphasis on secularism and ventured a wholesome transformation of society that has profound religious roots. It adopted, particularly between 1925 and 1938 more authoritarian stance. Moreover, by 1936 party and state merged (Koçak, 2010: 569). Thus, under the repressive tutelage, the party became an effective means of radical Westernization from justice to education and clothing (Heper, 2011: 176). CHP, until 1972 when Bülent Ecevit took over the leadership of it from İsmet İnönü, remained a Jacoben worldview (Heper, 2011: 177).

The party, from 1938 to 1972, was controlled and led by İsmet İnönü, Atatürk's right hand, and successor. Party's first years under the leadership of İnönü remained authoritarian (Parslow, 2007:30), but by the end of World War II, it showed slightly liberal inclination in terms of religious, economic, and political matters. Political liberalization manifested itself in forming new parties, one of which, to the amazement of CHP administration, came to power and relegated the CHP to opposition status. CHP's remained as an opposition party throughout the 1950s when the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes defeated it in three consecutive elections of 1950, 1954, and 1957. During these years, CHP defended two main principles: statism and secularism (Heper, 2011: 179). By 1959 at the general congress, CHP announced its Declaration of First Targets: the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, proportional representation, autonomy for universities, freedom of the press, constitutional court, collective bargaining, union right for public officers, and planned economy (Kili, 1976: 161-163). Some critical principles and institutions such as proportional representation, constitutional court, labour rights, and the planned economy would take place in the 1961 Constitution that was dictated by the military rule, which brought an end to DP Government by Coup d'etat. In the election following the military's interim regime, CHP gained about 37% of total votes, which was not enough to form a single-party government. Thus began the era of coalitions for Turkey, and between 1961 and 1964, İnönü formed two coalitions and one minority government (Tunçkaşık, 2017: 3-5)

Just before the 1965 Election, CHP determined its political position as "left of centre" mainly by the initiative of Bülent Ecevit, who had been CHP deputy in 1957 and the Minister of Labour in 1961 (Dündar and Akar, 2015: 59). However, this new definition did not prevent disappointment in election of 1965 (29%) when Süleyman Demirel's AP won the majority of not only chairs of parliament but also votes. By this time, while Ecevit and his faction were still defending more transformation toward the left, the other group leader Turhan Feyzioğlu was objecting to this idea. This inner conflict ended up with the domination of Ecevit (Dündar and Akar, 2015:74). Turhan Feyzioğlu and his group left CHP and founded Güven Party. The next general election of 1969 was also defeated with a rate of 27%. This failure became a source of a new dispute between Bülent Ecevit and Kemal Satır, a leader of the other faction within CHP.

After a military intervention of 1971, there raised a disagreement between Ecevit and İsmet İnönü, the party leader. The power struggle between them ended up in Ecevit's

triumph, and he stepped up the leadership of CHP by 1972 (Dündar, Akar, 2015:86). In the meantime, Kemal Satır and his fellows resigned and founded the Cumhuriyetçi Party (Heper, 2011: 180-182).

With its new leader, Bülent Ecevit, CHP was gaining strength just before the general election. Ecevit's CHP was suggesting participatory democracy, mixed economy, land reform, development of cooperatives and public economic enterprises, creating a people sector on the purpose of distribution of capital among the mass, the foundation of rural areas where a road, water, health, education, and other infrastructure services would be supplied. Ecevit's youth, dynamism, and oratory skill have rejuvenated the party and transformed it into a party that tries to get closer to people and strip off its former statist identity (Aydın and Taşkın, 2018: 251).

DP (Demokratik Parti/Democratic Party) as the offspring of AP: AP had come to power alone in 1965 and run the government up until 1971 when military intervention happened. However, there was an opposition group in the party, in favour of more nationalist and religious stance and was claiming political values of DP. The leader of this group was Sadettin Bilgiç. This opposition group became an ongoing problem, and a matter of chronic conflict within a party up until it broke up and formed a new party named Democratic Party on 18 December 1970. This new party, thereby, became the fourth party after the AP, CHP and GP (Güven Partisi/Trust Party) which was an offspring of CHP (Yalansız, 2002: 160).

CGP/Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi/Republican Trust Party as offsprings of CHP: Following the election of 1965 an internal opposition within CHP became apparent. Turhan Feyzioğlu and his 48 fellows cut loose from CHP and founded a new party on 12 May 1967 GP (Güven Partisi/Trust Party). This fraction was seeing itself as centre-right or nationalist and conservative and accusing CHP with having communist character and leftism. (Yalansız: 2002: 162) The party changed its name on 29 January 1971 as MGP (Milli Güven Partisi/National Trust Party). A year later, when Ecevit became the chair of CHP defeating the İsmet İnönü, another internal conflict came to exist. A small group led by Kemal Satır who was against Ecevit parted from CHP and founded CP (Cumhuriyetçi Parti/Republican Party) on 4 September 1972. After them, another group of 32 deputies left the CHP. Then these two fractions decided to come together under the roof of Güven Party, but the party name was changed as CGP (Cumhuriyetçi-Güven Partisi/Republican Trust Party). Turhan Feyzioğlu became the chair of party. Thus it became the third party in terms of representation

power before the election of 1973, but after this election, it fell behind the DP and MSP and became the fifth party with only 13 deputies. (Yalansız, 2002: 163-164)

From CKMP to MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/Nationalist Movement Party):

CKMP had formed as a synthesis of two former parties in 1958 under the leadership of Osman Bölükbaşı (Öznur, 1999: 62)[18]. After 1961 Election it was represented by 54 deputies in parliament, as the fourth party after YTP with 65 deputies (YSK, http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/1950-1977-yillari-arasi-milletvekili-genel-secimleri/3007). In 1962 there was an internal conflict, and the leader of party Osman Bölükbaşı resigned and founded a Millet Party. Alparslan Türkeş became a new leader of CKMP in 1965. (Öznur, 1999: 99) During his leadership, he transformed the party into a more nationalist character and by 1969 changed the name of the party as MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/National Movement Party (Parslow, 2007: 32). Despite the charismatic personality of Türkeş, party was not able to show significant performance from 1965 to 1973. However, after 1973 MHP began to assert its specific role in Turkish political life (Yalansız, 164-165)

MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi/National Salvation Party): The first party of Milli Görüş, MNP founded by Necmettin Erbakan on 26 January 1970, had closed under the suppressive political atmosphere of the Military Intervention of 12 March 1971. Constitutional Court gave the closure decision on the ground that the party had an Islamist tendency and actions on 20 May 1971 (Rabasa and Larrabee, 2008: 40). In the next year, on 11 October 1972 MSP as the successor party with a similar program was founded and started to prepare for election of the next year. Since the statements of Necmettin Erbakan was counted among the reasons for the closure of the first party, Erbakan, as discretion, opted not to join the founders of the MSP. Instead, he adjured Süleyman Arif Emre to be a Leader of MSP (Arpacı 2017: 226). In the same term of election, the worldview of party was set out as a new ideology named "Milli Görüş" (Yalansız, 2006: 266). Erbakan joined the party in May 1973, and shortly after the parliamentary election, held on 14 October 1973, became the leader of MSP (Milliyet, 22.10.1973)

Of other parties represented in parliament before the 1973 election BP (Birlik Partisi/ Unity Party) had 8 deputies; MP (Millet Partisi/Nation Party) had 6 deputies; and YTP (Yeni

[18] These parties were the Republican National Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*) founded in 1954; and the Peasant's Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Köylü Partisi*) founded in 1952.

Türkiye Partisi/New Turkey Party) had 6 deputies (YSK, http://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/1950-1977-yillari-arasi-milletvekili-genel-secimleri/3007) Unity Party, founded in 1966 was of sect based party, in other words, the party of Alevis (Çiçek, Aydın and Baran, 2017: 28). However, its executives denied that feature and claimed it as Kemalist, progressive and reformist, which was another example of the sense of warding off from the suppressive character of the regime (Sarıbay, 1997: 49). Unity Party won 8 deputies in 1969 election, but internal disputes of party never ended. In the meantime, it changed its name as Turkey Unity Party and 1973 election gave it only one deputy (Yalansız, 2006: 168). MP (Millet Partisi/Nation Party) was another offspring party broken off from CKMP in 1962. Its leader was Osman Bölükbaşı who was dominating the party strongly, and worldview was more nationalist and conservative concerning former party and could win 31 deputies in the 1965 election. However, the number of its deputies reduced to 6 in the 1969 election, and it could not gain any chair in 1973 election (Yalansız, 2006: 167-168). YTP was founded in 1961 as an heir of closed Democrat Party and had 65 deputies after 1961 election and took place in several coalition governments at this term. The 1965 election reduced the number of deputies of this party to 19. This term became uncertain time for party and three leaders changed until 1970. Party could gain only 6 deputies in 1969 Election, and in 1973 Election it was removed from the political arena (YSK, http://www.ysk.gov.tr/doc/dosyalar/1923-2011-MVSecimleri-Tuik.pdf). TİP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi/Turkey Workers Party) had been founded in 1961 and had 15 deputies in parliament after 1965 election, but it was closed before 1973 election like the MNP, the first party of Necmettin Erbakan.

Returning to the general conditions of the period, after briefly acquainting with parties, 1960 Military Coup, which followed by the two governments of the interim regime, had commenced an unprecedented era of coalitions in Turkish political life.[19] 1965 Parliamentary Election brought an end to coalitions in which AP was able to secure the parliamentary majority and run the country single-handed. However, in March 1971 the military forced the party to leave office on the ground that it failed to cope with an anarchic environment and economic strains of the country. This intervention was indicating the second era of both "interim regime governments" then of coalitions. Within roughly three years from March 1971 to January 1974, four interim regime governments have been

[19] "Interim regime" is a general term in Turkish political literature and it refers to the period during which governments either run directly by the army or founded under the direct influence of the army. First governments founded at the beginning of 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s are, therefore, called interim regime governments (Uslu, 2015).

formed.[20] First and second governments formed under the Prime Ministry of Nihat Erim, while the prime minister of the third government was Ferit Melen and of the fourth was Naim Talu (Kardaş, 2017: 62-68). General characteristics, policies and practices of these governments can be summed as follows:

1) Nearly half of the members of the first three cabinets were non-parliamentarian, and they were chosen as technocrats to work in pursue of the legal and economic reforms. 2) Some serious constitutional amendments were applied to curtail the more democratic character of the 1961 Constitution. 3) The primary goal of these governments was defined as appeasing the social and political tumult; accordingly, these governments prioritised this issue, and strict security policies came to the fore. 4) Fundamental rights and freedoms, students' political activities, academic autonomies, unionist actions, freedom of organization and speech were seriously curtailed. 5) Security precautions boosted against extreme rightists and leftists, severe penalties put into practice including death sentence for a group of socialist youth. 6) MNP and TİP were closed on the ground that they were Islamist and socialist, respectively. 7) Attempts were made for economic reforms; however, mainly due to harmony problems and political instability, those attempts were failed. 8) Military tutelage became dominant, and the army was monitoring the political developments closely. (Tunçkaşık, 2017: 13-17)

At the end of this period with the characteristics mentioned, election preparations began. Preparations and campaigns were run during the parliamentary recess of 1973. The main propaganda war was between AP and CHP, as two significant parties available. While Ecevit was blaming the AP for preparing the conditions which were abused by the army for intervention, Demirel was charging CHP with pursuing communist goals. On the other hand, two newly founded parties, DP and CGP, were trying to attract grassroots of their former parties as they had left AP and CHP respectively. When it comes to MSP, it was criticising the two great parties and accusing both of them. AP was "colourless", and CHP was leftist, according to Erbakan, and both of them were hauling Turkey to the crisis. (Yalansız, 2006: 281-282). An attack by a group to Ecevit while he was addressing to people at his Isparta rally in September, was an undesirable event during the electoral term. In the same month,

[20] Some call these governments as "supra-parties government" but this naming does not seem to be appropriate because these governments were dictated by the army which overthrew the legitimate democratic government. In contrast "supra parties" does not sufficiently carry such a meaning; on the contrary, it connotes the coalition-like formation which covers the undemocratic character of these governments.

government, in accordance with the advice of the National Security Board, dissolved the martial rule (Yalansız, 2002: 283).

Parliamentary elections, with d'Hondt without election threshold, were held on 14 October 1973. Elections were to determine all members of National Assembly and one-third of the Senate.[21] 8 parties had joined the race. AP, CHP, CGP, DP, MP, MHP, MSP, TBP. All but the Nation Party (Millet Partisi/MP) could enter the parliament (TÜİK, 2012: 4). The results of the election were as following:

5. Election Results 1973

Parties	**CHP**	**AP**	**DP**	**MSP**	**CGP**	**MHP**	**TBP**	**MP**	**Ind.**	**Total**
Percentage of vote	33.3	29.8	11.9	11.8	5.3	3.4	1.1	0.6	2.8	100
Number of Deputies	185	149	45	48	13	3	1	-	6	450
Number of Senators	25	22	-	3	1	-	-	-	1	52

Source: TÜİK 2012 (Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923 – 2011)

Two former parties that were represented in parliament did not join that election. One was Turkey Workers Party because it was closed by Constitutional Court. The other was the New Turkey Party which was dissolved before elections. In return, two newly founded parties took place in elections were MSP and DP. Two parties, which were regarded most successful in these elections, were CHP and MSP. CHP won 185 deputies and became the first party. This was attributed mainly to the multitude of the number of right/conservative parties and to the fact that AP and CGP were eroded during their rule. (Yalansız, 2006: 285) However, the effect of military intervention should be added to these causes. After the military intervention, the electorates shrank away from persisting on the former parties that were targeted by military action. The same situation was seen not only in earlier 1961 election but also to be seen in 1980 and 1997 military interventions. MSP's success, on the

[21] 1961 Constitution was urging two-chamber parliament, that is National Assembly and the Senate. This two-chamber structure lasted until the 1982 Constitution, which ordered single-chamber parliament of Turkish Grand National Assembly as previous Constitution of the Republic.

other hand, is claimed to be thanks to not having been tested and addressing the mass of disadvantageous people. MSP won 48 deputies and became the third-largest party in the parliament.

Nevertheless, this evaluation is also unsatisfactory because it omits the rising Islamic wave, which was gaining strength through the last twenty years, thanks to the democratic regime after the single-party regime. On the contrary, two parties, which took part in the last government -AP and CGP- lost plenty of votes and lowered their number of deputies and senators. AP had had 227 deputies before but now lost 78 deputies and reduced to 149. Likewise, CGP, of 43 chairs lost 30 and retained only 13 chairs in the National Assembly (Yalansız, 2006: 284). DP could be said successful in that it raised its chair from 41 to 45 thanks to addressing the grassroots of AP.

3.2. Formation Structure and Protocol of the CHP-MSP Coalition

The incumbent Talu Government, consisted of the AP, CGP, and independent deputies, resigned on 23 October 1973. However, as usual, the current government was to rule until the formation of a new government (Milli Daily, 25.10.1973). The next day, The National Assembly held the first meeting of the 4th term, and the Presidential resolution on the Council of Ministers' resignation was announced. Three days after this meeting, President Fahri Korutürk assigned CHP leader Bülent Ecevit to form the government (Emre, 2002b: 43). On 7 November 1973, Ecevit returned the task to (rendered his resignation to) the President, stating that he could not form the government. On 12 November 1973, Korutürk gave the task of forming the Government to AP President Süleyman Demirel. On 17 November 1973, despite all his efforts, Demirel stated that he could not form the government and returned the task to the President. On 18 November, 173, Korutürk assigned Naim Talu, a member of the Senate of the Republic, to form the government. Talu's hope and effort for forming a government lasted up to two months. However, when he lost hope of forming the government, he returned the post to the President on 10 January 1974. On 14 January 1974, Korutürk asked Ecevit to form the government. Because of the CHP and MSP groups' agreement, the CHP-MSP Coalition Government was appointed by the President on 26 January 1974 (Bağce: 73).

As can be seen from appointments and returns about the government's formation, which lasted about three months, forming a new government has been quite troublesome.

There was a need for a compromise to form a government under democratic procedures because no party could secure the majority. However, where and how to reach a compromise was unknown.

One alternative mentioned at the beginning was the coalition of right parties like AP-DP-MSP. The other was *the supra-parties* option, excluding CHP; the other, national coalition supported by CHP; other options were CHP-AP; CHP-DP; and CHP-MSP. However, the first alternative looked challenging to come true because it would be the coalition of "enemy siblings" and would be exposed to the harsh opposition of CHP. Moreover, Demirel revealed his intention in the following week of the election: "Our nation employed us with opposition task." (Milli Daily, 25.10.1973).

The second and third alternatives were, for the same reason, seemed unlikely. AP-CHP was the preferable choice for some circles, but it was said the only common denominator was that they favoured a parliamentary democratic regime, but not more, and in terms of socio-economic politics, they had deep conflicts. (Yalansız, 2006: 285). Moreover, the hostile language that these two parties used during these election campaigns created such a deep gap between them, challenging to close (Emre, 2002b: 43). CHP-DP coalition alternative was not likely because DP looked like AP in principal policies and was much sympathetic to any right coalition. What remained was the CHP MSP coalition, which was not easy at all, because one party was labeled as Islamist and the other as a communist.

CHP-MSP Convergence was indeed a great surprise because CHP, with its traditional identity, was the furthest party to Islamist circles and was labeled as the suppressors of Muslim people. Whatever such a partnership may be desirable for the leaders, imposing such a partnership by leaders would be quite tricky to electorates and deputies. Deputies such as Gündüz Sevilgen, Hüsamettin Akmumcu, Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, who are known as the Nurist wing in the MSP, were firmly against such a coalition option (Erbaş, Interview, Feb 2020). With the influence of this environment, the compromising attitude of Erbakan was labeled even as ugly political opportunism (Ahmad, 2015: 329). On the other hand, MSP was claiming to represent the Islam-sensitive people seeking to gain more religious rights and freedoms, which sounded quite reactionist and inadmissible for CHP's radical elements.

Nevertheless, there were several reasons, which despite these significant differences, brought two parties together. One of them was that two parties had some concerns about

whether their political legitimacy would be accepted by the military or to what extent they would be tolerated. However, this concern seemed to be more occupying the MSP because it was the heir of MNP, closed under the Memorandum conditions (Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 94). Indeed this disquiet could be seen explicitly through the coalition overtures, which lasted more than three months. Erbakan was proposing the most flexible position in terms of alternative coalitions. The other reason was that CHP saw the possibility of an all-right coalition as a strong probability, and it would not be happy with such a conclusion. So if CHP was going to be a partner of government, then accepting one of the right party was inevitable. It seemed that AP and its offspring DP were positioning themselves far from CHP, unlike MSP, which was more eager to take part in government. (Yalansız, 206: 286)

Finally, there were a few standard features of the two parties, not to be underestimated, in terms of socio-economic and political stance. Both parties were in favour of the support of low-income people and subsidizing disadvantaged and poor people. Social welfare was the aim of both parties. Both were claiming that they believed a democratic regime that would guarantee fundamental freedoms, mixed economy, economic and social development, which would not exclude social justice, and economic policy, which would be favourable not only for some groups but also for society. Both were bound up with the protection of small business owners, artisans, and small entrepreneurs and the nationalization of the mine resources and petroleum companies. Both were wishing for social security and humanitarian and democratic working conditions and were against people's exploitation by significant capitalists (Soysal and Alacakaptan, 1973).

It was said in the media that CHP and MSP were able to form a coalition by agreeing on principal matters such as granting an amnesty, securing social justice, taking necessary economic measures, and installing the constitutional democratic order. Moreover, thanks to this coalition, they would get a chance to prove that they were not communist or bigot parties (Yankı, 22-28 October 1973).

In this first critical phase of his political life, Erbakan showed an approach that demonstrated his compromising attitude. In the second week after the election, he said that after election, there came out three mindsets: CHP represented left mindset; AP-CGP-DP represented colourless liberal mindset, and *MSP represented national right*. He added that MSP’s first proposal was the coalition of all three mindsets, that the other favourable alternative was the coalition of the first two mindsets leaving the MSP in opposition, that

another alternative was the coalition of MSP with any of the great two parties, that MSP would not refuse this alternative and would be open to any proposal that may come from these parties (7 Gün, 24 October 1973).

As for the leader of DP Ferruh Bozbeyli, he was expressing his wish to form the coalition of right parties, which is AP-DP- MSP-CGP Coalition. For him, CHP as a party of the left had only 33 percent of the total votes, which means 67 percent of the people were on the right parties (Yalansız, 2002: 287).

After talking with all party leaders, Koruturük assigned a task of government formation to Bülent Ecevit, on 27 October, following the precedence of starting from the largest party leader with 185 chairs (*Milli*, 16 Jan 1974). Ecevit's meeting with Erbakan looked promising, but there were naysayers in both parties who saw the other party too far from their ideology (Yalansız, 2002: 287). Erbakan seeing this objection in his party, wanted to show them and to public opinion that there was no other option and sent a letter to Demirel, proposing a coalition of right parties. Demirel, not surprisingly, refused this proposal. Nevertheless, despite this refusal, the General Executive Board of MSP, three days later, decided to refuse CHP's proposal for a coalition. Thus Erbakan sent a letter to Ecevit, which says that the MSP-CHP coalition did not seem beneficial. Erbakan did not accept Ecevit's offer in the first round to prevent the right voter from misunderstanding him. He needed to show that his preference was for the AP (Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020).

Consequently, Ecevit returned to the President of the Republic the task of coalition formation by 7 November 1973 (*Milli,* 16 Jan 1974). The President, again after interviewing party leaders for five days, entrusted the task of government formation to Süleyman Demirel as a leader of the second-largest party with 149 chairs in the National Assembly. Demirel made the first offer to the leader of DP Ferruh Bozbeyli, but Bozbeyli, despite wanted to come together with AP as a party, was firmly against the prime ministry of Süleyman Demirel personally, so refused the proposal. Erbakan accepted Demirel's coalition proposal, however, these two parties, even added CGP, could not secure a majority, so on the recommendation of Erbakan, Demirel directed the proposal of a three-party (AP-MSP-CHP) coalition to Ecevit. However, Ecevit rejected this idea, asserting that "CHP-AP-MSP coalition under Demirel's primership does not match parliamentary precedence." After reviewing the situation in AP General Executive Board, Demirel returned the task to President Korutürk on 17 November (*Milli,* 16 Jan 1974).

Korutürk, this time, met with Ecevit and Demirel simultaneously, and the next day Ecevit met with Erbakan, but there seemed to be a problem on sharing the chairs of the cabinet, especially the National Education Ministry, which Erbakan wanted to take. Thus the stalemate appeared once again, and on 21 November, the CHP caucus decided not to form a coalition with AP and, if necessary, to go to snap election (Yalansız, 2002: 291). In the meantime, it seemed that Ecevit wanted to form a minority government before oncoming local elections, while on the contrary, Demirel was counting on participating in election under the current conditions in which AP-CGP and independents government was ruling (*Yankı,* 26 Nov-2 Dec 1973).

Among this limbo, President, on 4 December, giving an address on radio and television about the current situation, summed the main events during the passing time after the election, narrated the government formation effort, and urged the formation of a CHP-AP coalition. If not, there would be the option of forming a national coalition, including all parties (*Milli,* 16 Jan 1974). In his speech, he referred to the Turkish Armed Force and stating the hope of the army, "which had withdrawn to barracks," that a free democratic parliamentary regime would be able to raise the destiny of the country to the level of modern civilization level. This speech was interpreted as a kind of last warning to parties, which, if not heeded, may culminate in a new military intervention (*Parlamento,* Jan 1974). In the meantime, in support of the CHP-AP coalition, several persons and institutions such as academies, trade unions, conveyed their opinion to President and public opinion (7 Gün, 12 Dec 1973). However, these calls did not get a positive response from Ecevit, and he went on expressing his ideas about the impossibility of this coalition (*Hürriyet,* 1974 Almanac).

In local elections, held on 9 December 1973, CHP proved an excellent performance winning the mayoralty of 33 provinces, including İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir, while AP could gain 22 provinces and MSP only 2 and independents 8 (Yankı,17-23 Dec1973). These results encouraged the CHP to insist on snap election, and it was offering a formation of "election government" under the premiership of a non-partisan person up until election, which could be held in the spring. (Yalansız, 292)

President Korutürk, seeing that parties are not changing their position, urged Naim Talu, already the Prime Minister, to form a government having a character of "national coalition" by 15 December 1973 (*Milli,* 16 Jan 1974). In the same week, there was the election of the Speaker of the National Assembly, which also had bogged down because of

the lack of compromise among the parties. At last, this problem was solved by agreement among CHP-MSP- DP-CGP- A deputy of Kars Kemal Güven was elected by these parties on the 27th round, on 18 December (Yankı, 24-30 Dec 1973).

In the meantime, Naim Talu began to meet with party leaders in pursue of coalition formation. However, from the beginning, it seemed that there was no hope because Ecevit was chasing the snap election; otherwise, he would not participate in a "national coalition." In return, DP claimed that it would not accept a "national coalition" in which CHP did not join (*Milli,* 16 Jan 1974). Thus, because of the disagreement of two foremost party leaders, no result came out. Talu then worked on the formation of a right parties-coalition and invited AP to this coalition. Nevertheless, the AP administration reiterated their preference of a right coalition under the premiership of Demirel.

On the contrary, DP leader Ferruh Bozbeyli was declaring that their decision was the coalition among the parties out of CHP but under a non-partisan person's leadership. What DP meant by "non-partisan" was to prevent Demirel from becoming prime minister, to whom Bozbeyli had personal animosity. In the meantime, since his priority was founding a coalition with AP, Erbakan urged AP to make its mind about joining the AP-MSP-DP coalition. For CHP, he said they could not say anything about partnership (*Cumhuriyet,* 3-10 Jan 1974). Talu, giving up hope, returned the government formation task to the President (*Cumhuriyet,* 11 Jan 1974).

After Talu returned the task to President, there seemed a compromising atmosphere generated between MSP and CHP. Nearly 100 days passed after the election, but no government could be formed. Under this time pressure, a new contact was initiated between two parties (*Cumhuriyet,* 11 Jan 1974). This contact was carried out mainly by Deniz Baykal form CHP and Oğuzhan Asiltürk from MSP (Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020). Then Ecevit and Erbakan met on 12 January 1974, and after a long negotiation, they agreed on forming a coalition as a principle (Öznur, 1999: 325). Both of them met with President and Erbakan following this meeting, said that MSP has always been constructive for establishing the government, and everyone witnesses this, that MSP has kept national interests above all else (*Milli* 15 Jan 1974).

A new set of meetings started, and it seemed that MSP tended to accept fewer gains concerning former encounters during these meetings. It was claimed that one of the critical

factors accounted for this change was the concern of MSP about the probable military intervention (*Hürriyet,* 1974 Almanac).[22] However, it was not only MSP who had concerns about the attitude of the military. Ecevit, who produced the slogans "change of order" and "land belongs to who tills, water belongs to who uses," with all its connotations to the communist mindset, was not trustworthy enough for the military. Besides, he was frightening the established power circles when saying, "I would be glad if you call me a socialist" (Çevikçe, 2012: 44). Consequently, it was not only MSP which felt obliged to make itself accepted and tried to get as much as it could during these bargains. The other factor that pushed Ecevit toward compromise, according to Recai Kutan, was the fact that CHP and the party leader Bülent Ecevit was longing for power because CHP could not come to power under democratic conditions since 1950 (Kutan, Interview, Feb 2020).

On 13 January, reports expressed that the CHP-MSP had reached an agreement to form a coalition (*Milli* 16 Jan 1974). However, a few obstacles needed to be solved, such as who would get the Ministry of Finance. Among these bargaining, the President met with the leaders of both parties, and on the next day on 15 January, entrusted the task of government formation to Ecevit for the second time (*Cumhuriyet,* 12-16 Jan 974). On the same day leaders of the two parties had a long meeting together with their notables: MSP members were Süleyman Arif Emre, Fehmi Cumalıoğlu, Orhan Batı, İsmail Müftüoğlu, and Hasan Aksay; CHP members were Orhan Eyüboğlu, Turan Güneş, Deniz Baykal, Selçuk Elverdi, and Salih Tanyeri (*Cumhuriyet,* 16 Jan 974).

In the meantime, Erbakan was trying to relive hesitations of his party members, so he addressed them at General Executive Board and stressed out that the nation under both economic and social crisis in the country, was in need of a brave government to undertake jobs; that seeing the problematic conditions of the homeland, the MSP had always been constructive in establishing the government, and had done its best in this respect; that because of this urgent circumstances, they said yes to Demirel's coalition offer; that they showed by their attitude and manner their readiness for all sacrifice which should be offer; that in spite of all this positive manner, liberal parties and their leaders had been occupied with different accounts which prevented the coalition; that there left only one possibility and it was CHP-MSP coalition; that after a protracted government crisis afflicted Turkey, they

[22] Oğuzhan Asiltürk, indeed, says this on the subject: "We heard that Demirel was defaming us before the soldiers and accusing us of being enemies of Atatürk and the Republic. We were afraid that these suggestions would be effective." (Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020).

would continue their efforts to form a government that nation was looking forward (*Cumhuriyet,* 17 Jan 974).

The following week passed with the coalition negotiations and bargaining during which the details of the Coalition protocol was taking shape. In any case, the compromise between two parties was not an easy matter, and the difficulty of agreement could be figured out from the rumours that negotiations had halted (*Cumhuriyet,* 24 Jan 974). Indeed, the preparation of coalition protocol witnessed partners' diverse attitude, particularly because CHP insisted on cooperativism and people sector, and MSP saw the moral lessons for education curricula essential. Two parties approach toward Common Market was also diverse since MSP wanted to withdraw from it (*Milliyet,* 1975: 28). After long bargaining meetings, a compromise was effected, and the Coalition protocol of CHP-MSP was signed on 25 January 1974 (*Cumhuriyet,* 26 Jan 1974).

Milli Daily, a newspaper founded by MSP supporters, heralded the coalition protocol's signing with that headline: "…and Protocol was signed" (*Milli,* 26 Jan 1974). It also was highlighting these points of the protocol about which religious people of the party would be more interested: All schools will have compulsory moral classes, secondary phase of Imam Hatip schools were to open, Imam Hatip graduates would be able to apply for any faculty of universities, and substitute imams would be appointed (*Milli,* 25 Jan 1974). The newspaper emphasized other issues: freedom of opinion and conscience, prevention of obscene publications, moral lessons, and direction of credit support to the Anatolian business.

Cumhuriyet, a leftist Daily and supporter of CHP was summarizing essential points of the protocol as internal peace, amnesty law including the crime of thought, radical solutions for economic and social problems, an extension of rights and freedoms, right to vote for who reach 18, cooperativism and people's sector (*Cumhuriyet,* 26 Jan 1974).

Distribution of the ministries would be as such: CHP would have 18 cabinet members: Prime Ministry, Two Ministries of State, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Health and Social Relief, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Energy and National Resources, Ministry of Tourism and Promotion, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Rural Affairs and Cooperatives, Ministry of Forests, Ministry of Customs and Monopolies, Ministry of Youth and Spor. MSP would have 7 cabinet members:

Deputy Prime Ministry, Ministry of State, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock, and Ministry of Industry and Technology (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015a: 578-579).

Talu's cabinet, which consisted of AP and CGP, left the office by 26 January. On the same day, the President signed Ecevit's cabinet list, and thus, it took office (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Jan 1974). The program of the government was submitted to National Assembly on 1 February 1974. On 7 February 1974 Ecevit government secured the vote of confidence from parliament (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Feb 1974).

The first article of the Coalition Protocol was declaring that both CHP and MSP believed to the principle of the national, democratic, secular, and lawful state; that they were respectful to the rule of law and democratic rights and freedoms; that they were aiming to found a government bound to Atatürk's principals (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015a: 580-591).

The second article stated that coalitions formed by different parties entail each party to sacrifice to a certain extent in terms of their views. Therefore, one should not expect that each party of this coalition should practice their programs consummately (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015a: 580-591).

The third article expressed that this coalition government was regarded as a first duty to forgetting all resentment and griefs of the past and forming a goodwill environment that depends on forgiveness and tolerance.

The other essential points of coalition protocol were these:

- The government would develop a cooperative system, set up several institutions for this system, and form the Bank of Cooperatives.
- For securing internal peace, a general amnesty, which would include thought and belief crimes, would be granted. With the same intent, the Government would expand political rights, remove all barriers against the democratic rules, and guarantee freedom of the press, freedom of thought, expression, and faith.
- It would take all necessary precautions to increase the democratic participation and voter turnout, and lower the voting age to 18.

- It would initiate several reforms to develop the function, productivity, and accountability of the public administration.
- Tax system would be revised and made fairer, favourable to social justice and development, squandering in public resources would be prevented, and banking and credit system would be devised to encourage economic development and people's enterprises.
- Many measures would be taken to improve peasants' economic and social conditions, increase agricultural production, and recover stock farming.
- National, powerful, and extensive industrialization was the principal goal for Turkey's economic and social development. Industrialization would be congruent with Turkey's national resources and potential; it would increase the employment and spread among different regions of the country in an equitable way, industrial investment of private enterprise would be encouraged and subsidized.
- Energy deficit of Turkey would be dealt with in due course; electrical energy resources would be extended; to increase the national production, exploration of petrol, natural gas, and coal would be accelerated. Boron minerals, which had a strategic feature, would be nationalized.
- Relations with the European Economic Community would continue in the direction of principal agreements, but supplementary protocols would be revised and taking into consideration the Community's relations with other countries; the best conditions for Turkey would be demanded.
- Within the scope of the social security system, alternative security institutions would be formed for not only workers but also rural peoples; unemployment insurance would gradually be put into practice; all social security institutions would be united; providing a universal health service would be aimed,
- Public works, housing, infrastructure, and coastal areas would be ameliorated; remission of shanty houses would be implemented; the transportation network would be extended and more qualified.
- On education issues, at the secondary education level, necessary precautions for directing pupils to technical programs would be taken. Ethical lessons would be compulsory in primary and secondary schools.

- In international relations, Turkey would abide by the collective security system in which it takes place and existing alliances. However, Turkey would not confine itself only in the collective system for its national security and defence and would seek the development of self-defence policy, strategy, and facilities. On the other hand, collective defence munitions and equipment placed in Turkey's soil should be under the Turkish state's control.

Concerning the Cyprus issue, it was believed that the best solution was founding a federal-state system within which Turks would take part in the state government with equal sovereignty rights. Real estates and economic development facilities of Cyprus Turks would be guaranteed.

The Government program (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015a, 592-613), which was a kind of extended version of the Coalition Protocol, was read in the National Assembly and Senate of Republic by Bülent Ecevit on 1 February 1974 (*Milli* 1 Feb 1974).

Social justice that took place apparently in the coalition protocol was a dominating issue in the government program. Within this context, universal education, legitimization of the shantytowns, commitment to stop prise increase, improving labourers' conditions, rural peoples and civil servants, "people's sector," and "village-city" project were quite conspicuous themes that had extensive coverage throughout the program. On the other hand, there looked a small amendment in program vis a vis protocol, such as moderation of some international policies' expressions. The expression "tight friendship relations will be formed with neighbouring countries" changed as "Our government place great importance to the development of good relations with particularly our allies, neighbouring countries and the countries that we have historical, traditional and spiritual ties. This change was required, according to comments, for the first form of expression might bring into mind that the government would follow the convergence policy with the Soviet Union, while the other reason was that change requirement was felt in the Cyprus policy. Although the federal system's recommendation was reiterated in the program, its phraseology was amended and turned into a more moderate expression. Another moderation of expression was seen about the control of foreign bases (Yalansız, 298).

Parliamentary debates on the Government Program started on 4 February and completed on 7 February. The program was voted, and the CHP-MSP coalition government

obtained a vote of confidence with 235 aye, 136 nays, and two abstaining votes. 76 deputies did not participate in voting (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015a: 975).

During these debates, some evaluations on the coalition, made by Ecevit, reflected a festive atmosphere and hope for the country's future. What met with exuberant acclaim by CHP and MSP deputies were particularly these words:

> The Government partnership established by the CHP and the MSP has opened a new era that ended up the artificial disparities caused by some historical misconceptions which have damaged our national integrity and obstructed our development moves for a long time... The fact that the CHP and the MSP were able to form a government partnership with a program that can courageously deal with the main problems will be the beginning of a whole period of peace… It will be a period of peace where no one looks at each other with suspicion. There will be a period when different thoughts are discussed in peace and can live side by side. It will be a term when no one crushes anyone (MM, JD, 1/2/1974, 364).

MSP Deputy Hasan Aksay added that, in this new term, no one would find the opportunity not to give a chance to other thoughts to live (MM, JD, 4/2/1974, 453). Ecevit's statements reflected in the press by the first days were also quite positive: "CHP and MSP will serve as two brothers." (*Milli,* 16 Feb 1974). Erbakan, likewise, was speaking in quite a hopeful way: "We will establish brotherhood, peace, and tranquility in 40 million homeland children. We are going to act to anybody like a brother, no matter which party he is." Then he was summing up the program from his point of view as follows:

> 1) Law of amnesty and freedom of opinion. Everyone will be able to reveal his thought freely. No one will be punished because of his religion and prayer. 2) Material development is our goal. We will mobilize ourselves. We will serve. We will create a happy Turkey. We will take care of low-income people, workers, farmers, peasants, civil servants, artisans, and artisans. We will not let the cost of living to crush anyone. 3) Spiritual Development: Compulsory moral lessons are envisaged in schools. The secondary phase of Imam Hatip schools was to open, Imam Hatip graduates would be able to apply for any faculty of universities (*Milli,* 16 Feb 1974).

Hasan Aksay, one of the leading MPs of MSP, was pointing out the indispensability of compromise for establishing coalitions and explaining two sides' concessions in the following words:

"As clarified in the coalition protocol and the government program, it is natural for parties to make some sacrifices in every coalition. In this coalition, the CHP has sacrificed

its views on the law on the land reform, for example; likewise, we made some sacrifices on the Common Market."(MM, JD, 4/2/1974, 458).

3.3. Operation Challenges and Dissolution of the Coalition

The coalition government, which started with the quite optimistic statements of two party leaders, was tested at first with price increases. 1973 Oil Crisis, initiated by The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), had quadrupled the price of the oil, which hit the Turkish economy like other petrol importing countries. Since the cost of production increased, price of consumer goods, in parallel, increased rapidly (Öztürk and Saygın, 2017: 3-4). As a government, which was in favour of social justice and had promised social prosperity, it was ill luck that within the first month of its office price increase was declared. Inter-ministerial Economic Board had convened, the chair of which was Erbakan, and decided to increase the price of several staple products such as fuel oil, paper, iron, cement, sugar, and Sümerbank products by between 40% and 100% (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Feb 1974).

This increase, undoubtedly, was to affect the citizens very profoundly and was used by the political opposition. AP and CGP were claiming that these increases would crush the poor people. AP head Süleyman Demirel said, "The mindset which will make the poor poorer is at work." He was drawing attention to the first action of the government, which promised reducing prices, had been increasing prices (Yankı, 27 Feb 1974).

Prime Minister Ecevit defended the price increase on TV, saying that price increase was not something they created, on the contrary increase was a residual from the previous period and what they did was only approving the increase which was predetermined (*Hürriyet*, 1975 Almanac). Milli Daily, the supporter of MSP, was also defending the government about the price increase and was carrying the statement of the former head of the chambers of commerce to the headline: "The sin of price increases should not be attributed to the new government". The report was stressing that price increases were due to wrong policies followed since 1970 devaluation (*Milli*, 3 Mar 1974).

Erbakan, on the other hand, was focusing on the alleviation of the impact of increase via a variety of precautions. Within this scope, the government set about making several arrangements such as offering an increase in wages more than price the increase; setting the high price floor for critical agricultural products such as tobacco; reducing the price of tractor

via disintermediation; increasing the salaries of public officers; revising the minimum wage and renewing the labour agreement (Yankı, 4-10 Mar 1974). Another measure taken by the government was increasing the minimum living allowance to 900 Turkish liras by March 7, which used to be 300 liras (*Hürriyet,* 1975 Almanac).

General amnesty has been the other ordeal for two partners because it was an issue on which compromise seemed not to be an easy task. Since the issue was taken very seriously, particularly by CHP, negotiations on the issue had begun together with the preparations of the coalition. The issue could have been settled by July when a Cyprus operation came on agenda. Indeed CHP had proposed a bill before the Election on October 14, and almost all parties had made it a part of their election pledges. Likewise, this topic had taken an important place in the Coalition Protocol. Accordingly, a committee made of the member of coalition partners was formed to negotiate the topic from all aspects, and this committee agreed to extend the frame of the law as much as possible in the newly shaped bill. The main feature of this bill was that death penalty was reduced to 30 years of imprisonment and life imprisonment was reduced to 24 years, whereas, the so-called "thought crimes" were to be wholly remitted. However, the content and scope of "thought crimes" proved to be a problematic issue, and the partners of ruling parties were expected to compromise on it. In the meantime, contrasting the 141st and 142nd articles of the Turkish Penal Code with the 163rd article of the same Code was a delicate subject because the first two were related to thought crime which applied to the leftist prisoners while the third one was related to so-called faith crimes which were applied to the rightist prisoners. Parties were trying to differentiate the thought and action for the prisoners who were sentenced from these provisions (*Parlamento*, Feb 1974).

The draft proposal of "General Amnesty" prepared by coalition parties faced harsh criticism from the opposition parties at the Justice Committee of the National Assembly. AP and DP were opposing the inclusion of 141st and 142nd articles to the remittance on the ground that this change means forgiving the communists and these two parties were trying to affect the MSP deputies in having them oppose the inclusion of 141st and 142nd articles. Indeed, these efforts turned out to be effective and the Nurist wing in the MSP, which had previously opposed the coalition, opposed the amnesty law to be adopted in the form which would then include leftists (Erbaş, Interview, Feb 2020).

The draft law was discussed in the plenary of National Assembly at the beginning of March. During these debates, tension was high, and conflicts and fights came about. Although a few MSP and CHP deputies opposed the bill, and despite all the obstructive effort from the opposition, the bill was adopted (MM, JD, 27/3/1974, 353-407).

With the happiness of getting over this difficulty, Erbakan was expressing, in the Senate, his satisfaction and desire about maintaining the continuity of the government with these words:

> Our coalition government is working in full harmony. We believe that this government will serve our country for four years and will provide excellent services. Our work within the government today is in the form of the work of the government of a single party, and this harmony is increasing day by day…Today a government has been established within the democratic procedures and is working harmoniously. It works in good faith, it works day and night, and this opportunity is a blessing for our nation. Trying to shake this is against our country and even against the people who try to shake it. Because the government crisis is one of the biggest disasters for a country. (Sounds of "Bravo" in the rows of the CHP) However, thanks to God, these futile endeavours do not necessarily mean anything. Our government is robust and strong; our powerful government believes in its program. It is determined to accomplish its program and is in the diligence and happiness of taking as many practical steps as it can do every day…They say, "This government is temporal." Of course, it is only God who is eternal. However, we believe that this government will serve our country for four years (CS, JD, 3/5/1974, 182-183).

Erbakan also stated in the same speech that they would support the views of the CHP on the amnesty because they deemed this bill within the concept of the freedom of thought. To him, articles 141 and 142 were matters related to freedom of thought, and in terms of the freedom of thought, everyone should be able to express what they think, try to spread their ideas. People of the same opinion should be able to come together, and if this thought is about the belief or religion, then people with beliefs should be able to gather and perform religious worship together. None of these could be eliminated (CS, JD, 3/5/1974, 182).

However, Erbakan's compromising and optimistic approach was not enough to eliminate the obstacle standing in front of them. The bill had to pass from the Senate too. However, since the opposition parties had a majority in the Senate, the bill had undergone many amendments in Senate and turned into almost a bill of the opposition. Mainly the exclusion of the 141 and 142 from the scope of the bill was critical. Thus, the bill came to the plenary of National Assembly on 14 May 1974 for the second debates, where surprisingly 20 members of MSP voted against the 5th article of the bill which was prescribing the

inclusion of 141st and 142nd articles of Penal Code (*Cumhuriyet,* 15 May 1974). Thereby the bill passed as expected by coalition partners, which became a matter of distrust between them. Erbakan, troubled with this behaviour of some MSP members reprimanded them in these words:

> There should be Pacta sunt servanda. Your action against CHP is unforgivable. Under these conditions should CHP dissolve the coalition it would be rightful. If same thing was made against us with regard to the 163rd article, we would have left the coalition without hesitation. Now they have this right. We did not fulfil our duty. Some friends of us inconceivably generated this conclusion. I do not know if they knew where this is going to lead into but in any case, the dissolution of this coalition is not favourable for the country. We should somehow correct our mistake. (*Hürriyet,* 1975 Almanac).

Following this development, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that he tended to break with the coalition because he believed that there occurred the confidence crisis and he was saying "If the branch is broken it is useless to hold on to it" (*Cumhuriyet,* 17-19 May 1974). Despite this tendency, however, CHP Central Executive Board came to an agreement that Ecevit should meet Erbakan once more (*Cumhuriyet,* 21 May 1974).

By these days there were the budget discussions, and since MSP wanted to show its good faith at this stage, the party took part in this process. The budget was accepted by 231 aye votes. Nevertheless, MSP needed to make more effort to end the confidence crises within the coalition, so it was making caucus repeatedly. After one of this caucus that notice was published:

> MSP, unanimously supports the government and believe that the government will render great service to the nation despite there are grave conditions at home and abroad. MSP wholeheartedly aspires the realization of tranquility and peace at home and abroad. And with the intent of securing the domestic peace, it (the party) will support every attempt for the realization of the far-reaching amnesty which had taken place in coalition protocol and the government program (7 Gün, 22 May 1974).

After MSP took these positive steps, Ecevit and Erbakan met up. In this meeting, Ecevit urged Erbakan to get the wrinkles out which caused the crisis of confidence and some other problems were discussed such as some ministers' lack of support for the village-city and cooperativism projects; some other ministers were delaying the signature of appointments of public officials made by CHP ministers. After this meeting, leaders declared that there was no critical problem that would cause the dissolution of the Coalition, and the Coalition was working in complete harmony (*Cumhuriyet,* 24 Mar 1974).

Subsequently, Erbakan convened the General Executive Board of the party and made the board unanimously decide that the party would exercise due diligence to sustain the Coalition. The deputies who refused the government's amnesty provisions now joined the general decision. Likewise, in a meeting of MSP provincial chairs, the policy of the party in favour of continuation of the Coalition was approved (*Hürriyet,* 1975 Almanac).

In May, CHP applied to Constitutional Court for the repeal of the exception provision of Amnesty Law, regarding 141st and 142nd articles of Criminal Law. The Court, in its decision on July 13, would repeal Part A of 5th article of the Law on the ground of unconstitutionality. Thus the wish of CHP about the inclusion of thought crime which tottered the Coalition government came true and CHP fulfilled its promise (*Cumhuriyet,* 14 July 1974).

Meanwhile, an undercover leadership struggle was taking place between Celal Bayar and AP leader Demirel. Bayar, after the constitutional amendment, securing the restitution of political rights of former Democrat Party, came into force was seeking the leadership of right politics and the parties within this side. Despite not wanting to confront Bayar overtly, however, Demirel had no intention of giving up the leadership of AP and the right-wing. Bayar's efforts coincided with the negotiations on the General Amnesty works of the coalition government and during this time he directed the Democratic Party deputies to convince 20 of MSP deputies about opposing the provisions that CHP strongly backed. According to this, reckoning split in MSP would result in the dissolution of government; then a right-wing coalition would be formed around Celal Bayar as the leader of AP; then Demirel would be disqualified. These attempts annoyed both Erbakan and Demirel because such a plan may cause their party to melt and result in the loss of their leadership. Erbakan labelled this "Nationalist Front venture" which was led by Celal Bayar, as an attempt to divide the MSP and to aim to end the current government and identified Bayar's movement as an "ally of the masons" (7 Gün, 17 Apr 1974).

As a matter of fact, attempts at aiming the creation of National Front continued and these initiatives made the Celal Bayar-Süleyman Demirel meeting necessary. Despite Demirel's opposition against these initiatives, he was attentive not to break up the relations with Celal Bayar for the sake of keeping the control in his hand and not risking the leadership of the right-wing. Consequently, the meeting was conducted on 23 May 1974, but Bayar could not obtain what he wanted *(Cumhuriyet,* 14 May 1974). While Bayar was chasing the

leadership of Nationalist Front or a right-wing coalition which was only possible by the disqualification of Demirel, Demirel was pushing Bayar to the position of "honourary leader" rather than real leadership. Bayar, not long after this meeting, sent this message to Demirel: "I am ready to undertake the duty of founding the National Front delightedly. After the foundation, I will step aside, and the Front can choose its leader." *(Cumhuriyet,* 14 June 1974).

In the face of this message, AP set about to create the right-wing coalition without Bayar's help. However, in order to achieve this goal, present the government should be toppled, and for this end, the support of DP was required. Thereby AP and DP tabled a motion of censure against the National Education Minister Mustafa Üstündağ.[23] The justification of the motion was that the Minister made arbitrary appointments; guarded leftist teachers while oppressing the nationalist teachers and diverted the policy of the National Education from the path of Atatürk's principles (*Cumhuriyet,* 21 June 1974). In case the motion was accepted to be put on the agenda, the deputy sponsors of the motion or the government may ask for a motion of confidence. At this stage, AP and DP would pull out all the stops to overthrow the government and embark on the foundation of the National Front (Yankı, 17-23 June 1974).

Debates on putting the motion of censure on the agenda, which were delayed due to a fight between CHP and AP deputies in the first round, began on June 18. The result of the voting was in favour of the government; the motion about the National Education Minister Mustafa Üstündağ was refused with 231 votes against 202 votes. Thus government survived this attack because Erbakan this time was able to control its parliamentary group unlike the previous incident and did not give a chance to the opposition to topple the coalition government (Parliament, June 1974). In his speech, after the voting, Erbakan said: "MSP has proven to be a trusted friend." (*Cumhuriyet,* 21 June 1974).

The so-called "People Sector Project" was the early promise of CHP declared during the election period of 1973 under the title of "Toward White Days/1973 Declaration of Election". This project which was prescribing the creation of "people sector" alongside the "public sector" and the "private sector" also had taken place in Coalition Protocol and

[23] This collaboration of AP and DP seems interesting in that these two parties could never agreed at coalition overtures during the goverment formation quest and particularly DP was not showing compromising approach as far as Demirel's leadership remained on the agenda.

Government Program. The principal elements of this project were discussed thoroughly and accepted by the cabinet in the Cabinet Meeting before the voting of motion of censure. It was expected that the realization of this project would accelerate investments and consequently have an effect in the direction of reducing inflation. According to this project, at first, the Bank of Cooperatives, Bank of State Industry and Worker Investment, Hayat Holding and Tourism Investment Holding would be formed, and each of them would have the capital of 1 billion liras. Bank of Cooperatives which would work in support of the cooperatives with an autonomous status visa vis the Ministry of Village Affairs and Cooperatives, would divide its shares among the state and cooperatives; 51% of its shares would belong to cooperatives while 49% was allotted to the state. Bank of State Industry and Worker Investment was dedicated to the aim of supporting the state's industrial investments and utilizing particularly the currency of workers working abroad. 51% of shares of this bank would belong to the state. Hayat Holding was projected for the collection and utilization of the micro segregations of low-income citizens such as workers, public officers, and tradespeople. These funds would drive profit in exchange of equity share. Public economic enterprises such as Etibank, Sümerbank, Ziraat Bankası, TPAO, TKİ, İPRAŞ, THY, Emekli Sandığı, and Turizm Bankası were taken under the scope of this holding. As a rule, the shares of these institutions would not exceed 50%. A primary task of this holding was founding an engine factory, and its administration would be arranged like the private sector. Another institution to be formed for the micro segregations was the Tourism Investment Holding which would be dedicated to investing only in the Tourism field. This holding would be formed under the guidance of Tourism Bank, Turkish Airlines, Maritime Bank and Army Assistance and the Pension Fund. As it is seen, the People Sector Project's main reason was collecting people's savings, utilizing them and thereby increasing their level of income (Yalansız, 2002: 160). However, apart from this primary goal, the ownership of the means of production would be extended, and the people would have a voice in the process of economic decision making via this project (Parlamento, July 1974).

As can be suggested, the people's sector policy mainly belonged to the CHP. However, Erbakan, in consequence of the sensitivity of the coalition partner on this issue, was expressing that his party would "strongly support" this policy, as a requirement of loyalty to the partnership, with those words:

> During the speeches, it was said that "people's sector will be established" and and it will be established, God willing. In addition to two sectors, a third sector is to be added, and this has been

> attributed in particular to the Republican People's Party. This is an issue in our Government Program. We as the parties constituting the government are of this belief and we will strongly support it. I just want to remind my fellow speakers that this is not a new invention. The third sector is one of the basic elements of the Third Five-Year Plan, which we adopted together in the National Assembly. It is the development of this sector which had already taken place in this plan. (CS, JD, 3/5/1974, 182)

However, this project had been a matter of severe disputes at Plan and Budget Committee of the Parliament a few months earlier because the members of opposition parties were purporting that if such a sector is composed the private sector would get into trouble. So this attempt may incite the reaction of the private sector and their influential representatives (Ölçen, 1974: 10-11). Nonetheless, this project was taken into account in the 1974 Budget, and the necessary allocation of funds was arranged to commence the projects (Parlamento, Sept 1974). However, this comprehensive project required long term actions which would also entail stable political conditions. When the Cyprus crisis broke out in July and the government was mentally occupied with this extraordinary situation, the People Sector Project fade into the background. After the international crisis arising from the Cyprus issue, a new political crisis would arise in home affairs in September, which would culminate in the dissolution of the coalition government.

MSP, in the same period, was trying to realise its policies that had been promised to its electorates. As a minor partner, its effect on the general policy of the country was limited. On the other hand, Ecevit's policy preferences concerning supporting the low-income layer of the society were in line with Erbakan's social justice view. According to Feroz Ahmad, since policies towards social justice were likely to be ascribed to CHP, MSP needed to show its effectiveness in different areas such as religious and moral matters, about which the conservative segments of society were sensitive. (Ahmad, 2015: 336). Indeed this issue was carried to the headlines intermittently by Milli Daily, a newspaper supported by MSP. On March 10, the headline was "Obscene broadcast became gangrene". The report went on with the statement of the Justice Minister Şevket Kazan which said: "Obscene broadcast will absolutely be prevented". In the following days, this issue occupied the newspaper in different volumes. There were complaints about that obscene images were everywhere, in newspapers, magazines, books, cinemas, theatres etc.

