REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE ROLE OF NORMS IN TURKEY'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY IN THE JDP ERA: THE CASES OF PAKISTAN, SOMALIA, AND SYRIA

PHD THESIS

Serap ATALAY AKKAŞ

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ankara, 2020

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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

Signature :
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DEDICATION

To all people in need of humanitarian aid and to all humanitarian aid workers worldwide

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF NORMS IN TURKEY'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY IN THE JDP ERA: THE CASES OF PAKISTAN, SOMALIA, AND SYRIA

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Turkey was ranked first among non-DAC donors and fourth in the world in terms of total humanitarian aid in 2012. After a year, with a contribution value for humanitarian aid of 0.21% of its gross national income, Turkey was the most generous country in 2013. For the first time, Turkey surpassed the United States in terms of total humanitarian aid volume in 2017 and ranked first not only among non-Western donors, but also among all countries. This thesis analyzes Turkey's humanitarian aid between 2003 and 2018, asks why Turkey provides humanitarian aid, and how norms and identity shape the country's humanitarian aid decisions. In terms of methodology, qualitative research methods used to address the research question of this exploratory study through discourse analysis, process tracing method, and case studies. The theoretical base of the thesis is the constructivist theory that pays particular attention to the roles of identities and norms of actors in the international community. Turkish humanitarian aids for complex emergencies in Somalia and Syria, and for natural disasters in Pakistan are the three cases selected in this study. These three case studies are chosen in this study to analyze and compare Turkey's humanitarian aid in different humanitarian contexts that range from unanticipated natural disaster related emergencies to protracted humanitarian crises. Based on the findings of the study, it is plausible to argue that; Turkey's humanitarian aid policy under the governments of the Justice and Development Party has been shaped mainly by the humanitarian and historical responsibility, Islamic solidarity, protecting the vulnerable, and mutual partnership norms.

Keywords: Constructivist Theory, Norms, Humanitarian Aid, Natural Disasters, Complex Humanitarian Emergency

ÖZET

AK PARTİ DÖNEMİNDE TÜRKİYE'NİN İNSANİ YARDIM STRATEJİSİNDE NORMLARIN ROLÜ: PAKİSTAN, SOMALİ VE SURİYE VAKALARI

ATALAY AKKAŞ, SERAP

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı

Danışman : Dr. Öğr. Üyesi M. HÜSEYİN MERCAN

Aralık 2020, 212 sayfa

Türkiye, 2012 yılında toplam insani yardım açısından dünyada dördüncü sırada yer aldı. Bir yıl sonra, gayri safi milli gelirinin %0,21'ine tekabül eden insani yardım miktarı ile Türkiye, en cömert ülke oldu. Türkiye, 2017'de ilk kez toplam insani yardım hacmi açısından ABD'yi geçti ve sadece Batılı olmayan bağışçılar arasında değil, aynı zamanda tüm ülkeler arasında ilk sırada yer aldı. Bu tez, 2003-2018 yılları arasında Türkiye'nin insani yardımını analiz etmekte ve Türkiye'nin neden insani yardım sağladığını ve kimlik ve normların Türkiye'nin insani yardımla ilgili kararını nasıl şekillendirdiğini araştırmaktadır. Metodoloji açısından bu araştırma, nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden söylem analizi, süreç izleme metodu ve vaka çalışmaları yoluyla araştırma sorusunu ele almaktadır. Tezin teorik temeli, uluslararası toplumdaki aktörlerin kimliklerinin ve normlarının rollerine özellikle dikkat eden inşacı teoridir. Somali ve Suriye'deki karmaşık insani krizlere ve Pakistan'daki doğal afetlere yönelik Türkiye'nin insani yardımları bu çalışmada seçilen üç vakadır. Bu üç vaka çalışması, Türkiye'nin beklenmedik doğal afetle ilgili acil durumlardan uzun süreli insani krizlere kadar uzanan farklı insani bağlamlarda insani yardımını analiz etmek ve karşılaştırmak için seçilmiştir. Çalışmanın bulgularına dayanarak; Türkiye'nin Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümetleri dönemindeki insani yardım politikasını temel olarak insani ve tarihi sorumluluk, İslami dayanışma, savunmasızları koruma ve karşılıklı ortaklık normlarının şekillendirdiği ileri sürülebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnşacı Teori, Normlar, İnsani Yardım, Doğal Afetler, İnsani Kriz

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFAD	**:**	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
ARA	**:**	American Relief Administration
CARE	**:**	Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe
CENTO	**:**	Central Treaty Organization
CERF	**:**	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHS	**:**	The Core Humanitarian Standard
CRB	**:**	The Commission for Relief in Belgium
CRS	**:**	Catholic Relief Services
DAC	**:**	Development Assistance Committee
DGMM	**:**	Directorate General of Migration Management
DHA	**:**	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DİB	**:**	The Directorate of Religious Affairs
ECHO	**:**	European Commission Humanitarian Aid
ERC	**:**	Emergency Relief Coordinator
FAO	**:**	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCA	**:**	Forgotten Crisis Assessment
GHA	**:**	Global Humanitarian Assistance
GHD	**:**	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GNI	**:**	Gross National Income
HADR	**:**	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HCR	**:**	High Commission for Refugees
IASC	**:**	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICG	**:**	International Crisis Group
ICRC	**:**	The International Committee of the Red Cross
ICU	**:**	Islamic Courts Union
IFRC	**:**	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IHH	**:**	The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
ILO	**:**	International Labor Organization

IOM : International Organization for Migration

IRO : International Organization for Refugees

ISIS : Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

JDP : Justice and Development Party

LRCS : League of Red Cross Societies

MENA : Middle East and North Africa

MFA : Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MNC : Multinational Corporations

MP : Motherland Party

MSF : Doctors Without Borders (*Médecins Sans Frontières*)

NAM : Non-Aligned Movement

NGO : Non-Governmental Organization

OCHA : The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OECD : Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OIC : Organization of Islamic Co-operation

OXFAM : Oxford Famine Relief Committee

PKK : Kurdistan Workers' Party

RPP : Republican People's Party

RCD : Regional Co-operation for Development

SNM : Somalian National Movement

TFEU : Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

TFG : Transitional Federal Government

TIKA : Turkish International Co-operation and Development Agency

TOKI : Turkish Housing Development Administration

UDHR : Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UK : United Kingdom

UN : United Nations

UNAOC : The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations

UNDP : United Nations Development Program

UNDRO : United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator

UNEP : United Nations Environment Program

UNESCO : United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHCR : United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF : United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNIDO : United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UNRPR : United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees

UNRRA : United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

UNRWA : United Nations Relief and Works Agency

USA : United States of America

WFP : World Food Program

WHS : The World Humanitarian Summit

WHO : World Health Organization

WMO : World Meteorological Organization

WRCB : War Relief Control Board

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1. INTRODUCTION

The act of providing aid or assistance to those in need has existed throughout human history. Whatever the cause, whether a natural disaster or a human involved crisis, providing aid and assistance to people in need of help is one of the behaviors considered virtuous in all kinds of thoughts, beliefs, and religions. The contemporary humanitarian aid concept has emerged since the second half of the 19th century. The legal frameworks and institutions for humanitarian aid have been established by the pioneering of Western states. Under the Red Cross and Red Crescent flags, people in need have provided aid and assistance around the world. In the 20th century, the variety of these flags widened, again at the initiative of mostly Western countries, namely many non-governmental organizations were formed to provide humanitarian aid.

The norms and interests of Western governments and organizations dominated humanitarianism until the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. (Binder and Meier, 2011, p. 1135). The worldwide response to the tsunami devastation was an extraordinary demonstration of humanitarian action. In the space of a few hours after the disaster, several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided medical care, shelter, and water for the saving of lives. (Barnett, 2005, p. 723). In the middle of the 1990s, in response to a humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, only 16 donor governments officially pledged support. A decade later, without precedent, 92 countries responded to the Indian Ocean tsunami with commitments to support it. The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 has shown an increasing number of humanitarian aid donors, in particular, new and non-Western donors who are not members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the event of a humanitarian crisis, non-Western donors may not follow the same principles, policies, and responses as Western donors. With a humanitarian aid contribution value of 0.21% of its gross national income (GNI) in 2013, Turkey was the largest donor among those new non-Western donors, such as Brazil, China, India, South Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates. Turkey has also

assumed the responsibility of hosting a significant proportion of Syrian refugees, which constitute the biggest humanitarian refugee crisis, since the end of World War II.

