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THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOMALIA: THE CASE OF SELECTED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYEES IN MOGADISHU

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

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ACCEPTANCE AND CONFIRMATION PAGE

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DECLARATION

I acknowledge and certify that this dissertation is prepared under the Dissertation Writing Guidelines of Graduate School for the Social Sciences.

I declare that all data and information in this dissertation (The impact of corruption on political participation and democratization in Somalia) is my work. It has been prepared and presented by the academic rules and ethical standards of AYBU. I also affirm that I have fully cited and referenced all materials and that all work presented is original, and in any contrary of the above case, I accept to renounce all my legal rights. (10.08.2021)

Mohamed Omar BINCOF

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Mako Hassan Hussein, who passed away in 2002. May God have mercy on her. Amen.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the impact of corruption on political participation and democratization in Somalia. First, the study briefly discusses the historical and theoretical aspects of corruption, democratization, and political participation. The study develops a conceptual framework from the existing literature that explains how various types of political corruption influences political participation and democratization. Furthermore, this study employs the concurrent mixed methods design, in which qualitative and quantitative data were collected simultaneously and analyzed independently and merged. Qualitative data were obtained through semi-structured interviews with 18 participants, while quantitative data were collected through questionnaires completed by 191 respondents.

The quantitative analysis indicates that logrolling and embezzlement have a statistically significant negative effect on democratization. Notably, logrolling has significantly adversely affected political participation in Somalia. Qualitative data analysis findings suggested that electoral process vote-buying undermines holistic political participation. At the same time, those with little or no money have minimal opportunity to participate in political activities because they are excluded from the process. That ultimately undermines the achievement of full democracy.

Additionally, the prevailing view among respondents was that political elites are trying to remain in power by embezzling and preventing the electoral participation of those who have the competence to advance Somalia's democratization process. Regarding qualitative outcomes, abolishing clan-based federalism and adopting procedural democracy would allow citizens to participate equally in the political process, reduce electoral corruption, and promote successful democratization in Somalia. Overall, the consolidated data reflect convergences and differences between the qualitative and quantitative data.

Keywords: Corruption, political participation, democratization, Somali

ÖZET

Bu tez, yolsuzluğun Somali'deki siyasi katılım ve demokratikleşme üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. İlk olarak, çalışma kısaca yolsuzluk, demokratikleşme ve siyasi katılımın tarihsel ve teorik yönlerini tartışmaktadır. Çalışma, siyasi yolsuzluğun farklı türlerinin siyasi katılımı ve demokratikleşmeyi nasıl etkilediğini açıklayan mevcut literatürden kavramsal bir çerçeve geliştirmektedir. Ayrıca, bu çalışmada nitel ve nicel verilerin aynı anda toplandığı ve bağımsız olarak analiz edilip birleştirildiği eşzamanlı karma yöntem kullanılmıştır. Nitel veriler 18 katılımcı ile yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler yoluyla elde edilirken, nicel veriler 191 katılımcı tarafından doldurulan anketler yoluyla toplanmıştır.

Nicel analizden elde edilen sonuçlar, siyasi yandaşlık ve zimmete para geçirmenin demokratikleşmeyi olumsuz etkilediğini göstermektedir. Özellikle, siyasi yandaşlık Somali'deki siyasi katılımı olumsuz etkilemektedir. Nitel veri analizi bulguları, seçim sürecinde oy satın almanın bütüncül siyasi katılımı olumsuz yönde etkilediğini ortaya koymaktadır. Aynı zamanda, düşük ve orta gelirlilerin siyasi faaliyetlere katılmak için çok az olanağa sahip olması da demokrasinin tam olarak uygulanmasının önünde engel oluşturmaktadır.

Ankete katılanlar arasında hâkim olan görüş, siyasi elitlerin, Somali'nin demokratikleşme sürecini ilerletme yetkinliğine sahip olanları kendi saflarına çekerek ya da seçimlere girmesini engelleyerek iktidarda kalmaya çalıştıkları yönündedir. Çalışmanın ortaya koyduğu nitel sonuçlara göre, klan temelli federalizmin kaldırılması ve prosedürel demokrasinin benimsenmesi, vatandaşların siyasi sürece eşit şekilde katılmalarına, seçim yolsuzluğunun azaltılmasına ve Somali'de başarılı bir demokratikleşmenin desteklenmesine olanak sağlayacaktır. Birleştirilmiş veriler ise genel olarak nitel ve nicel veriler arasındaki benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları yansıtmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yolsuzluk, siyasi katılım, demokratikleşme, Somali

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LIST OF SYMBOLS/ ABBREVIATIONS

QUAN **:** Quantitative

QUAL : Qualitative

UN : United Nations

4.5 : Clan political system practiced in Somalia since the 2000s

NIEC : National Independent Electoral Commission

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1. INTRODUCTION

Given the multiple perspectives, scholars have attempted to assess the impact of corruption by simply equating it with other concepts such as public administration, politics, and ethics, and even democracy. In the mid-20th century, numerous bodies, including Transparency International, began critically assessing each country's level of political corruption and published the corruption Perception Index annually.

Moreover, corruption studies have appeared on an unprecedented scale worldwide in recent years and have been perceived as endemic in all governments, negatively affected political participation and democratization. In contrast, political scientists have emphasized the impact of corruption on democratic principles such as equality, integrity, and accountability; there has been little discussion of the impact of corruption on democratization, which hinders successful transitions to democracy and unequal electoral participation. This study seeks explanations for the most acute effects of various forms of corruption on political participation and democratization in Somalia.

1.1. Research Problem

Corruption is as old as human history and existed in Egypt, ancient China, and Greece 3100-2700 B.C. and still has a strong influence in all world nations. First and foremost, it cannot better explain the theoretical development of corruption unless we understand the literal sense of growth in the social sciences and its connection with other related concepts such as integrity and self-organization. The general notion of development in the social sciences and the history of corruption provides an objective reality driven by "ideational" and "material" forces (Tang, 2010:34). According to Smith (2007), integrity is a systematic state in which whole parts accept a superior morality. Corruption is considered not only an illegal act but also damages personal integrity. It is even necessary to mention that the term is considered another significant factor in paradigmatic development. When the term corruption is described, it is synonymous with dishonesty or abuse of power, often involving government officials, and is understood to be a regular and essential part of governance and most political systems (Peter, 1993:21).

Compared to other problems such as political violence, class-based exploitation, oppression, and decay, political corruption is classified as a minor crime. In recent years,

there has been a growing interest in various institutions and specialized individuals researching how academia perceives corruption; however, there is no single illustrative figure showing systematized corruption (Maciel, 2016:3). A significant problem in the early research was that the corrupt matters could not be attributed to either top-down or bottom-up rules. Nevertheless, the concept of corruption has emerged as a complex framework that encompasses professionals, institutions, and citizens' perceptions about the phenomenon in different cultures and periods.

Several theories explained the original development of corruption. Alieva & Zayats (2015:97) found that corruption cases combined with social theories and scientific knowledge create solutions to multidisciplinary problems. The literature on corruption usually refers to a material interpretation such as embezzlement, bribery, and extortion; however, in general, the study of corruption can be comprehensive and linked to other issues such as democratic values and professional ethics. It has become a public issue and influenced numerous political processes in modern democracies or industrialized quasi-democracies.

The causes of corruption are the subject of intense debate on the African continent. In 2019, Transparency International published a report indicating that corruption is a significant problem of political integrity in African states. According to the Global Corruption Barometer survey, several Africans consider a high rate of political corruption, especially public officials, members of parliament, and heads of government and state (Pring &Vrushi, 2019:12). Similarly, the data shows that the extent of corruption problems facing Africans is complex and requires radical and systemic transformations. This survey presents the immense, highly detailed form of public perception data on citizens' opinions about corruption and practical bribery experiences on the African continent (Transparency, 2019:3). In an analysis of corruption, Hammadi et al. (2019:5) found that corruption cases are closely linked to persistent conflict and state weakness in some African nations, particularly in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, Hassan & Barnes (2007) states that the post-independence period in Somalia has been described as a time of struggle for democracy and rampant corruption and nepotism to clans.

Recent surveys conducted in several countries have shown that many citizens are dissatisfied with the government's performance and the political system and even have low

trust in government officials. According to Johnston (1999), there is strong evidence that corruption weakens both democratic and economic development.

A growing body of literature shows that corruption occurs almost everywhere, although it is particularly pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa developing countries. Ritchie et al., (2017:2) found that the misuse of state funds is not adequately regulated in several countries or differences between legal provisions and practice. These gaps create the electoral systems being susceptible to manipulation by those in power. Some unique concepts are associated with corruption, and almost corruption itself extends a pattern of similar crimes. There is a complex pattern of the other terms related to corruption but rarely used accordingly. Embezzlement, for example, means the looting of state funds by government officials and is essentially considered another type of misappropriation of public reserves. Partisanship is the tendency of government agencies and political leaders to grant government resources and offer to distribute resources to specific individuals (Amundsen, 1999:11).

In Somalia, Ingiris (2016:131) highlights that "corruption is seen as a process of distribution of wealth among (Somali) clan members." For example, Sh. Mukhtar, the most senior MP in the last civilian government, said that former Somali President S. Barre was the father of corruption in the country. He argued that the entire bureaucratic system was so corrupt that it was difficult for most citizens to survive under the military regime. Citizens worldwide feel frustration over state corruption and lack of trust in public institutions and discuss the demand for greater political integrity (Rubio chairperson of transparency.org). In 2002 study, it was found that corruption in Africa is estimated at over $148 billion (one hundred and forty-eight billion) annually and increases the price of local goods by about 20%, discouraging foreign and domestic investment and limiting economic development. The brunt of the scourge of corruption in Africa falls on the poor and vulnerable in the society (Lumumba, 2011:12-13). According to the study published by Transparency International (2020), anti-corruption efforts are declining or stagnating in more than 2/3 of the countries around the world, as elections and political financing pose a threat to the influence of personal interests.

Unlike other countries in the world corruption index in 2019, Somalia scored the lowest index (9), and it was rated the highest corrupt state globally (Aljazeera, 2020).

In the last three decades, Somalia has been in conflict, civil wars, and instability that have disrupted the political scene and left much of what seemed to be a state of nature where only the strong and powerful get their way. The country is not an electoral democracy. For example, the previous assessment on transformation processes towards democracy ranked Somalia's political transformation on a scale of 1.48 to 10 out of 137 countries and classified it as hardline or oligarchy (BTI, 2020:1).

O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996 suggest that the process of democratization has three main stages:

- The "liberalization" stage when the former autocratic regime collapses or is exposed.
- The transition stage is when often the first competitive elections have taken place.
- The consolidation stage is when democratic institutions have reached the stage of stability and are accepted by most affected stakeholders.

The theory explains the different political transitions, from liberation from dictatorship to political transition to consolidation of democracy. Huntington (1991:31) noted that the third wave, transition to democracy, creates other natural complex conditions in many countries, such as addressing economic and political challenges. Somalia is not an exception, but the government is pushing similar problems; moreover, many believed that weak political institutions and law enforcement mechanisms lead to high corruption rates.

Nevertheless, the case of Somalia is in the political transition stage. In the past, the country has experienced dictatorship, internal conflict, civil war, weak public institutions, and injustice, which has resulted in the country becoming a dysfunctional and corrupt state. It is also unable to achieve the goals of democratization (such as fair and free elections, promotion, and protection of civil and political rights, among others). It is worth noting that the third wave of democratization produces more complicated literature on corruption in comparative politics and public administration (Warren, 2004:328). Based on the above-mentioned three stages of democratization, Somalia is in the second stage of transition. Free and fair elections of a competitive nature are expected to serve well and successfully transition to democracy. Huntington mentioned that achieving a successful transition to

democracy has become an essential means of changing the corrupt political system worldwide (Huntington, 1997: xii).

On the other hand, there is a rich literature on democratic theory, on infinite (endless) meanings of what democracy is and should be. They all challenge and vary according to scholars' choices (Bobbio, 1987; Dahl, 1956, 1971; Sartori, 1962; Schumpeter, 1962; 1944). In participation for a better quality of democracy, people should have equal rights and exercise their entitlements regularly. Lijphart (1997:1) said that equal consideration and respect to all political representatives is hardly possible if participation is as complete and comparable as possible. However, we believed that political participation is an indispensable part of any democracy; the characteristics and number of citizens who can participate in political activities such as elections can significantly affect democratic values. Unfavorable corruption violates basic principles of democracy such as equality, accountability, and justice (Anderson, & Tverdova, 2003:92). Many have argued a network of relationships in African countries where corrupt donors (patrons) bribe citizens to get involved. This network is usually referred to as favoritism, link participation, and corruption (Fatton 1986, Lemarchand & Legg, 1972).

Lijphart (1997:1) notes that inequalities are sometimes observed as unresolved problems. For example, political inequalities are an issue of systematic distortion in political participation among different groups worldwide, especially in the African continent. Additionally, several political scientists have addressed the interesting question of why certain people enter politics, and others do not. Bincof (2018:64) reports that citizens who have enough money, time and skills are much more likely to participate in political activities in Somalia. In fact, political participation is one of the essential tools for promoting good governance, the strength of political inclusion and democracy" (p.64).

Moreover, post-independence political inequality has had a massive impact on the political process. Furthermore, there are concerns about the level of political participation in Somalia. Particularly in relation to elections, campaigning, and clan-based politics. A recent report by the US State Department highlights that the electoral process for the Federal Parliament of Somalia was widely considered flawed and riddled with corruption; the report discovered that several acts of corruption, restrictions on political participation, illegal arrests with politically motivated (US State, Dep., 2019:25). The clan-based political system

and the indirect election process resulted in minority groups getting a smaller share in parliament and other political institution.

In addition, corruption was rampant through bribes to clan delegates and traditional elders, threatening candidates, manipulating electoral lists, voting-buying, and influencing outcomes. According to the Transformation Index (2020), Somalia scores the worst in political participation with a 1.8 out of 10. Moreover, the rating scale for the performance of the democratic transition was 1 out of 10, which means that it was not a successful transition to democracy(atlas.bti-project.org). That makes it indispensable to study how different types of corruption impact political participation and democratization in Somalia.

1.2. Research Question

Corruption is found in every country in the world and is endemic to the entire government institutions. First, this study focuses on how various forms of corruption impact political participation and democratization in Somalia. Second, we aim to test the individual effects of four forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling,) on political participation and democratization. The study uses convergent mixed methods to collect qualitative and quantitative data, analyze them independently, contrast the results, and combine the study's comprehensive interpretations.

Research explores the following questions:

1. How do different forms of corruption affect political participation in Somalia?

2. How do different forms of corruption affect democratization in Somalia?

3. How do corrupt practices affect voter turnout, campaign activities, the performance of democratic transition, and citizen attitudes toward the government according to the perceptions of the respondents working in the public and private sector?

4. To what extent do the qualitative findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between corruption and political participation and democratization?

1.3. Contributions

Various types of political corruption led to lower political participation and retard the democratization process. Corruption damages the hallmark of all political landscapes and reduces citizens' trust in government. Rakner, Menocal & Fritz, (2007:15) noted that several countries are stuck in inefficient democratization processes and have even failed in their attempt to establish democracy in their nations. However, they also struggle much more with the task of creating a stable state. As Gleditsch & colleagues mentioned, the long-term effects of democratization need to be studied for a sequence of regime changes and the degree of impact of civil wars that often shape specific models (Gleditsch et al., 2001:44). A more recent study by Andrews & Inman (2009:3) found more consistent results for the impact of corruption on voter turnout.

Other scholars have mentioned strong predictors of low political participation related to economic reasons-particularly education and resources (Brady, Verba, & Schlozmann 1995, Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Many scholars discuss the relationship between corruption and democratization. Indeed, in a study, Mondo (2014:2) concludes that the primary concern of corruption is related to democratization or democracy in many of his extensive ideas. Rose-Ackerman (1999:9) argues that corruption is a personal profit motive in which numerous actors cooperate to increase their earnings through a system beyond the law. In other words, Gambetta's views suggested that political corruption is a rent-seeking action in which individuals seek to realign government policy and work for individual gain.

For Gambetta, the classified types of political corruption are favoritism, bribery, and dishonesty (extortion) (Gambetta, 2002:44-45). Of significance, these scholars continue to consider corruption as one of the key elements influencing political participation in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972:85). That confirms the argument of this research that political corruption is related to electoral participation. This dissertation aims to develop a conceptual framework that explains the possibility of the impact of political corruption on political participation and the democratization process in Somalia, which is necessary for understanding the current problems surrounding the phenomenon. The most notable theories of democracy and highlight the main distinctions of the concepts of democracy such as deliberative, participatory, and, among other concepts, minimalist-maximalist forms of democracy will be discussed.

The theoretical underpinning of conducting mixed methods research is the social science framework designed to examine complicated public behaviors, social dynamics, and particular human scenes. The conceptual framework reflects the information gathered from the literature and provides further insights into the research case. Previous studies have focused only on corruption in democratic values - very little is known about the impact of corruption on democratization and participation in Somalia. For this reason, this dissertation aims to fill this gap, contribute to the literature, and shed new light on the following question: How do different forms of political corruption affect the democratization process and political participation.

To achieve the research objectives, it will be aimed to conduct a comprehensive and detailed research study to provide a concrete solution to the research problem. I contended that my findings would contribute to our field, political science, both conceptually and for public and private practitioners, by explaining how various forms of corruption negatively affect political participation and democratization. In particular, the study will provide valuable information for civil society organizations, citizens, and the international community to press the parliament and the government to urgently introduce legislation banning the illegal campaign financing, misuse of public resources, that politicians use to bribe voters and other interest groups.

After gaining independence in 1960, Somalia established a democratic government in which political officeholders came to power through elections; however, after nine years enjoying democracy, a military regime overthrew the civilian government that ruled the country for two decades. Moreover, in 1991, armed militia groups overthrew the dictatorship and flung the country into a long civil war. In the 2000s, political forces settled on a particular clan-based political structure (4.5) that increased electoral corruption blocking the transition to democracy and raised unequal participation in political activities. This power-sharing formula is considered Somalia's post-conflict system of government, reached at the Arta (Djibouti) Peace Conference in 2000. The first transitional government was formed, and parliamentary seats were allocated according to the 4.5 power-sharing formula (Ahmed, 2019). In recent years, indirect elections were practiced or held in Somalia based on power-sharing (4.5 formula) between the four powerful clans and minority groups, considered 0.5. That resulted in many political elites sought financial support from within and outside the country to contest legislative and presidential seats and bribe voters.

There are other fears that election bribery is on the rise, with federal and state presidents imposing conditions on candidates who run for election. For example, in the upcoming 2021 election, candidates who want to compete for the lower house will have to pay $10000 registration fees. In contrast, senators for the upper house of the federal parliament will have to pay $20,000 candidate registration fee to the indirect electoral commission of the state.

Some critics believed that foreign money doubles buying votes in the election, which has already devastated the electoral process. In the last election, registration fees for the lower house were $5000 and for the upper house $10000. Registration fees for presidential candidates were $20000 and are now reported to be more than double that amount. The parliamentary and presidential elections were hampered by massive corruption, resulting in many candidates not getting a chance to contest for elective positions. In this setting, supporting candidates who have money without considering their qualifications, abilities, and personal integrity. of course, that the consequence of electing unqualified candidates is detrimental to the democratization process.

Huneke (2017) noted that an estimated $20 million in bribes flowed during Somalia's parliamentary and presidential elections. He argued that many clan delegates and candidates accepted or paid bribes. In Somalia, bribery is directed at influencing traditional leaders, voters, and electoral management committees(bpr.berkeley.edu). For example, the New York Times (2017) writes: "Somalia's political actors have cashed in tens of hundreds (of USD) to buy votes".

The findings from this study make several contributions to the current literature. Firstly, the research aims to fill the gaps in the literature regarding the general scenario of political corruption and its impact on political participation and the democratization process in Somalia. Secondly, I intend to discover the challenges in implementing democratization and inclusive political engagement in the Horn of Africa's nation and contribute consistent and reliable findings to the literature and research case. Similarly, the country needs to pool all efforts and resources to address the widespread corruption in the electoral process and public institutions. I anticipate the findings of this study will help find some solutions to the current corruption problems and provide clear recommendations to support the development of a practical anti-corruption framework and an effective participatory model to achieve true democracy in Somalia.

1.4. Summary of Chapter

This study examines the impact of corruption on political participation and democratization in Somalia. The study develops a conceptual framework from the existing literature that explains the various influences of different forms of political corruption on relations to political participation and democratization. The convergent design involves the simultaneous collection of qualitative and quantitative data that are analyzed and merged independently. The result of these two data sets is presented.

Chapter two of this study begins with a summary of the evolution of corruption; the chapter examines the classical and modern development of the concept, discusses different types of political corruption: bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, logrolling; as the study seeks to provide answers to how these four forms of corruption might affect both democratization and political participation in Somalia, the complementary qualitative question is also proposed. The contested theories of democratization, democracy, and social theory framework support mixed-method study is presented and shows the conceptual framework.

Chapter three deals with the empirical approach, which aims to examine previous studies that attempt to answer the research questions set out in the chapter. The research questions are informed by existing concepts and ideas in the literature relating to the phenomenon. It describes the research methodology by naming models, mixed methods, two data, and research variables. Chapter four presents quantitative and qualitative results and findings. Chapter five succinctly summarizes what was consolidated in the study, recognizes the necessary implications of the findings, and discusses how these findings might be implemented in future studies and applications.

2. POLITICAL CORRUPTION, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIZATION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The second chapter provides a general understanding of the existing history and evolution of c**o**rruption, democratization, and political participation and discusses the current perspectives of the research context. Chapter two comprehensively presents and describes the concepts of political corruption, political participation, and democratization. Explains the competing theories of democracy and democratization, finally, concludes with the summary of the chapter.

2.1. Defining the Terms: Corruption, Political Participation, and Democratization

It is imperative to understand and define research terms. This study refers to and introduces specific operational definitions related to the study. The following sections address the critical operational definitions that apply to this study: corruption, political participation, and democratization.

2.1.1. Political Corruption

In a broader sense, *political corruption* can be defined as exploiting government office or influencing the development and legislative process through illegal and non-transparent procedures that benefit politicians in their interest (Co-Edna et al., 2007:6-7). Co et al., (2007) showed that political corruption generally includes judicial, legislative, and electoral corruption, and even more patronage politics and influential interest groups. According to Peter (1993), The concept of corruption is like dishonesty or abuse of power, which often affects government officials and must be understood as a regular and essential part of government work and most political systems.

2.1.2. Political Participation

Political participation is the first dependent variable addressed in the study. The term political participation is defined as the sphere of activities in which citizens seek to engage

in the system of government and participate in the election of political leaders (Conway 1991). This study refers to this definition and will be further elaborated in this chapter.

2.1.3. Democratization

The second dependent variable is democratization. The definition and explanation of the term are indispensable. The study pays particular attention to Whitehead's (2012) purpose of democratization. He defines *democratization* as a complicated, ever-changing, and open-ended process over an extended period. It is based on a rule that often requires mutual consent and broader participatory politics. Similarly, he pointed out that democracy is indispensable and requires a combination of values and facts associated with internal tensions (Whitehead, 2012:10). Amusan, Jegede, & Lsaka (2017:46) found that democratization in Africa is a slow process, complicated, unstable, and fraught with many shortcomings. Heyns and Stefiszyn (2006:251) emphasized that democratization in Africa requires promoting fundamental human rights for citizens, which is critical to social values and citizenship. Although the democratization process in Somalia brought many complications from political corruption, it has disappeared since the 2000s.

The process of the democratization has three primary levels of transformation in the literature: a) the "liberalization" period, when the former autocratic regime collapses or is exposed, b) a transition period, often when the first competitive elections have taken place, and c) the consolidation period when democratic institutions have reached the level of stability and are accepted by the majority of the actors concerned (Linz and Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). All explain in detail about the concept of democratization. Of significance, the purpose of democratization is to achieve a free and fair election that supports a similar concept of procedural democracy that involves ensuring regular general elections. Somalia has failed to move to democracy and implement the condition of fulfilling universal suffrage; we believe that political corruption is the main culprit for these failures.

2.2. Historical Development of Corruption, Political Participation, and Democratization

The evolution of corruption does not show a legal and consistent gradual formation. It has proven the problems with democracy only by illegal words (Maciel, 2016:6). The classical approach to corruption has been debated in the literature for years. Klitgaard (1988),

for example, has studied the phenomenon in detail. His ancient philosophical debates on corruption have become essential and helpful for today, even helping us understand the modern forms of corruption.

Mény & Sousa (2001) examined the Aristotelian and Platonic Opinions for the Greece tradition. Following Aristotle's forms of government, they stated that the correct type of government governs for the benefit of all. Instead of corrupt or degenerate, those who rule for "their own good" are oligarchy, tyranny, and democracy. According to Aristotle, the most corrupt type of government is democracy. Aristotle summarized the view of "boss politics" and said that the proper forms of government are those in which the one, few, and many rules with an idea for the common interest. On the other hand, governments that rule with a sense of individual attention, whether from the one, few, and many, are distortions (Aristotle, & B. Jowett, translated 1999:5). Consequently, Mulgan (2012) points out that participation in politics does not guarantee that everyone will advocate for their interests or hurt the public interest (Mulgan, 2012).

Several studies have shown that corruption is not a modern phenomenon but has existed for many years. For the first time, corruption was considered a "specific field of research" in which factors and effects are indispensable to study. Then, the subject gradually became an academic field and reliable scientific research. Corruption changed its position and no longer appeared as an insignificant aspect but as a crucial concept to be studied, explained, and evaluated (Farrales, 2018:32). As Nye (1967:417) stated, "corruption is endemic throughout governments" While Nye and other sought to advance the discourse, they noted that corruption hinders the process of democratization and development, especially in less developed countries. Scott (1972: 2-24) believes that the prevalence of illegal political campaign finance among government agencies has increased significantly on many practical issues but not on theoretical issues. Nevertheless, it remains necessary to view legislative corruption as a short-circuit of those factors that have influenced the democratic process.

By and large, the central problem of corruption has begun to be seen not only as a social phenomenon but as an endemic and public problem with systemic negative influences on political legitimacy (Porta & Vannuci, 1997). In other words, the problem of political corruption is absent from democratic theory. Most recent evidence shows that the adverse effects of corruption cause declining democracy (Porta & Vannuci, 1997; Rose-Ackerman

1999; Warren, 2004). Even though corrupt societies are associated with a pre-democratic legacy and weak reforms, politicians often abuse their power (Nicolescu-Waggonner, 2012: 28). Duris (2020:2) noted that political corruption could take many forms, ranging from unresolved conflicts of interest and crooked political financing to the distribution of misappropriated funds, extensive patronage networks, the misuse of state resources, and ultimately the capture of the state.

According to an IMF report, sub-Saharan Africa benefits economically more than any other region from reducing corruption (Hammadi et al., 2019:6). Most African countries followed the policy initiatives of their former colonial masters in the post-independence systems. They used the political pattern that worked in the western colonial state. Similarly, Somalia's adopted western model of the two colonial systems Italy-Britain has struggled with corruption as the main problem.

The historical development of corruption and its influences on modern democracies have been discussed in the literature. This study also addresses how states have developed the concept of democracy. To introduce the many discourses on democracy, we must first look at the history of democracy worldwide; for example, the former U.S. President Wilson led America into the world war; one of his arguments was that the world needed to be made safe for democracy. In late 1940, he proposed turning the United States of America into a "vast arsenal for democracy." In August 1941, he passed the Atlantic Charter, which advocates "the right of whole societies to choose the kind of government they want" (O'Donnell and Schmitter, (Eds) (1986:5). In 1949, the democracies of the Western nations established the Council of Europe, which was enforced by all member states to protect human rights, law and order, and fundamental freedoms; but it pledged to suspend any member state that violated these principles.

Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) committed all member states to protect freedom of speech and cultural heritage. They agreed to promote the basic principles of democracy, personal liberty, and the rule of law. After many years, Western states realized that it was imperative to promote democracy outside their borders. However, other non-western states argued that transitions to democracy were irrelevant, not very stable, not essential, or dependent on capitalist societies (Schmitter, & O'Donnell, (Eds) 1986:5). In Africa, the term democracy is a contested word (Bratton & Mattes, 2000:4); most African countries have adopted the term of democracy as it is (western nations) mentioned

above). Following Schumpeter (1943: xix), democracy is a system in which political decisions are made by individuals who obtain their power from the people through a competitive election.

That is recognized Przeworski, and his colleagues which conclude that "democracy is a regime in which government offices are often filled based on contested elections" (Przeworski et al., 1996: pp. 50-51). A broader perspective was presented by Huntington (1991), who demonstrated that the process of democratization in modern international politics is characterized by three distinct "waves" beginning in the early 19th century and continuing to the present. Huntington recognized democratization theory as a wave of democratization in world politics (Huntington, 1991), which states "that a wave of democratization is a multiple of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a given period, and that essentially as many political transitions occur in the opposite direction during the period" (p. 15).

Historically, the long wave of democratization began in the 1820s with the demand for competitive elections and equal representation in the United States and reached twenty-nine democracies by 1926. Huntington claimed that the "first wave of democratization" occurred from 1828 to 1926 and the "second wave" from 1943 to 1964. The two waves ended in a reverse wave in 1922, 1942, 1961-1975, which are described as democratic failures. In short, in these "reverse waves," many of the emerging developed democracies collapsed, and only certain countries could sustain and successfully implement the democratization process. In Italy, for example, Mussolini ruled the country from 1915-1917. That was notably the beginning of the first reverse wave of democratization in 1942. Later, the total number of democratic countries in the world then dropped to 12.

In addition, after winning World War II, some countries launched a second wave that produced 36 democratic states. However, from 1960 to 1975, democratization experienced the second opposite wave, and within a short period, the number dropped to 30. The result of the first opposite wave was the spread of fascism. During the Cold War, the second counter-wave was that regional disputes and civil wars limited the development of the democratization process. Similarly, 1974 is considered the "third wave" of global democratization. During this period, a wave of democratization spread to Spain and Portugal, quickly spread to entire developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The latter is referred to as the "Third Wave" (Huntington, 1991:13). Scholars such as Diamond (2006) mention

that the third wave spread through Eastern Europe and Latin America and reached entire countries in Africa and Asia. In 1974, there were 40 democracies among the existing 120 current states; however, by 2003, nearly three-fifths of the world's nations were considered official democracies (Diamond, 2006:93).