On March 17, Erbakan made a statement criticising the nude statue of "Beautiful Istanbul" erected in Karaköy Square with these words: "…such a statue that would be incompatible with the customs and morals of our nation represented the mentality of AP in

Karaköy Square…Our government, taking into account the historical and spiritual values of the city of Istanbul, would not see fit such a statue to be planted in the Karaköy square." (CS, JD, 3/5/1974, 182). Two days later, this statue was removed at the behest of the Minister of Interior, Oğuzhan Asiltürk (*Milli* 20 Mart 1974). On March 22, in his speech at National Assembly, the MSP deputy Yasin Hatipoğlu was interpreting the event as "Betrayal to the nation was prevented". Obscenity was taken as a serious problem by the party, therefore by June 25, it was reported that Justice Minister, expressed his determination to fight against the obscenities once more and tabled a government bill to amend the related articles in Criminal Law (*Milli* 17-25 June 1974). These developments had a positive effect on MSP supporters and conservative segments of society.

Minister of Interior, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, made a regulation about alcohol use. He made the consumption of alcohol in restaurants and coffee houses subject to official permission. In the meantime, compulsory lessons of moral values were incorporated into the curriculum of the schools by the National Education Ministry, which was administered by CHP. Another action of MSP was supporting the motion of a DP deputy on shifting the weekly vacation day from Sunday to Friday, as Ottoman State implemented it before the Republic of Turkey. Moreover, MSP put into practice the state's support to the foundation of mosques, additional vacancies for imams, their assistants, and teachers of Qur'an Courses, re-opening of the secondary level of the Imam Hatip schools and the recognition of the diploma of Imam Hatip schools like other High Schools (Sarıbay,1985: 189-190).

There were several actions that coalition partners realised together: Making the weekend holiday two days; conferring new rights to public officers and raising the minimum and maximum level of salaries of them; changing the rules of promotion degree by promoting the elementary and secondary school graduates in every four year and high school and university graduates in every three years; raising the minimum wage to 40 liras, raising the severance indemnity to 30 days, raising the base price of wheat by 70%; setting free the cultivation of opium poppy.

In all these studies, it was noted that despite the differences in the world views of the two parties, a benevolent and compromising atmosphere prevailed. According to Süleyman Arif Emre, one of the members of the government, while negotiations were held in the meetings of the Council of Ministers, information and thought sharing was dominant and no party partisanship was displayed. Therefore, the members of one party did not hesitate to

support the other party's proposal when necessary. This has helped the government to reach consensus on many issues listed above and to make effective decisions (Emre, 2002b: 63).

Lifting the ban on the cultivation of opium poppy became a source of trouble concerning foreign affairs. Cultivation of opium poppy was forbidden by Nihat Erim Government in 1971 mainly upon USA's request. According to the new regulation, this ban was lifted in seven provinces by 7 July 1974. Following the decree of the government, US Ambassador of the time met with Ecevit. Ecevit, in his speech in the National Assembly, said that the world does not need to concern about the sowing of opium poppy and that the most significant supervision measures were to be taken. Subsequently, US Secretary of State made a statement revealing the manner of the US toward this policy, then the US ambassador was called to the home to evaluate the situation further. The coalition government seeing the reaction of the US, decided to send a committee of goodwill to US administration. However, within two days, the US Senate decided upon cutting the cord against countries, which are not taking adequate measures against drug smuggling. Ecevit, in turn, declared that this resolution would not affect Turkish foreign policy. At the same time, Türk-İş Trade Union issued a declaration that the decision taken by US Senate meant interfering in internal affairs of Turkey. In the same week when Ecevit paid a visit to the regions that opium cultivation was prescribed took the news of the coup d'Etat in Cyprus. He broke short his visit upon this urgent development and returned to Ankara. The opium issue then was eclipsed by the much more critical developments on the Cyprus issue (Yalansız, 2002: 310-311).

Cyprus events in the summer of 1974 and military operations into Cyprus became both a great success and the beginning of the end for the coalition government. In Cyprus, on 15 July 1974, a group named National Guards staged a coup against the President Makarios and declared the new president Nikos Sampson with the support of the army of Greece (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 July 1974). In fact, there had been a severe strain between Turkey and Greece already mainly from oil exploration rivalry at the north of the Aegean Sea. Thus as soon as the coup news heard, Prime Minister defined it as a Greek intervention and declared that Turkey was to take necessary steps to secure its national interests on the Island (Ahmad, 2015:337). The next day Turkey send a diplomatic note to the United Kingdom administration which referred to the 1960-Zurich Agreement that guaranteed the independence of the Cyprus Republic and was signed by Turkey, Greece and the UK. The

Turkish government was offering joint operation with the UK to return the administration of Cyprus to the former situation.

On the other hand, it was preparing for a probable military operation. The British side, however, purporting that diplomatic solution might be possible, refused the offer (Çevikçe, 2012: 163). Turkey, at this stage, thought unilateral action would be legitimate because it was a guarantor, and the other guarantor did not accept taking part in the process. In the meantime, the US was interested in the recent developments, but Turkey did not want US interference on the ground that it was not a guarantor. Despite the offers of Athens that US envoys brought, which were promising to change the current situation, Turkey did not trust the intention of Greece and on July 20, commenced the military landing on Northern Cyprus and dominated the military conditions on the Island within two days. A few days later, a convention took place at Geneva where the representatives of Turkey, Greece and the UK met. At the same time, conflict was going on and by mid-August Turkey, made a second operation to the Island and created a domain of jurisdiction for Turkish Cypriots in the north of Cyprus de facto which was about 37% of the Island (Ahmad, 2015: 338). Rauf Denktaş, on August 16, was declaring that an autonomous Turkish state was founded (*Hürriyet,* 1975 Almanac).

Turkish intervention to Cyprus changed not only the circumstances of Turkish Cypriots but also the political position of Ecevit in Turkey. Ecevit's popularity skyrocketed in these days to the extent that Ecevit, and his immediate circle[24],began to think about dissolving the coalition, getting free from MSP, going for a new election and come to power single-handedly (Dündar and Akar, 2015: 97). By September 3, he was declaring a severe disagreement between two parties. (*Cumhuriyet,* 4 Sep 1974). He said that in his statement, "Our disagreements with our partner MSP might not be irreconcilable in terms of political aims. However, after 7 months of the experiment, I have to say that there are very serious separations, which are quite difficult to reconcile in our understanding of government and politics." (*Milli,* 5 Sept 1974). However, Erbakan, who never wanted the coalition to end, was trying to ignore the tendency of Ecevit and saying to the press the next day:

> Since 7 months, the coalition has overcome challenges. Henceforth, we believe that it will go on successfully. In this respect, we regard Mr Ecevit's concerns from time to time, as a temporary

[24] Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Interior Minister at the time, has put the blame on the people around Ecevit rather than Ecevit himself for breaking the coalition. According to Asiltürk "Ecevit was persuaded by those around him." (Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020).

situation… While it is necessary to protect our integrity as a nation against the outside on the Cyprus case which has not reached the final solution point and thus maintains its sensitivity, it has not been appropriate that Mr Ecevit made statements to cause hesitations about the reputation and continuity of the government.

Coalition means compromise. There are difficulties in its structure. However, we do not see any benefit today in discussing about what these challenges are and what side caused these disputes. The notion of government does not mean that in a coalition government, one of the parties should comply with every desire and attitude of the other. Any of the coalition partners may leave the coalition. No one can prevent it. However, it is not right that Mr Ecevit himself, with his attitudes and expressions, often shows a government as hesitant and weakened. Therefore, our country has political, especially economic losses…Even among the members of one-party governments, there may be differences of opinion. It is normal to have different opinions and views when negotiating in coalition governments. The important thing after negotiations is to make a compromise and to carry out the performance accurately and without interruption. For seven months, the coalition has defeated the challenges, and after that, we believe that it will be successful as well. (*Milli* 6 Sept 1974).

Erbakan, on the question about whether Ecevit felt empowered because of the Cyprus issue and he was trying to capitalize on the success, by leading to the dissolution of the coalition, made the following statement:

The Cyprus case and this great victory have strengthened our nation. No one's share is more or less than the other. For these reasons, it is not right for anyone to get into some delusions. The coalition, as understood from the word, means compromise. No one can control anyone. Negotiation is done; the truth controls the falsehood. This is the immutable rule ... Our country is in unity and solidarity more than ever. This is a great benefit. As a nation of 40 million, our responsibility is to strengthen this unity and solidarity and to resort to ways that will make ourselves stronger as a nation. It would be wrong to act on the contrary. In this respect, we act following our national duty (*Milli*, 6 Sept 1974).

Erbakan answered the question, as to whether the CHP members opposed the operation while the issue of Cyprus was discussed in the Council of Ministers, in the following way:

We have our own working method, our courtesy and our corresponding morality and belief. We are not in favour of the disclosure of the state secrets. It is possible to spread out various rumours. Everyone can come to the Council of Ministers meeting with various ideas. Our government has adopted such a resolution, and the Council of Ministers adopted this decision at the end of the negotiations with compromise (*Milli* 7 Sept 1974).

As can be seen from these statements, Erbakan used elaborate code, and avoided criticism towards his government partner and strived for the continuation of the cooperation. However, despite Erbakan's extraordinary effort to maintain the coalition, Ecevit had

decided to disperse the coalition and go to an election. As time passed by Ecevit's intention to convert the current popularity of him into election success became quite apparent. Public acclamation towards Ecevit in these days was enthusiastic and accelerated Ecevit's tendency to end the coalition (Yücekök, 1997 as cited in Akar, 2015: 97). However, this excitement would push Ecevit towards one of the biggest blunders of his lifetime. He began to go to any length to drag the coalition to the point of dissolution. Some of his party members, indeed, warned him of such an attempt would be faulty and may cost CHP a lot, because there was not even a guarantee of going for an election, let alone winning the election (Akar, 2015: 97; Çevikçe, 2012: 170).

By September 10, when Ecevit's will to disband the coalition became more apparent, Erbakan made a warning statement:

> Now we, as a nation, must turn to the economic victory after the Cyprus victory. On such a day, it is unfortunate to spread the rumour of government crises and coalition statements. On such a day, talking about the early election is senseless. Those who are misguided should leave working secretly ... No one can arrogate to himself this great Cypriot victory. In this victory, everyone has a share from the age of three to eighty. Now is not the time to think in partisan lines. Now is not the time for vote hunting. It is not the time to convert Cyprus victory to vote. Those who make such a move would draw a blank. The nation got together. Service will be performed only in unity and solidarity. Those who do not understand this movement get their deserts in a short while (*Milli* 10 Sept 1974).

In any case, Ecevit commenced a variety of actions, in one of which he met with Democratic Party Leader Ferruh Bozbeyli. A rumour that Bozbeyli would support an early general election resounded (Emre, 2002b: 209). Indeed, it was not known whether Ecevit could find another partner in case the current coalition should dissolve. Nevertheless, it was said that Ecevit had met with the President and convinced him to the possibility of formation of a minority government that would lead the country to an early election (*Cumhuriyet*, 8-10 Sep 1974). Now for CHP, the main concern was how to put the blame of dissolution of the coalition on MSP before public opinion. CHP, following the crisis strategy, began to push the government into a condition in which it could not work (Çevikçe, 2012: 169). MSP and its members, via several occasions, were disparaged. The first indication was that, when Erbakan was trying to meet Ecevit, mainly to speak about the rumours of dissolution of coalition, Ecevit was making various excuses to avoid meeting. Press reflected on this chase, and when the essence of the event was asked, Erbakan did not give up the courtesy and said:

"We have a tight schedule, yet if I have an opportunity, I will meet Mr Ecevit." (*Cumhuriyet,* 12 Sept 1974).

By September 13, Erbakan was able to meet with Ecevit, and after this meeting, he insisted on keeping his hope about the continuity of coalition. In his statement to the press, he said, "We talked about how to have a more harmonious government. Anything will be done for what is necessary. Thus, the services that the nation expects will continue with a stable government." He added that he was keeping his belief that the coalition would continue. When it comes to Ecevit, he did not express any word that may mean the possibility of compromise: "I told him what I meant when I said "there are differences in the form of management. Mr Erbakan told his ideas." (*Milli,* 15 Sept 1974).

One other such behaviour was that MSP members were not allowed to get on the helicopter of Ecevit who was going to the inauguration of the Keban Dam in Elazığ Province. Another such event became the final straw. Ecevit was going to pay an official visit to Scandinavian countries, and during his absence, the deputy was a Deputy Prime Minister, as a precedent. However, Ecevit, ruling out this custom, made a statement that he appointed another Minister, i.e. State Minister and CHP General Secretary Orhan Eyüboğlu as a proxy. Erbakan, as a reprisal action, refused to sign the decree that was needed for such a visit (*Milli,* 16 Sept 1974). Nevertheless, Erbakan in his press conference, on September 15, was still choosing constructive words about the political process, using hopeful expressions about the continuity of government and maintaining his courtesy: The dialogue between a journalist and him took place like this: The journalist asked "The government's weakness came into sight as there is an overt crack in the government. In this case, would you consider withdrawing from the government as MSP?" Erbakan replied:

> So far, I had no statement which would indicate that there is a crack in the government. I would like you to pay attention to this matter. So, this is your evaluation... We believe that our government has been performing strongly for seven months. This is how the MSP sees the situation. Since we look at the issue constructively and in good faith, leaving the coalition is out of the question for us. It might be a matter for the party who does not see harmony. However, seeing that there is no such movement in them, the coalition is working in due course and will work as well." (*Milli,* 16 Sept 1974).

On September 16, Ecevit stated that what withholds him from entrusting the Prime Ministry to Erbakan was his lack of confidence and that he decided to delay the visit. The

next day it was reported that Ecevit was to resign and these reports were verified on September 18 (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Sept 1974).

Despite MSP's compromising attitude and remarkable efforts to maintain the coalition, Ecevit had dissolved it. In this regard, it was often expressed that Ecevit had the desire for power on his own, for which he left the loyalty to the partnership and produced various excuses to end up the partnership. Erbakan's words, after the collapse of the coalition, were explaining this situation in details:

> …This is where the dispute in detail between the two parties came out. However, such a situation is very familiar in a coalition business. When such situations occur, there is always a way of making a compromise and going on, enough to get the goodwill and desire to walk. Many incidents have occurred in this way, but they were dealt with and overcome…I would like to indicate to a point here: when acting in good faith, all of these issues have been defeated. However, when the subject comes to a point, and it is said, "We will establish a joint commission, but you will accept what we say in advance" then this is a style how cannot work in coalitions. "I will order, you will obey" is not in the idea that can work in a coalition. Today, in fact, the critical issue that Turkey faces this... Dear friends, let us not look for the matter of the problem in the wrong places. This is a matter of accord, a matter of compromise. In the civilized world of today, no one can make headway by the principle of headstrongness… As all the members of the supreme Assembly are already familiar with the fact that the First Coalition term was unfortunately destroyed after the great Cyprus victory.
>
> How did this coalition disband? Everyone knows that without a doubt. Great Cyprus victory, gave birth to unity and solidarity in our nation, it gave birth to state-nation unification. It lit the torch of great and creditable Turkey in the hearts of all children of the country. The considerable resolution and eagerness of re-establishing great Turkey filled the heart of all children of the country. Our reputation has increased in foreign countries. At a time when we were so empowered, the task of us as a government was to complete the big, bright victory won in Cyprus with the economic victories in our country… Ecevit, in such a critical time, as is known, suddenly decided to end the coalition, in our view, for partisan and emotional reasons, and set about the activities for the dissolution of the coalition... Mr Ecevit, just as all the members of the supreme Assembly knew, made some contacts immediately after the victory of the August 30th.
>
> From time to time, as they themselves expressed, they made some conversations in these secret meetings without informing their coalition partner, and then went on to unilaterally destroy the coalition.
>
> In a press conference in Istanbul, he did not hesitate to expose his intention on this matter. Mr Ecevit made several press conferences while the coalition was breaking down. In addition, some of the people of the CHP, (we have documents available), did not hesitate to make various speeches against their coalition partners by taking that press conference of Ecevit as a signal (MM, JD, 27/11/1974, 177-178).

In the following dates, the other notables of the MSP expressed that Ecevit sacrificed this government to his desires. According to Süleyman Arif Emre, the Minister of State in this government, the fact that Ecevit entered in a hurry of the election, broke up the government formed with many difficulties, and that CHP ministers attempted to evacuate the ministries were all historical faults (MM, JD, 9/4/1975,389). İ. Fehmi Cumalıoğlu, another official of the MSP, claimed that CHP tried to seize the Cyprus Victory, get into the mood of election to convert the martyr's blood to the vote, threatened to evacuate the cabinet chairs, and caused a government depression which lasted six and a half months (MM, JD, 27/2/1977, 699). Hasan Aksay was another official who repeated similar opinions (MM, JD, 7/1/1975, 440). The opinion of the representatives of *Milli Görüş* on this matter has never changed, and Fethullah Erbaş, whose life has passed in *Milli Görüş*, says 45 years after the incident, that Ecevit was a lovely person as a human being. However, in terms of the culture of compromise, it is not possible to compare him with Erbakan because he was greedy after the Cyprus event, with the thought that he could reach a substantial vote in the election. He took a new attitude after when the country required government (Erbaş, Interview, Feb 2020).

However, the views in this direction were not only MSP's. Similarly, some officials from the CHP said that Ecevit, with personal enthusiasm, had destroyed the government without any valid account. According to Erol Cevikçe, Minister of Public Works from CHP, for instance, the reason for the dissolution of the coalition was that after the success of Cyprus, Ecevit got himself into the feeling of "national hero" and that he did not need a coalition any more (Çevikçe, 2012: 168). Kemal Anadol, another CHP deputy of this term, revealed that Ecevit had resigned without consulting to anybody, which was a great fault, and this behaviour opened the way which led to the September 12 Coup (Sunay, 2010: 194-195).

CHAPTER 4: NATIONALIST FRONT COALITION GOVERNMENTS

In this chapter, the second and third coalitions of the *Milli Görüş* are examined. The first was named First Nationalist Front, and the second was named Second National Front. The two coalition governments have been studied in the same section because they have the same name, they consisted of a similar party bundle, and the latter ended in a short time. Therefore, this chapter is divided into two parts for two coalitions, and the processes related to the establishment, operation, and dissolution of each coalition are analysed separately.

4. 1. National Front I Coalition

4.1.1. Political conditions before Nationalist Front I Coalition: A Coalition Predicament

Ecevit's counting on forming a new coalition or a minority government to go for a snap election went wrong. He finished his "historical mistake" of what he defined the CHP-MSP coalition, but he could not hew a new path that would lead to his political goals. Neither party consented to come together with CHP and support CHP for an election that was hoping to be held by December 1974. This avoidance was believed to do with CHP's expectation to win the election, which had increased its popularity during the Cyprus events. Rightist parties were positioning their relations with CHP according to this situation. However, their relations were not positive as well; because the problem of under which leader they would come together had not been solved. Hence, a new political conundrum afflicted the country, a solution of which would not be found for more than six months. This vacancy would be recorded as the most prolonged government crisis of Turkish political history. (Ahmad, 2015: 340)

After the resignation of Ecevit, the President requested Ecevit to remain in office until forming a new government. Just the same day, Erbakan, after meeting with the President, declared an offer of the right coalition, which would consist of AP-DP-MSP-CGP (*Hürriyet*, 1975 Almanac: 70). This early prediction revealed Erbakan's far-sightedness because, after a search for many alternatives and 6.5-month time-loss, this formula would be realized.

CHP-DP relations before and after the dissolution of the coalition looked quite complicated. Indeed, one of the reasons that courage the CHP about finishing the coalition was its hope about the support of DP to form a short term coalition or support its minority government, which would carry a country to a snap election. At this stage, Ecevit, appointed to form a new coalition, made his most serious offer to DP with a snap election theme. However, the DP deputy chairman Sadettin Bilgiç said the minority government would put the country in trouble (*Cumhuriyet,* 18 Sept 1974). It seems that DP, while aspired to take part in government, intended to buy time because it wanted to see the result of oncoming AP congress and find out whether Demirel would retain a party leadership (Yalansız, 2006: 315).

Ecevit, with great enthusiasm, began overtures with parties other than MSP. He was expecting to go for election by December and had the hope of founding a coalition with other parties or at least to have the support of them for a minority government. He met with DP leader Ferruh Bozbeyli and the leftist press was reflecting this meeting as "two parties had agreed on the coalition in principle, which, in a short while, proved to be wishful thinking." (*Cumhuriyet,* 22 Sep 1974). No longer than three days, after another meeting with Bozbeyli, Ecevit was, depressively, declaring that "DP did not think fit forming coalition with CHP." DP party council decided to refuse the coalition proposal of CHP if the election condition is put forward (*Milli,* 25 Sept 1974). Refused by the prospective partners, Ecevit returned the task to President (*Cumhuriyet,* 25 Sept 1974).

According to Erbakan, who evaluated the political developments at the time, Ecevit's destruction of the government without a guarantee from the DP showed that he could not see the future. He wanted to blame DP for the government crisis. He said that establishing a minority government alone would be a mistake and that parties other than the CHP in the Assembly could form a coalition government (*Milli,* 26 Sept 1974).

No sooner than DP leader Ferruh Bozbeyli offered a right coalition without Demirel, than Demirel was asked by the President to form a government, made a start on overtures for a new coalition (*Cumhuriyet,* 3 October 1974). Demirel's coalition offer got a positive return from Erbakan. He said that they would "make the sacrifice of collaboration with AP for the salvation of the country." With this attitude, according to S. Arif Emre, MSP

management showed that it was not fixed-minded, did not act with prejudices, and was flexible in creating alternatives for solving the country's management problem (Emre, 2002c: 20). However, this constructive approach was not enough to reach the majority of parliament, and more support was needed. However, DP leader Bozbeyli rejected Demirel's collaboration offer and reiterated his idea that a right coalition should form under the impartial leader.

The MSP continued its efforts to form a government at the time. The general secretary of the party Gündüz Sevigen said that they would say yes to the next proposal in order not to leave the country without a government. Besides, referring to the DP leader's suggestion, which offered the coalition in which no party leader would take part, he added that Erbakan would not take part should that way be followed (*Milli,* 2 Oct 1974). This declaration proved that Erbakan was ready to sacrifice for the formation of a government. In the meantime, Demirel, who had taken on the mission, met with Erbakan. Erbakan once again, after the meeting, reiterated their party's positive attitude about the formation of the government and reminded the conditions and needs of the country for political stability. On the other hand, Demirel said that he did not need to meet with Ecevit for the coalition (*Milli,* 3 Oct 1974). However, seeing that the DP leader kept saying that they would not take part in any coalition under Demirel's premiership, he abandoned the attempt (*Milli,* 4 Oct 1974).

Erbakan was intensifying efforts to establish a government as soon as possible. In this context, he said he could support a right-wing coalition even if MSP had not taken place (*Milli,* 7 Oct 1974).

A few days later, President had another meeting with party leaders but founded out that there was no possibility of a coalition among right parties because Demirel insisted on being the prime minister while Bozbeyli did not give up his formula, excluding Demirel. So he found it appropriate to give Ecevit another chance, described by Erbakan as a waste of time (*Milli,* 12 Oct 1974). The most important event at this stage was that Ecevit offered a multi-choice coalition proposal to Demirel. At this time, Ecevit prepared a new offer for AP, including the alternative coalitions between two parties and minority governments, that each party would support the other. Ecevit, due to pressure created by conditions, now was offering ample alternatives to AP. However, after nearly three weeks of mulling over, AP decided to reject this offer and instead made an alternative offer, which seemed not acceptable for CHP (*Cumhuriyet,* 4 Nov 1974).

Bozbeyli announced that CHP refused a proposal for a coalition that excludes election, reflecting the CHP's determination on the election (*Milli*, 6 Nov 1974). It was evident that Ecevit wanted to go to the election at all costs. What he said when he returned the task proved this situation once more: He would abdicate the prime ministry and vacate ministries even if a new government is not formed (*Milli*, 8 Nov 1974). This means he intended to create a government crisis to push the parliament to decide for a new election. Erbakan, upon this statement, replied with a declaration that if CHP had left the government, they would stay in charge of government with a proper formula that would be supported by the President (*Hürriyet*, 1975 Almanac: 78).

The president, after the efforts of Ecevit proved vain in forming a government, assigned Senator Sadi Irmak to form a government, in the expectation that he would form a broad-based government including much of the parties (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Nov 1974). However, neither AP nor CHP had accepted to take part in the prospective cabinet. Moreover, they decided not to support that government, some members of which were not parliamentarians. Hence this cabinet, which was approved by President and took office by 17 November (*Milli*, 18 Nov 1974), experienced a significant failure at Parliament. At the vote of confidence held on 29 November, it could take only 17 affirmative votes, while 358 votes were dissenting (Neziroğlu, 2013: 4581). Thereupon Irmak tendered his resignation, but President wanted him to govern up until the formation of a new government. Thus this government, which had not to have parliamentary support, stayed in office for four and a half months.

By the early days of December, there seemed a quest for the formation of the right coalition was continuing, and the "Nationalist Front" was uttered. Within these days, MSP Leader Erbakan said they would support a new right government even if they had not taken in it. However, on the right side, the fight between the DP and the AP did not seem to end, which made the constructive attitude of Erbakan and his party insufficient. These days, DP was claiming that AP's quest to form a right coalition was an attempt to divide DP (*Hürriyet*, 1975 Almanac: 82). Nevertheless, Demirel made a call by 6 December to all right parties to form a right coalition. However, the DP leader never gave up the idea of a government in which Demirel would not be prime minister and retorted by an explanation of "People who cannot get along with can come together only at the prison." (*Hürriyet*, 1975

Almanac: 83). However, other minor parties showed their positive attitude toward the invitation, and there emerged new hope for establishing a right-wing government.

On 13 December, AP, MSP, CGP, and MHP convened for the first time and decided to act together (*Milli*, 14 Dec 1974). In the following days, it was said those four parties and a few independent members were in preparation of forming a coalition. These "a few independent members" referred to a group of dissenters within DP, who were against the Bozbeyli's uncompromising manner. It was believed that Bozbeyli had personal animosity towards Demirel, and thus he was preventing the formation of a coalition on the right (Emre, 2002c: 16).

On the other hand, according to this calculation, the total number of them was 228, and there was a doubt whether the President would approve this conglomeration of the narrow majority, which would be poised on a knife-edge. In fact, the first signal of the President was interpreted to be negative. Moreover, there heard a message of the chief of General Staff of Army, İlhami Sancar, which expressed that they were sad for necessary measures to prevent the problems and secure positive developments were not taken and there were irresponsible and time losing behaviours. This statement, interpreted as it was targeting all politicians but, in particular, Ferruh Bozbeyli, who was perseveringly procrastinating the formation of the right coalition (Yankı, 6-12 Jan 1975).

Since the beginning of the New Year, Erbakan continued his statements, saying that it was wrong to govern a country with a government that did not secured the confidence of parliament. Referring to the government problem that lasted more than three months and pointing a solution they offered, he held that "The NF has 218 votes in the National Assembly. It also has a majority in the Senate. NF states that the government is ready to establish and is waiting for the assignment. There is not even a day to waste." He insisted that the President should appoint Demirel for the task of forming the government once more. In the meantime, when he was asked why he wanted to get together with the AP that he called "colourless liberal" before, his answer was reflecting his compromising attitude and optimistic personality: "The liberal view and the leftist view will unite in *Milli Görüş* someday." (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Jan 1975). This attitude, as mentioned in the previous sections, was stemming from *Milli Görüş*'s belief that both political actors and society should not be *marginalized* because one day they would become pro-*Milli Görüş*, which was believed to have the content that everybody would adopt if known well.

At the same time, the rightist press was increasing its pressure for the assignment of Demirel, which would pave the way to a right coalition (*Milli*, 2-8 Jan 1975). *For example*, *Milli Daily*, almost every day during January, bore headlines urging that a legitimate government should be established (*Milli*, Jan 1975).

On 7 January, leaders of the National Front, i.e., Süleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan, Turhan Feyzioğlu, and Alparslan Türkeş met for the fourth time, held a press conference at MHP headquarter, and repeated their will of forming a coalition government (*Milli*, 8 Jan 1975). Leaders in their joint declarations, addressing the country's problems and distresses of foreign policy, emphasized the urgency of establishing a government. After reminding that Ecevit broke up the previous government, they said that waiting for more is was useless and demanded that the President should entrust the task of governing to them (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Jan 1975).

However, the reply came from the President's Office was reiterating his previous concerns. Following this development, Erbakan, never talked about the snap election heretofore, ordered to his party organization to be ready for the election held in 1975. This situation was taken as a signal of the split of the National Front (*Milli*, 21 Jan 1975). However, four party leaders convened for the sixth time by 6 February for a coalition, this time in the chamber of Erbakan at National Assembly, which proved that hope for compromise and finding a formula for the National Front was not over (*Milli*, 7 Feb1975).

However, by these days, living conditions were getting worse increasingly. Clashes among youths and workers were rising, three devaluations were made within two months, and inflation was soaring. Under these critical conditions, the budget passage, to be voted by the end of February, from the parliament was critical because this government had not had the confidence of parliament. Fortunately, parties outside the CHP (AP, MSP, DP, CGP, MHP) provided the necessary facilitation and adopted the budgetary law (*Milli*, 28 Feb 1975).

Erbakan, in his speech on the 1975 Budget, after a long and detailed criticism on the budget prepared by the government, explained why they would, nevertheless, say yes to the budget in this way:

> We cannot approve this budget under normal circumstances, but what happens if this budget does not receive the supreme Assembly’s approval? A few months will be lost again to prepare the new

> budget. Even after a budget is prepared, state services and investments will be primarily disrupted. We suffered a lot last year. We saw how bitter the budget implementation was during the visits we made to the provinces that implemented the budget. As people who have seen them on site, we do not see any benefit, for our national interest, in disrupting our country's investments and delaying the state service. We feel compelled to calculate that this will cause more significant damage. For this reason, we, as MSP, will give white (affirmative) for the entire budget. Nevertheless, giving this white vote means neither giving the government confidence nor accepting the budget as a mentality. However, to prevent disruption of the state services and prevent further damage to our nation, we see the benefit of the budget in time. With this exposition, I would like to present you that we will give an affirmative vote for the budget as the MSP (MM, JD, 17/2/1975, 73).

This statement was a new example of Erbakan's compromising and constructive attitude, particularly at the critical circumstances. He stated that he would support a budget, of which content he opposed, for the sake of his country's interests. Prime Minister Sadi Irmak also confirmed that this approval did not mean the vote of confidence, and he would return the task to President (Yankı, 3-10 Feb 1975).

By this time, Celal Bayar, who wanted to form a National Front under his leadership, made a new attempt to convince the AP and DP deputies. However, this attempt was proved vain, and he stated that he was not able to reconcile AP and DP (*Milli,* 1 Mar 1975). Shortly after, he announced that he had released the former DP members to act as they want, which meant that he permitted DP deputies, who were faithful to him, for supporting the presumptive Nationalist Front coalition (*Milli*, 1 Mar 1975).

However, it seemed that President Korutürk did not like the idea of NF. He, therefore, assigned Sadi Irmak once more to form a government and preached at the parties that "dividing the citizens into fronts and forming a minority government would weaken the state and the consequences of this will not be easy to bear." (*Milli,* 1 Mar 1975). He was offering a "national coalition and snap election" instead. In his warning, "fronts" referred to the National Front and supporting parties, while "minority" was referring to CHP and DP, which were seeking to form a minority government. However, this warning had no use, and parties were unwilling to form a national coalition, even for a short while, to take the country to snap election. AP condemned this statement as "un-uniformed ultimatum" which meant that a civilian made this call but in a military tone (*Hürriyet,* 1976 Almanac: 29).

Having been assigned by President for government formation, Sadi Irmak commenced the overtures with party leaders. His preference was forming a national government that would

lead a country to an early election (*Hürriyet*, 1976 Almanac: 29). If not, he would seek other alternative formulas. One of them was forming a cabinet of DP members and technocrats who would come from parliament, and CHP would support this cabinet from outside (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Mar 1975). However, there was no positive response from the parties outside the CHP (*Hürriyet*, 5-10 Mar 1975). National Front parties rejected the offer on the ground that they had a more natural government formula, namely, National Front. Demirel, who was able to reconcile the right parties to form a government, said, "We can form a coalition with CHP only at the wartime." (*Hürriyet*, 1976 Almanac: 29). In the meantime, Demirel hardened his criticism toward Ecevit. He stated that CHP has always been annoyed by the peace of Turkey, that it grudged Turkey of being in tranquility, that the plan aspiring the unrest in Turkey was administered from one centre and it was CHP, that there was no severe peril that may threaten Turkey apart from communism (4 March 1975). Referring the statements of Ecevit about the government crisis, he added, a few days later, that he who turned tail and fled from the government was Ecevit, that it was ridiculous that he was holding others accountable from government crisis, that he supposed, some adjectives such as 'hero, Second Atatürk, Fatih, Third Man' ascribed to him, as real but when figured out that he did not deserved this ascriptions he became the captive of anger." (8 Mar 1975).

On the other hand, by these days, DP leader Bozbeyli clearly stated that they would not join a coalition government together with CHP. The main reason for this was CHP's early election condition. So the possibility of a CHP-DP coalition under the prime ministership of Sadi Irmak came to nothing. Among the outcries of civil society organizations for forming a strong government and going for a snap election, Sadi Irmak gave in and returned the task to President on 13 March 1975 (*Hürriyet*, 14 Apr 1975).

4.1.2. Formation Structure and Protocol of the Nationalist Front I Coalition

To find a way out of the stalemate, President initiated a new meeting series that included all party leaders and the group leaders of the Senate. Then, on 19 March, he assigned the CHP Leader Bülent Ecevit for forming a government, but Ecevit, suggesting that the current conditions would not allow him to form a coalition, requested President to free him from the task. Thereby President directed the task to AP Leader Süleyman Demirel (*Milli*, 20 Mar 1975). Erbakan, following this entrusting, once again showed his desire to

establish a coalition government with that statement: “It is national duty to support the formation of the government” (*Milli,* 23 Mar 1975).

While the parties that were to form a National Front set out to prepare the coalition protocol, a small group was reckoned to break with DP and join the National Front. Otherwise, the total of compromising parties was not enough to gain the parliamentary majority.

Bozbeyli, the leader of DP, was angry at this calculation made over DP members and in the hope of dissuading such a break, purported that “We will stand as a cannonball, they cannot take even a splinter from us; if DP stand firm we will take the job and we will upset the plans of AP.” (Öznur,1999: 336). However, these efforts had no use. It seemed that Celal Bayar’s statement that freed the former DP members and his advice for them about joining the Nationalist Front Coalition proved effective. Thus to Bozbeyli’s frustration, 9 deputies of DP, after consulting Celal Bayar, left their parties (*Cumhuriyet,* 29 Mar 1975). This group declared that for the sake of untangling the government stalemate, they would support the prospective government without taking part in it (*Hürriyet*, 30 Mar 1975).

Süleyman Demirel, on 31 March, announced the list of the cabinet of National Front, which was approved by the President on the same day. Four parties had given ministers to the cabinet, and their share of chairs was as AP 16; MSP 8; CGP; 4; and MHP 2 (*Milli*, 1 Apr 1975). Süleyman Demirel was Prime Minister while leaders of the other three parties, Necmettin Erbakan, Turhan Feyzioğlu, and Alparslan Türkeş, became deputy prime ministers. On the same day, Coalition Protocol was signed. (Yalansız, 2006:325).

At the beginning of the protocol, it was said, four parties decided to work together, paying regard to the worsening conditions of the Country, and nationalism was their source of inspiration. The protocols titles were about national education, religious affairs administration, youth, economy and finance, industrialization, energy, agriculture, stock farming and rural development, social matters, craft and trade workers, foreign policy, and national security.

The essential coalition protocol points of 12 pages were these (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015b: 980-992):

The main themes on education were equality of opportunity, encouraging the vocational and technical training, advancing moral courses in primary and secondary schools, screening out the curricula about national culture, and strengthening the national culture against foreign influences.

On economy and finance, raising the production, sharing economic development benefits with grassroots society, prevention of wastage, fair taxation, the balance of payments, regulation of credit systems by social and economic productivity, and prevention of inflation were promised.

National, robust, rapid, and extensive industrialization was committed. The heavy industry and national war industry would be created. Private enterprises that contribute to industrialization would be subsidized. Necessary educational infrastructure would be installed to meet the need of industrial institutions for skilled labour.

The energy bottleneck would be dealt with, and to that end, after proper plan and projects, hydroelectric, thermal, and nuclear power plants would be built. Agricultural production would be increased, and for this reason, input prices would be dealt with, and support purchasing would be carried out. Agro industries would be subsidized. Needs of rural settlement areas such as road, water, electricity, firing, telephone, school, library, mosque, health centre, etc. would be met.

Universal social security would be the ultimate goal. The unemployment problem would be solved, labour wages would be arranged under inflation effect, and due payment regulations would support a disadvantageous section of society.

In foreign policy and national security matters, peaceful attitude, loyalty to the agreements, positive relations with neighbouring countries including Greece, and particularly development of relations with countries which Turkey had historical and cultural bonds were prescribed. It was stated that Turkey would seek to reach a solution that would guarantee Turkish society's future and protect the federal structure of the Island within the judicial framework, which would consider the reality of the Island. Relations with the US were deemed troubled, and the Congress’s attitude was ascribed as hostile, and it was reminded that keeping the friendly relations entailed the responsibility of two sides. As for the European Economic Community, it was stated that the relations with this community would run according to Turkey's national interest.

At the end of the protocol, it was expressed that Turkey had been experiencing a protracted crisis that caused grave dangers in terms of internal and external security, economic life, and democratic regime, and this government would be the one which would bring to this crisis an end.

Sharing ministries became a problem, as the number of parties in the coalition was large. In order to overcome this problem, the number of ministries was increased. In pursuit of satisfying each partner, this number increased to 30 (Uçar, 2015: 175: 185). Distribution of the ministries to each political party was as following (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015b: 980-992):

AP had 16 members of cabinet: Prime Ministry, Two Ministries of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Energy and National Resources, Ministry of Tourism and Promotion, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Rural Affairs, Ministry of Forests, Ministry of Youth and Sport, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Social Security. MSP had 8 cabinet members: Ministry of State and Deputy Ministry, State Ministry, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Industry and Technology. CGP had 4 cabinet members: Ministry of State and Deputy Ministry, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Health and Social Relief, Ministry of Customs, and Monopolies. MHP had 2 cabinet members: State Ministry and Deputy Ministry, State Ministry.

In a week before the vote of confidence, voting was expected to be critical; therefore, to influence the outcome, a harsh struggle began between the pro-government and the opposition parties. It was being reported that AP was expecting to take four more MPs from DP. CHP was questing for transferring MP from CGP and pursuing independent MP's. Within this atmosphere, a few MPs changed their sides between coalition parties and opposition (*Milli,* 4-5 Apr 1975).

Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, on 6 April, read the government's program, which was a detailed form of Coalition Protocol (*Milli,* 7 Apr 1975). After the debates on government program in the National Assembly and the Senate, it was confirmed with 222 yes and 218 no vote (*Milli,* 13 Apr 1975). Before and during the voting, there had been very high tension and tumult (*Hürriyet,*13 Apr 1975). The same political strain had spread out of

the parliament on the same days. Ecevit, referring to Alparslan Türkeş, said that Demirel collaborated with the enemies of democracy to come to power (*Cumhuriyet,* 12 Apr 1975). Türkeş, in return, was saying that "Those who do not want the formation of a government are a handful of CHP executives, enemies of the state and communists." (*Hürriyet,* 1976 Almanac: 37-38).

Süleyman Arif Emre, one of the leading representatives of the MSP, summarized the MSP's approach throughout the coalition government's establishment as follows:

> The parties that constituted the government came together in good faith. As our experience shows, the coalition means agreement and compromise. In a coalition, no party can fully fulfil its wishes. There is a necessity to keep national interests at the forefront based on the sacrifices required by compromise… In the atmosphere of mutual understanding, working is needed day and night to do the services expected by our nation (MM, JD, 9/4/1975, 390).

The right press welcomed the establishment of the government with great joy. The headline of the Milli Daily was, "Victory belongs to believers." (*Milli,* 13 Apr 1975). When it comes to the opposition front, they looked quite unhappy by this compromise among the right parties and criticised it from several aspects. In fact, since March, when the prospect of the Nationalist Front coalition strengthened, columnists of left-oriented *Cumhuriyet* Daily have argued extensively that such a coalition was harmful, that partners were a world apart, that even if the government had been formed, it could not live long, that an election must be made as soon as possible. Uğur Mumcu, Oktay Akbal, Nadir Nadi, Fikret Otyam, Muammer Aksoy, Ali Sirmen have covered these themes in many columns during these days (*Cumhuriyet,* 1975 Almanac, 11-36). *Hürriyet,* Daily's columnist Cüneyt Arcayürek attacked the compromising aspect of the MSP when the government was established in these words: "Mindset of MSP which sees permissible to form a government even with Armenians and Jews does not escape the attention of public opinion." Arcayürek adds these words: "There are four different head, four different experiences. Today they show intimacy, but their ideals are completely separate. How they criticised each other during election periods. If this unity among differences brings a pessimistic picture, only an election can save the country." (Arcayürek, 1975).

Erbakan, among these evaluations, was referring to the CHP's breaking of the coalition with MSP and was describing it as a big mistake. He said that "What destroyed CHP has been its desire to exploit the Cyprus victory." (*Milli,* 21 Apr 1975).

Just in the new government's wake, Ecevit rolled up his sleeves to destroy the government. He was announcing that in his party caucus, "Eight persons who have not a gambling debt are needed to topple the government. An unprecedented pressure took place within and out of the parliament, and among these were spending of millions (*Cumhuriyet,* 15 Apr 1975). He accused Demirel of cooperating with enemies of democracy to form a government. He, referring to Alparslan Türkeş, claimed that he "who appointed illegal street bullies, did not recognize the law, and sought to establish a dictatorship regime" has become deputy prime minister. He was also needling MSP with these words: "A party that did not adopt the Republic's principles entered the government" (*Cumhuriyet,* 12 Apr 1975).

CHP made the first attempt to overthrow the government on 17 April, tabling the motion to go for a snap election. During the debates on the motion, CHP claimed that the present government was unstable, and it has weak parliamentary support; consequently, there loomed a new government crisis. A new election was a must to avoid such a new crisis (MM, JD, 17/4/1975, 503-514). Furthermore, for Ecevit, the government crisis was preferable to this government. He would reveal this idea two months later as such: "Even the government crisis is less inconvenient than the government, which fuelled the crisis by using state facilities." (*Cumhuriyet,* 25 Jun 1975). Parties took part in the coalition, naturally, refuted this claim on the ground that there had already been a prolonged government crisis that lasted more than six months, and now no such a problem existed because a legitimate democratic government was formed. MSP deputies expressed that, under the proportional representation system's circumstances, coalition governments were usual; hence, parties should learn to get along with each other. Therefore they were against a snap election (MM, JD, 17/4/1975, 503-514).

4.1.3. Operation Challenges and Dissolution of the Coalition

By the time the government took office, the country's primary problems could be seen as US embargo and cancellation of arms sales; territorial waters and armament tension with Greece, student incidents and height of social tension; poverty and other economic problems (*Hürriyet,* 1-30 Apr 1975). Each of these significant issues carried a severe depth, and the solution was not easy. The first action of the government was to reduce the price of artificial fertilizer. As was promised in a government program, this was for relief of the agricultural

sector, but the opposition condemned this pace as a populist venture aiming at Senate's incumbent election that were to be held on 12 October. (Ahmad, 2015: 345).

The government's other action that was occupied the agenda of public opinion was the large scale change in high ranking bureaucrats from the undersecretary of the ministries to general directorates, heads of departments, and governors. One of the most conspicuous among them was the dismissal of TRT General Directorate İsmal Cem, who was appointed by CHP; and the appointment of Nevzat Yalçıntaş instead(*Milli*, 13-18 May 1975). This issue has been an endless subject of dispute between two sides and their supporting press organs. Each side tried to prove the other side had been in charge of the "spoil system" concerning public offices' appointment and offered opposing figures that were revealing the governments' appointment decision (Uçar, 2015: 215-216).

The opposition harshly criticised the petroleum policy of the government. The energy and Natural Resources Minister from AP had allowed foreign companies to import petrol and increase petroleum prices and canceled a decision that had prescribed the nationalization of ATAŞ oil refinery by 6 May (*Hürriyet*, 1976 Almanac, 40-41).

Although several actions were coming into effect, it was noticed that there were some discrepancies among the statements of the leaders of coalition parties, so it was decided that only the prime minister would make official statements regarding the actions of the government and that post of government spokesperson was abrogated (Parlamento, Apr 1975).

As Demirel expressed, the main issue that the coalition had to deal with the most for a long time was the US's strained relations because of the Cyprus issue and the opium poppy. Determination of territorial waters between Turkey and Greece and the armament tension of two countries was also a critical issue of foreign policy by this term (10-20 Apr 1975). Turkey's side made efforts to be freed from the US's embargo because of these two issues. Within this scope, several meetings and negotiations were held in Vienna, Rome, and Brussels, with several occasions between Turkish delegates and Greece and US representatives during the spring of 1975. However, the problem could not be solved because while Turkey was trying to distinguish the Cyprus problem and relations with the US, the US urged Turkey to take a step back from the federation view and make concessions on the issue. As Turkey realized the US was persisting with an arms embargo, it decided to retaliate

with controlling the US military base in Turkey. Demirel's meeting with US President Ford and Greece Prime Minister Karamanlis to find a cure was no use in July. Nevertheless, the US Senate's approval of the bill prescribing the restriction of the embargo's scope reduced tension slightly. (Yalansız, 2006: 331).

The summer of 1975 was a time for preparation of the by-election to be held on 12 October. Holding many meetings in different Turkey cities, Ecevit was criticising mainly foreign, economic, and agricultural policies of the government. While holding the meeting in Gerede, the district of Bolu province, on 23 June, he was attacked by an opposing group (*Cumhuriyet,* 1975 Almanac: 50). Three months later, in another meeting at Elazığ, the same events would recur. Ecevit and his party made statements that blamed the government (*Hürriyet,*1976 Almanac: 52,54,60). He claimed that "Murderers will never be found because the murderers are in the government." (*Cumhuriyet,* 22 Jun 1975). These allegations were frequently brought to the agenda by the leftist press. According to the *Cumhuriyet* daily, for instance, NF created anarchy, and the aim was to establish a dictatorship-like administration in the country (*Cumhuriyet,* 30 Jun 1975). In return, coalition parties rejected these accusations and purported that events occurred mainly because of the provocation precipitated by the supporters of CHP; that it was a conspiracy of the cohort of Ecevit, and was aiming to wear down the government. According to some reports from the right-wing press, CHP supporters had opened fire on a mosque in Gerede (*Milli,* 23-27 June 1975). On the other hand, when there had been an attack on Prime Minister Demirel in the Prime Ministry building, not long ago, minister had launched a long polemic, claiming that the attack was carried out by CHP (*Hürriyet,* 1976 Almanac, 42-23). The accusations of violence between the AP and the CHP never stopped.

By the end of June, it was reported that there were 22 bills to be enacted before the parliamentary recess, most of which were about the fulfilment of promises given to voters and took place in the government protocol. The most important of these were; severance pays, 20 years of service for women to retire, electoral alliance, lowering voter age, increasing the minimum subsistence allowance (*Milli,* 27 June 1975).

Despite the government's show of strength via several investments' inauguration, economic indicators did not look well because, by the end of the august, the government devalued for four times. Under these conditions, business circles made a few meetings with Ecevit and Demirel to form a CHP-AP coalition; however, the leaders refused these offers.

In the meantime, the results of the election, which were held on 12 October 1975, showed that AP had increased its votes by ten points and reached %41 of total votes, and the CHP increase was about 8 points, which carried it to % 43 of total votes. These results also increased the hope of both Ecevit and Demirel about coming to power single-handed in the first general election, culminating in their uncompromising and even aggressive attitude against each other (Ahmad, 2015: 351).

One week after the election, MSP, who was not happy with the results of the election, among the concerns it might be melted within the shade of AP, published a notice which propounds a few urgent actions about external and internal issues, which were the promise of MSP to their electorates. AP yielded and met most of these demands, particularly about institutional and public personal affairs, because it was felt MSP was decisive about imposing them (Yankı, 10-16 Nov 1975). During 1975, the critical issues that MSP wanted to keep on the agenda could be traced from the headlines of Milli daily: putting moral values into education curricula; increasing the number of Imam Hatip schools and ensuring equal opportunities for these schools; development of the industry; prevention of price increases; and improving relations with Islamic countries in both economic and cultural fields (*Milli,* 1975).

Another problem the coalition parties engaged in the first year was the election of The Speaker of the Assembly, which occupied the parliament's agenda for two months. Members of the chamber would elect the National Assembly Speaker, but there was no consensus on any candidate. While CHP claimed their nominee be selected because CHP was the largest party, government parties were asserting the Speaker should be chosen from government parties. On the other hand, coalition parties could not compromise, so this election turned into a gridlock. This disagreement lasted for about two months, during which many discussions, disputes, and rumours took place, and 48 runoff was held. Finally, CHP candidate Kemal Güven was elected with the support of CGP and AP deputies (Yalansız 338-340)

The first days of 1976 were foreshadowing the troubled times about social cohesion. Increasing numbers of conflict between extreme rightist and leftist groups of students and youth were reported, and there were also severe conflicts between security forces and the restless demonstrators or protesters (*Hürriyet,* 1977 Almanac: 9-13). The rigid statements made by leaders of the political parties were igniting this turmoil. Communism and fascism

were two clichés that were used as tools to frighten their sympathizers. For example, among the numerous such expressions, Demirel was saying: "…The only threat is communism. Today, there is no other movement that bothers Turkey." (*Cumhuriyet,* 11 Dec 1975). "We shall not let them install communism by destroying the Republic. Our fight with communism will go on. If necessary, we will reach the stage of martyrdom in this way. We will defeat the troublemakers." (*Cumhuriyet,* 2 Aug 1976). In turn, Ecevit was declaring that "Demirel was cooperating with murderers" (*Hürriyet,* 1977 Almanac: 13). According to Ecevit, fascism, primitive capitalism, reactionaryism, and separatism, hand in hand, had come to power (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 25). Türkeş, on the other hand, was giving countenance to their young members about carrying weapons, on the grounds of self-defence: "Youth can carry pistol. We are a nation that has gun love. Nationalists are caught with heirloom guns, while leftist anarchists are being caught with machine guns. In case nationalist needs, he can use his national gun. There is such a thing as a defence. You may be forced to shut one that tries to shut you. Such is the present situation." (*Cumhuriyet,* 20 Dec 1975). Türkeş, in the same statement, had added, "Helping security forces is a duty." However, Interior Minister Oğuzhan Asilturk from MSP openly declared that he did not confirm the idea of Türkeş, which might have dangerous consequences. Asiltürk's response was, "The state does not need the help of anybody." (*Milliyet*, 2 Feb 1976). During the same period, the MSP was warning both sides about not resorting to violence. MSP deputy leader Fehmi Cumalıoğlu said: We are against turning freedom of ideas into violence. Violence has emerged from both sides in recent months. We fulfil the duty to warn our partners within the government on this issue (*Hürriyet,* 1977 Almanac: 13).

Negative consequences of polarization, which became increasingly popular in society, and was fuelled by some party leaders, have been reflected in the press. In 1975, it was reported, 35 people were killed in political violence. These figures reached 108 in 1976; 157 in 1977 (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 62). Indeed, compared with 1978 and 1979, when the death toll was nearly 1100 and 1400, these casualties were not very high, yet enough to shake the whole society within the milieu of economic crisis (Uçar, 2015: 220). While commenting on these violent incidents, Demirel and Ecevit were blaming each other. When Ecevit was claiming that these events of social conflicts were related to the National Front Coalition structure and policies, Demirel insisted on that conflicts existed before them and the primary source of these conflicts were the leftist circles. (Uçar, 2015: 227-228, 237)

Among this tension, at the meeting of the National Security Council, the Coalition government proposed martial law, but military members refused this proposal on the ground that the fight against extensive violence should be done within the constitution and law. Indeed this response was interesting because it was reckoning martial law as not lawful or constitutional. Demirel, the next day, referring to this situation, would say that "Turkey could not be governed with current constitution" (Yankı, 26 Jan-1 Feb 1976). Within this atmosphere, CHP was questing to overthrow the government, and the rumours of overtures with MSP were being reported. However, MSP stood firm against these hearsays and did not give hope to CHP about the probable coalition, and in the following budget voting, which was seen another chance for the opposition to dissolve the coalition, supported the budget unanimously (MM, JD, 16/2/1976, 4-26: 17/2/1976, 238-305).

Erbakan, during his speech on the budget, reflected MSP's point of view by the end of the first year of the coalition government. With his usual optimism and cheerful mood, he pointed out the government's primary goals in this way:

> To realize internal peace, tranquility, and brotherhood in the country: 1. The first goal is to get 41 million homeland children to live in tranquility and peace. 2. To ensure the fusion of the nation. It is one of the main objectives to turn the state from a dominating coterie to an entity established to serve the nation. 3. To instill a great Turkey ideal in all people. It is among our fundamental goals to create our historical consciousness, act with this awareness, and revive a great Turkey ideal. 4. Spiritual development: We must instill spiritual and national values in children and young people. If we do not give the children the concepts of propriety, decency, compassion, and mercy, and in case we adopt a materialist education, we cannot prevent the crimes and evils. In the same way, we should not neglect our history and achievements when narrating ancient Greece. 5. Financial development: One of the main objectives is economic development. The only way to avoid this is to stay away from usurious capitalism, which breaks social justice and leads to exploitation and communism who believe in materialism. In this system, equilibrium in income distribution, justice in taxes, justice in the distribution of loans, and industrial investments are applied (CS, JD, 4/2/1976, 290-295).

One crucial issue that occupied the early months of 1976 was corruption that ascribed to the Prime Minister's nephew. The case on the fictitious furniture export of the Yahya Demirel, Prime Minister's nephew, had started in the summer of 1975 (*Cumhuriyet*, 1975 Almanac: 140-153). This trial turned into a challenging matter of polemics between AP and CHP when Ecevit made a press conference on the subject and revealed the background and current investigation details in February 1976. Ecevit pushed the matter further and tabled the motion of censure about the Prime Minister and Trade and Finance Ministers

(*Cumhuriyet*, 1976 Almanac: 293). He intended to play on the coalition parties' current disagreements and hoped to obtain some support from CGP, MSP, and independents. However, after debates and harsh disputes on the motion of censure, on 24 March 1976, the coalition partners stuck together and refused the motion. Ecevit's attempt to overthrow the government ended up with the strengthened solidarity of coalition partners. Furniture corruption case would stay in the judicial process and drop off the radar through the following months (Yalansız, 2006: 346).