Turkish humanitarian aid has been mainly provided by the Turkish International Co-operation and Development Agency (TIKA) and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (*Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı*, AFAD). TIKA was first set up to support the transition in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkan states. According to Akgün and Özkan (2010, p. 537), TIKA became a more global humanitarian aid agency in 2003 and, in conjunction with Turkey's diversifying foreign policy commitments, expanded its field of operation. Other critical official agencies are the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) and the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet). In addition, humanitarian aid activities were carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Internal Affairs, Development, Justice, and Health. (Keyman and Sazak, 2014, p. 7). In Turkish humanitarian aid, NGOs also play an essential role. Cansuyu Foundation, Deniz Feneri, Dost Eli Foundation, Doctors Worldwide Turkey, The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), Türkiye Diyanet Foundation and Yardımeli Foundation are the leaders in these efforts. (Keyman and Sazak, 2014, p. 10). Turkey's motives remain mostly unknown in the providing of humanitarian aid, geographical and thematic priorities, and its internal decision-making processes. This thesis analyzes Turkey's humanitarian aid as part of its foreign policy and asks why Turkey is provides humanitarian aid and how the norms and identity shape the country's decisions in relation to humanitarian aid.




Figure 1. Turkish Humanitarian Aid

Data: OECD https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#

The main question of this thesis is: Why does Turkey give humanitarian aid and how do norms and identities shape its humanitarian aid policy. In order to meet this research objective, the following questions will be answered.

I. Why does Turkey offer to give humanitarian aid?
II. What are the motivations behind Turkish humanitarian aid?
III. How and why has Turkish humanitarian aid evolved since 2002?
IV. How do norms and identities shape Turkey's decisions regarding humanitarian aid?
V. How is Turkish humanitarian aid policy distinctive, or different from western donors' humanitarian aid?
VI. How is Turkish humanitarian aid policy distinctive, or different from non-western donors' humanitarian aid?

In terms of methodology, qualitative research methods are used to address the research question of this exploratory study through discourse analysis, process tracing method, and case studies. Statements by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Prime Ministers, and the Presidents have been included and analyzed as primary sources. Discourse analysis was carried out also on speeches of key political figures and policy makers from the case study states. In addition, the period of the JDP governments from 2002 to 2018, the early years of Republic of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire periods were included in the analysis of humanitarian assistance; therefore, the process tracing method was also used in this thesis. OECD data were used as the main quantitave data source and the maps were created using primary data sources. The secondary source of information for this research include academic literature, official policy documents, statistical data, humanitarian NGO reports, organizational websites, and articles, which share light on the topic of this research. Case study analysis has been defined as the systematic investigation of an event or a set of related events with the sole aim of describing and explaining these phenomena (Berg et al., 2004). Creswell (2014) introduces case study analysis as follows:

> *Case studies are a qualitative design in which the researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, or one or more individuals. The case(s) are bounded by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time. (p. 290)*

Case study analysis offers an advantage in critically examining contemporary as well as past events and providing a clear description and explanation of how and why the events happened or are happening (Bryman, 2012). With the case study analysis, Turkey´s humanitarian aid policies were critically described and examined whether and how they have changed.

Three criteria were used to select the cases. First, there must be at least one natural disaster case and a complex humanitarian emergency case so that, the cases selected in this study will cover all types of humanitarian emergencies defined by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Public Affairs (OCHA). Second, to analyze Turkish humanitarian aid actors, cases are selected in which the Turkish government, Turkish Red Crescent and NGOs were actively participated. The last criterion relates to the political and public agenda. The cases were selected which were on the agenda of Turkish politicians and have statements on cases and a high level of public knowledge. In this regards, Turkish humanitarian aid for complex emergencies in Somalia and Syria, and for natural disasters in Pakistan are the three cases selected in this study. These three cases are chosen in this study to analyze and compare Turkey's humanitarian aid in different humanitarian contexts that range from unanticipated natural disaster related emergencies to protracted humanitarian crises. Turkish humanitarian assistance operations in the selected cases of this thesis have given rise to strong reflections and appreciations beyond Turkey and these three countries.

According to OCHA statistics, Turkey provided humanitarian aid to 109 different countries between 2003 and 2019. During these years, the number of different countries to which Turkey provided humanitarian aid in one year reached an all time high of 44 in 2007. In the subpage of the MFA website titled “Turkish Humanitarian Assistance”, the main humanitarian aid operations carried out by Turkey after natural disasters were listed as the South-East Asia earthquake in December 2004, Pakistan earthquake in 2005, earthquakes in Haiti and Chile and flood in Pakistan in 2010, earthquake in Japan in 2011, typhoon in the Philippines, floods in the Balkans and attacks in Gaza in 2014, earthquake in Nepal in 2015 and flood in Macedonia in 2016. When we compare the internet search results of these natural disaster cases and Turkish humanitarian aid, the floods in Pakistan in 2010, the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005, and the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 were the highest results, respectively. These results show the agenda of Turkish politicians and a great public

awareness of these cases. Taking into account the aforementioned three criteria, the floods in Pakistan in 2010 and the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 are selected in this thesis as natural disaster cases. The Pakistan case covers Turkey's humanitarian aid operations regarding the earthquake of 2005 and the floods of 2010, namely 2005-2006 and 2010-2012 respectively. Having contributed to the victims of natural disasters in Pakistan, Turkey ranked third among non-DAC donors in 2005 and then ranked first among non-DAC donors in 2010.

In most cases, complex humanitarian assistance takes time and it is not surprising that providing humanitarian assistance to these cases does too. During the JDP governments' era, the countries experienced complex humanitarian emergencies to which Turkey provided them humanitarian assistance for more than 10 years were Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan and Syria. When we compare the internet search results of these countries' names and Turkish humanitarian aid, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia and Syria have been the more results than other countries. These four countries were then compared in terms of the second and third criteria mentioned earlier. Given the activism of Turkish NGOs and the high public awareness of this case, Turkish humanitarian aid to Somalia is chosen as the second case of this thesis. The Somalia case covers the direct emergency assistance in 2011 and 2012 and the humanitarian assistance ranging from social and health services to the transport area in between 2012-2015. Turkish NGOs were actively involved in the complex humanitarian emergency in Somalia and triggered the Turkish government's humanitarian assistance operations in this country. In view of Turkey's activism that has led it to the most generous country in the world since 2013, Turkey's humanitarian aid to the Syrian people is chosen as the third case of this thesis. As Turkish humanitarian aid to Syrian people continues, this case is limited by a period that covers the humanitarian aid operations between 2011 and 2018. With an enormous humanitarian assistance contribution to the Syrian people, Turkey ranked as the most generous country in 2013 (0.21% of GNI) and has remained in first place so far (0.84% of GNI in 2019).

The field of research concerning humanitarian aid donors is still under exploration, and non-traditional humanitarian aid donors are relatively new. The study is an attempt to separate humanitarian aid from general foreign aid in analyses and address a research gap

by exploring humanitarian aid of a new donor, Turkey, in accordance with constructivist theory. Constructivist theory pays particular attention to the roles of identities and norms of actors in the international community. Although influential in the analysis of international relations, constructivist theories are rarely applied to emerging donors. By incorporating constructivism into the analytical framework, this thesis will contribute to explaining the similarities and differences between the humanitarian aid policies of Turkish and western donors. This thesis further argues that the norms and identities of donors may create such differences.

In this thesis, the concepts of "soft power" and "humanitarian diplomacy", referred in the literature to explain the humanitarian aid activism of Turkey during the JDP era, were also analyzed. Turkey, under the JDP government, embraced its culture and history and became more active in the world thanks to its economic strength and democratic experience. Turkish humanitarian aid from the government and NGOs to victims around the world plays a crucial role in this activism. Turkish humanitarian NGOs provide contributions in cash and in kind to alleviate the suffering of the humanitarian crisis victims. The cases of Somalia and Syria are the best known globally. In addition, humanitarian diplomacy has been intrinsic part of Turkish foreign policy during JDP governments' period. Built on conscience and moral values and based on protecting the interests of vulnerable people, humanitarian diplomacy is an integral part of Turkey's humanitarian aid policy. Policymakers have so often cited to humanitarian diplomacy concept and emphasised the crucial roles in the humanitarian issues that Turkey as a non-Western emerging donor had taken. The importance of this research is twofold; it has both domestic and international effects. First, this academic research will support Turkey’s humanitarian aid policies through in-depth analysis. Secondly, this study will add a new dimension to current academic researches with its unique subject. There is no study in the literature that comparatively analyzes Turkish humanitarian aid policies from the viewpoint of constructivist theory among existing studies.