Democratization has been alarming and discouraging to most African nations, even though countries had the opportunity to transition from a colonial system to a democratic government (Amusan, Jegede & Lsaka, 2017). The criteria of democratization can be judged by the extent to which the country meets the minimalist theory of democracy. As argued in the previous pages in the historical development of democratization, one of the critical problems that dominated the twentieth century was political corruption. That may be related to the fact that, for example, the most stable democracies in the world, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have struggled with political corruption, particularly campaign finance (Heywood, 1997:417). To illustrate this, former U.S. President Bill Clinton committed irregularities in both the Whitewater scandal and his 1996 re-election campaign.

Similarly, less advanced democratic nations such as the former Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto have rejected allegations of corruption after President F. Leghari was accused of undermining the independence of the country's judiciary and being involved in numerous corruption cases. In Russia, as reported in March 1997, former President Yeltsin admitted that one of the biggest mistakes of Russian officials was their involvement in corruption (Heywood, 1997:417). In this regard, history teaches us that corruption is a universal phenomenon that every country has experienced to some extent. It can be said that the problem is not corruption itself; but also, how the states deal with different types of corruption.

On the other hand, in Africa, the influence of corruption has been particularly noticeable. Lumumba (2011:12) points out that African countries have some of the most visible cases of corruption which include unfavorable colonial legacy, weak leadership, "politics of the underworld", selfishness, greed and nepotism which encourage cronyism. He further notes that lack of broad participation, poor governance, failure of accountability and transparency. According to transparency international (2010), corruption is a harmful effect and misuse of critical resources of impoverished citizens. Numerous studies have attempted to explain the relationship between corruption and democratization (Harris-White & White,

1996; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001). They generally confirmed that democratization in countries often goes through difficult periods of political change.

Harris-White & White (1996:3) argued that the relationship between corruption and democratization has been contradictory during the last decade. Apart from improving (in the short or medium term), democratization can significantly increase the causes and extent of political corruption. Corruption is unthinkable and violates democratic principles; political corruption represents a guide and cruel disloyalty of public trust in public institutions (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003).

Somalia tops the list of the most corrupt countries globally, and state institutions have failed to implement anti-corruption laws successfully, and still, officials involved in corruption go unpunished. A weak public institution, a dysfunctional government, and rapid corruption in the electoral process have devastated and affected the country's social, economic, and political life. The President of Somalia signed the anti-corruption laws in September 2019 after both houses of the federal parliament approved. Recently, the report presented by Integrity (2016) highlighted high-ranking officials implicated in corruption allegations and misappropriation of foreign aid. In Somalia, after the civilian government became less effective, a military coup in 1969, and the democratization process in Somalia went in the opposite direction. The authoritarian regime took power and stalled the process, ruling the country for almost 21 years and liberating itself through military confrontation. Then the country fell into a protracted civil war between clan militias. Over the past 20 years, Somalia has struggled to make a successful transition to democracy. Overshadowing this transition has been rampant political corruption and a lack of equal political participation.

Conceptual Framework /Model of the Study

The transformative framework and a social science framework have been developed in the mixed methods literature in the past decade. The theoretical underpinning of conducting mixed methods research is the social science framework, which examines complicated public behaviors, social dynamics, and specific human scenes. This study referred to the social science framework (Creswell, 214:102). Waldt (2020:2-3) suggested that the practical method by which social science can build their conceptual framework reflects the variables and information collected from the relevant literature.

Significantly, Maxwell (2005) described a "conceptual framework as "the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that supports and informs your research"(p.33). Miles and Huberman (1994) "consider such a framework to be the overall context of ideas for the study"(p.18). In this chapter, the study has fully presented the conceptual framework that reflects the research variables that eventually, after both data are collected, will validate the expectation or problems provides a clear clue that contributes to the literature.




Figure 2.1. provides an overview of the conceptual framework. Illustrates the possible independent variables (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling-vote buying) and predicts how these factors might affect the outcome variables (political participation and democratization), shows the relationship between independent and dependent variables.

Baron and Kenny (1986:1177) suggested that independent and dependent variables should relate to the research objectives. The growing consensus emphasizes an inverse correlation between corruption and democracy: the more stable the democracy, the less corrupt it is.

A public official secretly accepts a bribe to handle a political matter differently than he otherwise would have (Johnston & Heidenheimer, 2007:3). Political corruption has been found to have fostered widespread frustration with organized political parties and political systems motivated by money and declining voter turnout, which is compelling evidence (Transparency, 2001:146). The inspiration is that the need for money necessity corrupts the political process and does something to limit the role of money in that process. The purpose of campaign finance law to determine the amount and impact of money on elections has developed in two bars, one constitutional and the other practical (Issacharoff, 2010:118).

Furthermore, Karklins says: "corruption is the main obstacle to economic and democratic advance in the post-communist territory (Karklins, 2002:30).

For example, the "extractive corruption theory" states that corruption is a critical part of government and society. In line with this theory, the corrupt (the state authority) benefits most from corruption. The governing elite is the most potent power in society; this group uses the tools of the state to obtain resources from the community. It does so in the interest of the rulers. In contrast, the political systems of neopatrimonialism, widely recognized in political science as non-democratic methods, are described by widespread patron- client structures; there is no distinction between public and individual and political appetite. The supreme leader controls personal patronage politics rather than ideology or law (Amundsen, 1999:8).

Recently, transparency has shown that political corruption includes various violations and illegal acts by decision-makers prior, during, and after departing public office. Therefore, they can manifest themselves in many ways, such as illegitimate political funding, excessive power in policymaking, state appropriation, election fraud, vote-buying, misuse of state funds in elections, and abuse of immunities. And other rights related to their position and favoritism in promotions and decisions, to name a few (Bosso, Martini, Ardigó, 2014:2). It has been discussed by many prominent scholars who contributed to the development of the concept of political corruption. However, this study is in relation to a specific context and considers the influence of the various forms of political corruption (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and vote-buying) on political participation and democratization in Somalia. Most scholars believe in an adversary link between political participation and corruption (Stockemer 2013; Kostadinova, 2009).

The philosophical argument is that corruption threatens successful political transition and inclusiveness and overshadows the relationship between citizens and elected legislators Warren (2004: 328) demonstrated that as corruption increases, citizens increasingly lose confidence in the political process. Consequently, corruption has commonly impeded political participation (Školník, 2020:89). Democratic legitimacy is undermined as citizens are excluded from political decision-making. Olsson's conclusion confirms that corruption negatively impacts political participation, with voter turnout being lowest in states with higher rates of corruption. He considers that the harmful effects of corruption, the most

destructive effects, maybe the attitudes and feelings of citizens towards the democratic process and political system (Olsson, 2014:9).

On the effect of corruption on democratization, a recent study suggested that the aspect of political corruption delays the democratization process. It also damages “the consolidation of democracy which originates from corrupt senior politicians, who misappropriate public resources for private gain (Waggonner, 2012:28). Political corruption has a direct or indirect influence on democratization and political participation. The first stage of democratization in many countries has featured high levels of corruption (Kubbe & Engelbert, 2018).

2.2.1. Forms of Political Corruption

Dahl (1956:68) pointed out that the core of any competitive politics is the bribery of the voter by politicians, leaving both options open. Political corruption was not considered a passive concept, and it assumed that what is regarded as corrupt today will be perceived as conventional politics in the future. In the modern world, corruption has become the most critical topic to discuss. Nye illustrates the concept of corruption beyond the official functions of public office. He stated that it is (family, personal networks) financial or situational income or breaking the rules by using specific unique power means. These are behaviors such as bribery (using money to influence a person's decision in an office of trust), favoritism (granting benefits based on relationships instead of the person's ability), and misappropriation (unlawfully using public funds for private commercial purposes).

Even though it says, "The (ancient) Greeks had no term for bribes, but they consider all donations to be bribes. Any gift is given through the exchange of favors in the past or the future. Nye explicitly rejects the notion of public interest to avoid embroiling the phenomenon in a battle with its consequences. Others have attempted to define political corruption specifically in respect of an interpretation of the common interest (Nye, 1989). Before modern times, it was not generally accepted the concept of political corruption exists in practice. However, the engagement regarding the abuse of public office did exist among the Greeks (Philp, 2002:442). Rousseau (1985) concluded that corruption is the erosion of people's natural moral compassion and the development of materialistic self-interest. Machiavelli defines corruption as the collapse of a nation's citizens and leaders to prioritize the quest of personal benefit to the needs of the public good (Philp, 1997).

The academic literature on corruption is widely recognized and extensively documented several signs of political and economic coercion. Indeed, political corruption diminishes the right of the general sovereign to impartially implement the laws and run the organs of the state. It consistently breaks accountability as a fundamental principle of democracy. The perception of elections and parliaments being marred by corrupt machinations can perpetuate the opposing view that democracy, which is supposed to be preventive to corruption, multiplies opportunities for corrupt deals and hiding. It should note that party competition leads to a phenomenon not usually referred to as 'corruption,' namely the overt 'buying' of voters' decisions through nepotistic commitments and policies for which available budgetary resources are used. It is usually possible at the expense of long-term and common interests (Offe, 2004:80).

Duri (2020:2), in his study, noted that political corruption could take various forms ranging from unresolved disputes and corrupt political funding to misappropriated funds, widespread patronage chains, misuse of public resources, and eventually, state. In other words, it has been contended that pure democracy is not enough to reduce corruption. However, the role of democratic institutions, such as the independence of the judiciary and free media, and active political participation are essential for fighting corruption, when solid institutions and political competition can contribute significantly to faster anti-corruption reforms. Practical and active political institutions that exercise oversight over elected officials could increase the possibility of detecting and punishing corrupt officials and even reducing the extent of corruption (Huntington, 1991).

Nicolescu-Waggonner (2012:3) says that political corruption retards the process of democratization. It "even harms the consolidation of democracy emanating from corrupt high-ranking politicians who misappropriate public resources for private gain." (p.3-25). Political leaders use bribery to stay in power and protect their interests from the rest of the people. In this context, political corruption has a direct or indirect impact on democratization and political participation. Herge et al. (2001:34) noted that the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy is complex; some are inconsistent because they are not democratic. In the mid-20th century, it became a crucial point that established the perception of corruption. The World Bank (1997:1) says corruption is harming the poor badly.

A study conducted by Aktan (2015:48) concludes that corruption penetrates the entire society from the grassroots level, including civil servants taking small bribes while some politicians consider stealing millions of dollars. He argued that political corruption has attracted much attention and presents different types of political corruption in his books points out that all acts and behaviors that are harmful to political ethics are called political corruption.

Furthermore, Farazmand (2018) highlights that political corruption includes electoral fraud and manipulation to benefit those who hold political office or are politically influential, or whose political influence is felt in the state. Many parts of Africa have progressed in facilitating and promoting democracy based on Agenda 2063 of the African Union. However, this progress is undermined by high levels of corruption (Duri, 2020). Numerous studies confirmed that corrupt practices have trajectories of political liberalization from authoritarian regimes. Saha & Campbell (2007:5) found that corrupt democracy is associated with disruption of better direction and promotes higher levels of corruption during the democratization process. Concerning Somalia, no authentic democracy has developed in almost 50 years; massive corruption, lack of electoral democracy, and low political participation remain unmatched. Several authors have attempted to define political corruption, but there is no universal definition. Roy (1970), for example, described corruption as the abuse of power for private gain, promotion, or prestige, for the benefit of self-interest or a group, in a way that violates the law and moral values. Given all this evidence, the concept of corruption seemed less intentional than political corruption.

Nevertheless, a broader perspective was taken by Aktan, who argues that "corruption" is the term for the specific forms of corruption (mainly bribery, embezzlement) that have political characteristics. Aktan (2015) stated that political corruption has a broader meaning compared to corruption. In short, political corruption is an umbrella term that encompasses corruption. For this reason, this study adopts four forms of political corruption as independent variables, such as bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling-vote-buying. Secondly, the study examines the impact of these four variables on two dependent variables, namely political participation, and democratization.

a. Bribery

Bribery is a form of political corruption that has been practiced for many years. *Bribery* can be defined as the abuse of power by granting certain privileges to individuals or institutions in return for financial gain or other benefits (Aktan, 2015). That shows the need to determine what is meant by the word "abuse." The abuse of authority or power is divided into two different methods: The first method is expediting proceedings that do not conflict with or violate the law. Such practices give certain advantages to some at the expense of others. This method of bribery aims to complete the procedures in the shortest possible time or with less time. Moreover, bribery harms services and labor productivity, especially among the poor, who are forced to pay bribes to access essential services (Labelle, 2009). On the other hand, those who could not afford to pay bribes often had no choice but to leave the public service and jeopardize the welfare of their families.

The second approach is the method by which officials in some places demand a bribe. This condition has been identified as "active bribery" but applied to count "forced bribery." In short, bribery comes about through an agreement between the bribe recipient and the bribe giver. On the other hand, extortion is a different type of corruption; it is an act by one party to coerce others to bribe. That always occurs in public institutions. For example, public officials may acquire money from citizens by illegally intimidating them or damaging their reputations, property, and personalities. Despite its common usage, the term is used in different ways to mean different things. While several definitions of bribery have been proposed, this study uses Abumousa's definition of electoral bribery, which often occurs during elections and is even systematic and normalized (Abumousa, 2017:5). Nicolescu-Nicolescu-Waggonner (2012:12) and other scholars pointed out that party competition encourages corrupt politicians to win elections by exploiting opportunities for vote-buying and illicit funding by individuals, arguing that corruption is detrimental to democracy. From this perspective, Somali elections are very much related to what Nicolescu-Waggonner (2012). and his friends have noted: Restrictions on political participation, embezzlement from the public, and electoral fraud have overlapped over the past two decades. Compared to previous years, the country was politically, socially, and economically unstable and was considered a "failed state." It suffered from systematic corruption and massive internal conflicts caused by poor governance for many years (Abdirasak, n.d:4).

As Menkhous (2007:12) noted, Somalia can provide critical insights into how informal institutions and governance systems have developed without a central authority. The effects of corruption are regularly perceived as rude.

Furthermore, corruption in humanitarian aid has been worsening. It affects the most vulnerable people, which raises why corruption persists and has a disproportionate impact on socio-economic development that makes ordinary citizens extremely poor. Emran, Islam & Shilpi (2013:4) noted that the poor communities have a problematic situation because they have less bargaining power and cannot refuse or pay bribes. In contrast, the wealthy (rich) have better bargaining power and do not necessarily accept bribes. Cockcroft (2014) provides four further indications of why corruption survives in a situation where poverty levels are high: permanence, greed, administration from above, and required payment. For example, about 69% of Somalis live below the global poverty line of less than $2 in purchasing power parity.

As a result, nearly 80% of the population is vulnerable to external disruptions such as environmental disasters, internal conflict, and economic dislocation. According to the Ministry of Planning (2020:22), widespread poverty in Somalia is often linked to many internally displaced persons and low rural development. Widespread unemployment has worsened the economic situation of Somalis and negatively affected vulnerable groups such as youth, women, and IDPs indiscriminately (Meters, 2020; MoP, 2020; World Factbook, 2020). In this regard, many citizens believe that bribery is the best way to facilitate public services, which shows that only the rich can get their way.

Recently, Mogadishu-based radio station Kulmiye conducted a public survey among citizens applying for birth certificates at the Benadir Regional Administration Special public registration department. The survey revealed that many citizens were asked "Active Bribery" to obtain their birth certificates. One of the respondents told the reporter, "We illegally pay $20-22 to facilitate obtaining birth certificates." He noted that the official fee is $15, but officials charge extra money or take bribes from beneficiaries (Kulmiye, 2020). For almost 30 years, ordinary citizens in the Horn of Africa country protected themselves through the regulatory and administrative structure mechanisms. As a result, political corruption could not develop in this public; it became a reasonable way for individuals to survive and prosper. Zaum (2013:3) observed an essential role of corruption and patronage for politics in weak states; in a context of widespread insecurity, it becomes reasonable for elites and non-elites

to engage in bribery to cope with the fluctuations of daily life. In Somalia, bribery is aimed at influencing voters such as traditional leaders, MPs, and electoral management bodies and facilitating public services.

b. Embezzlement

The second form of corruption is embezzlement. The term is a political term; embezzlement is characterized as the illegal use of money or assets that are considered public resources (Aktan, 2015) Scholars highlighted embezzlement as a contested term in its broadest sense, described as the theft of public property or money by those in authority. Transparency (2020) described embezzlement as when a person holding a public office in an institution corruptly and unlawfully uses available funds and assets he or she uses for personal gain or other activities.

Uslaner (1999) examined corruption theory; he mentioned that corruption causes the unfair distribution of resources, increasing injustice, and rising levels and corruption cases. Transparency has made a different interpretation. They specify as "Grand Corruption. That can include acts committed by political elites that manipulate government policies or the primary functioning of the state and bring unique benefits (Leslie, 2014:41). To understand whether the misuse of public funds is related to a lack of democracy. There is evidence that the re-election of politicians would reduce misappropriation. Some forms of political selection are compatible with democracy, while other methods are undemocratic, such as family succession, favoritism, and abuse of power. In contrast, cross-national comparisons showed that electoral democracy is associated with less public corruption (Lierl, 2019:30). Elections can lead to minor embezzlement by decision-makers, and some evidence showed that political decision-makers could hide embezzlements, which has no impact on the election. Corrupt government officials can use their office to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the government budget - misappropriation of public funds - or they can demand additional payments from citizens in exchange for public services - bribery (Fan, Lin, & Treisman, 2019:1). Thus, anti-corruption needs a more complex method that focuses on the various aspects and structural problems that reduce embezzlement. For example, it requires active participation and long-term efforts to mobilize stakeholders such as the anti-corruption agency, government officials, civil society, independent media, private organizations, international institutions, and academics.

Nonetheless, government agencies and political engagement can be the first line of defense against such unlawful practices. To combat corrupt government practices, it is crucial to promote the "Asset Declaration policy," which requires every government official to declare his/her assets before holding public office. Fantaye (2004:174) argued that many factors are associated with public embezzlement and corruption in third world countries; however, inadequate regulatory systems and law enforcement are believed to cause increased levels of corruption. Often, political corruption is perceived as embezzlement and exploitation of government procedures. It reported that African democracy is a semi-authoritarian government; political corruption refers to the misappropriation of public resources and public funds for personal interests (Ojo, 2018:4).

Corruption is an immoral act that significantly reduces the resources available for public funding of development projects. Embezzlement can be seen in the misappropriation of personal benefits, resources that belong to state institutions. That often happens in state institutions in Africa that are already affected by the scarcity of public resources (Hope, 2020). In Somalia, corruption is a complicated phenomenon. It is mainly seen in public institutions and government agencies where officials are employed, take bribes, and use public funds illegally (Abdirasak. (n.d). Nepotism, clan favoritism, bribery, misappropriation of public funds, and aid money have become routine in entire sectors, leading many citizens to believe corruption is a common culture.

To reduce the level of public embezzlement in Somalia, the former Somali Prime Minister Kheire ordered all ministers in his cabinet to declare and disclose their assets before taking up public office (Hassan, 2017). By this measure, many people thought that the looting of public funds would pause at one point. A recent report shows that misappropriation of public funds and (petty corruption) informal payments are affecting public service delivery. This notion is confirmed by international transparency that major and minor types of corruption in Somalia are critical factors that permeate the revenue stream, including airports and ports, foreign aid, and business sectors (Chene, 2013:1). Aidt & Dutta (2008:339) understand the relationship between corruption and government officials; it manifests significantly in those who use their jobs to seek corrupt opportunities to increase their influence and resources. Because of their honorary positions, bureaucrats can use rules and permits to select and create programs according to their means. Somalia faces significant challenges in this regard.

Moreover, in some cases, divided political elites struggle to access power and manage public resources in a context of political opportunism and weak state institutions (Johnston, 2005:44). In this context, there is growing concern that the misappropriation of public resources impairs or disrupts the promotion of democracy. A recent study found that democratic elections can reduce the misappropriation of public resources (Lierl, 2017:35). Thus, misappropriation undermines the value of democracy or could interfere with inclusive participation.

c. Favoritism

Favoritism is the third form of political corruption examined in this study. Favoritism is a form of political corruption that occurs when individuals participate in the political decision-making process. The term favoritism is commonly used to describe the partisanship of influential people. On the other hand, nepotism, which is related to favoritism, is another type of bias in which government contracts are awarded to individuals who have close relationships with politicians, such as relatives or close friends (Abumousa, 2017:5). Nepotism is widespread in Somalia and is practiced within government institutions.

Transparency (2020) found that people holding official positions use their authority and power to give their relatives jobs without considering their skills, abilities, talents, knowledge, etc., with tribal/clan ties and personal relationships being close and complex. Extreme nepotism and intolerance are common forms of political corruption found in many societies worldwide; excessive nepotism has been observed in Somalia in particular. The United States is also known to have this "spoils system". Public office is distributed to supporters and influencers without regard to their equality or ability to hold that office. Political favoritism is another type of political corruption that can be defined as an unlawful act. In today's world, political partisanship is prevalent in numerous countries around the world. In this type, political parties can create new positions in public institutions to hire their supporters (Johnston,1997:73-74). It is worth noting that all groups that come to power try to eliminate the available high-level positions in the bureaucracy and hire new people who share their ideology, political partisanship, and nepotism. This situation is called "clientelism." Some dominant ministers have extensive power and authority to allocate numerous posts and hire new advisors. Transparency (2020) explains that clientelism occurs when a person is selected for public office without regard to his or her suitability.

Generally, clan and ethnicity have been underestimated by policy makers in many post-colonial African states. Somalia is unique compared to other African nations because the country is inhabited by one ethnicity that shares a common language, religion, culture, and tradition. After Somalia gained independence from Italy-Britain in 1960, clannism was the first manifestation of Somalis' political identity based on their clan affiliation and subgroups. Unlike other African countries, the nation had an excellent chance of becoming a powerful, peaceful, and consolidated state because Somalis were a nation before the formation of the state. It failed, and the country could not create a consistent and robust form. The country's history shows that the entire political attitude is determined by clan loyalty; the tribes themselves act as an endless source of security and stability in times of crisis. That gives the traditional leaders and elders a reliable power to secure Somali politics (Linden, 2019:12).

A study by Adam (1992:17) reports that after independence, "Clannism" developed as identity politics, meaning that each clan member formed their political parties (or along with armed groups). The old system of government in Somalia has two main features: Clan-oriented chiefs, who played a role in clan jurisdiction, and the supreme authority of the sultanates. Clan chiefs were influential; they collected revenue from local communities and, in some places, acted as low-level enforcers. Contemporary, traditional elders are best distinguished from older clan-oriented tribal chiefs because they do not have absolute authority over the people. The challenge is that most new clan chiefs reside in major cities and are heavily involved in politics, significantly influencing the electoral process in Somalia, and selecting legislators. In any case, traditional elders mainly operate under political patronage as they have created a kind of typical clientele among political leaders (Hussein, 2018:19). For many years, Somalia experienced clan conflicts and resource competition (Adam, 1992:13-14). After the military regime took power in 1991, warlords and clan enmities became the main features of the war. That apparent the complexity of clan identity in Somalia is a national problem and brought several issues. This study explains and attempts to reveal how the politics of clan identity has corrupted and affected public institutions, especially in equal participation and democratic transition in Somalia. There is extensive academic literature that explains political identity and clan structure in Somalia.

The clan system is a core culture for the people of Somalia after the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991. From 1960 to 2017, Somalia had elected its ninth president and 19th prime minister in 57 years since its founding. In the 2000s, the first transitional federal government Arta Djibouti was established, based on power-sharing between clans (4.5 clan system). However, since then, the federal government has been on political transition, where 135 clan elders can nominate/elect 275 MPs to the national parliament based on the clan-political system. Four major clans receive 61 MPs each (the minority receives 31 MPs, which are considered 0.5 share while the other clans secure 1).




Figure 2.2. Classifies the current descent clans in Somalia, five main clans were identified in this study.

This power-sharing formula was not based on population size but referred to clan supremacy and the power of resources and the capacity to effect violence, which were considered the entitlement of these four essential clans, while other minority clans were classified as less powerful, giving (deserve) less than 1. That raised many questions about the current political transitions in Somalia and the achievement of fair equality.

Although clan preference remains a critical challenge to a successful transition to democracy, political leaders are typically connected to their clans. They have made little progress in abolishing a clan-based political system (Touval 1963:85). Competition for public resources and power often led to coalitions and conflicts between Somali clans and lineages. Increasing rampant corruption undermined the successful transition to democratization and reduced participation in political activities. In the Horn of Africa nation, clan-power-sharing political system was a transitional arrangement to promote formulations to accomplish universal suffrage. However, this indirect process was jeopardized by different widespread forms of corruption. According to Freedom House (2020) report, the judicial system in Somalia is disintegrated, lacks professional staff, and is riddled with corruption.

There is little respect for the administration of justice, with government officials disregarding court decisions and people often relying on Islamic or traditional (Xeer) law as a substitute. There is much political corruption in the electoral process that hinders the full participation of women in the legislative assembly and the exclusion of other segments of the population.

Bincof (2018:1) notes that most political leaders have come into public office to represent the wishes of their respective clan affiliations and not to support the national interest. The growing demands are to abolish the current institutionalized clan-based politics 4.5 and introduce a multiparty system to replace the corrupt indirect elections. The higher-level positions, including President and Prime Minister's position, are reserved for Darod & Hawiye Clans. At the same time, Digil & Mirifle, to Speaker of the Lower House, Dir clan gets the Deputy Prime Minister, Speaker of the Upper House, and the Chief of the Judiciary. On the other hand, the minority groups take the Deputy Speaker. In principle, the 4.5 clan system also applies to all government posts/ministers/DGs/ambassadors/military commanders and other senior government officials. That has led to less political competition, nepotism, preference for clans in public institutions, and corruption in elections. For almost a generation, the country has been conducting indirect elections, leading to a clan power-sharing structure as a surrogate political system and hindering the successful transition to a true democracy. It is also imperative to understand that clan favoritism undermines efforts to achieve genuine democracy and equal participation in Somalia.

d. Logrolling and Vote-Buying

Logrolling is a form of political corruption that occurs in a particular legislative process. It becomes a tool by which political parties can secretly offer financial incentives to MPs to vote for a particular bill introduced in parliament (Aktan, 2015:55). The political decision-making process involves various stakeholders, such as the ruling and opposition parties, voters, and other interest groups that seek to achieve the best decision-making in the public sector. Some examples in the literature show that corruption is closely associated with an undemocratic regime. However, there is insufficient evidence that democracy prevents corruption. In some cases, vote trading can lead to political corruption and undermines political ethics. It has been reported that vote-buying in the 2012 Somali election came at a high price. That resulted in several winners using their votes as lawmakers to pay off a massive debt.

For example, approved bills from 2012 to 2016 were low compared to the purchase; Somalia's Federal Government determines most new bills to advance its agenda. The requirement to generate revenue to offset these costs was a significant challenge for the government. There was also a twist like patronage politics and corruption in Somalia: political leaders' interest in money for the nation to alienate loyal customers and cover those customers' expenses in advance (Menkhaus, 2017).

In addition, the former Chief Auditor General interviewed by VoA news had told the reporter that the separatist Somaliland region received bribes in return for approving the United Arab Emirates Army base in Berbera City, particularly for the port. The auditor explained that the deal did not have the required legal provisions and did not go through the country's legal public procurement process, legislative approval, and financial institutions. He added that the deal is illegal and corrupt (Hassan, 2017).

In Somalia, some facts indicate that parliamentarians in presidential elections are offered payments ranging from $5000 to $10000 to sign endorsement for a presidential candidate who must garner the support of least 20 MPs to compete for office (Abumousa, 2017). In Transparency's assessment reports, Denmark is ranked as the most uncorrupted country (88 1st in 2015, (90) in 2016, (88) in 2017; (88) in 2018). in contrast, Somalia is the most corrupt country in the world with (8) in 2015, (10) in 2016, (9) in 2017, and (10) in 2018 (Transparency, 2016). In 2019 and 2020, it remains the most corrupt nation in the world.

For comparison, as reported by Deegan, nearly 100 elections were held in Africa between 1998: and 1994 (Deegan (2003). Moreover, in the 1990s, 42 out of 48 African states implemented democratic reforms and held elections. For example, Senegal, Namibia, and Botswana are the oldest electoral democracies in Africa that continued as multiparty democracies after independence (Teshome, 2008). Regional and global powers compete with Somalia's foreign policy and domestic politics. Recently, the Gulf states have damaged Somalia's geopolitical interests. For example, before 2017, United Arab Emirates was the prominent financial supporter of the Somalia Federal Government. However, after Qatar recently imposed sanctions on six Arab countries, President Farmajo and his close friend, the country's top intelligence agency, received millions of USD allegedly provided by the State of Qatar. This money fuels political corruption and makes the state an eager tool to influence Gulf countries' competition (Schwartz, 2021).

That suggests that foreign countries are involved in political corruption, such as bribing politicians to influence government decisions, whether in local or international affairs. Generally, legislators have collected bribes from several presidential candidates during presidential elections (Menkhaus, 2017:141).

The complicated indirect voting model has increased electoral bribery in Somalia because the model allows only a few citizens (clan delegates) to participate in voting and political activities. Somali Dialog Platform and Public Agenda have reported (2020) that the Somali election was influenced by direct vote-buying and corruption. This political corruption includes lawmakers, presidential candidates buying votes from clans, delegates, traditional elders, and candidates bribing election administrators. Menkhaus (2017:140) said that the current electoral process violates the national constitution and suffers from vote-buying, coercion, and political unrest. That believed the consequences of logrolling on the winning transition and voter turnout.

2.2.2. The Political Participation

This section presents the importance of political participation, which stands as the first dependent variable of the study. Democracy is thought to develop with concrete social measures. Today, many countries may be democratic; however, the history of their political institutions has shown the weakness and fragility of the democratic system (Held, 2006:1). Moreover, democratic governmental structures differ mainly in how they fulfill certain principles of political democracy, especially the level of political competition, accountability, representation, and political fairness (Svetlozar, 2005:5). In this circumstance, countries around the world differ in terms of their predominant types of political participation.