By the same time, Turkey was trying to find a way for foreign policy under the pressure of strain caused by the US embargo and Greece. Turkey had decided to play a balancing game, so established rapport with the Soviet Union and Iran. Demirel, in a later statement on this process, would say that "The development of good neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union has nearly been the basis of our politics." (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 17). While official statements were reported in this way, Turkey also had official interviews with the US, and by May 1976, it was agreed to give mutual concessions. Another diplomatic attempt of government was the Conference of Muslim Countries, to which 41 Foreign Ministers attended. This event's main goals were to raise support for the Palestine and Palestine Liberation Organization and provide the support of Muslim countries for Turkey's Cyprus Policy (Parlamento, May 1976). A few disagreements between MSP and AP on this occasion, mainly regarding some protocol procedures, were settled with compromise (Yankı, 17-23 May 1976).

Turkey's foreign policy agenda became intense again by July 1976 because of Turkey's research vessel, Hora, which set sail for the Aegean Sea (*Cumhuriyet*, 1976 Almanac: 56-59). This event, galvanized by Greece's press, became the matter of great tension during which Greece threatened to scuttle the ship, and Turkey responded as harshly as well and warned Greece about any false move. Through the end of August, Greece, with the warnings of the US and USSR, tuned down the matter and carried the problem to the UN Security Council and International Court of Justice, but its claims were refused by these institutions (Parlamento, Aug 1976).

The domestic politics of Turkey was not quiet at this time. In June, CHP deputies tabled a new motion of censure about the National Education Minister and then about Prime Minister and tried to shake the government once again. However, these efforts remained inconclusive. Likewise, the other opposition party DP tabled the motion of censure about

Prime Minister, and this attempt was of no use. The Law on State Security Court also became a matter of bitter disputes between ruling and opposition parties during these months (*Hürriyet,*1976 Almanac: 51). Since the Constitutional Court repealed this law, new draft bills were pushed forward by coalition partners, and this situation revealed the divergence between them.

On the other hand, there arose a disagreement within coalition parties, that is, between MSP and CGP. While MSP wished to exclude article 163[25] of the Turkish Criminal Code from the coverage of the State Security Courts, CGP, referring to Kemalism, opposed this idea. CHP was entirely against the State Security Courts and was committed to obstructing this bill's deliberation at plenary in September 1976. For this purpose, it used every possible means found in the rules of procedure and proved successful. As the matter dragged on, disagreement between MSP and CGP on the issue of 163 deepened (Yankı, 13-19 Sept 1976). The bill could not pass, so State Security Courts were abolished automatically by October 1976.

In October 1976, when the parliament was going to recess, it was seen many bills related to social problems could not pass mainly because of a few matters: the long-delayed elections of the speakers of two chambers; long debates on motions of censure; and prolonged process of deliberations on the State Security Courts (Yankı, 5-11 July 1976). Farmers who were affected from natural disasters, delay of local elections, minimum living allowance, general health insurance, lowering the voting age, lowering the retirement age of workers, full-day working of doctors, and amnesty for growers of opium poppy, etc. were some of the issues to which enough time was not allocated in the parliament (Parlamento, Jan 1977).

There was also a criticism that the government was window dressing about the sod-cutting ceremonies of investments and factories. These critical reports were mainly addressing MSP and Necmettin Erbakan. (Yalansız, 354). However, the MSP administration insisted that industrialization initiatives were far-reaching, efficient enough to accelerate the country's development, and that is why it was tried to be prevented by internal capital circles and external capitalist forces (Emre, 2002c: 70-73). MSP Deputy Chairmen Recai Kutan, at

[25] This article was about crime and punishment of action which oriented to foundation of a regime based on religious principles and making propaganda of religious values for the same aim or in pursuit of personal benefit.

the end of this month, was declaring that they would persist upon implementation of decrees, as prescribed in coalition protocol, on heavy industry and Imam Hatip Schools, and would make this matter of maintaining the Coalition (Yankı, 1-7 Nov 1976).

In October, there were ordinary congresses of AP and MSP, at which the leaders and organs of parties were elected. Both leaders reinforced their position of leadership at these congresses. However, Erbakan's determination of lists bothered some notable names and caused their reaction, but Erbakan was determined to relegate, particularly members who had caused trouble during coalition with CHP and challenged Erbakan's compromising policy (Yalansız, 2006: 355).

At the end of 1976, two newspapers, *Daily News* and *Milliyet*, and some journals elected Necmettin Erbakan as the man of the year for his attempts, industrial initiatives, and unprecedented statements, and elected the MSP movement as the "Event of the Year (Yetik, 1977). In the meantime, two important figures of MHP, i.e., Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti and Hüseyin Üzmez, left their party and joined to MSP was evaluated as a fall of one wing within the MHP (*Milli*, 17 Apr 1977).

By January 1977, "snap election" began to be mentioned mainly by AP politicians. Ordinary election time was October 1977, but the country's social, political, and economic problems, indicating the need for a more stable government and the craving of CHP and AP for single-handed power, made snap election inevitable. Both the CHP leader and the AP leader announced on February 12th that they were ready for early election (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 13).

The MSP administration perceived the early election idea and preparations as a conspiracy against them. According to Erbakan and the notables of the MSP, this decision would be taken essentially at the request of external powers (western countries), and its primary goal is to prevent the rapid industrialization pushed mainly by the MSP and to gain concessions from Turkey on the Cyprus issue (Emre, 2002c: 73-80). In line with this belief, MSP has worked hard to hold election in its regular date and has implemented many parliamentary tactics to prevent an early election resolution. However, these efforts did not yield results, and the early election was decided by the AP and the CHP (Emre, 2002c: 84).

While the snap election was being discussed, another subject came to the fore: Increase in salary and allowances of parliament members were accepted by unanimous agreement of

parties at the beginning of January. However, shortly afterward, the first CGP leader and shortly after the CHP leader criticised this increase. Since this topic was sensitive in terms of parties' prestige before public opinion, all parties disowned this change, and the increase was repealed (75 years of the Republic/2: 741). Another financial matter of dispute had been the disagreement about payment of premium by some Ministers to officers working in their Ministry. This matter reached the point that the Minister of Finance attempted to resign but was dissuaded by the Prime Minister (Yankı, 10-16 Jan 1977).

Although the issue of early election had taken place on the country's agenda, the MSP was eager to carry out the actions that are considered essential for the country as a government partner. In this context, in the first quarter of 1977, there were specific agenda issues that the MSP shared with the public by Milli daily. The most important of them were relations with the European Economic Community to be reviewed in Turkey's interests, intensification of heavy industry investment, and a series of sod turning ceremonies (*Milli,* Feb-Mar 1977).

Erbakan, on the other hand, summarized the government's work in February 1977 budget talks and expressed government actions. Erbakan, as always, reminded that development was two-winged, one of them was spiritual development, and the second was material development. Activities in the field of spiritual development, described by Erbakan, can be summarized as follows: 270 Imam Hatip schools were opened in the last three years, while 70 Imam Hatip schools had been opened in previous 25 years. Also, the law proposals were prepared for the expansion of the facilities of the Imam Hatip schools and the establishment of higher education institutions for them. Appointments related to Imams were increased, Qur'an courses and services related to village mosques were increased, pilgrimage opportunities were increased, school curricula were changed, and materialist elements were removed while moral lessons were placed. Obscenity was effectively fought. The most critical success in material development was the fact that instead of the assembly industry and simple factories, heavy industry moves have been started, and enormous allowances have been allocated for this (MM, JD, 18/2/1977, 260-261).

For Prime Minister Demirel, the conditions did not seem as lively as Erbakan saw. He thought that the relations between the coalition partners were worn out. On the other hand, the last by-election's results, like Ecevit, tantalized him about coming to power single-handed. Thus he showed its consent to snap election, but he wanted CHP to offer it. After a

few tactical moves by Demirel and Ecevit, until the middle of the March, both parties agreed and tabled a motion for an early election to be held on the 5th of June. The snap election's decision disturbed the MSP by the most; therefore, it tried to prevent the pass of resolution at the National Assembly, but its efforts proved vain, and it yielded by the beginning of April (Emre, 2002c: 83).

As the country entered the election atmosphere, ideological tension seemed to increase once more. Violence was ascending; reports of student conflicts, street fighting, murder, bank robbery were multiplying (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 20-29). At the Ecevit's election tour toward Amasya, Tokat, Erzincan, and Sivas, fighting and brawling occurred between rightists and leftists (*Hürriyet*, 26-29 Apr 1977). On 25 May, Demirel was physically assaulted in Uşak, where he went on a trip (*Hürriyet*, 25 May 1977). Despite official statements addressing citizens to renounce such conflicts and security measures taken by the government, these events could not be averted. The Meeting of 1 May 1977, which was organized by the Revolutionary Workers Union, and 34 people were killed, left an indelible effect on society and would be recorded as "Bloody May 1" (*Hürriyet*, 2 May 1977). In later days, there had been an assassination attempt against Ecevit at Çiğli Airport, when he was on his way of İzmir meeting (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 26-30).

On the eve of these elections, a point worth mentioning was that the mainstream media showed irresponsible behaviour on the presentation of news on social events. The best-selling newspapers reported the individual events in a manner that would increase the tension, perhaps because of their worldviews and in pursuit of commercial purposes. Exaggerated reflection of a violent incident on the right or left side resulted in the provocation of the parties (*Hürriyet*, Mar-Apr 1977). Despite many provocative headlines and reports, there were discreet writers who called for joint action of leaders to find solutions to the escalating social tension and increasing events. For example, Nazlı Ilıcak wrote a few days after the May 1 events that Demirel and Ecevit must come together and condemn the arms fired by both by rightists and leftists; take protective measures about the owners of the hands which pull the trigger instead of holding a book, and their agitators (*Tercüman*, 6 May 1977).

However, such calls had little effect on Demirel and Ecevit. The two big parties' leaders did not refrain from using any confrontational discourse to get the vote necessary to come to power alone in the upcoming election. Tension and social conflicts between the

right and left continued while they went on blaming each other about these events. For the sake of partisan political goals, they insisted on discourse, which served to a rapid increase in disruptive political polarization throughout the country. Demirel, for instance, said that Ecevit was the only responsible person for the 1 May events. According to the Demirel, "CHP was standing by and behind the people who betrayed the Republic as much as bringing the pictures of Marx and Engels, the red flag, sickle and hammer to Taksim Square." (*Hürriyet,* 2 June 1977). In another statement, Demirel said, "CHP rallies smells of blood and fighting" (*Hürriyet,* 4 June 1977). He held responsible CHP from the events that occurred at Ecevit's meetings with these words: "It is CHP which come in front of the public with the peace dove and then shot at the citizens. It is also CHP that rescued the anarchists from the state's hand and made them harboured by its municipalities (*Tercüman,* 18-27 May 1977).

On the contrary, Ecevit claimed that Demirel proved that he was a fascist and that he was trying to establish a regime of oppression and persecution (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 28). For him, some ostensibly leftist and irresponsible communities were used by the government. Some state powers that were out of control of the state were sneaking into left as agents. In the same way, the counter-guerrilla played a role in the massacre in Taksim. Again, according to Ecevit, those who abolished the freedom of life and freedom of education in universities were people provoked by government partners. If this rule had gone, and CHP came instead, such conspiracies would come to an end; thus, universities and all schools would find peace and security (8, 10, 31 May 1977). During this election period, Ecevit's statements were very problematic in terms of political compromise culture: "The CHP-AP coalition is an illusion. If we form a coalition with the AP, it will mean that we betrayed the people, democracy, the state, and ourselves." (*Hürriyet,*1978 Almanac: 25). This statement certainly reflects his account of coming to power alone. However, when this account went wrong, Ecevit would try to form troubled governments, and this process will continue until the September 12 Military Coup.

Ecevit also heavily blamed the Government and Demirel in his election meetings for economic matters. The economic situation was, indeed, getting worse as time went on; especially currency shortage had become a nuisance for the government and IMF from which government asked for debt was imposing challenging conditions, which the government could not accept on the eve of the election (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 15, 26-27).

Demirel's target in election meetings was not only Ecevit but also Erbakan because an issue that he dwelt on was the gathering of right-wing votes at the AP. Demirel, regarding the voters of Erbakan as his potential voter, considered the votes to be taken by Erbakan as his loss, which embittered him during electoral company (Kamalak, Interview, Feb 2020). He thus emphasized the importance of a one-party government and the drawbacks of the coalitions regarding political stability to electorates during the electoral propaganda term. Therefore, to the MSP's disappointment, he claimed every vote to be given to the MSP would benefit the CHP (18 May 1977). He held that "Today, Turkey's politics is divided into two: Leftists and nationalists. Some say that I am neither a leftist nor a nationalist. MSP is neither leftist nor nationalist and advocates for nonsense *Milli Görüş* freak. I'm hoping that MSP's frivolous behaviours and words will not blur the mind of our nation." (18 May 1977).

In the electoral period, MSP brought up its fundamental issues. Other parties were not in a position to resolve these issues, according to the MSP. In this context, some slogans they put forward during the election were "First ethics and spirituality. Not words but service. Not satellite but leader Turkey. Parties, a period of who is closed: The domination of the believers: CHP. Soda water, coke, assembly industry: AP. New era: Great Turkey Again: MSP" (*Milli,* 21 Apr 1977). The MSP stayed away from the violent events that had spread during this period. Besides, it did not choose to attack his rivals making capital out of violent incidents. Instead, they pointed to the global-scale capitalist-communist struggle that underpins violence. For this reason, Erbakan made the following comment for the 1 May events: "Foreign agents have a finger in the May 1 Taksim events." (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 25). However, when Demirel's effort to attract votes of MSP sympathizer increased and his speeches against the MSP become frequent, MSP tried to counter-attack. For this purpose, some reports and articles about Demirel's being freemasonry were published in Milli Daily just a few days before the elections (*Milli,* 3 June 1977).

Elections held on 5 June 1977 were to determine all members of the National Assembly and one-third of the Senate. Eight parties joined the race were CHP, AP, MSP, CGP, MHP, DP, TBP, and TİP (TÜİK, 2012: 4). The results were as following:

6. Election Results 1977

Parties	CHP	AP	MSP	MHP	CGP	DP	TBP	TİP	Ind
Percentage of votes	41.4	36.9	8.6	6.4	1.9	1.8	0.4	0.1	2.5
Number of Deputies	213	189	24	16	3	1	-	-	4
Number of Senators	28	21	1	-	-	-	-	-	-

By 13 June 1977, two chambers convened and at the same day, the coalition government resigned (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2013: 1326).

4.2. The Nationalist Front II Coalition

4.2.1. Political conditions before the Nationalist Front II Coalition

In the general election, the CHP was the first party with 41.4% of the votes and reached its highest point since the 1950s, while the AP received 36.9% of the votes (Öznur, 1999a: 439). These results were not satisfactory either to AP or CHP; because each of them had expected to take as many votes as to secure the majority of the chair in National Assembly. However, CHP fell short of a majority for only 13 chairs, and AP was well behind with its shortage of 37 deputies for the majority. As for smaller parties, MSP was disappointed with 8.6% of votes and 24 deputies, which makes the very half of the previous vote rate. MHP seemed to be satisfied with results because it increased its votes significantly and had 16 deputies. DP and CGP were almost melted away by this election and lost their influence in the equation of government formation (*Hürriyet*, 6 June 1977).

MSP attributed its election failure to the anti-MSP campaign of various *foreign powers* and *monopolistic capitalist circles* before the election (*Milli*, 14-15 June 1977; Erbakan, 1977: 4). On the other hand, it was claimed that the election was rigged by the use of multiple voting. According to this argument, three million multiple votes were cast in this election because while the number of people who have reached the voting age was 18 million according to the state register of persons, this figure was 21 million on the voter lists

(Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020). MSP, indeed, raised this issue to the Supreme Election Board (*Hürriyet,* 1975 Almanac: 33). However, despite the acknowledgement by the head of the Supreme Electoral Board that there were some flaws" they were deemed as not significant (*Milli,* 14-15 June 1977). Another critical issue regarding the result of the election, according to MSP, was the attitude of Demirel. His words targeting MSP during the electoral campaign embittered the supporters of the party (Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020). However, despite all, the party's strengthened role in terms of coalition formation became an essential source of consolation (Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020).

However, a third factor should not be forgotten. 16 Nurist MPs in the MSP resigned at the beginning of 1977 after sending a letter to Erbakan in January 1977, in which they blamed him with opportunism and resorting to unscrupulous political methods (*Cumhuriyet,* 1977 Almanac: 27). The break up of this group which was in disagreement since the coalition with the CHP has also been an essential factor in the loss of votes (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020).

In any case, the votes of the MSP had decreased by a third and the number of deputies had decreased by half in this election. However, this situation was not enough to prevent the *scary scenario* for some who had a hostile attitude toward MSP such as Metin Toker, a columnist in *Hürriyet,* Daily. Toker had listed his preferences two months before the elections. Accordingly, Toker's first choice was a CHP-AP coalition. The second choice was a government founded by a single party of either CHP or AP. What Toker feared the most was the possibility that MSP being a key once again and being effective in establishing the new coalition. To him, this situation would be the worst fate that could befall on Turkey (Toker, 1977). Actually, after Ecevit's trial of a short-term minority government, this possibility would be real. Erbakan's statement on this subject is an interesting example of his high morale under all circumstances: "Our key was silver, before; now it turned into gold." (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 32; *Milli*, 8 June 1977).

After the election, political party leaders made various statements about the election results and how to establish the new government (*Hürriyet,* 9 June 1977). Indeed, Ecevit's hasty statement and the way it was handed to the headline in *Hürriyet,* Daily was quite misleading: "CHP came to power". What Ecevit had said the day after the election was slightly different but still misleading: "CHP gained 222 memberships. Only 4 members were left to come to power alone." (*Hürriyet,* 6 June 1977). Such premature and false statements

of Ecevit and the headlines of the mainstream newspapers created tremendous excitement for the CHP supporters. This excitement would become a source of great disappointment in the following days and then turn into a new social tension and conflicts (*Hürriyet,* 6 June 1977).

Ecevit's decisive stance on forming a government continued even after the situation became more evident. His preference was to form a minority government rather than a coalition. He expressed this idea with these words: "There are more useful methods than the coalition". He was hoping that 13 deputies, from other parties, would join them or help them for a minority government and in the first week, he made a statement which meant such an invitation. "Our door is open to deputies that will support CHP." (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 32-35).

However, as he knew that this possibility was low, he did not rule out the coalition option. "…We are ready to discuss the conditions of solidarity and cooperation with the parties represented in the National Assembly and which have proven their loyalty to democracy, albeit in different dimensions or forms." This phrase implied MSP. Furthermore, he added that they could not cooperate with the two parties, that is AP and MHP. It seemed that Ecevit left behind the arbitrary attitude of 1974. Now he seemed to remember the need for compromise and the need for sacrifice. "We cannot fully implement our program. We can determine the extent of this together with those who will cooperate with us. Such a compromise is one of the natural rules of democracy. In so far it should not be forgotten that the CHP is the biggest party." Since he thought that MSP might not want a new partnership because of its past coalition experiences, he invited the party and the deputies not to be emotional. "I hope that the parties and deputies who believe in democracy and want peace in society will keep their responsibilities to the nation above the emotional factors." (*Hürriyet,* 9 June 1977).

In the face of Ecevit's efforts to form a government, Demirel was making great efforts. He, in turn, urged, "The Turkish nation did not bring the left in power in the election. Nationalist parties should not render the power to it as well." As for CHP's desire for transferring deputies, he said, "CHP was resorting to a shameful way to come to power." and added: "Ecevit says he will establish the government and meet with the Greek Prime Minister. Such behaviour is called cradle rocking before the child is born." On the other hand, it seemed that under no circumstances was Demirel planning a coalition with the CHP.

When asked "If CHP could form a coalition government with the AP" he answered "No way, contrary to the nature of the goods, impossible." He, playing on the hostility to the left, also condemned the possibility of a new partnership between MSP and CHP. He said that "The CHP-MSP coalition would confirm what I said during the election campaign." What he said in the election was "Every vote you give to the MSP will benefit the CHP. (9 June 1977)." A few days later it was reported that he said: "He, who brings the left to power, will take a grave responsibility both in this world and the hereafter." (14 June 1977). These hostile languages and attitudes between Demirel and Ecevit intensified polarization in society. While this polarization caused conflicts in violent groups, it created discriminatory attitudes even in average citizens. For example, Demirel and Ecevit supporters did not go to each other's mosques, did not shop from each other's shops, and did not sit in the other's coffeehouses (Asiltürk, Interview, Feb 2020).

When it comes to MSP, Erbakan reminded Demirel of breaking the coalition down, as Ecevit had done before, thus accused Demirel of the last government problems. He intended to hold them at arm's length in order to make two leaders see the need for compromise. Yet he was not keeping the door closed for coalition.

> A new crisis has emerged in Turkey. Demirel is responsible for this crisis. MSP has always been a party which saved Turkey from the crisis. Demirel abolished an ongoing government. As MSP, we will not participate in the establishment of the government for now. The CHP and the AP received 80 per cent of the votes. Come on then, let the two parties form a government. And let us serve as an opposition party. The AP has picked only on us in election. CHP increased its deputies… So, Demirel has no right to speak after he dissolved the government and rose to the bait of CHP and went to early election (*Hürriyet,* 9 June 1977).

The AP's agreement, a few months ago, with the CHP on early election had caused a significant disturbance by the MSP. This discomfort was often expressed during the process of forming a new government. For example, according to the Milli Daily, backed by the party "Early election threw the nation into a grave crisis." It was asserted that in this report, the early election was demanded by "world Zionism, Masons, the men of monopolistic capitalism, the capitalists and socialists, the Jews of the AET, the supporters of the European state, the embargo imposers who wanted to cede Cyprus to Greece" (*Milli*, 1 July 1977).

In the meantime, The MSP General Executive Board held a 14-hour meeting to evaluate the process of forming a government, which ended with the following decisions: The minority government would be rejected. If the coalition possibility comes up with the

CHP, the conditions would be determined. If the CHP could not establish a government, the proposal from the AP would be evaluated (17 June 1977). These decisions, once again, clearly demonstrated the flexibility of the MSP in compromise. CHP's arbitrary manners and the uncompromising attitude to abolish the coalition with MSP three years ago were not forgotten.

On the other hand, it was only a few months ago when Demirel had broken down the coalition and talked against MSP during the election process. However, despite all these negative experiences and bad memories, MSP was able, even publicly, to declare that it could form a coalition with both the CHP and the AP. There was no room for resentment and stubbornness in *Milli Görüş's* understanding of politics.

Among these developments, the President gave the task of government formation to Ecevit as a leader of the largest party. Ecevit, in pursuit of finding a supporter for his minority government or forming a coalition government, met with leaders of the parties.

However, Demirel's attitude about not forming a coalition with CHP was firm. Erbakan, at his meeting with Ecevit, said that they would not support the CHP minority government. As for the proposal to form a coalition together with CHP, his answer was "no, for the moment". (*Hürriyet,* 18 June 1977).

Nonetheless, Ecevit, although there was no sign of securing the majority support of the parliament, prepared a cabinet list, submitted it to the President and President approved it (Emre, 2002c: 116). At this stage, support for this government came from the industry sector and workers unions. The mainstream press also made quite positive comments for the new government, and it was demonstrating its happiness, particularly for the situation that this government was the one that MSP was not a partner. "Oh! Thankfully, a cabinet without MSP" was one of the headlines in *Hürriyet,* Daily (22 June 1977). However, what cabinet needed was the support of the parliament, and this seemed unlikely.

AP leader Demirel reacted harshly to the President's approval of a government that was not expected to have a parliamentary majority. The AP presidential tribunal said in a statement that "the parliamentary governments will soon replace the Çankaya governments." (22 June 1977). Erbakan wrote a letter to the President at this stage. He said that it was wrong for Ecevit to establish a government that would not take the vote of confidence. "This behaviour was incompatible with the constitution and the democratic system, because, 229

deputies officially declared that they would reject the minority government of CHP." (*Milli,* 22 June 1977).

For all that, Ecevit read the program of a minority government on 28 June 1977 at both chambers of the parliament. However, while reading the program, AP, MSP and MHP deputies reacted by leaving the general assembly, which showed the severity of the conflict in politics once again (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 34). On the other hand, two days later, three rightist parties, AP, MSP, and MHP issued a declaration that they could form a coalition government. By 3 July, the minority cabinet could not get a vote of confidence which meant a government crisis would last for a while (*Milli,* 4 July 1977).

Demirel on Ecevit's failure to have a confidence of parliament used trenchant words: "Occupation government has gone, and the government of Republic is going to be founded." He also deridingly likened the one-month Ecevit government to the government that children were forming theatrically at 23 April Children's Day. Erbakan was using more careful and gentle expressions while indicating their intention: "MSP will do what is necessary for the formation of a government." (Uçar, 2015: 354)

4.2.2. Formation Structure and Protocol of the Nationalist Front II Coalition

On failure of Ecevit cabinet to get the confidence of the parliament, the President assigned Demirel to form a government. Erbakan's first statement was that "We can support Demirel with some conditions from outside, or if he comes to us and insists on becoming a partner, we can enter the government." (*Milli,* 6 July 1977). He added that they would do their part for formation of a government giving the green light to a new Nationalist Front (Yankı, 18-24 July 1977).

As reflected in the press, the MSP was proposing certain conditions for the coalition. These conditions were; stopping anarchy, curbing the cost of life, moving the heavy industry to its target, eliminating the welfare imbalance in society, and following dignified foreign policy that would protect national interests effectively (*Tercüman*, 6 July 1977). In the same period, considering the priorities voiced in the editorial of the Milli Daily, other additional conditions were that the education system must be removed from the materialist and pragmatic way, and must be at a point that balances industrialization and spirituality; problems of youth should be solved systematically; unemployment should be prevented, and

employment should be increased; the tax system should put the load on the rich and protect the poor (*Milli,* 16 July 1977).

Recai Kutan's remarks about what happened in the background on these coalition talks are likely to shed light on the issues highlighted by MSP:

> Early negotiations of Second Nationalist Front government were held in our house. Erbakan and Demirel are already classmates, and I have worked together with Demirel at DSİ (State Hydraulic Works) for a long time, we are closely acquainted with. They do not want journalists to hear about. Demirel said, "Let us meet at Recai's house". We came together. Erbakan put forward the conditions. He said that, in this era of government, these people, it is called secularism, reactionaryism… they are under tremendous pressure and persecution. Many people have been persecuted. Legal amendments will replace these cruelties. We need to provide freedom of thought in the broadest sense. He (Demirel) said yes, you are right. Other than that, external powers only understand the language of force. In such a state that you are alone, they come and crush each one and take control. Moreover, we gain strength only in the state where we come together and develop good relations with Muslim countries, more precisely. I gave an example like this.Turkish Airlines is one of our internationally opened institutions. Which expeditions in the westward of Turkey does Turkish Airlines have? I counted: Is THY going to Tehran? No. Is it going to Baghdad? No. Is it going to Cairo? No. Is it going to Tel Aviv? Yes. Right now this is a message to the Islamic World that we will be together with Zionism, not with you. For example, he said yes to the idea of improving our relations with Muslim countries considerably. Meanwhile, it was said that I always remained the chairman of the economy board in the previous coalitions. I want that the scourge of interest… the man making production, making money, but the interests of the bank erases all of what he earns. So we will be pioneers in the determination of economic policies. Well, he said to him. This is a compromise." (Kutan, Interview, Feb 2020).

After the meeting of Demirel with Erbakan and Türkeş on 7 July, it was announced that they agreed in principle to form a coalition government. In the meantime, Demirel, as a mere formality, also met with Bülent Ecevit. In this meeting, Ecevit proposed the formation of a coalition government headed by an impartial prime minister, which he defined as a sacrifice made by CHP (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 36). However, Demirel rejected this offer and works on second Nationalist Front went on (Yankı, 18-24 July 1977).

As of 9 July, the delegations of the three parties started working on the coalition. According to the reports released by newspapers, negotiations about the ministries were being carried out intensively, and it was said that the cabinet could be presented to Çankaya in one week (*Tercüman,* 9 July 1977). During this one week, three leaders met several more times (*Milli,* 8-20 July 1977). The central theme of the coalition protocol on which three parties slogged through was the distribution of the ministries. Each party were setting

conditions for definite ministries about which they had particular sensitivity, and some of these conditions were incompatible. Ministry of the Home Affairs was, for instance, one of them which MSP was demanding resolutely. National education was another ministry on which hard bargaining was made (*Tercüman*, 12-17 July 1977).

When coalition formation works were about to be consummated as it became clear that the government would be established, the left press intensified its criticism of such a government. Likewise, 16 civil society organizations offered a united action against the formation of a new National Front attempt. Uğur Mumcu, a prominent journalist, also participated in this campaign and summoned all progressive powers of society should be ready for the relentless opposition against a second Front partnership (Mumcu, 11 July 1977). Mümtaz Soysal, one of the prominent academicians accentuated his adverseness against the coalition which he believed will not work in this word: "Demirel holds the drum, but the drumstick is seized by else." On the other hand, among the MPs, there were still some AP deputies who were expressing their sympathy for the CHP-AP coalition. These deputies, even after the announcement of the coalition program, were asserting that if the grand coalition had been formed, a peaceful atmosphere would be secured until the next election. However, Demirel's answer to these demands was giving tips about his concern and his attitude toward a compromise: "Citizens react against this; our forming coalition with CHP goes against the grain." (*Hürriyet,*1978 Almanac: 39). Nevertheless, these opposing views of the opposing group within AP would go on until the eve of the vote of confidence and these criticisms were taken as a signal to that second Nationalist Front might not be long-lasting. (Yalansız, 2006:373)

Finally, on July 19, parties agreed on ministries and other coalition issues, and by July 21, the government list was submitted to the President. Out of parties taken part in coalition 16 memberships of the cabinet were allocated to AP, 8 to MSP and 5 to MHP. Distribution of ministries to partners was as such (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015b: 1325):

AP: Prime Ministry, Two Ministries of State, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Energy and National Resources, Ministry of Tourism and Promotion, Ministry of Rural Affairs and Cooperatives, Ministry of Youth and Sport, Ministry of Culture. MSP: Ministry of State and Deputy Ministry, Ministry of State, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and

Livestock, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Industry and Technology, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Forests. MHP: Ministry of State and Deputy Ministry, Ministry of State, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Health and Social Relief, Ministry of Customs and Monopolies.

It could be seen that AP made a sacrifice at the formation of the government because its proportion of ministries was not parallel with its proportion of chairs compared to two other minor partners. This distribution had indeed disgruntled the deputies of AP, but Demirel's defence against these criticisms was that they were sacrificing for not leaving the country without a government and for not leaving the power to the left (Uçar, 2015: 361). According to Demirel, "A reasonable compromise has been achieved." (*Tercüman*, 27 July 1977).

MSP's share of the cabinet, in turn, was quite advantageous. Although it lost almost half of its chair in this parliamentary term, it kept its number of ministries within the cabinet. MSP was using the privilege of being the "key party" once again to form a government and therefore was taken on the chin (Son Havadis, 20 July 1977). In the meantime, Milli Daily, the supporter of MSP was interpreting the development in a way that MSP was doing its best, showing a positive attitude and making all sacrifice that it could do for not leaving the country without a government. It was also stated that if it were not for MSP and if the destiny of the government had been left to leaders other than Erbakan, it would end up in disaster (*Milli*, 17 July 1977).

Satisfied with the agreement, speakers on behalf of MSP were reminding that coalitions and compromises were indispensable for democracies. Hasan Aksay, in his speech two days before the vote of confidence, described the importance of coalitions and compromise for democracies with these words (MM, JD, 30/7/1977, 184).

> In the 5 June election, our nation has again shown its preference for coalition governments. In the past, single-party governments were established. These single-party governments were unable to make the major development moves that our nation had been missing and waiting for. Looking back to the figures of 1973, when 544 dollars per capita national income in Turkey, even Greece has increased to 1830 dollars. The one-party rules have brought our nation from time to time in extremely troubled days. The country faced 1946, 1960, 1972 with one-party governments. The two coalition governments that were established in the previous period have achieved far more important services than the one-party governments so far. The Cyprus issue was settled during this period. The progress of spiritual development and heavy industry was initiated in the coalition period. The most important steps to

> eliminate imbalances were taken during this period. In terms of social laws, this period was of an exceptional place. Coalition governments govern many of the countries governed by democracy today. In fact, the coalition has been a phase of democratic administration in our time. Democracy is a compromise of the people of the whole country. Coalition governments are at a more balanced point then extremes. Respect for everyone's opinion is essential in democracies. It should be customary. When this is customary, it will be possible for the coalitions to work even more harmoniously.

Milli Daily, by these days, was summarizing the underlying points of the coalition protocol, on which parties agreed on, with the following headings: Prevention of anarchy, reduction of cost of living, establishing the voting age as 18, providing security and education in universities, making a constructive solution to problems with Greece (*Milli*, 22 July 1977).

Coalition protocol was starting by summarising the general political process after the general election and continuing with these main themes (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015: 1327-1337).

The coalition was against communism, fascism, other materialistic mindsets, oppressive administrations and dictatorial aspirations; and was loyal to national, spiritual and historical values. Communism, particularly, was deemed as a destructive, anarchic ideology aim of which was to subvert the state and democratic regime and divide the integrity of country and nation.

It was determined to safeguard the integrity of land and nation, internal peace and tranquility. It would take all necessary measures to guard the state against inner and outer threats which oriented to harm the country; would fight with all kinds of lawlessness by legal means; and would secure the rule of law. For this purpose, security forces would be provided with all material and authoriser means.

All citizens would make the most of material and spiritual development. Social inequalities would be averted; social security would be provided for every citizen; elderly, disabled, poor, widow, orphan, helpless, jobless, and low- income people would be mainly addressed, and they would be safeguarded with special measures.

Freedom of thought and religion; prevention of erotic, indecent publication, and arrangement of TRT telecast in accordance with national, spiritual and cultural values were

promised. Acceleration of justice, regulation for providing electoral alliance, were other issues that were pointed out.

The education system would be shaped in a way that would instil the students with national, moral, spiritual and cultural values of Turkish Nation and rear them as model persons in the race of science, technology and civilisation. Equality of opportunity to education would be attached importance. An alumnus of İmam- Hatip High Schools and other vocational high schools would be qualified as the alumnus of other high schools in university entrance examinations.

In the economic area, these targets were manifested: Planned, balanced, powerful and fast development and growth, elimination of poverty, permeating the welfare to grassroots of the society, prevention of inflation, regulation of fair and straightforward tax law, the arrangement of the credit and banking system particularly in favour of petty tradespeople and artisans. Development balance would also be realised in a regional context; therefore, eastern and south-eastern regions of Anatolia would be supported via several measures. Industrialisation would be accelerated; production of electricity, steel, coal, cement, fertiliser would be increased many times more; oil exploration would be mobilised; electricity would be provided with all villages while only 50% of them had that service already; unemployment would be solved with a new plan of "National Employment".

The international policy was based on these principles: Peaceful attitude toward neighbours and other states; keeping the undertakings; development of relations with Muslim countries particularly in industrial and technological areas; taking care of humanity and cultural matters of related communities living abroad; regulating the relations with European Economic Community in a way that is favourable to the development of the national industry; solution of disputes with Greece by negotiated settlement; guarding the security of Cyprus Turks permanently and putting an effort to create an independent federal state with two region and societies; development of national war industry which would met Turkish munition need locally.

As the day of a vote of confidence for government and its program drew near, two sides, that is, government and opposition were closing the ranks. In the words of columnist Nazlı Ilıcak, "two workers confederations took action to tackle the tripartite coalition." DİSK Chairman Kemal Türker invited CHP to take place in "National Democratic Front" against

Nationalist Front while Türk-İş was discussing the general strike (Ilıcak, 5 Agu 1977). On the other hand CHP, CGP and DP were declaring that they would give no vote to the National Front government. Among this tense atmosphere the government program, the extended form of coalition protocol was debated. After long and hard debates on the program, the vote of confidence took place on 1 August 1977. The result was 229 yes votes against 219 no votes; thus the so-called Second Nationalist Front government consists of AP-MSP-MHP went on functioning (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2013: 5377).

4.2.3. Operation Challenges and Dissolution of the Coalition

The government, received the vote of confidence from the Assembly, had many urgent problems on the agenda: Cyprus issue, cereal base prices, general strike announcement of *Türk-İş* Trade Union, heavy industry studies, public order problems, amendment in Article 163 of Penal Code, and local elections in December 1977 (*Milli*, 2 Aug 1977). Besides, the fact that the Speaker of the Assembly could not be elected after the June 5 election was a problem. The election of the Speaker of the Parliament, as a result of the parties' disagreement and hindrance, had become a crisis in previous periods. For example, the Speaker could be elected at 64th round in 1961, at 27th round in 1973, and at 48th round in 1975. Normally, in 1961, a gentleman's agreement was reached between the parties to solve this problem, and the problem was thus overcome. However, it was a matter of controversy when the government was established in 1977. The Speaker of the Senate was elected within the second week, but it was not possible for more than five months to elect the Speaker of the National Assembly. The CHP tried to get Siirt MP Nebil Oktay elected while AP supported AP deputy Kinyas Kartal and both sides insisted on these choices. While the CHP and the AP blamed each other on the issue, the inability to elect the Speaker led to many disruptions in the functioning of parliament (Yalansız, 2006: 265).

In this process, Speaker of the Senate Sırrı Atalay has reminded that this deadlock was great harm to the work of the legislature. Atalay told that not only the National Assembly but also the Senate could not work because of this vacant seat problem. Because under these conditions, the assemblies of the parliament could not hold a united meeting, the Budget Joint Commission could not be established, the preparation of the fourth five-year development plan was delayed, parliament was unable to declare war and TSK could not send troops to other countries (*Tercüman*, 14 Agu 1977). Among these, particularly the

failure of forming the Budget and Plan Commission had very adverse effects because this situation led to the delay of the five-year development plan and to the failure of the annual investment and expenditure program to be the basis of the budget (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 57). Five months after the election, that is, on November 7, the newspapers still had the following news: CHP, AP MSP and MHP group deputy chairs who came together to seek a solution for election of the Speaker of the National Assembly, disbanded without a resolution (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 54). For this reason, the budget draft for the fiscal year of 1978 could be submitted to the Speaker on 30 November 1977, just minutes before the end of the legal period (Yalansız, 2006: 265).

The matter could only be settled on November 17th by-election of CHP candidate Cahit Karakaş at the 38th runoff. MSP leader and many deputies had not attended the sessions during which Karakaş was elected (MM, JD, 17/11/1977, 401-402). However, the establishment of the Bureau would be succeeded in the next month, i.e. the middle of December. This date also coincided with the time of the break-up of some AP members, which signed the dissolution of the coalition government (*Milliyet*, 15 Dec 1977). Therefore, this electoral problem, which continued throughout the life of the coalition, was an example of a lack of consensus among all parties, including the MSP.

As the government and opposition could not agree on the election of the Speaker, the ruling parties also could not reach an agreement among themselves. There were two reasons for this dispute. First; Süleyman Demirel was afraid of the possibility that the committee of inquiry reports about him might come to the General Assembly and the possibility of impeachment might appear. The other one was that the AP did not keep its promises to the MSP, given at the time of coalition bargains, on some authorities. In this instance, the MSP requested the chair of specific commissions to support the candidate of the AP (Yalansız, 2006: 257). As a result, after about five and a half months of disagreement, on November 17, CHP candidate Cahit Karakaş was elected as the Speaker of the parliament in the 38th round (*Milliyet*, 18 Nov 1977).

Among these political compromise challenges, the economic situation of Turkey was getting deteriorated. The main problem was foreign exchange bottle-neck which was aggravating as time passed. Foreign exchange reserves run short mainly because of two reasons: First was the procuring military replacement parts under the press of US embargo, and the second was the skyrocketing petrol prices after 1974. Because of a shortage of

foreign exchange, diesel, gasoline and butane gas became rare. Moreover, other than petrol production, many articles of industrial raw material could not be imported. It was reported that the scarcity of these items brought the factories on the verge of a stop (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 38-44).

Economic conditions were entailing the practical measures, and the government was signalling this end. Indeed, Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan, by 23 August said: "If taking precaution entails price hike, we do not hesitate to do so for the good of our nation." (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 43). On the other hand, the industrialization efforts that Erbakan always kept at the top of the agenda were continuing. Despite economic constraints, new factories were opened in different regions of Turkey (*Milli*, 31 October 1977). However, there were two points, which became a matter of new disputes among the partners of the coalition. On the one hand, the framework or intensity of economic recovery program, which IMF was forcing, was contradictive. Who would declare this unattractive program was also not clear, on the other. Finally, Süleyman Demirel declared the recovery program on 8 September. Measures, explained by Demirel were listed under three main titles: 1) Measures related to increase in export and balance of external payments 2) Measures related to speeding up investments, financing, and reducing the losses of Public Economic Enterprises. 3) Measures related to struggle with costliness and inflation (Parlamento, Sept 1977). Each of these three items was detailed in sub-items. For example, the "measures" mentioned in the first article were explained by 16 sub-items such as minimizing the formalities related to export, facilitating the importation of raw materials required for the production of the goods to be exported, expanding the scope of export credits etc. (Yalansız, 2006: 259).

No sooner had the austerity program was declared than the price rise began. Prices of petroleum products and electricity were in the lead. At first prices of staple food products were not taken into the scope of increase lest social effect would be negative. However, these products had already become scarce and went on the black market, so the government was forced to take sugar, tea, coal, and bottle gas into the scope of price hike (Parlamento, Sept 1977). Demirel was trying to defend the hikes and the measures taken and said, "Governments do not always do likeable work. Nevertheless, the decisions are in the best interest of the country. Losing more time could have required tougher decisions." Ecevit, the main opposition leader, blamed the government heavily on the price hikes: "Low-incomers, fixed-wage earners, pensioners, peasants, workers, and public officials will bring those who

have exhausted all state facilities like the electoral fund of their parties in two and a half years, to the book. They will claim, against those who drove the Turkish economy to such severe depression and dragged people to poverty, their rights and get all of them." (Parlamento, Sept 1977). Ecevit, answering questions on the subject, said that neither the state nor the economy and regime could put up with waiting election that would be held four years later, and asked for early election (Parlamento, Sept 1977).

IMF delegation who came to Turkey at the beginning of the September welcomed the austerity package that government commenced (Yankı, 19-25 Sept 1977) but it was regarding devaluation as complementary for better economic balance and was urging for it. However, the government was unwilling such a measure that will draw more reaction from people. Erbakan, the chair of the national economic board seemed more objecting to this imposition by IMF. However, the government yielded, and 10% devaluation was decided by September 20 (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 48).

While IMF was not satisfied by the rate of devaluation, outcries of different sectors against hikes and devaluation resounded. Istanbul business circles, worker unions, opposition parties, and press organs were severely criticising these economic implementations. While some journalists were implying government could not survive these social reactions, even some others who were correspondents of the rightist newspapers were drawing attention to the political conclusions of last economic situations and warning the government (Yalansız, 2006:382-383). Cihat Bilgehan, the Minister of Finance, went to Washington at this time for deallocation of the credit that was projected by IMF. After series of meetings, he stated that 45 million dollars were prescribed to be lent, but this decision was not ultimate yet, and it would be approved after an examination in Turkey that would be made by a new IMF delegation (Parlamento, Oct 1977). Government, in the meantime, decided to alleviate the effects of economic grievances and by 20 October announced the hike in salaries of pubic officers, retired, orphans and widows, which would annoy the IMF delegation (Parlamento, Nov 1977).

Political violence which was increasingly continuing was one of the fundamental problems that left the government up against the wall during this period. News of violence and other crimes such as killing, wounding, bombing, bank robbery, began to be encountered more frequently than former years and that trend would continue until 1980. In this tense atmosphere of the right-left conflict, the way the right-wing and left-wing newspapers

interpreted events became more partial and even hostile. For example, Nazlı Ilıcak, the right-wing columnist of *Tercüman* Daily, argued that the violence stemmed mainly from the left-wing and that it should be crushed (Ilıcak, 7 Ağu 1977). Abdi İpekçi, however, was saying something different. After confirming that the anarchy increased day by day and that the anarchy had both the left and the right wings, he argued that leftist anarchy came from fractions other than CHP, and the CHP did not protect them, did not tolerate them, and opposed it. However, the rightist anarchy was not independent of the MHP; the right-wing anarchist organizations were associated with the MHP and were supported by it (İpekçi, 17 Nov 1977).

MSP and Erbakan's attitude on social tension and street conflicts are worth mentioning. MSP has always been sensitive about keeping its base out of political violence. The MSP youth branches were not involved in social conflicts, which became frequent during this period. A senior official of the MSP Recai Kutan emphasized this situation in the National Assembly and stated that his party represents peace and stability in terms of both organization and youth branches (MM, JD, 15/6/1978, 353) Şener Battal, one of the MSP's group chairman, explained that anarchy could not be attributed to merely one side because it emerged from both sides: "The external power is not just Russia. America is also included in external powers. Those who appeared with the claim of crushing communism have no more work to do after quelling them and started looking for more adventure and action." (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 41).

While the coalition government struggled with economic hardship and social unrest, the AP's unrest within it further reduced the coalition government's performance. Factions within the AP restricted the party's ability to move. One of these factions brought the *grand coalition* of CHP-AP back on the agenda, arguing that the country could only recover with such a grand coalition (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 46-51). There were harsh debates and accusations between this group and those who vehemently opposed to a coalition with CHP, at various meetings of the party. Party leader Demirel, was taking the brunt of demand that was urging forming a coalition of CHP-AP. He was reiterating that "AP and CHP could not form a coalition, because, otherwise political mission of AP would end in that they had always been against communism and leftist view so if they had collaborated with them, people would call the party for an account and that party's raison d'etre would die out." (Yalansız, 2006: 263).

Some of the opposition members complained that the government's partners, the MHP and the MSP, were not acting harmoniously on issues such as cadres and economic policies. Demirel sometimes made statements in line with the pressures of this opposition group. For example, in a statement on behalf of the party administration, after reproaching the coalition partners about abusing power and administration, it was said "AP would not think to remain in power at all hazards. Our party will remain in power as long as it is useful and a need for Turkey." Likewise, Demirel said in a statement that "We will not remain in power if our competent boards decide so" (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 53). However, these statements were not enough to settle the boiling crucible. There was a rumour that CHP had persuaded a group of AP deputies and offered eight of them a ministry. It was also said that leading deputies within this opposing group was aspiring for being minister so they were resented by Demirel's attitude towards them (7 Gün, 23 Nov 1977). The fact that this opposition group voted in favour of the CHP in the election of the Speaker of the Parliament aggravated the internal tension. Demirel at the AP General Executive Board meeting, said, "Let the traitors in us go away. Whatever we are, let's stay and conduct the cause that way." (Yalansız, 2006: 264).[26]

While the tension within the AP threatened the existence of the coalition government, Ecevit commenced an election preparation on 12 November, one month before the local elections. He, expecting a successful outcome, stressed that these elections meant a referendum in terms of the credibility of the current government and would finish the coalition. National Front parties, in turn, were claiming that, as this was a local election, it had nothing to do with the survival of coalition government (Yankı, 21 Nov-4 Dec 1977).

However, the reports, revealing the new disagreements within AP and among coalition parties, were signalling that government's lifetime did not seem to last much after the local elections. The visit of foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil from AP to Egypt had been a matter of new disputes within the government (Emre, 2002c: 139). This was because MSP, MHP and a few AP deputies opposed to the visit on the ground that this visit would mean

[26] Temel Karamollaoğlu, who was a deputy during this coalition period, put forward the following interesting view regarding this process: "Despite these statements, Demirel consented to the development of a conspiracy which aimed the collapse of the coalition." Karamollaoğlu, set forth his idea in the following words: "Because we would not make concessions on our principles… because they could not satisfy their expectations, their environment or external powers if they kept up with us… so this is a planned business… Demirel could not say that I am breaking the coalition, 12 people resigned from Demirel's party and left. 11 of them became ministers in Ecevit's government. So even this is the sign of a conspiracy, clear. Those 12 people could not go without Demirel's consent." (Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020).

supporting Egypt's policy of rapprochement toward Israel, which could lead to a disruption of Turkey's relations with many other Muslim countries (*Milli,* 30 Nov 1977). The other serious problem by this time was a new devaluation and a letter of intent, which was supposed to be sent to IMF. The rate of devaluation and the content of the letter were controversial. Payment of foreign debts, the arrangement of the currency, momentum of growth, credit limits, volume and structure of external and internal loans, level of public investment expenditures, interest rates, and scrutiny of IMF on all these topics became a matter of long discussions within the government. Erbakan, particularly, was questing to prevent hard constraints and the control of IMF on Turkish economic policy (Yankı, 21 Nov-4 Dec 1977).

Within this political and economic limbo, the country went for local elections by 11 December 1977. CHP proved victorious gaining 42 mayoralties of 67 provinces. AP could win only 15 and MSP 3 provinces mayoralties. MHP winning in 5 provinces became the other successful party in these elections (*Hürriyet,* 1978 Almanac: 59).

Beginning by the Election Day by two deputies, a series of resignations came, and within 10 days this number reached 11. This group declared that "We will support any initiative we will find in the interests of our nation as an independent group, leaving those who did not strive to realize the two big parties (the AP-CHP) partnership in order to solve the problems of the country, on the contrary, made it impossible, with their historical responsibilities." Group of independent deputies added that it was not possible for them to participate anymore in the responsibility of this government, which jeopardized Turkey's free parliamentary regime (19 Dec 1977).

The rumour that this group had left their party with the promise of being a minister in the government to be established by the CHP relayed by the right-wing press during those days. According to these reports, the group was causing dissolution of the current government for their personal interests rather than the "interest of the country" or "protection of regime". Deputies, number of whom reached 12 in the meantime hastily denied these claims and replied: "We do not expect an office or position." (*Milliyet*, 25 Dec 1977). However, it soon became apparent that this defence did not reflect the truth. It would leave no room for doubt about the resignation reason of these deputies when a week later the list of the cabinet was revealed that 10 out of 11 former deputies of AP were nominated as

ministers. However, these deputies defended themselves against the condemnation of dissolving the government for their interests.

With these resignations, the coalition government lost the majority support. Thus, the left circles began to put pressure on the government to resign. It seemed that these circles did not tolerate even a week for the government fall by a no-confidence motion. Abdi İpekçi, for example, said, "A week is a waste of time with the motion of no confidence and is wrong for country affairs." (*Milliyet*, 22 Dec 1977). However, the government leader implied that they were expecting action from the opponent party, to leave the post (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 61). Ecevit, thereupon, after meeting with the leaders of CGP and DP and the group resigned from AP tabled a motion of no confidence on 22 December 1977. The motion was justified on the ground that government was not able to provide the security internally and externally, prevented the integration of the nation because of front conception, impoverished the majority of people and strived to distract the country from the framework that is determined by the constitution (MM, JD, 22/12/1977, 570-571). After all, by 31 December 1977 National Assembly voted the motion of censure, and as was expected, 228 votes of no confidence were used while votes of confidence reduced to 218. Therefore, the Nationalist Front II Coalition government became the first government to be overthrown with the censure. Demirel, on the same day, resigned (*Hürriyet*, 1978 Almanac: 62).

According to Uçar, the main reason why the Second National Front Government ended was the policies that government followed were unsuccessful and far from meeting the people's needs and expectations (Uçar, 2015: 432). However, CHP's effort to subvert the government had been proved quite determinant. Ecevit, in his interview to Journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek in 1985, had said that CHP's neither deputies nor local organizations had the patience to wait until the 1981 General Election. Indeed, no sooner had the Second Nationalist Front government had a vote of confidence than CHP initiated activities to overthrow the government at all costs (Uçar, 2015: 433). The column of Akbal, penned in the third month of the Second Nationalist Front, was giving a clue about the methods of this effort. According to this text, 214 deputies were idle, and only 12 chairs would provide power for CHP's single-party government. Six of them would come from parties out of the coalition and independent deputies. The other six would be extracted from parties within the coalition. Ecevit should not stay still without doing anything; conversely, he should step forward and find somehow a way of coming to power democratically (Akbal, 1977).

Everyone, as to be expected, interpreted the collapse of the government from their political perspectives. According to the right-wing press, the fall of the government was not realized by the national will, but by the "Byzantium intrigues" of Ecevit which were engineered at the hotels of "the Bosphorus" and by the erosions of the personalities. He reached this conclusion by distorting the will of the nation and by seducing the men from the rival party (Kabaklı, 1978). As for Demirel, he claimed that the US had influence in the toppling of the government and that this situation would cause a new government crisis. Erbakan was assessing the incident as "Who did not want a roaring Turkey sabotaged the government." Türkeş, the other partner of the government interpreted this outcome "Foreign powers that are afraid of Turkey that would wake up to it, and their local accomplices bring about this end." (Birand, 1985: 251). Ecevit's had a different view entirely; he stated that the crisis caused by II. National Front, which was continuing for months, ended (*Milliyet*, 1 Jan 1978).

CHAPTER 5: RP-DYP COALITION

5.1. Political Conditions Before the RP-DYP Coalition

The interim military regime had abolished all political parties in 1981 and did not allow their renascence even after returning to the democratic regime (Tanör, 2007: 42). Therefore, new political parties with new leaders emerged. MDP (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi/National Democracy Party), HP (Halkçı Parti/Populist Party), ANAP (Anavatan Partisi/Motherland Party), SODEP (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi/Social Democracy Party), RP, MP (Muhafazakar Parti/Conservative Party) and DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi/True Path Party) were among the new parties that were set up in 1983(Tanör, 2007: 55-56). Some of these parties were indeed representing the grassroots of the former parties and were perceived as their successors: DYP was the successor of AP with its new leader Hüsamettin Cindoruk, RP was the successor of MSP with its new leader Ahmet Tekdal, MP was the successor of MHP (Bora, 1995: 1276), SODEP was the successor of CHP and its new leader was Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü. HP's grassroots was the same with SODEP, so they united under the name of SHP (Social Democrat People's Party/Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti) by 1985. The leader of this united party was Aydın Güven Gürkan, but he would be replaced next year by Erdal İnönü. ANAP was a more independent party with its new charismatic leader Turgut Özal who won two consecutive elections and was Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989. In 1985, DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti/Democratic Left Party) was set up by Rahşan Ecevit, wife of Bülent Ecevit, who was banned from politics like other former leaders (Tanör, 2007: 42). In the same year, MP turned into MÇP (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi/Nationalist Labour Party). In the meantime, in 1986 MDP (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi/Nationalist Democracy Party) dissolved itself and all deputy members of it joined to other parties.