This thesis consists of five chapters. Introduction chapter presents the research problems and questions, methodology, and delimitations of the thesis. Based on the research questions, the second chapter presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. The second chapter first identifies the key terms and concepts of humanitarian aid. It next examines the humanitarian aid in international relations through a review of the literature on the role of

Western powers and non-Western powers. The second chapter then presents constructivism, soft power, and the emergence of non-traditional humanitarian aid donors and their norms. It then outlines the humanitarian aid structure through historical background, the legal framework, and the institutional framework of humanitarian aid. The third chapter examines Turkey as a humanitarian aid donor. It first presents the norms and identities of Turkish foreign policy regarding humanitarian aid operations. The third chapter then examines the Turkish humanitarian aid background in the context of the historic periods of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. It then examines how government institutions, the Turkish Red Crescent and non-governmental organizations frame Turkish humanitarian aid. The fourth chapter, as the case study chapter, examines the Turkish humanitarian aid in different humanitarian contexts that range from natural disasters to complex humanitarian emergencies. It first examines Turkey's humanitarian aid operations related to both the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods in Pakistan. The fourth chapter then examines Turkey's humanitarian aid to Somalia. It next examines Turkey's humanitarian aid to the Syrian people. The fourth chapter shows how norms and ideas have shaped Turkish humanitarian aid in these three cases. Lastly, the fifth chapter summarizes the thesis and concludes with considerations for future research.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID

2.1. Key Terms and Concepts

It is necessary to clarify the meaning of key terms and concepts, which form the basis of this dissertation, before moving to the study's literature review. Humanitarian aid stands out as being at the core of this study. This chapter, therefore, starts by defining and discussing the terms and concepts of humanitarian aid.

2.1.1. Humanitarian Aid

The term "humanitarian" is generally used to indicate someone "who is devoted to the promotion of human welfare and the advancement of social reforms" (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language) or something "concerned with improving bad living conditions and preventing unfair treatment of people" (Longman English Dictionary). The origins of humanitarianism are usually placed at the beginning of the 19th century, when "individuals started using the concept to characterize their actions and those of others" (Barnett, 2011, p. 19). Modern humanitarian aid is rooted in the ancient traditions and values shared by the world's major faiths. Hebrew Scriptures emphasized justice for the poor, and temples often served as sanctuaries for the persecuted or refugees. Christian faith and practice are also based on the values of charity and mercy, and Christian orders have long provided services to the poor, the sick, and the vulnerable. Likewise, Islam emphasizes human dignity, charitable giving, and assistance to the poor. Assisting the poor is one of the five pillars of Islam. Hinduism values compassion, non-violence, and service to the community. The concepts of compassion, tolerance, inclusion, and empathy for suffering's of others are also central to Buddhism (Brooks, 2014).

Barnett (2011, p. 19-21) argues that since the 19th century, humanitarianism had come to be characterized by three distinctive features: focusing on foreign countries, being increasingly organized and institutionalized, and being connected to something transcendental. Moreover, in the second half of the 19th century, humanitarianism shifted its focus from outside the battlefield to the battlefield. Barnett (2011, p. 76) defines this shift as "emergency humanitarianism", which is now the official face of international

humanitarianism. Morgenthau (1962) defines humanitarian aid as “the aid which governments have traditionally extended to nations which are victims of natural disasters, such as floods, famines, and epidemics” (p. 301). Morgenthau (1962) does not associate humanitarian aid with military conflict, according to his definition. Gundel (1999) describes the term humanitarian aid as the immediate response with relief supplies to people who are in acute need of basic resources (clean water, food, medical care, shelter, and sanitation), as well as the required means of transport and the funds required to fund the acquisition of all such supplies. Excluded are weapons, weapon systems, ammunition, and other requisites for hostilities (such as communication equipment) or money intended for this purpose. Humanitarian aid also covers protection from displacement, detention, torture, and other inhuman and degrading treatments or rehabilitation operations.

Sandvik-Nylund (2003) defines humanitarian aid as “assistance of an exclusively humanitarian character, provided by the international community, to meet the immediate needs of victims of emergency situations” (p. 6-7). Comparing relief and aid, Sandvik-Nylund describes relief as “[it] seems to refer to more concrete acts, such as ‘relief consignments’ and ‘relief convoys’” and humanitarian aid, which “is more of an overall concept, covering both the relief consignments and the whole humanitarian operation or program” (p. 4-5). In this regard, Sandvik-Nylund (2003) sees humanitarian relief as a concept narrower than humanitarian aid. The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative was set up in 2003 as a forum to share best practices and to discuss and agree on principles for giving humanitarian aid. The definition of humanitarian aid agreed on at the Stockholm conference is “the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of the affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods”. Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA, 2007) describes humanitarian aid as “the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies”.

UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines humanitarian assistance as “aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population”. (IASC, 2003, p. 3) IASC divides humanitarian assistance into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population.

> *"Direct Assistance is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services. Indirect Assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel. Infrastructure Support involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population". (IASC, 2003, p. 3)*

Barnett and Weiss (2008) describe humanitarian aid with boundaries that it may range from any "act intended to save lives and reduce suffering" to "the impartial, independent, and neutral provision of relief to those in immediate need because of conflict and natural disasters" (p. 5). Spieker (2008) describes humanitarian aid as "the most prominent activity within the broader concept of humanitarian action, the latter ranging from short-term relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, and further to development co-operation, often even encompassing measures of disaster preparedness, prevention, and risk reduction". Maus (2011) defines humanitarian aid as "material or logistical assistance in the form of food, water, shelter, medicine, etc., is typically provided as an immediate response to natural disasters or complex emergencies caused by armed conflicts" (p. 103). The term "humanitarian aid" is often used synonymously with "humanitarian assistance" and "humanitarian relief". In this regard, "humanitarian aid" is employed in this thesis as equivalent to "humanitarian assistance", "humanitarian relief", "emergency aid", "emergency assistance", "emergency relief", "disaster aid", "disaster assistance", "disaster relief", and "relief assistance".

In the current literature, the concept of humanitarian aid is associated with four principles, namely humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement define humanity as "a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found". In this regard, the principle of humanity seeks to focus attention on human suffering and human rights, no matter where the problem might arise. GHD defines the principle of impartiality as "the provision of humanitarian assistance without discrimination among recipients and guided solely by needs, with priority given to the most urgent cases of distress".

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement describe impartiality as making no discrimination as to nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political

opinions. In this regard, The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement endeavors to relieve individuals' suffering, be guided solely by their needs and give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. According to this principle, in the provision of humanitarian aid, the only immediate need is taken into consideration without any discrimination among recipients. In other words, the impartiality principle focuses on providing aid to those most in need first, then on down the line to areas with less urgent needs, and not allowing politics or other considerations to interfere with the decision as to whom aid should be provided first.