In terms of political participation, most countries are almost the same in terms of eligibility criteria, which often require candidates to be at least 25 years old. The average age of parliamentarians worldwide is about 53, and 50 for female parliamentarians (UNDP, 2015; Power and Shoot, 2012). In a more stable democracy, people should have equal rights and regularly exercise their constitutional entitlements. Lijphart (1997:1) said that equal consideration and respect for all political representatives is hardly possible unless participation is as complete and equal as possible. Considering that political participation is an essential element of any democracy, the characteristics and number of citizens who can

participate in political activities can significantly affect democratic values. For example, in the city-states of ancient Greece, the role of citizens in political participation or the role of citizens in a democracy was crucial (Behrouzi, 2006; Held, 2006). As initiated in the Greek cities, the spread of patterns of pure democracy was observed to be perfect. These promoted the essentials for citizens' participation in governmental decisions. On the other hand, in some cases, exclusive models were preferred where citizen participation was considered unimportant compared to the conditions of a powerful state that ensured rule and justice (Robertson, 2009:17).

In contrast, modern democracy differs from the Greek version in several respects. The interest of modern scholars, however, is not in the same direction. Especially in recent years, optimists have raised serious concerns about how different democratic institutions emerge and what highlights their persistence in some cases while others may collapse (Fleck and Hassan, 2006:115). Since the beginning of the 20th century, the central paradigm of democracy in the Western world became a democratic liberal one. This pattern has respected the principles of democracy, such as the freedom of citizens, individual rights, and an open market economy.

Moreover, within the advanced model of democracy, there are still different views on the number of prefects and issues of citizen participation (Robertson, 2009:17). This study refers to procedural theories that explain the minimalist concept of democracy because it accepts all citizens to participate in political activities, including voting. Schumpeter (1976:244) suggested that citizens limit their participation in elections; after electing their representatives, citizens should let their decisions without further interfering. Elections would then serve as the only protection against evil or corrupt political leaders.

As for participation, a considerable amount of literature has been published on political participation. These studies, including Verba and Nie (1972), have distinguished four participants: (1) those who do not participate in political activities. They contribute little to the community. (2) Voters -those who vote but do not participate in other endeavors, (3) Parochial participants -those who individually prefer contact with politicians, (4) Demonstrators -those who protest but may also vote and happen to associate with politicians (Verba, & Nie, 1972:74-90-91).

A recent study conducted by the UK Parliament identifies two characteristics of political participation: formal politics include, for example, participation in elections, referendums,

political parties, and participation in public forums; unofficial or informal participation may include signing petitions (UK Parliament, 2015:1).

According to Conway (1991), political participation is a sphere of activities in which citizens engage as they seek to influence the system of government by participating in the election of government representatives. This study refers to Conway's definition. Verba took a broader perspective, and his colleagues (1995) agree (CVM) Civic Voluntarism Model, which combined numerous psychological theories that evaluate why people engage in politics. They found that citizens become politically involved for the following reasons: 1) they can; 2) they want to; or 3) someone told them to (Verba et al., 1995). Brady, Schlozman & Verba (1995) stated that citizen participation is at the heart of democracy. They argue that democracy is inconceivable without the ability of people to openly participate in the process of government (Brady, Schlozman, &Verba, 1995:291). Dalton (2008) suggested that three motives that may have influenced the above factors of Verba and his friends, such as a) individual trait to be involved; b) political behavior that encourages participation; and c) social strata that encourage participation.

Moreover, such factors relate to micro-level personal characteristics that influence political participation, as noted by authors such as Kitschelt & Rehm (2008). Kitschelt and Rehm argue that politics and the kinds of people who participated in political activities changed over many years and even reinforced the democratic process that encouraged citizens to participate in politics. A significantly growing literature has examined corruption and political participation. After the collapse of the communist system in 1990 and the overthrow of numerous military and dictatorship regimes, it can be observed that an unprecedented number of countries are simultaneously engaged in the implementation of the institutions of liberal democracy. In such activated reforms, the importance of political engagement for effective democracy is discussed (Linz & Stepan, 1996; Huntington, 1991). In practice, the role of "third wave" political corruption in the political system has become an expected consequence of damage to democratic durability and value (Huntington, 1991).

Many scholars have suggested that higher levels of corruption are associated with low levels of institutional trust. That promotes the chance of adverse effects on the durability of political organizations (Theobald, Robin & Doig, 2000; Doig, and Stephanie, 1999). Seligson (2002:413) says that corruption led minimal levels of performance and reduced the

government legitimacy. There has been empirical evidence that reveals corruption damages about the government's performance. For example, Warren (2004:338) found that corruption weakens the overall quality of political processes and the relationship between MPs and citizens. He notes that it undermines the people who try to put pressure on the authorities to usurp political power. It undermines democratic legitimacy, resulting in people being outvoted in decision-making processes that may affect them in the future.

Furthermore, Warren highlights that corruption affects democratic culture by stating that if corruption is widespread, citizens' trust in government gradually decreases. Warren's (2004:339) analysis shows that corruption can reduce the possibility of cooperation, which diminishes the value of democracy. The achievement of democratization of any country measures the implementation of the minimalist factors of democracy. The study of Huntington (1991:29) and his colleagues suggest that fair and free elections and institution-building grow and become visible regardless of the presence of such democratic political institutions, with the value of democracy varying wildly from country to country (Merkel & Croissant, 2004; Bunce 2003; Carothers, 2002; Huntington, 1991).

Consequently, the approach of assessing democratic consolidation precisely on a formal basis has come under criticism (Berg-Schlosser, 2004; Millard, 2004; Schedler, 1998). That is extraordinarily complicated considering that the results of many surveys on citizen participation in most modern democratic processes (Vanhuysse, 2004; Ekiert & Kubik, 1998) have proven that citizens are incredibly disconnected from formal political participation, including elections and political parties. However, informal forms such as politics and participation in interest groups show progress. There is even the vulnerability of accountability to representativeness or elected politicians (Merkel, 2004:47). The relationships between political participation and democratization work to assess the nature of democracy at the national level on a broader set of essential principles than is found in the literature on democratic consolidation.

As a result, the diverse application of research on democratic nature is mainly concerned with democratization processes rather than their outcomes (Svetlozar, 2005; Croissant and Merkel, 2004). The general analysis of democratic structure examines whether democratic political institutions exist and how these institutions function successfully and guarantee accountability while promoting public participation and enhancing social,

economic, and political equality (Svetlozar, 2005:3). Somalia, after independence, the first decade was characterized by a vibrant democracy that gradually turned into a corrupt and eventually dysfunctional multiparty democracy. Disenchantment with the regime triggered a military coup led by Bare in 1969. The people, who experienced poor governance characterized by entrenched corruption, monopolization of state resources, nepotism, discrimination, marginalization, and a deteriorating economy, supported the military takeover.

Two decades later, thousands of Somalis lost their lives in Somalia's internal conflicts, marking the emergence of sustained resistance to the military regime, which was eventually overthrown in 1991. Ten years of civil war followed, culminating in the declaration UN that Somalia had no government. In 2000, Somalia again initiated a transition process and held the first indirect elections, which continue to this day and are based on a clan-based political system and an electoral process that is considered highly corrupt. In this context, it is believed that corruption hinders successful inclusive political participation because a few elites have blocked the space to give a chance for all citizens to participate in the election (universal suffrage), which the country lacks or does not practice.

a. Electoral system

Schattschneider examined multiparty democracy extensively; he contended that the party system is in many ways the cornerstone of efforts to establish a well-functioning democracy (Schattschneider, 1942: xxxviii). Bryce (1921:11) stated that: "Parties are inevitable: no free country has been without them, and no one has shown how representative government could function without them" (p.111). In Western political parties, the promotion of party building is expressed along with democracy to affirm the development of acceptable universal consensus and political freedom. In African states, political parties are unlikely to survive the era of parliamentary elections. They emerged amid the colonial system, which was no longer democratic, in African political parties that emerged in an undemocratic environment.

For example, many colonialist countries influenced the recognition of African states after World War II. Salih and Ahmed (2003:18) showed that the revolt of Africans around the sovereign was inevitable. After the gains of independence, "liberation nationalism" ceased and disappeared; political leaders dismantled the goal of national unity. The political leaders

arranged the political and social context with the internal clan structure. They governed themselves mainly through consent rather than disagreement, which made them particularly liberated and self-sufficient uniquely. (Fox, 2015:124).

The development of multiparty democracy has been a fascinating topic for many years. In the old days of the colonial period, Somalia was considered a nation without a modern state. It lacked the essential tools for a form such as political parties and bureaucracy; there was no political culture in the country when it was structured and divided clan roots. That formed the basis for developing political parties in Somalia based on the existing local and regional clans. Tripodi (1999:363) reported that the Board of United Nations Advisory said that the first concern (priority) for Italy was developing territorial and local government in Somalia during the trusteeship.

Nonetheless, Somalia experienced the same scenario during this period. In principle, the establishment of the Republic of Somalia contributed to the development of public institutions and increased awareness among political elites who had the opportunity to learn the basic principles of governance. That is well discussed in many studies; for example, Samatar (2016:13) noted that the nascent government in Somalia faced three major obstacles: merging two colonial governance structures in northern and south of Somalia when two regions gained independence from Italy, the United Kingdom. Therefore, the two systems presented various challenges, such as reorganizing or reforming the new government and merging the two regimes into one Somali state. Secondly, many low-skilled, uneducated people in the country and few educated people are in the government. Most of them did not know how modern democratic institutions work or form an effective central government of Somalia. Talking about sixty years after independence, the current government of Somalia is facing the same challenges as decades ago. These problems include internal conflict, destructive foreign intervention, insecurity, high unemployment, an emerging clan-based political system and political instability, dysfunctional state.

Following Schattschneider (942: xxvii) modern democracy is unthinkable without political parties. Almost 52 years, there are no functioning political parties in Somalia. As Weiner (1967:1-2) expressed in the comparative study, political parties organized political leaders to win elections. The most influential scholar in the discussed non-democratic party system is Weiner demonstrates a dictatorial system; parties arranged to influence the views

and attitudes of citizens. He argues that an institutional system should stimulate, need resources, hired staff, officials should be elected or selected. For the mid-20th century publication on political parties, interest groups played a primary role and where the "raw material of politics." Fifty years later, the idea seems extraordinarily diverse. The most advanced theories about parties characterize established parties, especially parliamentarians, as the dominant actors. First, the understanding of multiparty democracy proved essential in Somalia decades ago; from the 1960s to 1969s, the nation was one of the few democratic countries to emerge in Africa after cross-continental independence movements developed. In 1964, Somalia held its first democratic election, and in 1969, the second election was free and fair; the number of parties increased from 21 to 64 (Somalia, 1969:61).

Some critics say that most of the parties that emerged characterized a particular clan or subclan lineage. In the 1969 national parliamentary elections, some 1,000 candidates vied for the 123 seats up for grabs. The Somali Youth League, SYL, was the most influential party in the country and was elected for the second time in 1969; the main party (SYL) failed on Clan lines. In 1969, the electoral transformation was interrupted by a military coup, and it ruled the country for 21 years (Ismail, 2018). On the contrary, after ten years of clan conflict, civil war, and instability, the complexity of clan identity politics in Somalia became a national problem. Politicians and international actors tried to address these challenges. Clan leaders and other representatives agreed on a power-sharing system to end long-running civil war in 2000 in Djibouti. It was 2017, the first time in 52 years that Somalia introduced multiparty democracy, and the National Independent Electoral Commission began to register the nascent political parties temporarily. That was a positive step in the right direction (democratization) and allowed citizens to participate in political activities). The former speaker of the Somali National Parliament said this at a ceremony to award certificates to the newly registered parties. He said certification is an essential part of building the nation's democracy. "Political parties, whether ruling or opposition parties are the pillars of our politics and democratic culture of our country" Mogadishu, (Goobjoog, 2017).

It should be noted that numerous different electoral systems exist or have been practiced in recent years. For example, the comprehensive electoral system used by the state is the 4.5 clan system. The new constitution of Somalia recognizes the right to form political parties, and many prominent political leaders have already registered their respective parties.

Since the 2000s, the country has practiced a clan-based political system. However, the new Political Parties Act prohibits political parties based on extremism, clan, dialect, family, race, gender, and regionalism (NIEC, 2010). Over 90 political parties have already provisionally registered under article four of Somali Political Parties Law. That is a positive step towards democratic choice in the coming elections. However, the country still practices a clan-based political system, and challenges remain unresolved (Ismail, 2018). Unfortunately, this step was postponed after the political actors failed to reach a political consensus on implementing a one-person vote election.

b. Voting participation

The current voting system in Somalia is not relevant to the universal electoral system; the federal parliament of Somalia consists of two chambers: the lower house with 275 MPs elected by traditional leaders and clan delegates. The upper house consists of 54 MPs appointed by regional presidents and confirmed by provincial assemblies (Act for Somalia, 2016:2). An indirect electoral model agreed upon by political leaders consistently shows that minimalist democracy is no longer desirable in Somalia because corrupt political elites are very self-serving and want to retain power and hinder the process of inclusive political participation. In the house of the People elections, delegates vote in their respective states (Galmudug, Southwest, Hirshabelle, Jubbaland, and Puntland), Mogadishu, with special arrangements for the representatives Somaliland.




Figure 2.3. Illustrates indirect voting participation in Somalia

Since the draft federal constitution was adopted in 2012, the country had a permanent government. Initially, only 135 clan elders representing all Somali clans participated in the parliamentary election held on 4.5. In 2016, the lower house elections authorized 135 clan elders to appoint 14,025 electoral delegates, which in turn were divided into 51 electoral colleges to elect for every single seat for the House of the People by secret ballot (Saferworld, 2017: ii).

On September 17, 2020, the National Leadership Forum (consisting of federal and state government leaders) agreed on the indirect voting model that expanded electoral delegates to 28,050. Thus, seats in the people's house were allocated based on a clan allocation formula and contesting individual seats within the same clan. This election will be held in 11 constituencies selecting from 275 members of the lower house and 54 members of the upper house of the federal parliament of Somalia. Members of the upper house are selected by the regional presidents and are endorse by the regional assembly. Notably, Somalia uses informal by single-member plurality or past-the-post electoral system. Under this system, the candidate who receives more votes than any other candidate is announced the winner.

The same model applies to the 4.5 clan system dividing the country into five federal member states and Banadir Regional Administration with constituencies sending 275 members to the lower house of parliament and have been allocated to the federal state capitals where individual seats are contested within the same clan. This year the number of cities has been doubled to eleven that voting will take place.

Apart from that, conflicts between clans over control of public resources and political power have led to an increase in political corruption. Moreover, parliamentary elections in Somalia usually involve vote-buying, vote-rigging, and opaque electoral procedures. It has been recognized that the multiple forms of corruption and clannism in Somalia have led to the exclusion of many minority clans (voters) from full political participation. Regrettably, the continuity of the clan-based formula (4.5) or indirect electoral systems became an issue and shows that the leaders have consistently failed to implement universal suffrage elections for almost two decades. The international community, which provides financial, technical, and security support to Somalia's government and ordinary citizens, has been frustrated by the government's failure. It is believed that a popular vote would allow citizens to participate in the political process, which could reduce electoral bribery as candidates would no longer

be able to bribe all voters and citizens. Finally, it would facilitate accountability to elected leaders, which is currently non-existent or inadequate.

2.2.3. Democratization

Few studies have addressed the problem of democratization in Somalia. The failure of democratization is almost entirely related to massive electoral corruption involving several political elites since the 2000s through indirect elections. Considering recent research on African states, Clapman (2010:7-8) points out that most African countries, regardless of their sovereignty, have colonial structures characterized by the implementation of artificially formed nation-states and imperial systems. Clapham's idea seems acceptable given the fact that African states are. African states are weak and artificial, a fleeting colonial division, have inadequate internal unity, are imperfect, dysfunctional, and even collapsed. They are neither politically nor economically fully independent of Western states and face a massive challenge of democratization. Besides, rampant corruption was widespread in practice, and respected democratic institutions such as parliaments and local governments were ineffective.

The result was political cultures based on clan or ethnic rankings and distinctions, authoritarian models of government, and increasing state corruption. The issue is developing post-independent leadership and a political tradition/culture built on clan or tribal affiliations and dictatorial governance models. It dominates political institutions and resources, which have become the primary target of political competition. The political systems developed by African elites emerged mainly through aggressive methods and centralized economic and political rule; for example, police, bureaucracy, and military (Kew, 2005:152), and clan politics reinforced the appearance of colonial authority.

Nationalist politicians took power from colonial rulers; clan politics developed simultaneously. Interventions to support democratic development in post-conflict countries face unique challenges. First and foremost, they must deal directly with the command space lost when the state was overthrown or stripped of its authority and with its capacity to generate internal conflict. However, let us assume that international agents or actors intervene directly to fill the vacuum. In this case, they faced legitimacy problems and reinforced the post-conflict stabilization and democratization process.

As the experience of Iraq, Somalia, and other recent post-conflict interventions shows, they are developing democracy. That includes the need to mobilize sufficient budgetary, military, and intellectual resources to meet the challenge and achieve a return to democracy. Therefore, local elections come first, and state elections can be postponed until the most favorable political circumstances (Diamond, 2006:93).

Liberalization: The democratization waves proposed by (Huntingtin 1991:18) explain various transitions from dictatorships to democratic systems over time. Regime opportunism is a crucial concept in the democratization waves. We examine the impact of regime change and trace the failure of democratic transition in Somalia. In the first decade of independence, multiparty democracy successfully prevailed in Somalia. Despite the lack of a clear political ideology, the formation of clan-based political parties led to a military coup and the overthrow of the civilian government on 21, 1969. The former president of Mohamed Siad Barre led the military coup, and his regime developed the second republic (Somali democratic republic). Over 200 military coups took place in all African countries during this period, some of which were successful while other attempts failed.

As a result, foreign actors had a decisive impact on Africa's economic and political situation at a given time. During and after Cold War, they were found to instigate conflicts and coups on the continent. In the 1960s alone, there were 39 coups, of which 27 or (69%) were successful and established new regimes. Nonetheless, the number of failed military coups reached (61%) from the 970s to the 1980s, which may have allowed African states to repair their political systems and overcome military coups.

From the 1990s to the 2000s, the number of failed coups declined, with nearly half of African states reporting that they had overcome a military coup. Most often, military intervention related to political affairs became a significant reason for individual greed. Inspired by "rents," they seek to remove authority or take over the country. Notably, in the post-colonial and Cold War periods of the 1970s and 1980s, most coups or military coups or ideological views, such as socialism, capitalism, free-market economy, and mixed economy attitude, increasing the 1990s 2000s changed interest in several external and internal factors. That suggests that countries with moderately dynamic economies did not have much social commitment before independence. They restored or maintained some degree of political participation and political diversity. They experienced fewer military interventions or coup attempts.

It is worth noting that the former Soviet Union had direct military and economic support for the military regime and had close allies since 1960 and 1977. In the mid-1970s, the party, considered the "vanguard of the revolution," was formed to replace the Supreme Revolutionary Council formed after the fall of the civilian government. It banned the constitution and political parties, parliament, and the Supreme Judiciary (Lewis, 1972:400). Barre's party SSRP, which was initially founded on Marxist-Leninist philosophy, had the administration of the entire society, all political offices, and a standing committee chaired by Barre (Hanti-Wadaag) (Samatar, 1987:875). Theoretically, the party had supreme authority regarding socio-economic and political leadership; however, its supreme power was President Barre. Thus, in 1981, when widespread anti-government protests occurred, Barre ended the party's participation and imposed a state of emergency. The event served to assert the president's authority over the inadequacies of Somalia's political institutions. The following year, the president arrested seven senior his party's core members, including I. Abokar, O. Arta Qalib, O. Haji Mohammed; these members sought to challenge the president's unbridled expansion of personal power (Samatar, 1987:882).

The president's closest allies dominated the party structure; they were mainly members of his clan, the Ogadeni and Dolbahante lineages, and Soviet experts. The ruling party promoted a top-down approach, and the active participation of citizens was non-existent. Later, in the 1970s, the SSRP relied on the security forces and domestic watchdog groups to expand its power. By the 1980s, the party had lost the trust of citizens. In 1989, it finally became a monopolist of power. Due to increasing internal and external pressure, President Barre agreed in late 1989 to hold free national elections and form a multiparty system by the end of 1990. His initiative was unsuccessful.

In November 1989, appointed a six-member constitutional review committee to draft a new constitution. In earlier years, the president had appointed similar bogus committees to defeat his rivals (Makinda, 1991:116). Another crucial factor that contributed to the conflicts was the rivalry between tribes. Tribes have always been crucial in Somalia's political structure, but their role has never been critical to political stability. Even the president's cynical attempt in the 1970s to eliminate clan differences failed and led to the collapse of the military dictatorship. Even Barre himself played an unwanted role in the disastrous nation-building experiments, maneuvering clan divisions and oppositions to achieve his political goals. Many critics believe the country first needed an improvement in political

stability, including a purge with rampant corruption. Barre's government internally supported individual clans while marginalized others from the political process (Makinda, 1991:125).

Significantly, the third wave of democratization engulfed the entire African countries as the expectation of political change (liberalization) was too great; the transition to democracy was also visible on the continent. After a decade of military rule, the regime-held elections in which a single party participated, the "Somali revolutionary socialist party". There were no registered voters (there were only two options on the ballots, yes or no), and 99.91% voted for the SRSP, and only 0.09% voted against the ruling party. In 1984, elections were held for the People's Assembly (171 seats were up for election), only 0.11% voted no, and 99.89% voted yes, winning for the ruling party. In the 1986 presidential election, President Bare was re-elected without any opposition candidate achieving the same result, 99.97% voted yes and only 0.03% voted against him. The autocratic regime narrowed the political space, some members of the government opposition were imprisoned, and numerous military commanders fled the country to seek political asylum.

In 1990, armed groups and clan militias were liberated from the dictatorial system, and all state institutions collapsed. An armed conflict began, followed by a ten-year civil war involving several clan militias and armed groups. In the 1990s, Africans were eager to renew the establishment of a democratic system. Several African states witnessed a rebirth of electoral democracy after decades of oppression and misrule. That is believed to be due to longstanding domestic and international pressures that led states to overcome their political oppression and demand democratic reforms in the 1990s (Omotola and Onuoha, 2018:3). As a result, the country was without a functioning government for almost 30 years.

The third waves of democratization have not manifested in Somalia because of the failure to establish a minimalist democracy after liberation from the military regime. Thus, a recent study suggests that the main reason for the collapse of the Somali state in 1990 was a conflict between armed clan militias and the military regime. Another feature of the struggle is the intense pursuit of state power by various groups in a race for potential resources - the overthrow of state tribes and subclans drove communal arming. In the absence of a central administration to uphold the rule of law, different sectors of society consisting of main clans, subclans, and societies took up arms to ensure their security and enforce their rules (Dersso, 2009:9). Although people in Somalia belong to one ethnic group,

share the same language, culture, and religion, clan affiliation undermines the sense of their common nationality (Makinda, 1999:1).

On the other hand, Somalia has not had a formal or functioning government for almost a decade and has lost its role in international society. The country lacks effective security services, public services, a national army, a functioning legal system, and direct National Assembly representatives valued by international society. A proliferation of clan militias and armed groups put an end to the regime. Later, in 1991, the interim government Ali Mahdi was also prevented from establishing strict rule by armed groups. The armed groups are a more significant sign of securing political power in Somalia. The causes of unrest and conflict are political, social, cultural, and economic divisions by numerous clans and groups (Maria, 1991:28). Muse (2019) stated that Somalia's political crisis is inevitable and caused by clan structure and system.

In several decades, the country has failed to develop a national identity to bring all Somalis into one (Muse, 2019:17). Baris and Elmi (2006:33) studied Somalia's disputes and the deep-seated causes; they found that after the military dictatorship took power, conflicts increased; many innocent people were arrested, killed, and tortured to secure power. As a result, several hundred thousand people died in conflicts related to the military, and others were internally displaced or fled the country. The leading causes of the conflicts are related to competing power and control over state resources. The conflicts also contributed to the politicization of clan identity and increased unemployment, especially among young people. Numerous studies have attempted to explain clan-related conflicts; for example, Barise and Elmi 2006) highlighted that some political elites from certain clans dominate the entire mechanism of state institutions and the economy.

Several contradictory themes have emerged in the academic literature on the conflict in Somalia. Significantly, the protracted civil war in Somalia has become an exciting area for numerous scholars from various academic disciplines, including economics, political science, humanities, and sociology. Two schools of thought have emerged to explore the causes of the protracted civil war in Somalia: a) instrumentalists and b) primordialism: according primordialism, the Somali civil war resulted from clan competition, old hatreds, and clan deviance (Makinda,1991; Lewis, 1965). Another leading school of philosophers, the instrumentalists, saw the Somali civil war as a product of the economic recession in the

late 1980s, rivalry and competition for resources and state power, elite exploitation, and unfortunate colonial legacy.

In a study by Samatar (1997:705), it was shown that: the destruction of public institutions in Somalia created situations that reinforced the mismanagement of available resources and the exploitation of political power. He states that the politicians involved in the destruction of the state institutions created the civil war in these situations. That led to the political division of the nation state and created a severe threat to thousands of citizens who hastily ended up in an evil country. Historically, moreover, the former military dictator appeared to manipulate the country's internal affairs, and the government maintained its power by regularly removing critics and imprisoning political rivals. Clan advantages and opponents were also played out, and in some cases, opposition parties were bought out with money, and the government is corrupt (Makinda, 1991:111).

In a longitudinal study, it was found that the main problem of Somalis is clan rule; this makes them different from nations in Africa that have ethnic problems. After independence, African countries struggled to form nations with different ethnic groups, while Somalia created one state. Somalis belong to an ethnic group with a similar language, skin color, culture, and religion. Nevertheless, Clannism has a significant influence on their social, economic, and political structure. Economic, social, and political organizations are traditionally ruled by clan systems based on five clans as Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Digil & Mirifle, and minority groups (Makinda, 1991:112).

Political change, whether in the form of authorization or democratization, can produce instability. Similarly, loss of regime legitimacy can lead to further frustration among groups fighting each other. The direction of change is towards dictatorship; the deconsolidation of political institutions is also associated with increasing repression found that autocratic regimes exist for a shorter period than democracies; however, the difference was not statistically significant (Herge et. all, 2001:34-38). In essence, numerous studies confirmed that corrupt practices affect the course of political liberalization of authoritarian regimes. Corrupt democracy is associated with the disruption of perfect direction and provides evidence of high levels of corruption in democratization. Moreover, democratization has not been shown to significantly impact levels of political corruption, for example, in South Korea. To the extent that deeply entrenched corrupt elites and channels maintain their situation by blocking political and economic substitutes, this type of

corruption can be seen as a significant intensity that supports the maintenance of a flawed and undemocratic society (Saha & Campbell, 2007:5). Clan conflicts in Somalia remain intractable; the clan's fundamental conflicts are related to politics and competition for resources. Ultimately, the regime change (liberalization) has not led to a path to democratic transition but went opposite, generated the prolonged civil war and instability.

Achievement of the democratic transition: This part addresses the failure of transitions to democracy by examining possible approaches that could help the country improve its transition to democracy in Somalia. The problems of democratic development in Africa are many and complicated, including rebuilding state institutions and systems and constitutional democracy. Somalia has similar challenges to other African countries, but the state has also experienced complex clan politics that have hindered a successful democratic transition.

The achieving a successful transition to democracy has become an essential means of changing the corrupt political system in many countries worldwide. He noted that the "third wave of democratization" has contributed to massive revolutions in East and Central Europe (Huntington, 1997) and that some degree of revolution was also evident on the African continent.

In the early 1990s, Africa was discovered to be transforming, exploring the narrative of sweeping and drastic change that redeemed the promise of Africa's immediate or genuine sovereignty to usher in a period of absolute political freedom (Villalon, 1998). The inadequate implementation of structural change in African nations undermined political and economic development (Young, 1994). The political and economic failure left most African countries fragile, neo-affiliated and weak. The democratic transition was to blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disaster of neo-colonial rule. By the end of 1997, thirty-eight of most African states on the continent held competitive multiparty elections for at least the parliamentary legislature (Diamond, 1997: xiv).

The newfound consensus evolved into concepts of democratization - minimalist democracy -an electoral democracy that supports modern political ideas (Hyden & Bratton, 1992; Hyden, 1999). The concept of democracy in Africa is increasingly seen as a set of institutions, all-encompassing layers such as parliaments. These constitutional governments transfer power peacefully, promote the rule of law and secure the rights of the people. Even

though it emphasizes the electoral form of democracy, it gives all citizens an equal right to participate in political activities. It has liberal different ideas or opinions to hold those in power accountable.

In contrast, the case of Somalia on the continent is quite different and fascinating, despite becoming Africa's first democratic state in the 1960s. In Somali politics, clan affiliation is the basic principle of any political contest. Changes in human rights and resource distribution have increased disintegration and clan divisions (Zoppi, 2018:13). However, the nation shares the same ethnicity. It is divided into five tiers, with Somaliland proclaimed as autonomous from the state of Somalia but not yet recognized by the international community (Ingiris, 2018:58). Each region is usually occupied by a particular clan and is led by influential clan leaders considered traditional elders. That harms national sovereignty and weakens the nationalism or unity of the country (Muse, 2019:12).

Makinda (1991:112) showed that the previous military government under former President Siad Barre was corrupt, extremely unwilling, and unable to implement democratic values effectively. The dictatorship attempted to transform nationalism from the old, segmentary type to a modern, natural one and banned all references to clans in the early 1970s. The regime advocated scientific socialism to unite the people into a single nation and made immense efforts to combat clannism. Nevertheless, the influence of clan politics remained a powerful force and shaped the cycle of most political developments in Somalia. Moreover, kinship and clan affiliations were even crucial in securing public employment and other state services. Somali socialist-revolutionaries and members of the highest levels of government are no exception in terms of clan competition. For nearly 30 years, some African countries have made steady progress in promoting equality in inclusive politics, holding regular national elections, and strengthening democracy. In contrast, other countries have failed to do so. From a minimalist perspective, while some African countries have made significant progress in democratization through universal suffrage, others have not, including Somalia, but among the most successful examples are Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, and Zambia.