No sooner had the ban lifted by referendum in 1987 than former leaders who were disqualified from political life turned into an arena of politics and took the helm of their parties: Bülent Ecevit headed up the DSP, Süleyman Demirel headed up the DYP, Alparslan Türkeş took the lead of MÇP and Necmettin Erbakan took over the leadership of RP.

Seven political parties raced in early election of 29 November 1987: ANAP, DYP, SHP, DSP, RP, MÇP, and, Reformist Democracy Party (Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi/IDP). While ANAP secured the majority of chairs in the parliament, SHP and DYP became second and third parties to be represented in the parliament. As for DSP, RP and MÇP, they left out

of the parliament because of the election threshold which entailed 10% of total votes for any party to take place in the parliament. However, the vote rate of RP (7.2) seemed to reach almost that of the MSP's votes gained in 1977 election (8.6) (Tanör, 2007: 77).

In 1989 as Turgut Özal was elected as President of Republic by parliament, he rendered the leadership of the ANAP to Yıldırım Akbulut and appointed him as Prime Minister. Akbulut's prime ministry lasted about one and a half year, and by June 1991 he was replaced by Mesut Yılmaz who was elected as party leader in the grand congress of ANAP. Mesut Yılmaz, in line with the demand of opposition parties' leaders, decided to go for an early election and had the parliament decide for an early election which would be held by 20 October 1991(Tanör, 2007: 87).

When the election decision was taken, the issue of alliance with small parties came to the agenda in the RP. Because, as in the 1987 election, they did not want to get stuck again. Indeed, in the local elections held two years ago, the RP's votes were close to 10%. Nevertheless, the RP administration did not want to take risks in this election. The MÇP and IDP were already willing to cooperate, as there was no hope of crossing the threshold by them. For this purpose, interviews were held with MÇP and IDP officials. Although a group in RP opposed an alliance with nationalist parties, the idea of alliance prevailed. Thus, the MÇP and IDP candidates took part in the election lists of RP (Çakır, 1991).

Distribution of votes in 20 October 1991 Election was DYP 27%, ANAP 24 %, SHP 21%, and RP 17% (Demirtaş, 1998: 79). This result was indicating that like the 1960s and 1970s, 1990s was going to be the era of coalition governments with all its advantages and disadvantages after ANAP's single-party rule, which lasted during 1980s.

DYP and SHP formed the first coalition of this term under the prime ministership of Süleyman Demirel, the leader of DYP. This was Demirel's 7th government. After one and a half year, Demirel resigned for the nomination of the post of Presidency of the Republic which became vacant by the unexpected death of Turgut Özal, so this coalition terminated (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 385-390).

The same parties formed the next coalition government but this time under the premiership of Tansu Çiller who had been elected the new leader of DYP. During this government's lifetime which lasted for two years and three months, four leaders of SHP and CHP (which had been set up in 1992 and absorbed SHP in February 1995) carried out a duty

of deputy prime minister: Erdal İnönü, Murat Karayalçın, Hikmet Çetin and Deniz Baykal. Within six months following the dissolution of this coalition, second and third governments of Çiller were founded. While the second government of Çiller was a minority government lasted only 25 days, the third one was a coalition with CHP and lasted for four months (Tunçkaşık, 2017: 33-37).

With the 1991 election, *Milli Görüş* began to be represented in the parliament again after a long interval of 11 years. During this period, RP served as the fourth largest party in the parliament. Erbakan's following words were signalling that *Milli Görüş*, as a party, would be constructive and compromising.

> We want to carry out all our opposition duty with great endeavour and we regard our duty as the most honourable. The task of opposition is as honourable as the task of power. Because, the opposition will help the government to do the services, feed the truths, and try not to make mistakes; it will be constructive, will lead the way, and if government falls, it will hold it by its arm. Here, as the Welfare Party, we are in an effort to do our opposition task with this understanding, the important thing is the happiness of our nation. Whoever does the services; I wish this delegation did, and we would help this delegation. For this reason, our point of action against the delegation is compassion, goodwill, helpfulness. Without a doubt, all our colleagues in the Parliament will behave in the same way. Now, with that compassion, I am starting to do my brotherly duty (TBMM, JD, 28/11/1991, 148).

Milli Görüş movement reached its peak in the 1995 election. However, it had a steady upward trend during the decade preceding this point (Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020). After the 4.4% rate in the local elections in which it was caught unprepared in 1984, it continuously increased its votes until coming to power. In the 1987 General Election, it approached its potential before the coup. These elections proved that *Milli Görüş* had built up itself roughly to the level of 1977 election. However, 7.2 % of votes were below the 10 % electoral threshold the new rule decreed by the 1982 Constitution, and therefore RP could not gain a chair in parliament.

Nevertheless, RP and Erbakan ran a significant opposition from out of the parliament against ANAP, the ruling party and continued to increase its strength. In the 1989 local elections, the rate of votes reached 9.8% (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 32). RP during the same period criticised the current situation of human rights in the context of freedom of thought and belief, economic policies, moral degradation, quest of joining the European Community, and Gulf War particularly. During the same period, RP strengthened its local organizations, intensified its public relations and brought forward more social and economic themes such

as poverty, health, education, social security, rights etc. Within this context party put forward its "fair order" ideal against the current "slave order". This time was also when particular Islamist civil society groups began to leave ANAP and gravitate to RP (Arpacı, 2017: 279-284). All these developments carried the party to the front line in 1991 election in which RP secured the 16.9 % of total votes and became the fourth party after DYP, ANAP and SHP. The March 1994 Local Elections also proved the rising popularity of RP because its rate of votes increased to 19 %. Moreover, its success in winning the Mayoralty of İstanbul and Ankara metropoles made a tremendous impression (Akşin, 2007: 167).

24 December 1995 General Election, to the chagrin of far laicists brought *Milli Görüş* Party to the top with 21.4% votes. The other feature of these election was that the votes of parties were quite close to each other (Erbakan, 1995: 9). In other words, the votes were distributed between major parties evenly, which was indicating the continuation of coalition governments.

7. Election Results 1995

PARTIES	RP	ANAP	DYP	DSP	CHP	MHP	HADEP
Percentage of votes	21,4	19,6	19,2	14,6	10,7	8,2	4,7
Number of Deputies	158	132	135	76	49	-	-


Source: YSK (High Election Board)

Dinç (2008:3), ascribes the rise of *Milli Görüş* in these period to several reasons. First of them was the party's strong grassrots organization, which personally reached the neighborhoods and streets and propogated the party's discourse ardently. Secondly, the party highlighted the fundamental material issues of the society rather than religious themes, thus trying to persuade large segments of the society. Another reason was that while the party gained sympathy via public reliefs in the municipal administrations it controlled, it also increased its political experience by getting in close contact with the people.

Arpacı gathers the reasons that carried RP to the first within five points. The first one is its organization. RP, unlike other parties, chose to reach the electorates in person and make its propaganda face to face. With its branches of woman, youth etc. it diffused all aspects of

society, and highly motivated personnel of the party delivered a remarkable performance. The second reason is the socio-political transformation. Accelerating urbanization after the 1950s generated a broad poor population which had traditional culture and could breezily observe the political and economic distribution of national sources. While this population was articulated to revolutionary left by 60s and 70s, it began to approach to political Islam and express their demands within this context.

8. The Rise of RP (Welfare Party)



Source: YSK (High Election Board)

The third reason is considered to be the failure of centre-right and centre-left parties. Voters observed that centre-right had lost its identity and its capacity to meet the demand of people through the downfall of ANAP and the coalitions of DYP by 1990. The same years coincided with the international discredit of socialist ideology and leftist views. Hence, the voters of suburbs began to move toward RP instead of social democrat parties. Endless corruption reports of both centre-right and left parties throughout national and local level disappointed the poor sections of society, and this turned into a reaction which expressed itself in the slogans of RP "Fair Order". Changing economic structure is taken another reason which helped the rise of RP. After the liberal economic policies of Özal, petty bourgeoisie, tradesmen and craftsmen broadened their influence and began to compete with traditional economic elites, and supported the RP in pursuit of taking their share from public resources. The last reason is accepted to be the disappointment of Turkish society in the face of EU's manner regarding the membership of Turkey and the Western indifference toward the events happened in Bosnia where thousands of Muslims were massacred (Arpacı, 2017: 296-301).

No matter what counted for the rise of *Milli Görüş*, RP's success deemed very critical in that *secular established order* (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 33) of the country saw this situation as a "dangerous" for their interest. The victory of RP was defined as a significant handicap for "order" (Akşin, 2007: 169). Indeed, another *Milli Görüş* party, MSP, had participated in government in the 1970s even with Ecevit's CHP. However, at the time, MSP was the small partner of the government, and Ecevit was prime minister. However, now, Erbakan was at the position of being prime minister. At that point, someone was consoling himself or herself saying that RP's vote was 21% and the remaining 79 were against them. However, the reality that serious discord was available between other parties was unsettling for them. It was seen that there was a severe conflict on the one hand between the leaders of ANAP and DYP, on the other hand between the leaders of DSP and CHP (Akşin, 2007: 169).

These results were entailing a compromise to form a coalition government. However, DYP and ANAP, although they were centre-right parties, had declared during election campaigns that they would not collaborate with RP to form a coalition. That means, finding a partner for the government would be quite tricky for RP, and coalition alternatives were not much. Indeed, it was felt that business circles, mainstream media which was ascribing the representation of "public opinion" to itself and also the army was favouring the ANAP+DYP coalition since all of them were against RP. Nonetheless, these two parties did not suffice to secure the majority of the parliament (276 chair) which was requisite for the establishment of government. Therefore, another support was required from other parties for which DSP was said to be appropriate (Devrim, 1995: 1160-1164). On the other hand, personal disunity between Mesut Yılmaz and Tansu Çiller seemed to be a real handicap for cooperation.

The fact that the distance between Yılmaz and Çiller did not close was eliminating the possibility of a government without Erbakan. This situation caused significant discomfort in the circles that reflected Erbakan and RP as a threat to the established order or secular system. *Hürriyet* Daily, as one of the main actors of this approach, said under the headline of "Here is the price of obstinacy" that since Çiller and Yılmaz did not agree for their stubbornness, the coast is clear for an anti-secular party. The task of forming a government is likely to be given by the President to Erbakan tomorrow (*Hürriyet*, 9 Jan 1996). Oktay Ekşi, a prominent columnist of *Hürriyet*, argued that RP's deputies were very compatible at

the oath-taking ceremony of the parliament, they did nothing to disturb the Kemalists, but they were engaging in deception. He claimed, “even if others do not now, we know that they hate Ataturk, they try to overthrow secularism” (Ekşi, 1996).

Nevertheless, President Demirel made a 5-hour meeting with political party leaders and entrusted the government forming task to Necmettin Erbakan as the leader of the largest party in parliament. Erbakan had declared from the beginning that he could form a coalition both with the centre-right and centre-left (Devrim, 1995: 1160-1167). In his first statement after commissioning, Erbakan said that the coalition would form with RP one hundred per cent, that he would meet with all the leaders including DSP and CHP, but he would give back the office without even extending a day if they were to say no. Erbakan said, also, “In case they say 'We will build between us' then we will say 'Here you are' and we will watch the theatre.”

Mesut Yılmaz said, at this point, that the most challenging thing they could do was cooperate with RP, that DYP seemed to be the best partner, but there were difficulties. Ecevit, in return held that, they would support the coalition of ANA-YOL (ANAP and DYP), and that they saw any coalition with RP as dangerous for the regime (*Hürriyet,* 10 Jan 1996).

Erbakan met with leaders of DYP, ANAP, DSP and CHP with the intention of the forming coalition but it turned out that no leader wanted to cooperate with him (Kamalak, Interview, Feb 2020). Thus he returned the task to the President (*Hürriyet,* 20 Jan 1996).

According to Şevket Kazan, one of the leading figures of RP, there were two reasons why particularly DYP and ANAP parties did not agree on forming a coalition with RP. The first one was that these parties had mentioned RP during their election propaganda as a symbol of fear. Therefore, their acceptance of forming a coalition in the first round may be taken as discrepancy by public opinion. The second reason was that capitalist class and media had a significant influence on the two-party leaders (Kazan, 2006: 53).

After Erbakan abandoned the task of forming a government, Demirel assigned Tansu Çiller, leader of DYP, to form a coalition. Çiller made the most critical meeting on forming a government with Mesut Yılmaz. However, the two sides could not agree on the Prime Ministry (*Hürriyet,* 24 Jan 1996). Çiller's meeting with Erbakan was more like a courtesy visit. She did not offer partnerships. However, Erbakan said to her “Look! I am telling you

as an elder brother; let us form a coalition government together." (*Hürriyet*, 1 Feb 1996). However, this advice did not benefit, and Çiller abandoned the effort as well.

It was Mesut Yılmaz's turn to take over the task. He had a series of meeting with party leaders, starting from CHP. His last appointment was with RP. Şener says that he has seen a non-compromising attitude in Mesut Yilmaz during RP-ANAP meetings he attended. This was because Yılmaz had an ANAP-DYP coalition under his premiership in his mind (Interview, Feb 2020).

Nevertheless, thanks to Erbakan's concessions, the Yilmaz-Erbakan agreement seemed close. Erbakan had accepted to support the Yılmaz minority government for the first two months, and ceding "important" ministries to ANAP (*Hürriyet*, 18 Feb 1996). When the news of Mesut Yılmaz's agreement with Erbakan spread, an intense attack against probable ANAP-RP coalition began.

Erbakan's assessment about the attackers of the likely coalition of ANAP-RP was as following:

> Those who opposed RP-coalitions on the grounds of secularism and Republican principles were just a few rentiers and some media in their hands. These were in contradiction with the society, which made RP the largest party.

Erbakan continued with the following words:

> He, who is loyal to democracy, should respect RP. Since RP is the biggest party, it is natural for the RP to form a government. If a person does not say that, there is a disease in him…Secularism means equal treatment of all religions and respect for all beliefs of the people. In turn, there are some fossils in our country whose period has ended, but traces remain to want to carry out hostility against religion under the name of secularism…They attack because the student wears a headscarf, the officer prays, the officer's wife wears a headscarf. If you are involved in people's clothes, it is a "guardian state." We would like to "waiter" state instead. This state will find bread and work for the people (*Hürriyet*, 23 Feb 1996).

The most powerful spokesperson of the rentier class, which Erbakan mentioned, was *Hürriyet*, Daily. Strongly opposed this coalition, the newspaper took the word of Erbakan "I did not change" to the headline, as it offers confession to the public (*Hürriyet*, 22 Feb 1996). Oktay Ekşi, lead writer of the daily was interpreting this report with this title: "It is clear as a day" (*Hürriyet*, 23 Feb 1996).

While waiting for the completion of the process of ANAP-RP coalition, somehow, Mesut Yılmaz suddenly gave up the negotiations on coalition and turned his attention to DYP (*Hürriyet,* 24 Feb 1996). The convincing theory explaining this sudden change of mind was that the soldier had indirectly warned him for not to cooperate with RP. In Erbakan's words "The coalition to be established with ANAP was broken with the call of several rentiers, and Mesut Yılmaz had therefore made a U-turn." (*Milli,* 9 June 1996). Thereupon, during the last week of February, the ANAP-DYP talks accelerated, and as of March 4, following the desire of the capital and the military bureaucracy, the leader of the two parties signed the ANAP-DYP Protocol (*Hürriyet,* 4 Mar 1996). Defenders of the established order, such as Oktay Ekşi, who saw the Welfare Party as an ogre welcomed this news with great relief: "They saved the country from the RP nightmare" (*Hürriyet,* 6 Mar 1996). Ertugrul Özkök, on the other hand, was attempting to justify the abortion of ANAP-RP coalition by military intervention. In his column titled "There was no intervention, but wish", he said: "According to Yılmaz, the commanders stated that they wanted ANAP and DYP to come together when talking about ANAP-RP coalition in the office of the Speaker of the National Assembly Mustafa Kalemli… However, beyond that there was also hearsay: The generals gave the Speaker of the Assembly the Republic daily's clipping of article penned by İlhan Arsel, and said: "Forward this to Mr Mesut. We put our signature under it." In this article of January 8, it is said: "There are forces in Turkey to prevent the RP from coming to power." (Özkök, 13 Mar 1996). Everybody knew that "forces" meant military power. Oktay Ekşi, also, referring the event aforementioned, confirmed that the army is involved in this process. He, after citing the words of the Chief of Staff in the context of *secularism and reactionism* held that "I find it *funny* to discuss whether the army interfered." (Ekşi, 14 Mar 1996).

Mesut Yılmaz, following the wish of influential business circles and the army, formed a coalition with DYP, agreeing on rotating prime ministry (Akşin, 2007: 169). The parliament approved this government with the support of DSP, which had promised to give abstention votes, by 12 March 1996 (Neziroğlu, 2013: 7383).

However, as time passed, disunity between leaders of collaborating parties, which could be seen since the coalition bargains, intensified, (Ayata and Ayata, 2001: 93). On the other hand, RP did not intend to leave this coalition alone. Firstly, RP sent the motion of inquiry files to the Assembly containing the allegations of corruption about DYP leader

Çiller (*Milli,* 2 Apr 1996). Abdullah Gül, deputy leader of RP, alleged that these files were so significant that could lead Çiller to the Supreme Court, and that their aim was not to put the government into a difficult situation but to ensure the emergence of the truth. Files were about allegedly tender corruptions of TEDAŞ and TOFAŞ (*Milli*, 25 Apr, 10 May 1996). Secondly, applied to the constitutional court because the vote of confidence given to the current government was invalid (*Milli,* 13 Apr 1996).

While the RP was pushing the government in this way, circles fearing the breakdown of the government intensified their efforts to condemn the RP in the military eye. *Hürriyet,*'s move was that, with the headline "A strange word from RP", tried to provoke the military. According to the report, RP's vice-president Oğuzhan Asiltürk criticised practice of the army. Asiltürk, in his speech, was opposing a decree of military force, which included the order that the rank of the military personnel must not go to the mosque. He said that this was not secularism but hostility to religion (*Hürriyet,* 24 Mar 1996). Three days after this report, *Hürriyet,* took a reaction that it incited and carried it to the headline: "The response of the soldier" (*Hürriyet,* 27 Mar 1996). The newspaper exaggerated both Asilturk's words and the reaction of the military in order to increase the conflict. In the meantime, veteran writer Ertuğrul Özkök, a reputed adversary of RP, was affirming the military's response and suggesting that civilians had to react to this statement before the soldiers reacted. (Özkök, 27 Mar 1996). His attitude meant more than affirming the reaction of the soldiers because to him, such an explanation that was against secularism had to be cursed early by the government and political parties so that this explanation burden should not have been put on the soldiers. Erbakan, meanwhile, expressed his discomfort with this aggressive and provocative manner of mainstream media and severely scolded those who are behind this intrigue. However, his protest was similarly exploited by the media and presented in the same style, as seen in this headline: "They waged war on the media (*Hürriyet,* 27 Mar 1996)."

On those days, one of the RP's staff, Süleyman Arif Emre's "Army-RP relations and inner peace" was drawing attention. According to Emre, some exceptional events between the army and the RP were exaggerated in the purpose of creating tension between the two. However, opening the gap between the country's strongest party and the military would harm internal peace. While such an incitement should be avoided, some of the media were mischief-maker. By giving examples from the recent political history, Emre argued that there

is a consensus among the army and RP staff. The examples were as follows: In the case of anti-secularism after 12 September, the MSP rulers were found innocent in a military court. In the 1974 Cyprus movement, the position of Erbakan and the military was joint. In 1974, the military representatives of the Senate gave full support to Erbakan's heavy industry project. Emre explaining these examples in detail tried to prove that his party did not contradict with the army; on the contrary, there was consensus between them (Emre, 1 Apr 1996).

During April and May, the files of corruption against Çiller kept the agenda busy. The never-ending hatred between the two partners, Çiller and Yılmaz, once again come to light in the investigation files brought against Çiller (Sazak, 29 June 1996). She could not find support from her government partner against these files. Çiller seeing that her partner would not support her against corruption claims of opposition; decided to terminate this partnership and initiated overtures with RP for a new coalition (Tunçkaşık, 2017: 38). On the other hand, an ongoing judicial process against the legitimacy of the current coalition accelerated the end of this coalition. Constitutional Court had decided by 14 May that parliament resolution on a vote of confidence was null. Thus with the resignation of Yılmaz by 7 June 1996 ANAP+DYP coalition government ended (Akşin, 2007: 169).

5.2. Formation Structure and Protocol of the RP-DYP Coalition

Erbakan, having been assigned to form a government for the second time, on the day that Yılmaz resigned, revealed that his priority was the coalition with ANAP (*Milli*, 9 June 1996). Erbakan explained the reason for his preference of ANAP in these words: "Because ANAP is the youth branch of our RP. ANAP established because the military administration closed us down. Özal was already our İzmir candidate. Most of the fellows who founded ANAP are members of our old party." (Civaoğlu, 9 June 1996). However, as always, he was open to different alternatives. For example, just a week ago, the deputy chairman of the party had called for a tripartite coalition of RP-ANAP-DYP for a powerful government (*Milli*, 1 June 1996). Likewise, Erbakan's statement was inclusive toward all parties. He said that they were close to all parties with regard to forming a government, that the most critical issue in the coalition government was the trust, sincerity and harmony among the partners, that because the country had lost 6 months since the election, he would meet with his party's authorized boards as soon as possible, contact the parties represented in the Grand National

Assembly, speak to them fraternally, and propose to work together. Erbakan went on as follows:

> We can come together in good faith with all the parties in the Parliament and work in perfect harmony. This is not just a wish. Because we have done these things before, we have the most experience in this regard. We once formed coalitions together with our social democratic friends and served our country very well. We have also formed coalitions with liberal-minded, national conservation-minded parties. We worked in harmony with all of them. There is no reason not to do the same things today. Within the framework of the establishment of the government, we will make contacts with all parties. We expect all parties to act in a constructive manner as well." (*Milli*, 8 June 1996).

Erbakan's calls for compromise targeting ANAP, in particular, continued during the week. He urged that the leaders should not act in an emotional and biased way and reminded that the RP-ANAP-DYP-BBP coalition would create a strong government with 430 seats (*Milli*, 10 June 1996).

In his speech at the TGNA group meeting, Erbakan made compromise once again: "All political parties are brothers. Indeed, we agree on the issues of the country, but there are some differences in the point of view regarding the solution of the issues. Mr Yılmaz must listen to the voice of his group and the organization. Although ANAP says 'no' today to our offer, our door will be open to them again, but the sooner they are, the better for them." (*Milli*, 12 June 1996).

However, Erbakan's urgent calls were in vain. Yılmaz was determined not to meet with RP. Moreover, he made anti-RP statements and said that rule of RP would be a waste of time (*Hürriyet*, 9 June 1996). As for CHP leader, Deniz Baykal, he refused Erbakan's call on the grounds that "Establishment of a government in the name of not to leave the country without government, by parties which cannot agree with each other, is not a solution." (*Milli*, 12 June 1996). Ecevit's response was negative too. Erbakan, at the meeting, said "In 1974, we established a government. This government made important services. Let's work together." Ecevit, after the interview, stated that "RP leader Erbakan, with his silver tongue, almost convinced us that there is no difference between RP and DSP." Ecevit had said concisely "We will be more useful if we stay in the opposition, and you be in power." (*Milli*, 13 June 1996).

Under these conditions, it seemed that the only option left for the coalition was DYP. By this time three motions of parliamentary investigation, submitted against Tansu Çiller,

seemed to ease the assent of her for partnership with RP (Kamalak, Interview, Feb 2020). Indeed these motions were instigated by RP and had contributed to the dissolution of the former ANAYOL coalition government. Now as DYP was moderating its attitude toward RP and coming to the compromising table, RP was giving a signal of not supporting these motions. (Yalansız, 470) As a matter of fact, as of mid-June, the talks between Erbakan and Çiller took a positive turn (*Milli,* 15 June 1996). For several days, the two leaders discussed and agreed on the basic principles of the coalition. At this stage, the RP, as a gesture, withdrew its motions tabled against Çiller (*Hürriyet,* 15 June 1996).

On the other hand, RP members voted against the motion of inquiry, which was submitted by DSP, about discretionary fund against Çiller, so that exonerated Çiller (*Hürriyet,* 20 June 1996). Likewise, the two parties rejected an investigation against Erbakan and accepted the motion of inquiry targeting Mesut Yılmaz (*Milli,* 20 June 1996). Among these gestures and mutual attitude increased the rapprochement of the two parties.

The question who would be prime minister was a matter of dispute for a while. Tansu Çiller, although her party had fewer seats in the parliament, demanded that she become a prime minister while Erbakan would be a deputy prime minister. In this, as always, the pressure of the tutelary regime on Erbakan was very influential. Actually, according to Şener, Erbakan would also accept this proposal under the current conditions. This atmosphere was dominant at the party caucus. However, the situation changed with the news that Tansu Çiller had taken a step back and accepted the formula of the rotating prime ministry (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020). According to the agreement, the first prime minister would be Erbakan, and after the end of the second year, he would leave the office to Çiller (*Hürriyet,* 27 June 1996). As for the distribution of offices in the cabinet, it was arranged as follows (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015c: 2350):

RP: Prime Ministry, 10 Ministries of State, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Works and Housing, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ministry of Energy and National Resources, Ministry of Culture, and Ministry of Environment.

DYP: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Ministry, 9 Ministries of State, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of

Health, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Tourism, and Ministry of Forests.

The 54th Government of Turkey, under the Prime ministership of Erbakan, was founded on 28 June 1996 with the President's approval of the cabinet (*Hürriyet*, 29 June 1996). The two parties have prepared and signed the coalition protocol as well as the sharing of ministries.

It was stated in the introduction of protocol that "Democracy is a regime of compromise." Besides, it was expressed that a robust compromise based on principles and programs was a pre-condition for stability which Turkey needed (Neziroğlu, 2015: 2352).

About security and internal peace, fight with terror would be effectively conducted. All economic and social measures would be taken in order to provide welfare and peace for citizens living in Eastern and South-Eastern regions of the country.

In the economic area, a shift from unearned economy to production economy was prescribed. Inflation would be reduced, and sustainable growth would be realized. The fair tax system would be secured. Infrastructure investments would be given priority. Public investments would concentrate on health, education and eliminating regional inequalities. Liberal policies would be followed for foreign capital. Incentive policies would be implemented in a way that will develop new investment possibilities, support small and medium-sized enterprises, contribute to the improvement of development priority regions. State, for turning back its original functions of justice, security and infrastructure investment, would accelerate the actions of privatization.

The agricultural policy would be implemented in a way that production would be directed toward the internal and external need and development of husbandry sector would be given importance.

As a solution for energy shortage, alongside other measures, nuclear power plants would be built. Search for petroleum would be accelerated.

Compulsory education time would be 8 years. All social security institutions would be united.

Transparency and openness of state was essential, and for that aim all legal actions and regulations would be developed.

International relations would be run within the framework of friendship, good neighbourhood, and collaboration. Development of relations with Muslim countries, Central Asia Turkic Republics and Balkan countries would be sought. All international and strategic agreements would be honoured, but the implementation of these agreements to the detriments of Turkey would not be allowed.

In processes of appointments and assignment, the signature of the deputy prime minister for all processes that prime minister was assigning would be made necessary, and this change would be legalized by law.

It was evident that this coalition, which was opposed by military forces, left-wing circles, capitalist circles and the mainstream media, would remain under heavy pressure. The two parties having the majority support in the parliament had agreed but the heavy press, both internal and external, that never ceased, manifested itself from the first days. First, the negative signals from the west began to arrive early. Jacques Chirac, the French President, for example, said in these days without hesitation "If RP comes to power; we will freeze relations of Turkey with the West." (*Milliyet,* 24 June 1996). Internal pressure would be very prominent. With the establishment of the government, the mainstream media embarked on relentless propaganda to prevent the vote of confidence. This media intensely voiced the disturbance from the military, capital and left circles. The reactions of these uncomfortable circles were mainly voiced by *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet*, dailies. *Milliyet* columnist Oktay Akbal was saying those to people who were thinking that it would be useful to try RP for once:

> ... However, Erbakan, Asiltürk and Kazan are in charge of this party. (Those people) are forgetting Erbakan's many monstrous lies, his effort to disseminate his own party and thought, his attitude and behaviour that will lead the country to the darkness of medieval age… What can those who are against all the principles of the Republic of Turkey, modernity, secularism, human rights, enlightenment, universal cultural fusion give to our people and our country? (Akbal, 13 June 1996).

Hürriyet, the day after the government was approved by the President, also blamed Çiller with "ceding" the government to Erbakan. Putting Erbakan's enormous picture with prayer beads and rosary together with the report was attention-grabbing (*Hürriyet*, 29 June 1996). The next day its headline was "Disaster for Turkey". According to the news, two days later, *Hürriyet,* had conducted a public opinion poll, and according to this poll, the votes of

the DYP had fallen to below 10% because of the coalition with RP (*Hürriyet,* 2 July 1996). The pressure of the media and the tutelary elites behind it was so great against Çiller, who opened the way for power to Erbakan and *Milli Görüş.* (Kutan, Interview, Feb 2020).

In the meantime, as the RP's coalition government was approaching the vote of confidence, the pressure was increasing. *Hürriyet,* under the title "A Day of Historical Test" made the following comment: "The quality of the regime and the fate of the Republic will be voted in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Prudent votes will determine the fate of Turkey." In the same day leader writer of the daily, Oktay Ekşi made the following warning in his column: "DYP deputies who will give a vote of confidence to this government should not forget: ... They will either sell the future of this nation for the sake of saving Tansu Çiller or go down in history as honourable people of the republic. Theirs is the choice." (Ekşi, 8 July 1996).

Milliyet columnist Derya Sazak said in his article titled "Before it is too late" established similarity between Turkey and Iran and likened the Premiership of Erbakan to the Khomeini's coming to power. Blaming the DYP leader Çiller with betraying to women and youth who voted for her, he warned the deputies of the DYP against supporting this coalition and said otherwise they would confess their sins in 2000s years (Sazak, 30 June 1996). Oktay Akbal, another prominent columnist, was saying that in his article titled "Like undergoing a nightmare" that "Turkey was to cross the turning point, but it seems as if what had been said yesterday are forgotten today: secularism, Kemalism, modernity, civilization are thrust aside… the partnership of a sister from Ankara with the mentor of those who declared the Republic of Atatürk as an arch-enemy." (Akbal, 7 July 1996).

The next day *Hürriyet,* announced the coming of RP to power with these words selected carefully: "The Welfare in Power: The 74-year-old Republic, for the first time in its history, entered the rule of an Islamist party, which won 21% of the vote in the general election (*Hürriyet,* 9 July 1996). Yavuz Donat, at his column, called the parliament that gave the vote of confidence to this coalition as "Turkish Grand National Theatre", which was also the title of his article (9 July 1996). Doğan Heper, another columnist of *Milliyet*, was accusing all who did not prevent the government of RP, i.e. Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller, Mesut Yılmaz, and Bülent Ecevit. Thus, he was revealing how severe was his hostility to the RP was (Heper, 9 July 1996). Oktay Ekşi started with the question "How did we get here?" to his article. He, after giving several names of journalists and politicians who had objected

the warning of "There is a danger of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey" said "We came to these days because of the intellectuals and irresponsible politicians who did not see their reality. However, despite them, we will survive (*Hürriyet,* 10 July 1996).

These pressures began to show their effect. Among this campaign of hostility, Mesut Yılmaz attacked the RP with harsh words: "The leader of the RP is a very good hope-monger. When Erbakan came to power, he forgot about the fair order. There can be no fair order of such an immoral government (*Hürriyet,* 10 July 1996). Under the same daunting atmosphere, up to 16 July, some 12 DYP deputies, among whom were notable names such as İsmet Sezgin, Cavit Çağlar, Köksal Toptan, Emre Gönensay, had resigned from DYP (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 425).

In this period, Ecevit was reiterating an argument, which was purported by opponents of *Milli Görüş* frequently. According to this opinion, the RP received 21% of the votes, but the majority of 79% was against the RP on the opposite side. Besides, for Ecevit, this 79% saw the RP as a threat against the regime. Ecevit expressed his views that RP was threatening the regime from the lectern of the parliament:

> No one who adopts democracy cannot find odd the RP's right, as the first party- albeit with a distinction - to form a government; however, the Welfare Party received 21 percent of the votes in the last general election. Against this 21 percent, there is a large majority, close to 80 percent, at least 70 percent, which sees the Welfare Party rule as a severe threat to a secular democratic republic…
>
> The great majority…is offended because RP exploits religious belief for politics... Again, that vast majority object to the Welfare Party because it tries to deflect Turkey from Ataturk's illuminated path. Since they doubt that the vast majority is uneasy about the RP will transform Turkey into some Middle Eastern countries that are ruled by the obsolete regime. In the meantime, we are happy to see in the Protocol and the Government Program some remarks that relieve such concerns. However, in a broad section of the public, the suspicion that these statements are merely a deception is heard, unfortunately, because Mr Erbakan was extremely sweet when he was in charge of forming a government, he was Kemalist, he was secular. However, when the task of forming a government was transferred to someone else, Mr Erbakan and his party showed their real face" (TBMM, JD, 6/7/1996).

Ecevit also, recalling her words against the RP during the election period, criticised Çiller for forming a coalition with RP: "Ms. Çiller, a few weeks ago, was calling Mr Mesut Yılmaz as such: "Do not form a coalition with the RP, do not bury your country and your party into the dark; you will ruin Turkey's future." Now, Ms. Çiller, with her own words, is rotating Turkey and her party into the darkness."

When it comes to Erbakan, he opposed Ecevit's approach and held that it was natural that political parties criticise each other during the electoral period, but it would be wrong if this criticism was taken as an obstacle to the formation of the coalition government. This approach matches Gutmann and Thomson's understanding, who pointed out the necessity for flexibility and psychological shift. Erbakan puts his ideas about this shift with these words:

> Precious spokespeople and party heads have spent most of their speeches here, reading the lists he said, this to him, this said this to that…This is wrong behaviour. Once more, I am expressing that during the elections, the parties must express their convictions about each other…I also thank you for what you said; why is that; now, they want there to be a government out of RP another alternative. They say… they say but, at the and we leave what we said outside the door when 65 million people are waiting for service, come together in the room as the children of this country, now, how to find a job for the unemployed, how will we make a road of our village. How are we going to treat our sick people? We are all the children of this country, and we talk about them as brothers, we solve and serve our people. Otherwise, he said that in the election, he said this after the election ... In this way the Welfare Party and the True Path Party cannot form a coalition. Well, we have told so much about ANAP, and it cannot do it either. We have also said something about DSP, CHP, so they cannot. Who will do this work for God's sake, who will? ... Is there left a word that nobody used to each other?
>
> These are tasks, so let us not even condemn each other; let us say thank you and try to take advantage of them. Making a fuss about, if we plunge into vicious strife in front of 65 million children of the country who are waiting for service, and making them wait, then we can neither satisfy our Assembly nor our people, we cannot serve our people too. Therefore, we need to know how to get over it. There, this is a government established by getting over these; therefore, we all should be happy, and all of us should appreciate it. (TBMM, JD, 6/7/1996)

In his speech at the National Assembly, where the vote of confidence would take place a few days later, Erbakan recalled that they acted in goodwill and unbiased toward all parties, without exception, while trying to form a coalition government. He said that one of these parties accepted the partnership with them, and a compromise was achieved in this way. Through this collaboration, he said, they want to provide tolerance and compromise in Turkey and the world. He also emphasized the requisite for compromise to form a government, which is inevitable to serve the country. Thus, Erbakan once again revealed, by content and style, his compromising character:

> My honourable and venerable friends, indeed my brothers from RP stated what we did between December 24th and June 28th, as an opposition party; what we did is clear: First, in the establishment of the first government, we opened our arms wide to all parties, and we are opening now too. Today,

together with the DSP and the CHP, we can set up a coalition and do the best services to this country; we already did, we do not doubt that. There is no point in developing an attitude of prejudice that will take us away from each other instead of compromise. Therefore, we -you all are witness- did not this mistake; parties other than us fallen into this error more or less.

This government is indeed a compromise government. This is the right word. No matter the definition of compromise is made with this or that word, word plays are of no importance. There are two biggest parties in this country; we have separate bases; now, sincerely, we have come together to serve our people. Our embrace with these brothers and sisters is the embrace of 65 million people.

Let me tell you that: This, as it will provide the coalescence of the state and the nation, will not confine to the borders of Turkey, you will see. On the one hand, the Muslim countries and the West are always trying to bear hostility, producing artificial hostilities. In cooperation, this Government will work in the West, we will work in Muslim countries as well, we will eliminate the tension on earth and become a symbol of a new softening, a new compromise in the whole world. This is such a compromise.

I want to salute and thank all the executives and all the members of the group of the True Path Party with love and affection; because you saved Turkey from the crisis and provided a compromise to solve the problems of our people, and likewise, I will offer the same thanks also to our parties staying in opposition, because, God willing, we will serve our people all together (TBMM, JD, 6/7/1996, 96).

After all, the government program, the gist of which was coalition protocol, was read by Erbakan on 3 July 1996 (TBMM, JD, 3/7/1996, 524-539). After debates on the program, a Council of Ministers received a vote of confidence with 278 yes votes, on 8 July 1996, while the number of no votes was 265 (TBMM, JD, 8/7/1996, 126). The cabinet received confidence with a narrow margin because within DYP deputies, 10 no votes and 1 abstention vote were given, and 4 deputies did not attain the plenary (Yalansız, 2006: 92).

5.3. Operation Challenges and Dissolution of the Coalition

First, a wise saying used by Hasan Celal Güzel to summarise this term helps to understand the challenges that Erbakan faced during his tenure: “Chasing the devil, he could not find time to take ablution[27](Güzel, 1997). However, this definition might slightly be revised, which would make a critical difference: “While chasing the devil, he also took ablution.” This expression needs to be fixed in that, despite all the barriers and attacks initiated by established powers, Erbakan performed significant actions, though in a short period of one year and as a government partner. The intense initiatives, as mentioned above,

[27] Ablution: Religious ritual performed by Muslims by washing their hands, arms, face, and feet and wiping over their heads with a wet hand as preparation for prayer.

in order to make the Erbakan Government inoperative uninterruptedly continued. The elites of the army, the media, high judicial institutions, universities, and leftist people, all of whom had united in "imposing laicism" showed an openly hostile attitude towards RP and Erbakan (Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 134) and attacked the government relentlessly on all occasions for a year during which Erbakan was the prime minister. Erbakan, nevertheless, endured all these attacks for a year with his extraordinary poise and careful style. Among these attacks, he, along with his partner, worked diligently to implement his program that he imagined. Consequently, when examining this coalition period, it is necessary to address both the actions and the attacks against the government.

One of the primary issues that Erbakan's government dealt with was Turkey's deep-rooted problem, the development difference between the East/southeast regions and West, which he thought was related to the ethnic terror issue. However, Erbakan was also in favour of removing the obstacles to the cultural dimension of Kurdish identity. This kind of freedom, he believed, was a requirement of justice and would contribute to the integration of different ethnic groups in Turkey (Kösebalaban, 2011: 96). That is why he stated a few years ago that "They are making children shout at school 'How happy is he who says I am a Turk.' This is wrong. If the Turks said such a thing, Kurds have the right to say 'How happy is he who says I am a Kurd.'" (Çakır, 2012).

Within this scope, The Development Project for the development of East and Southeast and Application Plan was prepared. A decree which included several subsidies for the encouragement of business toward these two regions was issued. Similar policies, such as the project of "return to villages", which had been emptied because of anti-terror actions, were implemented (*Hürriyet,* 12 July 1996). Other components of this project, such as rehabilitation of the villages, construction of houses, providing necessary facilities to tend livestock, acceleration, and completion of the earlier investment, reopening the mining areas, etc. were carried out. At the same time, the government offered a two hour broadcast in the Kurdish language as a contribution to moderate policies toward Kurdish society (*Hürriyet*, 5 Aug 1996). Erbakan also supported civil and official initiatives aiming to solve the Kurdish issue in peaceful and deliberative ways (Arpacı, 2017: 326). Within this scope, a group from Turkey, including RP deputy, Fethullah Erbaş, went to the PKK camp to bring back a captivated group of soldiers. However, these events and following reasonable explanations annoyed the army, and some officials reflected indignation on several occasions. The

mainstream media, representative of the established powers, sabotaged these attempts of compromise with provocative news and pictures. This central media made RP members seem to be cooperating with the terrorist organization. It tried to create a social outrage (*Hürriyet*, 31 Aug 1996).

On the other hand, this clamor resounded in Demirel's words that targeted Erbakan: "Bandits must be crushed. No compromise…Do not demoralize the army" (*Hürriyet*, 9 Aug 1996). Erbakan, despairingly, yielded; stating, "Bargain is not possible with terrorists." Orhan Miroğlu has stated that Erbakan's peaceful attitude towards the Kurdish issue significantly impacted the 28 February Military intervention that would bring the end of this coalition (Miroğlu, 2011: 71).

Erbakan's foreign policy would, not surprisingly, be different, as, during not only his election campaigns but also throughout his political life, he had promised that he wanted to develop the relations of Turkey with the Islam world. However, such a transformation was not acceptable for Turkey's traditional/established power points, deeming themselves the regime's owner and had this potency in reality. Indeed, the coalition protocol and government program had shown that Erbakan was aware that his party was only half of the government, and he had made concessions that were required. Therefore, his policies were not what he exactly wanted, but only the production of compromise, which his partner could accept. However, it would become clear that even his partner's agreement and the parliamentary majority's support were not enough to follow policies that he deemed appropriate. The invisible "senior partner" would remind itself as time passed.

On 9 August, Erbakan made his first official visit to Iran and then went to Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Within the scope of these visits, many trade agreements were signed, industrial production projects were prescribed, customary advantages were secured, and various collaborations for aviation and navigation sectors were accepted. However, ignoring all economic dimensions, this visit was discussed only by its ideological and Islamic aspects. Indefinite speculations were made about the negative aspects of these trips by mainstream media organs, and they were reflecting the army's negative attitude about the same issue with alacrity. The US also had revealed its negative manner toward this visit. Three days before, the US Spokesman of the Department of State made a declaration, which reflected the US's discomfort against this visit (Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 429). *Hürriyet*, in this period, claimed that the 70-year-image of Turkey went for nothing, and

Erbakan as prime minister even for a short period, began to shake the image of the Republic, which have been modern and Western (*Hürriyet,* 12 Aug 1996).

At the end of August, an agreement on the defence industry was signed by Turkey and Israel (Yalçın, 2012: 245). Taking such a decision was not in line with the ideological line and the former discourse of the RP, but Erbakan signed this agreement for the sake of not to confront the established forces which were committed to maintaining good relations with Israel (Balcı, 2011: 124). However, *Hürriyet,* as spokespersons of the hostility to RP, exploited even this behaviour against Erbakan and RP and reported this event in such a way as to provoke RP voters (*Hürriyet,* Aug 1996). In the meantime, the Arab countries, which Erbakan wanted to develop good relations with, reacted negatively to this event. In terms of exploitation of Erbakan's compromising attitude by his opponents, a very similar event took place at this time. The revalidation of stationing Combined Task Forces (Çekiç Güç) would be voted by the parliament (Aydın, Taşkın, 2014: 425). RP, at the term of opposition, had declared that it was against the continued existence of this force in Turkey. However, when in power, under pressure from the established forces, RP approved grudgingly, even if its scope was somewhat narrowed (Yalçın, 2012: 245).The "centre press" again exploited it to discredit Erbakan in the eyes of his electorate. This incident was interpreted as Erbakan's betrayal of his past and supporters (*Hürriyet,* 31 July 1996).

By the beginning of October, Erbakan began a trip to three African countries of Egypt, Libya, and Niger. He took significant steps, which initiated commercial bonds and economic relations with these countries and prepared the D-8 Organization infrastructure. This organization was prescribed to consist of Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, and Niger, and it would work for cooperation in pursuit of economic, politic, and humanitarian development (Arpacı, 2017: 318). However, these visits were used to attack Erbakan, RP, and the government in the guise of criticism (*Milliyet,* October 1996). Some symbolic issues and details about the wording of Muammar Kaddafi, the leader of Libya, were made headline in Turkish mainstream media. Erbakan was held countable for Kaddafi's speech, and opposition parties tabled the motion of censure against him, which was refused by parliament on 16 October.

Bülent Arınç, one of the top executives of the RP, in his speech on this motion of no confidence, pointed out the exclusion, stigmatization against RP. Arınç described how the RPs became overwhelmed by the elite's repression of the RP as follows:

> The establishment of a government with RP was opposed since 24 December. This is an extremely shameful situation for democracy. It is presumptuousness to look at a legal political organization that received the votes of people, represents more than 6 million people as if it came from the space and to turn it into leper. Some businessmen, some media, some politicians with the concern that the security of their share is endangered, opposed to the formation of a government with RP as a principle at the beginning, and goes on opposing to it as a principle afterward; both when it was established and from its establishment onward, unfortunately, they have been in a state of war with the government. For this reason, unfortunately, as occasion requires, they bring forward the secularism, yearn for the coup or play upon national pride (TBMM, JD, 16/10/1996, 93)

Conspicuous economic characteristics of this term were pool system in public finance; high increase in salaries of public officers and pensioners; increase in social transfers; high growth rate, and increase in exchange reserves (Erdem, Şanlıoğlu and İlgün, 2007: 266). The so-called "pool formula" was of great importance, particularly for state resources' efficient use. With this application, all accounts were collected in a single pool in public finances. The money was transferred from the public institution that has money to the one in need of money. Thus, domestic debt would be significantly reduced (*Hürriyet*, 27-29 July 1996).

Susurluk accident, which occurred on 3 November, had been another critical and protracted issue that occupied Turkey's agenda and was used to overthrow the government (Yalçın, 2012: 246). RP-DYP Coalition had taken over when dirty relations of state-politics-mafia angle were at the top.[28]

These relations emerged from obscurity when a traffic accident happened at the Susurluk district of Balıkesir province. It was revealed that the paths of prominent people from a crime syndicate, security directorate, and parliamentarian had crossed. Those people's relations seemed to reach the Minister of Internal Affairs Mehmet Ağar, and within one week, he was forced to resign. When ANAP leader Yılmaz attempted to chase up these relations, Tansu Çiller accused him to abusing the events for coming to power, and this conflict continued between them as a new war of words (Aydın, Taşkın, 2014: 428). In the meantime, when such events indicated relations between some DYP members and crime syndicates, RP did not want to give up its partner. The main reason for this was that at the same time, RP was under the massive attack of the army, media, and far-laicists, which have no patience for the continuation of this government. RP deemed that the fall of DYP would

[28] These relations were believed to be developed during the State's fight with Kurdish terrorist organization PKK particularly at the beginning of 1990s as someone within state was preferring to go to any length to defeat this organization so resorted to irregular warfare.

only serve to its opponents' general aim, so it did not countenance the attack against DYP. After all, the RP management chose not to focus on the event, although some wanted otherwise. However, to alleviate the reactions, they opted for the formation of a research committee on the matter (Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 141). Thus, a committee formed in parliament to investigate this event set out by 3 December. This committee asked from all high-level institutions of state for information and documents. However, while the committee investigation was going on, mainstream media intensified its campaign against the government and turned it into a means to topple the government. This time, the RP antagonism took the form of a "demand for clean society" which was quite convenient to misuse. At the beginning of February, the central media elites initiated an original protest of "one minute darkness for constant light and strongly encouraging participation (Pulur, 199). This incident harmed RP's prestige as it did not take a clear stand on corruption (Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 142-143).

Another event that the media focused on to attack Erbakan Government was a fast-breaking meal given by Erbakan to Religious scholars from the Presidency of Religious Affairs, theology academics, and religious societies (Erbakan, 1997: 154). This individual event by 11 January 1997 was taken as a significant religious reactionaryism issue and was assumed as a clear proof of the bond between RP and reactionaryism (Yalçın, 2012: 249). Almost at the same time, the media pushed forward another individual report of dramatic-sensational relations among the members of a tariqa named Aczmendi, who were distinguished with their Arab traditional dresses. Rebroadcasting this matter of yellow journalism for the umpteenth time, they tried to defame İslam and its current champion RP. On the other hand, RP's some discourses and initiatives, such as going on pilgrimage by highways or lifting the headscarf ban for university students, also used by media as bright indicators of reactionaryism and the new challenge of RP against the values of the Republic. Among these provocations, by 17 January, the General Staff gave a briefing on the reactionaryism to the President without the President's request (Arpacı, 2017: 322).

By 30 January 1997, a new operation started to overthrow the Erbakan government. Selected words, used in the speeches and theatre play within the scope of activity, organized by the mayoralty of Sincan district of the Ankara, in favour of Palestinian Muslims, were submitted to public opinion as "breaking news" and were introduced as the ominous threat of reactionaryism. The mayor of the district was from RP, and thereby this event was pushed

forward as one more example of RP-reactionaryism relation (Yalçın, 2012: 249). Within a few days, a few dozens of tanks and military vehicles paraded on the Sincan district's streets, which was apparent intimidation against the RP and government (*Sabah*, 5 Feb, 1997). Indeed, an official investigation was launched against the ceremony organizers, and Mayor himself was taken into custody. Erbakan, wishing to defuse the tension, said, "There is no regime question in Turkey. It is a country ruled with democracy. Turkey is a state of law, and the necessary measures will be taken." (*Milliyet*, 5 Mar 1997).

Bülent Arınç, the other top executives of the RP, was also struggling to express how these clamors were baseless and show the attacks against his party were unfair at the National Assembly's plenary:

> Dear friends,… there are accusations that we are accustomed to; in other words, the concept of thought owned by the RP proponent, their behaviours, the speeches of the mayors, the events happened at night organized by the municipality, the politicization of the communities, coming together at Ramadan break fasts, to ask for building a mosque at Taksim square, to say that the pilgrimage shall go to hajj by land route, to say that they shall dispose the leather of the sacrifices at will are demonstrated as behaviours against secularism. I would like to show you how these events are local events and nothing to do with the fundamental principles of the state…(TBMM, JD, 25/2/1997, 184).

However, this easing statement could not help to decrease the rage of RP opponents (Ali, 1999: 109). Oktay Ekşi, warning Erbakan at his column, said: "Erbakan, unless he lost his senses, should see that no force, including himself, will have the power, to turn the Republic of Turkey into the sharia state. Accordingly, he should get into line... Erbakan, from now on, must leave the hypocrisy." (Ekşi, 26 Feb 1997).

As two parties representing the left-wing society of Turkey, CHP and DSP saw the government of RP as a threat both for them and for Turkey. CHP leader Deniz Baykal's view about this government was as below:

> ... Turkey is passing through a crisis. The main reason for this crisis was that (RP-DYP) power supported the political quest, which targeted the basic premises of Turkey's political history and popularized it. With clarity, plainness, each of us has to see it. In Turkey, the RP-DYP government has taken the political understanding that could not accept our republican regime's political basis and projects to destroy it. This power, during his stay in power, unfortunately, in this regard, caused trouble that gave our society a profound shock and prompted it to serious concerns… How could this political understanding that opposes Turkey's republican regime's political bases get the opportunity to come to the effective power domain? ... It has been unavoidable that we face a critical test about neutralising the

significant political threat, a threat growing from the democratic system itself, by the methods of a democratic regime. It is obvious; unfortunately, this threat has been improved -....statements made one after the other, manners, organization that has been revealed, ideological expansion, the emergence of hostile mentality, a hostile understanding- at the level that the democratic regime of Turkey cannot accept. It began to shake the social peace of Turkey in a severe way and Turkey has been led to a grave unease.

RP-DYP Government...on the contrary, wasted the opportunity of the power at the service of the mentality that led Turkey to polarization, contention, friction. This is the underlying cause of the crisis; we cannot ignore it…The the first phase of the quest for survival is, of course, the removal of the Welfare Party from power, no doubt; because it is not possible for someone who takes for granted the right of latent destruction of the most fundamental provision of the Constitution upon which they swore to remain in power…It is revealed that RP has a tissue that mismatch constitutional, political regime of Turkey. (TBMM, JD, 10/7/1997, 397-400).

Ecevit's thought was almost the same as Baykal. He was claiming that the RP-DYP government was a threat to the state and the regime, and that it violated the principle of secularism.

In the approximately eleven-month period of the RP-DYP government, Turkey has faced the most severe crisis of the republic's history. Turkey has been through social crises, regime crisis from time to time, but this time, beyond the regime crisis, there is a state crisis; because the government, which is the most important implementation tool of the state, has conflicted with all state organs. The government and the army, the government and the judiciary, the government and the universities, the government and the youth, the government and the workers, the government and the employers have entered into opposition with the government. Thus, society has experienced an unprecedented crisis in the republic period…Moreover, secularism, which is the most sensitive point and the Republic of Turkey's element, has faced a serious threat for the first time. (TBMM, JD, 10/7/1997, 466).

Pressures arising from such viewpoint of the Turkey's elite, who deemed themselves the *owner of state*, were evolving into a new phase by February 1997. The event, which marked the period and gave its name to the next term, was the National Security Council[29] meeting, held on 28 February. In this meeting, which lasted for nine hours, military members of the Council put forward many files, which were reporting that reactionaryism was gaining strength, that *Milli Görüş* movement was sprawling, that reactionaryism was approaching a

[29] The Council was composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, the Ministers of National Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Commanders of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Gendarmerie Forces, meeting under the chairmanship of the President. It was responsible for the formulation of the policy for the security of the national state and to take needed decisions for its applications as well as to present to the Coincil of Ministers its views related to how the necessary coordination in this respect can be achieved (*Turkey an Official Handbook*. 1990: 60).

turning point that was gravely threatening Turkey (*Hürriyet*, 1 Mar 1997). Then many recent events, which were deemed to have a reactionaryism feature, were discussed in detail, and in a sense, cabinet members were questioned. Despite Erbakan's objection to arguments put forward, military members of the council tabled their 18-article list of "fight against reactionaryism" as National Security Council Resolutions and forwarded them to Government to do what is necessary (Arpacı, 2017: 337). As time went on after this critical event, the military's pressure on civilian power became more apparent, and the incident was called the "28 February Coup" later. Countless actions aiming to repress Islamic values' social appearance under the label of the fight against reactionaryism were, similarly, called "The Process of 28 February" (Özbudun and Hale, 2010: 33).