The word "neutrality" comes from the Latin "*ne-uter*", meaning "neither one thing nor the other" (ICRC, 1996). The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (1984) define neutrality as "not taking sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature in order to enjoy the confidence of all". GHD describes the principle of neutrality as "the provision of humanitarian assistance without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature". In this regard, the principle of neutrality requires those who provide humanitarian aid, not to take sides in political, religious, ethnic or social rivalries, disputes or conflicts. This principle appears to be motivated by the development of international humanitarian law. This set of rules, conventions, treaties, and declarations by various organizations is aimed at and depends on both "states" and "non-state" actors. The neutrality principle was intended to be the tacit bargain between those committed to humanitarian aid operations, and the potential targets of those operations. This bargain means the provider can access a target individual or population as long as the provider is neutral in its actions. (Shackelford, 1995). The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (1984) define independence as "maintaining autonomy from political consideration to be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles". In this regard, the principle of independence stresses the importance of humanitarian action to take place free of all state political, religious, or other extraneous influences. These principles; humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence are mentioned in a number of documents that set standards for the humanitarian assistance, such as the UN General Assembly Resolution 58/114 of 2003, the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, the 2003 GHD principles, and the 2008 European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

2.1.2. Disaster

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent define the term disaster very broadly, including drought, flood, volcanic eruption and earthquake, epidemics, famine, population movement, technological disasters, and human-made disasters, such as civil conflict. Cahill (2003) defines natural disasters as a sudden major disturbance of nature that can result in extensive destruction to the local environment and possible death and suffering to affected communities. These disturbances could include events such as hurricanes, tornados, flooding, and or drought. On the other hand, human-made disasters are attributed to an individual or societal action or inaction. Technological disasters and large-scale fires are examples of such disasters. Moreover, Cahill (2003) describes the humanly conceived disaster as acts that are planned and carried out by individuals with the sole intent of causing dehumanization, severe suffering, and hardship or to eliminate a given group or population. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, and forced disappearance are examples of human conceived disasters. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) breaks the term "emergency" down into two different types, a natural disaster, and a complex emergency. OCHA defines natural disaster as “a natural hazard such as an earthquake, hurricane or tsunami typically characterized by a sudden onset and widespread human, material or environmental losses that exceed the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources”.

2.1.3. Complex Humanitarian Emergency

OCHA describes complex humanitarian emergency as a “humanitarian crisis typically characterized by extensive violence and loss of life, massive displacements of people, widespread damage to societies and economies, and hindrance of humanitarian assistance by security risks and political and military constraints”. (OCHA, 1999) Duffield (1994, p. 3) defines complex humanitarian emergencies as “protracted political crises resulting from sectarian or predatory indigenous responses to socioeconomic stress and marginalization”. Unlike natural disasters, complex humanitarian emergencies have a unique ability to erode or destroy the civil, cultural, economic, and political integrity of established societies.

According to Cahill (2003), the nature and influence of political and military entities

make complex humanitarian emergencies unique from other forms of disasters. In complex humanitarian emergencies, military and political interference (and instability) often serve to augment the adverse impacts, resulting in severe food shortages, widespread displacement of people, loss of civil and human rights, and increase in mortality. According to Duffield (1996, p. 187) and Natsios (1997, p. 6-7), complex humanitarian emergencies are defined by five characteristics. The first and most visible characteristic is civil conflict. Second, the authority of the national government deteriorates to such an extent that public services disappear. Thirdly, there are mass movements of people and emergencies in public health. Fourth, the economic system suffers massive dislocation and collapse. Fifthly, the four features, sometimes exacerbated by drought or natural disasters, contribute to a general decline in food safety, resulting in massive malnutrition and possible widespread hunger.

On the other hand, “complex humanitarian emergency”, “complex political emergency” and “complex emergency” terms are usually used interchangeably in the literature. In this regard, “complex humanitarian emergency” is employed in this thesis as equivalent to “complex political emergency” and “complex emergency”. Although the frameworks used in defining “humanitarian aid” or “humanitarian assistance” may be different from each other, they all come together in essence. Humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence are also generally accepted principles of humanitarian aid. Natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies are two main types of situations in which people need humanitarian aid. Concepts of constructivism, soft power, and emerging humanitarian aid donor are referred in the literature when discussing the Turkey's humanitarian aid activism in JDP era. In the second title of this chapter, construtivism, which forms the theoretical basis of the thesis, soft power, and lastly the emergence of non-traditional humanitarian aid donors and their norms will be analyzed.

2.2. Approaches in International Relations and Humanitarian Aid

2.2.1. Constructivism

Constructivism, in opposition to the domination of rationalism over the discipline of international relations, offers alternative explanations. Rationalists perceive states as

rational, utility-maximising and unitary actors. The most significant of rationalist theories, neo-Realism and neo-Liberalism, focus on the behaviour of states in times of conflict and cooperation, where states act under the conditions of international anarchy. Neo-Realism focus on 'power' as the primary interest and neo-Liberalism prioritise 'economic prosperity'. Rationalists view international relations as interest-driven, and according to them, states behave as egoistic value maximizers, where moral considerations are hardly mentioned. (Baldwin 1993: 3–25) According to Adler's definition: "Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world." (Adler, 1997, p. 322) Constructivism asserts that "the behavior of individuals, states and other actors is shaped by shared beliefs, socially constructed rules and cultural practices" (Karns and Mingst, 2004, p. 50). Constructivism views that there is no single state of "rationality" within a regime. While realism and liberalism emphasize external, material factors such as power or trade, constructivism emphasize individual national identities, shared expectations and norms (Hook et al., 2001, p. 42-47).

Identities perform three necessary functions in a society: "they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are" (Hopf, 1998, p. 175) Wendt (1992) describes identity as "a relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self" (p. 397). Despite a consensus on "state identities were constructed within the social environment of international and domestic politics", constructivists disagree on the "weight of international versus domestic environment in shaping state identities (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, p. 399). According to the constructivist interpretation, identities are not exogenous, but are constructed through interaction with other states in historical, cultural, political and social contexts (Hopf, 1998, p. 176; Wendt, 1995, p. 72-73). Since identities are constructed through social practices, so consequently are the interests upon which they are based. Identities directly influence the kinds of interests or preferences with respect to the context that states find themselves in. Wendt (1992) states that: "identities are the basis of interests" (p. 398). Weber (2001) argues that "what states do depends upon what their identities and interests are, and identities and interests change" (p. 60).

While rationalist theories are actor-based and focus on the material (power and wealth), constructivists seek to investigate international structures in terms of the social

(meaning and social value). States are embedded in dense networks of international social relations whose perceptions of a state play an important role in shaping a state's perceptions of the world it is part of. It is necessary to start by examining these social relations rather than the actors, as the state and its interest is informed by socially constructed values and norms of what can be considered excellent and appropriate. State leaders and their decisions are highly influenced by this normative context. As this normative context evolves over time, as international norms and values evolve, the interest of the state also inevitably changes, and external threats or demands cannot, therefore, be identified as the only factor redefining the state interest. (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2-3).

Katzenstein (1996) defines norms as "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity" (p. 5). According to Bernstein (2000) "norms do not necessarily identify actual behaviour; rather they identify notions of what appropriate behavior ought to be" (p. 467). Meanwhile, Wendt (1999) defines norms as "shared beliefs" (p. 185), which tend to be one form of culture. Wendt (1999) defines culture as "shared knowledge" and norms and rules as its manifestations (p. 253). Liberalism does not see the substantive power in norms, categorizing them as "'intermediate factors,' or 'intervening variables' between fundamental characteristics of world politics such as the international distribution of power." (Keohane, 1984, p. 64). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 887-917) propose three stages of normative development. First, there is "appearance" as "norm entrepreneurs" give birth to an idea. Nevertheless, not all ideas are readily received favorably, "new norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest… Efforts to promote a new norm take place within the standards of 'appropriateness' defined by prior norms." (p. 897). In other words, ideas are debated and frequently must be understood as rooted in an existing tradition (are "appropriate") before becoming new norms. The second, is "acceptance," a moment when the idea is popularly received. The third step is "internalization," when the idea becomes a fixture and routinely informs action.

International institutions play a large part in this normative development process, as they generally represent internationally held norms and values. The United Nations, for example, has guidelines or charters formulated, that dictate acceptable conduct for its member states. These guidelines or charters reflect the socially constructed consensus of

what constitutes appropriate behavior as formulated in a forum of representatives from the member states and not by the institution itself. States themselves set these norms and values and adhere to them to remain part of society and legitimize their actions. This so-called logic of appropriateness coexists with a logic of consequences, which informs state behavior based on their concerns for costs and benefits (Barnett, 2008, p. 163).