Scholars Omotola and Onuoha (2018:3) noted the importance of strengthening public institutions, holding free and fair national elections, and developing structures that shape a non-violent political transition. That ensures a stable ideological base for political parties,

inspires civil society, deepens pathways for further political engagement, and creates a robust national normative structure to combat dictatorship.

After the collapse of the military regime in early 1990, the international community and the United Nations had made massive efforts to rebuild democracy in Somalia. The term "democratic transition" generally refers to the evolution from one limited democratic system to another free democratic government. Two types are often distinguished in transitions to democracy, including upper and lower transitions. The first evolution model is called "leadership-driven" and refers to a state in which leaders respond to the current as-is state by initiating democratic reforms. The second model is called "people-driven" (community-led) and represents a dominant force for democratic reform motivated primarily by the dominant civil society. These two forms have widely acknowledged the likelihood of components of the two transition modes merging into a single case (Omotola and Onuoha 2018:3).

In African states, experiments have shown that democratic transitions have usually been stimulated from below. About four different elements of transition are noted: domestic political conferences, public revolutions, agreement-building, and undertakings by the military. Although each element has specific characteristics, it is essential to note the overlap in several cases where both types are shown in a single transition (Omotola and Onuoha 2018:3). Somalia followed the above four elements of transitions. For example, the country experienced political conferences in Arta were agreed (4.5 clan power-sharing), about 20, 000 African peacekeepers were deployed in Somalia. The fourth element is public revolutions, which are still pending. Somalia must engage in community-driven change or bottom-up emergence even though the country faces similar challenges to other African countries; the country is beset by complex clan-based politics that prevent a successful democratic transition.

First and foremost, Somalia is characterized by poor governance, a clan-based political system, non-universal electoral processes, high levels of electoral corruption such as voter buying, irregular campaign financing, and other complex problems that undermine the development of democratization.

Moreover, the lack of equal political participation and freedom of expression remains problematic and hinders democratic transitions. The political system was organized under a

complicated clan structure linked to social, cultural, political, and economic life. The clan misconception led to constant misunderstandings, chaos, and disruption of the country's political system, which has delayed democratization since the 2000s. For decades, Somalia continued to observe social and political crises (Muse, 2019: iv).

In conclusion, we argue that the interference of Somalia's clan leaders/traditional elders in the political system and rampant corruption in the electoral process play a negative role in achieving a successful transition to democracy.

The literature has discussed that the recent waves of democratization are one of the many consequences of globalization. The intertwining of globalization and democracy has described economic growth, reforms, market liberalization, and the facilitation of foreign direct investment on the African continent. Therefore, "democratization and globalization have been seen as mutually reinforcing" (World Bank, 1994:114-124).

The country stayed in the path to democracy for only nine years, from 1960 to 1969. "In 1969, there was a military coup in the country, which was ruled for almost 21 years, followed by ten years of civil war." Historically, Somalia has experienced several military interventions after the fall of the Somali government in 1991. The first military intervention took place in 1992. The United Nations tried to intervene to respond to the humanitarian disaster and improve the stability and peace in the country. The country's democracy and political stability have not progressed since 1991; For example, Somalia's post-independence rule was characterized by a period of competition for democracy and widespread corruption, and clan-based nepotism (Hassan & Barnes, 2007).

In 2000, Somalia's democratization process got back on track when political actors met in Djibouti, agreed on a power-sharing formula among 4.5 clans, and installed a new transitional government. That confirms one of the four dimensions of democratic transitions in Africa, "political conferences," presented in previous pages and proposed by Omotola and Onuoha in 2018. However, the system arguably did not work sufficiently, even though the people of Somalia sought to rebuild and improve their social and economic conditions by re-engaging the government back in charge of providing public services to its citizens. Somalis established unlikely private sectors such as schools, universities, and other economic organizations. Most of the founders of these organizations were affiliated with Islamist groups and threatened the strong government.

The second dimension, relating to democratic transitions, 'peacekeeping,' was introduced. In 2006, the second international military intervention in Somalia occurred after the Somali government appealed to Ethiopia and the international community to support fighting the Islamic Courts that controlled southern and central Somalia. Subsequently, the federal government of Somalia and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (dominated by the Islamic Courts Union) agreed to share power. They formed a coalition government in Djibouti in 2009. That confirms Qaradawi's argument that when democracy and political freedoms are absent, "Islamic movements seek alliance and political participation through all channels available to them." (Freeden, Sargen, Stears (eds.) (2013: p.640). After almost 12 years of evolving political transition, the state adopted a new constitution stating that Somalia is a federal parliamentary republic. In this context, Somalis held parliamentary and presidential elections in 2016 and early 2017 in indirect elections where voters did not directly elect their representatives.

The government still faces the challenge of holding general elections in the coming years to achieve a complete and successful transition to democracy. For this reason, the study remains focused on uncovering the above critical challenges and examining the extent of corruption affecting political participation and democratization in Somalia.

Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa significant challenges were faced despite the substantial development in several multiparty elections in the 1990s and after. Multiparty elections were held in almost 42 Sub-Saharan African countries in the 1990s, except for a few countries such as Congo, Uganda, Somalia, Eritrea, Swaziland, (Teshome, 2008). It has been observed some elections as undermining transitional democratization due to the volatile political atmosphere after the elections. Several scholars have acknowledged that there may be higher levels of corruption in undemocratic governments (Treisman, 2000; Mohatdi, Hamid & Roe, 2003). In other words, there has been little discussion about what level of democratization itself might reduce corruption scales. Scholars such as Chowdhury (2004:95) and Lederman et al. (2001:1-2) found that democratization, competitive elections, and freedom of the press create conditions for accountability that could reduce incidents of corruption. It was hypothesized that further development of democracy with voter participation and media freedom should promote accountability of voters and government and reduce corruption.

Chowdhury's (2004:93-94) detailed study on government accountability showed that through their understanding, voters could punish political parties they recognize as corrupt in elections. In his intriguing analysis of democratization, He identifies two primary benefits that build up through democratization:

- Democratization increases political accountability because elections allow citizens to reward performing political parties by voting for them while punishing corrupt parties by voting for their opponents.

- The country needs to allocate more resources to fight corruption because democratization establishes accountability. Chowdhury (2004:94) argues that competitive elections and media freedom may not significantly change the level of corruption and that it may take a while for more significant changes to become apparent.

While Lederman and his friends highlights that the process of democratization was generally appropriate for non-democratic nations. Finally, the massive political structure associated with the check-and-balance electoral system, among others, shows that those who hold public office are loyal and abide by the law and punish the misconduct of others, leading to a reduction in corruption levels (Lederman et al., 2001:7). In contrast, a recent study suggests that the aspect of political corruption retards the democratization process. It "also harms the consolidation of democracy, which emanates from corrupt high-level politicians who misappropriate public resources for private gain."(Nicolescu-Waggonner (2012: 3-25).

Political corruption has a direct or indirect impact on democratization and political participation. In its broadest sense, political corruption characterizes the abuse of an official position for personal gain, private gain through the common good, and individualism through universalism. The term is associated with a wide range of favoritism, nepotism, campaign finance, and political lobbying. Huntington (1991:6) identified modern "definitions of democracy in three stages-those based on the sources of authority for government," "the purposes that government serves," or "the procedures for forming a government" (p. 6). The debate over democratization is characterized by a lack of consensus on how to measure democracy. Some scholars have divided the world into democracies and non-democracies, which is interesting for some ideas (Nicolescu-Waggonner, 2012). In the study, Somalia's governance is considered a non-democracy.

Huntington's third meaning comes close to a minimalist approach in some respects; they remained definitional terms of primary importance for understanding democratic consolidation. The transformation from authoritarian rule to democracy is often complicated, and consolidated democracies do not emerge overnight. Democratization is a slow process, and often some systems are inconsistent because they are not democratic (Herge et al. l (2001:34). On the other hand, Johnston argues that high levels of corruption can be reduced and low to moderate levels maintained by combining two groups: The first is the "micro" level, including institutional reforms and human resources. The second "macro" level also promotes openness, stability, fair economic and political competition, and the establishment of secure, legitimate political institutions. It is essential to recognize that some of these democratizing factors require the initiation and safeguarding of the formal political course: fair, competitive elections and transparency (Johnston, 1999:32).

The case of Somalia is not different from what we have discussed in the above pages. In the last eight years, the country has experienced corruption at a high level, which has resulted in the country becoming a corrupt or failed nation where the law is in place, but the implementation is weak. In other words, the lack of law enforcement has increased corruption activities and unequal political participation in Somalia. Moreover, political freedom and civil rights are weak or not functioning correctly. According to Freedom House (2019:4), Somalia is "one of the worst performing countries in terms of political rights and civil liberties" (p. 4). Nevertheless, the country has a constitutional democracy where the constitution protects individual rights. According to (ICAI, 2017: ii), Somalia is the most fragile country in the world. It has made limited progress in building a competent institutional capacity and establishing a mechanism to fight corruption.

2.3. Theoretical Framework of the Study

To better explain the research of the phenomenon, it is necessary to have a theoretical framework that underpins the research problem. In this regard, this study attempted to use the most prominent theories on democracy and democratization.

2.3.1. Theories of Democracy

There is a rich literature on democratic theory, on infinite (endless) meanings of what democracy is and should be. All theories are challenging and vary according to the choice

of scholars (Bobbio, 1987; Dahl, 1956, 1971; Sartori, 1962; Schumpeter, 1962; 1944). Nonetheless, the overview of recent theories of democracy, such as Held (2006), is crucial and essential to this study. He examines three different concepts of democracy: minimalist and maximalist forms of democracy, which can be characterized in three components of Lincoln's explanation of democracy. The first, elitist form builds on a minimalist understanding of democracy as government by the people. The second participatory form builds on an intermediate understanding of democracy and seeks government by and of the people. The third social form of democracy ties in with a maximalist understanding; it could be characterized as the government of, by and for the people (Most desirable representation/significant participation social justice.

On the side of procedural theories of democracy or minimalists, it is contested that citizens who engage in political activity must restrict voting (Schumpeter, 1976:271). Having elected their representatives, citizens should allow them to carry out their decision-making without further interference. Elections would then serve as the only protection against evil or corrupt political leaders. Although this approach sustained throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it came under massive criticism from theorists who emphasized the need for a much more extensive active citizenry to give legitimacy to the democratic policymaking process (Pateman, 1970:47). The failure of citizens to participate in politics is seen as necessary by minimalist conceptions of democracy, while participatory democracy emphasizes the benefits of participation for both members and constitutional accountability (Macpherson, 1983; Pateman, 1970). That, in turn, underlines Barber's (1984:144) argument for intensive democracy in the 1980s, in which he claimed that active citizenship is a guarantee against weak democracy, as advocated by Schumpeter.

Alternatively, adopting the principle of political dialog and deliberation could improve relations between elected representatives and citizens to promote civic awareness (Barber 1984; Tam, 1998). However, the means of achieving such a 'participatory society are proving increasingly impractical as the population grows and changes rapidly.

Theories of participatory democracy also assume that people want to participate in politics. That relates to the concept recently challenged by Morse (2005) and Hibbing (2002), who claimed that most people would prefer not to participate intensively in politics. Instead, many would opt for a covert or invisible democracy in which elected members to make decisions for the benefit or interest of others, arguing that they are free to pursue other work.

This theory seems more consistent with the facts than participatory democracy. As Markel & Croissant (2004:205) noted, defective democracy is every day among low-intensity citizens; the problem of illiberal democracy is also common among imperfect third-tier democracies. They added that low intensity is often much associated with low states. For example, some defective democracies are weak in preserving their sovereignty and maintaining the welfare of citizens, which is a fundamental constraint on significant democratic transformation. That is a clear case observed in some collapsing countries in Africa and beyond, including Somalia. At the same time, the recognition of deliberative democracy is a modernization of the principles proposed by participatory democracy in the 1960s and 1970s (Hibbing, 2002; Morse, 2005).

Deliberative concepts have also attracted citizens, reform organizations, and policymakers worldwide (Dryzek, Curato, Ercan, Hendriks, & Niemeyer, 2017). Florida (2013:3) revealed significant differences in theoretical engagement with the concept of deliberative democracy. The two concepts are not similar: for example, participatory democracy is based on direct participation, where citizens intend to exercise specific power and make decisions for matters that affect their daily lives. In contrast, deliberative democracy is based on debate, information sharing, and mutual respect in the general discussion that leads to decisions. This type of democracy sees debate as free from collective bargaining that legitimizes democratic institutions and only, they should and can accept.

Nevertheless, there are widely differing views among proponents of deliberative democracy about how the debate should be conducted and how its chances of success should be assessed. Such issues also underlie much of the general criticism of deliberative democracy. Some discussed that its demands on equality and logical understanding are impractical (Stoker, 2006; Ryfe, 2005). For example, Stoker (2006) accepts that deliberation between citizens can increase the value of democratic policymaking; however, the emphasis on the right ways can also exclude many potential actors. While this can, in some ways, increase access to participation, it can also promote inequality. In response, Stoker suggests that informal deliberative approaches must fit within the broader means to improve essential connections between citizens and political actors. He understands the discussion of Hibbing and Morse (2005; 2002). They accept the concerns that many people do not have the desire to engage in politics. His method might suggest "politics for amateurs," which is non-professional and aims to encourage citizens to become political by connecting with them.

That relates to the assumption that active engagement can be helpful for democracy; it also requires less in terms of quantity of participation compared to the old theory of participatory democracy and further alongside numerous cases of deliberative democracy.

That seems to be a vigorous compromise between minimalist and participatory approaches to democracy that best suits the characteristics of modern liberal democracies. In particular, the burgeoning rigidity and dominance that encompasses party politics suggest the isolation of citizens and a diminution of comprehensive and complex political debate. The primary new form of political participation that addresses these problems is the critical core values of deliberative democracy. That refers to promoting citizens intending, discussing, and demanding political matters in a registered manner (Dryzek, 2002; Cooke, 2000; Bohman, 1998; & Fishkin, 1991). The importance of this method lies in increasing the value rather than the level of participation. Neither of these concepts is currently practiced in Somalia, but the country assumes a minimalist democracy in which citizens seek to elect their political leaders through universal suffrage.

2.3.2. Theories of Democratization

Several theories of the emergence of democratization have been proposed in the literature, but it will be addressed six prominent controversial theories of democratization in this study. Firstly, Modernization: one of the unique ways is to claim that democratization is linked to modernization. Specifically, as society becomes more financially independent and educated, it demands to regulate state affairs and seeks to protect its interests. Although this theory had declined its support in the 1970s, democratic governance collapsed in several Asian and Latin American countries that achieved unprecedented economic growth under dictatorial regimes. Consequently, scholars of modern politics reject the notion that modernization would bring long-term stability and democracy. Similarly, modernization theory has historically asserted that democratization is almost inevitable once the state has prepared a stable middle class and achieved a certain standard of living. This claim remains unjustifiable. Today, it is seen that countries where the standard of living has risen, such as the oil-rich states of the Middle East, yet democracy was never sought or developed (O'Neil, 2018:141-142).

Secondly, elite theory is another theory that explains democratization. Modernization has encountered some criticisms. For example, one of the wealthiest states in Africa remains

an unfree country. Gabon's president has ruled his country for almost 42 years; later, Gabon introduced a meaningless multiparty system and held several elections since the 1990s. Due to the weak political system, state power continues to rest with the son of former President Ali Bongo. In contrast, Tanzania, Senegal, and Benin, which are among the poorest nations on the African continent, are entirely free states and regularly hold fair and free elections in their countries. How can this be explained? Some studies examined the role of people with power, the elites; they often focused on what causes (motivates) elites to hold on to or give up power. This theory looks at income distribution independent of overall economic prosperity or poverty.

For example, Nigeria is the most populous country in West Africa. Resources remain in the hands of the elites; political changes, reforms are unlikely because the elite feels that reform would rob them of their wealth. Only the fact that citizens' wealth increases through democracy makes democratization a possible institutional change to avoid revolution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). The same scenarios have existed since the 2000s in Somalia, where corrupt political elites control the country's political process, block political space, expand indirect elections, and delay the realization of multiparty democracy. In addition, only a few (political elites) who have money can participate in the electoral process; other citizens are excluded from political participation. For example, registering as a candidate cost between $10,000 and $20,000 for legislators. That suggests that money is a deciding factor for potential legislators and presidential candidates, and others remain behind the door and are political observers.

Third, civil society: elite-based theories provide us with an understanding of why political leaders might be willing to cede power to the people, but not why the people should claim power. Some extent of further democratization, then, emphasized not the importance of elites but the power of the people. Initially, civil society was developed in Eastern Europe to free itself from the communist system (Tismaneanu,1990). The term is described as independent from the state, and citizens from different organizations joined together to promote their own best interests, not politically motivated (O'Neil, 2018:144). The role of influential civil society organizations in Somalia is appalling; most of them are busy receiving grants from abroad or international donors, including the UN. They are not active and do not participate in public decision-making or have a weak role in exerting pressure on government policies.

Fourth, foreign or international relations: On the other hand, there are other global influences that we have observed in several cases. For example, the invasion of many countries, including Germany, Japan after WW2, and in 2003 Iraq experienced a massive military intervention. After the 9/11 attack in Afghanistan, global drivers and play a significant role in democratization. The global war on terrorism, global trade, and foreign direct investment also drive democratization because the international community can pressure elites to support democracy. Indeed, in the 1990s, almost all Eastern European promoted democracy because it was seen as a prerequisite for joining European Union (KIM, 2017:2).

In the case of Somalia, the government relies on external support, including the peace building, fighting terrorism, and humanitarian aid, among others. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, formerly the international partners, supported Somalia's political and state-building (democratization) process since the 2000s. They organized several peace conferences in Djibouti and Kenya that led to the establishment of the federal republic of Somalia. However, two decades after establishing the third republic, the country still faces enormous challenges such as political instability, insecurity, lack of genuine political engagement, and an inconsistent clan-based political system to achieve stable democratic institutions.

Fifty, political culture: many scholars have explained why democratization happens in some places and not others. Modernization does not lead to democracy and individualism. Many scholars argue that democracy has developed mainly through cultural, historical, and logical principles. Each culture can promote specific categories of ideas (KIM, 2017:3). In summary, the dynamics of internal and external situations are the basic drives of democracy. Politics is not the rule of physics fixed over time and space (O'Neil, 2018:144). Somalis are divided into clans: The current political system is based on the clan political system 4.5. So political culture is more about clan supremacy, not democracy. Clan delegates and elders are very powerful and choose the MPs who represent them in parliament, and so they know little about democracy, but they support their tribes.

The sixth theory, “waves of democratization,” explains various transitions from dictatorships to democratic systems over time (Huntingtin, 1991:13). The main points of this theory reflect the research phenomenon. Of significance, Somalia is currently undergoing a democratic transition. Many measures need to be considered to achieve a minimalist

democracy, including holding regular elections, establishing a multiparty system, regulating presidential succession through the electoral process, and enforcing the rule of law (Schumpeter 1943:271). In this study, the competing theories presented in the previous sections relate to Huntington's democratization theory of democracy in general and support the theoretical foundations of the different stages of democratization developed by (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan,1996). That helps us to understand the transition process.

2.4. Summary of Chapter

Chapter two covered the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. The first part of the chapter examined the historical aspect of corruption, democratization, and political participation. It highlighted the main logical arguments of various scholars that reflect most of the recent development of the research topic as they revealed the theoretical framework of the study. On the other hand, we presented that far too little attention has been paid to the relationship between corruption on political participation and the democratization process, which this chapter attempts to explain more comprehensively. Regarding the theoretical basis of the study, theories of democracy have been discussed in detail to show the importance of political participation and theories of democratization. In the next chapter, the research method is explained, a convergent mixed-methods design that combines the two methods, quantitative and qualitative.

3. RESEARCH METHOD

The first chapter summarizes the problem statement, research questions, and contribution of the study. Chapter two presents the main logical arguments of various scholars reflecting the historical and most of the recent development of the research topic. It highlights the competing theories that support the research context and developed a conceptual framework that explained the general variables of the study. It is noteworthy that research design is the most critical stage of the entire research process. It requires a long-term strategy that determines the type of methodological approach to the study and methods of data collection and strategic analysis, the role of the researcher, and the overall guiding structure of the stages of the study.

This chapter explains a convergent design in mixed methods research to combine the quantitative and qualitative data, analyze them independently and merge the two data sets in the mixed phase. The case study aims to understand the research problem or phenomenon and specific relationships. This study is related to an explanatory study that seeks to explain the research context and effect of variables (Creswell, 2003; Maxcy, 2003).

The phenomenon for this research is to examine how corruption affects Somalia's political participation and democratization. The actual situation is the selected private and public institutions where the interaction of the study takes place. By limiting the survey to the employees working in public and private organizations/institutions and independent groups, they specify this research as a case study. Mogadishu was purposively selected as the site of the study. To explain the phenomenon or concept, and its actions and scenarios were analyzed in detail and entirely.

Chapter three research methodology pays particular attention to the details of the research design:

3.1 Research Question

The literature shows that corruption exists throughout human history and has a strong influence on all states worldwide.

1. How do different forms of corruption affect political participation in Somalia?
2. How do different forms of corruption affect democratization in Somalia?
3. How do corrupt practices affect voter turnout, campaign activities, the performance of democratic transition, and citizen attitudes toward the government according to the respondents' perceptions working in the public and private sector?
4. To what extent do the qualitative findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between corruption and political participation and democratization?

3.2. Unit of Analysis

To specify the characteristics of the target population, all participants were Somali citizens living in Mogadishu. The city is Somalia's capital, where most government institutions and private institutions/organizations are based. Mogadishu is also the most populous city in Somalia, with approximately 13.4% (1,650,227) million people in the population. Population of this survey is 438. During data collection, the study reached the most educated respondents who could answer the research questions and contribute to the study. The study sample selected randomly target groups from (7) public intuitions and (8) private organizations operating in Mogadishu. The purposive sampling can be started before the study (data collection), during the study, or both whether the nature of the data relates to narratives(qualitative), numerical data (quantitative). This view is supported by Creswell et al. 2003; Herriott &; Firestone, 1983). In this study, a similar procedure was used. Participants were purposively selected for both methods based on experience with the research topic and contribution to the research objectives.

Creswell (2014) further noted this; he pointed out that it is essential to compare the two types of information and combine them. The primary purpose of all mixed methods sampling is to produce a sample that focuses on the research questions. The fundamental interest of mixed methods of sampling is to combine two goals: to confirm the quality or validity of the research findings and to obtain in-depth knowledge about the study context (Onwuegbuzie &; Leech, 2007; Kemper, Stringfield, &; Teddlie, 2003). That approach was adopted from the convergent mixed methods study by Beavers (2016:41).

We used maximum variation sampling to gain more insight into a phenomenon by studying it from multiple perspectives. That could help the investigator to discover

fundamental problems that are apparent in the entire sample. Therefore, this study decided to select different individuals who work for the government and private institutions. These participants have different experiences, which helps us study the problems more intensively from different angles and evaluate all study contexts accordingly.

Sample size

To obtain a reasonable sample size for both methods, the Slovin formula developed by Michael Slovin in the 1960s was used. An example of this formula is: n= number of samples, "N= total population and e=marginal error denotes the allowable possibility of making an error in selecting a small representation of the population." For example, Slovin's method determines a sample size of population (438) with a maximum acceptable error of 5% based on 95% confidence level (Stephanie, 2012).

n=get 438/ (1+438(0.05) ^2) n= N/ (1+〖Ne〗^2) n= 438/2.095 = 209.06

Total Respondents 209 (Interview 18 and Questionnaire 191).

The Sample of the study was 209

3.3 Data

The research questions illustrate the expected data, including corruption, political participation, and democratization in Somalia. Various data sources such as quantitative and qualitative data were used for the study to explain the research context fully.

Online Questionnaire: challenges of data collection in Somalia unthinkable: during data collection, there were many difficulties, such as insecurity, political turmoil, restrictions on freedom of expression, and Covid 19 limitations that negatively impacted recruitment or access to research participants. According to the annual study published by Freedom House (2020), Somalia's political rights and civil liberties are the lowest (considered not accessible) in the world 7/100 were classified as not free. For example, academics researching sensitive issues such as corruption encounter coercion because no one is interested in addressing such issues publicly. It can understand that it is impossible and quite challenging to recruit more volunteers for this study. On this basis, in this study, neither institutions nor their names have been revealed.

In contrast, collecting secondary data is a limited way to obtain data because there is little or no national microdata. Hence, 209 target respondents are entirely acceptable and significant for this study. Survey-Research Methods Fowler (2008:1) discusses that it is essential to draw from various sources to assess numerical descriptions of the population's opinions and use questionnaires to collect data. In this regard, this study used a questionnaire to collect partial quantitative data from 191 respondents. Dibb and Michaelidou (2006:289) suggested that email or online platforms were an alternative way of collecting data. Quantitative data was collected online through docs.google.com; the process was beneficial, less costly, and more efficient; questionnaires were collected from January 20 to March 31, 2021. Significantly, online platforms have become the most attractive and preferred form of communication for students and educational institutions during the impact of the Covid 19 pandemic on global society. First, most participants were identified according to their respective organizations/institutions in which they work.

In this regard, this study utilized online data collection, and 191 questionnaires were completed online https://docs.google.com/forms Furthermore, this study used Likert scale form developed by Rensis to measure respondents' views and their level of "agreement or disagreement" with statements (McMillan & Schumacher, 2014:4). The Likert scale is considered one of the most ordinal data in survey questionnaires, and as shown in Figure 3.1, a 5-point Likert scale was used in the questionnaire. Most of the questions in the questionnaire were presented as closed questions where all respondents could tick their preferred statements in a box.



Figure 3.1. shows a summary of a 5-point ordinal Likert scale.

Interestingly, the research topic was relevant and essential to explore the problems related to corruption, political participation, and democratization. The first section of the questionnaire asked respondents about demographic characteristics such as age, experience, education, occupation, marital status, and gender. The second section began with a general question about the study, followed by listing research variables: Forms of corruption (e.g., logrolling, bribery, embezzlement, and favoritism) and participation and democratization.

Each of these variables has several items in the questionnaire, which are organized into groups. The questionnaire contains 31 items (independent variables) and 16 items from (dependent variables). The total number of items in the questionnaire was 47.

The average age of the respondents (mean) was 32 years. That confirms the estimate of the survey conducted by UNFP (2014:16-42) that more than 75 percent of Somalia's population is below the age of 30 years. This statistic shows that the youth in Somalia is the main base of the Somali population. Consequently, most of the participants in the survey are young. The Somali National Youth Policy has recognized Somali youth between the ages of 15 and 35.

Semi-Structured Interview: This section explains how the qualitative data was collected. The qualitative method may use semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions to gain insights into participants' views and beliefs (Creswell, 2018:262). Green & Thorogood (2009; 2004) said that the best practice of qualitative was limited interview research, the transcript or interview of 18 participants. The duration of the interviews was conducted from January to March 2021. The qualitative sample was also applied to the same population as the quantitative data. According to UNESCO, Somalia is an affluent oral society; traditional Somali society is considered the most oral society in the world (Quetzalli & Gustavo 2014:13).

Therefore, the interview was helpful in this context and is the essential method for data collection. The purpose of using interviews is to obtain unique details or interpretations from participants, gather numerous information from individuals, and discover something that hard to discover (Padilla, & Trigo-Arana, 2013; Stake 2010). Qualitative studies are also very time-consuming; analyzing a large sample can take much time (Willis, 2007:150).

All interview questions were designed to gain an in-depth knowledge of the views and perceptions of the study participants. The interview protocol, limited to two pages, consists of several significant components; these include the participant's personal information, an introduction, the substantive interview questions with study, the participant's responses, and a conclusion. Therefore, the study conducted online interviews (phone, messenger, and WhatsApp calls). All interviews were recorded using a digital audio memo-voice recorder installed on a MacBook Air and transcribed using Microsoft Word. It is often considered the availability of interviewees as mentioned in the sampling process - the

interviews were conducted at a critical time when the global pandemic was affecting social movement. I Traveled to the field study to reach the desired research participants and conducted a semi-structured interview with 18 participants, averaging 37. The interview process includes numerous essential components, these included participant details, an introduction, the substantive interview questions with study, participant responses, and a conclusion. Creswell's suggestion was confirmed: 'The total number of questions should be somewhere between 5 and 10' (Creswell, W. and Creswell, J., 2018: 266). Five specific questions were investigated from the interview discussions.

3.4 Analysis Methods

In this study, qualitative and qualitative methods are conducted simultaneously; the data were collected and analyzed independently; the following sections explain the methods of quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The first part presents the strategies of quantitative data analysis, followed by qualitative analysis.

3.4.1. Statistical Data Analysis

We will summarize the two models with the questions derived from the literature on how the various forms of corruption impact democratization? How do the various forms of corruption impact political corruption? Quantitative analysis was performed using descriptive statistics, Spearman's rho, and ordinal regression.

Descriptive statistics were used to present the characteristics of the sample. The purpose of descriptive analysis is to present summary information about the sample characteristics of survey respondents in the quantitative method of the study (McMillan & Schumacher, 2014:30). The second statistical method used is Spearman’s rho to test the correlation between variables. Given the main objective of this quantitative inquiry, an ordinal regression analysis was necessary to determine which (if any) of the various forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling) have a statistically significant impact on political participation and democratization in Somalia. This analysis could provide a better understanding of how the different forms of corruption might influence democratization and political participation. In the first model, political participation was regressed on different forms of corruption. In the second model,

democratization was regressed on different forms of corruption. The model satisfies all the assumptions of ordinal regression.

To verify the variables, the investigator distributed the research questionnaire to at least three individuals who were well versed in the research topic and variables. The external examiners reviewed and validated the items and statements of the questionnaire and confirmed whether the questions related to the research variables or did not relate to the study variables and were therefore invalid. Ultimately, the questionnaire was also approved by the AYBU Ethics Committee, and the research instrument was accepted as valid for distribution to respondents.

In quantitative research, validity is an essential tool to reduce errors in the initial measurement of the research variables. In essence, reliability often ensures the accuracy of a measurement procedure (Thorndike, & Thorndike-Christ, 2014:75). The term uses to determine the internal consistency of quantitative data, that is, how accurate a set of items is as a group. Therefore, it used Cronbach's alpha to conduct the reliability test.