28 February Resolutions took a broad coverage in media, and the Vice President of General Staff Çevik Bir's evaluation of this process in his own words was engraved in public memories: "We made a balance adjustment to democracy." By the same days, some institutions of labour and business such as the Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen of Turkey (Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu/TESK), Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, TİSK), The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği/TOBB), Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu/Türk-İş), and Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu/DİSK) had expressed their support to these resolutions (Erdem, 2019: 357; Aydın and Taşkın, 2014: 431). Thus, the anti-democratic coalition was formed to destroy the RP-DYP government. Some political parties, military and civil bureaucracy, the judiciary, the President, and the media took part in this coalition (Can, 2011: 64).

Mainstream media, supporting an attitude of the military with fervour, in the meantime, had its beady eye on the government, and made the notification to the military about whether government was doing its *homework* given by the military. Knowing Erbakan's reluctance about enacting 28 February decisions, this press went on provoking the military (*Hürriyet*, 3 Mar 1997). Erbakan, in the face of this heavy pressure, was trying to soften the environment and reduce the tension. For this purpose, referring to the MGK meeting, he said, "The members of the Council are in complete harmony". "However, when the journalists forwarded this statement to Major General Erol Özkasnak, General Secretary

of MGK, he refused this constructive and conciliatory attitude and replied, “Turkish Armed Forces, are in harmony only with those who believe in and set their heart on the secular republic established by Atatürk and the realization of its basic principles. However, it is not in harmony with anyone else and cannot be.” (*Hürriyet,* 3 Mar 1997).

Erbakan signed the National Security Council's decisions reluctantly, not during the meeting but a few days later, at its insistence. In fact, the dominant view of RP was that he should not sign these decisions. However, Erbakan signed the signature, hoping that these decisions could be rejected by the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. In this way, he thought that he would have saved time, and the soldier's reaction would decrease. However, this was a very optimistic approach, and the result was the way the military intended (Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 159-162).

The media’s efforts to escalate the government-military tensions were relentless. For example, *Hürriyet,* daily, finding out that Erbakan was preparing to amend the decision on 8-year education, announced this news to the public with that headline “The 8-year is returned to National Security Council” (*Hürriyet,* 24 Mar 1997). This was clearly informing against the government and was arranged carefully in the way of igniting the military response. The desired response was quick: “These decisions will be fully obeyed (*Hürriyet,* 26 Mar 1997). This headline was attributed to Chief of the General Staff İsmail Hakkı Karadayı.

The insistence of established order for 8 year-education was to ensure the shut down of the Imam Hatip schools, which had religious lessons in addition to the standard curriculum of the other schools. Oktay Ekşi’s views reflected the established state elites' views, which was revealing how they see those who support Imam Hatip and those who read there as *enemies*. Ekşi was purporting that students attending at Imam Hatip were trained to destroy the secular regime and establish an Islamic republic instead, that RP was seeing those who were trained there as the future mujahideen of the party, and tied the hope for the mujahideen to overthrow the regime, that the aim of those who opposed to 8 years of education was not education, but to train warriors for themselves with the taxes of the people; however, they would not be allowed to reach their goals (Ekşi, 30 Mar 1997). Not until the dissolution of the RP-DYP coalition government did manipulation of people and provocation of military circles by centre media stopped.

Erbakan, despite all these provocations, always tried to calm things up and reduce the tension that was ignited deliberately. In April, he arranged a round of discussions with all party leaders represented in the parliament. He had been doing these interviews regularly all along. Through these negotiations, he wanted to develop warm relations with opposition leaders and inform them of the government's actions. This was because "they attached great importance to the development of tolerance atmosphere in Turkey" (*Milli*, 11 Apr 1997). On the other hand, the deputy chairman of RP, Ahmet Tekdal, insisted that they were not at odds with anyone, that their only purpose was to serve the country. He was requesting a response to their efforts: "We invite all political parties to respond to the call of dialogue initiated by our party leader." (*Milli*, 12 Apr 1997).

In this period, another important event was that the military, going beyond its duty downright, sought to incorporate significant non-military social groups into pressing on RP and government. Within this scope, particular units of the army set out a wide range of briefings on the matter for several public institutions and civil society organizations (Erdem, 2019:358). Within this scope, General Staff invited the public prosecutors to present a briefing on the finance and educational strategy of Islamic capital (*Hürriyet*, 9 June 1997). Justice Minister Şevket Kazan stated that he did not want prosecutors to attend the briefing (*Hürriyet*, 10 June 1997). *Hürriyet*, continued its agitator stance on occasion and commented on the incident as follows: "The threat of briefing". It was announcing the instruction of the Minister of the Justice as a "threat". In this case, that would not be seen in a normal democratic country; this daily was not only siding with the military but also was striving to set it on the civil government.

The opening of a case for the ruling RP's closure created the last phase of the attack on *Milli Görüş*. On May 22nd, the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals brought a lawsuit against the RP at the Constitutional Court on the ground that RP was supporting the reactionaryism and dragging the country to civil war and demanded the closure of the party (*Hürriyet*, 22 May 1997).

Erbakan was imperturbable again in the face of this initiative to close the party and made the following statement: "Governments are established in Parliament in Turkey. They carry out their duties as long as they receive the trust of parliament. The authority to terminate the government also belongs to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Therefore, in other places, in the media, in the streets, the government cannot be established." (*Milli*, 28 May 1997).

Regarding the prosecution of RP, he said: "The event is simple and transient. The Constitutional Court will, of course, correct this wrong action. The claims are groundless and have nothing to do with the facts. It should be rejected because it is a violation of legal procedures." (*Milli*, 28 May 1997). According to Erbakan, such a large party with 4 million members could not be punished with a wholesale criminalization because of a few members' crimes. Such an application would be a collective punishment, which could be seen only under the totalitarian governments. However, such unlawful practices were unimaginable in a free, democratic parliamentary country (*Milli*, 28 May 1997).

Nevertheless, Constitutional Court would decide to close the RP, one year later, by 16 January 1998, and disqualifying Necmettin Erbakan and six prominent members of the party from politics for 5 years. This heavy blow to a broad based democratic has been interpreted by some scholars as "the extention of Kemalist paranoid" (Çaylak, Dinç and Güngör, 2017: 710). Erbakan seeing that the army's pressure was deepening on him and RP, decided to make a shift with Tansu Çiller, which was prescribed at the beginning of the coalition forming. Thereupon he resigned by 18 June 1997 (*Hürriyet*, 19 June 1997). However, before tendering the resignation of the government, leaders of three parties, Necmettin Erbakan, Tansu Çiller, and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu (Head of BBP/Büyük Birlik Partisi/Grand Unity Party), held a press conference, declared and displayed that they had enough vote to form a new government under the premiership of Tansu Çiller. Thus, they demanded that Demirel give the task to Çiller. However, under the general repressive atmosphere, President Demirel, instigated mainly by the army, mainstream media, and extreme secularist elites preferred to appoint Mesut Yılmaz, instead of Çiller (*Hürriyet*, 21 June 1997). The minority cabinet established under the presidency of Mesut Yılmaz was approved in Çankaya on 30 June. Thus, Erbakan Government de facto ended (*Hürriyet*, 30 June 1997).

Erbakan, despite all the hostile attacks on him and his party (Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 134), while handing over the task was making kind and courteous statements. Throughout the handover ceremony, Erbakan was a model of deportment for political leaders. He said that one of the most beautiful moments of democracy was being experienced, that there was no difference between opposition and power in serving the country, that in democracies, tasks could change hands, but it was essential to work together for the country. Adding that

the new government began to work with the President of the Republic's approval in accordance with the Constitution, he congratulated Mesut Yılmaz and his work comrade and wished success to them. On the other hand, the statement made by Minister of Culture İsmail Kahraman when transferring his post was fascinating and striking in that he prophesied that the outcome of the current pressure would not be permanent: "Only the dead do not come back." (*Milli*, 1 July 1997).

CHAPTER 6: INDICATORS AND REASONS OF COMPROMISING ATTITUDE OF MİLLİ GÖRÜŞ

This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, the difference of Milli Görüş from other political actors, in terms of political compromise, is demonstrated. Discourses, actions and attitudes that show this difference have been presented for each coalition period by organizing them separately (CHP-MSP; National Front I; National Front II; RP-DYP).

In the second part of the chapter, the factors affecting the Milli Görüş's compromising character are combined. These factors are addressed under four headings: The environment in which Erbakan was grown up and his temperament; the understanding of Islam adopted by the Milli Görüş; the strategy reasoning of the Milli Görüş; and the national unity sentiment.

6.1. How *Milli Görüş* Was Distinctive in Terms of Political Compromise

6.1.1. Compromising Attitude of *Milli Görüş* in the CHP-MSP Coalition

Military intervention in 1971 and then four unstable governments of the interim regime revealed the weakness of the culture of political compromise in Turkey once more. The election held on 14 October 1973, again entailed a compromise among political parties to form a government. This compromise had to take place between the two major parties or between one of the big parties and the smaller ones. The partnership of the two major parties could not be achieved because of the strict stance of the two party leaders. However, the result of the election was compelling a coalition, which was quite clear, and CHP and AP could form the widest range coalition because the collaboration of these two parties could secure an overwhelming majority not only in National Assembly but also in Senate. For that reason, a variety of groups who had concerns about the political and economic stability was pointing at the coalition of these two grand parties.

Primarily Demirel and partly Ecevit were responsible for the failure of forming a broad coalition. Because Demirel said right after the election "Our nation employed us with opposition task…We are not seeking for forming a coalition with anybody….We are respectful to our nation's decision…"(Milli Daily, 25.10.1973). According to Şener, the reason for Demirel's uncompromising attitude might have been that he did not want to be

Ecevit's deputy prime minister after serving as prime minister in the previous period (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020). In any case, Demirel rejected a government under Ecevit's prime ministry. His initial statement was reflecting his antipathy toward coalition alternatives when his party was the second-largest party, and it was clear that there might be an essential requirement for his party for the formation of a coalition. Indeed, the interpretation of being a second party should not have been as "nation imposed the duty of forming government in due ways." This attitude was a typical symptom of "uncompromising mindset" which afflicted Turkey's political life in no small measure. It should be remembered, however, Demirel, when assigned for the first time, just after Ecevit, offered a coalition to Ecevit. However, Ecevit's refusal was understandable because CHP was the largest party in the parliament. Therefore, Demirel's offer cannot be regarded as a compromising step.

Ecevit's approach to the AP was not significantly different. He also found the coalition with the AP quite unpleasant. Therefore, he revealed his firm stance on the next day of the election saying that he was committed to correct the current order and that he would not make a concession for the sake of forming a coalition. To him, such concessions would harm not only CHP but also the whole system so that it would end in the loss of hope in the country (*Milliyet*, 16.10.1973). Nevertheless, although kept away from AP regarding coalition, Ecevit has been constructive and accommodating in forming an alternative coalition. Notably, it was a bold step to think about a partnership with a different worldview as MSP. Because the prejudices of the CHP supporters were strong, it was not easy to form such a government. Therefore, at this stage, Ecevit's attitude had contributed to the development of compromise culture in Turkey.

During this period, the attitude of the DP and its leader, the fourth largest party in parliament, was not compromising. The fact that this party did not consider a partnership with the CHP may be somewhat understandable since it was the successor of the DP. (Ahmad, 2015: 326). However, this ideological distance was not enough to explain the attitude of DP and its leader, because Ferruh Bozbeyli, the leader of this party, refused the coalition offer of Demirel too. Thus he blocked the coalition alternative which would be formed by AP-DP-MSP. Bozbeyli's objection was based on the animosity toward Demirel, and they had offered, on several occasions, forming a right coalition which would exclude Demirel. This kind of manner, for sure, was not realistic because Demirel had a robust

control on his party members. Bozbeyli's approach was obstructive for any possibility of government forming (Uçar, 2015: 146).

The political or personal calculations of these political party leaders led to a government crisis. During this period, the solution to the country's economic and social problems was delayed. Again, the government crisis provoked the military to send threatening messages about politics indirectly. In the same period, a parliamentarian that was not a party leader was assigned to form a supranational government. All these events were elements that undermine the establishment of democratic order in the country.

As for Erbakan and MSP in this coalition period, their discourse and practices were early signals of the compromising nature of *the Milli Görüş* line. Unlike the CHP, AP and DP; MSP did not establish any preconditions for the coalition and did not rule out any party regarding the partnership. Erbakan, just after the election results demonstrated his difference in terms of compromising manner and made a relatively moderate statement. Following the election, he gave a signal that their priority would be AP for partnership, but he did not close doors to CHP. In particular, because of the negative attitude of the party grassroots about the partnership with the CHP, which they regard as the cause of their historical grievances, Erbakan has postponed this option in the first step, and after it became clear that there was no possibility of forming a government with the AP, he attempted to reach an agreement with the CHP.

It was a challenging goal for the MSP to compromise with CHP. There were a large number of people who opposed this coalition both within the party supporters and the deputies. MSP's rigid elements were seeing CHP as the mother of all evils because from the beginning of Republic it was CHP mindset that repressed the Islamic value of Turkish society and recently was representing the left or communism. (Özdemir, 2007: 270). Persuading these objectors was not an easy task as was proved during the coalition seeking (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020). Particularly the Nurist group in the MSP tried to prevent this compromise. During debates made within party caucus, Süleyman Arif Emre, the former leader of MSP was reminding the widespread objection of party grassroots and pointing out the political costs of such a coalition to party. Right-wing parties have also tried to take advantage of this initiative of the MSP and condemn it before the conservative people. The AP and MHP blamed the MSP for carrying CHP to power and dancing to Ecevit's tune" (Küçükyılmaz, 2011:122). They likened MSP to watermelon with the green cover but red

interior and stigmatized it as “green communist” (Karamollaoğlu and Arınç, Interview, Feb 2020).

Despite all these adverse conditions, as government crisis lasted for more than three months, Erbakan took critical steps to form coalition with CHP. He reasonably responded to the accusations against him and his party on this compromise. He stressed that the country, which was in economic and social difficulties, urgently needed a government, that the crisis was prolonged, that the importance of being constructive and ready for all sacrifice was above all the interests of the party. He answered the question about this matter, posed by a citizen in a striking manner: “You gave them three million votes. Therefore, you chose them. We respected your vote.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Jan 1974).

CHP-MSP Coalition was indicating a considerable change in Turkey’s political tradition. In the pre-1980 political polarization environment, the forming of such a coalition was accepted by both sections as a frame-breaking step (Akın, 2018: 101). According to Temel Karamollaoğlu, “After the establishment of the Republic, the 1974 Coalition was, in fact, a revolutionary coalition. For the first time, the deep state was at peace with the nation” (Karamollaoğlu, Interview, Feb 2020). Agreement between these two parties, indeed, could be interpreted as a vital breakthrough in the development of compromising culture and essential contribution to surpassing the political stalemates. By this coalition, the pro-Islamic party was establishing its place not only within the Turkish political system but also in the state apparatus. Such a starting point was critical in that Islamist sector of society, despite shrinkage for decades, had strong historical and ideological roots and had a sense of victimization for many years. Therefore, by this advent, these feelings would be placated, which was valuable for not only fulfilment of justice but also social peace and stability.

The coalition protocol, the government program, and the speeches of the two party leaders in parliament heralded a hopeful and resolute start of political compromise. The coalition partners worked in solidarity to solve the aggravated economic problems. However, the uncompromising attitude of a group within the MSP on Amnesty Law made things hard for MSP administration. Nevertheless, Erbakan made great efforts to fulfil his responsibility to the coalition partner. He had difficulty persuading opposition within his party. As a result, it prevented this problem from harming the coalition. In his speeches in parliament, he talked about the government’s work in harmony, support for CHP-funded projects and the belief that the government will serve for four years. During the period, he showed his support for

big projects such as village-city, cooperativism and people sector which Ecevit attached great importance to. In the summer of 1974, he did not favour the attempts of the AP and DP to establish a Nationalist Front government and stood by the CHP demonstrating their loyalty to the coalition. Erbakan and MSP's compromising attitude continued during the time the coalition worked. The MSP's effort to meet its electorate's expectations has led to some frictions with its coalition partner. However, in every dispute, Erbakan did his utmost to ensure that the coalition was not dissolved.

The most critical success of this coalition turned into the main reason for the collapse of the coalition. After the Greek Cypriot coup in Cyprus in the middle of the summer of 1974, the Turkish government's counter-operations were completed. The Turkish Republic was established in the north of Cyprus. When this result increased Ecevit's popularity in the country, Ecevit and those around him became eager to disrupt the coalition, to go to a new election and to rule alone. Therefore, two weeks after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus Ecevit declared that there was a severe disagreement between two parties (*Milli* 5 Sep 1974). Ecevit's claims about the disagreement would not end until the end of the coalition.

In response to Ecevit's desire to dissolve the partnership, Erbakan insisted on keeping his optimistic manner. He was saying that there was no major problem, that the differences of opinion between the two parties were natural, that there were differences of opinion even within the same party, that these differences could be solved by consensus, and that the meaning of the coalition was compromise. Erbakan, after acknowledging that one of the partners of the coalition has the right to leave the coalition, was adding that, under current circumstances, leaving the country without government would lead to political and economic loss. Therefore, he said, they would act with national responsibility. Accordingly, Erbakan disapproved the rumours that the CHP had been hesitant about the Cyprus operation (*Milli*, 6 Sep 1974).

However, Erbakan's constructive and conciliatory rhetoric and attitude proved not to be enough to prevent Ecevit's enthusiasm. As time passed by, Ecevit's intention to convert the current popularity of him into election success became quite apparent (Yücekök, as cited in Akar, 2015: 97). He used many occasions to disrupt their relations with the MSP. Ecevit's attitude was expressed by Erol Çevikçe and Kemal Anadol, who were members of the CHP at the time, years later. According to Çevikçe, the Minister of Public Works in this

government, the reason for the dissolution of the coalition was that after the success of Cyprus, Ecevit got the feeling of 'national hero' and that he did not need a coalition any more (2012: 168). Comparing Ecevit and Erbakan as the main actors of this coalition, he says: Erbakan, with his flexible and soft temperament, was able to get on with everyone. As for Ecevit, he was more stolid and hard-liner (Çevikçe, 2012: 169). Kemal Anadol also had expressed that Ecevit had resigned without consulting to anybody, that this was a great mistake, and this behaviour opens the way which led to the September 12 Coup (Sunay, 2010: 194-195).

Erbakan, however, did not give up his efforts to keep the coalition alive until the coalition ended officially. He did his best to dissuade Ecevit from his decision. When he wanted to meet with Ecevit for this purpose, Ecevit avoided meeting with Erbakan for days, making various excuses. However, in the face of media probe, Erbakan did not give up the courtesy and said: "We have a tight schedule, yet if I have an opportunity, I will meet Mr Ecevit." (*Cumhuriyet,* 12 Sep 1974). Finally, after meeting with Ecevit, which was only five days before Ecevit's resignation, he spoke of working in harmony, rendering the services the nation expects, and maintaining his belief that the coalition will continue (*Milli,* 15 Sep 1974). In fact, Erbakan's insistence and optimism in this regard made him go to futile efforts to avoid the inevitable because Ecevit was thinking nothing but breaking the coalition. Finally, on September 18, Ecevit resigned from his office to end the coalition government.

6.1.2. Compromising Attitude of *Milli Görüş* in the First Nationalist Front Coalition

Ecevit's resignation from the prime ministry ended the compromising atmosphere of the period, which coalition parties were proud of at the beginning, and a new government crisis arose. The parties other than CHP were obliged to establish a new government with the existing parliamentary arithmetic, as they did not consider early election. However, the circumstances did not seem to be favourable for the formation of any coalition.

The President requested Ecevit to remain in office until the formation of a new government. Just the same day, Erbakan, after meeting with the President declared an offer of coalition among the right parties (*Hürriyet,* 1975 Almanac: 70). His call was an early reflex for political stability. As a matter of fact, after a protracted government crisis which

lasted for 6.5 months, a right-wing coalition government would be formed with a similar formula.

At the beginning of this period, the President assigned Ecevit to form the government. However, since Ecevit put forward the election as a condition, even the DP, which is the only party that could make a partnership, did not accept it. After meeting with parties outside the MSP, Ecevit realized he could not get results and returned the post. Then, when Demirel was assigned, Erbakan immediately showed his positive approach toward coalition forming. He said, "We will make a sacrifice of collaboration with AP for the salvation of the country." (*Hürriyet*, 1975 Almanac: 71-72). Moreover, in a statement made on the same days he said, he could support a right-wing coalition even if MSP did not join (*Milli*, 7 Oct 1974). However, this compromising approach was not enough to obtain result because the MSP and the CGP were not enough for the formation of a Demirel government since the total number of deputies of these three parties remained a little below the parliamentary majority. DP was refusing to join this coalition, as it strongly rejected Demirel's prime ministry. Because of this uncompromising attitude of DP, a new government conundrum afflicted the country, which lasted for more than six months. This vacancy has been recorded as the most prolonged government crisis of Turkish political history.

The MSP was ready to compromise for the implementation of the government model, which was demanded by DP resolutely. The general secretary of the party Gündüz Sevigen, referring to the DP leader's suggestion which was offering the coalition in which no party leader would take part, declared that Erbakan would not take part should that way be followed. (*Milli*, 2 Oct 1974). This declaration proved that Erbakan was ready to sacrifice for the formation of a government. However, Demirel had no intention of accepting such an offer. Therefore, he returned the task to the President without needing to meet with Ecevit.

Although assigned for the second time to form a government, Ecevit could not form the government. Moreover, this time, while returning the mandate, his statement included a threat of inciting political crisis in order to push the country toward election. He said he would leave the prime ministry office and vacate ministries in a short while even if a new government was not formed (*Milli*, 8 Nov 1974). Erbakan, upon this statement, replied with a declaration that if CHP had left the government, they would stay in charge of government with a proper formula that would be supported by the President (*Hürriyet*, 1975 Almanac: 78).

Although the Sadi Irmak government, approved by the President in mid-November, received only 17 votes from parliament, stayed in office for four and a half months. When right coalition comes up in December MSP said it would support the initiative. However, DP's response was an example of political intransigence: People who cannot get along with can come together only at the prison." (*Hürriyet*, 1975 Almanac: 83). The fight between the DP and the AP did not seem to end, which made the positive attitude of Erbakan and his party insufficient. Against these developments blocking political solutions, the General Staff made warning statements again, which once again revealed that political antagonism was playing a role in the military's anti-democratic behaviour.

Under these circumstances, the leaders of the AP, MSP, CGP and MHP began negotiations for the formation of a right-wing coalition as of December. Erbakan with several initiatives was trying to accelerate this compromise process. The leader of the four parties had to come together many times for two months, trying to settle an agreement. These leaders also supported the Irmak government's budget, which they did not give a vote of confidence in this period. Erbakan, in his speech on the budget, said they were not satisfied with the content of the budget, but if the budget were rejected, the country would suffer damage. Therefore they would support it. This approach once again demonstrated Erbakan's compromising and constructive attitude, particularly at critical times.

Celal Bayar, who kept the Democratic Party under remote control, said that he freed the DP deputies to make their own choices by the end of February. This statement broke the resistance of Ferruh Bozbeyli, the party leader who had blocked the DP's support for the National Front Coalition. Thus, the obstacle to National Front disappeared. Therefore, while the preparations for the NF accelerated, the President agreed to give the task to Demirel. This is because the President had assigned Sadi Irmak and then Ecevit once more by those days but did not get any result. Erbakan, following this appointment, once again showed his desire for the establishment of a coalition government with that statement: "It is national duty to support the formation of the government" (*Milli*, 23 Mar 1975).

The conditions for establishing the government had been created. The faction of deputies within DP had left DP contrary to the consent of their leader who was blocking the way to compromise. Thus, within ten days, a compromise has been reached among the four parties.

It was envisaged that the government could not remain in office for too long, as it consisted of four parties. This situation was emphasized so often in the pro-CHP media, and it was suggested that the government would disperse in a short time. However, Suleyman Arif Emre, speaking on behalf of MSP, emphasized that they would make sacrifices for the continuation of the government: "As our experience shows, the coalition means agreement and compromise. In a coalition, no party can fully fulfil its wishes. It is necessary to keep national interests at the forefront based on the sacrifices required by compromise…"(MM, JD, 9/4/1975, 390). The compromising attitude of the MSP was so evident that some journalists who disliked it accused this party in an impolite way. Cüneyt Arcayürek, for instance, was saying "Mindset of MSP which sees permissible to form a government even with Armenians and Jews does not escape the attention of public opinion." (Arcayürek, 1975).

Ecevit also condemned this government and immediately set about to dissolve it. He was referring to MSP, which he made partnership last year, as "A party that did not adopt the principles of the Republic entered the government" (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Apr 1975). He described Türkeş as the "enemy of democracy". Türkeş, on the other hand, responded to this hostile language in the same manner. He, at the MHP Convention in May 1975, accused Ecevit and his party of supporting and provoking communism, which tried to destroy the state, turn the country into a war zone. He was also adding that these attackers would not defeat the national forces, and the victory would belong to the Turkish nationalists (Öznur, 1999: 340).

A four-party government was not a typical situation for Turkey. Therefore, it was not easy for the coalition to work in harmony. As a matter of fact, some disagreements appeared between the AP and the MSP in the first few months, such as the appointment of some senior public officials and the recruitment of the graduates of Imam Hatip schools to the military academies but ultimately compromise was reached (Yalansız, 2006: 225). Another matter of disagreement was the election of the Speaker of the Assembly, which could be done towards the end of the year. There was disagreement not only between the government and the opposition but also between the ruling partners. This uncertainty, which lasted for about two months, came to an end when the AP and CGP supported the CHP candidate. This example should be noted as a contradicting behaviour with a traditional compromising attitude of the MSP.

1976 has been a year in which the conflict escalated in the social and political arena, and the culture of compromise declined. In this period, a political polarization took place with Ecevit on one side and Demirel and Türkeş on the other. This language of ideological violence, which had increased since the mid-autumn election in 1975, caused Ecevit to be attacked in several rallies held during the elections. The sides of the ideological poles in the country, communism-nationalism, held each other accountable for increasing violence. In this environment, Ecevit was claiming that there were murderers in the government. Demirel, on the contrary, said that their wars against communism that was trying to destroy the country would continue. Türkeş was declaring, on the other hand, that nationalist youth could carry weapons, and they would not avoid shooting those who wanted to shoot themselves (*Milliyet, Cumhuriyet,*1976).

As for Erbakan, he carefully avoided using conflict language, and he continued to emphasize the themes of peace, tranquility and goodwill. To end the conflict and tension, he was prescribing primarily moral and spiritual development and then material development. To him, moral and spiritual development would provide a sharing of cultural values, while material development would secure the sharing of economic values, so social cohesion and tranquility would be realized (CS, JD, 4/2/1976, 290-295).

In 1976, the unity of the government partners had repeatedly been tested by the motions of censure tabled by the opposition. Since the majority of the government in parliament was narrow, the opposition was hoping to overthrow the government with these no-confidence motions. So during the year, both the CHP and the DP pressed the government with various proposals. However, each time the harmony retained between partners and they survived all these challenges. In the fall, however, there arose a dispute between the coalition partners MSP and the CGP on The Law on State Security Court. Due to the sensitivity of this issue, the Kemalist character of the CGP and the Islamist character of the MSP showed itself more clearly, and this led to a conflict between the two parties. The CHP has benefited the result because the law could not be enacted due to this dispute.

The grand congress of MSP, held in 1976, was suggestive about MSP's commitment to compromise because in this congress Erbakan revised the party management. While the new administration was being created, Erbakan supported the compromise-minded and moderate deputies, while relegating the members who have an uncompromising mindset. In doing so, Erbakan looked at their behaviours at the time of CHP-MSP coalition. As will be

remembered, these hawkish members had been incompatible with some of the consensus issues foreseen in the coalition protocol, thus put the coalition in trouble and caused Erbakan to apologize for his party's erratic manner.

Since the beginning of 1977, when rumours of early election emerged, the MSP adopted a stance that the coalition should complete its usual term. Erbakan, again with his usual optimism, argued that the government had done many services in the material and spiritual sphere. Accordingly, in the spiritual field, Imam Hatip schools and Qur'an courses were multiplied, mosques were built, school programs were arranged in favour of morality, and the obscenity was effectively fought. The most critical success in the field of material development was the fact that instead of the so-called "assembly industry" and simple factories, heavy industry initiatives were started and significant funds have been allocated for this (MM, JD, 18/2/1977, 260-261).

However, Demirel had hoped for a one-party government, as a result of his success in the by-election. Therefore, he supported CHP to go for the election. Thus, the country entered the election atmosphere again. Election campaigns continued under the influence of right-left discourse. Demirel and Ecevit were seriously fuelling the right-left distinction in order to gain a majority in parliament and to form a one-party government since each of them was calculating that it would help to collect all votes close to its own bloc. The tension was so high that Ecevit and Demirel were attacked by opposing people in their rallies. Social violence occupying the agenda all over the country left an indelible blot in the history of Turkish political life. It can be seen that the leader of the two major parties, who were being followed by almost three-quarters of Turkey population, but the goal of coming to power alone above the social, political and economic stability of the country. The two sides accused each other of supporting terrorism and violence, instead of using moderate discourse to lower the tension. Thus, when one coalition government was coming to its end in the country, and a new government was being prepared, the seeds of an irreconcilable and confrontational period were being planted.

The role of the media in diminishing the already weak culture of political compromise in the country cannot be underestimated. The mainstream media's imprudent attitude toward the incidents occurring in the country was incompatible with the sense of responsibility. The best-selling newspapers reported and interpreted the incidents in a manner that would increase the tension, perhaps because of their worldviews and in pursuit of commercial

purposes. Exaggerated reflection of a violent incident on the right or left side resulted in the provocation of the parties (*Hürriyet*, March- Apr 1977).

In all this social division, polarization, and conflict, the MSP has adopted the principle of impartiality. The MSP administration kept its organization and grassroots away from violence. Erbakan, in his speeches to his audience and youth, said that "you must not go into conflict, whether you are beaten or faced with bad things, do not react or retaliate. These conflicts are the game of imperialism." (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020). The ideology of the party was not suitable for taking part in such a camp and conflict. The phrase "We are at neither left nor right, we are on the true path" which was used as the slogan of this period, was like a summary of this approach. However, among the international political dynamics, the social structure and the polarizing discourses of the major parties, the MSP's third path proposal was hardly heard. On the contrary, Demirel, who targeted MSP alongside the CHP, was preaching that Turkey's politics was divided into two, that is right and left, that MSP's *Milli Görüş* idea which was staying out of these two was nonsense, that such an idea should not confuse the mind of citizens. One week after the election, held under these circumstances, of 5 June 1977, the NF Government resigned.

6.1.3. Compromising Attitude of *Milli Görüş* in the Second Nationalist Front Coalition

Hoping to come to power alone, Demirel went along with Ecevit about ending the coalition and moving the election to an earlier time. However, the election results did not satisfy both Demirel and Ecevit. In fact, both increased their votes, but none was able to secure the majority of the National Assembly to come to power alone. In the meantime, the MSP was more disappointed, because its votes had fallen by a third and the number of deputies had decreased by half compared to the previous election. Moreover, the most important factor influencing this outcome was the propaganda of the former coalition partner AP during the election. The AP had intensely touched on the theme which claimed that right-wing vote should not have been divided in order to prevent the power of CHP and to bring AP to power single-handedly, so voting for MSP would hinder this aim. Therefore, the MSP was deeply offended by the AP. However, this resentment did not change the conciliatory character of the MSP in the final analysis. When the post-election conditions became clear, MSP took on the constructive role for the establishment of a new government.

If Ecevit had only a dozen more deputies, he would have been able to form the government solitarily. Being so close to power had put him in a hasty and uncompromising attitude. So he tried some unusual ways such as attempting to transfer MPs from other parties and to form a minority government. However, when he realized he could not get any results in these ways, he began to pronounce the coalition. However, there was also a severe problem, because Ecevit openly said that he would not cooperate with the AP and the MHP, which meant, though implicitly, that he was thinking to form a coalition with MSP. It seemed that Ecevit was ignoring the memories that he left his partner down in 1974 because he was talking about compromise, sacrifice, cooperation, and not being emotional. However, when the MSP made clear that it had prioritized partnership with the AP, he formed a minority government which failed to get a vote of confidence from parliament (*Hürriyet,* 9 June 1977).

Like Ecevit, Süleyman Demirel was uncompromising about forming the grand coalition. He described the CHP-AP coalition as impossible, arguing that it would go against the grain. On the other hand, in a quest for a coalition, he established his rhetoric on left-wing hostility and pursued a policy of leaving Ecevit alone. Within this context, he claimed that the nation did not bring the left to power; nationalist parties must not give this opportunity to the CHP as well. By this way, he used expressions that provoked conservative and nationalist sentiments, in order to prevent right parties from getting close to the CHP (*Hürriyet,*14 June 1977).

As for Erbakan, he reminded that Ecevit and Demirel had displayed an uncompromising attitude in their coalitions with the MSP, that they had not carried the burden of the partnership, that they had subverted the governments and left the country ungoverned. Indeed, at first, the CHP had disbanded the coalition in 8 months and did it in a humiliating way. AP had similarly ended the coalition prematurely and used a discourse against the MSP in the election process. Despite all this, the MSP did not have a disgruntled and uncompromising stance. The statement of the MSP General Executive Board, by this time, showed that there was no room for resentment and hatred in the political view of *Milli Görüş* and that the ways of compromise were always open. The MSP announced that it would be able to form a coalition with both the CHP and the AP and would consider the proposals coming from these parties for this purpose (*Hürriyet,* 17 June 1977). These decisions, once again, clearly demonstrated the flexibility of the MSP about compromise.

So, it seemed that despite all these negative experiences and bad memories, MSP was able to adapt itself to the new conditions and processes.

However, at the first visit of Ecevit, Erbakan said "No, for the moment" to the coalition with CHP. This was to say, the coalition with the CHP was not impossible. However, this option was going to wait at this stage. There were several reasons why the coalition with CHP was not preferred in the first place. First, Erbakan's first choice was a coalition with AP, and he would prefer to try this alternative at first. Second, even if he forms a coalition with CHP, it should have been seen that he was not very eager, because the MSP grassroots was not warm to this partnership. Finally, Erbakan wanted the show to people that MSP had a compromising attitude about the solution of the national problems while other parties had no such positive stance.

No sooner had Demirel been given the mandate to form the government, than MSP showed its compromising character and made a positive statement about it. Erbakan revealed that they were open to alternative models for the establishment of the government, saying that they could provide support to the Demirel government either by joining it or externally (*Milli,* 6 July 1977).

As Demirel was asked to form a government, he met with Ecevit pro forma. Ecevit, at this interview**,** offered a "grand coalition" of CHP-AP which was voiced many times by the President and business circles, but Demirel refused. Ecevit, on being refused said that "The solution that we put forward entailed sacrifice for us, we are in a time that we should pass beyond our personalities." In another statement, he said that "Our offer on CHP-AP is not tactical. It is an offer that generated from the conscious of the responsibility of a party which founded the state and democracy. We think that such a partnership can only solve the problems of the country."

At this stage, Ecevit was taking a more conciliatory position than Demirel. However, it is not easy to see Ecevit's statement as a reflection of his compromising character. The establishment of a broad coalition was made unlikely by Ecevit as much as Demirel, because two months ago, in election rallies Ecevit had strongly condemned such a possibility: "I declare to the whole world that we do not establish a CHP-AP coalition. We do not, because a CHP-AP coalition is a betrayal to the public." (*Milli,* 15 July 1977).

This attempt of Ecevit, who defined forming coalition with AP as a betrayal to the public before, could be interpreted in a variety of ways in terms of political compromise. First, it seems that Ecevit took this step not to end the political stalemate but because he saw that a government without CHP was already being established. Such an end would be very disappointing after instilling hope of power into millions of people. In the previous period, he had not accepted any coalition option for months and then did not accept any alternative which excluded the election. Nevertheless, it can be said that, though out of desperation, Ecevit's proposal to form a coalition with AP shows that he can, in the last instance, reach a compromise.

Demirel, under the circumstances, emerged after the election, must have thought of the Second National Front Coalition government. First of all, during the election campaign, he had used very definite expressions about not being a partner with the CHP, so he precluded this possibility early. On the other hand, the election results were not in a way that would force him to end the enmity with the CHP. More clearly, the number of seats of the MSP and the MHP together with AP was enough to form a government, and the partnership of the three right-wing parties did not seem too difficult. In particular, the early statements of the MSP for compromise and the positive attitude of the MHP strengthened this option.

Demirel, during the election period, had said a lot against MSP, as well as the CHP. In particular, he had told very harsh words about the MSP in order to gather all right-wing votes under the roof of the AP. However, after the election, he seemed ready to abandon this manner. When journalists reminded Demirel that prospective partners of the coalition were denigrating each other during the electoral campaign he responded with this say, which is critical in the process of political compromise: "If what is said during the election campaign become a matter of blood feud then no government could form in Turkey." (*Milliyet*, 1 Aug 1977). Here, Demirel was pointing the different moods and requirements of politics before and after elections which were reasonably compatible with the Gutmann and Thompson's concept of "psychological shift" that was supposed before and after the elections. It may be recalled that Gutmann and Thompson held that during the election campaigns uncompromising mindset was reasonable, but compromising mindset would be more proper for the post-election term and at the time of governing. This idea was based on the premise that politicians on the eve of elections need to make practical campaign promises. Otherwise, their campaign will suffer, and their commitment will be questioned. Nevertheless, after

elections, especially when they are not able to win the election to come to power single-handed, then they are obliged to break their promises, at some degree, because changing the status quo necessitates such flexibility. Therefore, to reach a compromise, politicians are supposed to figure out this situation, be able to change their approach and make the necessary "psychological shift". (Gutmann and Thomson, 2010: 1130).

Here, however, two points should be taken into consideration: First, Demirel could not put into effect his correct determination of not pursuing blood feud with regard to partnership with Ecevit. He has preferred a narrow and weak parliamentary majority which was likely to sharpen the conflict in the society but refused to accept a broad-based coalition with CHP. Although Ecevit was the leader of the first party, he seemed to notice this urgency, and he proposed a coalition. This showed that Ecevit was more moderate than Demirel in terms of compromise.

Second, there must be a limit of different attitudes or repugnance that may occur before and after the election, which Demirel indicated. It is not an easy task to turn into friends after treating as a sworn enemy. The way to escape from this contradiction might be to limit hostility but not friendship. This is because you cannot limit cooperation when a coalition obligation arises. Then it is the discourse of hostility that should be limited. Parties should not ignore the possibility of a need for compromise in case they cannot get the result they expected. As it is expressed in Turkish idiom "Do not slam the door that you get out; because you may need to turn back". In democratic regimes in which political parties compete to rule, the possibility of "having to rule together" should always be kept in mind. For this reason, parties had better focus more on their own programs and policies. In other words, a party election strategy should not be based solely on the defamation of competitors.

In Turkey, however, it is general behaviour to discredit the other parties during the election campaign. Throughout this election campaign, the political parties tried to receive a vote by denouncing and accusing other parties and showing them as threats. Especially the fact that Ecevit and Demirel held each other responsible for social turmoil and accused each other harshly, aggravated social polarization and severely damaged the ground of compromise. If during the power struggle, you qualify your opponent as a traitor, terrorist or a murderer, then you may lose your chance of coming together with your opponent. As a matter of fact, Demirel and Ecevit could not find a compromise platform after the election

because they used such a method. Demirel, instead, had to turn to MSP and MHP for compromise.

Distribution of cabinet membership in the National Front Coalition was as AP had 16, MSP had 8 and MHP had 5. In this distribution, as in the previous coalition, it was apparent that small parties were more advantageous in proportion. This shows that the MSP could negotiate effectively together with its compromising character. Because, according to the NF I period, the number of MSP deputies has halved, but the number of ministries they had was still eight. It is understood that the MSP had been able to use the "key party" role effectively in the establishment of the government. Perhaps MSP reaped the benefit of its compromising character because it was not impossible for MSP to compromise with the CHP. Demirel, on the other hand, knew that he had to agree with MSP to become prime minister and to make his party a major partner in power. Therefore, when some of the AP officials opposed the distribution of the chairs of the cabinet, Demirel's response has been: "A reasonable compromise has been achieved." (*Tercüman*, 27 July 1977).

MSP seemed to be delighted with the establishment of the government and its share in the cabinet. This satisfaction was reflected in the statements of the MSP representatives. Hasan Aksay, for example, in his statement, praised the coalition government and said that the coalitions had done a perfect job in recent years in Turkey. Besides, he claimed that single-party governments failed to solve the essential problems of the country. Aksay held that coalitions, being a compromise of the whole country and respect for everyone's opinion, had been a phase of democratic administration of the time (TBMM, JD, 30/7/1977, 184).

The fact that the Speaker and the Bureau of the National Assembly were not elected when the new coalition government took office was a significant event showing the low capacity of compromise among political parties. Because of the dispute between the parties, the Assembly could not elect its Speaker during the months following the establishment of the government. Therefore, this election problem, which continued throughout the life of the coalition, was an example of a lack of compromising attitude among all parties, including MSP.

Two main issues this coalition government faced were the economic crisis; and social tension and conflicts. MSP was in favour of a more autonomous solution, while AP was in favour of implementing IMF-set package to overcome the economic crisis. However, this

disagreement was tried to be solved in some way through compromising efforts. Again, in this period, despite the requests and attempts of some AP deputies to disrupt the coalition, MSP showed that it was in favour of the continuation of the partnership. On the other hand, on social segregation and conflict, the MSP persisted in its discourse of peace and goodwill and was determined to keep its organization, base and youth branches away from conflicts.

The local elections in November 1977 have signalled the end of the coalition government.

CHP provided a significant advantage in the municipalities in these elections and started to transfer deputies from the AP. With the transfer of 11 deputies from the AP to the CHP, the coalition's support in the parliament was over. What these deputies were saying when they changed their party, could be considered a positive development in terms of compromise. This group condemned the failure of the two big parties to come together. However, looking at the results of the change, it is seen that this event does not contribute to the compromise. Because the new government, to be formed by the participation of this group to the CHP, would not be broad-based, but would be a narrow margin like the current government. Secondly, 10 of the 11 AP members of this group were on the cabinet list. It is understood that the real aim of these deputies, who had said, "We do not expect the office or position" was to be a minister but not the compromise of the big parties.

The fact that Ecevit's attempt to establish a minority government following the 1977 election; Demirel's absolute opposition to the coalition and his preference for Second Nationalist Front government with a narrow majority; then Ecevit's transfer of MPs from the AP with the lure of ministry post to destroy this government, and the establishment of a narrow majority government can be seen, in the words of Özdemir, as the most important disease of the regime: the lack of a culture of political compromise (Özdemir, 2007: 277). This disease was the mother of the political problems that led to the collapse of democracy in the 1980 military coup (Barlas, 2000).

Süleyman Arif Emre's interpretation, in his book of memoirs named "35 Years in Politics" of the attitudes of political leaders is remarkable at this point: "Politicians, who put partisanship over the interests of the nation and the state, are the first to be blamed for the military intervention. If they did not drag political rivalry to the point where brothers fights, do not show weakness in the country's administration, do not misconduct, be successful,

then the military would not intervene to satisfy themselves. Even if they do, they would be punished like Talat Aydemir."(Emre,2002: 214). Likewise, as stated by Özdemir, those who conduct attitudes and behaviours deepening the political crisis were responsible as well as those who staged the coup. This political crisis, which became as severe as to justify the 1980 coup in the eyes of the average person, clearly demonstrates the responsibility of these leaders (Özdemir, 2007: 277).

6.1.4. Compromising Attitude of *Milli Görüş* in the RP-DYP Coalition

The 1991 election, in which RP rose to the fourth largest party, heralded a new coalition era in Turkeys political life, which would either trigger new expansions on political compromise or create new government crises. Political culture in Turkey has created a political environment in which the latter was dominant. The uncompromising attitude that dominated the political culture manifested itself in this period. On the one hand, hostile attitudes among political leaders, on the other hand, military tutelage with extreme secularism, and the exclusionary attitude of its supporters towards the Welfare party and the religious sector led to the political turmoil of the 90s.

In fact, between 1991 and 1995, it can be said that Demirel, probably with the help of lessons learned from the past, developed a more compromising attitude. Thus Demirel and his successor, Tansu Çiller, formed coalition governments with SHP, the representative of left politics. However, it should be kept in mind that, during this period, the right-left ideological polarization had lost its importance, and such a step did not require much courage. In the new era, military tutelage with extreme nationalism and imposing secularism was sensitive to rising identity politics and in that sense regarded ethnic and religious demands as significant threats. During 1995 election campaigns, mainly because of this tutelary supervision, the centre-right and centre-left parties adopted a discourse, which excluded and condemned the RP as the representative of religious demands in society.

When the general election, held at the end of 1995, came out with the championship of the RP, the feeling that dominated the political agenda was this: Will it be possible for the RP to come to power? This question was meaningful in two ways. First, all other parties had assailed RP during election campaigns. The right-wing parties, ANAP and DYP, and the left-wing parties, DSP and CHP, referred to the "perils of the RP". Therefore, it was not very likely that these parties would come closer to the RP. Secondly, and more importantly, would

the military tutelage, having demonstrated RP as a threat, allow the RP to become a coalition partner?

These questions were also associated with the question of to what level political compromise culture has reached in Turkey. The answer to this question was to show whether the hegemonic elite would approach compromise toward the religious people which regarded them being victimised by the way secularism has been applied during the history of the Republic.

The answer to these questions was shaped by the political events that took place during the two years after the election. Many of these political events bear traces of the entrenched compromising attitude of the RP and the intransigent attitude of its interlocutors. In other words, during these two years, while both the political interlocutors and the soldiers were continually trying to exclude and marginalise the RP, the RP displayed a peaceful and compromising attitude towards both groups and tried not to be affected by the hostilities nurtured against it.

In the days following the election, in January 1996, a coalition obligation was evident, but relations between political parties were not very favourable for the coalition. Firstly, both of the right-wing parties, DYP and ANAP, had declared during the election campaign that they would not engage in a coalition with the RP. This made it difficult for the first party RP to come together with one of the right-wing parties to which it was relatively close. However, if a two-party coalition was to be formed, one of the parties had to be RP. If two right-wing parties would come together without RP, support from one of the left parties was needed. Indeed, the leaders of the left parties were willing to give support to prevent the RP from coming to power (*Hürriyet*, 10 Jan 1996). Such a coalition, however, seemed difficult due to the personal antagonism between the two party leaders. They had entered into rivalry during the election campaign because they appealed to a joint base of electorates in the election campaign. After the election, when the votes of both were almost the same, the issue of who should become the prime minister turned into a definite matter of contention. Therefore, these two leaders took a stand against the RP with the discourse of "the sensitivities of the regime" while they took an attitude towards each other with the feeling of "personal envy". Therefore it can be said, Mesut Yılmaz and Tansu Çiller, could not fulfil their duty on political compromise.

The disagreement between ANAP and DYP leaders was monitored with great concern in the anti-RP media because the conflict between the two leaders increased the chances of RP coming to power. This mainstream media, which regarded the administration of RP as "nightmare" has continuously put forward the "price of the two leaders' disagreement", emphasised the "view of the military" on this issue and thus tried to agitate both the secularist circles and the military. Oktay Ekşi, for example, in his article in *Hürriyet,* was warning that nobody should be fooled by RP deputies' positive attitude at the opening of the parliament, claiming that they were enemies of secularism and Atatürk (*Hürriyet,* 9 Jan 1996)

In response to this marginalising attitude of other political parties and tutelage forces, the RP leader approached all political parties with a compromising and peaceful attitude. Erbakan's compromising attitude was evident from the very beginning. When he was given the mandate to form the government, Erbakan had declared from the beginning that he could form a coalition not only with a centre-right but also with centre-left (Devrim, 1995: 1160-1167). In accordance with this promise, Erbakan met with all party leaders and proposed to form a coalition government. According to Şener, it has not been the political parties what threatened *Milli Görüş* since its establishment, but it was the established political regime. The pressure of this regime, protected by military tutelage, strengthened Erbakan's motivation to come together with other political parties. In turn, other parties and party leaders sought to take advantage of the soldier's pressure on the RP (Şener, Interview, 2020). Erbakan, under these circumstances, met with the leaders of the DYP, ANAP, DSP and the CHP to form a coalition but it turned out that no leader wanted to cooperate with him, so he, returned the task to the President (*Hürriyet,*20 Jan 1996).

After Erbakan, President Demirel assigned Tansu Çiller. During this process, the uncompromising attitude of Çiller was visible, because for the formation of the coalition, she had to compromise with either the RP or the ANAP, but she was not able to find common ground for the establishment of a government. Çiller first met with ANAP, but, no agreement was reached because each side regarded the office of premiership as their own right. The meeting of Çiller with Erbakan was only for the sake of "courtesy" and did not involve any idea of partnership. Therefore, Çiller did not propose a coalition during the meeting. In exchange, Erbakan reiterated his coalition proposal and tried to persuade Çiller to compromise (*Hürriyet,* 1 Feb 1996).

Mesut Yılmaz, the third leader, assigned by Demirel, started his first meeting with the CHP and held the last meeting with RP. This arrangement showed that Yılmaz did not consider democratic precedents and had a negative attitude towards compromise. Nevertheless, Erbakan by virtue of his constructive character made a rapprochement with Yılmaz's in his meeting and showed that he was open to Yılmaz's disproportionate partnership offer that privileged his party. In this context, Erbakan accepted to support Yılmaz's minority government for the first two months and to cede "important" ministries to ANAP when forming the coalition government (*Hürriyet,* 18 Feb 1996).

However, when the possibility of compromise between the two parties became visible, the tutelage institutions began to react negatively, and the collaborative media intensively re-enforced this reaction. The mainstream media began to play upon the sensitiveness on the secular regime and stressed dissatisfaction of the army by the latest development. As a matter of fact, the indirect messages and warnings of the military ended with the sudden withdrawal of Mesut Yılmaz from the coalition negotiations (Ekşi, 1996).

Mesut Yılmaz, accepting the guidance of the army, abruptly turned away from the RP, turned its face to DYP and established the coalition government in a short time with the support of the DSP. However, this government, formed by the will of external focal points quite hastily, was implemented because of a forced unification but not the product of a compromise. Therefore, the incompatibilities between the two party leaders appeared quite early, and the government ended within a few months.

When the President gave Erbakan a second mandate to form a government in early June, Erbakan reported that his first choice for coalition government was ANAP. It was because some of the founding members of the ANAP were close to the idea of *Milli Görüş*. Still, at this stage, Erbakan took care to keep other options open and even proposed a three-party government. Normally, while RP was numerically sufficient to form a government with the support of only one right-wing party, Erbakan's proposal for a three-party coalition involving the RP ANAP and DYP seemed to contradict the classical coalition theories. As it may be remembered, according to classical coalition theories, politicians prefer to form coalitions just big enough to ensure a majority in parliament namely "minimum winning coalitions". This is because they are motivated primarily by ambition for power or prestige, and that means sharing cabinet posts among more parties than is necessary is senseless.

However, Erbakan's offer was corresponding to the "oversized coalitions" which could come for exceptional circumstances. Erbakan's attitude here seems to be contrary to the principle of winning maximum ministerial chairs. Given the reasons for this, it is possible to say that the first reason was the exclusionary political pressure on Erbakan and his party. Erbakan was trying to hold on against the tutelary elite and striving to overcome the prejudice against them. One way for this seemed to be to renounce their gains and to accept less than they deserve in power. Therefore, Erbakan was forced to sacrifice for the sake of not losing all of its gains. As for the second reason, it is possible to say that Erbakan's compromising disposition was effective in keeping close to such a coalition model because Erbakan had repeatedly proved his compromising and sharing attitude on the political scene. Therefore, it should not be ignored that there is an idealistic dimension of sacrifice along with a pragmatic dimension.

Moreover, Erbakan said that he was willing to form a quadruple coalition in the process, including the BBP as well as these three parties, and recalled that a government of four parties would represent 430 seats in parliament. It is not difficult to predict that such a broad-based government would pave the way for social peace and harmony. Furthermore, Erbakan said that they had no negative prejudices about forming a coalition with the leftist parties. This rhetoric and attitude made it clear that *Milli Görüş* movement, led by Erbakan, had the flexibility to reach a compromise that no party had. In response to this constructive and compromising attitude of the leader of RP, the leaders of the left parties, rankings of which were fourth and fifth in respectively, Deniz Baykal and Bülent Ecevit showed a decisive attitude towards not being involved in a coalition government to be formed by Erbakan and became an example of the uncompromising attitude (*Milli,* 12-13 June 1996).

The last option for Erbakan, who faced these uncompromising attitudes, was to get closer to the DYP leader who was in trouble with the investigation files. When the DYP leader could not get ANAP support for the files against him, he was left alone and had to get close to RP. The RP welcomed this convergence as it was already lonely, and in mid-June 1996 the foundations of the RP and the DYP coalition partnership were laid.

At this stage, RP took some steps that it deemed inevitable for the compromising ground: it withdrew its files against Çiller, rejected the DSP's investigation proposal against Çiller, and together with DYP supported the investigation proposal against Mesut Yılmaz. Erbakan also agreed to the rotating prime ministry formula for the sake of his compromise

with Çiller. The application of such a coalition method, which had never been implemented before, can also be explained by the two factors mentioned above: Political pressure on Erbakan and Erbakan's compromising attitude. Distribution of the ministries was made in favour of the DYP in terms of proportionality. In other words, RP could not get what it should under normal conditions. RP was able to adapt itself to the conditions that were forcing it to make more sacrifice. Hence, the word, which took place at the beginning of the coalition protocol, had a more special meaning for the RP: "Democracy is a regime of compromise." Another concession that Erbakan accepted for the sake of this compromise was the adoption of the rule that was not previously found: In processes of appointments and assignment made by the prime minister, the signature of the deputy prime minister would be necessary, and the law would legalize this requirement.