Constructivists believe that norms, as part of the structure, have both constitutive and causal effects on agents. As Katzenstein (1996) states:

> *"We use the concept of the norm to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations, norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such an instance, norms have "regulative" effects that specify standards of proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both." (p. 5).*

Wendt (1999) defines three degrees to which norms can be internalized by states: the first degree of internalization refers to the situation in which states observe cultural norms "because they are forced to," the second degree of internalization "because it is in their self-interest," and the third degree of internalization "because they perceive the norms as legitimate (p. 250)." According to constructivist scholars, the relationship between states and their environments is two-sided. It includes both the impact of states on their environments and the impact of environments on the states, and the latter is more significant most of the time. Environments can influence the state actors in one of the three ways: first, they may affect only the behavior of actors, second, they might affect the contingent properties of the actors (identities, interests, and capabilities), and the last environments might affect the existence of actors. (Jepperson, Wendt, Katzenstein, 1996)

Under the constructivist lens, foreign assistance is read as a set of norms and ideas constructed by states. Lumsdaine (1993) sustains that foreign aid cannot only be explained on the basis of economic and political interests of donors; humanitarian convictions and moral values equally shape aid policies (p. 29). In his words:

> *Support for aid was a response to world poverty which arose mainly from ethical and humane concern and, secondarily, from the belief that long-term peace and*

> *prosperity was possible only in a generous and just international order where all could prosper. (1993, p. 3)*

In this regard, foreign aid is influenced not only by international norms, but also by the "ethical" behaviors of states. Kondoh, Kobayashi, Shiga, and Sato (2010) argue that the emerging donors share some of the norms and values of the traditional donors, and these promote their aid-giving behaviors; nonetheless, the substance of the emerging donors' norms and values seem to be unique. As Kondoh, Kobayashi, Shiga, and Sato (2010) state, "This suggests that an additional motivation for engagement in aid activities by the emerging donors is their identity in international and regional communities." (p. 62). According to Aneja (2014) while motivation of humanitarian aid of China is driven by south-south solidarity norm and superpower identity, for Gulf States it is based on Islamic solidarity norm and co-operative identity. In addition, humanitarian aid of Taiwan and South Korea is motivated by cosmopolitanism norm and converging identity. (Aneja, 2014) Another study of constructivism applied to examine foreign aid was conducted by Yen (2010). In this study, Asianism, internationalism, sovereignty, and developmentalism norms were discussed and related to Chinese foreign aid.

Most recently, a few Turkish humanitarian aid researches conducted based on constructivist theory. Tabak (2016b) analyzed the relationship between norms and foreign aid. Turhan (2019) examined the role of faith-based non-governmental organizations in Turkey's humanitarian aid policy and practice. Turkmen (2020) analyzed Turkey as a non-Western and emerging humanitarian actor in her thesis. When we focus on Turkey, which is an emerging non-Western donor, with a constructivist lens, we see that particular norms explain the activism of humanitarian aid during the JDP era. The political preferences of society and the political trend of the JDP shape most of these norms. Namely, the historical and cultural heritage and Islamic values put forward by the JDP in its policies are seen as the basis for the formation of most of these norms. In addition, it is undoubtedly obvious that there are norms that existed before the JDP era, are accepted by all segments of society including voters of other parties, and had been formed by general moral values such as the protection of vulnerable people. After discussing constructivist perspective in this sub title, the concept of soft power, referred in the literature when discussing Turkey's humanitarian aid activism in the JDP era, will be analyzed in the below sub title.

2.2.2. Soft Power

The concept of power is a highly contested subject in International Relations theory. In Robert Gilpin's words: "The concept of power is one of the most troublesome in the field of international relations" (Gilpin, 1981, p. 13) A classical definition of power by Max Weber: "Power (*Macht*) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which that probability rests." (Weber, 1964, p. 152) Bertrand Russell attempted to classify power into different categories: "power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion." (Russel, 1938, p. 11) John J. Mearsheimer, a leading proponent of offensive realism, argued, "a state's actual power is embedded mainly in its army and the air and naval forces that directly support it." (Mearsheimer, 2004, p. 61). Realists like Mearsheimer, generally associate power in the form of a nation's military strengths and capabilities. Robert Dahl, pluralists, defines power this way: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl, 1957, p. 202-203). The use of coercion or inducement to change a subject's strategies is called the first face of power. This first face defines simple, evident and direct use of power when there is an observable disagreement that is counterproductive to B's collection of interests. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz (1962) expanded upon Dahl's work, pointed out multifaceted power analysis, and proposed the "second face" of power. Commenting on Dahl's first face of power concept, Bachrach and Baratz tried to integrate notions like non-decision making or agenda setting. Stephen Michael Lukes criticized Dahl (1957) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962), by pointing to a third face of power. Lukes defines power thus "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests' " (Lukes, 2005, p. 37) Lukes argued that the absence of conflicting interests does not necessarily indicate the absence of a power relationship. In his words, "the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place" (Lukes 2005, p. 27)

Table 1. Three Faces of Power

	One-Dimentional View of Power	Two-Dimentional View of Power	Three-Dimentional View of Power
Focus on			
	Decision making	Decision-making and non-decision making	Decision-making and control over political agenda (not necesserily through decisions)
	(key) Issues	Issues and potential issues	Issues and potential issues
	Observable (overt) conflict	Observable (overt or covert) conflict	Observable (overt or covert), and latent conflict
	(subjective) Interests, seen as policy preferences revealed by politival participation	(subjective) Interests, seen as policy preferences of grievances	Subjective and real interests

Data: Lukes (2005, p. 29)

Joseph S. Nye first introduced the idea of "soft power" in "Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power", published in 1990. In this book, Nye challenged the belief that USA was in decline. In response to the controversy over the decline of the United States in the 1980s, Nye proposed the "soft power" concept. (Guzzini, 2013, p. 68) Nye introduced "soft power" concept in this book, chapter 2 that builds on what Bachrach and Baratz (1962) called the second face of power. The contemporary discussions of "soft power" concept are associated with mostly second and third faces of power. (Nye, 2011, p. 16). Nye argues that when it comes to the assessment of power, the importance of technology, education and economic growth increases while the importance of geography, populations and raw materials decreases. (Nye, 1990, p. 29) Military power and economic power are forms of hard power that can be used to alter the positions of others. In Nye's (2002) terms "Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks)" (p. 7). Nye (2002, p. 7) also argues that in world politics, a country can achieve the results it wants because other countries want to follow it. According to Nye, USA was the strongest country not only in terms of military and economic strength, but also in terms of the third dimension, which he called soft power. (Nye, 1990, p. 30)

Nye elaborated on the soft power concept in his 2004 study "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics". Nye defines the concept of soft power as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies." (Nye, 2004, p. 10)

Here Nye's (2002) observation deserves a lengthy quote:

> *Soft power rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others. ... The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as an attractive culture, ideology, and institutions. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do. Soft power is not merely the same as influence, though it is one source of influence. After all, I can also influence you by threats or rewards. Soft power is also more than persuasion or the ability to move people by argument. It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation. (p.6)*

Joseph Nye also coined the term "Smart Power' in 2003. Smart power calls for the strategic use of both hard power 'transactional' and soft power 'inspirational' resources, depending on the context. (Nye, 2008, p. 83-84) Smart Power concept represents a common sense approach to foreign policy and national security aimed at harnessing both soft and hard power capabilities to optimize effects in accordance with strategic priorities. Nossel (2004, p. 132) described smart power as a belief in the necessary alignment of actions resources, and consent for the sustainment or production of soft power. There are generic power currencies, such as 'benignity', from which both power and its 'softness' are derived. From a "soft power" perspective, the provision of humanitarian assistance is a way to express 'benignity' and project soft power. Humanitarian assistance can be provided not only by civil society actors using economic resources, but also by troops using military resources. (Vuving, 2009, p. 8, 15)

Any resource, even military capabilities, can be a means of "soft power" as long as they are justified by humanitarian ends, such as humanitarian assistance. Thus, some states view humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions in foreign countries as a way to increase the attractiveness of their culture, in other words as a means of soft power. The US Pacific Fleet deployed the "USNS Mercy", a hospital ship, to areas affected by the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami in Southeast Asia on December 25, 2004. (Smith, 2005)

According to Vuving (2009):

> *The relief operations provided by the U.S. Navy after the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and other affected countries helped improve the image of the United States as a nice country, an image that suffered large damages in the invasion of Iraq the year before. (p. 15)*

Also, The Chinese People's Liberation Army launched the "Ark Peace" naval hospital ship in 2008 and deployed it, in addition to military exercises, to humanitarian missions. According to the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China released white paper titled "China's National Defense in the New Era"; "Ark Peace" has fulfilled seven voyages coded as Mission Harmony, visited 43 countries, and helped over 230,000 people. (SCIO, 2019)

According to Chacho (2009):

> *The People's Liberation Army (PLA) shows signs of viewing international Humanitarian Assistance/DisasterRelief (HADR) operations as a means of improving their ability to project soft power to complement China's emerging role on the international scene. Building international goodwill, contributing to the projection of a non-threatening Chinese rise in the international community and enhancing the role of the PLA vis-à-vis other military services are three specific results that the PLA can accomplish through participation in international HADR missions. (p. 1)*

All in all, the use of military forces has proven to be successful over time in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, and an increasing number of countries are promoting natural HADR operations with military personnel and assets. (Canyon, Ryan, and Burkle, 2019, p. 5) Theoretical debates on soft power are not limited to the works referred in this title. The soft power concept is widely employed by scholars and politicians to explain Turkey's foreign policy activism (Kirişçi, 2005; Kalin, 2006; Oguzlu, 2007; Altunişik, 2008; Kalin 2011). A special issue of Insight Turkey (2008) discusses "Turkey's Rising Soft Power." Turkey's liberal visa system, notes Kirişci (2005), includes a component of peacebuilding and soft power that has enabled the free movement of people across borders once considered spatially distant from each other. Kalin (2006) contends that:

> *Turkey must rediscover the opportunities offered by its soft power. This will provide Turkey with new areas of geographic expansion stretching from central of Europe*

to the interior of Asia and Africa and make it an element of stability in the region.