3.4.2. Thematic Data Analysis

We used a thematic analysis in which data were coded and categorized and then developed into themes that were consistent with or reflected the conceptual framework of the study. Indeed, procedural analysis in qualitative research requires detailed steps in analyzing the many types of "qualitative data." Typically, the goal is to produce meaningful texts and virtual data. According to Creswell & Creswell, (2018:108) it should analyze the previously collected interviews, write notes that can eventually be compiled as a narrative report, and formulate the structure of the final report. This process is a multidimensional qualitative study in which collects the data, analyses the information, and finally writes the report

Table 3.1. Visual paradigm of qualitative analysis

1.First Reading	2. Divide text into segments of data With coded data	3. Comparing themes in case

The above table represents the process of qualitative analysis, derived from Creswell's (2002:44) model of qualitative analysis, which illustrates the visible/visual paradigm of qualitative analysis (p. 244).

The central guiding question for the qualitative part of this study was: How do corrupt practices affect voter turnout and campaign activity, performance transition to democracy, and citizens' attitudes toward governance? For conducting practical qualitative data analysis, it is necessary to examine the data, read extensive reading transcripts and transcripts, identify the information by dividing and classifying the text accordingly.

Also, applying codes in thematic areas by combining similar means establishes connections to related themes and builds narratives (Creswell, 2002:263). As qualitative data analysis is related to the textual analysis collected from the interview transcript. The visual data should emerge from the conceptually underpinning factors linked in the data (Huberman & Miles, 1994:11). Creswell and friends argue that the investigator attempts to link the themes and narratives to the goals and other activities in the study (Creswell and Maitta, 2002; Merriam, 1998).

Creswell (1998), one of the most prominent experts who has worked with mixed methods, has proposed eight verification methods for qualitative data analysis to establish trustworthiness: Triangulation, long-term field involvement, negative case review, peer review, articulation of bias, external audits/checks, member checking, dense description. Creswell suggested that it should conduct at least two verification procedures. Therefore, we used two verification procedures, namely triangulation and member checking.

In the following, the operationalization of the variables is presented.

3.5. Dependent Variables

Political participation and democratization are considered dependent variables. In addition, to explain how to measure these dependent variables is listed in Table 3.2, respectively.

3.5.1. Political Participation

Political participation is defined as an activity in which citizens seek to become involved in the system of government and participate in the election of political leaders (Conway 1991). Citizens' political participation tends to be better informed about political scenarios and, in some cases, strongly involved in political activities (Quintelier & Hooghe, 2011:64). Lijphart (1997:1) said that equal consideration and respect for all political actors is hardly possible unless participation is as complete and equal as possible. Considering that political participation is an essential element of any democracy, the characteristics and number of citizens who can participate in political activities can significantly affect democratic values.

Understand that citizens must limit voting participation; after electing their representatives, citizens should let them make their decisions without interfering further. By the end of the 19th century, most democracies had succeeded in abolishing vote-buying and related approaches to electoral bribery. Nonetheless, several different challenges related to money in politics remained unresolved in these government systems. It believed that in an emergent democracy, equality of opportunity and resources for all citizens was at risk so that electoral bribery would continue to promote exclusiveness in political participation. Elections would then serve as the only protection against evil or corrupt political leaders (Walecki, 2003:17).

Inclusive political participation remains a challenge in Somalia, where most elections have been marred by electoral bribery, intimidation, and vote-buying. In indirect voting, everyone is precluded from casting a vote or participating in the voting process. Only a few clan delegates are allowed to participate in the election (voting) for parliamentarians; achieving inclusive political participation. Thus, it will explore how the various forms of corruption affect political participation.

3.5.2. Democratization

Dependent variables can be measured in many ways and therefore often require operational definition. In this regard, the research attempts to explain the second operational definition is democratization considers as dependent variable, The study pays particular attention to Whitehead's (2012:27) purpose of democratization. He defines *democratization* as a complicated, ever-changing, and open-ended process over an extended period. It is based on rules that often require mutual consent and broader participatory politics. Similarly, he pointed out that democracy is indispensable and requires a combination of values and facts associated with internal tensions.

3.6. Independent Variables

To evaluate the various factors on the forms of corruption: bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling-vote buying worked as independent variables.

3.6.1. Bribery

Despite its widespread practice, Scholars have provided various definitions of bribery; this study adopts Abumousa's definition of electoral bribery, which often occurs during elections and is even systematic and normalized (Abumousa, 2017:5). As reported by the New York Times, political actors in Somalia have cashed in tens of hundreds (USD) to buy votes. Other politicians have bribed or forced themselves to run against a political nobody in parliamentary elections to make the contest appear fair (Gettleman, 2017). Huneke (2017) found that an estimated US $20 million in bribes were paid in Somalia's parliamentary and presidential elections. He stated that numerous clan elders accepted or paid bribes. This makes it imperative to investigate how bribery plays out in the electoral process: For it is suspected that most clan delegates (voters) receive bribes from parliamentary candidates to vote for them in elections. It is unlikely that political elites use bribery to stay in power and protect their interests. The process for electing Somalia's president and federal parliament is widely viewed as flawed and corrupt.

3.6.2. Embezzlement

There is a growing concern that the misappropriation of public funds is detrimental to the promotion of democracy. Uslaner (1999:1-27) examined corruption theory; he mentioned that corruption causes the unfair distribution of resources that could increase injustice and rising levels and corruption cases. Transparency (2020) describes misappropriation as when a person holding a public office in an institution corruptly and illegally uses available funds and assets he or she employs for personal gain or other activities. For this much understanding, to fight corruption needs a complex method that focuses on the various forces, aspects, and structural matters that embezzlement entails, such as active participation and long-term efforts by various anti-corruption actors - government officials, civil society members, independent media, private organizations, international institutions, and academics. In Somalia, corruption is a complex aspect.

It is largely recognized in public institutions and government offices where administrators are hired, take bribes, and use public funds illegally (Abdirasak. (n.d:3-8). The systematic public embezzlement and use of illegal funds relate to the absence of democracy and slow progress towards democratization.

3.6.3. Favoritism

Political favoritism is another type of political corruption that can be defined as an unlawful act. In modern times, political partisanship is widespread in numerous countries around the world. A study by Adam (1992:11) reported that Clannism developed after independence as identity politics, meaning that each clan member formed their political parties (or along with armed groups). The ancient system of government in Somalia has two main features: Clan-oriented chiefs who played a role in clan jurisdiction and the supreme authority of the sultanates. Clan chiefs are influential; they collect revenue from local communities and, in some places, act as low-level enforcers. Most political leaders have come to public office to represent the wishes of their respective clan affiliations rather than to support the state's interests. Bincof (2018:1) pointed out that Somalia urgently needs to abolish the current institutionalized clan-based politics 4.5 and introduce a multiparty system to replace the corrupt indirect elections.

For nearly a generation, the country has conducted indirect elections, resulting in a clan power-sharing structure as a surrogate political system and hindering the successful transition to a true democracy. Clan preference is a commonly accepted idea in Somalia's political process that prevents equal participation and true democracy in the country. The struggles between clans for control of public resources and political power led to an increase in political corruption. Clan favoritism has always been crucial to political decision-making, and favoritism is common throughout Somali political life. In other words, the literature does not show that favoritism is related to democratization and political participation. In this regard, the use of favoritism in the context of Somalia is quite unique and its impact on political participation and democratization in Somalia is unpredictable.

3.6.4. Logrolling and Vote Buying

Logrolling is a type of political corruption that occurs in a particular legislative process and becomes a tool by which political parties can secretly offer financial incentives to each other's MPs to vote for the bill they are introducing in parliament. It has been reported that vote buying in the 2012 Somali election came at a high price. This resulted in several winners having a huge liability that they could repay by casting their votes as legislators (Menkhaus, 2017:141).

According to the report Somali Dialog platform and public agenda (2020), reported that the Somali election was influenced by direct vote-buying and corruption. This political corruption includes legislators, presidential candidates who buy votes from clans-delegates, and traditional elders, and candidates who bribe election administration. The complexity of the indirect voting model in Somalia unimaginably violated the national constitution and suffered from vote-buying, coercion, and political unrest (Menkhaus, 2017:140).

There is speculation that members of parliament are receiving bribes from vested interests, including the executive, voting for motions, resolutions, and bills. Somalia's parliamentary elections are widely seen as a case of vote-buying and opaque electoral processes. In summary, this study focuses on the above four different forms of political corruption as independent variables to find out whether (any) of these factors have an impact on political participation and the democratization process in Somalia.

Development of the questionnaire: Online research was conducted with previously used questions and questionnaires on democratization and political participation—the online source scrutinized including Google Scholar, JStore, Science Direct, and Elsevier. The appendix of retrieved articles was viewed, and some items that proved helpful in the present work were adopted. Unluckily, a complete questionnaire was not found. That prompted the development of a new questionnaire. An online self-administered online questionnaire was created using Google Forms. The newly developed questionnaire contained six small 5-point Likert scales designed to measure the dependent variables of interest (democratization and political participation) and independent variables (bribery, embezzlement, logrolling, and favoritism). Five scales contained 8 -statements each, and one scale (logrolling scale) contained 7- statements.

The statements used for the scales were based on the literature. For example, one statement from the bribery scale was.

Statements in the questionnaire

1. Bribery: 1-8
2. Embezzlement:1-8
3. Favoritism: 1-8
4. Logrolling: 1-7
5. Political participation: 1-8
6. Democratization:1-8

Pretesting: There are several methods to assess content validity: (1) ask various questions about the instrument (2) seek the opinion of experts in the field (Heale, & Twycross, 2015). Shekaran & Bougie (2010:15) Suggested that "The more the scale items represent the domain of the concept being measured, the greater the content validity."(p.15). Once the questionnaire was completed, experts reviewed it to provide feedback. Some adjustments were made based on the experts' comments. The items were found to be valid and relevant and measured what they were intended to measure.

3.7. Concept Formation in Qualitative Research

The following section presents the main concepts and specific questions intended for qualitative research.

3.7.1. Voting Turnout on Indirect Election

In liberal democracies, voters decide which party wins the election. Politicians who support clans have significant influence over a party, and existing local polarization can reinforce this power in the community, allowing parties to win votes. In Somalia, identifying clan groups is a complicated task, and it is practically unlikely to obtain accurate facts (Yoshimura, 2009:11). The clan-based political system has been practiced in Somalia since the 2000s, and elections have been conducted through indirect voting. Of importance, it is necessary to understand the clan-based political system where only a few clan delegates and clan elders decide which candidate wins the election.

Moreover, this indirect process has been clouded by various widespread forms of corruption. Schram & Klarita (2007:13) found that elites seek to dominate the election process and persist in their interests. In Somalia, there are four main clans and small sub-clans (Hawiye, Darood, Digil & Mirifle, Dir, and minority groups). These are referred to as the 4.5 clan structure and serve to share power in all public institutions: for example, over the past two decades when the modern state was re-established, it has adopted an indirect election model 4.5 clan-based political system that recognizes only traditional elders and clan delegates to participate(voting) in the election of members of the House of the People. Five indirect elections have been held in the country using the model (4.5).

Unfortunately, this led to many candidates offering bribes to clan delegates and elders during voting, and many critics believed that the candidate who had money or was bribed won the election.

In the late 2017 election, over 14000 clan delegates and 135 traditional elders voted for parliamentarians. Many reports indicated that the election involved massive corruption, and the candidate who paid more money won the election. In Kismayo, in Jubbaland state, and in Baidoa in southwestern Somalia, many delegates were forcibly detained, threatened, and excluded from the electoral process. Somalia's top financial comptroller said clan delegates were threatened; some withdrew out of fear. Others were not allowed to vote and were locked out of polling stations, unlike others who were allowed to vote under their names. It was noted that some seats were more expensive than others or that candidates are businessmen and influential people who believe that participation in the legislative assembly

provides protection and immunity, and elected representatives use their seats as a shelter (Maruf, 2016).

Nonetheless, there are challenges that the clan-based political system (indirect election) remains constant in Somalia. Thus, when electoral bribery is introduced into the political process, the simple aggregation of voter interests is lost. In this context, interview participants were asked for their opinion on whether bribery leads to lower voter turnout in Somalia (e.g., in parliamentary and presidential elections). Electoral bribery in Somalia has produced many people who promote their interests, disqualified, inept politicians, and a lack of personal integrity.

3.7.2. Political Campaign Contributors

The political campaign aspect is closely linked to lobbying groups and political parties. Similarly, campaign finance is regulated and enacted by parliaments worldwide to regulate the small or large amounts of money spent on campaign activities. At the same time, the electoral commission and other independent bodies are expected to oversee campaign finance. However, in Somalia, campaign activities are closely linked to political brokers who bring money from inside and outside the country to bribe clan leaders, clan delegates, and legislators. Addressing voters in parliamentary and presidential elections is crucial and has costed many millions of USD in Somalia.

In many democratic systems, there are restrictions on government subsidies to respond to financial mismanagement (scandals). Social pressure also helps to stop corruption by limiting unnecessary and unbalanced influence on candidates and parties (Walecki, 2003:17). The Horn of Africa country has no campaign finance law; millions of campaign funds come from abroad, which in return, contributing countries have the absolute power to decide who becomes the presidential candidate or wins the election.

The former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, Mr. Schwartz, mentioned that the head of the country's national intelligence security agency acts as a political commander (broker) and conduit for secret funds from the State of Qatar to Somalia (Schwartz, 2020). He argued that the state of Qatar funded incumbent's President Farmajo in the 2017 election. Cannon (n.d.) reported that individuals reportedly shared confidential and sensitive information about the timing and location of bribes to Somali parliamentarians who cast their votes.

There is not enough literature on the role of campaign financing in political activities in Somalia, so it is important to note that the use of illegal money for political campaigns is widespread in Somalia; the more money one pays, the greater the chance of winning elections, the less money one has, the less one participates in political activities. Based on the above discussions, the interviewer has asked participants this question, "How do foreign countries provide illegal financial support to political elites to exploit political campaigns and bribe voters?

3.7.3. Performance of Democratic Transition

The concept of the democratization process has gone through three different levels: a) the "liberalization" period, when the former autocratic regime collapses or is exposed, b) a transition period when often the first competitive elections have taken place, and c) the consolidation period when democratic institutions have reached the level of stability and are accepted by most of the actors concerned (Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996). We explain and consider the first and second phases of democratization, which are most related to Somalia's democratization process. Treisman (2007:219) states that a democracy that provides high values could expect low observed levels of corruption and assumed that democracy could eliminate corruption. Huntington mentioned that achieving a successful transition to democracy has become an essential means of changing the corrupt political system in many countries worldwide. Significantly, the "third wave of democratization; has contributed to massive revolutions in the Central Europe (Huntington, 1997:13). Somalia faces the challenge of achieving a successful transition. The government has experienced complex corrupt clan politics that have hindered the achievement of a successful democratic transition. Scholars Omotola and Onuoha concluded that promoting democracy on the African continent requires strengthening public institutions, holding free and fair national elections, and developing structures that formulate a non-violent political transition.

After the collapse of the military regime in early 1990, the international community and the United Nations had made massive efforts to rebuild democracy in Somalia. The term democratic transition; generally, refers to the evolution from one limited democratic system to another liberal democratic government. Two types are often distinguished in transitions to democracy, including upper and lower transitions. (Omotola and Onuoha, 2018). We

believe that the clan based political system and rampant corruption in the electoral process plays a negative role in achieving a successful transition to democracy. In the nearly 20 years of transition, procedural democracy did not develop. However, the indirect electoral model was practiced in the election, meaning that only a few clan representatives and traditional elders participated in the parliamentary elections, resulting in rampant corruption.

Notably, a successful transition to democracy requires competitive elections; this has failed in Somalia because of the clan-based political system, which has a great chance of derailing the democratization process. In this aspect, Interview participants were asked. How does corruption delay the process of democratization? (Or the successful transition to true democracy, and would fair and free elections reduce political corruption in Somalia?

3.7.4. Embezzlement undermines citizens' trust in government

Citizens' trust in the functioning of government is faltering worldwide, undermining government agencies and representatives. Democratic government becomes an artificial entity when it fails to live up to its responsibilities - through unfair treatment and discrimination in public service, widespread exploitation of government agencies for self-interest.

That increases distrust, which can worry citizens and bring about political change that requires declining trust in government. There is no doubt that corruption weakens citizens' trust in government and impairs institutional effectiveness. BTI (2020:42) suggested that the major obstacles in Somalia are power struggle among political elites and reluctance to corruption, abuse of office and mismanagement of public resources. With corruption in Somalia, those in power and controlling state resources will seek power by corrupting the equal participation of all. That will lead to delays in essential steps needed attaining full democracy, establishing an independent judiciary, and equal application of laws. *This question was posted to the interview participants: How does misappropriation of public funds undermine citizens' trust in government.*

3.8 Model

For the quantitative method, we developed two models that represent democratization and political participation as dependent variables in addition with explanatory factors.

Table 3.2. Measurement Process

Dependent Variable	Purpose	Scale	Primary Data
Political Participation	To Measure the effect of four forms of corruption (bribery, favoritism, embezzlement, and logrolling) on political participation.	5-Points Likert Scale	Data Collected through Purposive Sampling. (191 respondents)
Democratization	To Measure the effect of four forms of corruption (bribery, favoritism, embezzlement, and logrolling) on democratization	5-Points Likert Scale	

For categorical independent variables: The forms of political corruption in this study are classified into four groups: Bribery, Embezzlement, Favoritism, and Logrolling.

From this point of view, we can interpret that the group, e.g., (strongly agree) respondents suggest that logrolling negatively affects our dependent variables:(democratization and Political Participation).

Moreover, we will see the ordinal regression analysis in the next chapter. A model can be considered a statistical model; the statistical model used in this study is ordinal

regression. Models usually use direct or indirect estimation, which means that the indirect model is used in this study because our study is conducted through indirect measures. Since we ask different people how they view the research questions, we analyze their answers accordingly.

The quantitative section aims to statistically test the individual effects of four forms of corruption on political participation and democratization that formed the below hypotheses. It will test these hypotheses to determine whether they are accepted or rejected.

Table 3.3. Summary of Hypotheses

Variables	Hypotheses	Expected Directions
Forms of corruption	*H_1: Various forms of corruption has effect on political participation*	Probably negative effect
Forms of corruption	*H_2: Various forms of corruption has effect on democratization*	Probably negative effect

3.9 Convergent Mixed Method

Simultaneous mixed-methods design: in the data convergence of mixed-methods analysis, both quantitative and qualitative data are treated as equivalent. Mixed-methods data interpretation falls under the discussion or interpretation section, combines the data (comparing) or juxtaposes or contrasts the results of both data sets in a discussion (Creswell, 2009:613). This involves a side-by-side comparison where the quantitative results are presented first in a discussion section, followed by qualitative reports (citations) to confirm, or refute the quantitative results. (Creswell, 2009:614). This study applied the same approach (side-by-side comparisons or integration introduced by Creswell, 2009. This study used the convergent mixed methods design explained in Figure 3.1.

This mixed-methods study aims to answer the general question: To what extent do the qualitative findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between corruption and political participation and democratization?




Figure 3.2. Convergent **Design**: "Research Design: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Approaches" copyright by John W. Creswell. 4th ed. Sega publications" (2014:618).

3.9.1. Interpretation

Interpretation usually involves discussion of the extent to which the data triangulate or converge. These designs help to confirm, cross-validate, and corroborate the results of the study. Therefore, this study would give equal priority to both methods as suggested by Creswell and his colleagues (Creswell, Hanson, Creswell, & Clark, 2003). It suggested that by merging the two data sets, numerous data sources, such as interviews and field observations, would be integrated and any biases and limitations would be overridden (Anfara et al., 2002:6).

This study will attempt to integrate both data sets and confirm or refute whether the results are the same or dissimilar. Classen et al. (2007) suggested that the investigator has more flexibility to present the quantitative statistical results and address the discussion of the qualitative results – for example, questions that refute or confirm the statistical or analytical results? Both data were collected and analyzed independently in this study, and the results/ findings were interpreted. Therefore, this study would use Classen and friends' (2007; Creswell, 2009) model for side-by-side comparison.

The qualitative method is used to understand where the detailed, complete picture, questions concepts, reports detailed opinions of informants, and conducts the study in a natural context (Creswell, 2014; Creswell, 1998; Miller, 2000).

The interpretation happens in the discussion section of the study. The results and findings from qualitative and quantitative databases are compared and adjusted if there is a difference or convergence between two sources of information (Creswell, 2014:273). There are insufficient quantitative figures in the existing literature to measure how different forms

of corruption affect Somalia's political participation and democratization. This aspect motivated to develop a conceptual framework to measure the research variables that explain the possible relationship between independent and dependent variables. Similarly, qualitative data does not provide sufficient literature how do corrupt practices impact voting turnout, campaign finance, performance transition to democracy, and citizens' attitudes towards governance according to the perception of the respondents.

3.10. Summary of Chapter

Chapter three explained the research method based on a mixed convergent mixed methods design. It revealed the main components of the research process, including the research question, two data, and measurement process. Additionally, it explained the characteristics of the target population (participants), study location, sampling procedures, data collection methods, methods of analysis of the two data sets, and presented the reliability of the study. The following two chapters explain and present the models and discussion of the results/ findings.

4. RESULTS AND FINDINGS: THE IMPACT OF FORMS CORRUPTION ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION

Chapter three of this study presented the research questions, data, methods of data collection, and analysis. Chapter four presents the overall findings/results of the quantitative and qualitative data and combines two data sets accordingly. The first section presents descriptive statistics including sample members, shows the results of the reliability tests, performs normality test, measures the bivariate correlations among variables, and finally explains the ordinal regression intended to determine the effects of the various factors on the outcome variables. The second section focuses on the results of the qualitative analysis, focusing on six themes, which are listed below. Section three presents the combination, contrasts, and interpretation of the results of the mixed method of the study.

Farrales (2018) stated that corruption was initially considered a "specific field of research" in which factors and effects are indispensable to study and regarded that the topic gradually became an academic field and reliable scientific research studies and became a crucial concept be studied, explained, and evaluated. Similarly, this study aims to examine the impact of corruption on political participation and the democratization process in Somalia. Chapter four presents the analysis and results of the quantitative and qualitative data. The total number of research participants was 209. One hundred ninety-one were recruited for questionnaires; simultaneously, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 18 participants. This chapter will first present the results of the quantitative analysis and then explain the results of the qualitative analysis.

4.1. Quantitative Results

191 public and private sector employees in Somalia completed questionnaire via online docs.google.com/forms. The collected data reflected the respondents' attitudes, opinions towards whether four forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling) affect democratization and political participation. Reliability test was performed using Cronbach's alpha. This section presents the quantitative analysis, beginning with descriptive statistics, normality test, bivariate correlations between measured variables, and finally, ordinal registration was performed to test the effect of the factors on the outcome variables.

4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive analysis aims to present summary information about the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and sample characteristics of the survey participants according to the quantitative methodology of the study. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.1. As predicted, the independent variables negatively affect the dependent variable, indicating significant political participation and democratization.

Table: 4.1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Bribery	3.30	0.727	1	5
FAV	3.30	0.733	1	5
EMB	3.46	0.662	1	5
LOG	3.48	0.695	1	5
PPP	3.55	0.708	1	5
DEM	3.81	0.646	1	5

Table 4.1 indicates that all variables have almost equal means though democratization has the largest mean 3.81 while bribery and favoritism have equal means 3.30. The average mean reflects the overall view of the respondents.

Table 4.2. Sample characteristics (N= 191*)*

Profile of the respondents		
Sex	**Frequency**	**Valid %**
Female	45	23.6
Male	146	76.4
Age Group		
20-29	77	40.3
30-39	101	52.9
40-49	8	4.2
50+	5	2.6
Mean	31.82	
Std. Deviation	6.323	
Employment Sector		
Public	89	46.6%
Private	102	53.4%
Experience		
1-5	75	39.5
6-10	95	50.0
11-15	17	8.9
16-20	2	1.1
Over 20	1	.5
Education		
Secondary	2	1.0
Diploma	2	1.0
Bachelor	74	38.7
Master	110	57.6
PhD	3	1.6
Marital Status		
Single	75	39.3
Married	114	59.7
Divorced	2	1.0

Summary of the profile of the respondents

The first section of the quantitative analysis examines the data collected (questionnaires) from one hundred and ninety-one participants from private and public employees in Mogadishu, Somalia. That includes age, education level, gender composition, years of experience had the respondents who participated in this survey.




Figure 4.1. Gender Composition

Figure 4.1 explains the gender composition of the survey participants. 146 were male, representing 76% of the research participants, and 45 were female, representing 24%; this shows that Somali males dominate the positions for both the private and public sectors. The Gender Inequality Index for Somalia is 0.776, indicating total inequality and placing the Horn of Africa country at the fourth top position globally. Moreover, women are affected by higher unemployment than men, 74 percent for women and 6 percent for men (UNDP, Somalia (n.d.)




Figure 4.2. Age composition

Figure 4.2 shows the age composition of the participants in the quantitative survey. The average age of participants (mean) was 32 years; this confirms UNFPA and Somali government estimates that more than 75 percent of Somalia's population is under 30 years old. The minimum age of respondents was 20 years, indicating that the study targeted a sufficiently mature population.

In percentage terms, 24% were 28 years old, 50% were 31 years old and 26% were 34 years old. These statistics indicate that the youth in Somalia form the main base of the Somali people. It follows that most of the participants in the study are youth. The Somali National Youth Policy has recognized Somali youth between the ages of 15 and 40.




Figure 4.3. Sectors of work

As shown in Figure 4.3, the scope of work of quantitative participants. 102 respondents (53. %) work for private organizations and 89 (47%) in government institutions.




Figure 4.4. Experiences

The histogram graph above shows the experience level of the quantitative participants. The average experience of the target respondents was 7 years of experience; in percentiles: 39.5% had 1-5 years of experience, 50% had 6–10-year experiences, 9.5% had over 10 years. which means that most of the respondents had enough experience to answer the questions of the questionnaire as they had four years or more of experience.




Figure 4.5. Education

The figure above shows the educational level of the survey participants. 58% of them have a master's degree while 38. % Said they have a bachelor's degree, only 2% have a doctorate degree, 1% have a secondary certificate, 1% have a diploma, which shows that most of the participants have a master's degree, which ensures that they have enough knowledge to answer the questions in the questionnaire.




Figure 4.6. Marital status

The pie charts above show the marital status of the participating individuals from the quantitative section. Of those approached, 114 were married, accounting for 60% of the total, 75 were single, accounting for 40%, and only 2 of them were divorced, accounting for 1%. A show that the survey mainly targeted married people, and this is because as shown earlier, the participants were on average 32 years old and culturally most people above this age are married in Somali culture.

Reliability tests were conducted using Cronbach's alpha (reliability test) to assess the internal consistency of the six small scales and determine the relationships between the items of each variable (see table 4.2).

Table 4.3. Reliability tests

Scale	No of items	Cronbach's Alpha
Bribery	8	0.628
Embezzlement	8	0.520
Favoritism	8	0.660
Logrolling	7	0.650
Political participation	8	0.630
Democratization	8	0.711

The analysis show that all the scales have acceptable level of reliability. The democratization has the highest reliability (0.711), and the embezzlement has the lowest reliability (0.52). Each respondent was asked her/his opinion regarding the variables of interest via six scales contained a 5-point Liker scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree). Each small scale contained seven to eight statements intended to measure the variable of interest. To carry out the analysis, the scales were coded as following.

Table 4.4. Likert-scale coding

Label	Value
Strongly disagree	1
Disagree	2
Neutral	3
Agree	4
Strongly agree	5

A total score was calculated for each scale and then averaged. The average value represents the respondent's overall view for that variable, for example, if the average value of the

bribery scale is 3. Then, the respondent's overall view on this variable is neutral. Also, to conduct the necessary analysis, the averaged value was used.

Table 4.5. Normality test

Variable	Kolmogorov-Smirnov	Shapiro-Wilk	d.f.	p-value
Political participation	0.313	0.790	191	0.000
Democratization	0.343	0.779	191	0.000

At this point, table 4.5 explains the normality test. For instance, both political participation and democratization do not follow a normal distribution. Both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk were statistically significant, $p < 0.001$, and the null hypothesis stating, "Political participation and democratization come from a normally distributed population" was rejected. When the normality test is not met, many parametric tests may not produce reliable results. Therefore, it becomes necessary to find other tests that can produce more reliable results. In the case of the current quantitative analysis, both the two dependent variables are ordinal. Thus, to examine the effects of the four forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, logrolling, and favoritism) on political participation and democratization, ordinal regression was found to be a suitable statistical model. However, the first other analyses will be presented in the following pages.

4.1.2. Bivariate

The second statistical method used is Spearman's rho to test the correlation between variables. Spearman's rho test is the second statistical model used in quantitative analysis and is used to measure correlations between variables. it is nonparametric measure of the strength and direction of the relationship that exists between two variables measured on at least one ordinal scale(disseration.laerd.com). Spearman's rho test results will be presented in table 4.6 to show the correlation between variables.

Table 4.6. Spearman Correlations

	Bribery	FAV	EMB	LOG
Political participation	0.313**	0.296**	0.220**	0.446**
Democratization	0.205**	0.082	0.221**	0.421**
			N 191	

Correlations are significant at **p<0.001

Table 4.6 Indicates that the four forms of corruption (bribery, favoritism, embezzlement, and logrolling) have significant (p-value<0.01) negative correlations with political participation (0.313, 0.296, 0.22, and 0.45, respectively). Also, democratization has significant (p-value<0.01) negative correlations with the three forms of corruption bribery, embezzlement, and logrolling (0.205, 0.22, and 0.42, respectively). However, democratization negatively correlates with favoritism but not statistically significant p>0.05.

This section compares the information background of the participants. It examines whether respondents' attitudes towards political participation and democratization in Somalia differ by age group, gender, education, employment sector, and experience.

Table 4.7. Attitudes towards political participation by age group, sex, education, employment sector, and experience.

	Mann-Whitney U-test	p-value	Kruskal Wallis test	p-value
Age			6.242	0.044
Sex	3231.0	0.852		
Education	3722.0	0.041		
Employment sector	4487.5	0.880		
Experience level			5.237	0.073
			N	191

The results indicate that respondents' views towards whether the four forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, logrolling, and favoritism) have influence political participation differ by age and education. Older and experienced respondents with a higher degree were more likely to agree than those with lower education. There were no differences by the employment sector, sex, or level of experience.