Erbakan was able to form a coalition government with his compromising character and his ability to manoeuvre in the political field, but the tutelary elite who saw *Milli Görüş* as a threat to them would not tolerate this result. Signals of this intolerance appeared at an early stage. The mainstream media took the brunt of the offensive against the RP-DYP government. On the one hand, media used all kinds of disinformation methods to slander the RP in the public eye, on the other; it was introducing the DYP, who partnered with the RP, as a traitor. Earlier news reports claimed that the DYP had lost half of its votes for entering this coalition. *Hürriyet,* and *Milliyet* dailies launched an intensive campaign to prevent the government from gaining a vote of confidence from the Assembly. In this context, they tried to define this government with concepts such as *a nightmare, a disaster, a threat, a reactionary movement* and a *counter-revolution*. They tried to agitate the military circles on the one hand and to create fear in public on the other. In the meantime, a statement of French President in the same days, targeting the RP and harshly criticising the formation of a coalition government, which was quite impertinent, summarised the attitude of the western world toward *Milli Görüş* movement. This hostile attitude of the West continued later; for example, the US government demonstrated its hostile attitude towards the Middle East policy of the RP-DYP Coalition.

The reactions to the establishment of the government were not limited to these. The political leaders of the other parties blamed the government heavily by virtue of the confidence provided by non-democratic circles. For example, Mesut Yılmaz described the government as "immoral" (*Hürriyet,* 10 July 1996). Ecevit claimed that RP having 21% of

total votes could be interpreted as 79% of the people in the country were against the party and even were regarding it as a threat, which was entirely unreasonable (TBMM, JD, 6/7/1996). These internal and external pressures and hostile attitudes had a severe impact on some members of DYP, so a dozen MPs resigned from this party in the first days of the coalition (Aydın and Taşkın, 2016: 425).

Erbakan responded to all these exclusionist and aggressive attacks with great patience and calmness and did his best to soften the political atmosphere. He responded politely to the criticisms and accusations against him and tried to reduce the influence of hate speech on politics. In this respect, he reminded that what was discussed in the election campaign should not be an obstacle in forming a post-election government. He emphasised that there is a need for the government and stressed that these prejudices must be overcome in order to serve the people. With this approach, he acted following the concepts of Gutmann and Thomson deemed necessary for politics: flexibility and psychological shift. Erbakan, who set an example of this psychological change, has set an example for other parties in this way.

The RP-DYP coalition tried to establish effective management despite all the pressure and attacks. However, since the pro-tutelage elite saw the government as a threat to themselves, they began to denigrate all activities of the government, right or wrong. This strive was hardened, mainly because it was thought that successful policies and practices could increase the prestige and acceptance of the government in public opinion, which was scary for them.

That is why when the government tried to resolve the Kurdish issue, one of Turkey's most fundamental problems, by peaceful ways, these initiatives were accused, discredited and barred on the ground that "concessions were given to terrorists". Another fundamental problem having deep historical roots was the deprivation and victimization of the religious community in the face of the guardian elite. The steps taken by the government to remedy the problem were condemned by the agitation of "Islamophobic" feelings and prejudices, and the moderate approaches of the state to "involve" religious community were kept under constant surveillance by tutelage circles. On the other hand, the government wanted to strengthen the economic and cultural ties with the Middle East and African countries that were neglected throughout the history of the Republic, which had a direct relationship with the country's major problem, the energy issue. However, the pro-tutelage elites severely sabotaged the steps again by using "ideological" prejudices and agitating nationalist feelings.

However, these initiatives of the government were of great importance for ensuring social peace and compromise within the country because "religion" and "ethnic nationalism" have been two major fault lines where the social conflict in the country was based on during the history of the Republic. The "marginalization "of the religious section of society by the state elite since the foundation of the Republic had been an everlasting matter of grievance of the religious people. This perception has caused a deep sense of alienation in this section of society. On the other hand, denial and exclusion policies based on the "ethnic nationalism" that shaped the founding ideology of the state had been a cause of another deep cleavage in the country. The fact that Kurdish citizens have been exposed to such a nationalist treatment since the foundation of the Republic was another major obstacle to peace and integration in the country. In this sense, the macro policies of the government were aimed at serving the integration of the nation, increasing the national cohesion and reducing the potential for conflict. Efforts to this end could have contributed significantly to creating a permanent compromise among conflict-bearing elements of society. However, the attacks on the government have dashed the hopes of comprehensive social integration, development of a compromising political culture and the potential economic recovery that would be stimulated by such a socio politic stability. On the contrary, exclusionary and hateful attitudes and discourses towards the government, mainly RP, have led to the emergence of a new confrontational and bleak political future.

Another step taken by Erbakan in the economic field has been tried to be sabotaged, although it was critically important. The so-called "pool formula" was of great importance, particularly for the efficient use of state resources. With this application, all accounts were collected in a single pool of public finances. The money was transferred from the public institution having money to the other in need of money. Thus, domestic debt would be significantly reduced (*Hürriyet*,27-29 July 1996). However, the interest groups that were harmed by this system felt uncomfortable and tried to prevent it. Erbakan's economic policies favouring the low-income and fixed-income sectors aimed at improving social justice, but these steps have disturbed the social groups affected negatively by such policies. Social inequality and poverty are phenomena that destroy social peace and integration. In this sense, the government's initiatives could serve to close another social gap (income injustice). However, the steps in this direction, like the others, did not gain effectiveness among the intense attacks.

Three significant problems of Turkey and Erbakan's approach to them are directly related to the three main fault lines in Turkey and to the effort to reach a compromise in these areas. These fault lines are secularist-Islamist, Turkish nationalism-Kurdish nationalism, and rich-poor distinction. Erbakan's approach coincides with the compromise of these opposite poles. Erbakan dreamed of a grand compromise that would end these three areas of conflict by providing the fundamental rights of Muslims against imposing secularist practices; softening the aspects of Turkish nationalism that neglecting the Kurdish existence, and balancing income distribution. Two main instruments would make the compromise in these three areas permanent: Spiritual and material development. Spiritual development meant the development in moral of individuals and consciousness of social responsibility while material development meant the welfare of the citizens and technological progress of the country that could compete with the developed world.

For the attacks on the Erbakan Government, sometimes more convenient means have been generated. One of them was the Susurluk incident. With this event, it became clear that some of the influential figures in the government's partner, the DYP, were associated with a group of police organizations and some organized crime organizations. The public focus on this event has been considered a new material for the deposition of the RP from power. In this context, a relentless campaign under the name of a "clean society" was carried out, the pressures to tumble the government were increased, and social tension was kept high persistently. However, since the tutelary elite did not always find favourable events like "Susurluk", they did not hesitate to use more "innocent" events to attack the government. These included, Erbakan's giving a fast-breaking meal to several leaders of religious societies, "The Quds Night" organized by the municipality of a district, way of going on a pilgrimage, gathering of the skins of the sacrificial animals, and the unofficial marriage of a community leader. These events, which were presented to the public by the media for days inflammatorily, became a striking and unforgettable example of the media's marginalization of a certain segment of society and the division of society into hate camps via disinformation.

Representatives of the left parties, Deniz Baykal and Bülent Ecevit, also participated in this baseless hullabaloo. In their speeches in the Assembly, these leaders claimed that the republic was in danger of collapse, that RP posed a threat to this regime and that secularism was being tried to be destroyed. Like every word that was said with the comfort of the patronage of the tutelary elite, these words were taken seriously and all kinds of provocation

was made to force the "actors" to take action. It was in this environment that the military forces were convinced that the time had come for them to take the necessary step. Thus, the February 28 process, the beginning of the end for the government, was initiated.

9. Political Parties of Milli Görüş

	Party Name	Founding President	Establishment	Closure	Life Period
1	**MNP** Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party)	Necmettin Erbakan	26 January 1970	20 May 1971	1 year, 3 months, 24 days
2	**MSP** Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)	Süleyman Arif Emre	11 October 1972	16 October 1981	9 years, 4 days
3	**RP** Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)	Ahmet Tekdal[30]	19 July 1983	16 January 1998	14 years, 5 months, 28 days
4	**FP** Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)	İsmail Alptekin	17 December 1997	22 June 2001	3 years, 6 months, 5 days
5	**SP** Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)	Recai Kutan	20 July 2001	-	-

Source: Data compiled from TBMM Kütüphane ve Arşiv Hizmetleri Başkanlığı, "Siyasi Partiler"

28 February represents a powerful expression of the hate felt by the pro-tutelage secular elite toward the religious society which demanded and succeeded to become a partner of the power by democratic means. Despite all compromise efforts of RP, this hegemon segment has made it clear that they did not want a compromise and they will not be willing to make concessions and share the country's resources under their control. The military bureaucracy, which led the hegemon side and saw the ultimate power in itself, ensured the expulsion of the *Milli Görüş* from the field of political activity by taking the support of the peripheral hegemons who defended the same values and shared the resources. These peripheral hegemons consisted of large capital owners, central media bosses, laicist/leftist political parties, high judiciary bodies, leaders of the academic community, managers of

[30] The first founder of RP, Ali Türkmen, was vetoed by the Military Council.

trade union organizations, and managers of semi-public/professional institutions. As can be seen, administrations of almost all public and non-public organizations of Turkey, where civil society is not well-developed, have been involved in the side of the pro-tutelage laicist elite. It is not difficult to foresee that the *Milli Görüş*, to whom organized power centres of society were opposed, could not cope with such a challenge. As a matter of fact, since 28 February 1997, this balance deteriorated rapidly against RP.

During the period of 28 February, the army moved from the indirect intervention stage, which had been felt previously, to the overt intervention stage. In this context, it has dictated its macro policies to the government. In line with the fulfilment of the "homework" given to the government, the military organized series of a briefing for many public institutions, from the judiciary to universities, to provide social support, and the military briefing, therefore, made sense of "policy dictation" in the country. The central media reflected the military's intense pressure on the civilian government in its news with "enthusiasm for revenge." Moreover, it played a provocative role to make the military take a stiffer attitude.

As for Erbakan and his party, they tried to reduce social tension during this period, called for political parties to engage in dialogue for political compromise, invited everyone to be more moderate and tolerant, used a very soft language against the aggressive attitude of the soldier, and recommended moderation to the clash mongers of the society. Erbakan maintained his composure even in the closure case against his party used diplomatic language and expressed his optimism that such an attempt against democracy and political compromise would not yield results. However, among the hubbub of the media, the voice of the prime minister went unheard. The uncompromising and oppressive attitude of the tutelary institutions and their supporters was evident. Erbakan's calls for compromise, tolerance, and democratic attitude were unrequited. The military did not reduce the severity of the pressure it set up, media did not change military-provoking stance against the government, the leftist political parties did not oppose the intervention of the military, and the management of other organizations did not refrain from accusing the weakened government. This organized repression made the government unable to function by its 12th month, and the government was forced to resign.

The closure case of the RP, opened a few weeks before the resignation, showed that the removal of the *Milli Görüş* from power was not satisfactory for the hegemon elite and

that this political movement was wanted to be destroyed "permanently".[31] Six months later, the Constitutional Court, with its decision, proved that it was part of the lynching campaign against the *Milli Görüş*. Erbakan, nevertheless, kept his gentlemanship against these relentless attacks against himself and his party, did not use aggressive language and avoided attitudes and rhetoric that would provoke his party base. Moreover, while transferring his duties, he talked about the normalcy of the change of duty in democracies, the honour of serving the country and congratulated the new prime minister and wished success to them. Such composure with diplomatic and conciliatory language after such aggression bears the distinction of being the one exception in the panorama of Turkey.

6.2. Why Does *Milli Görüş* Have A Distinctive Compromising Attitude?

The fact that *Milli Görüş* has a more compromising character than other political actors in the political atmosphere of Turkey was disclosed above. Looking at the factors that create the difference, it will be seen that, like many social events, more than one factor comes into play: the environment in which Erbakan was grown up and his temperament; the understanding of Islam adopted by the *Milli Görüş*; strategy reasoning of the *Milli Görüş*; national unity sentiment. While examining the factors, it will be seen that all of them have in some way related with the personality of Necmettin Erbakan, which is the locomotive of this movement. This is because the *Milli Görüş* movement has been shaped by the ideas and working methods of Erbakan (Bekiroğlu, 2018: 252) and it is identified with Erbakan (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020). Therefore, even though the opinion and practice of the *Milli Görüş* have a volume exceeding Erbakan, it should not be forgotten that Erbakan has a determining effect on all the basic features of this movement.

6.2.1. The Environment in Which Erbakan Was Grown up and His Temperament

Erbakan was a child of some aristocratic lineage; he was born and raised in an educated family. His father, Mehmet Sabri Bey, lived in cities with different cultures, languages and traditions such as Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Erzurum, Mosul, Elazığ, Bitlis, Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kastamonu, Sinop, Trabzon, Afyon, and Kayseri, as required by his duty. On the other hand, Erbakan lived in various cities such as Kayseri, Trabzon and Afyon as a child, and he finally

[31] The word of General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu who was the Chief of General Staff in 1998 "The February 28 will take a thousand years." has revealed a striking expression of this intention. (Hakan, 2009).

breathed the air of a cosmopolitan city like Istanbul since his early youth, and therefore met with different communities, thoughts and cultures early (Demirkan, 2018: 430). These different worlds and cultural diversity have probably created an abundance of thought and perspective. The diversity of thoughts and perspectives, cultures and traditions contribute to the development of compromising culture because, in order to the differences to coexist, they must be tolerant and compromising.

Looking at the family environment where Erbakan lived his childhood, it is seen that his upbringing style in his family has a significant democratic quality. It is understood that he did not have a harsh discipline on himself and his siblings, and instead, a persuasive training method was applied. His father Mehmet Sabri Bey is said to have had a patient personality that he patiently waited for their children to be corrected in the face of their mistakes, he carried out his domestic manners through persuasion and did not scold his children (Gündoğan, 2019: 21). Having a religious personality, the father wanted to convey the same world view to his children, but while doing so, he used a soft style and tried to shape their thoughts with positive methods. Rather than applying a harsh discipline on this issue, he made shrewd guidance. For example, he was praying with a light voice, in a way that they could hear him and learn these prayers, placing the books he wanted them to read in the place that it would easily catch their eye, and he spoke about a book and its contents appropriately (Gündoğan, 2019: 21). Though, Erbakan's brother Kemalettin Erbakan also gave examples of his mother and father's a few strict rebukes (Erbakan, K. 2014:37). However, it is seen that a peaceful, orderly and tolerant atmosphere prevails rather than these exceptions in the family environment. It is a probable result that children raised by such a moderate and understanding parent will also tend to solve the problems away from conflict, to be open to dialogue, and to approach problems with peaceful methods. Therefore, it would be reasonable to think that Erbakan's childhood treatment from his parents was a meaningful factor underlying his peaceful and compromising personality.

The fact that Erbakan's father Mehmet Sabri Bey was a judge and continued his duty during the Republic period shows that there was no radicalism in his worldview that would directly oppose the republican revolutions. He was close to the Sufi tradition representatives in the places he served (Çalmuk, 2017: 99). However, in the radically changing political and legal order with the Republic, he continued his professional work and did not stand openly against the new order of the state. In other words, he seems to have managed to reconcile his

religious personality and his views sympathetic to Sufism with the oppressive secularism conditions of the new political order. Likewise, he ensured that his children received the education prescribed by the new political order. Therefore, it can be said that Erbakan has not been in a religious environment built on open conflict with the new political regime until the ages that he started university. Instead, he grew up in such a family which did not bring its religiosity to the point of conflict with the new political regime and which was able to adapt to the new political order. It would be reasonable to think that such a childhood period also had an impact on Erbakan's non-confrontational understanding of religion.

In addition to the childhood environment of Necmettin Erbakan, some information about his temperament gives important clues about his compromising attitude in his political personality. In the narrations of Necmettin Erbakan about childhood and primary school, it is seen that he is an extroverted, social and active child. His desire to play with his siblings and neighbourhood friends instead of spending time alone, and try to involve them, shows this. Moreover, he tried to increase the number of participants in the game and applied various methods and tricks to reach his goal (Erbakan, K. 2014:41-42) The fact that the games he chose are related to shopping, market, economy, military service, administration, and the state is also a reflection of the same sociality. Therefore, it is clear that Erbakan likes to communicate and interact with others, to engage in collective activities and to struggle in crowds. However, this social personality has another essential feature: the desire to be in the centre. For this reason, he took care of the organization of the social games he chose, determined the rules of the game himself, rearranged the rules when lost, thus he was always the main actor of the game (Erbakan, K. 2014:37). These games played in childhood gave hints about the future (Demirkan, 2018: 430). His words about the desire to be in the centre of the organization are enlightening: “The duty of organizing had begun for me from the age of nine. Even the children in the first year of high school would behave within these rules. I would organize many subjects in high school as well… To be the first in the class, to be a teacher in the class, to explain the points where the teachers were not able to solve… This lasted until the end of the university.” (Türk and Üstün, 1992: 11 as cited in Demirkan, 2018: 431).

Characteristics existed in the temperament of Erbakan were clearly visible in his childhood such as standing at the centre of the organization, remaining at the forefront, passion for success, desire for power, which were the driving forces of his brilliant

achievements in studentship and academia. Likewise, these features seem to have been reflected in his attitudes and behaviours in politics. It is stated that after joining the Parliament as an independent deputy in 1969, Erbakan and his supporters faced a possibility of joining the Millet Party, which had not succeeded in the same election. However, in these negotiations, Erbakan wanted to be the leader of MP (Millet Partisi/Nation Party) and the party's President, Osman Bölükbaşı, did not accept this offer so this attempt was not successful (Çaylak, 2004: 600).

Bülent Arınç reminds that Erbakan has a slogan of "power in any case" (Arınç and Şahin, 2019:134). With his surprise success in 1973, Erbakan evaluated the opportunity to become a partner in power, despite all risks and difficulties. It took time for this situation to be adopted by his party deputies and their base. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who made an essential contribution to the intellectual foundations of the first party of the *Milli Görüş*, criticised this attitude with the following words: "When this party unexpectedly came to the parliament with 50 deputies in 1973 ... it decided to suck advantage of the government costively and finally to step on the threshold of wearing down" (Kısakürek, 2009: 20). Erbakan's willingness to become a ruling partner showed itself in the same way in the two National Front governments and the RP-DYP government in 1996. Concessions made for sharing the power, on the other hand, have been subject to severe criticism from time to time in both the top management and the base of the party (Arınç and Şahin, 2019).

Some representatives of *Milli Görüş* have argued that the desire of the authority in the *Milli Görüş* has been bridled perfectly, that its prominent representatives have sacrificed at the highest level, offered each other the authorities, and even insisted on it (Emre, 2002b: 54). In the movements that set out with an idealistic and principled program, the attitude of generosity and altruism is likely to be more common, but this reality should not be overstated, and human's passion for power and authority should not be overlooked. Opinions that ignore human passions and weaknesses are far from convincing. Therefore, while *Milli Görüş* was seeking to take part in the power and make concessions for this aim with both its leader and the management team, it is necessary to remember the relationship of this attitude with desire for power. As a matter of fact, the owners of the same claim confessed that the people who served as ministries in *Milli Görüş* left the party when they were not nominated for ministry in the next government (Emre, 2002c: 54).

6.2.2. Islamic Understanding of *Milli Görüş*

Before delving into the understanding of Islam adopted by the *Milli Görüş*, it is useful to touch upon the question of where to place Islam in terms of moderate-fundamental, peaceful-warfare, defensive-offensive, non-violent- violent dualism.

First of all, it should be remembered that the opinion that Islam is the "religion of peace" is quite widespread among Muslims. Muslim theologians who advocate this common idea make various arguments while defending their views: For example, according to Mehmet Görmez; Islam means "peace and well-being", and it is all wrong to combine it with "violence", a word full of cruelty and hate. Because according to the Qur'an principles, the destruction of an innocent person is equivalent to the destruction of all humanity. The death of a person is the death of humanity (Görmez, 2020). According to Mehmet Paçacı, the Qur'an is a peaceful book and only envisaged "just war". Just war is a physical response to the aggressive opposition to Muhammad's holy message when Muslims can afford it. While passive resistance was applied in the first phase of the Islamic society, this righteous war was allowed when the society reached the power to protect itself in Medina (Paçacı, 2015:142). Based on some provisions in the Qur'an, Hakkı Ünal states that it is not desired to impose and spread the religion of Islam through oppression, coercion, violence (Ünal, 2015: 250): "There shall be no compulsion in (acceptance of) the religion". (Baqarah/256) "The truth is from your Lord, so whoever wills let him believe, and whoever wills let him disbelieve (Kahf/29). And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed - all of them entirely. Then, [O Muhammad], would you compel the people in order that they become believers? (Yunus/99). Adem Apak acknowledges that the prophet of the Islamic religion has made a great effort to prevail peace rather than violence in society and he tried to spread the religion of mercy and social peace (Apak, 2015: 378). Finally, Ejder Okumuş argues that the issue of Islam and violence has been assessed by Western countries mainly in a way that its context is ignored, based on the individual events, according to their own interests, and in defiance of a scientific approach, so an anti-Islamic assessment is made (Okumuş, 2015: 443).

However; it can be seen that there is no consensus on how the message of Islam should be related to society. In the face of the comments above, there are particular views and practices that include violence about the nature of Islam's relationship with society and non-Muslims. For this reason, 27 out of 53 organizations in the lists of international terrorist

organizations have defined themselves as Islamists. In this case, Nevzat Tarhan says that the question asked in the West is not a surprise: If Islam does not approve violence, why almost all terrorists are Muslim? (Tarhan, 2015: 104,109). There are enough Islamist movements in the Islamic world that have adopted violence to make this question relevant. In the words of Manaz, a revolutionary, radical, warrior Islamism is also mentioned. They aim at a radical change in the existing political and intellectual structure, acting on revolutionary principles and procedures. This kind of Islamism is wholly closed to compromise. It rejects integration and dialogue with the dominant order in its society, sets out its goals clearly and does not refrain from using violence for this (Manaz, 2008: 26).

A significant number of Islamist movements in the Islamic World refused to act within the framework of the current political regime/constitutional order, therefore, from time to time, took a position of violence and conflict, and some adopted the way of armed struggle from the very beginning. If these are remembered briefly, the Takfir wal-Hijra organization, founded in Egypt in 1942 by Shukri Mustafa and effective since 1971, envisaged an uprising and was involved in various terrorist acts in the 2000s (Manaz, 2008: 236-240). The Islamic Jihad founded by Fathi Shaqaqi in Palestine in the 1980s and the Islamic Resistance (Hamas) organization founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, also adopted the armed struggle (Manaz, 2008: 297-309). The Taliban Movement, which was founded in Afghanistan in 1994 and remained under the direction of Molla Omar, carried out an armed struggle (Manaz, 2008: 336). The Al Qa'ida organization, which cooperated with the Taliban Movement, followed an armed and violent path. Established in 1991 by Osama Bin Laden, the leader of the organization, the Al Qa'ida carried out effective armed actions against the United States, European and Israeli assets in order to prevent US activities in the Middle East (Manaz, 2008: 341). The Hezbollah organization, which was founded in Lebanon in 1983 under the leadership of M. Hussain Fadlallah, also adopted an armed struggle against Israel and the US behind it (Manaz, 2008: 482).

In contrast to these Islamist movements that adopt direct armed struggle, some Islamist movements did not adopt violence as a direct method and tried to avoid violence. However, the harshness of the existing regimes' approach to these movements also made them harder and triggered a conflict environment. For example, despite the leaders who reported that they were against violence from time to time, the Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood), which was founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1930 as the most rooted Islamist

movement of Egypt, could not stay completely away from violence because of its thoughts and demands and the existing regime's harsh approach to these demands (Manaz, 2008: 222-234). Al-Cebhetü'l-İslamiy li'l-inkāz (Front Islamique du Salut: FIS), which was founded by Abbâs Medenî and Ali Belhâc during the democratic life in Algeria in 1989 and gained an overwhelming majority in the local and general elections held between 1990-1992, was prevented from coming to power with a military coup. The practices and pressures of the coup administration led to a civil war in the country. 150,000 people died in clashes between Islamist groups and the army until 2000 (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2007).

Finally, in some instances, Islamic movements remained free of violence and took place in a civil-democratic struggle method, thanks to these Islamist movements' attitudes rejecting violence and the relative moderate attitude of the relevant political regimes. For example, the Jamaat el Islami, (Islamic Congregation), founded by Abul Alā Mawdudi in Pakistan in Lahore in 1941, "regards violence as illegitimate and believes that the Islamic state will go through peaceful, democratic and parliamentary means." (Ahsan, 1993). Therefore, he envisaged a kind of theo-democratic order and took part in democratic elections, although he could not achieve successful results (Manaz, 2008: 320). The Islamist organization, which tried to advance an Islamic vay of life in Tunisia, started in the 1970s. This movement formalized by the name of Ḥarakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement) in 1981 by Rachid al-Ghannouchi (Akar Yüksel and Bingöl, 2013: 317). The movement, which was against violence from the beginning and adopted the democratic struggle method, converged with the government in the late 1980s and turned into a political party called Nahda. However, since 1991, the party was closed by the government, and thousands of its members were imprisoned. The party, which says it has an Islamic reference, continued its activities in a parliamentary democracy with the democratization process after 2010 (Yıldırım, 2018: 95). National Islamic Front (NIF) (later "National Congress") founded by Hassan Abdallah al Turabi in Sudan also operated as a legal political party in the 1980s and had the opportunity to represent it in the parliament. Turabi, who has been in cooperation with the government and sometimes in opposition since 2000, has continued his policy free from violence even though he has been arrested from time to time (Arpa, 2016: 185).

All these opinions and practices put forward show the fact that a political movement is "Islamist" does not mean it should be compromising or noncompromising, peaceful or warrior, moderate or radical. What determines which of the two is closer to the Islamist

movement is what one understands from Islam. In Şener's word "Religion is shaped by whoever controls it" (Şener, Interview, Feb 2020). In the same manner, *Milli Görüş's* understanding of Islam was effective in its legal, compromising, evolutionist and soft way. Erbakan believed that the basis of the İslamic belief is compassion and love. For him, the fact that the Qur'an started with "Bismillahirrahmanirrahim" and that the Islamic prophet "sent as a mercy to the worlds" reveals this reality (Erbakan, 2006: 7). Besides, Islam is the derivative of the word "silm" which means goodness, peace, goodwill, quiet, and tranquility (Bekiroğlu, 2018: 233).

The understanding of Islam, adopted by Erbakan rejects violence, is based on peace and aims at dialogue and compromise. It is because of this understanding that he chose a legal political struggle with a secular order banning the establishment of a party based on explicit Islamic references. When the political parties he founded were closed, he founded new parties in compliance with the current law, and never thought following a path of conflict/violence. He never adopted a negative attitude towards the military, which always looked at him and his movement with suspicion and was at the head of the guardianship regime. He did not speak against the military and always used a compromising soft language. He formed four coalitions with parties which were standing on two opposite ideological poles; he became the most enthusiastic leader in the establishment of these coalitions, strived for the continuation of the coalitions and did his best to keep them intact. He forced all the ways to create the possibilities of living in peace together with different structures and thoughts.

The most crucial reason for Erbakan and the *Milli Görüş* to have a compromising attitude with the thoughts and practices outlined above is the Islamic understanding of this movement. The Gümüşhanevi-İskenderpaşa sect is the basis of this Islamic understanding.

In fact, all of the sufi orders (tariqa) were closed officially since the Republic established. However, although these structures lost their visibility institutionally, they did not die out completely. Nevertheless, they did not engage in a conflict with the new regime that implements secularist revolutions because, according to the Sunni understanding that they are subject to, the bad government was preferred to anarchy, chaos and revolution (Yılmaz, 2011: 255). Gümüşhanevi, a branch of the Naqshbandi, the most prominent tariqa and its sheikh, Mehmed Zahid Kotku (1897–1980), was closely involved with the country's socio-economic and political issues, on the one hand, trying to prevent the moral-spiritual

decline of the society on the other (Mardin, 2005: 152 as cited in Yılmaz, 2011: 255). In this context, the country's economic dependency on foreign countries, waste of country resources, external borrowing, delay in industrialization, poverty and unemployment have been brought to the agenda, and several solutions were offered (Kotku, 1984a: 36). He mentioned the necessity of urgent economic development and getting rid of economic dependence, thus being a self-respecting, free society and helping other Muslim societies in the same direction (Kotku, 1984a: 37).

As mentioned earlier, these views and approaches are the issues directly reflected in Erbakan's political program. Because Erbakan, while Mehmet Efendi was still a resident in Bursa, was regularly attending to the wisdom circle of Hasip Efendi, and after his death, he continued to the lectures of Aziz Efendi. In particular, Mehmed Zahit Kotku has been described as a port of peace where Erbakan took refuge in almost every stage of his life (Kemikli, 2018:93). Therefore, Erbakan has been described as Kotku's disciple (Yılmaz, 211: 255).

The way this sufi order and Mehmet Zahit Kotku understand Islam and jihad also played a determining role in Erbakan's understanding of Islam and jihad. In fact, this determination is already compulsory for someone who adopts this order. Because, while Mehmet Zahit Kotku explained the mystical morality, he spoke very clearly about the obedience of the disciple to the Sheikh.

> "Disciple must be extremely obedient to his master ... he should not go out of his word, neither add anything to his lesson, nor drop anything from the lesson, and should not go to the conversation of other masters." It is his master who will make him right, he must believe. He must accept all his suggestions wholeheartedly and process them all as the master says. He should regard him as the deputy of the prophet. He must see obedience and subordination to him as obedience to Allah and His Messenger (Kotku, 2017: 116).

> If this disciple does not hold this bond of love, he cannot benefit from his sheikh under any circumstances. A disciple must do away with his ego within the ego of his sheikh. Even if he finds it wrong, he should not object to any of his orders, and he should keep his word (Kotku, 2017: 117).

So it is crucial to look at Kotku's proposed method for society to achieve happiness (adopt Islamic values). First of all, Kotku acknowledges that hardness, violence, anger and wrath are bad natures that do not suit believers. He reminds that these traits can lead to separations, quarrels and death. He mentions that the prophet of Islam was not harsh and

hard-hearted, he treated people softly, so he was able to convey his message to people in the best way (Kotku, 1985: 51). According to Kotku, "Believer is a softhearted and docile person." (Kotku, 1985: 70). Kotku recalls the following word attributed to the prophet of Islam: "I was ordered to welcome people, just as I was commanded to implement god's orders." (Kotku, 1985: 124). The following words of Kotku are also remarkable in terms of one's mildness and positive approach to the other: "The first duty of every believer is to be the salvation to the world, to the universe, to the all living and non-living." (Özdamar, 2008:113). "Evil tongue, hardness and violence are forbidden, both for human beings and for animals (Özdamar, 2008:117). "Sofi is just like a ground - earth. All kinds of dirt are thrown at it, but always good things come out of it" (Özdamar, 2008:110).

Zahit Kotku opposed the referral of young people to violence and conflict as part of political organizations, emphasized fraternity ethics and encouraged the upbringing of the generations fed by our national values instead of the right and left jargon (Kemikli, 2018: 94). Reminding the importance of social unity, reunification and compromise, Kotku states that disagreement, division and disorganization will result in everyone's loss:

> "There is strength in numbers, and there is peace in the strengths. It is known that the threads break quickly when they are one by one; but when they come together, they become ropes and even stop the ships. Everyone knows this… Look at the Muslims in our country; we have no choice but to cry. Putting them together is harder than trying to scratch your ear with your elbow. Well, look, the enemy swallows us one by one, you are still trying to get what you said. How is this Islam?" (Kotku, 1984b: 93).

According to Kotku, obedience to power/government and avoiding breaking the unity is among the recommendations of the prophet. (Kotku, 1985: 59). However, this obedience and submissiveness are not limited to the fair administration. It is not appropriate to rebel, whether the ruler/administration is unfair or cruel. "Even if the sultans have bad features, obedience to them is obligatory as they said and it is not allowed to rebel against them. If a sultan does justice, he reaches the goodness; otherwise if he oppresses, he will have his own sin (Kotku, 2018: 24).

As it can be deduced, Kotku did not see the secular state as an absolute enemy (Yılmaz, 2011: 255) he favoured Islamization in a society, not in a revolutionary way, but evolutionarily, therefore disapproved of radical movements in the Islamic world. (Yaşar, 2005: 330-331) Kotku has adopted the way to act in the name of Islam by staying within the

framework of the current constitutional order. This understanding, which envisaged striving for its cause without facing the state, continued from Mevlana Halid, the leader of the Halidism branch, to Said Nursi, the leader of the Nurculuk movement (Yılmaz, 2011: 255). There was a particular emphasis on moral development in the field of movement that did not conflict with the existing formal politics of a country. According to Kotku, moral development would provide the material well-being and political balance "the country needed urgently" (Heper, M. 2011, 408-409). The idea of moral development has inspired all MG parties relatively MNP (1970-1971), MSP (1972-1981), RP (1983-1998), FP (1997-2001) and SP (2001-) (Heper, M. 2011, 408-409). On the other hand, despite the trauma experienced by the religious people in the early years of the Republic, Kotku's attitude which excluded hostility, revenge and radicalism has been the core of the moderate and compromising character dominating the top management of the *Milli Görüş* parties.

6.2.3. Rational (Realistic-Pragmatic) Strategy

Having a rational, realist and utilitarian mentality also plays a vital role in the *Milli Görüş* to have a compromising character. The *Milli Görüş* movement has the temperament to act calmly and thoughtfully rather than reacting sentimentally when encountering situations that prevent or make it difficult to achieve a goal. It has the ability to make profit and loss analysis and take steps accordingly. With such a character, while trying to protect the principles and ideals you base on, you have the necessary flexibility to preserve and advance these principles and ideals, you manoeuvre when necessary, and you accept to go one step back to take two steps forward. Likewise, if you are deprived of the right to express your own truth, you can choose to express them indirectly; you can postpone the realization of these truths or extend them over a period. Thus, with this rational strategy, you will progress even if your progress line is not stable and you will serve your ideal better.

The strategy implemented by the *Milli Görüş* also evokes real politics. As it is known, realpolitik, in its simplest sense, is defined as the approach that expresses the state of accepting the existing conditions as a single reality by abandoning idealist politics. However, the MG's realist and pragmatic approach did not push it to the point of abandoning its principles (Tuncel, 2018: 138). The attitude of the *Milli Görüş* at this point corresponds to the concept what Gutmann & Thomson (2010: 1135) call as "principled prudence", which is examined in the first chapter, under the title of "political compromise". As will be

remembered, principled prudence is a feature of a compromising mindset, and it is to recognize that compromise is an inevitable way to improve the status quo in democratic life. By this pragmatic and rational stance, "principled prudence" helps to go beyond its intransigence. However, this attitude must not be taken as being unscrupulous. This attitude is also not in contrast with partisanship. On the contrary, partisanship necessitates making principled concessions when it is inevitable in order to reach better conditions. This model could be evaluated as accepting temporary deviations from the target in order not to break entirely from the target: "You will think idealist; you will live realistically. This is the system. Erbakan never gave up on his ideals."(Arınç and Şahin, 2019:134).

Thanks to his realistic perspective, Erbakan accurately identified the power relations on which the political-legal order of the country is based. As Erbakan stated, "by peeling the skin covering the body" he was able to see the significant position of the military in the power equation lying just beneath the legal order of the system. Seeing this fact, he avoided an approach that would lead to the harsh reaction of the military, which may destroy the Movement. On the other hand, he searched for ways to change this equation in favour of democracy. In this way, without ignoring the reality, he preserved his ideals.

As a result of his attitude, he made great efforts to take part in the coalition governments at every opportunity he has, because in this way he believed that they would overcome the legitimacy problem which the tutelary elites tried to impute over the *Milli Görüş* parties (Arınç and Şahin, 2019:134).

He, also, used all kinds of moderate discourse, showed a sympathetic approach to the military and waited with endless patience for the soldier to understand his "goodwill and useful ideas". Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent journalist of the relevant period, describes the attitude of Erbakan towards the military that was asserting the guardianship of the regime which Erbakan was trying to "correct": "The Welfare Party, especially Erbakan, wanted a compromise with the soldier. He did not want a fight with the soldier. Moreover, he was always trying to cover up. 'Come on, how do you concoct it, the media is trying to plot mischief, I get on well with the soldier. They came to me today, they saluted.' Always compromise, always covering up." (Demirkan, 2018: 444).

Ali Bayramoğlu, the famous political analyst of the period, also, gives another example of Erbakan's pragmatic approach to the military. According to his story, at the beginning of

the February 28 period, when his relationship with the military was the most troublesome, on the 8th of March, Erbakan insistently said that there was no problem with the soldiers. However, two months later, on 6 May, he left his tactical political statements and expressed his real opinion that radically challenged the 28 February decisions. When asked why he did not express these views at the 28th February meeting of the National Security Council, he gave the following answer: "If we had said these ideas at the NSC council, a coup would have been staged in the same night." (Bayramoğlu, 2011: 36-37).

Milli Görüş has shown its realist and pragmatic approach to the other political parties as well as to the military. When a coalition was inevitable for the establishment of a government, *Milli Görüş* parties were able to see the requirement early and quickly acted for the coalition. As a political movement that embraced the game of democracy, it was able to consent to the share of the government under current circumstances. On the other hand, as they made a realistic assessment of how much they were needed to form the government, they managed to calculate the highest share they could get from the government. For this reason, they managed to obtain several ministries over their parliament share, especially in three coalitions of the 1970s. During the functioning of these coalitions, while they were trying to expand the area of their own political preferences and policies, on the one hand, they also managed to compromise for the sake of maintenance of the government. This was because they knew that they had to be part of the government to implement their own policies, albeit partially. In the last coalition, founded in 1996, although RP got secured the position of the first party, they showed an unlimited tolerance to the exclusionary attitudes of all other parties. They said that they could establish a partnership with all of them, and made concessions to establish a coalition.

One dimension of the strategy followed by the *Milli Görüş* is to develop an indirect/connotative discourse. This method was legitimized on the grounds that the opportunity of doing politics in Turkey is not allowed to the social groups that refuse the official ideology and reject the militant laicist assimilation of the society. This has prevented political parties representing different social segments and thoughts from appearing and expressing themselves clearly (Tuncel, 2018: 137).

The *Milli Görüş* had an opinion accepting Islamic principles and values as the sole source of material and spiritual development and happiness of the individual, society and state. However, the legal system imposing secularism prevented expressing the views

directly, so the MG applied for indirect expression. This indirect expression has spread from the name itself given to the movement to many concepts that it propagates: *Milli Görüş*, spiritual development, conservatism, fair order, the belief of Fatih etc. "Erbakan always used eggy peggy language. That means he could not get his point across clearly (Kamalak, Interview, Feb 2020). "Whoever does not know this language cannot understand Erbakan correctly." (Yıldırım, 2012).

Attempts to keep the rules of the political regime together with their truths raised the problem of consistency in the discourses of *Milli Görüş* from time to time. For example, Erbakan's words about the centrality of Islam were on one side: "There is no source of rights and truths other than Islam. Even science and wisdom, art and industry are within Islam as a branch of it. Any science and technique that does not receive inspiration from the Qur'an can never be a means to good, free from evil and harm". (Erbakan, 2014: 34). On the other hand, when the RP was the first party and a candidate for power, it was said in an article published in the *Milli Daily* that some provocative press organs claimed that the Welfare party was incompatible with the system prescribed by Atatürk; however, RP was the protector and guarantee of the order established by Atatürk. The views of Atatürk were parallel to those of RP. (Ketencioğlu, 1996).

Due to the difference between its official and non-official discourse, the *Milli Görüş* was occasionally accused of resorting to "taqiyyah". This concept, while literally meaning to safeguard, to defend, to fear (Rizvi, 2018; Stefon, 2018) is defined as "a precautionary dissimulation or denial of religious belief and practice in the face of persecution", as a term (Esposito, 2014). This term seems to have been adopted more in the Shia sect (Akyüz, 2014: 158). However, because this term is not welcome in Turkey's society, almost all of whom is a follower of Sunni sect, the MG has refrained from openly embrace it (Erbaş, Interview, Feb 2020). Nevertheless, some comments in Milli Daily, a daily newspaper of Milli Görüs, show that this is not an excluded method. In an article, it is said that taqiyyah is a tool and this tool can be used if the goal is good; that all the reform leaders, including Atatürk, resorted to taqiyyah especially during the preparatory and the transition periods; that adopting for a specific time some rules and institutions that should be demolished is taqiyyah, that what matters is the intent and outcome; that some false values and orders can be exploited to achieve a goal that will benefit Islam and humanity; that one may choose an uncompromising manner on his behalf and prefer singlemindedness, but

leaders acting on behalf of a society should not attempt such cheap courage tricks which endanger their cause and base; that one should act in line with the hadiths "War is deception" (Akgül, 1997).

6.2.4. Nationalism Effect and National Unity Sensitivity

As stated in the section in which the ideology of *Milli Görüş* was introduced, the emphasis on the "nation" of the *Milli Görüş* ideology is strong as well as the "religion". The "Ottoman longing" that Erbakan expressed in his numerous speeches is not accidental. "Great Turkey again", "leading country" slogans were used in almost all elections. Likewise, the imagination of Turkey at the core position of the new world order that was envisaged, or seeing Turkey as the locomotive of other Muslim countries are essential signs of nationalism (Erbakan, 2014: 242). Besides, the fact that Erbakan was influenced by the rising Turanism/Turkism wave, though not as much as Turgut and Korkut Özal brothers, during his university years and was sympathetic to these movements may give some clues about his nationalism (Yalçın, 1994: 18). According to Akdoğan, "Erbakan had an anti-imperialist, indigenous and national imagination. Although religious tendencies shaped the concept of MG, nationality was at the centre of it" (Akdoğan, 2011: 101). However, nationalism does not have to produce a "peaceful, conflict-free" method directly. Indeed, the Nationalist Movement Party, which took nationalism as a central value, adopted a harsh discourse in the name of nationalism, especially in the 1970s, and carried out actions that would lead to the escalation of social violence. So nationalism itself is not enough to develop a compromising and peaceful attitude. Therefore, at this point, it is necessary to look at what nationalism means for the *Milli Görüş*, just like Islamism. The nationalism of *Milli Görüş* does not include conflict and quarrel within national borders. This nationalism advocates social integration, compromise and solving all problems within nation via dialogue. The most critical condition for protecting the high interests of the nation is to protect national unity and integrity.

Milli Görüş does not wish elements of the nation to be excluded and conflict with each other because the nation is considered a "family" and the individuals who make up the nation are "brothers". Erbakan's expression describing the people of the country as "children of the homeland" is famous. In his book published in 1975, he expressed the understanding of *Milli Görüş* with the following words: "*Milli Görüş* is based on the basic principle of indivisible

integrity of the country and the nation and regarding 40 million children of the country as brothers. The establishment of brotherhood, solidarity and unity in our country comes first. The brotherhood of the children of the same nation and of the same history is essential. The path to follow is the path of inner peace and brotherhood." (Erbakan, 1975: 30).

Erbakan strongly emphasized fraternity rhetoric and never gave up it during the times of social conflict he encounters (*Milli,* 16 Feb 1974; Arınç and Şahin, 2019: 165). Problems may arise within the family, disagreements may occur, but these problems and disagreement s should be resolved within the family, without causing severe conflicts. The existence and integrity of the family is indispensable for all individuals, and the disintegration of the family is the biggest loss for all. Therefore, what really matters is that the family should not conflict, should not divide and keep living.

The first decade that Erbakan was influential in the political arena can be regarded as the most turbulent political and socio-economic term of Turkey. First of all, the military intervention that took place in 1971 at the beginning of this period created tension between military and civilian politics. The first political party of Milli Görüş, MNP, was closed in this process and became one of the victims of this tension. The shadow of the soldier on civil politics was felt throughout the period. During the same period, the prejudice of the soldier continued toward the second party of Milli Görüş. Secondly, this decade has become one of the most troubled periods in the history of the republic, with ideological polarization that has intensified significantly in the second half and the nationwide violence events created by this polarization. The attitude of civil policy leaders has also had a significant impact on this ideological division and conflict. For example, the rhetoric of Bülent Ecevit, Süleyman Demirel and Alparslan Türkeş went beyond a peaceful democratic race and turned into ideological friction that affirmed violence.

Under these circumstances, Milli Görüs has shown a moderate and compromising attitude in response to the military's prejudice against it and avoided the attitudes and discourses that would provoke the military (*Milli* 9 June 1997). As a result of this positive attitude, it tried to gain the trust of the soldier with three coalitions in the decade and was successful to a certain extent in this regard. Likewise, it remained free from the tense, polarizing and confrontational rhetoric that dominates civil politics, that is, between the political parties and based on the right-left distinction. While other political party leaders

were trying to consolidate their votes with this confrontational rhetoric, Milli Görüş avoided making such a political gain account.

Milli Görüş representatives have always said in parliament, election meetings and the media, that all citizens are brothers, that no one should attack anyone, that right-left differentiation should be avoided, that national integrity should be protected, and national unity should be strengthened against external powers (MM, JD, 15/6/1978, 353). Milli Görüş also implemented this fraternity rhetoric in practice, never letting its members engage in conflict and armed action in a chaotic environment that gave a civil war-like image.

The sense of fraternity of citizens and the protection of national interests is reflected in the relations of Milli Görüş parties with other political parties. It should be remembered that in the 1970s, coalitions could not be established among the parties representing the left and right. This situation was mostly due to the hostile discourse and attitude developed by the parties against each other. Even the government crises that have been going on for months did not create a rapprochement between the CHP-AP. In contrast, Erbakan has always kept the possibility of a partnership with all parties, avoiding the language of hostility and conflict. He repeated that all parties and their supporters were brothers. Also, he took accommodative steps in the name of social responsibility, worked effectively for the establishment of a government, and did not close his doors to any party on coalition during the period of government crises.

In the 1990s, which was the second decade in which it was influential in politics, Milli Görüş and Erbakan continued to work on themes of national unity, national interest and brotherhood and avoided the attitude that would lead to separation, division and conflict in the nation. During this period, he developed a restrained attitude towards both the military (*Milli,* 9 June 1997) and other political parties, both of whom excluded Milli Görüş. The same understanding of unity has been valid for the Kurdish issue, which was intensified amid the rising identity policies during this period. In this regard, Milli Görüş tried to discredit ethnic separation through the emphasis on the common ground of Islamic fraternity, and it strongly embraced the Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood theme.

According to Akyol, one of the most valuable heritages of Erbakan is that he won the heart of primarily conservative Kurds and integrated them into the general democratic system. Erbakan succeeded in winning the heart of conservative Kurds and integrating them

into the democratic system with the criticisms he directed towards repressive secularism (Akyol, 2011: 38). Thus, Erbakan kept the discourse of brotherhood, peace, coexistence and compromise alive for all segments of the society. While he was on his way to power during this period, he acted with endless patience against the forces trying to disqualify him with anti-democratic methods and continued his discourse of fraternity and compromise. The *Milli Görüş*'s attitude towards national interests and fraternity was so definite that even during the military intervention on 28 February; it took the necessary measures to prevent its base from reacting violently. He was able to maintain the same soft demeanour at the close of RP and FP in the 1990s.

As explained above, the high sensitivity of *Milli Görüş* on social peace and national integrity has a significant impact on all its positive and compromising attitudes. The main reason lying behind this sensitivity was the belief that there is a massive external threat against Turkey. As stated in detail in the section in which the ideology of *Milli Görüş* is examined, according to the opinion of *Milli Görüş*, this nation, with its fair order (Islamic order) has sustained peace, justice and prosperity in the Islamic geography that it has dominated for a thousand years and in the regions where it was influential. In contrast, the western civilization and the Zionist forces behind it represented the system of falsehood and brought persecution, war, injustice and destruction to the world. With its economic power, Zionism has accelerated its plans to take over the world hegemony for the past three hundred years and has been significantly successful in this (Erbakan, 2014: 87-95; Erbakan Başkent Oturumları 4 July 2007).

However, there are still some obstacles to realize this goal fully; the most important of them is Turkey as the heir of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, with its historical status and experience, has the potential to take stand against Zionism. Therefore, the Zionism shows a massive effort to prevent the disclosure of this vast potential of Turkey. One of the most critical campaigns conducted for this purpose is to create chaos and conflict between the peoples of Turkey and thus make it feeble and ineffective (Erbakan, 2007) According to this perspective, for whatever reason it might be, all kinds of divisions and conflicts that occur within the nation is the most giant trap for the whole of Turkey. Thus, preventing polarization, division and conflict and establishing fraternity, peace and compromise among the people of Turkey is of vital importance.

CONCLUSION

The impact of political culture on politics had been eternal, but like all facts, this phenomenon needed to be noticed and conceptualised. This discovery had been made since the 1960s, and the book The Civic Culture, published by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in 1963, made a groundbreaking effect. The value of this approach for political science has not diminished throughout the next half-century, though, like any significant theory, it has been widely criticised and gained different dimensions.

Political culture has been brought to the agenda with the concept of democracy as much as the concept of politics since its inception; because the discussions about the value of political culture have been made in the axis of the impact of this phenomenon on democracy. The argument on whether political culture is a critical factor in the existence and absence of democracy or at least whether democracy can be healthy without political culture has remained alive. The opinions accusing this argument of being biased, exaggerated, discriminatory, and fatalistic were often raised; however, these objections are not as convincing as the argument itself. After all, the political culturalist approach has made a profound contribution to the understanding of both politics and democracy. Political culture, which reflects attitudes, values, and beliefs about political phenomena, is of significant influence on providing stability and continuity in any democratic regime.

Political compromise, which is a critical element of political culture, has particular importance for democracies. Compromise is a vital key at every stage of democratic life. In all societies, the conflict of interests between individuals and groups is limitless, and there are two ways to resolve it. Either the mighty will impose its power through violence and oppression, or a fair and peaceful order will be established through compromise. Democratic societies have preferred the latter, and they found a compromise-based system on almost all dimensions of social life. All political parties, non-governmental organisations, interest groups or unions have been created with compromise. The constitutional bodies within democratic governments are relied upon compromise to form and function. Compromise is needed for the formation and change of rules and institutions that directly affect everyone's interests. In societies without a culture of compromise, this rational and peaceful order is hard to be established. Instead, a dictatorial regime rules or conflicts and chaos prevail. Therefore, a culture suitable for democracy must also include compromise.

Within this sense and value of it, when you look at the Turkey side of the political culture, it is seen that in Turkey's political heritage, political compromise culture is relatively weak. In contrast, the influential attributes in Turkish political culture can be listed as follows:

- the patrimonial characteristic of the state,
- the understanding of personal government,
- the intolerance of political power to the opposition,
- the centralist and firm belief in the state,
- the elitist conception of government,
- the influence of the army on politics,
- the priority of society to the individual.
- the lack of compromise culture

The last of these political culture elements mentioned above have been studied as the central concept of this thesis. As revealed in the first chapter, the post-Republican historical process was not very fertile for developing compromise culture. Immediately after the short compromise between the Westernist and conservative/religious elites during the Independence War, Turkish politics has turned into its traditional patrimonial, centralist and authoritarian codes since the foundation of the Republic. Since the founding cadre of the Republic aimed at a revolutionary cultural transformation in the society, it oppressed large sections of the society that opposed it and went on their way. The fact that the ruling party allowed the transition to multi-party life in 1945 with the effect of international developments also became an example of a short compromise in Turkish politics. However, the resulting balance of power led to tensions which ended up in a coup, instead of leading to the way of more democratic development. The stress and conflict in politics and society after the 1960 Coup culminated in 1971 and 1980 military interventions. Polarisation, which based on the Kemalist-conservative distinction up until 1960, intertwined with the left-right divide in the following years. Since the 1970s, sectarian, religious and ethnic conflict dimensions were added to these distinctions and have extended to the present day. Meanwhile, the fact that the constitutions of the Republic (1924, 1961, 1982) are the product of the military authority, is a striking indicator of the reality that the political life and the regime of Turkey have been designed by force and imposition rather than compromise. Limited amendments on these constitutions do not change this fundamental truth.

As shown in the first chapter, almost all segments of society have accepted that Turkish society is prone to polarisation rather than compromise. In this regard, surveys made at different times by Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Yasin Aktay, Yılmaz Esmer and Fuat Keyman, have shown that tolerance and interpersonal trust are relatively low among Turkish society. Similar ideas are emphasised in numbers of comments on the subject in the media. Güneri Civaoğlu, Deniz Kavukçuoğlu, Haldun Gülalp, Mehmet Barlas, Fatih Altaylı, Oktay Aydın, Ayşe Sucu are among them. On the other hand, interviews held within the scope of this study have revealed that *Milli Görüş* politicians Recai Kutan, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Temel Karamollaoğlu, Mustafa Kamalak, Bülent Arınç, Abdüllatif Şener and Fethullah Erbaş share the belief that there is a weak culture of compromise in Turkey.

According to the data obtained in the thesis, the reasons for the weak political compromise culture might be addressed in four groups. The first is the historical reason. The effects of the tension created by the radical secularisation process started with the Republic on the society kneaded with Islam for centuries are continuing. The second reason is socio-cultural. The ethnic diversity of the society and the policies followed for this issue has created a difficult-to-close rift. Ideological reasons are the third group. Turkey, from World War II to the collapse of the Communist Bloc, has become a theatre of ideological polarisation. Finally, individual factors tell that ambitious attitude of political party leaders and their divisive rhetoric generated from this attitude has been a significant cause of political antagonism.

It is understood that coalitions are essential indicators of the place of compromise culture in society. In the parliamentary systems, which were adopted for many years in the vast majority of developed democracies, coalitions are common political phenomena. For example, 85% of the governments established in democratic European countries for about half a century after World War II are coalitions. Coalitions, mainly stemming from the political party system and electoral system factors, are elements of "consensus democracy" according to Liphart and indicative of a more democratic political structure than single-party governments of the "majoritarian democracies" (Lijphart,1999).

The coalition governments in Turkey have clustered in three periods. The first is the first half of the 1960s, the second is the 1970s, and the third in the 1990s. The political party system and the electoral system typically have an impact on the establishment of the coalition governments in Turkey. However, an abnormal factor is a military factor because

the beginning of the first two periods is the result of the military's intervention. While the 1960 Coup ended the Democratic Party's single-party rule and started the period of coalitions, the 1971 Military intervention ended the Justice Party's single-party rule and started the period of coalitions.

Coalition governments "normally" refers to a more democratic landscape, however, due to the low political compromise culture of Turkey, coalitions have usually led to instability or even crisis in politics, and they have made no notable contribution in terms of democratic consolidation. The average mandate of coalitions provides an opportunity to assess the issue. 13 coalitions, established from 1960 to 2002, served an average of 1 year and 4 months. Moreover, this period is "the time when they are officially counted in office". Therefore, the actual terms of office are even shorter. Short-term governments indicate the lack of a "political compromise" culture and also means that substantial and long-term policies could not be implemented.