Oguzlu (2007) emphasizes the economic diplomacy of AKP governments and its multilateral and cooperative foreign policy based on a win-win approach unlike the traditional zero-sum game approach. Altunisik (2008) argues that the perception of Turkey's political and economic transformation process in the era of AKP governments could be a source of soft power for attracting the people of the Middle East. Kalin (2011) contends that Turkey's soft power comes from its strengths, namely Turkey's history, geography, cultural depth, economic strength, and democratic experience. Kalin (2011) further argues that Turkey's new identity reconciles its cultural and historical heritage in its soft power and communicates it comprehensively in its public diplomacy activities.

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu put forth Turkey's foreign policy activism. The doctrine of a new vision of foreign policy, dubbed as strategic depth, articulated that Turkey is a regional power, a central country and a country instituting order based on humanitarian responsibility, including various forms of foreign aid. (Davutoğlu, 2012). The policy of multi-regionalism and strategic depth reconfigured the Turkish foreign policy from 2009 to 2014 in the era when Ahmet Davutoğlu was then the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Turkey's soft power has gained importance owing to the gradual involvement of new state and non-state actors along with the adoption of novel frameworks, such as cultural, public, and humanitarian diplomacy. One of the main facets of Turkey's new foreign policy, illustrated in recent years by increased funding for international aid, is the strengthening of humanitarian and economic aid programs. (Ozkan and Akgun, 2010, p. 537) According to Çevik (2018):

> *Throughout consecutive AKP governments, development and humanitarian aid have been integral to Turkey's public diplomacy in attempts to brand the country as a 'donor state' and 'benevolent country'. The AKP government has utilized the historical Ottoman benevolence to depict Turkey's benevolent nation brand. (p. 223)*

The concepts of "soft power", "public diplomacy" and "humanitarian diplomacy" have been thoroughly studied in the literature to explain Turkey's enormous humanitarian aid in the last two decades. (Keyman and Sazak, 2014; Haşimi, 2014; Çevik, 2015; Donelli, 2015; Cannon, 2016; Çevik and Sevin, 2017; Ayhan, 2018; Altunişik, 2019)

2.2.3. The Emergence of Non-Traditional Humanitarian Aid Donors and Their Norms

The key institutions and NGOs in the humanitarian aid sector have mostly originated in Europe and North America. These "Western" states also set up the intergovernmental institutions forming the basis of the present-day humanitarian aid system. (Khakee, 2018, p. 23) Thus, the international humanitarian aid organizations were established at the initiative of western donors, in other words, core countries, according to Cox (1996, p. 137-138) arguments. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was formed in 1863, and the first Geneva Convention was signed in 1864 in Switzerland. In the aftermath of World War I, the League of Nations and the Commission for Refugees by the League of Nations were created in 1919 and 1921, respectively. Save the Children was also created in 1919. The UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), Oxfam, and CARE were created in response to World War II.

The first large-scale western humanitarian aid program was created on October 22, 1914, two months after the start of World War I. Herbert Hoover, a businessman in Belgium who would eventually become President of the US, launched a private program to support people in occupied Belgium and Northern France with food and aid needs. The Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) operated until August 31, 1919. CRB's responsibilities were subsumed under the USA government-operated American Relief Administration (ARA), with Hoover as its director. The ARA operated during the "reconstruction period" of August 1919 to July 1923. The governmental USA Food Administration operated between April 1917 and June 1919, also with Hoover as its head, and provided massive aid to the allied governments, namely France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Belgium. The USA government appropriated approximately $5.2 billion in loans (approximately $75 billion in 1997 dollars) to facilitate the purchase of food and other relief products for 1.3 billion persons affected by the war in 23 European states. More than 211 private USA charitable organizations also gave approximately $1 billion (approximately $14 billion in 1997 dollars) in cash or food or relief items. The ARA operated a "European Children's Fund" which provided food aid to the Soviet Union during its major famine between 1921 and 1923. The ARA provided the Soviet Union $63.2 million ($885 million in 1997 dollars) in assistance. (Callan, 2011, p. 123-124).

The USA has emerged as a hegemonic state after World War II and extended its political and economic influence across the world. In addition to the USA' material supremacy in international politics, its international hegemony imposes the spread of Americans' culture and ideology as a dominant force worldwide. (Shor 2010, p. 65). According to Hobson (2000, p. 40), a hegemon meets five defining criteria, including willing to make short-term sacrifices in order to achieve benefit in the long term. Hobson (2000, p. 40) argues that as a hegemonic state, the USA makes sacrifices in investment and aid. Hobson further argues that there are two phases of hegemony: benign and predatory. The benign phase describes the USA from 1945–1973, and the predatory phase describes the USA from 1973–2000. In the predatory phase, the declining hegemon eschews its policy of self-sacrifice and pursues its own selfish national interest. (Hobson, 2000, p. 40).

According to Zakaria, the past five centuries have been marked by three "tectonic power shifts" (2008, p. 1). The first power shift is the rise of the "West" in the 15th to 18th centuries, the second power shift is the rise of the "US" in the closing years of the 19th century and the third power shift is what Zakaria terms the "rise of the rest" (2008, p. 2). Also, Nye, argues that two major power shifts are occurring in the 21st century, "power transition and power diffusion" (2011, p. 113). Thus, the rise of the rest or the "new powers", is challenging the western hegemony and the structure and balance of power throughout the world. (Bound, K, Briggs, R., Holden, J., Jones, S., 2007, p. 52). The widely accepted argument is that the USA started to lose its hegemonic position and activism in world politics since the beginning of the 21st century (Layne 2012, p. 203). The old realities of the Cold War, with its division between rival superpowers, are now long gone and have been replaced with a more fluid set of multilateral relationships and alliances (Bound, et al., 2007, p. 52).

Since the beginning of 1990, as international relations have become global and wealth shifts gradually to emerging economies, new players have seemed to play an ever more critical role within the context of the community of humanitarian donors and influenced the ways that humanitarian aid has been provided. (ICRC, 2011). Although only 16 states pledged their support in response to the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, 92 states responded after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. Over 100 states responded after the Haiti earthquake in 2010. According to Harmer and Martin (2010, p. 1) Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and the Haiti earthquake in 2010 are the best cases of humanitarian aid

donor proliferation.

These new humanitarian donors are highly diverse in terms of geographical location, cultural and religious background, economic and political power, and volume of the humanitarian aid budget. The variety among these donors is reflected in a number of different terms attached to them like “non-DAC donors”, “non-traditional donors”, “non-Western”, “new” or “emerging donors”. (Kot-Majewska, 2015, p. 121-122). The top two donor governments, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, contributed US$50 million and US$8 million, respectively, to the Haiti emergency response fund. Moreover, eight of the ten governments making the most considerable contributions to the Haiti emergency response fund were non-DAC donors. (Smith, 2011, p. 2) Non-DAC donors, such as the Gulf States, Turkey, China, India, and some Eastern European countries, were also a significant part of the Pakistan earthquake in 2005, contributing almost half of the relief effort. (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005, p. 37).