Table 4.8. Attitudes towards democratization by age group, sex, education, employment sector, and experience.

	Mann-Whitney U-test	p-value	Kruskal Wallis test	p-value
Age			7.433	0.024
Sex	3078.0	0.458		
Education	3302.0	0.001		
Employment sector	4089.000	0.170		
Experience level			20.001	0.000
			N	191

Similarly, as table 4.8 shows, respondents' views towards whether the four forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, logrolling, and favoritism) have influence political participation differ by age, education, and level of experience. Older and respondents with higher education were more likely to agree than those with lower education. There were no

differences by the employment sector, sex, or level of experience. Respondent views did not differ by employment sector and sex.

Table 4.9. General Question: Political corruption has no significant impact on Somalia's political participation and democratization

Sex		Frequency	Valid %
	Strongly Disagree	14	31.1
Female	Disagree	9	20.0
	Neutral	3	6.7
	Agree	14	31.1
	Strongly Agree	5	11.1
	Total	45	100.0
	Strongly Disagree	80	54.8
Male	Disagree	39	26.7
	Neutral	5	3.4
	Agree	14	9.6
	Table 4.6 (Cont.)		
	Strongly Agree	8	5.5
	Total	146	100.0

First, most of the respondents were asked with a general statement on the subject. Table 4.9 showed that respondents strongly disagreed and believed that corruption significantly impacts Somalia's political participation and democratization. Secondly, half of the female respondents agreed with this statement, and the other half disagreed. However, most males disagreed with this concept and believed that corruption significantly impacts Somalia's political participation and democratization.

4.1.3. Ordinal regression results

In this analysis, the purpose was to examine the effects of four forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling) on democratization and political participation. As explained in the previous sections, a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) was used to measure respondents' attitudes. Also, to obtain the respondent's overall views on a particular variable, such as bribery, their views on bribery effects were summed and averaged. The averaged values represented the final values of each variable. Similarly, to conduct an ordinal regression analysis, the dependent variable must be in an ordinal measurement scale; thus, both democratization and political participation were initially measured in an ordinal measurement scale using a 5-point Likert scale. Two ordinal regression models were run using IBM SPSS statistics version 26.

Model 1: In the first model, political participation was regressed on the four forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling).

Model Assumption testing

First, for most, each statistical procedure has certain assumptions that must be met to produce meaningful results. The central assumption of ordinal regression is the parallel lines (proportional odds) assumption (O'connell, 2006:29). The assumption of parallel lines was not violated, and the null hypothesis was accepted at (p-value 0.090), and the final model was statistically significant at (p-value = 0.000).

H0: The null hypothesis states that the model's location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same across response categories.

H1: The alternative hypothesis states that the model's location parameters (slope coefficients) are not the same across response categories.

Table 4.10. Multivariate analysis predicting effects of four corruption forms on political participation

		Estimates	Std. Error	Wald	p-value	C I	
						Low	Up
Threshold	PP = 1	-9.475	1.529	38.406	0.000	-12.472	-6.479
	PP = 2	-8.014	1.421	31.803	0.000	-10.800	-5.229
	PP = 3	-4.833	1.369	12.470	0.000	-7.515	-2.150
	PP = 4	-0.426	1.215	.123	0.726	-2.808	1.956
Location	Bribery=2	-1.426	1.098	1.688	0.194	-3.577	0.725
	Bribery=3	-0.820	0.970	0.715	0.398	-2.721	1.081
	Bribery=4	-0.780	0.929	0.705	0.401	-2.600	1.040
	Bribery=5	Reference category					
	FAV=1	-0.555	2.838	0.038	0.845	-6.119	5.008
	FAV=2	-0.732	1.084	0.456	0.499	-2.855	1.392
	FAV=3	-0.359	0.939	0.146	0.702	-2.199	1.481
	FAV=4	0.040	0.867	0.002	0.964	-1.660	1.740
	FAV=5	Reference category					
	LOG=1	-5.663	2.304	6.043	0.014	-10.179	-1.148
	LOG=2	-3.530	1.367	6.671	0.010	-6.209	-.851
	LOG=3	-2.363	1.220	3.751	0.053	-4.754	0.028
	LOG=4	-1.166	1.171	0.993	0.319	-3.461	1.128
	LOG=5	Reference category					
	EMB=1	21.502	0.000			21.502	21.502
	EMB=2	-1.699	1.370	1.539	0.215	-4.384	0.985
	EMB=3	-1.706	1.124	2.304	0.129	-3.909	0.497
	EMB=4	-1.530	1.097	1.944	0.163	-3.680	0.620
	EMB=5	Reference category					
		Pseudo R^2	0.34			N	191

Link function: Logit 0[a] This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Table 4.10 presents the results of the four-predictor ordinal regression model, and the threshold estimates are the intercept estimates and not of interest to the current analysis. For this model, all four forms of corruption were added to the final model. Logrolling has statistically significant (P<0.05) effects on political participation. If we take the exponent of the coefficients to find the odds ratio, for example, the coefficient of "agree" is (-1.166) to get (0.312) odds ratio, which indicates that respondents were (0.312) times likely to suggest that logrolling results in lower political participation.

On the other hand, embezzlement was not statistically significant (p-value>0.05) on political participation. For bribery, respondents were more likely to suggest that bribery

affects political participation in Somalia, but the results were not statistically significant (p>0.05) (see table 4.3). Similarly, respondents tended to indicate that favoritism influences political participation in Somalia, but the results were also statistically insignificant (p>0.05). Together, these four forms of corruption were responsible for about 34% of respondents' attitudes variations towards political participation in Somalia. Logrolling had a more significant influence on political participation.

Table 4.11. Summary of hypothesis testing regarding whether each of the four forms of corruption affects political participation

Hypothesis	**Coefficient**	**P-value**	**Results**
Hypothesis 1: Bribery	Has negatively affect but not statistically significant	p-value>0.05	Rejected
Hypothesis 2: Embezzlement	Has negatively affect but not statistically significant	p-value>0.05	Rejected
Hypothesis 3: Favoritism	Has negatively affect but not statistically significant	p-value>0.05	Rejected
Hypothesis 4: Logrolling	Has statistically significant effect	p-value<0.05	Accepted

Summary: Model one was analyzed and tested regarding whether each of the four forms of corruption affects political participation. Initially, it was expected that bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling negatively affect political participation; however, after testing the hypothesis, the results show that bribery, embezzlement, and favoritism have an adverse effect not statistically significant. Therefore, it was rejected. Additionally, longlining is the only variable in the model with a statistically significant effect, and therefore it was accepted.

Model 2

In the second model democratization was regressed on the four forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling).

Assumption Testing

The assumption of the parallel lines was met, and the null hypothesis was accepted at (p-value=0.903). Moreover, it was much greater than 0.05. Furthermore, the final model was statistically significant at (p-value = 0.000).

H0: The null hypothesis states that the model's location parameters (slope coefficients) are the same across response categories.

H1: The alternative hypothesis states that the model's location parameters (slope coefficients) are not the same across response categories.

Table 4.12. Multivariate analysis predicting effects of three corruption forms on democratization

		Estimates	Std. Error	Wald	p-value	C I	
						Low	Up
Threshold	DEM = 1	-8.639	1.588	29.589	0.000	-11.752	-5.526
	DEM = 2	-7.448	1.360	29.993	0.000	-10.114	-4.783
	DEM = 3	-3.655	1.180	9.594	0.002	-5.968	-1.342
	DEM = 4	0.210	1.144	0.034	0.854	-2.033	2.453
Location	EMB=1	18.719	0.000	.	.	18.719	18.719
	EMB=2	-3.356	1.233	7.404	0.007	-5.774	-0.939
	EMB=3	-2.228	0.929	5.748	0.017	-4.050	-0.407
	EMB=4	-1.964	0.897	4.793	0.029	-3.723	-0.206
	EMB=5	Reference category					
	LOG=1	0.450	1.917	0.055	0.814	-3.308	4.208
	LOG=2	-3.167	1.304	5.895	0.015	-5.724	-0.611
	LOG=3	-0.917	1.066	0.739	0.390	-3.007	1.174
	LOG=4	0.557	1.035	0.290	0.590	-1.471	2.585
	LOG=5	Reference category					
	Bribery=2	-0.129	0.983	0.017	0.896	-2.056	1.799
	Bribery=3	-0.062	0.855	0.005	0.943	-1.737	1.613
	Bribery=4	-0.262	0.838	0.098	0.754	-1.906	1.381
	Bribery=5	Reference category					
		Pseudo R^2	0.311			N	191

The assumption of the parallel lines was met, and the null hypothesis was accepted at (p-value=0.903). Moreover, it was much greater than 0.05. Furthermore, the final model(fitting) was statistically significant at (p-value = 0.000). In the second model, favoritism was not included in the model to have a better model fit. Embezzlement is statistically significant (p-value<0.05). Again, if we take the exponent of the “agree” coefficient (-1.964) to find (0.14)

indicates that the respondents were (0.14) times likely to suggest that embezzlement negatively affects democratization.

Logrolling has a significant effect on democratization. Although respondents were more likely to agree on logrolling effects on democratization, there were (0.042) odds that respondents indicated that logrolling does not affect democratization. Finally, the bribery effect was not statistically significant at (p-value>0.05). In summary, these three forms of corruption were responsible for about 31% of respondents' attitude variations towards democratization in Somalia. However, logrolling and embezzlement were the two variables that had the more significant influence.

Table 4.13. Summary of hypothesis testing regarding whether each of the four forms of corruption affects democratization

Hypothesis	**Effect**	**P-value**	**Results**
Hypothesis 1: Bribery	Has negatively affect but not statistically significant	p-value>0.05	Rejected
Hypothesis 2: Embezzlement	Has negatively affect and statistically significant.	p-value<0.05	Accepted
Hypothesis 4: Logrolling	Has negatively affect and statistically significant.	p-value<0.05	Accepted

P-value is significant p<0.005

Summary: Bribery was found to affect democratization adversely but was not statistically significant; therefore, hypothesis one was rejected. Logrolling and embezzlement were found to have a statistically significant impact on democratization. Therefore, hypotheses 2 and 4 were accepted. For favoritism, the variable was not included in the model because favoritism (hypotheses:3) had no significant relationship with democratization.




Figure 4.7. Response categories plotted against their probabilities: The table shows that for both model 1 and model 2, compared to strongly disagree (1) and disagree (2) categories, the strongly agree (5) and agree (4) have higher probabilities. Therefore, the respondents were more likely to attribute the low political participation and democratization to the four forms of corruption.

4.2 Qualitative Results

The first part of this chapter analyzes the semi-structured interview discussions conducted from February to April 2021. The qualitative analysis aims to develop meaningful research objectives and to understand the phenomena more deeply. According to Creswell & Creswell (2018:259) it should analyze the collected interviews and write notes that will eventually comprise a narrative report. The qualitative data analysis consists of an overview of the demographic characteristics, a description of the interviews, and a presentation of the thematic analysis. The data were coded and categorized and then developed into themes that were consistent with or reflected the study's conceptual framework.

This section presents the findings/results of the qualitative analysis by focusing on the following six themes, which are listed below: Corrupt practices in elections and campaign financing, Engagement Political Corruption deeply inhibits the democratization process; more political elites receive financial support from abroad, challenges in

implementing universal suffrage, Factors contributing to the rise of corruption in Somalia and embezzlement undermines citizens' trust in government.

At the outset, the central question of the guiding qualitative part of this study is: how do corrupt practices affect voter turnout, campaign financing, the performance of transition to democracy, and citizens' attitudes towards the government according to the perceptions of the respondents working in the public and private sector?

4.2.1. Description of Thematic Analysis

According to Creswell & Creswell (2018:267), the investigator should analyze the previously collected interview and write notes for the final narrative report. The qualitative data analysis in this study used thematic analysis, where the data was coded and categorized and developed into themes that were consistent with or reflected the study's conceptual framework. The entire collected data was carefully examined during the (first reading), the text was divided into parts with coded data, and themes were developed that were finally compared to the other themes.

Table 4.14. illustrates the visual paradigm of qualitative analysis

1.First Reading	2.Divide text into segments of data With Coded data	3.Comparing themes in the case

Table 4.15 the above figure illustrates the process of representing qualitative analysis, derived from Creswell's (2002:244) model of qualitative analysis, which illustrates the visible/visual paradigm of qualitative analysis (p. 244).

Demographic Characteristics Interview participants

The following section presents the demographics of the sample based on qualitative data collection; a semi-structured interview was conducted with 18 participants. The purpose of the descriptive analysis is to present summary information about the sample characteristics of the interview participants according to the qualitative methodology of the study.

Table 4.15. Profile of the interview respondents

Profile of the respondents			
Sex	**Frequency**	**Valid %**	
Female	3	17%	
Male	15	83%	
Age Group			
20-29	1	5.6%	
30-39	13	72.3%	
40-49	2	11.1%	
50+	2	11 %	
Mean			
Std. Deviation	6.323		
Employment Sector			
Public Service/employees	5	27.8 %	
Private sector employees	8	44.4 %	
Independent/Intellectual.	2	11.1 %	
Senator for the upper house	1	5.6 %	
Members of the lower house	2	11.1 %	
Experience			
2-5	4	22 %	
7-10	9	50.1%	
11-20	3	16.8%	
25	2	11.1%	
Table 4.15.(Cont.)			
Level of Education			
Bachelor	3		16.7%
Master	15		83.3%
Marital Status			
Single	4	22.2%	
Married	13	72.2%	
Divorced	1	5.6%	

Source: Primary Date (2021)

Gender Composition: 83% of the interview participants were male and only 17% were female; this dedicates the Somali society is male dominated in both the public and private sectors. Most of the respondents (15) interviewed were male.

Marital Status: Of the respondents approached, 72% were married which means that 13 respondents had a family, 22% were single, only four participants were not married, 6% were divorced which means that one respondent had separated after marriage. An indication that the survey mainly targeted married people. As shown earlier, participants

were on average 37 years old, and culturally, most people above this age are married in Somali culture.

Age composition: of the participants interviewed, the overall average age was 37; the maximum age of respondents was 69, the minimum age was 27, and the average age was 33; this confirms the UNFPA, and Somali government population survey estimates that more than 75 percent of Somalia's population is under the age of 30. These statistics state that the youth in Somalia form the main base of the Somali population. Consequently, most of the participants in the interview are young. The Somali National Youth Policy has recognized Somali youth between the ages of 15 and 35.

Field of work: 27% work for the public sector/employees, 44% work in the private sector. 11% targeted self-employed/intellectuals. 7% were senators for the upper house, 11% members of the lower house.

Experience: respondents had an average of 10 years of experience, which means that most respondents had enough experience to answer the interview questions. They had at least two years of experience, and the highest experience was 25 years.

***Educational level*:** 83% of them had master's degree while 17. % Claimed Bachelor's degree.

4.2.2. Presentation of themes

As Bazeley (2009:6) noted, establishing themes as the goal of the analysis is common in qualitative research. Generally, the thematic analysis of this qualitative analysis is composed of six main themes that we have uncovered through the in-depth review and analysis of the data. As a result, the empirical findings of the qualitative research reflect the conceptual framework of the study.

a) Corrupt practices in elections and campaign financing

Political corruption has been the subject of research in various disciplines in recent decades, including the developing field of interest of campaign finance. Many have engaged in the study of campaign finance in the emerging political processes and elections. Nonetheless, the underlying suspicion of increasing individual donors and arranged trading

activities and precisely unlawful institutions has often been discussed since political leaders came to power. A growing number of abuses have led to an increased distrust of elections in various countries.

Although campaign finance is seen as interest-free money or cash, invisible interests emerge to control the political landscape with their support. In weak public institutions, complicated processes create opportunities for political corruption. However, it was noted in (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Key, 1963) that when campaign finance is relatively high, it has been reported that it could pervade public authority in decision-making processes. That is the reason why elected government officials use their power and control to compensate their donors. That may include, for example, appointments to senior positions, supportive/friendly legislation and, awarding of contracts, and various types of compensation are given solely in return for the financial support provided.

There are no rules and regulations in Somalia that could restrict or prohibit certain forms of campaign finance donations or contributions and made it difficult to determine or identify each candidate's level of campaign financing received or spend during the electoral process.

A comparative study of campaign finance and its relationship with political corruption was examined by Evertsson (2008:80), who found that campaign finance is strongly associated with political corruption. He notes that the exchange of corruption-related activities often begins with campaign contributors (corrupters) seeking to achieve a specific purpose, which may be through the provision of funds to the political leadership's campaign (Truster) by the candidate's political structure (trustee). In addition, political leaders often expect sponsors to compensate them, award procurement contracts, fill senior government positions and pass favorable legislation. That likely has to do with the fact that specific state institutions manage political leaders in power.

Apart from illegal money entanglements with political leaders and campaign contributors, however, campaign finance is a legal business to which many nations have assigned institutions to regulate. That dual relationship generates critical discussion of financial-political contributions in elections as an unlawful act or the aspect of individual respect or ideological endorsement (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:133). It has already been noted that resources are an issue in a democracy, as many pro-democracy political activities cannot

occur without funding. Some scholars claimed that in established democracies, rules for political financing are associated with greater integrity, accountability, and equity for the financial framework of politics. By the end of the 19th century, most democracies had succeeded in abolishing vote-buying and related approaches to electoral bribery. Nonetheless, several different challenges related to money in politics remained unresolved in these government systems (Walecki, 2003:17).

Some believed that in an emergent democracy, equality of opportunity and resources for all citizens was compromised, so that electoral bribery continued to undermine the inclusiveness of political participation. At the same time, those with less or no money have little opportunity to participate in politics, which ultimately undermines democracy. That is compounded by the abuse of political power and the promotion of private interests for personal gain. In recent years, the electoral process in Somalia has been undermined by vote-buying, a non-transparent electoral process, or illegal campaign financing.

On the contrary, electoral bribery has also reached unprecedented levels; most respondents expressed fear that candidates who pay corruption (bribery) in elections are more likely to be elected in Somalia. It has been noted that indirect parliamentary elections are conducted by clan delegates and traditional elders who often demand money from MPs in exchange for their votes. In presidential elections, candidates resort to bribing MPs to win the presidency.

For many years, bribery in Somalia jeopardized political participation, which eventually hurt the democratization process. Even though campaign finance is an integral part of political activities, black money can produce incompetent and ineffective leaders because they are elected based on their money rather than experience, knowledge, and leadership skills. That was illustrated by Honorable Senator Osman, member of Upper House, by saying, "There is no doubt about the existence of political corruption in Somalia." He expressed that bribery in political participation should be curtailed entirely and mentioned that most politicians worldwide regularly run political campaigns through legitimate means. However, many politicians use illegal money for a political campaign in Somalia and even try to bribe the voters" (Respondent 01).

Similarly, Hon. Haji Ali, a member of the lower house of the Federal Parliament of Somalia, expressed that funding political campaigns is essential in every country in the world

because, without money, no parties can compete in the political process. He claimed that "Somalia needs the campaign finance law to regulate the norms of governance." The lack of campaign finance regulation is a significant problem in the Somali electoral process and has increased electoral bribery. That has allowed many politicians to efficiently use illegal money to bribe voters to win elections" (Interviewee 02). In 2016, more than 14000 clan delegates participated in the national indirect elections, electing 275 members to the lower house of Federal Parliament Somalia.

To illustrate this, Somalia's former Auditor General, Mr. Farah, told VoA Somali News that the parliamentary elections held in several states could not be trusted due to rampant corruption, including vote-buying, dishonesty, and threats the key factors that influenced the election. Further, he argued, "Some votes for legislative seats were bought with $5,000, some with $10,000, and some with $20,000 or $30,000. However, not all seats were equal. For some, wealthy and influential candidates competed, spending much money to win their respective seats. The two most contested (valuable) seats paid $1.3 million each, according to the report. The Court documented that one of these seats was won in Galmudug and the other in HirShabbele (Maruf, 2016). Mr. Dhoodaan, a senior academic administrator, expressed that "bribery hinders decent citizens who do not want to pay illegal money to participate in the political competition" (Interviewee, 15).

One interviewee spoke about obstacles related to corruption, pointing out that "bribery limits inclusive political participation, especially when it comes to voting and informed traditional leaders and MPs often demand illegal money from candidates to cast their votes" (Interviewee, 19). An exciting view was expressed by a respondent (11) who said that voters/influencers often demand bribes during election campaigns. That shows that politicians are willing to pay bribes, but the electoral process (participants) were also involved in corruption practices. Moreover, a senior government advisor argued that "When bribery is introduced into the political process, the simple aggregation of voter interests is lost. Those who have money to bribe but not necessarily the best policies are elected, leading to voter apathy.

In this case, the voice of the citizen is drowned out by voter bribery." He mentioned that the Somali people perceive the international community consisting of UN, US, UK, EU, and AMISOM as the "sixth clan in the country." They support the peace process in Somalia; on the other hand, many foreign diplomats, mainly from Qatar and UAE, directly or

indirectly influence the decisions of the political leadership; they bring too much illegal money to bribe politicians or opposition groups. In comparison, Hon. Ahmed, a member of the lower house of the federal parliament of Somalia, expressed his view that individual skills and qualifications are irrelevant to the political process. He also noted that lack of resources is a significant issue that prevents citizens from participating in elections and contesting for elected positions such as legislative seats, ministerial positions, and the presidency (Respondent, 03).

b) Voting Participation

Participation in political activities usually requires resources (money) to promote party vision. Andrews and Inman (2009:6) found a strong influence of corruption on participation. Several experts have cited corruption as the main factor limiting political participation in Africa (Lemarchand 1972; Andrews & Inman, 2009). Andrews & Inman (2009:3) conclude that corruption severely impacts when the economic situation is inadequate. That is confirmed by most interview participants who agree with the statement of the primary factors contributing to the rise in the level of corruption in Somalia: economic hardship, lack of jobs, and insecurity.

Apart from this, voter turnout is crucial and faces many challenges in Somalia's elections. For example, in Kismayo in Jubbaland state and Baidoa in southwestern Somalia, many delegates have been forcibly restricted, threatened, and excluded from the process. Somalia's top auditor said clan delegates were threatened; some had withdrawn out due to fear. Others were not allowed to vote and were locked out of polling stations, unlike others who used their names to vote. Further classifying why some seats were more expensive than others or those candidates are businessmen and influential people who believe that participation in the legislative assembly provides protection and immunity, and elected representatives use their seats as a refuge (Maruf, 2016).

The U.S. State Department report highlighted that the electoral process for Somalia's legislative assembly was generally considered flawed and riddled with corruption; the statement cited numerous facts of corruption, restrictions on political participation, and illegal arrests with politically motivated goals (U.S. State, Dep., 2019).

According to Transparency International (2020; 2019), Somalia is considered the most corrupt country globally. Most political candidates in Somalia use bribery to maintain

their political authority and protect their best interests at the expense of the rest of the people. In Somalia, "there are two groups: the first group enters politics to protect their business (private) interests while the second group enters politics to enrich themselves. Maybe the first group uses illegal money to stay in power" (Interviewee, 02).

c) More political elites receive financial support from abroad

Since the 2000s, the international community (foreign countries) has shown its interest in Somalia's internal affairs. Mainly from Gulf countries, Western countries, and neighboring countries. However, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have played an indispensable role in the rise of political corruption and bribery in the electoral process to influence government decisions and the power of political leaders. Surprisingly, there is a remarkable result of Over half of the respondents said that Qatar and UAE are the most influential countries in the current political process and play a significant role in government decisions related to domestic and foreign policy. Few respondents indicated that European Countries might also be involved in political corruption in Somalia. One respondent argued that Somalia is in a strategic location were international and regional powers fight for influence over Somalia's internal affairs. That confirmed that participants broadly showed that Gulf states (UAE, QATAR, and KSA) financially support Somalia's political leaders, especially during parliamentary and presidential elections.

The International Crisis Group reported that many factions within the government manage the highest public institutions, massive, complicated, and downright sprawling across the country's borders. The lack of accountability (punishment) and the work of their members and control over the system to support their greed is extraordinary. They are not fit to hold public positions and need to be pressured, sanctioned, and isolated (ICG, 2011: i). An exciting finding from the interview discussion revealed that many foreign countries are involved in the political process and political corruption.

On the other hand, different views have been expressed that the EU is supporting the democratization process in Somalia and providing humanitarian aid to exploit the country's rich natural resources. The UN and the US also play an essential role in the peace building process and had hidden agendas. Concerns about the role of foreign nations were widespread and often supported a particular politician who could dictate their political agenda. In response to election bribery, Mr. M. Hassan said, "The first tool the politician uses are

bribery and tribalism to promote his/her political agenda." Every citizen knows that without corruption, most of the political elites would not carry out political activities.

Moreover, clan leaders do not consider the skills and abilities of candidates and instead support people who have money or pay bribes. (Interviewee, 09). It was suggested that political elites use any means to stay in power or bribery to get elected. noted, "that in the case of Somalia is not an exception; we see that some MPs have been in power for almost 20 years, and they are still in power without fear of losing their position, which indicates that they manage to protect their interests." (Respondent, 02). A few respondents indicated that most political elites use false methods, including bribery, to protect their interests while seeking public office.

In Somalia, bribing voters to stay in power is a common practice, so much money is sometimes visibly exchanged within election halls. It is common to see today that numerous political elites have been in power for many years; it is believed that the only way to stay in power is to pay bribes to clan leaders who are the gatekeepers at elections. As a result, in Somalia, the politician's interest comes first and not the public's interest. Since the public has no role in electing their respective representative freely, the bribe money does.

According to the report (ICG 2018: ii), the Gulf state has aggressively fueled instability and made it risky. The previous conflict between the Gulf States has had a very negative impact on the weak nation of Somalia, which is directly torn between the contested interests of Qatar and the UAE. The rivalry has so far muddled the intra-Somali political conflict. Somali officials recently seized millions of U.S. dollars from an Emirati plane that had landed in Mogadishu, claiming the cash was evidence of UAE interference in domestic politics. However, the Emirati government has denied the allegation, arguing that the money was intended to pay the salary of the Somali national army.

Moreover, as the UN Somalia Monitoring Group revealed, the recent Gulf crises had further implications for the internal affairs of Somalia and the region. The connection between the two states also exacerbated previous tensions between the federal government and regional administrations (UNSC, 2018:30). Turning now to the speech of the prominent opposition leader, Mr. Shakur spoke about political corruption, stating that it is flourishing in public institutions, primarily through logrolling and vote-buying. Farmajo's government has massively targeted and eliminated senior positions in the bureaucracy and (filled) new

civil servants who show their loyalty to the leadership, promoting political partisanship and nepotism.

He added that "when the government appoints senior government officials: such as a military commander, ambassador or director-general are not considered based on their competence and qualifications. Shakur mentioned that only high-level positions are given to those who have the support of their deputies - in exchange for their legitimate power (or to compromise their oversight role)" (Shakur, 2020); claimed that the government abuses its power through corruption. He explained that when the government wants to pass a motion, it bribes MPs to influence their decisions - noting that most of the money used comes from Gulf countries. Citizens are losing their confidence in the government, and the federal parliament has lost public trust and the value of parliamentary immunity (Shakur, 2020).

There is widespread concern about corrupt political funds threatening democratic governance. Political corruption has compromise democratic principles, reduce voters' political participation, distrust public officials, and reinforce authoritarian patterns. Citizens understand campaign finance and party misconduct from a broader perspective that dominates distrust of the processes of politics and public institutions. In numerous democratic systems, new restrictions and significant government subsidies have been initiated to respond to financial mismanagement (scandals) and social pressures to stop corruption by limiting undue and disproportionate influence over candidates and parties (Walecki, 2003:8).

Recently, the former U.S. ambassador to Somalia, Mr. Schwartz, alleged that the head of the country's national intelligence agency, Fahad, acts as a political commander and conduit for secret money into Somalia. Schwartz added that the man has significant influence over the federal government and the country's head of state, complicating the political decision-making process in Somalia. No rule defines the type of contributions that political parties/candidates can legally receive, and no regulation restricts illicit money in the country. Also, the country lacks the transparency and accountability measures to investigate the sources of political funding and lacks mandatory financial disclosure and reporting. In summary, most participants agreed that corrupt elections and illegal political campaigns are commonly practiced by political actors/candidates seeking public office in Somalia. Due to this fact, all actors including clan delegates and traditional leaders demanded bribe from

legislative candidates and elected parliamentarians demand bribe from presidential candidates.

d)Engagement political corruption deeply inhibits the democratization process

Many scholars widely discuss the relationship between corruption and democratization. Indeed, Mondo's (2014:2) study concludes that the primary concern of corruption is linked to democratization or democracy in many of its extensive ideas. Rose-Ackerman (1975:6) argues that is a personal profit motive in which numerous actors cooperate to increase their earnings through a system beyond the law. In other words, Gambettas' views suggested that political corruption is a rent-seeking action in which individuals seek to realign government policy and work for individual gain. For Gambetta, the classified types of political corruption are favoritism, bribery, and dishonesty (extortion) (Gambettas, 2002:44-45).

In addition, (Jain 1998:93) showed that corruption involves the use of criminal procedures, while rent-seeking individuals address the rule to benefit their interests. Scholarly publications on causes of corruption concluded a close relationship between developed and consolidated democracies and the minimum level of corruption (Pellegata, 2012; Serra, 2004; Treisman, 2000; 2007). Moreover, the organizational-institutional literature has highlighted democratization as an essential role that society shows to achieve lower corruption stability.

Most of the basic assumptions examined in the literature state that democratization should reduce corruption, which implies that it has a direct negative impact on corruption (Mondo, 2014:11). Unlike Sandholtz & Koetzle (2000:44), the influence of prolonged democratization on corruption has been negatively associated with corruption in democratic governments. That related to the debate that democratization, in the long run, requires the consolidation of democratic principles that promote widespread rejection of corruption, which would also serve to strengthen social oversight of government.

Most recent evidence points to a non-direct impact of democratization on corruption. Where corruption is most likely to increase in the very short to medium term, considering the democratic transition and the decrease in the level of corruption can only be observed in the long term. The previous study highlighted that shorter attribute associated with such a

relationship, especially the specific extent of consolidation of democratization, can take a long time, affecting corruption (Mondo, 2014:6).