Milli Görüş, which was a partner to three coalitions in the 1970s and one coalition in the 1990s, is a political movement representing the second side in the western-conservative/religious dualism transferred to the Republic from the last period of the Ottoman Empire. However, *Milli Görüş* movement that entered the political scene in 1969 and its charismatic leader Necmettin Erbakan made a difference in this tradition. The ideology of Islamism, which previously tried to exist as a weak vein in conservative and right politics, in the repressive environment of the radical secular regime of the Republic, has gained a detached and open structure with *Milli Görüş*. However, it was inevitable that this movement, adopted Islamic values as a reference, would have problems with the values and institutions of the Republic based on the philosophy of Westernism. The solution to this problem lay in "political compromise", which requires both parties to make sacrifices.

At this point, *Milli Görüş* was able to develop a compromising attitude despite all the difficulties that interlocutors posed. It tried to pursue its political goals within the restrictive constitutional framework that the political regime held in effect. This political framework did not allow political parties to rely on religious references, to bear religious names, and to make religious propaganda. Under these conditions, the four parties that *Milli Görüş* founded after 1970 were closed, and it continued the struggle with the fifth party (Dinç, 2008: 3). The first of these, the MNP, was established in January 1970 and was closed in May 1971. Second, the MSP was established in October 1972 and closed in October 1981.

Third, the RP was established in July 1983 and closed in January 1998. Fourthly, FP was established in December 1997 and closed in June 2001. The SP, the last party of *Milli Görüş*, was established in July 2001.

As noted above, the election results in 1973 heralded a second coalition era in Turkey. However, the lack of political compromise culture, required for the coalition, manifested itself in this process. Three-and-a-half-month of stalemate occurred until a coalition was established. The uncompromising attitude of the two big parties, particularly the AP, was a critical factor in this situation. Demirel never thought to take part in a government under the prime ministry of Ecevit. The harsh rhetoric of Ecevit, on the other hand, made it difficult to establish a grand coalition. However, Ecevit's approach to a coalition with MSP at the last stage of the negotiations was a positive indicator of compromise.

On the other hand, the position of DP, which was the fourth-biggest party in the elections and had a value in coalition possibilities, was very problematic in terms of compromise. While DP avoided CHP for ideological reasons, it avoided AP because of personal animosity. Throughout this period, the proposal of a coalition without Demirel on the right was an unrealistic approach and had a significant impact on the failure to establish a government. During this period MSP, the party of *Milli Görüş*, reflected a compromising mindset. Erbakan did not use any exclusionary language about the coalition and found it worth evaluating any form of coalition. Indeed, as a result of this attitude, despite all the accumulated prejudices and risks, the CHP adopted the coalition. Agreement between the two parties can be evaluated as a meaningful contribution to Turkey's compromise culture.

The CHP-MSP Coalition initially faced some difficulties due to the attitudes of a group within the MSP that could not digest that compromise. However, in general, it worked within the framework of the principles set by the coalition protocol and program and took practical steps in implementing the envisaged policies. Besides Ecevit's pro-social justice economic policies, Erbakan's industrialization projects and studies on the religious sector were carried out in compromise. It is understood that despite the ideological remoteness of the two parties, a benevolent and compromising atmosphere prevailed. However, the most critical success of this coalition then proved to be the main reason for the collapse of the coalition. Turkey's military victory in Northern Cyprus increased Ecevit's popularity in the country, so Ecevit and his party became eager to disrupt the coalition, for the sake of coming to power alone.

Therefore, Ecevit started complaining about the coalition and developed an uncompromising attitude.

Erbakan made great efforts to change the idea of breaking this coalition that Ecevit had put on his head. For that purpose, he used a mild language towards his partner, emphasized that disputes can be resolved through compromise, made optimistic statements to the public, and kept saying that the country could not tolerate a new government crisis. Nevertheless, the constructive and compromising approach of Erbakan could not change the result. Finally, by the eighth month of the coalition, Ecevit resigned.

The end of the CHP-MSP Government left politics with two options: Either the election would be held in line with the CHP, or a coalition government other than the CHP would be established. As it was only CHP which wanted to go for election, this option became invalid due to parliamentary arithmetic. Ecevit's optimism that DP would give the support in this regard did not yield any results, and CHP paid the price of breaking the coalition by becoming isolated. The only option left was to form a coalition between right-wing parties. At this stage, MSP leader Erbakan exhibited his compromising attitude by saying that they are ready to provide all necessary support for a coalition on the right. AP leader Süleyman Demirel, also found this option favourable. However, the DP, which was needed for the realization of this option, prevented a compromise on the right-wing, mostly due to the personal hostility of its leader against Demirel. This deadlock left the country without a parliamentary-backed government for more than six months, the most prolonged government crisis of Turkish political history. The new government was ultimately formed thanks to a group of DP deputies leaving their party for a compromise on the right.

MSP showed its compromising attitude throughout the coalition quest. During the six-month crisis, Erbakan came up with various coalition possibilities. He proposed a coalition among the right parties, including the MSP, at the beginning of this term. When this seemed unlikely, MSP has announced its willingness to apply the formula that DP insists, that is, a right-wing coalition without current leaders of the parties. As the crisis continued, MSP encouraged and supported a right-wing coalition even in its absence. Finally, by the beginning of 1975, they effectively supported the Nationalist Front idea and made a generous contribution to its establishment.

The National Front I government was built on a foundation that did not seem very solid. The first reason for this was that there were four parties in the government, and the

other was that the government got the support of the parliament with a narrow majority. However, despite these drawbacks, the government's life lasted longer than the average term of coalition governments. All the coalition partners had a share in this, but the compromising mindset of the MSP had a more significant impact. This mindset was summarized in the words of Süleyman Arif Emre, the prominent name of the party. "As our experience shows, the coalition means agreement and compromise. In a coalition, no party can fully fulfil its wishes. There is a necessity to keep national interests at the forefront, based on the sacrifices required by compromise…" (MM, JD, 9/4/1975, 390).

The success of the MSP and the other parties in maintaining the coalition does not mean that this coalition was always in agreement and harmony. In fact, in the earlier months of the government, it was difficult to compromise on some issues, such as the election of the Speaker of the Assembly. Moreover, MSP also played a specific role in experiencing these troubles. However, the government, which was established with the compromise of the four parties in a challenging period of the country, can be considered a success in itself. This coalition government ruled the country for longer than expected, despite international pressures on the Cyprus issue, the US embargo, the Greek tensions about the Aegean Sea, the economic bottlenecks, ideological tensions in the society, and CHP's attempts to bring down the government.

In this period, the right-left polarization and the conflict environment created by this polarization, made the difference of Milli Görüs as to compromise visible. During this process, CHP and more radical left formations on the left, AP and MHP on the right have developed discourses and attitudes that would increase ideological polarization, tension and violence. Similarly, media outlets followed a broadcast policy that would increase the tension in the country and fuel the ideological feelings according to their right or left tendencies. Especially towards the end of this coalition, after entering the election period, this polarizing and confrontational discourse started to be adopted excessively in politics. The MSP administration, in return, neither in coalition period nor in the election process has adopted any policy based on the right-left antagonism. On the contrary, it emphasized that the citizens of the country were brothers, and reminded the need for compromise in society and politics.

In the 1977 General Election, the votes of the CHP and the AP increased, but these increases were not sufficient to come single-handedly to the power. In fact, both parties had

left their coalition governments, which included MSP, prematurely, with the desire to come to power alone. On the other hand, there was a significant decline in the votes of the MSP in this election, and one of the critical reasons for this decline was the tendency of the MSP to coalition and compromise. In an atmosphere where everyone had used the language of hostility and conflict, MSP's moderate and compromising attitude got lost in the shuffle. Moreover, throughout the election, the AP leader followed a strategy targeting the electorate of the MSP, saying that the election was between the rightists and the leftists. Since the leaders of the two major parties used hostile rhetoric during the election period, it became almost impossible for them to establish a big coalition after the election. When it became clear after the election that they could not form the government single-handedly, they could not achieve this impasse. This polarizing attitude of the two leaders led to instability in politics, at the expense of deepening the country's major economic and social problems, and the start of the process that would eventuate in a military coup three years later.

Since MSP grasped the country's need for a new government after the election, it has shown that it was ready to forget all the troubles and frustrations of the past. It reminded that there is no room for resentment and hostility in politics. The MSP administration stated that it was ready to cooperate with all parties to establish the required coalition. All these discourses and behaviours of the party once again demonstrated its flexibility for compromise. This approach also matches Gutmann and Thomson's understanding, who pointed out the necessity for flexibility and psychological shift particularly after the elections.

NF II coalition, founded by AP-MSP and MHP, had a short life span. While trying to overcome economic problems, social inequality, increasing anarchy environment, US sanctions, etc., this government has gone through difficult tests on compromise. AP and MSP had a hard time in reaching a compromise on the economic policies mainly because of the policies envisaged by the IMF. On the other hand, the election of the Speaker of the National Assembly was the subject of dispute among the coalition partners, which could be counted as one of the exceptions of the general compromising attitude of the MSP. However, it was not these difficulties that ended the government, but the CHP's attempt, that is a transfer of a dozen deputies of AP in exchange for ministry posts.

Milli Görüş took part in its fourth coalition between 1996-1997 with DYP. This was a period in which the national vote and the parliamentary representation of *Milli Görüş* were

relatively high compared to other periods. Before this coalition, the increase in the volume and the role of *Milli Görüş* in politics during the decade had exacerbated the discomfort of the state elites who found the discourse and actions of *Milli Görüş* "intolerable". This discomfort reached its peak in the 1995 General Election as RP became the leading party. This intense uneasiness turned into smear campaigns and hate speeches against RP, the party of *Milli Görüş*. Thus, elites of military, media, judiciary, academy and political parties carried out a hostile campaign against *Milli Görüş* and tried to prevent the public's orientation towards *Milli Görüş*.

While elite collaborators were continually trying to exclude and marginalize the RP, the RP mainly displayed a moderate and compromising attitude and tried not to be affected by the toxic atmosphere generated by interlocutors. Indeed, this atmosphere of hatred caused some people within the Milli Görüş to use a confrontational language. However, these individuals occupied a marginal position within the mainstream policies of the party. The RP leader approached to all political parties with a compromising and peaceful attitude. Having been given the mandate to form the government, Erbakan declared from the beginning that he could form a coalition with not only centre-right but also centre-left. Erbakan repeatedly demonstrated this attitude in coalition negotiations. However, other parties refrained from responding positively to this compromising approach, partly for fear of the military tutelage.

In the face of hostile attitudes, RP's compromising attitude was not enough to be a government partner. An additional chance, needed for this, arose as the DYP leader had to approach RP, fearing the investigation process opened against her. Therefore, RP got its due thanks to the DYP's compulsion.

DYP's orientation towards a coalition with RP, albeit compulsorily, caused outrage among those who carried out hostile campaign. Seeing RP coalition as a "nightmare", this tutelary community carried out an incessant campaign to overthrow the established RP-DYP coalition. Military, political, judicial, academic, and media attacks were carried out to prevent the government's policies that aimed to bring radical solutions to the country's deep-rooted problems and to render the government inoperable. The government addressed the country's main issues under these attacks. These fundamental issues were the acceleration of economic development and industrialization, the realization of social justice, the solution of the Kurdish issue on the basis of cultural rights and economic recovery instead of security

measures (Erbakan, 2015: 25), the strengthening of moral values in the country, and the inclusion of marginalized religious people in legal politics, dignified foreign policy toward West and to provide multi-dimensional cooperation with Islamic countries, all of which had been highlighted in *Milli Görüş* program ever since.

As long as Necmettin Erbakan was prime minister, he struggled to face the attacks against the government while trying to achieve the stated goals. The method he applied against the attacks and hostility towards the government was a patient dialogue, persuasion effort, call for compromise, and courteous words. However, this approach did not receive a positive response from the military and civilian elite. Pressures turned into an attempt to overthrow the government through a military intervention called the 28 February Process, and finally, the government was forced to resign after a one-year term of office.

The four coalition governments in which *Milli Görüş* involved revealed that this movement was not afraid of the meeting, discussing, dialogue and compromising with other political actors in the way of solving the problems of the country, although it had a very different prescription for the solution of issues. Even though it regarded its ideals vital for the salvation of the country, it comprehended the indispensability of the compromise in democratic politics as Rostbøll (2017: 620) and Weinstock, (2017, 636) emphasised. As Gutmann and Thompson, (2010: 1130) proposes anyone who realises the complexity of political life, and dares to take responsibility of advent for finding a way out of status quo should meet a challenge of criticism. In this sense, Erbakan has always been accused of being able to come to terms with "everyone" from the first to the last coalition. However, he seems to have understood that the road to change the status quo comes through compromise.

Therefore, when the prospect of coalition emerged, *Milli Görüş* took a stance open to all coalition options. It took an active role in the formation of coalitions. It effectively defended its own interest in bargaining for the formation of coalitions but did not push it much to the point of obstructing the compromise. While observing its party program and interests in the coalition processes, it showed loyalty to the coalition principles and made the necessary concessions for the coalition to survive. It also always avoided behaviour and attitudes which would lead to the termination of the coalition governments in which it was involved. Therefore, *Milli Görüş* never played a role in the dissolution of these coalitions.

Four essential factors, accounting for *Milli Görüş's* compromising character, presented through coalition processes, have been identified:

- the milieu in which Erbakan was grown up and his temperament
- the understanding of Islam adopted by *Milli Görüş*
- the strategy reasoning of *Milli Görüş*
- the national unity sentiment

The temperament and the milieu in which Erbakan grew up seems appropriate for the formation of a compromising personality. First of all, Erbakan's childhood passed in several cities of Anatolia with different cultures. Therefore, it is likely that these different worlds and cultural diversity might have created a wealth of thought and perspective, which is appropriate for developing a compromising character. Secondly, looking at the family environment where Erbakan lived his childhood, it seems that his upbringing style in his family had a significant democratic quality. Education and training for children in the family were not given by pressure but by persuasion and dialogue. Thirdly, Erbakan's father was a pious person, but he had the flexibility to do his duty as a judge under the new political and legal conditions. These experiences and observations are likely to be effective in Erbakan's acquiring a moderate and compromising personality.

On the other hand, information about Erbakan's childhood gives essential clues about Erbakan's temperament. Erbakan had an ambitious temperament who loved to play crowded social games in his childhood, organised these games and played a most influential role in those organisations. By combining this ambition with his brilliant intelligence, he became a favourite student throughout his education life, and then he attracted attention as a brilliant academician. After that, he took an active role in bureaucracy and finally took a step into political life. It would be a reasonable explanation to say that this "desire for success" was effective in Erbakan's acting with the slogan of "power in any case" and his willingness to take part in coalitions.

The second important factor that led to *Milli Görüş* having a compromising character is the Islamic understanding it adopted. The representatives of *Milli Görüş,* interviewed within the scope of this study, have attributed this feature of *Milli Görüş* to Islam. However, when the thoughts and practices in the Islamic world are reviewed, it is seen that Islam is subject to very different interpretations. Therefore, the fact that a movement is "Islamic" does not guarantee that it will be compromising. It can be said that the compromising character of *Milli Görüş* is not based on Islam in its general meaning, but on "a certain interpretation of Islam". This Islamic interpretation is the interpretation of the Gümüşhanevi-

İskenderpaşa lodge. The three prominent names of this lodge; Abdullah Hasip Efendi, Abdülaziz Efendi and Mehmet Zahit Efendi had a significant impact on shaping Erbakan's religious personality from the 1940s to 1980s. In particular, the religious thought and approach of Mehmet Zahit Kotku was a critical reference for Erbakan. Therefore, the religious interpretation of Erbakan was mainly based on the interpretation of this school. The prominent themes in this religious interpretation are a peaceful Islamic struggle, an evolutionary social transformation, a legal mode of action, a compromising approach, etc. Kotku reckons that hardness, violence, anger and wrath are evil attributes which do not suit believers. Therefore, it rejects conflict with the state, social violence and illegal organisations. This religious understanding of the İskenderpaşa Lodge shaped the religious personality of Erbakan; thereby, it has determined the religious understanding of *Milli Görüş* and therefore, its style of politics. The compromise arising from Islamic understanding of *Milli Görüş* corresponds to Rostboll's concept of "intrinsic compromise" and Bellamy's concept of "deep compromise", because here, as they point out, compromise is adopted not by any tactical or strategy requirement, but because of its own intrinsic value.

Having a rational, realist and utilitarian mentality also played an essential role in *Milli Görüş* to have a compromising character. *Milli Görüş* movement had the composure and profit-based action style rather than emotionality and excitement. With this feature, it tried to calculate the power balances in the field it was struggling with and the probable outcome of its steps under these conditions. With such a character, while trying to protect the principles and ideals, it had the flexibility to preserve and advance these principles and ideals, to manoeuvre when necessary, and to consent to go one step back to take two steps forward. This factor, corresponds to Rostboll's concept of "pragmatic compromise" and Bellamy's concept of "shallow compromise", as were presented in the first chapter because this compromise motive comes to the fore not by reference to the value of the compromise itself, but by force of circumstances.

Finally, the feeling of nationalism with the sensitivity of national unity has been determined as an influential factor for the compromising character of *Milli Görüş*. As presented in the second chapter, *Milli Görüş* has deemed Turkish society as a family. This family has potential as the heir of the Ottoman Empire, and it should act in unity and brotherhood to uncover this considerable potential. Any disagreements that may arise within the family can be resolved in dialogue, persuasion and compromise, but not with conflict. For this reason, in the 1970s, it rejected the right-left polarisation in which other parties took

part enthusiastically, and avoided the violence of that period. It avoided ethnic themes in the face of the rising Kurdish problem in the 1990s and embraced the theme of brotherhood. In the same period, despite the bias of the military against it, it complimented the Turkish army and avoided discourses that would offend the military. Again, while criticising other political parties heavily in thought, they did not personally blame party members but defined them as brothers. With these attitudes, it always stood at a tune that would let forming a coalition with all political parties.

The political tradition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic, from the past to the present shows that the lack of compromise culture is one of the crucial elements of Turkish political culture. The problems created by this deficiency continue at almost all levels of social life. However, the area in which this deficiency has the most significant impact is the politics. It is possible to see this problem if one looks at the top of the political pyramid. In case there is a balance of power between political elites and actors, this situation creates a confrontational discourse and attitude, the democratic precedents are disrupted, and instability begins. In return, when there is no balance, the authoritarian attitude comes to the fore.

For this reason, people who defend justice, equality and law when they are in opposition, take these values less seriously when they come to power and tend to reduce participation of the other political actors in political processes. This zero-sum game situation hardens the democracy race and makes the power-opposition relations destructive. This uncompromising attitude and insecurity are also available at the bottom of society. There is already a top-down interplay between these two parts because, on the one hand, the elites are the product of grassroots while on the other hand their attitudes are taken as an example and repeated by the mass.

The value of the culture of political compromise is known for democracies to become established. The choice of a system of government in a democracy does not decrease this importance. Therefore, the need for political compromise continues even after Turkey shifted to the quasi-presidential system after a relatively long experience of the parliamentary system, which was in effect during the multiparty system of the country. This is because compromise is not a phenomenon that needed only for coalition governments. With the new system, the election process of the president will often require party alliances or compromise among parties.

On the other hand, compromises that would provide the majority to enable the parliament to fulfil its legislative function would be inevitable. Likewise, there is no other way than to reach a compromise between the legislature and the executive in times when the president and the majority of the parliament belong to different political parties. Even if the executive and the legislature belong to the same political party, there will always be a need to consider the demands and views of the opposition and different segments of the society in decision-making processes.

So, if Turkey wants to have an established democracy, there is a need in all circumstances for political compromise. Each good example is worth examining closely to meet this need. In this sense, *Milli Görüş* experience seems to be one of the good examples. However, along with *Milli Görüş*, the examples of tolerance, trust, cooperation and compromise in our political history should continue to be explored. Thus, we will have more road signs to move more steadily towards the consolidated democracy.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. Turkish Summary of the Thesis

Bir siyasi rejimin "demokratik" olarak nitelendirilmesi için taşıması gereken belirli şartlar vardır. R. Dahl bunları; kamu politikalarını belirleyen görevlilerin seçimle iş başına gelmesi, serbest, adil ve sık yapılan seçimler, ifade özgürlüğü, örgütlenme özgürlüğü, alternatif bilgi edinme kaynakları ve katılımcı vatandaşlık şeklinde sıralamaktadır (2005: 188). Bununla birlikte, başta Almond ve Verba olmak üzere birçok siyaset bilimci, yukarıda sayılan özellikleri haiz demokratik rejimler için "siyasi kültür"ün altyapı oluşturduğuna dikkat çekmişlerdir. "Siyasi olgular hakkındaki tutum, değer yargıları ve inançlar" şeklinde tanımlanan siyasi kültürün (Diamod, 1993: 8) istikrarlı bir demokratik rejimin oluşması ve devam etmesinde önemli bir rol oynadığı geniş bir kabul görmüştür (Heywood, 2007: 12; Gutmann ve Thomson, 2010: 1130).

Siyasi uzlaşma kültürü, siyasi kültürün önemli unsurlarından biri olup demokrasinin yeniden üretilmesinde kritik bir değere sahiptir (Bellamy ve Hollis, 1998: 54; Şaylan, 2006:1). Modern toplumsal yapılar olan uluslar, bölünmüş aidiyet yapılarıyla heterojen özellik taşırlar. Farklı sosyal arka planlar, bağlılıklar, değer yargıları ve ahlaki ilkeler, insanları çatışan değerlere ve hedeflere yöneltmektedir. Bu farklılıklar daha çok ideoloji, etnisite, cinsiyet, din ve bölge formlarında yoğrulmuştur (Bellamy, 1999: 1). Vatandaşları arasında duygusal ve düşünsel birlik yaratmaya yönelik araçlara sahip olmakla birlikte, liberal demokrasiler ortak politikalar üretmenin zorluklarıyla karşılaşmaktadırlar (Weinstock 2017: 640).

Gelişmiş Batı ülkelerinde, sosyal refah uygulamalarının ölçüsü, sağlık sigortasının kapsamı, ötanazi, uyuşturucu kullanımı, kürtaj, azınlık hakları dindarlığın kamusal yansımaları vs. anlaşmazlık konuları tartışılagelmiştir (Weinstock 2017: 641). Türkiye'de ise sosyo-ekonomik, etnik, ideolojik ve dinsel-mezhepsel tercihlerdeki farklılıkların derinliği anlaşmazlık unsurlarını artırmıştır (Kalaycıoğlu, 2016: 31). Bütün bu farklılıkların yarattığı ayrışmaya rağmen insanlar bir arada yaşamak zorundadır. Bu nedenle çağdaş siyasal teorinin önemli çalışma alanlarından biri çatışan dünya görüşleriyle, insanların bir arada nasıl yaşayacağı hakkındadır. Bu hayati soru için verilecek cevapların başında uzlaşma gelmektedir (Rostbøll, 2017: 620).

Siyasi uzlaşma, bütün demokratik hükümet sistemleri için kritik bir değerdir. Parlamenter sistemde sıklıkla gündeme gelen koalisyon hükümetlerinin kurulması ve işlemesi için uzlaşma biricik yoldur. Demokratik yasama organları çoğunlukçu ilke ile çalışırlar ve kural olarak kanunların ve diğer hukuki metinlerin kabul edilmesi için parlamento çoğunluğunun uzlaşısına ihtiyaç duymaktadırlar. Bunun yanında azınlık hükümetleri de bir uzlaşı temeline dayanır ve kendilerini destekleyecek siyasi partilere ihtiyaç duyar. Aynı şekilde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri gibi başkanlık sistemlerinde uzlaşma demokratik işleyişin tek çıkar yoludur. Devletin işleyişi için yasama ve yürütme organları arasında bir uzlaşmanın varlığı zorunludur. Keza, yarı başkanlık sistemi, devlet organları arasında bir uzlaşmanın varlığı ile işlemektedir. Diğer taraftan siyasi uzlaşma, demokratik toplumlar için yalnızca çoğunluğun biçimsel olarak sağlanması için gerekli bir araç olmanın ötesinde anlamlar taşır. Toplumun tamamında etkili olacak kuralların konması ve geçerli olması için toplumsal desteğin geniş olmasında ve meşruiyetinin güçlü olmasında uzlaşmanın önemi yadsınamaz. (Rostbøll, 2017: 623). Dolayısıyla, demokratik siyaset için taşıdığı öneme dayanarak Bellamy ve Hollis'in (1998:54) uzlaşıların "demokrasinin can damarı" olduğunu söylemeleri anlam kazanmaktadır.

Demokratik siyasetteki yaygınlığına karşılık, siyaset teorisinde ve felsefesinde son yıllara kadar siyasi uzlaşma üzerinde tartışmaların çok yetersiz olduğu görülmektedir. Ancak yakın dönemlerde bu kavram üzerindeki çalışmalarda görece bir artış olduğu söylenebilir. 2000'den bu yana konu üzerinde Bellamy, Fumurescu, Gutmann ve Thompson, Lepora ve Goodin, Margalit, Wiseman, Dixit-Grosman ve Gul ile Weinstock'un çalışmaları görülmüştür Bu çalışmaların ana temaları daha çok siyasi uzlaşmanın kavramsallaştırılması, alt öğelerinin oluşturulması, demokratik siyaset için gerekliliği, yaygınlığı, değeri, doğası, özellikleri ve belli şekillerinin eleştirisinden oluşmaktadır (Rostbøll, 2017).

Siyasi uzlaşmanın Türkiye'deki durumuna bakıldığında, bu kavramın hem teorik hem pratik düzlemde zayıf olduğuna dair önemli işaretler bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle, literatürde bu kavramı merkeze alan çalışmaların bulunmaması, siyasi olay ve olguları bu perspektifle inceleyen araştırmaların eksikliği dikkat çekmektedir. Diğer taraftan uzlaşmanın Türk siyasi hayatında zayıf olduğuna dair yaygın bir kabul vardır. Bu görüşlere göre, Türkiye, etnik, kültürel, dini ve ideolojik ayrım çizgilerinden dolayı çatışmacı bir sosyal karakter taşımaktadır (Kiriş, 2011: 41; Kanra, 2009: 2; Çarkoğlu ve Toprak, 2007: 32-40; Huntington, 1993: 31). Öyle ki, ülkenin yaşadığı birçok sorunun kaynağı olarak da siyasi kültürdeki

uzlaşma eksikliğine işaret edilmektedir. Şaylan'a (2006: 1) göre, Türkiye'deki siyasi istikrar konusundaki pek çok sıkıntının temelinde siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün zayıf olması yatmaktadır.

Bununla birlikte, Türkiye'deki uzlaşma kültürünü bu genellemelerle özetlemek indirgemeci bir yaklaşım olabilir. Bilimsel yaklaşım, her alanda olduğu gibi bu konuda da yapılmış genellemelere temkinli yaklaşmayı gerektirmektedir. Dolayısıyla, demokratik rejimin kökleşmesinde kritik önem taşıyan siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün izini sürme konusunda yeterli çabanın gösterildiğinden emin olmakta yarar vardır. Bu bağlamda Milli Görüş Hareketi siyasi uzlaşma bakımından yakından incelenmeye uygun bir örnek olarak değerlendirilebilir. Cumhuriyetin temel değerleriyle uyum sorunu yaşayan dindar/muhafazakâr kitlenin (Bingöl ve Akgün, 2005: 7) temsilciliğini iddia eden bu Hareketin, içinde yer aldığı dört koalisyon hükümeti ile bu Hareket'in siyasi partilerinin söylem ve eylemleri yakın bir incelemeyi hak etmektedir. Zira bu toplumsal kesim, devletin yerleşik ideolojisine en uzak toplumsal kesim olarak görülmüştür (Vielhaber, 2012: 51; Akşin, 2007: 168). Dolayısıyla bu kesim üzerinden siyasi uzlaşma deneyiminin incelenmesi, Türkiye'nin demokratik kapasitesinin analiz edilmesi açısından anlamlı veriler sağlayabilecektir.

Çalışmanın temel varsayımı şudur: Milli Görüş Hareketi Türk siyasi hayatında diğer siyasi aktörlere göre daha uzlaşmacı bir karaktere sahiptir ve içinde yer aldığı koalisyonlarda bunu ortaya koymuştur.

Çalışmanın araştırma sorusu şudur: "*Milli Görüş* hareketinin siyasi uzlaşma yönünden diğer siyasi aktörlerden farkı nedir ve bu farkı meydana getiren sebepler nelerdir? Çalışma Türkiye'de siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün zayıf olduğu varsayımından yola çıkarak Milli Görüş hareketinin nasıl bir fark taşıdığına ve bu farkı yaratan saiklere odaklanmıştır. Milli Görüşün siyasi uzlaşmaya katkısı problemini çözmek için bu hareketin içinde yer aldığı dört koalisyon incelenmiş, farkı yaratan saikleri bulmak için hem koalisyonlar hem de Milli Görüş'ün genel yapısal özellikleri analiz edilmiştir.

Belirtilen temel problemin çözülmesine yardımcı olacak çeşitli alt problemler bulunmaktadır. Bu problemler şu şekilde ortaya konmuştur:

- Siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün önemi ve siyasi kültürle ve demokrasiyle ilişkisi nedir?

- Türkiye'de siyasi uzlaşma kültürü ne ölçüde gelişmiştir?
- Türkiye'nin toplumsal yapısı siyasi uzlaşma kültürünü hangi yönde etkilemiştir?
- Milli Görüş'ün yapısal özellikleri nelerdir?
- Milli Görüş hareketinin Türk siyasetinde siyasi uzlaşma bağlamında ayırt edici özelliği nedir?
- CHP-MNP Koalisyonunda Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacı tutumunun göstergeleri nelerdir?
- I. MC ve II. MC Koalisyonlarında Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacı tutumunun göstergeleri nelerdir?
- RP-DYP Koalisyonunda Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacı tutumunun göstergeleri nelerdir?
- Milli Görüşün uzlaşmacı karaktere sahip olmasının sebepleri nelerdir?

Bu çerçevede, çalışmanın odağındaki Milli Görüş koalisyonları siyasi uzlaşma kavramı perspektifinden analiz edilmiş, bunun yanında diğer sorun alanları için geçerli cevaplar elde edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşma tutumunun koalisyonlar aracılığıyla incelenmesinin birkaç sebebi bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle bir siyasi hareketin anlaşılabilmesi için en iyi yol onun icraatına/pratiklerine bakmaktır (Uçar, 2015). Siyasal söylemin de tanınma açısından belli bir değeri bulunmaktadır ve bu nedenle Milli Görüş'ün söylemleri de yakından izlenmiştir. Ancak insan, kurum veya ideolojilerin gerçek kimliklerinin belirlenmesinde "eylemler" kritiktir. İkinci olarak, "siyasi uzlaşma" konusunda, koalisyonlar, analiz için en iyi numune olma konumundadır çünkü koalisyon tecrübeleri farklı görüş, çıkar ve tarafların uzlaşma konusundaki maksimum kapasitelerini ortaya çıkarma vasfı taşırlar. Son olarak, koalisyonların seçilmesinin bir sebebi de çalışmanın pratik zorunlulukları ile ilgilidir. Sayısız boyutu bulunsa da incelenecek her konunun belli sınırlamalara ihtiyacı vardır zira, zaman ve kaynakların sınırlılığı bunu gerekli kılmaktadır.

Çalışmanın literatüre katkısı, siyasi uzlaşma perspektifinden Milli Görüş koalisyonlarının analiz edilmesi suretiyle Milli Görüş'ün Türkiye'de siyasi uzlaşma kültürüne katkısının belirlenmesi ve bunun ardındaki sebeplerin ortaya çıkarılmasıdır.

Literatür taramasında, genel olarak Türk siyasi hayatı hakkında yapılmış çalışmaların sayısının çok fazla olduğu ve bunların içerisinde koalisyonlarla ilgili bazı tezler bulunduğu görülmüştür. Aynı şekilde Milli Görüş, Erbakan, Refah Partisi vb. konularda kitap ve makale türünde azımsanmayacak sayıda eser yayımlanmıştır. Ne var ki, bunların esas olarak, siyasi olayların tarihsel akışı içinde verildiği daha çok kronolojik anlatıma sahip olduğu görülmüştür. Farklı odakları bulunan eserlere de rastlanmıştır ancak bu tezin ana problemini doğrudan yansıtan çalışmaların olmadığı anlaşılmıştır ki bu problem "siyasi uzlaşma kültürü açısından Milli Görüşün diğer siyasi aktörlerden farkı ve bu farkın sebepleridir". Bu problem alanı Türkiye için özel bir değer taşımaktadır, çünkü Türkiye patrimonyal ve merkeziyetçi bir tarihsel mirasa sahip ve demokrasisi zaman zaman kesintiye uğramış bir ülke olarak siyasi uzlaşma kültürünü geliştirmeye muhtaçtır. Bu çalışmanın, hem uzlaşma konusunda literatürde görülen eksikliğin giderilmesine hem de Türkiye siyasetinde uzlaşma kültürünün gelişmesine katkıda bulunması umulmaktadır.

Çalışma kapsamında belirlenen alt problemler de literatüre katkı yapabilecek niteliktedir. Örneğin bu kapsamda ele alınan siyasi uzlaşma ile siyasi kültür ilişkisinin irdelenmesi önemlidir. Çünkü Türkiye'nin siyasi kültürü üzerindeki çalışma sayısı da oldukça yetersizdir. Siyasi uzlaşma üzerinde ise yapılmış kapsamlı bir çalışma yoktur. Dolayısıyla eksikliği görülen bu iki kavramın ele alınması ve birbiriyle ilişkisinin irdelenmesi anlamlı olacaktır. Yine çalışmanın tali problemleri arasında yer alan diğer sorunlar bir yenilik taşımaktadır. Türkiye'de siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün gelişim seviyesinin tartışılması ve Türkiye'nin toplumsal yapısının siyasi uzlaşma üzerinde yarattığı baskı bunlar arasındadır. Özellikle Milli Görüş'ün dört koalisyonunun siyasi uzlaşma ekseninde derinlemesine incelenmesi Milli Görüşün tamamen yeni bir boyuttan ele alınması anlamına gelmektedir. Nihayet Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacı bir tutum geliştirmesinin sebeplerinin incelenmesi özgün bir tartışma alanı olarak ilave bir katkı sağlayacaktır.

Bilimin temel özelliklerinden biri nesnel olması, kişisel değer yargılarına yer vermemesidir. Oysa sosyal bilimlerde hem araştırmayı yapan hem de araştırmaya konu olan insandır. Böyle olunca araştırmayı yapan kişinin bilgi, inanç, değer ve yargılarının araştırma sonuçlarını etkileme ihtimali bulunmaktadır (Bahar, 2017:45). Neuman'ın (2011: 4) ortaya koyduğu üzere, *genellemecilik, seçici gözlem, aceleye gelmiş sonuçlar, ayla etkisi (halo effect)* ve *yanlış uzlaşı* gibi hatalar araştırmanın önünde duran risklerdir. Milli Görüş ve Necmettin Erbakan'ın karşıt dünya görüşleri tarafından ideolojik temelde yapılmış

değerlendirmeleri bu alanda objektif verilere ulaşmayı zorlaştıran bir etken olmuştur.

Bu riskleri bertaraf etmek için öncelikle bu riskin farkında olmak ve çalışma süreçlerinde bu bilinçle hareket etmek gerekir. Bunun için, incelediğim konu alanıyla ilgili olabildiğince farklı veri kaynaklarından yararlandım. Örneğin arşiv kayıtları kapsamında incelediğim günlük gazeteleri geniş bir yelpazede tutmaya çalıştım. Koalisyon dönemleri boyunca Milli Görüş'ün önde gelen temsilcilerinin TBMM tutanaklarına yansıyan düşüncelerini ve söylemlerini geniş bir biçimde taradım ve tezin konusuyla doğrudan ilişkili bölümleri tasnif ederek değerlendirdim. Farklı felsefi tutumları olan kaynaklara ulaşmaya çalıştım. Farklı dünya görüşlerine sahip yorumcuların değerlendirmelerini ve yaklaşımlarını göz önünde bulundurdum. Diğer taraftan siyasi faaliyette bulunan kişi ve kurumların idealizminin, birey ve grup çıkarlarıyla, insani zaaflarla el ele yürüdüğünün bilinciyle hareket ettim. Aynı hassasiyeti Milli Görüş'ün önemli temsilcileriyle yaptığım yüzyüze görüşmelerde de gösterdim. Görüşmede düşünce ve algılar toplanırken, yönlendirme olmaması amacıyla "görüşme formu" adı verilen ve yarı yapılandırılmış sorular hazırlandı. Böylece bir taraftan derinlikli cevaplar alınmaya çalışıldı diğer taraftan standart sorular üzerinden görüşme yürütüldü.

Çalışma, nitel araştırma geleneği içinde yer alan araştırma desenlerinden biri olarak vaka incelemesi *(case study)* şeklinde tasarlanmıştır. Bilindiği üzere, nitel araştırma, özellikle son otuz yıldır, sosyal bilimlerin konusu olan insan ve grup davranışlarını konu alan sosyal bilimlerde ağırlık kazanmıştır (Bahar, 2017: 39). Nitel araştırmanın temelindeki felsefe, pozitivizmin aksini savunur ve postpositivist, hermenötik bir felsefi yaklaşımı öne çıkarır. Bu yaklaşımda tek bir mekanik, tek yönlü ve tekil bir doğru yerine, görelilik, karşılıklı nedensellik gibi tezler savunulur (Yeşil, 2017: 57). Çalışma, bu çerçevede, Milli Görüş hareketinin siyasi uzlaşmacı karakterine dair bir iddia taşımakta ve bunu koalisyonlar üzerinden betimleyici ve açıklayıcı bir yolla ortaya koymaktadır. Araştırmanın temel amacı olayların ve durumların doğal gelişim seyrinde anlaşılmasıdır. Bunun için olaylar tarihsel akışına göre ve önemlerine göre incelenmiş ve ilgili kavramla ilişkilerine dikkat çekilmiştir. Araştırmanın verileri nitel özelliktedir çünkü veriler doküman incelemesi, arşiv kayıtları ve mülakat yöntemiyle elde edilmiştir. Veri analizinde tüme varımcı düşünce yöntemi kullanılmış ve koalisyonlar dönemindeki olayların toplamından hareketle Milli Görüşün uzlaşmacı karakteri ve bunun arkasındaki saikler hakkında birtakım genellemelere ulaşılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Vaka incelemesi niteliğindeki çalışmalar, bir veya birkaç olayın çeşitli boyutlarını ele alır. Bireyler, gruplar, kurumlar, hareketler vb. vaka olarak ele alınabilir. Bu vakalar genellikle teferruatlı, geniş bir veri setinin ortaya konmasını gerektirir. (Neuman, 2011:42) Bu tezde olayların ele alınış şekli bu tarife uygun düşmektedir. Milli Görüş'ün kendine ait özellikleri ve içinde yer aldığı dört koalisyon hükümeti ayrıntılı olarak ele alınmış ve bir kavramsal perspektif içerisinde yorumlanmıştır. Koalisyonlar, içinde bulundukları bağlamların daha iyi anlaşılması için, içinde geliştikleri siyasi atmosfer içinde tasvir edilmiştir. Zira vaka incelemelerinin bir özelliği de onların "her olayın kendi bünyesindeki özelliklerinin yanı sıra olayın etrafını kuşatan koşulların da göz önünde tutulmasıdır (Neuman, 2011: 43). Örneğin özellikle ilk koalisyon olan CHP-MSP koalisyonundan önce, yakın dönemdeki siyasi manzara tasvir edilmiş ve siyasi parti yelpazesi hakkında açıklayıcı bilgiler verilmiştir. Aynı ön bilgiler, daha sınırlı da olsa, diğer koalisyonlarda da sunulmuştur.

Araştırma verilerinin ayrımı genellikle nicel-nitel sınıflamasına göre yapılır. Bu çalışmada toplanan veriler sayısal ve matematiksel ölçüme dayanmadığı için niteldir. Tez, nitel özellik taşıyan kavram, düşünce, eylem ve ifadelerin, sözlü ve yazılı anlatımların anlamlandırılması ve kavramsal çözümlemesini yapmaktadır. Siyasi uzlaşma ve koalisyon gibi iki kavram üzerinden Milli Görüşün söylem, eylem, olay ve süreçlerine bağlı bir analiz sözkonusudur.

Nitel veriler döküman inceleme, gözlem, mülakat vb. çeşitli tekniklerle toplanmaktadır. Bir araştırma deseni bunlardan sadece biriyle de yapılabilir. Ancak bu tezde "triangulation" olarak adlandırılan birden fazla veriden yararlanma yoluna gidilmiştir. Araştırmada kullanılan veri toplama teknikleri 1) doküman inceleme (literature review), 2) arşiv kayıtları, 3) görüşme'den oluşmaktadır. Bu verilerin toplanmasına dair bazı hususlar şöyle sıralanabilir.

Doküman inceleme, çalışmanın hazırlık aşamasından itibaren sürekli yapılan bir işlemdir. Doküman incelemenin verimli olması için tarama sırasında göz önünde tutulması gereken bazı sorular vardır: Araştırmanın amaçları nedir? Kapsamı nedir? Sonuçları ne olmuştur? Hangi strateji kullanılmıştır? Benim araştırma sorularımla bağlantısı nedir? (Murray, 2018: 145).[32] Bu sorular göz önünde tutularak literatür taraması yapılmıştır.

[32] Murray, R. (2018). Tez Nasıl Yazılır? Çalışma Becerilerini Geliştirmek. Ankara: Anı Publishing.

Öncelikle konuyla ilgili daha önceden yapılmış çalışmalara yakından bakılarak problem ve alt problemler geliştirilmiştir. Bu süreçte konuyla ilgili kitaplar, makaleler, akademik tezler, raporlar, ansiklopediler, sözlükler, sempozyum tebliğleri, resmi ve gayrı resmi internet sayfaları geniş bir şekilde taranmış, konunun odağına yakınlığı ölçüsünde incelenmiş, gerekli kayıtlar yapılmıştır. Yine bu kapsamda siyasi parti tüzük ve programları, koalisyon protokolleri, hükümet programları, kanunlar, yasama önerileri, hükümet kararnameleri gibi metinlerden yararlanıldı. Bu arada dönemin olayları ve algılarına ilişkin doğrudan bilgi veren otobiyografi, biyografi ve anı kitaplarına özel bir ilgi gösterilmiştir. Necmettin Erbakan, Kemalettin Erbakan, Şevket Kazan, Bülent Arınç, Süleyman Arif Emre, Oral Çalışlar, Erol Çevikçe, Fehmi Çalmuk tarafından yazılmış eserler bunlar arasındadır.

Literatür taramasında görülmüştür ki, genel olarak Türk siyasi hayatı üzerinde çok sayıda daha çok kronolojik mahiyet taşıyan eser yazılmıştır. Ancak "siyasi kültür" üzerine çok az çalışma bulunmakta, "siyasi uzlaşma" konusu neredeyse hiç çalışılmamıştır. Türkiye'nin koalisyon hükümetleri üzerinde çeşitli akademik çalışmalar bulunmaktadır. Milli Görüş ve Necmettin Erbakan hakkındaki külliyat da azımsanmayacak kadar çoktur. Bunlardan özellikle Fuat Uçar'ın *Türk Siyasi Hayatında Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümetleri*, Nedim Yalansız'ın *Türkiye'de Koalisyon Hükümetleri 1961-2002* ve Işıl Arpacı'nın *Türk Siyasetinde Erbakan* adlı çalışmaları öne çıkmaktadır ve bunlardan çokça yararlanılmıştır.

Literatür taraması için en temel veritabanı olarak, Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi'nin elektronik kütüphanesinden faydalanılmıştır. Bu elektronik kütüphane vasıtasıyla konuyla ilgili geniş veritabanlarından sayısız makale tarandı, konuyla ilgili olanlar indirildi, incelendi, kayıtlar alındı ve değerlendirildi. Bunun yanısıra Hacettepe Üniversitesi kütüphanesi, Milli Kütüphane ve Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Kütüphanelerinden geniş bir şekilde istifade edildi.

Veri toplama tekniklerinden arşiv kayıtları incelemesi de bu tez çalışmasında çok geniş bir yer tutmuştur. İncelenen dönemi, kendi tarihsel bağlamı içinde anlamak ve ortaya konan eylem ve söylemi doğru analiz etmek için arşiv belgelerinin incelenmesi önemlidir. Bu kapsamda, iki temel veri kaynağı incelenmiştir. Bunlardan ilki TBMM Genel Kurul görüşme tutanaklarıdır. Milli Görüş Hareketinin etkili olduğu 1970 ile 2000 arası dönemin Meclis tutanakları taranmış, özellikle uzlaşma ve koalisyon süreçleriyle ilgili olanlar tespit edilmiş, çıkarılmış, kaydedilmiş, tasnif edilmiş ve çalışma kapsamında değerlendirilmiştir. TBMM Kütüphanesinin bu arşiv belgelerini elektronik ortama geçirmiş olmaları, araştırmacılar için

büyük bir kolaylık sağlamaktadır. İkinci bir arşiv çalışması olarak, yine ilgili dönemin önde gelen gazeteleri taranmıştır. 1970'li yıllara kadar geri giden tez konusu için gazetelerin elektronik kayıtları henüz yeterli olmadığı için TBMM kütüphanesinin zengin mikrofilm arşivinden yararlanılmıştır. Bu çerçevede, dünya görüşlerine göre farklı eğilimleri olan gazeteler belirlenmiş (özellikle Milli, Tercüman, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet) ve taranmıştır. Bu gazetelerin günlük olarak verdikleri haberlerden dönemin olaylarının ayrıntıları takip edilmiş, diğer taraftan köşe yazarlarının günlük siyasi gelişmeleri nasıl yorumladıkları incelenmiştir. Böylece dönemin önde gelen basın organlarının, demokratik kültür ve siyasi uzlaşma yönünden nasıl bir tutum sergiledikleri belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Son olarak arşiv kayıtları arasında sayılması gereken bir unsur da Erbakan'ın konuşmalarını içeren video kayıtlarıdır. Erbakan'ın, siyasi hayatı boyunca yaptığı konuşmaların zengin bir demeti internet ortamında erişime açık olarak bulunmaktadır. Açıkoturumlar, mülakatlar, konferanslar, tartışma programları vs. bunlar arasındadır. Tez kapsamında bu video kayıtları da taranmış, izlenmiş, notlar alınmış ve tezde işlenmiştir.

Araştırma kapsamında başvurulan veri toplama tekniklerinden bir diğeri ise yüzyüze görüşmedir. Görüşme, önceden belirlenmiş soru sorma ve yanıtlama tarzına dayalı karşılıklı ve etkileşimli bir iletişim süreci olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Yıldırım and Şimşek, 2018:129). Görüşme, "araştırmacıya çevresel unsurları gözleme, sözel olmayan iletişim ve görsel öğelerden yararlanma" (Neuman, 2011: 339) olanağı sağlamak ve bütün soruların yanıtlanmasını mümkün kılmak gibi avantajları bulunmaktadır.

Yüzyüze görüşmede Milli Görüş evreninden örneklemin oluşturulmasında *amaçlı örnekleme* yöntemlerinden *homojen örnekleme* uygulanmıştır. Örneklemdeki kişiler, Milli Görüş'ün etkili konumlarında bulunma açısından benzer özelliklere sahip bir gruptur. Görüşme için belirlenen kişilerin Milli Görüş'ün üst düzey kademelerinde (Parti Genel Başkanlığı, Genel Başkan Yardımcılığı, Parti Genel Sekreterliği, Bakanlık, Milletvekilliği) bulunmuş olmaları özellikle tercih edilmiştir. Çünkü Milli Görüş'ün düşünce ve eylem planında ortaya koyduğu tecrübelerde bu kadronun büyük etkisi olmuştur. Dolayısıyla Milli Görüş Hareketi'nin siyasi uzlaşma kavramını nasıl algıladığı, buna yönelik nasıl bir tavra sahip olduğu, uzlaşma süreçlerini nasıl yönettiği ve uzlaşma tutumunun arkasında hangi saiklerin yattığı hususlarında anlamlı bilgiler edinmek için bu kişilerin görüşlerine

başvurulmuştur. Görüşme yapılan kişiler şunlardır:[33]

- Abdüllatif Şener
- Bülent Arınç
- Fethullah Erbaş
- Mustafa Kamalak
- Oğuzhan Asiltürk
- Recai Kutan
- Temel Karamollaoğlu

Görüşmelerin her birine ortalama bir saatlik süre belirlenmiş, soru ve cevapların tamamı ses kayıt cihazı ile kaydedilmiştir. Bunun için görüşülen kişiler görüşmenin başında yapılan açıklama ile bilgilendirilmiş ve sesli kayıt konusunda onayları alınmıştır.

Y*arı yapılandırılmış yüz yüze görüşme* esas olarak önceden hazırlanmış sorulara bağlı olarak yürütülmüştür. Ancak görüşme tekniği kapsamında "sonda" yöntemi ile tali sorular sormak suretiyle daha detaylı bazı bilgilerin edinilmesi yoluna gidilmiştir. Sorular ve konuların sıralaması konusunda esneklik sağlanabilen bu yöntemle (Merriam, 2013) araştırma probleminin tüm boyutlarını ortaya koyma amacı güdülmüştür.

Sesli kayıt ortamında kaydedilen görüşme verileri daha sonra bilgisayar ortamında yazılı hale getirilmiş, böylece toplamda 58 sayfalık bir yazılı veri elde edilmiştir. Elde edilen veriler, betimsel analize tabi tutulmuştur. Bu doğrultuda, veriler önceden araştırma sorularıyla belirlenmiş olan temalara göre tasnif edilmiş, temalarla doğrudan ilgili olmayan veriler ayıklanmıştır. Böylece belirlenmiş temalardan her biri için eldeki veriler analiz edilmiş, katılımcıların görüşlerini etkili biçimde yansıtmak amacıyla doğrudan alıntılara yer verilmiştir.

Görüşme sürecinde Milli Görüş partilerinin içinde yer aldığı koalisyonların oluşum ve sona ermelerinde nasıl bir yaklaşım gösterdiği irdelenmiş, koalisyon kuruluş süreçlerinde Erbakan'ın "herkesle ortaklık yapabilen" siyasi tutumunu etkileyen faktörler ortaya

[33] Görüşmeler 2020 Şubat ayı içinde, Ankara'da, muhtelif mekânlarda gerçekleştirilmiştir: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Milletvekili ofisi (Abdüllatif Şener), Arınç Hukuk Danışmanlık Bürosu (Bülent Arınç), Saadet Partisi Genel Merkezi (Oğuzhan Asiltürk ve Fethullah Erbaş), Kamalak Hukuk Bürosu (Mustafa Kamalak), Ekonomik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi (Recai Kutan ve Temel Karamollaoğlu).

çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Görüşmenin son kısmında Necmettin Erbakan'ın siyasi tutum ve davranışları üzerinde etkisi olabilecek unsurlar sorulmuştur. Bu çerçevede, Erbakanın çocukluğu, dini anlayışı, stratejik yaklaşımı vs unsurların etkileri hakkında ne düşündükleri belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır.

Başvurulan görüşme formu yaklaşımı ile sohbet tarzı görüşmeye kıyasla daha sistematik, karşılaştırılabilir ve analiz etmeye uygun bilgi elde edilmiştir. Söz konusu yöntemle, esneklik, yanıt oranının yüksekliği, sözel olmayan davranışların tespiti, araştırmacının ortam üzerindeki kontrol imkânı, soruların sırası konusunda değişkenlik sağlayabilme, anlık tepkileri kaydetme, veri kaynağının teyit edilmesi, soruların tam olarak cevaplanması ve derinlemesine bilgi edinme gibi yöntemsel avantajlar temin edilmiştir. Bütün bu avantajlarıyla toplanmış olan görüşme kayıtları yazılı hale dönüştürülmüş bu metinlerdeki önemli bulgu ve tespitler analiz edilmiş, doktora tezinin muhtelif bölümlerinde gerek doğrudan gerekse dolaylı atıf yöntemiyle işlenmiş ve siyasi uzlaşma kavramı bağlamında yorumlanmıştır.

Sosyal bilimlerdeki pek çok araştırma gibi bu tezin üzerinde oturduğu bazı ontolojik ve epistemolojik varsayımlar bulunmaktadır. Örneğin bu önermelerden biri "Demokrasi daha az kötü bir siyasi rejimdir." Bu nedenle bir demokrasi eleştirisi veya değerlendirmesi yapılmamıştır. Bir diğer varsayım "Siyasi uzlaşma demokratik toplumlar için iyidir." şeklindedir. Uzlaşmanın farklı boyutlarıyla da ilgili olsa yapılan bazı eleştirilere rağmen (Weinstock, 2013; Ulshafer, 1992; Gutmann, A. & Thomson, D.2010 Weinstock, 2017) bu eleştirilere, bu tutumun ahlaki meşruiyetini tartışmak için değil, kavramın farklı yönlerini sergilemek adına yer verilmiştir. Bir diğer aksiyom ise "koalisyon hükümetlerinin demokratik değeri" ile ilgilidir. Bu anlamda yeri geldiğinde, koalisyonların kurulması ve devamlılığı bir "başarı" gibi ifadelendirilmiştir, zira demokratik süreçler ve kamusal çıkar böyle bir çözümü gerektirmektedir.

Çalışma, giriş ve sonuç bölümleri dışında altı bölümden oluşmuştur. Bu bölümlerin ilki çalışmanın üzerine inşa edildiği temel kavramlara ve bu kavramlar arasındaki ilişkilere ayrılmıştır. Bu kapsamda siyasi kültür; kavramsal, tarihsel boyutlarının yanında Türkiye ölçeğindeki karşılığıyla irdelenmiştir. Siyasi kültürün bir unsuru niteliğindeki siyasi uzlaşma, kavramsal analizi, demokrasiler için taşıdığı önem ve Türkiye için taşıdığı anlamıyla ele alınmıştır. Üçüncü kavram olarak hükümet koalisyonları da hem genel

boyutlarıyla hem Türkiye'deki tarihsel tecrübeleriyle incelenmiş, koalisyonların siyasi uzlaşma kültürü üzerinden okuması yapılmıştır.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümü müstakil olarak Milli Görüş'e tahsis edilmiştir. Bölüm, Hareket'in bir bütün olarak değerlendirilebilmesi amacıyla üç alt başlık altında şekillenmiştir. *İslam-Siyaset İlişkisi, Necmettin Erbakan ve İslamcı Kişiliği, Milli Görüş: İdeoloji ve Hareket* biçiminde sıralanan bu başlıklar sırasıyla Milli Görüş öncesi arka planı, Necmettin Erbakan'ın kişilik ve düşünce yapısı ile temsil ettiği hareketteki belirleyici konumunu ve Hareketin söylem ve eylemlerini bütüncül bir perspektifle ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışmanın bu bölümü, Necmettin Erbakan'ın "uzlaşma" eğiliminin arkasındaki sebeplerin belirlenmesinde önemli veriler içermektedir.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü Milli Görüş'ün ilk koalisyon tecrübesine ayrılmıştır. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ile Milli Selamet Partisi'nin uzlaşmasıyla kurulan bu koalisyonun incelendiği bölüm üç alt başlıktan oluşmuştur. *Koalisyonun kurulması öncesindeki siyasi koşullar; koalisyonun kurulması, yapısı ve protokolü; koalisyonun işleyişi, karşılaştığı zorluklar ve sona ermesi*, şeklinde belirlenen bu üç tema, müteakip bölümlerde incelenen koalisyonlar için de aynı şekilde düzenlenmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle dördüncü bölümde yer alan iki Milliyetçi Cephe Koalisyonu ile beşinci bölümdeki Refah Partisi-Doğru Yol Partisi Koalisyonu da aynı şemaya uygun olarak incelenmiştir.