In this regard, Binder and Meier (2011, p. 1135) argue that “From the days of Solferino in 1859 to the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, humanitarianism has been dominated by the norms and interests of governments and organizations from the West – despite its claim for universality. Those days are now over.” Ferris (2011) explains this power shift and the rise of the rest: “The changing shifts in power should mean that rising countries, such as Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa, will play a much more important role not only in financing international humanitarian work but also in shaping and supporting the future work of multilateral agencies.” (2011, p. 929) Most of the non-Western humanitarian donors, such as Brazil, China, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, are beginning to integrate international solidarity as part of their foreign policy. (Bernard, 2011, p. 893) According to Kot-Majewska, using humanitarian aid as a soft power instrument, India, Turkey, and the Gulf States express their leadership or significance regionally and even globally (2015, p. 121-122). Also, Binder and Meier (2011, p. 1140) argue that humanitarian aid donorship is a soft power instrument as many non-Western donors are increasingly starting to discover.

On the other hand, Binder and Meier (2011, p. 1139) argue that “in terms of scope, non-Western donors have a strong preference for funding assistance in natural disaster situations and specific sectors, predominantly food and health. For example, nineteen out of

twenty-four emergencies that Brazil provided humanitarian funding to, and all twelve crises that India was active in, were in response to natural disasters or epidemics." Also, Harmer and Martin (2010, p. 19) argue that "non-traditional donors" tend to concentrate their humanitarian aid resources on a limited number of crises, in particular, those located in their region or area of influence. According to Binder and Meier (2011, p. 1138), "the norms underpinning humanitarian action of non-Western donors are a blend of a commitment to traditional humanitarian principles, principles of South-South co-operation, and, at times, religious norms". Also, bilateral relations with the state that disaster or complex emergency occurred and the previous disaster experience of the donor state, in other words, "disaster solidarity" are underpinning humanitarian aid allocation decisions.

One of the significant norms underpinning humanitarian aid of non-Western donors, "south-south solidarity", can be traced through South-South co-operation that has a long and notable history. In the 1950s, South-South co-operation emerged in the context of the common struggle of former colonies to attain genuine independence and development. The Bandung conference in 1955 brought together 29 countries from Asia and Africa to promote economic and cultural co-operation in the Asian-African region on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty. (Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference, 1955) This pioneering South-South conference paved the way for the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and the Group of 77 in 1964. Since then, co-operation between South and South has been practiced in many ways: from economic integration to the formation of negotiations within multilateral institutions, military alliances, and cultural exchanges. It has included humanitarian aid and technical co-operation. (The Reality of Aid, 2010, p. 2)

As a non-western humanitarian aid donor, India "openly rejects Western definitions and approaches, as well as the terms donor and aid, preferring to view its efforts as a form of South-South partnership" (Global Health Security Initiative, 2012, p. 46). Respect for the sovereignty of the disaster-affected state is also a vital norm informing non-Western humanitarian aid operations. Sovereignty is seen as part of a distinct South-South co-operation approach that looks to promote an equal relationship between the governments that provide aid and those that receive it. In this regard, the Brazilian government frames its engagement as "humanitarian co-operation" instead of "humanitarian aid". (Binder and

Meier, 2011, p. 1138)

Another major norm underpinning humanitarian aid of non-Western donors is "Islamic solidarity". As Aneja argues that "the concentration of humanitarian aid from Gulf donors and Turkey to Muslim majority nations similarly highlights how humanitarianism might be based on the principle of Islamic solidarity rather than universalism" (2014, p. 6). According to Harmer and Cotterrell (2005, p. 33), motivations for the humanitarian aid contributions of Gulf donors include a religious obligation, solidarity, bilateral relations, and regional rivalries. Also, Davey argues, "for some Islamic organizations, humanitarian action is an expression of solidarity with other Muslims and is part of a broader effort to defend the Islamic community (the Ummah) from outside threats" (2012, p. 4). In 2013, an estimated 75% of people living in the top ten recipient countries of humanitarian aid were Muslim (Stirk 2015, 3).

According to Harmer and Cotterrell, humanitarian aid contributions of Gulf donors, partly thanks to oil wealth and traditions of charitable giving and solidarity with Arab and Muslim populations, and because of their proximity to a number of high-profile crises (2005, p. 9). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are two of the largest official donors in the Gulf. The Gulf Red Crescent societies established in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s, and in the Emirates in the 1980s. These societies have benefited from *zakat*, one of the five pillars of Islam, and have become the most essential operational agencies in the Gulf. In 2004, contributions going through the Red Cross/Red Crescent constituted 71% of overall humanitarian aid from the Gulf States reported to OCHA's Financial Tracking System. In recent years, the largest recipient countries of emergency assistance from the United Arab Emirates Red Crescent have been Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, all of which have significant or mostly Muslim populations. (Harmer and Cotterrell, 2005, p. 14).

The United Arab Emirates has even established several interactive channels with traditional donors and multilateral organizations for humanitarian aid. The United Arab Emirates launched the Global Humanitarian Appeal in 2009 and proactively participated in setting up international humanitarian agendas by organizing annual meetings for humanitarian aid, such as the Dubai International Humanitarian Aid and Development Conference and Exhibition. The United Arab Emirates also joined the OCHA Donor Support

Group in 2006 as well as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Donor Support Group in 2009 as the only non-Western Islamic donor. (Binder, Meier, and Steets, 2010, p. 8).

The “humanitarian aid” phenomenon, as old as human history, have been shifted three times in the past three centuries. The battle of Solferino (1859) triggered the birth of contemporary humanitarian aid structure. The first shift began with the establishment of legal norms and the international institutionalization of humanitarian assistance in the middle of the 19th century. In other words, the acceptance of the Geneva Conventions and the establishment of the Red Cross and Red Crescent over the world were the first turning point in the progress of humanitarian aid after the existence of humanity and the phenomenon. Almost a century later, the crisis in Biafra triggered the second shift, which took place in the mid-20th century. Characteristic of this second shift is the establishment of numerous humanitarian NGOs within the structure of humanitarian aid structure, which has been dominated by the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Both of these shifts were led by Western states and Western NGOs. The third shift occurred in the early years of the 21st century and it was not triggered by a war or conflict, but through a natural disaster, namely a tsunami in the Indian Ocean in late 2004. The third shift can be summed up as follows: the enormous rise of non-Western states and their NGOs in the humanitarian aid structure previously dominated by Western states and their NGOs. These shifts in humanitarian aid phenomenon is illustrated in the below Figure 1.




Figure 2. Shifts in Humanitarian Aid

2.3. Humanitarian Aid Structure

Although the contemporary concept of humanitarian aid has appeared in the second half of the 19th century, humanitarian aid has been present throughout history. The legal base and institutional framework of humanitarian aid have progressed in response to global events, disasters and complex emergencies. Thus, the subtitles below give a brief overview of the history of humanitarian aid, a review of the legal framework for humanitarian aid and an overview of the institutional framework for humanitarian aid.

2.3.1. History of Humanitarian Aid

Origins of humanitarian assistance can be traced through thousands of years of human history. Helping the needy has been common in the world throughout ancient history. The importance of preserving the lives of those in need is attested to in ancient the historical accounts from China, Greece, the Middle East, and Rome. Historical data from the twenty-third century BC. Upper Egypt reflects the belief that it is commendable to provide food for the hungry (Walker & Maxwell, 2009). Davey, Borton, and Foley (2013, p. 5) argue that although they are not entirely separate categories, the two forces most widely cited are "religious belief" and "the articulation of the laws of war". Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions are not only limited to their followers, but also often make moral claims that are universally applicable. The importance of respect for life, human dignity, justice, and fairness are some examples of those found in all religious traditions (Viotti and Kauppi, 2012, p. 393). *Zakat* is one of Islam's five pillars. *Zakat* is compulsory, and every year 1/40 of one's wealth is given to the poor and needy, especially during the month of Ramadan. There are eight categories of zakat beneficiaries, according to the Quran, Sura 9, verse 60, which allows *zakat* to fund both emergency and long-term aid. (Krafess 2005, 335). Jesus taught a lot about the subject of humanist charity in the New Testament. He commanded all the world's Christians not to discriminate and distinguish between people and treat them all with love and compassion. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus called on people not only to love their friends but also their enemies, as well as those

who have been rejected by society, the poor, crippled, lame, blind and sick. (LWF Nepal and IRW, 2018, p. 12). Judaism commissioned its followers to look after the poor, orphans, and widows. Hinduism advocates compassion on the ground that the whole living being is part of the universal family. Buddha asks people to give loving-kindness and compassion to the whole world and all living beings regardless of caste, creed, gender, wealth, or poverty. (LWF Nepal and IRW, 2018, p. 11).