The federal government of Somalia has failed to complete the draft constitution, build a strong national army, and carry out a comprehensive national reconciliation. On the contrary, the government is trying to interfere in parliamentary affairs by dominating the legislative process by taking more MPs into the cabinet. Ultimately, the role of parliament in exercising oversight and accountability is compromised and undermined (Shakur, 2020).

Rationally, no country will succeed in its democratization unless it improves national security, strengthens economic development, and reduces unemployment. For example, one interviewee said, "Underdeveloped countries in Africa are generally plagued by deep hunger and extreme poverty; therefore, democracy is not the priority for them, democratization as such will only be a second priority. For example, most Somali political leaders come to power to make money; even those who have money/business seek power to protect their private interests and increase their income. said that, if the country develops its economy, political corruption will automatically decrease" (Interviewee, 02).

A decade of civil war and political cleavage have contributed to Somalia's most impoverished nations in Africa. Almost 7 out of 10 Somalis are affected by poverty (Pape & Karamba, 2019). On the other hand, there are many reasons why political corruption has delayed Somalia's democratization process. These can be linked to the inadequate legal framework, lack of political commitment and resources, rampant political corruption, constant political instability between the federal government and federal member states, political actors, and lack of conflict resolution mechanisms which remain significant challenges to a successful transition to democracy.

As one interviewee commented, "Bribery is a significant obstacle to Somalia's successful democratization process and is influenced by all forms of political corruption that hinder the achievement of a successful general election" (Interviewee, 09). interviewee put it, "Those in power and controlling state resources will seek to hold on to power by corrupting the democratic process. That will lead to delays in critical steps necessary for full democratization, including holding fair and free elections, establishing an independent judiciary, and applying the law in an equal manner. For this reason, and because corruption

will be the primary tool of those in power, it is always the main obstacle to the democratization process" (Respondent, 11).

To further discuss this issue, one respondent said, "In Somalia, corrupt leaders are not accountable to the public, which goes against the principles of democracy and hinders the achievement of full democracy." He also noted that corruption delays the democratization process. Participants revealed that corruption hinders successful democratization in Somalia because politicians came to power for a long time through money, which prevented the rest of the people from participating in the political process. The prevalent view among respondents was that it had created more political elites who try to stay in power through bribery and embezzlement; they agreed that political corruption delays the democratization process and prevents inclusive participation of those who have the competence, skills, and skills knowledge to lead elected positions.

Most participants agreed that buying votes from clan delegates and traditional leaders for parliamentary seats has damaged citizens' trust in the legislature, which is expected to represent the will of the people, as many critics claimed that Somalia's political leaders have never attempted to take the necessary steps to achieve the one-person-one-vote election. One participant commented, "Political corruption is the key problem hindering the achievement of universal suffrage in Somalia. It also has negative consequences fulfilling the fulfillment of true democracy. Moreover, bribery, bias, and mismanagement have destroyed Somalia's democratization process" (Respondent, 14). Another interviewee alluded those incumbents try to retain their seats and be re-elected in every election so that the status quo remains unchanged. He further argues that corruption and democracy are incompatible. The clan delegates and traditional leaders select candidates to bribe and buy their votes (Respondent, 17).

Various views were expressed on how political corruption deeply hinders the democratization process in Somalia. Some believe that the Somali government has failed to promote the democratization process, fight political corruption, and build strong public institutions. The country faced fierce fighting, internal displacement, food insecurity, humanitarian crises, and a general lack of functioning governance structures. Nevertheless, it was worth noting that there had been at least one peaceful transfer of power between successive governments during the two decades in which indirect elections had been held.

Most participants agreed that political corruption in Somalia has negatively affected and hindered successful democratization.

e) Challenges in implementing universal suffrage

Treisman (2007) suggested that a democracy that delivers high scores can expect a low score for observed corruption. In Somalia, democracy has been replaced by a clan-based political system that allows only a few clan representatives and traditional elders to participate in elections, which has led to electoral fraud, restrictions on political participation, and vote buying. With this respect, interview respondents were asked this question: If Somalia introduces universal suffrage, the rampant political corruption can be reduced.

Half of the respondents agreed that universal suffrage could reduce the level of corruption in Somalia. They argued that both candidates (MPs and Presidential candidates) could not afford to bribe all citizens or voters to win the election. They suggested that this will also reduce political inequality as more people will get a chance to participate in the electoral process. This way, citizens can vote for the best politician/party that serves the will of the people instead of money. However, universal suffrage will only go so far in taming political corruption in Somalia. In an interview, it was said, "Universal suffrage will increase the cost of corruption for those who seek power because it will be harder to bribe the entire population. Strong institutions that monitor the electoral process and enforce the laws will equally tame political corruption" (Respondent, 11).

Identified several problems, agreed that the implementation of universal suffrage could reduce political corruption; every citizen should have the right to vote without fear of intimidation, corruption, and exclusion. One interview discussed this issue differently. He pointed out that "corruption remains even if individual corruption is eliminated because political corruption advances to the second level as political parties use the money to win elections. Historically, political corruption existed in Somalia since independence and used the most powerful parties to win elections" (Interviewee, 02). For example, in recent years, Somalia has had indirect elections (51 clan delegates), often bribed by candidates. It is believed that confronting and controlling corruption, the government needs to practically address these issues, such as improving law enforcement and building strong public institutions, significantly reducing political corruption in Somalia.

f) Factors contributing to rise of corruption in Somalia

In a recent study by Kaufmann & Mastruzzi (2009:18-20), it was found that various countries are less focused on fighting corruption, while only a few countries have significantly improved and fought corruption cases in the last decade. As the Corruption Perception Index shows, the level of corruption in Somalia has gone through various stages and is currently at its highest. A previous study found that economic development could reduce the need for bribes, although developed countries characterized by well-established liberal democracies, freedom of the press, and more women in public institutions are considered less corrupt (Treisman, 2007:211).

According to the report published by ICG (2011: i), the level of corruption in government institutions increased significantly, and many domestic and international observers believe that the previous governments became the most corrupt since the succession of unproductive transitions in 2000. An inadequate legal framework and weak law enforcement agencies were unanimously cited as factors contributing to corruption in Somalia. High unemployment, clan-based politics, and the lack of anti-corruption, accountability, and freedom of expression policies have also contributed to an increase in corruption in Somalia. A study conducted by Freedom House (2019) has found that freedom of expression in Somalia is often disrupted, illegally arrested, and coerced by government and non-state actors. One interview stated that "The lack of an adequate legal framework and weak law enforcement agencies have contributed to the level of corruption in Somalia" (Respondent, 11).

Rahman (2017:9) recently found that some of the leading causes of corruption in Somalia are high poverty levels, the non-existent efficiency of the government recruitment system. In addition, widespread unemployment, lack of an anti-corruption system or prevention, weak law enforcement, and limited socio-economic justice. One interviewee argued that the key factors contributing to corruption in Somalia are the lack of a justice system and noted that some people seek justice from al-Shabaab (terrorist group). He added that the lack of a functioning government and weak public institutions, especially law enforcement, and the failure of anti-corruption policies (Respondent, 01).

In addition, it was suggested that few clan representatives and traditional leaders participated in Somalia's parliamentary elections that led most politicians to buy votes from the electorate. It claimed that "the private sector must not use corruption practices to get a

contract from the government" (Respondent,10). For example, one respondent talked about the problem of increasing corruption is insecurity: argued that "if the country has better security and active law enforcement agencies then all public officials committed deterioration could be quickly arrested and charged (Respondent, 12). Overall, these findings suggest that the current government is trying to control corruption cases at the lower level, especially among public officials. On the other hand, many believed that corruption is rampant at the top level of government officials. Most high-ranking political leaders seek financial support from abroad to stay in power, promote their political influence, and buy electoral votes.

g) Embezzlement undermines citizens' trust in government

The trust of citizens in government work fluctuates worldwide, undermining government agencies and representatives (Al-Hossienie & Anny, 2019:1). Democratic government turns into an artificial entity when it fails to live up to its responsibilities - through unfair treatment and discrimination in public services, widespread exploitation of government agencies for self-interest. That increases distrust, which may worry citizens and make the political transition more complex, requiring decreasing government trust. There is no doubt that corruption weakens citizens' trust in government and affects institutional effectiveness. Today, many citizens do not have complete confidence in the actions of their government due to corruption and mismanagement of public resources (Al-Hossienie & Anny, 2019:1).

The following comment illustrates this. In an interview, it was said, "I think the current government is better than other previous governments. However, the government has failed to deliver essential public services, promote freedom of expression, protect liberty, and access to free health services. All of these remain a challenge, and in some areas, it is even worse" (Interviewee, 04). In contrast, one interviewee argued that corruption weakens people's trust in government because citizens often expect the government to provide goods and services to all citizens. If there is no transparency within the government, citizens will not have confidence in the accountability of the government (Interviewee 05).

Overall, these results show that citizens' trust towards the government of Somalia is relatively low. Most respondents agreed that the Somali government had made several missteps - for example, the recent conflict in the Gulf, which severely affected Somalia's

foreign and domestic affairs after the federal government declared its neutral position and did not support sides. In practice, however, Somali leaders were observed to travel frequently to Doha, not to UAE (Interviewee, 07).

In contrast, most participants argued that such a decision was not in the national interest. The UAE and KSA are the main trading partners of the Somali people, while Qatar only has contact with the political leadership. It was common for politicians to contest elections by bribing voters; it is not easy to build public trust that promotes the best interest of citizens. In a democracy, individuals work in the best interest of citizens and do not try to bribe voters; in Somalia, those who pay more bribes are elected. In this way, the effects of corruption have weakened citizens' trust in government and undermined the effectiveness of institutions.

4.3. Mixed Method Analysis

This section discusses the results of the quantitative analysis and the themes developed from the qualitative analysis. Both forms of data are brought together (combined) through a visual matrix as a side-by-side comparison; the combined matrix is presented in table 4.15. We will also have discussed the areas of data confirmation and contradiction for both forms of data. Combining is one such form of data to interpret and improve the results in each other (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Graham (1989) e et al., 1989). The mixed-methods approach represents the final part of the data analysis where both data are interpreted, contrasted, and compared using the data convergence matrix, followed by a discussion matrix. In this regard, this mixed-methods approach could provide a deeper understanding of how participants' attitudes towards corruption influence political participation and democratization in Somalia.




Figure 4.8. Mixed-methods design for this study. illustrates the data collection methods of date sets and analysis. In addition, the results from qualitative and quantitative aspects were combined for triangulation. Each aspect of the data was used to capture and interpret each other.

4.3.1. Summary of Quantitative Findings

The objective of the quantitative analysis was to determine whether the various forms of corruption (bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling) have a statistically significant impact on political participation and democratization. Descriptive statistics presented, bivariate correlations of all variables were calculated using Spearman's rho, a statistical test for measuring correlations between ordinal variables, four forms of corruption (bribery, favoritism, embezzlement, and logrolling) have significant (p-value<0.01) negative correlations with political participation (0.313, 0.296, 0.22, and 0.45, respectively). Also, democratization has significant (p-value<0.01) negative correlations with the three forms of corruption bribery, embezzlement, and logrolling (0.205, -0.22, and 0.42, respectively). However, democratization negatively correlates with favoritism but not statistically significant $p>0.05$.

Political participation was regressed on the four types of corruption. The results show that Logrolling has statistically significant (P<0.05) effects on political participation. For example, the coefficient of "agree" is (-1.166) to get (0.312) odds ratio which indicates that respondents were (0.312) times likely to suggest that logrolling results in lower political participation. Respondents were more likely to suggest that Favoritism, embezzlement, and bribery negatively affects political participation in Somalia, but the results were not statistically significant.

Democratization was regressed on the four types of corruption. The results show that embezzlement has statistically significant (p-value<0.05) effects on democratization. Again, if we take the exponent of the "agree" coefficient (-1.964) to find (0.14) indicates that the respondents were (0.14) times likely to suggest that embezzlement negatively affects democratization. Logrolling has a statistically significant effect on democratization. However, respondents were more likely to agree that logrolling affects democratization; there were (0.042) odds that respondents tend to indicate that logrolling does not affect democratization. Finally, the bribery effect was not statistically significant at (p-value>0.05). However, logrolling and embezzlement were the two variables that had the more significant influence.

In summary, Pseudo R^2 for three forms of corruption were responsible about 31% of respondents' attitude variations towards democratization in Somalia. On the other hand, Pseudo R^2 Together with four forms of corruption were responsible about 34% of respondents' attitudes variations towards political participation in Somalia.

4.3.2. Summary of qualitative findings

In the qualitative part, all the data collected during the (first reading) were carefully examined, the text was divided into parts with coded data, and themes were developed, which were finally compared with the overarching themes reflecting the study's conceptual framework.

The main findings were presented as follows.

First, participants believe that buying votes from clan delegates and traditional elders for parliamentary seats has damaged citizens' confidence in the legislature, which is expected

to represent the will of the people, as many critics noted that Somali political leaders have avoided taking the necessary steps to achieve the one-person-one-vote election.

Secondly, most participants agreed that political corruption in Somalia has negatively affected and hindered the process of successful democratization. That confirms Sandholtz & Koetzle (2000:42), who found that corruption is negatively associated with corruption in democratic governments. Although these findings suggest that the current government has tried to curb corruption cases at the lower level, especially among civil servants, the number of corruption cases at the upper level remains high.

Third, many critics believe that corruption is rife at the highest levels of government officials. Thus, most high-ranking political leaders seek financial support abroad to stay in power, increase their political influence and buy votes. That confirms that most interview participants agreed that the main factor behind the rise of corruption in Somalia is that foreign countries provide bribes to politicians to win elections.

In summary, the two main verification procedures proposed by Creswell in 1998 were used: The first was triangulation, which involves collecting data collection from different people; we collected data from different sources, including officials and private employees in Mogadishu; as part of this process, we compiled all interview discussions and produced a summary for cross-checking.

After conducting data collection and analysis, the interview transcription was returned to the research participants to confirm the information and validity of the description. The second validation process is member checking: these validation approaches start from the participants; this stage is crucial for building credibility.

4.3.3. Presentation of the Mixed-methods Analysis

A mixed-methods design, like the convergence design, is a methodological procedure that supports the combination of quantitative and qualitative data and is considered for the third stage of the analysis. In general, the combination of quantitative and qualitative data should deepen the research phenomena, facts, and trends that could help it understand the research problems more broadly and provide a richer explanation of the factors that may contribute to the outcome variables.

The mixed methods research question for this study was: To what extent do the qualitative findings contribute to a richer understanding of the predictive relationship between corruption on political participation and democratization? To better understand data convergence, Creswell (2009:613) analyzed the mixed method, which often comes from the discussion section or interpretation; it combines two data sets. For example, one type of data is transformed into the other so that they are contrasted).

The study created a data convergence matrix to present the qualitative and quantitative results in a side-by-side summary. Alternatively, the results of the two data sets are merged side by side in the discussion section, with the quantitative statistical results initialized, followed by qualitative reports (quotation) that confirm or refute the quantitative results. The two data sets and results could be compared or integrated side by side in the study.

Similarly, how a matrix combines data has been explored in depth by Bazeley (2009) and his colleagues Creswell, Clark, 2011; Miles & Huberman, 1994); all noted that a matrix is an essential means of combining different forms of data. They also pointed out that combining qualitative and quantitative data in a matrix allows for combinations and comparisons and enables the audience to understand how data provides clues to the research investigation or topic being presented.

Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that the presentation of reduced data has implications for understanding. Considering the research questions and what parts of the data are needed to answer them, it is necessary to provide complete analyses while consistently highlighting and arranging the information.

In this context, a data convergence matrix was constructed based on four corruption factors (types) that may affect Somalia's political participation and democratization. That is in line with the purpose of this study; these factors were used from quantitative research questions and developed themes combined from qualitative data analysis. The detailed matrix is presented in table 4.15.

Table: 4.16. Data convergence factors matrix

Quantitative Data	Qualitative Data	Convergence
	Factor 1: Logrolling	
Logrolling has statistically significant *(P<0.05) affects on political participation* and democratization.	"There *was a time when the Upper House (FPS) was debating the Somali aviation Bill, the Prime Minister's office has deliberately interrupted the closed session and caused a lack of of quorum to delay the vote on Bill (Respondent, 01).* "Vote-Buying" has the presidential elections had been increased; it is understood that Somalia's corrupt leaders are not accountable to the public, which violates the principle of democracy and hinders the achievement of full democratization (Respondent,11). Most participants agreed that buying votes from clan delegates and traditional leaders for parliamentary seats has damaged citizens: trust in the legislature and failed attempted to take the necessary steps to achieve procedure democracy.	Confirmed

Factor 2: Bribery	
	Confirmed
Respondents were more suggest that bribery Negatively affect on political participation but The result was not statistically significant.	"Generally, few clan delegates and traditional elders participate Parliamentary elections. Thus, politicians use illegal money for a political campaign and even try to bribery the voters" (Respondents, 01).
Respondents more likely to strongly agree Bribery negatively effect on democratization but Comparison was not statistically significant.	Bribery limits inclusive political participation especially When it comes to voting and informed traditional elders and clan delegates often illegally demand from candidates to cast their votes (Respondent 18). Bribery has significant obstacles Somalia's successful democratization process (Interview. 09).

Factor 3: Embezzlement		
Embezzlement has statistically significant (P<0.0) respondents were (0.14) times likely to suggest that embezzlement negatively affects democratization. On the other hands, respondents were More likely to tend that embezzlement negatively affect on political participation but the result Statistically insignificant	"political elites who seek to remain in power use bribery and embezzlement to prevent political participation for those who have the competency, skills, and knowledge and delay the democratization process (Respondent, 14). Moreover, mismanagement of public resources is devastating Those in power and control state seek to hold power by corrupting democratic principles and that will cause to delay in critical steps necessary for full democratization (including holding of fair and free elections) (Interview, 09). A prevalent view among respondents was that it had created more political elites who try to stay in power through bribery and embezzlement.	Confirmed
Factor 4: Favoritism		
The lowest estimate score favoritism was found to be least associated with democratization. However, respondents were more likely to strongly agree that favoritism negatively affect on political participation. In Somalia, but not statistically insignificant.	It was suggested that the public servants are recruited through Nepotism and favoritism (interviewee, 12). On interview argued that "We see a lot of corruption and favoritism in the public recruitment process and whole process is not fair and transparency (Respondent, 01).	Contradict

Range confirmation

The two data sets are merged and compared in a convergence matrix, and it is declared whether the two data confirm or disconfirm. There are three areas of confirmation found in the data comparison. The first area of confirmation was in logrolling, which has a more substantial influence on political and democratization in Somalia. For this reason, I will discuss these areas of confirmation in the following section.

First confirmation: Logrolling has statistically significant ($P<0.05$). For example, the coefficient of “agree” is (-1.166) to get (0.312) odds ratio which indicates that respondents were (0.312) times likely to suggest that logrolling results in lower political participation. On the other hand, the results indicate that logrolling is statistically significant and negatively affects democratization.

In contrast, for qualitative results: Participants in the qualitative data confirmed that logrolling and voter buying of legislators had increased dramatically recently during presidential elections. In the qualitative data, logrolling and voter buying wreak havoc in Somalia's parliamentary elections; informants felt that logrolling hinders democratization (Respondent 01; 11).

Furthermore, most participants agreed that political corruption in Somalia has negatively affected and hindered the process of successful democratization. For many years, bribery in Somalia jeopardized political participation, which eventually harmed the democratization process. Most participants agreed that buying votes from clan delegates and traditional leaders for parliamentary seats has damaged citizens’ trust in the legislature and failed to take the necessary steps to achieve procedure democracy.

The second area that was confirmed was bribery. For bribery, respondents were more likely to agree that bribery negatively affects political participation, and democratization, but neither comparison was statistically significant. On the contrary, As described earlier in the qualitative findings, the results reported here shed new light on bribery in the electoral process that could undermine holistic political participation.

Interestingly, participants were expressed that "bribery limits inclusive political participation, especially parliamentary voting, and informed traditional elders and clan delegates often demand illegality from candidates to cast their votes. To underscore this, one

interview previously elected as a legislator in 2016 said there were few clan delegates and traditional elders in Somalia's parliamentary elections; therefore, politicians preferred to use illegal money for political campaigns and seek to bribe voters. At the same time, those with less or no money have minimal opportunities to participate in politics, which ultimately harms the achievement of full democracy. That meant that many citizens were excluded from participating in the electoral process or voting participation. Similarly, Bribery has significant obstacles Somalia's successful democratization process (Interview, 09).

The third Confirmation, quantitative data, confirmed that embezzlement statistically significant ($P > 0.05$) negatively affects democratization. Respondents were more likely to suggest that embezzlement affects political participation but did not have statistical significance. In qualitative data confirmed: It was reported that those in power and control the state try to hold on to power by corrupting democratic principles and that this leads to a delay in the crucial steps needed for full democratization (Interview, 09). A prevalent view among the interviewees is that the political elites try to stay in power through embezzlement. It uses embezzlement to prevent the electoral participation of those who have the competence to drive Somalia's democratization process (Interviewee, 14).

Areas of Contradictory

There were two areas of contradiction in the data. The first contradiction was in the quantitative and qualitative data regarding favoritism versus democratization and political participation. According to the sample members in the quantitative data, favoritism is least associated with democratization. However, respondents tended to strongly agree that favoritism negatively affects political participation in Somalia, but not statistically insignificant. These two areas of contradiction are discussed in the Qualitative data. The interviewees did not associate favoritism with political participation and democratization; on the other hand, they argued that favoritism is more related to the fact that civil servants are recruited through nepotism and favoritism (Interviewee, 12). Claimed that a lot of corruption and favoritism in the public recruitment process and the whole process is not fair and transparent (Interviewee, 01).

In nutshell, the qualitative results showed that favoritism was not related to political participation or democratization, but interview participants thought favoritism was related

to hiring civil servants and public procurement. The quantitative results show that favoritism adverse effect on political participation but is not related to democratization.

In Brief data convergence matrix

In general understanding, the data convergence matrix gives visible ways to combine the qualitative and quantitative data in the form of integration, interpretation, and comparison. The convergence matrix has focused on four factors determined by the quantitative data previously collected and the themes developing from the qualitative data. In summary, two data some factors were not associated with political participation and democratization. Similarly, some qualitative data were not presented in parallel; these themes stood independently and were discussed in this chapter.

3.4. Summary of Chapter

Chapter four explained the analysis of the quantitative results and the finding of the qualitative results. The first section presented the quantitative results as descriptive statistics. Spearman's rho test was used to measure the correlations between ordinal variables, and ordinal regression analysis was also conducted to determine which forms of political corruption respondents predicted influencing democratization and political participation. The second section was presented the thematic analysis used for qualitative data analysis in this study, whereby data were coded, categorized, and developed into themes consistent with or reflected the study's conceptual framework. The final section presented a mixed-methods analysis, integrating and comparing both qualitative and quantitative data. Both confirmations and contradictions were found in the responses of the quantitative sample members, and several themes emerged from the qualitative data. Next (Chapter V) will be presented the conclusion and discussion of the study and provide relevant recommendations for future studies.

5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The final chapter briefly summarizes what has been detailed in this study, classifies some of the critical implications of the results and findings, and interprets how these findings can be used in future research and application. The literature reviewed examines the evolution of classical corruption and modern development of the concept, and discusses different types of political corruption: bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling.

The study highlighted the central logical argument in democratization and political participation by various scholars, reflecting most recent developments. As mentioned in the previous chapters, political scientists remain methodologically unexplored in the impact of corruption on political participation and democratization in Somalia. Previous studies have focused only on the impact of corruption on democratic principles such as equality, integrity, and accountability. In this context, the study developed a conceptual framework that explains the effect of corruption on both political participation and democratization in Somalia.

Although representative democracy in Somalia remains complex and has shortcomings due to lack of political engagement and low trust in political institutions, the country shared negative perceptions towards the political elite, poor clan identity politics, and disorganized political actors without political education and campaigning resources. Most actors aligned themselves with their clans rather than having a clear political ideology. The country's electoral history has highlighted frustrated elections, periodic disruptions due to military coups, clannism, and the imperfection of multiple transitions that have resulted in a dysfunctional state.

5.1. Overall Findings & Discussions

An ordinal regression model was unified to measure two quantitative research questions. This study introduced other questions, but it will discuss them in the qualitative and mixed methods sections. For quantitative, it was asked one general question: if political corruption has no significant impact on Somalia's political participation and democratization. At the outset, most respondents were presented with a general statement on this topic. However, half of the women agreed with this statement while the other half disagreed with it. It found that most respondents agreed that corruption significantly impacts political participation and democratization in Somalia.

Pearson's results indicate that (bribery, favoritism, embezzlement, and logrolling) have significant (p-value<0.01) negative correlations with political participation (0.313, 0.296, 0.22, and 0.45, respectively). Additionally, democratization has significant (p-value<0.01) negative correlations with bribery, embezzlement, and logrolling (0.205, 0.22, and 0.42, respectively). Nevertheless, democratization negatively correlates with favoritism but was not statistically significant p>0.05.

Model 1: political participation was regressed on four forms (Bribery, Favoritism, embezzlement, logrolling). Notably, the model showed that respondents were more likely to suggest that logrolling has statistically significant and adverse effects on political participation in Somalia. The model showed that bribery, embezzlement, and favoritism negatively affected political participation but was insignificant.

The first model was analyzed and tested regarding whether each of the four forms of corruption affects political participation. Initially, it was expected that bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling negatively affect political participation; however, after testing the hypothesis, the results show that bribery, embezzlement, and favoritism have an adverse effect not statistically significant. Therefore, it was rejected. Additionally, longlining is the only variable in the model with a statistically significant effect, and therefore it was accepted.

Model 2: Democratization was regressed on four forms (Bribery, Favoritism, Embezzlement, logrolling). The second model indicates that Embezzlement and logrolling are statistically significant (p-value<0.05). Bribery adverse effect on democratization but was statistically insignificant). on the other hand, Favoritism was found to be the least associated with democratization, and therefore, it was removed from the final model to have a better model fit. Importantly, logrolling and Embezzlement were the two variables that had the more significant influence on democratization.

Bribery was found to have a negative effect on democratization but was not statistically significant; therefore, hypothesis one was rejected. Logrolling and embezzlement were found to have a statistically significant impact on democratization. Therefore, hypotheses 2 and 4 were accepted. For favoritism, the variable was not included in the model because favoritism had no significant relationship with democratization.

Results from qualitative data: Semi-structured interviews were conducted, and data were analyzed through thematic analysis. As a result, the empirical findings reflect the conceptual framework of the study. The informants in this qualitative research discovered a deeper understanding of the central phenomenon of the study, the impact of corruption on Somali political participation and democratization. Data were analyzed, transcribed, coded, categorized and themes developed using thematic analysis; a report was written using a more flexible approach by drawing out structures, assessing conditions, and summarizing participants' views. The sections below presented the overall findings and discussions of the six themes developed from the qualitative data.

Theme One: The analysis of corruption in elections, political participation, and campaigns in Somalia was based on the following findings. Some respondents indicated that most political elites use illegal methods such as bribery to protect their interests. In general, participants claimed that many political elites have been in power for many years; it is believed that the only way to stay in power is to pay bribes to traditional elders and clan delegates who are the gatekeepers in elections. The result is that in Somalia, the politician's interest comes first and not the interest of the public. Since the public plays no role in electing their respective representatives directly, bribery of clan leaders and limited delegates significantly affects the outcome. In an interview, "We see that some MPs have been at the helm for almost 20 years, and they are still in power without fear of losing their position, which indicates that they manage to protect their interests." (Interviewee, 02). Shakur (2020) claimed that the government abuses its power through corruption. Recently, the former US ambassador to Somalia, Mr. Schwartz (2021), alleged that the head of the national intelligence agency, Fahad, acts as a political commander and conduit for secret funds into Somalia. The study found that there is no regulation to restrict illegal money in the country. There are no clear definitions of political funding that political leaders/candidates can legally receive domestically, but the study found that most presidential candidates receive foreign money during elections.

Comparatively, Walecki (2003:8) concluded that citizens understand misconduct in campaign finance and political parties from a broader perspective that dominates distrust in the processes of politics and public institutions.

The second theme: More political elites receive financial support from abroad. Political elites are crucial stakeholders for the political stability of the country and the

promotion of successful democratization. However, there are many concerns about the role of political elites and their involvement in illicit financial support from foreign. Though International actors systematically initiated the prospect of the Somali state to re-establish an already broken federal system of government in Somalia. After 20 years, the transition supported by the international community has increased political conflict or absolute power and massive electoral corruption.

Most participants felt that the recent Gulf crisis has harmed domestic politics in Somalia and has also exacerbated political corruption in Somalia. Most participants agreed that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates provide most of the illicit funds or financial support for the elections and allow the leaders to influence voters through bribery. It was suggested that political elites use any means to stay in power or bribery to get elected. One interview pointed out "that in the case of Somalia is not an exception; we see that some MPs have been in power for almost 20 years and are still in power without fear of losing their position, which indicates that they manage to protect their interests." (Interviewee 02). An exciting finding from the interview discussion is that many foreign countries are involved in the political process and political corruption; most countries seek to control Somalia's foreign policy towards the region and the Middle East.

Third theme: the analysis of the involvement of political corruption, which deeply hinders the democratization process in Somalia, was explained by the following findings. One interviewee commented, "Bribery is a major obstacle to the successful democratization process in Somalia and is influenced by all forms of political corruption that hinder the achievement of a successful general election" (Interviewee, 09). As one interviewee put it, "Those who are in power and control state resources will try to hold on to power by corrupting the democratic process. That will lead to delays in critical steps necessary for full democratization, including holding fair and free elections, establishing an independent judiciary, and applying the law in an equal manner.

In history, the organization/institutional literature has emphasized democratization as an essential part of achieving less corruption and having experienced stability. Sandholtz & Koetzle (2000) suggested that forms of corruption influence the long process of democratization.

Tying political corruption to those in power is the main obstacle to the democratization process in Somalia. One interviewee said, "In Somalia, corrupt leaders are not accountable to the public, and this violates the principles of democracy and hinders the achievement of full democracy." He also noted that corruption delays the process of democratization (Interviewee, 11).