Çalışmanın altıncı bölümü, Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacı tutumunun göstergelerini ve sebeplerini irdelemeye özgülenmiştir. Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşma eğilimine kanıt teşkil eden veriler bölümün ilk kısmında ele alınırken, bu eğilimin ardındaki saikler ikinci kısımda tartışılmıştır. Birinci kısımdaki değerlendirmeler esas olarak koalisyon dönemlerini anlatan üç bölümden süzülürken, ikinci kısımdaki veriler aynı bölümlerin yanı sıra Milli Görüş bölümünde ortaya konan verilerin ışığında ortaya konmuştur.

Siyasal kültürün önemli bir unsuru olan siyasi uzlaşmanın demokrasiler için özel bir önemi vardır zira siyasi uzlaşma demokratik hayatın bütün safhalarında ihtiyaç duyulan bir anahtar roldedir. Bütün toplumlarda bireyler ve gruplar arasındaki menfaat çatışması sonsuzdur ve bunun çözülmesi için iki yol vardır. Ya çatışma ve şiddete başvurulur ve güçlü olanın dayattığı kurallar çerçevesinde hareket edilir; ya da uzlaşmaya gidilir ve daha makul ve adil bir düzen kurulur. Demokratik toplumlar ikincisini tercih etmişlerdir ve toplumsal yaşamın bütün boyutlarında uzlaşmaya dayalı bir sistem kurmuşlardır. Demokrasilerdeki

siyasi faaliyetlerin gerçekleşmesi için üretilen bütün kurumlar uzlaşma eseridir. Bütün siyasi partiler, sivil toplum örgütleri, çıkar grupları, sendikalar bir uzlaşmanın yansımasıdır. Aynı şekilde demokratik hükümetlerin anayasal organlarının kurulması ve işlemesi ancak uzlaşma ile mümkündür. Herkesin çıkarlarını doğrudan etkileyen kuralların konması ve hayata geçirilmesi için de uzlaşma gereklidir. Siyasi uzlaşma kültürüne sahip olmayan bir toplumda bu rasyonel ve barışçıl düzenin kurulması ve işlemesi mümkün değildir. Bunun yerine iki ihtimal gündeme gelecektir; ya otoriter bir düzenin kurulacak veya çatışma ve anarşi hüküm sürecektir. Dolayısıyla, demokrasi için gerekli siyasi kültürün, uzlaşma kültürünü içermesi bir zorunluluktur.

Bu anlam ve değeriyle siyasal kültürün Türkiye boyutuna bakıldığında Türkiye'nin siyasi kültür mirası içinde siyasi uzlaşma tutumunun oldukça zayıf olduğu görülmektedir. Buna karşılık, Türk siyasi kültüründe önemli yer tutan özellikler şöyle sıralanabilir: devletin patrimonyal karakteri, kişisel yönetim anlayışı, iktidarın muhalefete tahammülsüzlüğü, merkeziyetçi ve güçlü devlet anlayışı, silahlı kuvvetlerin siyaset üzerindeki etkisi, toplumun birey karşısında üstün tutulması (Şen, 2015: 34; Heper, 2011: 44; Algan, 2015:136).

Uzak geçmişten kalan bu özelliklerin yanı sıra Cumhuriyet sonrası tarihsel süreç de uzlaşma kültürünü zayıflatıcı yönde işlemiştir. Kurtuluş savaşı sırasında batıcı-muhafazakar/dindar elitler arasında oluşan kısa uzlaşmanın hemen ardından Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan itibaren Türk siyaseti, geleneksel patrimonyal, merkeziyetçi ve otoriter kodlarına dönmüştür (Esmer, 2006: 225). Cumhuriyetin kurucu kadrosu, toplumda devrimsel bir kültürel dönüşümü hedeflediği için buna karşı çıkan geniş kesimleri tek parti rejimi ile baskı altına almış ve yoluna devam etmiştir. 1945 yılında uluslararası gelişmelerin de etkisiyle iktidar partisinin çok partili hayata geçişe izin vermesi yine Türk siyasetinde kısa bir uzlaşma örneği olmuştur. Ancak meydana gelen güç dengesi, siyasetin demokratik bir yöne evrilmesini sağlayacağına tam tersine darbeyle sonuçlanacak bir gerilime yol açmıştır. 1960 Darbesinin ardından siyasette ve toplumda meydana gelen gerilim ve çatışma 1971 ve 1980 askeri müdahaleleriyle sonuçlanmıştır. 1960'a kadar Kemalist-muhafazakar ayrımına dayanan kutuplaşma, sonraki yıllarda sol-sağ ayrımıyla iç içe geçmiştir. 1970'lerden itibaren ise bu ayrımlara mezhepsel, dini ve etnik çatışma boyutları eklenmiş ve günümüze kadar uzanmıştır. Bu arada Cumhuriyet anayasaları olarak 1924, 1961 ve1982 anayasalarının askeri otoritelerin ürünü olması Türkiye'de siyasi hayatın uzlaşmayla değil

kuvvet ve dayatmayla şekillendirildiğinin çarpıcı bir göstergesidir. Bu anayasalar üzerinde rötuşların yapılmış olması bu temel gerçeği değiştirmemektedir.

Türkiye toplumunun uzlaşmadan çok çatışmaya, uyumdan çok kutuplaşmaya eğilimli olduğu çok farklı kesimlerce kabul edilmiştir. Bu konuda Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Yasin Aktay, Yılmaz Esmer ve Fuat Keyman tarafından farklı zamanlarda yapılmış olan araştırmalar ağırlıklı olarak şunu göstermiştir ki Türkiye toplumunda tolerans ve kişiler arası güven zayıftır. Medyada konuyla ilgili sınırlı sayıda yorumda da bu tespit vurgulanmaktadır. Güneri Civaoğlu, Deniz Kavukçu, Haldun Gülalp, Mehmet Barlas, Fatih Altaylı, Oktay Aydın, Ayşe Sucu bunlar arasında yer almaktadır. Bu çalışma kapsamında kendileriyle yüz yüze görüşme yapılan siyasetçiler Recai Kutan, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, Temel Karamollaoğlu, Mustafa Kamalak, Bülent Arınç, Abdüllatif Şener ve Fethullah Erbaş'ın da aynı fikirde oldukları ortaya çıkmıştır.

Siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün zayıf olmasıyla ilgili nedenler dört grupta ele alınabilir. Birincisi tarihsel sebeptir. Cumhuriyetle başlayan radikal sekülerleşmenin yüzyıllar boyu islamla yoğrulmuş toplum üzerinde yarattığı gerilimin etkileri hala devam etmektedir. İkinci sebep, sosyolojik-kültürel niteliktedir. Toplumun sahip olduğu etnik çeşitlilik ve buna yönelik üretilen politikalar kapatılması güç bir uçurum oluşturmuştur. İdeolojik sebepler üçüncü gruptur. Türkiye, II. Dünya Savaşından komünist bloğun çöküşüne kadar sağ-sol ideolojik kutuplaşmasının arenalarından biri haline gelmiştir. Son olarak bireysel faktör şunu ifade etmektedir ki, siyasi partilerin hırslı tutumları ve bu tutumdan kaynaklanan ayrıştırıcı söylemleri siyasi husumetin başlıca sebeplerinden biri olmuştur.

Uzlaşma kültürünün toplumdaki yeri konusunda koalisyonların önemli göstergeler olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Gelişmiş demokrasilerin büyük çoğunluğunda uzun yıllar boyunca benimsenmiş olan parlamenter sistemlerde koalisyonlar sık görülen siyasi olgulardır. Örneğin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nı izleyen yaklaşık yarım yüzyıl boyunca demokratik Avrupa ülkelerinde kurulan hükümetlerin yaklaşık % 85'i koalisyondur (Lijphart,1999). Esas olarak siyasi parti sistemi ve seçim sistemi etkenlerinden kaynaklanan koalisyonlar, Liphart'a göre "uzlaşmacı demokrasi"nin unsurlarıdırlar ve "çoğunlukçu demokrasi"lere özgü olan tek parti hükümetlerine göre daha demokratik bir siyasi yapıya işaret ederler.

Türkiye koalisyon hükümetlerinin kümelendiği üç dönem vardır. Bunlardan ilki 1960'lı yılların ilk yarısıdır, ikincisi 1970'li yıllar, üçüncüsü 1990'lı yıllardır. Türkiye'de

koalisyon hükümetlerinin kurulmasında da normal olarak siyasi parti sistemi ve seçim sisteminin etkisi bulunmaktadır. Ancak normal olmayan bir faktör asker faktörüdür. Çünkü yukarıda sözü edilen üç dönemden ilk ikisinde koalisyonların başlaması, askeri müdahalelerin etkisiyle olmuştur. 1960 Darbesi Demokrat Parti'nin, 1971 Askeri Müdahalesi Adalet Partisi'nin tek parti iktidarına son vermiş ve koalisyonlar dönemini başlatmıştır.

Koalisyon hükümetleri, "normalde" daha demokratik bir manzaraya işaret ederler ancak Türkiye'nin uzlaşma kültürü zayıf olduğu için Türkiye'nin koalisyonları çoğunlukla istikrarlı olmamıştır ve demokrasinin pekişmesine ciddi bir katkısı olmamıştır. Koalisyonların ortalama görev süresi bu konuda bir değerlendirme yapmaya imkân vermektedir. 1960'tan 2002'ye kadar kurulan 13 koalisyon ortalama 1 yıl 4 ay görev yapmıştır. Üstelik bu süre koalisyonların resmi olarak "görevde sayıldığı süredir". Fiili görev süreleri bundan daha kısadır. Kısa süreli hükümetler ise açıkça "siyasi uzlaşma" kültürünün eksikliğini gösterdiği gibi, önemli ve uzun vadeli politikaların hayata geçirilememesi anlamına da gelmektedir.

1970'li yıllarda üç koalisyon hükümetine, 1990'larda bir koalisyon hükümetine ortak olan Milli Görüş, Osmanlının son döneminden Cumhuriyet'e aktarılan batıcı-muhafazakar/dindar düalizminde ikinci tarafı temsil eden bir siyasi harekettir. Ancak 1969'da siyaset sahnesine giren Milli Görüş hareketi ve onun karizmatik lideri Necmettin Erbakan, bu gelenekte bir farklılık yaratmıştır. Daha önce, Cumhuriyet'in radikal seküler rejiminin baskı ortamında, muhafazakar ve sağ siyaset içinde zayıf bir damar olarak var olmaya çalışan İslamcılık ideolojisi, Milli Görüşle beraber müstakil ve açık bir yapıya kavuşmuştur (Edelman, Cornell, Lobel and Karaveli, 2015: 15).

Ancak İslami değerleri referans olarak benimseyen bu hareketin, batıcılık felsefesine dayalı Cumhuriyetin değer ve kurumlarıyla uyum problemi yaşaması kaçınılmazdı. Bu problemin çözümü "siyasi uzlaşmada" yatıyordu. Uzlaşma ise iki tarafın fedakârlıkta bulunmasını gerektiren bir süreçtir. Milli Görüş bu noktada, muhataplarının çıkardığı bütün zorluklara rağmen, uzlaşmacı bir tutum geliştirebilmiştir. Hareket, siyasi rejimin yürürlükte tuttuğu kısıtlayıcı anayasal çerçeve içinde siyasi mücadelesini yürütmeye çalışmıştır. Bu siyasi çerçeve, siyasi partilerin dini referanslara dayanmasına, dini isim taşımasına ve dini propaganda yapmasına izin vermiyordu. Bu koşullarda 1970' ten itibaren kurduğu dört parti kapatılmış, mücadeleye beşinci parti ile devam etmiştir. Bunlardan ilki, Milli Nizam Partisi,

Ocak 1970 te kurulmuş, Mayıs 1971'de kapatılmıştır. İkincisi, Milli Selamet Partisi Ekim 1972'de kurulmuş, Ekim 1981'de kapatılmıştır. Üçüncüsü, Refah Partisi Temmuz 1983'te kurulmuş, Ocak 1998'de kapatılmıştır. Dördüncüsü, Fazilet Partisi Aralık 1997'de kurulmuş, Haziran 2001'de kapatılmıştır. Milli Görüş'ün son partisi olan Saadet partisi Temmuz 2001'de kurulmuştur.

Bir ideoloji olarak Milli Görüş belli temalar etrafında kapsamlı fikirler ortaya koymuştur. Bunların başında İslam gelmektedir. Milli Görüş'ün lideri için İslam barış, adalet ve refahı ifade eder ve birey, toplum ve dünya için biricik kurtuluş reçetesidir. İslam bir taraftan yaratıcıya karşı iyi bir kul olmayı, diğer taraftan bütün yaratılanlara faydalı olmak için mücadele etmeyi gerektiren bir inançtır (Erbakan, 2014). Erbakan'ın bu İslam anlayışında çocukluğundan siyasi hayatına kadar yakın durduğu Gümüşhanevi tarikatının çok büyük etkisi olmuştur. Söz konusu tarikatın önemli isi Mehmet Zahit Kotku'nun din-devlet ilişkilerine dair ılımlı yaklaşımı, uzlaşma yanlısı anlayışı, Erbakan'ın ve dolayısıyla Milli Görüş partilerinin devletle ve diğer siyasi partilerle kurdukları ilişkinin "uzlaşmacı" olması üzerinde önemli bir etki yapmıştır.

Milli Görüş ideolojisinin ikinci bir ana teması olarak siyaset, yine dinle yakından ilişkilidir. Çünkü bu ideolojiye göre, siyaset, dinin bütün insanlığa hizmet etmek için verdiği sorumluluğu (cihad görevi) yerine getirmenin etkili bir aracıdır. Milli Görüş'ün siyaset anlayışının önemli bir özelliği de legal, barışçıl ve uzlaşmacı bir yolu vaz etmesidir. Milli Görüş, kendi siyasi düşünce ve hareketini diğer bütün siyasi aktörlerden radikal bir şekilde farklı tanımlar: Milli Görüş milletin öz değerlerinin temsilcisidir ve milletin menfaatlerini savunur, fakat rakip siyasi aktörler ve partiler Batılı değerlerin temsilcisidir ve batının menfaatlerine hizmet eder.

Milli Görüşün ekonomiye ilişkin düşüncelerinin özünde şunlar bulunmaktadır. Ekonominin sosyo-politik hayat için muazzam bir önemi vardır, bu nedenle çok ciddiye alınmalıdır. Ancak mevcut ekonomik düzen batılı/Siyonist dünya egemenlerinin kontrolünde işleyecek şekilde tasarlanmıştır ve bir sömürü sistemini uygulamaktadır. Bütün yoksul ülkelerin ve Türkiye'nin bu sömürü çarkından çıkması gerekmektedir. Bunun için gerekli reçeteye "adil ekonomik düzen" adı verilmiştir. Bu düzen kapitalizm ile sosyalizmden bazı unsurlar taşımakla birlikte esas özelliğini İslamdan almaktadır (Erbakan, 1991).

Milli Görüş ideolojisinin önemli bir teması da Batı ve Siyonizm karşıtlığıdır. Milli Görüş'e göre Batı dünyası ve onun arkasında saklanan Siyonizm son üçyüz yıldır İslam medeniyetine etkili bir şekilde saldırmaktadır ve kurduğu küresel düzenle insanlığın büyük bir kısmını kendi çıkarlarına köle haline getirmiştir. Siyonizmin emperyalist düzeni ekonomik aygıt aracılığıyla işlemektedir. Türkiye, tarihsel olarak İslamı temsil eden Osmanlının mirasçısı olduğu için ve Siyonizme kafa tutma potansiyeli taşıyan ülkedir ve bu nedenle hedef ülke konumundadır. Milli Görüş'e göre bu küresel zulüm düzenini değiştirmek için Müslüman devletlerin bir araya gelmesi, siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel anlamda organize olması küresel bir güce dönmesi gereklidir (Erbakan, 2014: 226).

Milli Görüş 1973 seçimleriyle ilk defa iktidar ortağı olma imkanına kavuşmuştur. 1973 seçim sonuçları aynı zamanda, Türkiye'de ikinci bir koalisyon döneminin başlangıcını ifade etmektedir. Ancak koalisyon için gerekli siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün eksikliği bu süreçte kendini göstermiştir. Bu nedenle seçimlerden sonra bir koalisyon kuruluncaya kadar yaklaşık üç buçuk aylık bir çözümsüzlük yaşanmıştır. Bunda, öncelikle iki büyük partinin, fakat en çok AP'nin uzlaşmaz tutumunun etkisi olmuştur. Demirel, Ecevit'in başbakanlığında bir hükümette yer almayı asla düşünmemiştir. Ecevit'in de sert söylemleri bir büyük koalisyonun kurulmasını zorlaştırmıştır. Ancak Ecevit'in son aşamada MSP ile koalisyona yanaşması uzlaşma konusunda olumlu bir göstergedir. Diğer taraftan seçimlerden dördüncü büyük parti olarak çıkan ve koalisyon olasılıklarında bir değeri olan DP'nin tutumu uzlaşma açısından çok sorunludur. DP, CHP'den ideolojik nedenlerle uzak dururken, AP'den ise kişisel husumet nedeniyle uzak durmuştur. Bu dönem boyunca DP'nin sağda "Demirelsiz" bir koalisyon önermesi gerçekçi olmayan bir yaklaşım olmuş ve bir hükümetin kurulmasını engellemiştir. Milli Görüş partisi MSP ise bu sürecin başından itibaren uzlaşmacı bir zihniyeti yansıtmıştır. Erbakan koalisyon konusunda olumlu bir dil kullanmış, her türlü koalisyon formülünü değerlendirmeye değer bulmuştur. Nitekim bu tutumun sonucu olarak, bütün tarihsel önyargılara ve siyasi risklerine rağmen CHP ile bir koalisyon kurmayı kabul etmiştir. Bu koalisyon, Türkiye'de uzlaşma kültürünün gelişiminde önemli bir dönüm noktası olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Ecevit'in de bu koalisyonun kurulması yolundaki tavrı siyasi uzlaşma adına cesur bir adımdır.

CHP-MSP Koalisyonu, MSP içindeki bir grubun uzlaşmayı sindiremeyen tavırları yüzünden başta bazı zorluklar yaşamıştır. Ancak, hükümet genel olarak koalisyon protokolü ve programının belirlediği ilkeler çerçevesinde çalışmış, öngörülen politikaları hayata

geçirmede etkili adımlar atmıştır. Ecevit'in sosyal adalet yanlısı ekonomi politikalarının yanı sıra Erbakan'ın sanayileşme projeleri ve dindar kesimin taleplerine ilişkin çalışmaları uzlaşı içinde yürütülmüştür. Bu durum, farklı dünya görüşlerine sahip olmalarına ragmen iki parti arasında verimli ve uzlaşmacı bir atmosferin hakim olduğunu göstermiştir. Ancak bu koalisyonun en önemli başarısı, koalisyonun sonunu getiren asli sebep haline gelmiştir. 1974 yazının ortasında gerçekleşen Kıbrıs'taki Yunan askeri darbesinin ardından Türk hükümetinin karşı askeri müdahalesi başarıyla tamamlanmış, Kuzey Kıbrıs'ta bir Türk Cumhuriyeti kurulmuştu. Bu olay Ecevit'in prestijini yükselttiği için Ecevit ve etrafındaki partililer koalisyonu bozma, bir erken seçime gitme ve tek başına iktidara gelme hesabı yaptılar. Bu nedenle Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasından iki hafta sonra Ecevit, koalisyonun yürümeyeceğine dair açıklamalar yapmaya başlamış, uzlaşmaz bir tavır geliştirmiş ve bu tavrından hükümet sona erinceye kadar vaz geçmemiştir (Çevikçe, 2012: 168).

Erbakan ise, Ecevit'in kafasına koyduğu koalisyonu bozma fikrini değiştirmek için büyük çaba göstermiştir. Bunun için, ortağına yönelik nazik bir dil kullanmış, anlaşmazlıkların uzlaşma ile çözülebileceğini vurgulamış, kamuoyuna iyimser açıklamalar yapmış, ülkenin yeni bir hükümet bunalımına tahammülü olmadığını tekrarlayıp durmuştur. Ancak Erbakan'ın yapıcı ve uzlaşmacı söylem ve tavırları Ecevit'in koalisyondan kurtulma niyetinden vazgeçirmeye yetmemiş, Ecevit 18 Eylül 974'te başbakanlık görevinden istifa etmiştir (*Cumhuriyet,* 19 Eylül 1974).

CHP-MSP hükümetinin sona ermesi, siyaseti iki seçenekle karşı karşıya bırakmıştır: Ya seçime gidilecek, ya da CHP dışında bir koalisyon hükümeti kurulacaktı. Seçime gitmeyi sadece CHP istediği için, parlamento aritmetiği gereği, bu seçenek devre dışı kalmıştır. Ecevit'in bu konuda DP'nin desteğini alacağına dair iyimserliği gerçekleşmemiştir. Geriye kalan tek seçenek için MSP dahil sağ partiler arasında bir uzlaşıya ihtiyaç vardı. Bu aşamada MSP lideri Erbakan, sağda bir koalisyon için gerekli her türlü desteği vermeye hazır olduklarını söyleyerek uzlaşmacı tutumunu sergilemiştir. AP lideri Süleyman Demirel de bu seçeneğe olumlu yaklaşmıştır. Ancak bu seçeneğin gerçekleşmesi için ihtiyaç duyulan DP, özellikle liderinin Demirel'e karşı kişisel husumetinden dolayı sağda sağlanacak bir uzlaşıyı engellemiştir. Bu durum ülkenin altı aydan fazla bir süre, meclisten güvenoyu almış bir hükümetten mahrum kalmasına yol açmıştır ki bu boşluk Türk siyasi tarihinin en uzun

hükümet krizi olarak kaydedilmiştir. Yeni hükümet neticede DP'li bir grup milletvekilinin sağda bir uzlaşı için partilerinden ayrılması ile kurulabilmiştir (*Hürriyet,* 30 Mar 1975).

MSP uzlaşmacı tavrını bu koalisyon arayışları boyunca göstermiştir. Erbakan, altı aylık kriz boyunca değişik koalisyon ihtimallerini gündeme getirmiş ve bunları teşvik etmiştir. Sürecin başında MSP dahil sağ partiler arasında bir koalisyon önermiştir. Bu mümkün görünmeyince MSP, DP'nin ısrar ettiği formülü uygulamaya, yani mevcut liderlerin bulunmayacağı bir sağ koalisyona razı olduğunu bildirmiştir. Kriz devam ederken, bir sağ koalisyonun kurulmasını teşvik etmek için, kendileri içinde olmasa bile kurulacak bir sağ koalisyonu destekleyeceklerini belirtmiştir. Nihayet 1975'in başlarından itibaren, oluşan Milliyetçi Cephe formülünü etkili bir şekilde desteklemiş ve kurulmasında büyük katkı sağlamıştır. MSP'nin bu "herkesle uzlaşabilen" tavrı, ona husumet güdenleri çok rahatsız etmiştir. Hürriyet Gazetesinin köşe yazarlarından Cüneyt Arcayürek'in şu ifadeleri bunu açıkça ortaya koymuştur: "Ermeni ve Yahudi ile de hükümet kurmayı mübah sayan MSP mantığı kamuoyunun dikkatinden kaçmıyor." (Arcayürek, 1975)

I.Milliyetçi Cephe hükümeti aslında çok sağlam görünmeyen bir temel üzerinde kurulmuştur. Bunun sebebi, hükümette dört partinin yer alması, diğeri ise hükümetin dar bir çoğunlukla meclisin desteğini elde etmesidir. Ancak, bu dezavantajlarına rağmen, hükümetin ömrü, Türkiye'nin koalisyon hükümetlerine göre oldukça uzun sürmüştür. Bunda koalisyon ortağı bütün partilerin payı vardır, ancak MSP'nin uzlaşmacı tutumunun etkisi büyük olmuştur. Bu tutum, partinin önemli temsilcilerinden Süleyman Arif Emre'nin sözlerine şöyle yansımıştır: "Geçirdiğimiz tecrübelerin de gösterdiği gibi, koalisyon anlaşma ve uzlaşma demektir. Bir koalisyon içerisinde hiçbir partinin kendi isteklerini tam anlamıyla yerine getirmesi mümkün değildir. Uzlaşmanın gerektirdiği fedakârlıklara katlanarak millî menfaatleri ön planda tutmak bakımından bir zaruret vardır." (MM, JD, 9/4/1975, 390). Milli Görüş partisi MSP, bu dönem içerisinde kendi öncelikli politikaları olan hızlı sanayileşme, sosyal adalet, manevi kurum ve değerlerin desteklenmesi ve Müslüman ülkelerle işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi gibi hedefleri, hayata geçirmeye çalışmış (*Hürriyet*, 1976-1977 Almanacs) ancak taleplerinde koalisyonun varlığını riske atacak zorlamalardan kaçınmıştır.

MSP'nin ve diğer partilerin koalisyonu sürdürme başarısı, bu koalisyonun her zaman anlaşma ve uyum içinde yürüdüğü anlamına gelmemektedir. Hükümetin birinci yılı içinde, Meclis başkanının seçimi konusunda olduğu gibi bazı konularda uzlaşmada sıkıntılar yaşanmıştır. Üstelik bu sıkıntıların yaşanmasında MSP'nin de belli bir rolü olmuştur. Ancak

ülkenin siyasal, sosyal ve ekonomik olarak çok sıkınlı bir döneminde dört partinin uzlaşısıyla kurulmuş hükümetin iki yıldan fazla bir süre görevde kalması başlı başına bir başarı sayılabilir. Kıbrıs konusundaki uluslararası baskılar, ABD ambargosu, Yunanistan'la Ege denizinde yaşanan ve büyük gerilim, ekonomik darboğazlar, toplumdaki ideolojik gerilim ve CHP'nin hükümeti düşürmek için sıklıkla başvurduğu girişimlere rağmen bu koalisyon hükümeti beklenenden daha uzun süre ülkeyi yönetmiştir.

Bu koalisyon hükümeti döneminde ülke gündeminin ön sıralarını işgal eden sağ-sol kutuplaşması ve bu kutuplaşmanın yarattığı çatışma ortamı, Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacılık konusundaki farkını görünür hale getirmiştir. Bu süreçte sol tarafta CHP ve daha radikal sol oluşumlar, sağda ise AP ve MHP ideolojik kutuplaşmayı, gerilimi ve şiddeti tırmandıracak söylem ve tavırlar geliştirmiştir. Aynı şekilde, medya organları sağ veya sol eğilimlerine göre, daha çok ülkede yaşanan gerilimi tırmandıracak, ideolojik duyguları körükleyecek bir yayın politikası izlemişlerdir. Özellikle bu koalisyonun sonlarına doğru, seçim sathı mailine girildikten sonra bu kutuplaştırıcı ve çatışmacı söylem siyasette aşırı biçimde benimsenmeye başlamıştır. Buna karşılık, MSP yönetimi gerek koalisyon döneminde, gerekse seçim dönemine girerken, sağ-sol temelinde ideolojik bir ayrışmaya yüz vermemiş, ülke vadandaşlarının kardeş olduğunu vurgulamış, toplumda ve siyasette uzlaşmaya olan ihtiyacı anlatmıştır (CS, JD, 4/2/1976, 290-295).

1977 genel seçimlerinde, CHP ve AP'nin oyları artmış, fakat bu artışlar tek başına iktidar için yeterli olmamıştır. Aslında her iki parti de tek başına iktidar olmak arzusuyla MSP'nin de içinde bulunduğu koalisyon hükümetlerinin normal süresinin tamamlanmasına tahammül etmemişlerdi. Buna karşılık, bu seçimlerde MSP'nin oylarında önemli bir düşüş olmuş, üstelik bu düşüşün önemli bir sebeplerinden birisi de MSP'nin koalisyona ve uzlaşmaya yatkınlığı olmuştur. Herkesin düşmanlık ve çatışma dilini kullandığı bir atmosferde, MSP'nin ılımlı ve uzlaşmacı tavrı, siyasi bir kazanç getirmemiştir. Üstelik seçim boyunca AP lideri, seçimin sağcılarla solcular arasında olduğunu söyleyerek, MSP'nin seçmenini hedefleyen bir strateji izlemiştir. İki büyük partinin lideri seçim döneminde düşmanca söylemler kullandıkları için seçimden sonra bir büyük koalisyon kurmaları neredeyse imkansız hale gelmiştir. Nitekim seçimden sonra tek başına iktidar olamadıkları belli olunca da bu imkansızı başaramamışlardır. İki liderin bu kutuplaşmacı tutumu, siyasette istikrarsızlığa, ekonomik ve sosyal sorunların derinleşmesine ve bu sürecin üç sene sonra darbe ile sonuçlanmasına yol açmıştır.

MSP seçimden sonra geçmişteki bütün olumsuzlukları ve hayal kırıklıklarını unutmaya hazır olduğunu göstermiş, siyasette küstünlüğe ve düşmanlığa yer olmadığını hatırlatmıştır. MSP yönetimi yaptığı duyuru ile ihtiyaç duyulan koalisyonun kurulması için bütün partilerle işbirliğine gitmeye hazır olduğunu ifade etmiştir. Partinin bütün bu söylem ve davranışları MSP'nin siyasi uzlaşma konusundaki esnekliğini bir kere daha göstermiştir. Bu yaklaşım kısa sürede bir koalisyon hükümetinin kurulmasıyla sonuçlanmış ve ikinci bir Milliyetçi Cephe hükümeti kurulmuştur (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz, 2015b: 1325).

AP-MSP ve MHP tarafından kurulan II. MC koalisyonunun ömrü çok kısa sürmüştür. Bu hükümet, ekonomik sorunlar, sosyal eşitsizlik, artan anarşi ortamı, ABD yaptırımları vs sorunları aşmaya çalışırken uzlaşma tutumu konusunda zor sınavlardan geçmiştir. AP ile MSP özellikle ekonomik sorunların çözümü konusunda IMF'nin öngördüğü politikalar üzerinde uzlaşmakta zorlanmıştır (Uçar, 2015: 432). Diğer taraftan Millet Meclisi başkanının seçimi koalisyon ortakları arasında anlaşmazlık konusu olmuştur ki bu anlaşmazlık, MSP'nin genel uzlaşmacı tutumuna aykırı düşmüştür. Ancak hükümeti sona erdiren sebep bu zorluklar değil, CHP'nin bakanlık vaadiyle AP'den bir düzine milletvekilini transfer etmesi olmuştur. Bu girişim, bir uzlaşı hükümetinin sonunu getirirken, şaibeli bir hükümetin kuruluşu sağlamıştır ki bu hükümet zamanında hızlı bir tırmanışa geçen sosyo-ekonomik sorunlar 1980 Askeri Darbesine giden yolu açmıştır.

Milli Görüş dördüncü koalisyon hükümetini 1996-1997 arasında DYP ile yapmıştır. Bu dönem, diğer dönemlerden faklı olarak, Milli Görüş'ün seçimlerde aldığı oy oranının ve parlamentodaki temsilinin yüksek olduğu bir dönemdir. Milli Görüş'ün bu koalisyondan önceki on yıl boyunca siyasetteki hacminin ve rolünün artıyor olması, bu hareketin söylem ve eylemlerini "sakıncalı" bulan siyasi partilerin ve devlet elitlerinin rahatsızlıklarını şiddetlendirmiştir. Bu rahatsızlık, 1995 Genel seçimlerinde RP'nin birinci parti olmasıyla zirveye ulaşmış, asker, medya, yargı, akademi ve siyaset eliti işbirliği halinde Milli Görüş'e yönelik düşmanca bir kampanya yürütmüş ve Milli Görüş'ün iktidara gelmesini engellemeye çalışmıştır (Kazan, 2006: 48-53).

Milli Görüş partisi RP ise, sözü edilen 90'lı yıllarda, kısmen kendisi aleyhinde oluşturulan elit koalisyonu ile baş etmek için, kısmen de kendi karakteri gereği, uzlaşmacı bir tutum içinde hareket etmiştir. Bu elit koalisyonu sürekli olarak RP'yi dışlamaya ve marjinalize etmeye çalışırken RP bu çevrelere karşı uzlaşmacı bir tavır göstermiş ve kendisine yöneltilen düşmanca tutumdan etkilenmemeye çalışmıştır. Milli Görüş'ün lideri

Necmettin Erbakan'ın uzlaşmacı tutumu en baştan itibaren açıkça görülmüştür. Kendisine hükümet kurma görevi verildiği zaman Erbakan yalnız sağ partilerle değil sol partilerle de koalisyon kurabileceğini açıklamıştır. Erbakan bu tutumunu, koalisyon görüşmelerinde sürekli olarak ortaya koymuştur. Ancak, diğer partiler, askeri vesayetin de etkisi ile bu uzlaşmacı yaklaşıma olumlu cevap vermekten kaçınmışlardır.

Kendisine gösterilen düşmanca tutuma karşılık ortaya koyduğu uzlaşmacı yaklaşım, RP'nin normal şartlarda bir iktidar ortağı olmasına yetmemiştir. Bunun için ilave bir şansa ihtiyaç duyulmuştur ve bu şans, DYP ile ANAP liderlerinin kişisel husumetleri ve DYP liderinin aleyhindeki soruşturma dosyaları ile doğmuştur. Bu iki faktör sayesinde DYP, koalisyon konusunda RP'nin çağrılarına olumlu cevap vermek zorunda kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla RP hükümette yer alma hakkına, DYP'nin mecburiyeti sayesinde kavuşmuştur (*Hürriyet,* June 1996).

DYP'nin, Milli Görüş'e karşı yürütülen ötekileştirme ve düşmanlık kampanyasından ayrılması ve daha demokratik bir pozisyon alması, bu kampanyayı yürütenlerde infiale yol açmıştır. RP'li bir koalisyonu "kabus" olarak gören vesayetçi elit, kurulan RP-DYP koalisyonunu yıkmak için etkili ve yoğun bir kampanya yürütmüşlerdir. Hükümetin ülke sorunlarına radikal çözümler getiren politikalarını engellemek ve hükümeti çalışamaz hale getirmek için asker, siyaset, hukuk, akademi ve özellikle medya eliti tarafından saldırılar yapılmıştır. Hükümet bu saldırılar altında ülkenin temel meselelerini ele almaya çalışmıştır. Bu temel meseleler Milli Görüş'ün öteden beri programında vurguladığı ekonomik kalkınma ve sanayileşmenin hızlandırılması, sosyal adaletin gerçekleştirilmesi, Kürt meselesinin güvenlik tedbirleri yerine kültürel haklar ve ekonomik iyileşme temelinde çözülmesi, ülkede manevi değerlerin güçlendirilmesi ve marjinalize edilmiş dindar kesimin legal siyasete dahil edilmesi, dış politikada Batı ile ilişkilerin bağımlılık modelinden çıkarılması ve İslam ülkeleri ile çok boyutlu işbirliğinin sağlanması idi.

Necmettin Erbakan, başbakan olduğu sürece, bir taraftan belirtilen hedefleri gerçekleştirmek için uğraşırken diğer taraftan hükümeti yıkmaya yönelik girişimleri bertaraf etmeye çalışmıştır. Bu girişimler karşısında başvurduğu yöntem sabırlı bir diyalog, ikna çabası, uzlaşma çağrısı ve nezaketli bir dil olmuştur. Ancak bu yaklaşım, kendini "devletin sahibi" olarak gören asker-sivil elit tarafından karşılık bulmamış ve Cumhuriyetin biçimsel ve duygusal sembolleri üzerinden hükümet baskı altına alınmıştır. Bu baskılar 28 Şubat süreci olarak adlandırılan askeri müdahale ile hükümeti fiilen sona erdirme girişimine

dönüşmüş ve hükümet bir yıllık bir görev süresinin ardından istifa etmek zorunda bırakılmıştır.

İçinde yer aldığı dört koalisyon hükümeti ortaya koymuştur ki, Milli Görüş hareketi, ülke meselelerinin çözümü konusunda oldukça farklı bir reçeteye sahip olmasına rağmen, bu sorunların çözümü yolunda rakip siyasi aktörlerle bir araya gelmekten, tartışmaktan, diyalogdan ve uzlaşmadan çekinmemiştir. "Adil düzen" idealinin ülke için yaşamsal bir gereklilik olduğuna inansa da demokratik siyasette uzlaşmanın zorunluluğunu kavramıştır ve bunun için kendi taleplerinden ve programından fedakârlık yapmayı kabul etmiştir. Bu nedenle, hükümet ortağı olma ihtimali doğduğunda, koalisyon alternatiflerinin hepsine açık bir duruş sergilemiştir. Koalisyonların oluşumu yolunda aktif rol üstlenmiştir. Koalisyonların oluşumu için yapılan pazarlıklarda kendi çıkarını etkili bir şekilde savunmuş, ama bu pazarlığı ortaklıktan vazgeçme pahasına zorlamamıştır. Koalisyon süreçlerinde de kendi parti programı ve çıkarlarını gözetmekle birlikte, koalisyon ilkelerine sadakat göstermiş, koalisyonun ayakta kalması için gerekli tavizleri vermiştir. Ayrıca içinde yer aldığı koalisyon hükümetlerinin sona ermesine yol açacak davranış ve tavırlardan her zaman sakınmıştır. Bu nedenle bu koalisyonların hiçbirinin sona ermesine Milli Görüş sebep olmamıştır.

Milli Görüş'ün koalisyon süreçleri üzerinden izi sürülen bu uzlaşmacı karakterini yaratan dört temel faktör tespit edilmiştir. Bunlar *Erbakan'ın mizacı ve içinde yetiştiği çevre, Milli Görüş'ün benimsemiş olduğu İslam anlayışı, Milli Görüş'ün strateji mantığı* ve *milli birlik hassasiyeti*dir.

Erbakan'ın mizacı ve içinde büyüdüğü ortam, uzlaşmacı bir kişiliğin oluşması için uygun görünmektedir. Öncelikle, Erbakan'ın çocukluğu Anadolu'nun farklı kültürlere sahip şehirlerinde geçmiştir (Demirkan, 2018: 430). Uzlaşmacı bir tutum için gerekli olan zengin düşünce ve geniş bakış açısının, bu farklı sosyo-kültürel ortamlarda kazanılmış olması muhtemeldir. İkinci olarak, Erbakan'ın içinde büyüdüğü aile atmosferine bakıldığında, ailede yetişme tarzının demokratik bir nitelik taşıdığı görülmektedir. Ailede çocuklara yönelik terbiye ve eğitim, o dönemlerde yaygın olan baskıcı ve otoriter gelenek yerine daha çok ikna ve diyalog usulüyle verilmiştir (Gündoğan, 2019: 21). Üçüncüsü, Erbakan'ın babasının, dindar bir kişiliğe sahip olmakla birlikte hakimlik görevini yeni laik düzende yapabilmek için gerekli uzlaşma esnekliğine sahip olduğu görülmektedir. Bu tecrübe ve gözlemlerin Erbakan'ın ılımlı ve uzlaşmacı bir kişilik edinmesinde etkili olması

muhtemeldir. Diğer taraftan, Erbakan'ın çocukluğuna dair bilgiler, Erbakan'ın mizacı hakkında önemli ipuçları vermektedir. Erbakan, çocukluğunda kalabalık sosyal oyunlar oynamayı, bu oyunları organize etmeyi ve bu organizasyon içinde bir en etkili rolü üstlenmeye seven, hırslı bir mizaca sahiptir. Bu hırsı, parlak zekasıyla birleştirerek bütün eğitim hayatı boyunca gözde bir öğrenci olmuş, ardından parlak bir akademisyen olarak dikkat çekmiş, sonrasında bürokraside yüksek bir pozisyon edinmiş, nihayet siyasi hayata atılmıştır. Erbakan'ın siyasette "illa iktidar" sloganıyla hareket etmesinde ve koalisyonlarda yer almaya istekli olmasında bu "başarı arzusunun" etkili olduğunu söylemek makul bir açıklama olacaktır.

Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacı bir karaktere sahip olmasında ve koalisyonlarda yer almaya meyilli olmasında ikinci önemli faktör olarak, benimsediği İslami anlayış ön plana çıkmaktadır. Araştırma kapsamında görüşülen Milli Görüş temsilcileri, şunu ileri sürmüşlerdir: Milli Görüş, İslami değerleri referans aldığı için uzlaşmacıdır. Ancak, İslam dünyasındaki düşünce ve uygulamalar gözden geçirildiğinde görülmektedir ki İslam çok farklı yorumlamalara maruz kalabilmektedir. Dolayısıyla bir hareketin "İslami" olması, onun uzlaşmacı olmasını garanti etmez. Bu yüzden denilebilir ki Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacı karakteri "İslami" değerlere dayanmasından değil, "İslamiyetin belli bir yorumuna" dayanmasından ileri gelmektedir. Bu İslami yorum "Gümüşhanevi-İskenderpaşa tarikatının yorumu"dur. Bu tarikat'ın üç önemli ismi, Abdullah Hasip Efendi, Abdülaziz Efendi ve Mehmet Zahit Efendi 1940'lardan 1980'e kadar Erbakan'ın dini kişiliğinin şekillenmesinde büyük etki yapmıştır. Özellikle Mehmet Zahit Kotku'nun dini düşünce ve yaklaşımı Erbakan için temel referans niteliğindedir. Bu nedenle Erbakan'ın dini yorumu esas olarak bu ekolün yorumuna dayanır. Bu dini yorumda öne çıkan temalar barışçıl bir İslami mücadele, evrimsel bir toplumsal dönüşüm, legal bir hareket biçimi, uzlaşmacı bir yaklaşım vb.dir. Kotku sertlik, şiddet, öfke ve gazabın inananlara yakışmayan kötü hasletler olduğunu vaz etmiştir. Bu yüzden devletle çatışmayı, toplumsal şiddeti ve yasadışı yapılanmayı reddeder. İskenderpaşa Cemaatinin bu dini anlayışı, Erbakan'ın dini kişiliğini şekillendirmiş, oradan da Milli Görüşün dini anlayışını, dolayısıyla da siyaset anlayışını belirlemiştir.

Rasyonel, gerçekçi ve faydacı bir zihniyete sahip olma, Milli Görüş'ün uzlaşmacı bir karaktere sahip olmasında etkili olan üçüncü bir unsur olarak tespit edilmiştir. Milli Görüş hareketi, duygusallık ve heyecandan çok, soğukkanlı ve fayda-maliyet analizine dayanan bir hareket tarzına sahiptir. Bu özelliğiyle, mücadele ettiği alandaki güç dengelerini ve bu

koşullarda atacağı adımların sonuçlarını hesaplamaya çalışmıştır. Bu yaklaşım, sahip olunan ilke ve idealleri korumaya çalışırken, bu ilke ve idealleri ileri bir aşamaya taşımak için gerekli esnekliği göstermeyi, gerektiği zaman manevra yapmayı ve iki adım ilerlemek için bir adım geri atmaya razı olmayı gerektirmektedir. Milli Görüş bu yapısının gereği olarak, statükoyu değiştirmek için koalisyonlara girmeyi, siyasi rakipleriyle pazarlık yapmayı ve uzlaşmayı kabul etmiştir.

Son olarak, Milli Görüş'ün siyasi uzlaşma karakterinde etkili bir faktör olarak milli birlik hassasiyetine sahip milliyetçilik duygusundan söz edilebilir. Milli Görüş Türkiye halkını aile olarak görmekte, bu ailenin, Osmanlı imparatorluğunun mirasçısı olarak, yüksek bir potansiyele sahip olduğuna inanmakta ve bu potansiyelini ortaya çıkarmak için birlik ve kardeşlik içinde hareket etmesini istemektedir (Erbakan, 2014: 242). Aile içinde çıkabilecek her türlü anlaşmazlığın çatışma ile değil diyalog, ikna ve uzlaşma ile sonuçlanabileceğine inanmaktadır. Bu "aile içi" anlaşmazlıkların veya farklılıkların aileye zarar vermeden çözülmesi hayati önem taşımaktadır. Bu nedenle 1970'li yıllarda diğer partilerin içinde yer aldığı sağ-sol ayrımını reddetmiş bu dönemin şiddet olaylarından uzak durmuştur. 1990'larda yükselen Kürt sorunu karşısında etnik temalardan uzak durmuş, kardeşlik temasını işlemiştir. Aynı dönemde askeriyenin kendisine karşı şiddetli önyargısına rağmen Türk ordusuna iltifat etmiş ve askeri rencide edecek söylemlerden kaçınmıştır (*Milli,* 9 June 1997). Yine diğer siyasi partileri, düşünce olarak ağır biçimde eleştirmekle birlikte parti mensuplarını kişisel olarak suçlamamış, hepsini kardeş olarak tanımlamıştır. Bu tavırlarıyla bütün siyasi partilerle her zaman koalisyon kurabilecek bir kıvamda durmuştur.

Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete, oradan günümüze kadar gelen siyasi gelenek göstermektedir ki uzlaşma kültürünün eksikliği Türk siyasi kültürünün önemli bir özelliğidir. Bu eksikliğin yarattığı problemler toplumsal hayatın hemen bütün seviyelerinde görülmeye devam etmektedir. Ancak bu eksikliğin en büyük etki yarattığı alan siyasetin tepesidir. Siyasi piramidin tepesine bakıldığında şunu görmek mümkündür. Eğer siyasi elitler ve aktörler arasında bir güç dengesi varsa bu durum çatışmacı bir söylem ve tavır yaratmakta, demokratik teamül bozulmakta ve istikrarsızlık başlamaktadır. Buna karşılık siyasi güç dağılımında bir denge yoksa otoriter eğilimli yönetim tarzı öne çıkmaktadır. Dolayısıyla muhalefette iken adaleti, eşitliği ve hukukun üstünlüğünü savunan kesimler iktidara geldiği zaman bu değerleri daha az ciddiye almakta ve diğer siyasi aktörlerin siyasi kararlara katılımını kısıtlamaya çalışmaktadır. Sıfır toplamlı oyuna dönüşen bu durum,

demokratik rekabeti sertleştirmekte, iktidar-muhalefet ilişkilerini yıkıcı hale getirmektedir. Sözkonusu uzlaşmazlık tutumu ve güvensizlik toplumun tabanında da mevcuttur. Zaten tabanla tavan arasında birbirini karşılıklı besleyen bir ilişki bulunmaktadır, zira tavandaki aktörler tabandaki yapının ürünü yani sonucudur, diğer taraftan tavanın ortaya koyduğu tavır ve tutumlar toplumsal taban tarafından örnek alınmakta ve tekrar edilmektedir.

Siyasi uzlaşma kültürünün, demokrasilerin yerleşik hale gelmesindeki değeri bilinmektedir. Demokratik toplumun hangi hükümet sistemini benimsediği, bu önemi azaltmaz. Bu yüzden Türkiye'nin çok partili hayatı boyunca tecrübe ettiği parlamenter sistemden sonra başkanlık benzeri sisteme geçmesinden sonra da siyasi uzlaşmaya olan ihtiyaç devam etmektedir. Çünkü, uzlaşma sadece hükümet koalisyonlarında ihtiyaç duyulan bir olgu değildir. Yeni sistemle birlikte Başkanın seçimi süreci, parti ittifaklarını veya partiler arası uzlaşmayı sıklıkla gündeme getirecektir. Diğer taraftan parlamentonun yasama fonksiyonunu yerine getirebilmesi için Meclis'te çoğunluğu sağlayacak uzlaşmalara büyük ihtiyaç duyulacaktır. Aynı şekilde, Cumhurbaşkanı ile parlamento çoğunluğunun farklı siyasi partilerden olduğu dönemlerde yasama ile yürütme arasında uzlaşmanın sağlanmasından başka çıkar yol olmayacaktır. Hatta yürütme ve yasama aynı siyasi partiye mensup olsa bile, karar alma süreçlerinde muhalefetin ve toplumun farklı kesimlerinin talep ve görüşlerinin dikkate alınmasına olan ihtiyaç her zaman var olacaktır.

O halde siyasi uzlaşmaya olan ihtiyaç yerleşik bir demokrasiye sahip Türkiye için her koşulda bir ihtiyaçtır. Bu ihtiyacın karşılanması yolunda her iyi örnek yakından incelenmeye değerdir. Bu anlamda, Milli Görüş tecrübesi Türk demokrasi tarihinin ilham verici örneklerinden birini oluşturmaktadır. Ancak Milli Görüş'le birlikte siyasi tarihimizdeki tolerans, güven, işbirliği, uzlaşma örnekleri araştırılmaya devam edilmelidir. Böylece kurumsallaşmış bir demokrasi yolunda daha istikrarlı bir şekilde ilerlemek için daha çok yol işaretlerimiz olacaktır.

APPENDIX 2. Ethics Committee Approval Form

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT ÜNİVERSİTESİ (AYBÜ)
ETİK KURULU
PROJE ONAY BELGESİ

Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi bölümü öğrencilerinden Halil Tunçkaşık'ın, *"Milli Görüş Temsilcilerinin, Türkiye'de Siyasi Uzlaşma Kültürü ve Milli Görüş Partilerinin Siyasi Uzlaşma Konusundaki Tutumu Hakkındaki Görüşleri"* adlı araştırması değerlendirilmiştir.

Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmuştur.	☑
Proje etik açısından geliştirilmesi gerekmektedir.	☐
Proje etik açısından uygun bulunmamıştır.	☐

AYBÜ ETİK KURULU KARARI (Etik Kurul tarafından doldurulacaktır)	
Araştırma kodu (Yıl – Araştırma sıra no)	2020 – 602
Başvuru formunun Etik Kurula ulaştığı tarih	04.02.2020
Etik Kurul Karar toplantı tarihi ve karar no	05.02.2020 – 06
Yer	Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, Esenboğa Külliyesi
Katılımcılar	Formda imzası bulunan üyelerimiz toplantıya katılmıştır.

KURUL BAŞKANI, BAŞKAN YARDIMCISI VE ÜYELER:

		İMZA
Prof. Dr. Cem Şafak ÇUKUR	Üye	
Prof. Dr. Tekin AKDEMİR	Üye	
Prof. Dr. Muharrem KILIÇ	Üye	
Doç. Dr. Özge GÖKBULUT ÖZDEMİR	Üye	
Doç. Dr. Behlül TOKUR	Üye	
Doç. Dr. Birgül ÖZKAN	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şule KAYA	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ertuğrul DEMİRDEL	Üye	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Nimet YILDIRIM TİRGİL	Üye	

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APPENDIX 3. Interview Questions

I am a Ph.D. student at the Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. The title of the thesis I'm writing is "Political Compromise and Coalition in Turkey: The Case of *Milli Görüş*". Information gathered from this interview will be used in this Ph.D. thesis the advisor of which is Prof. Dr. Yılmaz Bingöl. Within the scope of this thesis, I would like to interview you on the general status of the the political compromise culture in Turkey and the position of *Milli Görüş* parties on political compromise.

My aim in this interview is to learn what the representatives of *Milli Görüş* think about the general status of the the political compromise culture in Turkey and the position of *Milli Görüş*. I hope the work that will come off in conjunction with this research will contribute to the development of compromise culture in Turkey.

Before you start, do you have any thoughts or questions to ask about what I said?

I will record the conversation if you allow me, would you mind?

I estimate that this meeting will take about 1 hour. I want to start the questions if you allow me.

- Can it be said that there is a relationship between political compromise culture and democracy? Can you explain this relationship, if any?
- What do you think about the existence, status, and the degree of political compromise culture in Turkey?
    - Can you evaluate the situation on this subject from past to present?
    - If you think it is low or insufficient, what could be the reasons?
        - Historical reasons (republic, secularism, Islamic tradition)
        - Sociological reasons (ethnic, sectarian, cultural, family structure, education)
        - Ideological reasons (right, left)
        - Personal reasons (attitude of leaders, personal motivations)
- Where do you place *Milli Görüş* Movement and its leader Necmettin Erbakan in the context of political compromise culture in Turkey?

- If positive, how has this movement contributed to political compromise since 1970?
- If negative, could you explain the reasons?

- What relationship can be established between the *Milli Görüş* Movement's involvement in the four coalition governments and the movement's understanding of compromise?
  - CHP-MSP Coalition Government 1974
    - Islamist-leftist unity, criticism, Erbakan's attitude
  - NF I Coalition Government 1975-1977
    - AP-MSP-CGP-MHP
  - NF II Coalition Government 1977
    - AP- MSP-MHP
  - RP-DYP Coalition Government 1996-1997
    - Military guardianship, attitude of RP and other parties, 28 February and Erbakan's attitude
- What is the position of Necmettin Erbakan in the National Vision Movement?
  - Can the movement be considered entirely of Necmettin Erbakan's thoughts and actions?
  - If not, what are the other factors that affect the Movement?
- Can you make comparison between Necmettin Erbakan and the important political leaders living in his time regarding the attitude of compromise?
  - Bülent Ecevit, Süleyman Demirel, Alparslan Türkeş, Turgut Özal, Tansu Çiller, Mesut Yılmaz
- If the compromising feature of the National Vision Movement is assumed, what could be the reasons for this feature? Can you evaluate the effect of the following factors in this sense?
  - Sufi understanding of Islam: Naqshbandi tariqa, Mehmet Zahit Kotku,

- Idealist/positive understanding: giving importance to national unity, conflict avoidance, understanding of social responsibility
- Strategic/pragmatic approach: overseeing political balances realistically, rational approach, gradual understanding of progress, taqiyyah
- Individual factor: Necmettin Erbakan's temperament and the environment he grew up.

APPENDIX 4. Interview Photos












SAADET PARTİSİ