The fourth theme: challenges in implementing universal suffrage: respondents were asked this question: If Somalia implements universal suffrage, that will reduce political corruption? Half of the respondents suggested that universal suffrage could reduce the level of corruption in Somalia. It is believed that democracy can eliminate corruption; Treisman (2007:241) found that stable democracy could deliver to observe low corruption. One of the respondents said, "Universal suffrage will increase the cost of corruption to those in power because it will be harder to bribe the entire population. However, universal suffrage will only go so far in taming political corruption in Somalia. Notably, Strong institutions that oversee the electoral process and enforce the laws will also curb political corruption" (Interviewee, 11). For example, in recent years, Somalia has practiced an indirect electoral process in which few people voted. The last indirect elections held in 2017 were through 50 clan delegates and one traditional elder (51 electors) for each member of parliament and were often bribed by candidates.

The fifth theme: Factors contributing to the rise of corruption in Somalia, according to the report published by ICG (2011: i), revealed the level of corruption in government institutions had increased significantly, and many domestic and international observers believe that the previous governments became the most corrupt since the replacement of the unproductive transitions in 2000. When asked about the factors contributing to corruption in Somalia's political process, the inadequate legal framework and weak law enforcement institutions were unanimously cited. High unemployment, clan-based politics, an ineffective anti-corruption commission, unaccountability, and lack of freedom of expression policies have also contributed to the rise of corruption in Somalia. The absence of a functioning government compounds that. It suggested that an anti-corruption strategy should be implemented, and public education on the harms of corruption should be promoted. When people receive better education, they avoid lousy behavior (Interviewee, 01).

The sixth theme: offered the findings that corruption could undermine citizens' trust in the government of Somalia. The trust of citizens towards the government is fluctuating

worldwide and undermines the public agencies and representatives (Al-Hossienie & Anny, 2019:1). Today, many citizens do not have complete confidence in the government's decisions due to corruption and embezzlement (Al-Hossienie & Anny, 2019:13). The following comment was made from a respondent: Affirmed that "The government of Somalia has been failed to provide essential public services to its citizens (Respondent 04). An interview pointed out that "When there is no transparency within government institutions, citizens lose trust in the government's ability to meet its responsibilities" (Interviewee 05). Overall, the sample respondents suggest that citizens' trust towards the government of Somalia is relatively low and suggested that corruption damages public trust.

5.2. Summary of Mixed Methods Findings

This mixed-methods study aims to examine factors that may influence democratization and political participation. As discussed briefly in the methodological section, the quantitative data collection was focused on the following variables: Bribery, Embezzlement, Favoritism, and Logrolling to determine if (any) of these factors affect democratization and political participation. Indeed, the converged qualitative and quantitative analyses were presented in visible form for integration and comparison. There were some facts where the two data components confirmed each other while the two data components also contradicted each other. A brief data convergence matrix was presented in chapter four to remind the reader of all the factors presented in this chapter themes developed from the qualitative section are also discussed here. First, the findings show that corrupt practices in the electoral process can affect inclusive political participation and reinforce illegal campaigning.

The second finding suggests that corruption can undermine citizens' trust in the government of Somalia. The study found that some factors contributing to increasing the level of corruption in Somalia were presented, including high unemployment, clan-based political system, lack of anti-corruption policies and accountability, inadequate legal framework, and vulnerable law enforcement agencies. In summary, the qualitative findings revealed that political corruption hinders the democratization process in Somalia.

Summary of Convergence: This section presents a discussion of the mixed methods and summary results. The mixed-methods analysis revealed that participants had different perceptions toward the impact of corruption on political participation and democratization.

Overall, participants firmly stated that corruption has a significant negative impact on Somalia's political participation and democratization.

In the quantitative analysis, the correlations between variables presented in chapter four show that four forms of corruption bribery, embezzlement, favoritism, and logrolling, have significant (p- value<0.01) negative correlations with political participation. On the other hand, democratization significantly (p-value<0.01) negatively correlates with the three forms of corruption bribery, embezzlement, and logrolling, respectively. The correlation between favoritism and democratization is not statistically significant. In the qualitative data, participants illustrated that bribery overwhelmed political participation in Somalia and ultimately blocked the successful democratization. Nicolescu-Waggonner (2012:14) stated that political corruption retards the process of democratization. It also harms "the consolidation of democracy emanating from corrupt high-ranking politicians who misappropriate public resources for private gains."

There are four summary findings from the mixed-method results discussed in the following sections: First, the summary findings suggest that logrolling is among the critical factors contributing to lower political participation in Somalia. It has been reported that some politicians have bribed or delicate candidates to run against them for the legislative contest to make the contest appear fair. Furthermore, Huneke (2017) has revealed that in the last election in 2017 alone, an estimated $20 million was used to bribe parliamentary and presidential elections. Indeed, it has been assumed that most politicians around the world run political campaigns through legitimate means, but in Somalia, many political leaders use illicit funds to manage political campaign activities and even try to bribe voters.

Respondent (02) expressed that political corruption limits political participation and hinders political opportunities among citizens by stating that only the people with money mobilize political campaigns and win elections. Interestingly, individual skills and qualifications are unimportant for holding public office - while the presence of resources is vital for citizen participation in elections. A previous study confirms that numerous elements are related to embezzlement and corruption in third world countries; however, inadequate regulatory systems and low enforcement cause increased levels of corruption (Fantaye, 2004:171). A Uslan (1999) examined the corruption theory; he suggested that corruption causes the unfair distribution of resources, increasing injustice, and rising levels and corruption cases.

Thought a recent study found that democratic elections can reduce the misuse of public resources (Lierl, 2017:2). In other words, the qualitative respondents spoke similarly about these issues; they emphasized that many public officials embezzled public resources and stated that many public officials buy luxury cars and properties while receiving small salaries from the government. However, participants did not link embezzlement to political participation. The study examined whether the embezzlement of public funds is related to a lack of democracy. The literature shows evidence that some reasons for politicians to be re-elected would reduce embezzlement.

In a similar study by Hassan (2017), it was found that nepotism, clan favoritism, bribery, embezzlement of public funds, and aid money have become routine in entire sectors, leading many citizens to start thinking that corruption is a common culture. In this regard, the embezzlement activities in Somalia were related to the misuse of public funds and the looting of government assets. Most importantly, corruption is the leading cause of political instability. Significantly, international anti-corruption organizations reported that corruption cases in Somalia are seen in all government and business sectors. It affects all sectors of Somali society, from government officials who misuse public resources for personal gain and collect illicit funds in exchange for essential services to the clan-based sponsorship networks used to gain employment and political office. In comparison, the private sector has abused the situation of anarchy in recent decades by, for example, evading taxes and selling expired medicines and food (Rahman, 2017:1).

Corruption is a complicated issue in Somalia. As one interviewee said, "It is evident that political corruption and misappropriation of public funds by public officials is prevalent in Somalia. One of the most prominent arguments in support of elections is political accountability highlights elections are the way citizens can potentially reward or punish public decision-makers. For example, considerations for re-election might have reduced corruption among politicians. That could influence the electoral decision to prevent corrupt candidates from gaining access to a government office. Lierl concludes that local elections can be crucial in identifying good leaders who are much more likely to be inspired to prevent embezzlement by externally contracted local leaders or ordinary residents (Lierl, 2014). On the contrary, the quantitative sample members of this study confirmed that embezzlement is more likely to be associated with democratization in Somalia.

The third summary of results showed that favoritism influenced political participation in Somalia but was not statistically significant. That is, even though Transparency International (2020) found that nepotism is widespread in Somalia, where tribal/clan ties and personal relationships are close and complex. Similarly, Hussein (2018:4) observed that traditional elders representing their clan mainly operate under political patronage as they have created a kind of joint patronage with political leaders. Significantly, Ibrahim (2019) examined much political corruption in the electoral process, including the limited participation of women in the legislative assembly and the elimination of minorities and other marginalized groups. Furthermore, Bincof (2018:1) found that Somalia essentially needs to abolish the current institutionalized clan-based politics of the 4.5 formula and instead move to a multiparty system to replace the corrupt indirect election. Most respondents agreed that favoritism is associated with recruitment into the civil service and government services in Somalia (e.g., respondents 01; 07; 09). In this regard, there is no quantitative or qualitative evidence found in this study that rampant favoritism is related to the democratization of Somalia.

Fourth, the summary findings showed that logrolling is the critical factor contributing to low political participation and inhibiting the democratization process in Somalia. Numerous studies have attempted to explain the effect of logrolling on participation and democratization. For example, Menkhaus (2017:136) concluded a high price of vote-buying in the 2012 election. That led to some winners having a substantial obligation to repay and once elected, using their vote in the legislature against accepting bribes.

After this election, fewer laws were passed by parliament than in the previous parliament. Since the government needs laws to advance its business, this struggle with members of parliament has affected its effectiveness. Schwartz (2021) stated that after Qatar was sanctioned by six Arab countries, President Farmajo and its prominent supporter from the country's intelligence agency misused the millions of USD allegedly provided by the state of Qatar. This money feeds political corruption and makes the nation an easy target of influence by Gulf countries. That shows that foreign countries are involved in political corruption, such as bribing politicians to influence government decisions, whether in local or international affairs. That confirms the previous conclusion of Schwartz (2021). Thus, Shakur (2020) mentioned political corruption and noted that it thrives in public institutions, especially logrolling and vote-buying.

Other evidence suggests that corrupt democracy is related to the disruption of perfect direction and provides evidence of high levels of corruption in democratization. For example, Held (2006:8) suggested that political participation is a significant element of any democracy and that the characteristics and number of citizens who can participate in political activities can significantly affect the level of democratic values. According to Saha and Campbell (2007:2), Stable democratic institutions and active political participation are essential in the fight against corruption. The case of Somalia is not different from the conclusions of Saha and Campbell; in the last eight years, the country experienced high levels of corruption, resulting in the country being a corrupt and a failed state to achieve a successful transition to democracy.

5.3. Limitations & Recommendations for Future Research

As expected in any study, some areas of research should be considered for further investigation of the research context. It was challenging to recruit many volunteers to participate in the study. Therefore, future studies may be helpful if more samples are recruited. Chapter three of this study mentioned that political rights and civil liberties are not considered free in Somalia. Freedom House (2020) reports that academics are threatened when writing or expressing their opinions on sensitive issues.

First, due to the limited national survey data, secondary data collection is also limited to obtain sufficient data. Therefore, the study purposively selected 209 participants from government and private employees or individuals to conduct primary data collection. The overall findings of the study reflect the views of the participants who were participated in data collection. it cannot be generalized to Somalia. Second, other difficulties, such as insecurity and Covid 19 global pandemic restrictions, negatively impacted the data collection process. The study was conducted under the highest standards, and all research guidelines were applied and maintained to produce meaningful results that contribute to the literature and present a possible solution to the research phenomenon.

Suggestions: The findings contribute to the phenomenon regarding the current responses of the study sample members. However, further research would be needed to confirm or shed new light on the impact of political corruption among other larger target groups identified in other contexts. Numerous recommendations for further areas of research would emerge from the findings of the current study. Other possible approaches that

contribute to the concept of corruption, political participation, and democratization can be explored with different groups to be measured empirically. Maciel (2016:1) suggested that the concept of corruption has formed as a complex framework that includes professionals, institutions, and citizens' perceptions of the phenomenon in different cultures and periods. Even the evolution of corruption is not a rational and logical constant gradual formation. It could be combined with other factors related to or revealing the variations in response views and further explore any effect or interaction between them; factors may include extortion, patronage, illegal money to the forms of political corruption.

Aktan (2015:48) stated that corruption is mainly associated with "bribery" in the literature. Nevertheless, there are many different types of political corruption. Most of the sample members who contributed to the data collected were young people; (their mean age was 32), so it would be beneficial if more older people participated in other studies to compare the research context. One point that emerged from the study's findings was that it was challenging to extend corruption from qualitative data because the time spent in the qualitative semi-structured interview study was limited; only 18 participants were interviewed over two and a half months.

A more extended engagement with more participants might allow the investigator to generate a more robust engagement with other themes not covered in this study, understand the phenomena, and discover the context in a condensed form. A study with more facts could support this research finding or create other possible judgments or conditions. Similarly, this qualitative data should be collected from focus groups to stimulate analysis in an explanatory mixed-methods design. Finally, the study recommends the following further research areas:

- The factors undermining the democratic transition in Somalia
- The role of civil society in fighting corruption and promoting democracy in Somalia.
- The challenges of the Clan political system and democratization process

Implications: The conceptual framework of the study indicates whether these factors can influence the outcome variables. Maxwell (2005:33) describes a conceptual framework as "the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that support and inform your research" (p.33). Miles and Huberman (1994:18) "consider such a framework

to be the overarching context of ideas for the study" (p.18). The purpose of the study was to confirm or validate these predictions or factors that may negatively impede the achievement of full participation and a successful transition to democracy. The consistent or contradictory results of the mixed-methods analysis reveal some implications for practice in the current research question. It is recognized that democratization in any country depends on the actions taken to implement the minimalist concept for democracy.

The findings shed new light on bribery and favoritism in the electoral process that could undermine holistic political participation. Moreover, the results suggest that logrolling and embezzlement significantly negatively impact political participation and democratization according to sample members. Taken together, the findings of this study provide essential insights; for example, research participants indicated that corrupt practices in elections and illegal political campaigns have become a common cultural practice and are accepted by Somalia's political actors/candidates, which is unique to show in this study. A more recent study by Andrews and Inman (2009) found more consistent results for the effect of corruption on participation. Warren's (2004:328:25) analysis shows that corruption can reduce the possibility of a collective effort and diminishes the value of democracy.

The U.S. Department of State (2019:1) highlights that the electoral process for the federal parliament of Somalia was generally considered flawed and riddled with corruption; the paper discovered several acts of corruption, restrictions on political participation, illegal arrests which are politically motivated. According to the sample members of this study, this result can be explained by the fact that logrolling and embezzlement are a critical part of corruption, have significant native correlation, and hold the highest associated with lower political participation. The quantitative respondents strongly supported that corruption has an adverse effect on Somalia's political participation and democratization.

A surprising theme that emerged from the qualitative data findings indicated that corruption hinders successful democratization and prevents people from participating in the political process. Thus, this study provides new insights into how corruption-related activities affect democratization and political participation in Somalia. In the first decade of independence, Somalia experienced a sustained political transformation. From 1960 to 1969, democratic institutions were formed, and several political parties contested nationwide elections. At that time, Somalia was one of the few democratic countries that formed a democratic movement after gaining independence and then disintegrated into a disparate

clan party system. However, everything changed dramatically on October 21, 1969, when the military coup took power, banned all political parties, suspended the constitution, abolished the General Assembly, and handed over the power to a new administration. In the 1990s, the military regime in power was overthrown, but democracy did not remain. Instead, decades of civil war and conflict, instability, a political clan system, and rampant political corruption followed, hindering democratization. Representative democracy in Somalia remains complicated and faces unique challenges due to a lack of political commitment and low trust in political institutions. In addition, the political elite is often perceived negatively; political parties are perceived as clan groupings. They are poorly organized because they lack political education and resources for electoral campaigns - most political parties are loyal to specific clans rather than having a clear political ideology.

Earlier, from 1960 to 1969, over 1000 political parties participated in the national elections. Most of these parties have aligned with specific clan interests rather than promoting the national interest; this shows that political parties have significantly affected the nascent democracy in Somalia. The continued unsustainability of the current emerging political parties in Somalia could further become a problem if political parties do not receive adequate resources and capacity development from political scholars and international support.

The country's electoral history has emphasized regular frustrated elections, disruptions by a military coup, clannism, and multiple transitions that become a dysfunctional state. More outstanding efforts are needed to ensure political inclusivity, achieve genuine democracy, and strengthen anti-corruption strategies to promote transparency and accountability and strengthen Somalia's nascent democracy in Somalia. From this study, corruption in Somalia is on the rise and has reached unprecedented levels. The study revealed that some foreign countries are involved in political corruption by providing financial support to political leaders to use this money for political campaigns or buying votes in parliamentary and presidential elections.

Moreover, the findings suggest that the practice of political corruption is not limited to domestic politicians. Foreign nations are also involved in corruption. Gulf states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates seek to influence Somalia's foreign and local policies towards their interests.

The study suggested that the country needs to develop implementable strategies and policies to fight and control corruption from top to bottom to increase participation in political activities leading to the achievement of true democracy. This finding was unexpected and suggested that many cursed incumbents are eager to retain their seats and get re-elected in every election so that the status quo remains unchanged. According to the findings, corruption hinders successful democratization in Somalia as many politicians came to power through bribery, which discourages the rest of the population from participating in the political process. At the same time, they have the competence, skills, and knowledge to compete with elected positions.

The following research findings contribute to the academic understanding of the impact of political corruption on political participation and democratization in Somalia and provide a basis for empirical findings of qualitative research. Interestingly, corruption within lower-ranking civil servants has declined to some extent in the last four years as the government has arrested and charged several high-ranking officials who committed public embezzlement. That has been a positive step for the fight against corruption cases in the most corrupt state. However, there has been a sharp increase in high-level political corruption, such as bribery of voters, acceptance of illegal foreign funds for personal interests, and political favoritism. No one held accountable would remain a danger to attain a successful transition to democracy and equal political participation.

Other factors contributing to the rise of corruption in Somalia's political process include the lack of a powerful anti- Corruption Commission: According to the Provisional Constitution, Article 111C orders the country to establish the Anti-Corruption Commission responsible for preventing the misappropriation of public or individual property by a public official, although the Commission has recently found that it is not yet operational. The study recommends that if the country supports the newly established Anti-Corruption Commission to perform its duties freely and independently without political interference and take the necessary steps to protect and fight corruption more efficiently and effectively - punishing individuals, nationals, or foreigners have committed corruption. That will reduce the rampant corruption that has been devastating in Somalia's electoral system.

The justice sector has been dismantled mainly during thirty years of conflict and instability, leaving institutions unable to respond to the needs of the Somali people and undermine citizens' confidence. Despite significant support from the international

community, structural deficiencies, institutional corruption, and inadequate capacity remain common. There has been no legal Judicial Service Commission in Somalia formed since the adoption of the provisional constitution in 2012. The Supreme Court is still under the president and appoints federal judges and other high-ranking justices, and the judiciary is supposed to serve the public interest, expose corruption cases, and preserve and support the integrity of elections. However, the executive dominates the entire judicial system by appointing and dismissing judges, making it a challenge to find checks and balances between different arms of government.

Over the past eight years, elected leaders have failed to establish a Judicial Services Commission necessary to enforce laws and freely exercise their constitutional powers. In the fight against corruption, it has noted that lack of meaningful anti-corruption measures and the inadequate independence of the judiciary has led to an increase in political corruption, including embezzlement, vote-buying, and other types of corruption cases.

Since 2012, those in power have deliberately paralyzed or ignored the establishment of the third institution (the Judicial Service Commission and the Anti-Corruption Commission, provided for in Article 111A of the Constitution). We concluded that these two institutions could help reduce the level of corruption and promote accountability and transparency. Therefore, the country should recognize the importance of these law enforcement agencies in fighting corruption and promoting electoral integrity in Somalia. Otherwise, corruption will persist in Somalia and continue to be the worst corrupted nation in the world.

5.4. Concluding Remarks

This study has systematically explored the impact of different forms of corruption on political participation and democratization. This in-depth investigation served to understand mixed research design based on a conceptual framework that reveals corruption as admittedly multidimensional and complicated in this research context. The findings from this study have made some contributions to the current literature. The findings show that corruption has a meaningful impact on political participation and democratization in Somalia. The study found that the lack of an existing practical anti-corruption framework has hindered inclusive participation and a successful transition to democracy in Somalia.

The study concluded that there is massive confusion in the Somali political system, and the influences of traditional elders and rampant corruption in the electoral process have negatively affected the successful transition to democracy. For instance, traditional elders, clan delegates, and political elites are the main actors controlling the electoral process and are seen as obstacles to democracy and full participation in the political process.

The study found that the Somali government is making little progress in fighting corruption at the lowest level. However, more efforts are needed to combat different forms of elections and allow all citizens to participate in the electoral process, such as voting. Rampant corruption has severely damaged citizens' trust in government services.

Overall, the findings suggest that citizens' trust in governance in Somalia is relatively low, and it was found that most elected positions were obtained through bribery. It is difficult to build public trust that is assumed to serve the best interest of citizens. The empirical findings of this study provide a new understanding that the lack of public services, the lack of public participation in the decision-making process, and the widespread self-serving exploitation of government positions reduce citizens' trust in government services in Somalia.

The result is that in Somalia, the politician's interest comes first and not the interest of the public. An exciting finding revealed that illegal political campaigning was commonly practiced and accepted by political actors vying for national legislative seats and the presidency.

The study's analysis underscores the need to implement the relevant legal framework for a universal election system and a constitutional referendum as early as possible in the timeframe with agreement among key stakeholders. Otherwise, there would be a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the "One Person One Vote" elections can even occur in the country. According to the Provisional Constitution of 2012, elections should be held through universal suffrage, but corrupt political elite who lack the commitment to transition to democracy have failed this vision for many years.

Still, Somalia faces a similar challenge, and the gloomy prediction shows that conducting electoral democracy will not be possible in the coming years. This study has shown that immediate action is needed in several areas in Somalia, including universal

suffrage throughout the country, improving law enforcement, and raising public awareness on public participation and good governance.

The study found that many political elites have been in power for many years and that the only way to stay in power is to pay bribes to the clan chiefs, who are the gatekeepers in elections. Those in power who control state resources will try to hold on to power by corrupting the democratic process and delaying crucial steps towards democratization, including holding fair and free elections and establishing an independent judiciary. The findings reported here shed new light on bribery in the electoral process, undermining holistic political participation. At the same time, those with little or no money will have minimal opportunities to participate in politics as they will be locked out of the process. That ultimately undermine the achievement of full democracy.

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7. APPENDICES

Appendix A. Questionnaire for The Study

Expected Time: January 20, February- March 31, 2021

Introduction:

Dear Madam/ Sir,

You are invited to participate in the research (The impact of corruption on Somalia's political participation and dememorization). This Study is working on by (Mohamed Omar Bincof) from the department of political science and public administration at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. This Study's central aim is to study how different forms of political corruption has affected Somalia's political participation and democratization process.

For the questionnaire, you will ask four basic questions and two related themes, such as political participation democratization: How does systematic bribery affect Somalia's electoral process? What is the relationship between the systematic exploitation of public money and the lack of democracy in Somalia? How does systematic clan favoritism undermine efforts to achieve genuine democracy? Moreover, how does logrolling erode citizens' confidence in the government?

The Study is voluntary participation. No reward was entitled to this task. If you are interested in participating, you are requested to fill the questionnaire form online (docs.google.com). To answer all questions, it will take about 7 minutes. Before the survey started, you have the right to download a copy of this consent (invitation) That you can keep as references. Since your participation is voluntary and you can retreat the process at any time. You are free to leave out any questions. Indeed, the details you provided will remain undercover and will only publish for educational purposes. If you have any questions, please email me: 165206410@ybu.edu.tr/bincofsom@gmail.com

Sincerely,

I. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. Age:
2. Sex Male ☐ Female ☐
3. Marital status a) Married ☐ b) Sing☐ c) Widow d) Divorce
4. Level of Education: a) Secondary b) Diploma c) Bachelor
   d) Master e) Ph.D.☐ f) Oth☐
5. Level of Experience☐

GUIDANCE: PLEASE SPECIFY YOUR BEST CHOICE BY USING THE RATING SYSTEM BELOW:

ANSWER FORM	RATING
▪ Strong- Agree	5)
▪ Agree	4)
▪ Neutral	3)
▪ Dis-agree	2)
▪ Strong- disagree	1)

Mohamed Bincof, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, AYB

SECTION II: Questionnaire Form (Quantitative Data)

General Question	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Political corruption does not have a meaningful impact on Somalia's political participation and democratization.					

1) BRIBERY – IV:					
Questions	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. Most public officials demand a bribe from citizens for public services or to speed up procedures.					
2. Bribery is used in elections to persuade traditional leaders, clan delegates, and the electoral committee to vote for a particular candidate.					
3. Citizens interested in bribing public officials for preferential treatment at others' expense.					
4. During elections, most clan delegates (voters) receive bribes from parliamentary candidates to vote for them.					
5. Political elites are implausible to use bribery to stay in power and safeguard their interests.					
6. The process for electing Somalia's president and federal parliament is generally considered flawed and corrupt.					
7. Somalia's presidential candidates are often buying votes from legislators during their campaign to win elections.					
8. Elected leaders seek to bribe traditional elders and opposition figures to support their flawed policies for their respective regions or for the nation.					

2) EMBEZZLEMENT					
Questions	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. Broadly speaking, public officials in government office are involved in the theft of public property for personal gain.					
2. Embezzlement of public resources has been rationalized as normal and culturally is longer considered wrong in Somalia.					
3. Low salaries and lack of employment benefits often drive public officials to misuse public funds.					
4. Systematic theft and misappropriation of public resources have less generally eroded citizens' trust.					
5. Ongoing political turmoil and a lack of resources and administrative capacity have increased abuses of state resources in Somalia.					
6. Government officials often steal public money to secure their re-election and invest in their own businesses to attain financial stability.					
7. Corrupt politicians not only abuse public money but also embezzle foreign aid.					
8. Misappropriation is wrong and related to the lack of democracy in Somalia.					

3) Favoritism					
Questions	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. Senior public officials misuse their authority by giving jobs to their relatives, friends, and clan members, regardless of skill or experience.					
2. Government contracts are a little awarded to people with relatives or close relationships with people in office.					
3. State institutions often have mechanisms to curb illegal favoritism in government office.					
4. Favoritism is rampant among all public institutions, leading most Somalis to believe that corruption is a way of life.					
5. When making political decisions, clan favoritism given low priority.					
6. Clan favoritism is less commonly used in Somalia's political life.					
7. Political system in Somalia is less influenced by clan association.					
8. Struggles between clans to control public resources and political power have caused to increase political corruption.					

4) Logrolling?					
Questions	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. Logrolling, a kind of political corruption where members of parliament trade favors by voting for each other's proposed legislation, is routine in Somalia's legislative process.					
2. Sometimes elected officials do not make decisions based on citizens' best interests; instead, their decisions serve foreign countries that provide illegal financial support.					
3. Members of the federal parliament receive bribes from interest groups, including the executive arm, to vote for motions, resolutions, and draft legislation.					
4. Parliamentary elections in Somalia are widely considered to involve vote-buying, election-rigging, and non-transparent electoral processes.					
5. The lack of campaign financing regulations has allowed election bribery to proliferate in Somalia.					
6. Since Somalia's independence, Somali governments have been filled with rampant corruption and incapable of preserving democratic principles.					
7. Corrupt elected officials often go unpunished, as they have extensive immunity.					

Political Participation					
Questions	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. Corruption and a lack of equal political participation between clans, youth, minority groups, and women remain overwhelming problems in Somalia's political activities.					
2. Inclusive political participation may abolish electoral bribery and the buying of votes.					
3. Politically motivated detentions and restrictions on political participation are common in Somalia.					
4. The absence of law enforcement has allowed corruption and unequal political participation to proliferate in Somalia.					
5. Due to corruption and clannism in Somalia, clan delegates(voters) are less interested in participating in political activities such as voting.					
6. Most campaign funds sent to Somalia by foreign countries are destined to buy votes to support a particular presidential candidate.					
7. *In Somalia, transparency and fair, competitive elections are unnecessary, but other factors may need to be reconsidered.*					

8. Corrupt, clan-based political systems remain a significant obstacle to the establishment of a multi-party system in Somalia.					

Democratization					
Questions	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. Over the past decades, the Dictatorial regime and current clan-based political system have blocked Somalia's democratization process.					
2. Deeply rooted corrupt elites are blocking the path to the successful democratization of Somalia.					
3. Massive political corruption is one of few obstacles to achieving genuine democracy in Somalia.					
4. Political corruption has delayed the process of democratization in Somalia Since the 1960s.					
5. Revolts against the dictatorial regime in Somalia were related to rampant corruption, nepotism, and political favoritism.					
6. A successful transition to democracy requires competitive elections, but the clan-based political system has a strong chance of derailing democratization in Somalia.					
7.Democratization enhances political accountability because elections enable citizens to punish corrupt politicians or parties during an election.					
8. In Somalia, more *corruption means less trust in institutions.*					

Thank you for participating this questionnaire.

Best Regards. -----*END*---

Appendix B. Interview Guide for The Research

January 20, February- March 31, 2021

INTRODUCTION

My name is Mohamed Omar Bincof. a Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University. Thank you for accepting my interview invitation. I want to introduce you to the research topic (The impact of corruption on Somalia's political participation and democratization). The interview comprises (7) questions; the duration of the interview will be 30 minutes and will be conducted through online. Initially, I would like to guarantee you that this interview will keep unidentified, and no records of the meeting will be conducted in your name. I also wish to request your consent to sound recording this interview to precisely capture your answers and ideas. That will help me significantly during the date analysis that I will do later. I am very aware that the sensitivity of collecting and storing personal information; in this regard, all collected information will be kept on my laptop with a secure password. The details you give me remains undercover and will only report for educational purposes. Since you are voluntarily participating in the study, you have a right not to answer any questions that you might not interested to reply. After the interview ended, you have a right to retract any information which you do not want to use for the report.

Note: Every participant will receive a copy of the invitation letter with my signature, which allows for further reference). Possible communication channel will be WhatsApp or Direct Call/Skype etc.).

Section I: Demographic characteristic

1. Age:

2. Sex: a) M. b) F.

3. Marital status: a) Single, b) Married, c) Widow, and d) Divorce

4. How many years of work experience do you have?

5. What is the highest degree you studied? Diploma, b) Bachelor, b) Master, c) Ph.D. and c) other

Section II: **Interview Questions**

1) in your opinion, do you believe that (whether bribery) leads /causes lower participation in elections in Somalia? *(Such as voting in both parliamentary and presidential elections.)*

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2) Would fair and free elections reduce political corruption in Somalia?

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3) How do foreign countries provide politicians with illegal financial support to exploit(use) political campaigns and bribe voters?

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4) In your views, how does the misappropriation of public resources erode citizens' trust in the government?

Conclusion: Thank you for your time and information shared with the study.

#END#