War laws were adopted in ancient Greece and Rome and ascribed to Sun Tzu in China. They were articulated in "The Art of War." In the 1100s; Saladin is also promoting them in the Middle East. (Davey, Borton and Foley, 2013, p 5). In 1621, the King of Sweden, Gustavus II Adolfus, decreed the first European rules containing and specifying provisions on the status and rights of non-combatants. During the seventeenth century as a recorded example of international humanitarian aid, a shipment of food from Ireland to New England in 1647 was destined for the poor who were distressed by the late war with the Indians (Smillie, 1995, p. 37). The Battle of Solferino, 1859 (June 24, 1859) can be considered the birth of the modern structure of humanitarian aid. In this battle, part of the 1859-1860 Austro-French War, resulted in large-scale casualties— of the more than 200,000 fighters, 6,000 were killed, and more than 40,000 wounded. Jean-Henri Dunant, a Swiss businessman who served as a medical observer, was inspired to set up an aid society after witnessing this event first-hand. Dunant also wrote a book called “A Memory of Solferino” (“*Un souvenir de Solferino*”), detailing his Solferino observations and advocating rules to protect the victims of international war. The publication of the book led to the adoption in 1864 of the first Geneva Conventions and the founding of the ICRC, an organization now known worldwide for its humanitarian work and charity. In 1901, Dunant was awarded the first Nobel Peace Prize for his dedication to developing international humanitarian aid (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 9).

As Forsythe (2005, p. 16) points out, Dunant was not the only person to take notice. Another well-known, influential figure in the humanitarian aid movement is Florence Nightingale. Florence Nightingale became a European nursing figurehead who used government funding to lead thirty-eight nurses in the Crimean War (1854-1855) to help wounded soldiers. Nightingale, however, had very different views on the suitability of the ICRC. While Dunant called for humanitarian aid at all costs, Nightingale argued that

voluntary efforts, which reduced the costs of war ministries, merely made it easier for governments to engage in wars more frequently and longer. (Polman, 2010, p. 3-4).

The Franco-Prussian War (1870), the Boer War (1899-1902) and the Russian-Japanese War (1904) included early humanitarian aid operations of the Red Cross on the battlefield. Humanitarian aid included not only medical care, but also the distribution of relief goods, which required the establishment of supply warehouses and the negotiation of concessions for transport and imports. During World War I, on behalf of both military and civilian victims, extensive Red Cross relief activities were carried out. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 10). In 1919, the League of Nations was established. The main purposes of the League of Nations, as laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations, were "promote international co-operation and to achieve peace and security" via alliances and treaties through diplomacy, disarmament, and collective security. The foundation of the League of Nations has led refugees beyond the immediate interests of the states of origin and refuge to adopt collective measures. International concern for refugees has been expressed by the status of refugees and the establishment of refugee protection agencies and material assistance administration. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 15).

The League of Nations established the High Commission for Refugees (HCR) in response to the growing refugee population fleeing the Russian Revolution and the Russian Civil War in 1921. Fridtjof Nansen was appointed the first High Commissioner in 1922. Nansen developed the world-renowned Nansen Passport used by hundreds of thousands of those who either had lost or never had ID or passport. (Fuller, 2008, p. 239). In 1930 on the death of Nansen, the League of Nations formed an autonomous body, Nansen International Bureau of Refugees. The Bureau was instrumental in developing a draft 1933 treaty on the rights of refugees. (Davey, Borton, and Foley, 2013, p. 8). Nansen was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1922 for his efforts during World War I. Later, The Nansen International Bureau of Refugees was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1938 for its efforts in establishing the Nansen Passport. The efforts of Nansen were significant because these efforts realized an international agency to assist refugees for the first time.

Meanwhile, as the international federation of 26 national societies that existed then, the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) was founded in 1919. (Macalister-Smith, 1985,

p. 77). By expanding its international activity to include civilians affected by wars and their consequences, LRCS became instrumental. (Paulman, 2013, p. 224). LRCS is governed by its own Constitution and funded by Member Societies. LRCS was explicitly created to deal with natural disasters and promote the development of national societies to better prepare the entire Red Cross movement for all types of relief contingencies. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 77). LRCS is the precursor of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC).

The number of organizations involved in providing humanitarian aide also expanded shortly after World War I. For example, Save the Children was formed in 1919 to help young victims of World War I. The World Student Christian Federation (predecessor of the World University Service) also emerged from the war, seeking to connect students worldwide in solidarity. (Smillie, 1995, p. 38). Belgrade and Nachmias (1997, p. 3) argue that with the end of World War I, humanitarian aid programs based on the need to help innocent victims of the conflict became a matter of concern for allied political leaders. Since the scope of World War I victims had never been seen before, private charities that intervened earlier could not control enough resources to alleviate hunger and disease. The Wilson administration of the USA decided in those parts of Western Europe most devastated by the German wartime-occupation to establish massive rescue operations. Initially, Belgium was the most worthy of aid and became the first recipient of a relief effort led by Herbert Hoover after the war. (Belgrad and Nachmias, 1997, p. 3-4).

The U.S. government funded and controlled humanitarian agencies during World War II. Barnett (2011, p. 108) argues that the U.S. administration started imposing controls on humanitarian aid when it entered World War II in late 1941 to advance its military purpose. The Committee of War Relief Agencies was set up by President Roosevelt. This committee was defined as “a small, self-appointed committee to coordinate, supervise, and consolidate relief by endorsing certain organizations and refusing to endorse others.” (Barnett, 2011, p. 109). In July 1942, the War Relief Control Board (WRCB) was established. The WRCB requested that all aid agencies register, and that it was in the competence of the WRCB to approve budgets, to monitor the methods used in appeal campaigns, to command organizations to make public their funding, and to decide which organization would be granted an export license. (Barnett, 2011, p. 108). The number of humanitarian agencies

declined from several hundred in 1941 to sixty-seven in 1943.

Barnett (2011) argues that while the WRCB has justified its actions based on waste reduction and relief delivery, America's war aims have been broad. The US administration has granted $12 million for various projects between 1943 and 1946 to Catholic Relief Services, according to Barnett (2011), partly because it hoped that the Catholic Relief Services would maintain intelligence contacts in Europa. Barnett (2011) concludes that the US government had converted private agencies to almost para-statal agencies by aligning its relief sector with its targets for war. During the end of World War II, $13.4 billion in aid from 1948 to 1952, almost one-third of which was provided for food, feed, and fertilizer was provided through the US European Recovery Program (known as the Marshall Plan). The Marshall Plan was also an incentive for American national agriculture to secure American agricultural exports when high levels of production in peacetime resumed. (Shaw, 2011, p. 2).

Walker and Maxwell (2009) claim that “World War II and its legacy fundamentally shaped the humanitarian community we see today” (p. 31). The UNRRA was set up in 1943 to provide aid, rehabilitation, and resettlement assistance. The term "United Nations" has been officially used since 1942 to describe the Allies’ coalition against the power of the Axis. The UNRRA was subsequently transferred to the UN. The UNRRA had become a new approach and had developed unique international governmental co-operation with a near-globalization focus on humanitarian action in China, the Philippines, Korea, the Middle East, Ethiopia, the Balkans and other parts of mainland Europe. (Cohen, 2008, p. 440). The UNRRA was the world’s leading humanitarian organization for four years until its closure in 1947. (Davey, Borton and Foley, 2013, p. 9).

The UNRRA’s successor organizations; the International Organization for Refugees (IRO) and UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) were approved by the General Assembly in 1946. After the dissolution of UNRRA, the Office of the UNHCR, created on January 1, 1951, assumed its functions. Moreover, in 1949 four new Geneva Conventions were signed to safeguard the war victims further. Another important post-war declaration was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR was significant in that it first defined and standardized “fundamental freedoms” and “human

rights". In addition, the UN advised that its adoption constituted an obligation on all members of the international community. (Joyse, 1978, p. 27).

During World War II and its subsequent years, a number of new private humanitarian agencies were also organized. In 1942, the Oxford Famine Relief Committee (Oxfam) was established (Rieff, 2002, p. 80). Although it was initially created just to respond to the Greek famine, Oxfam has become, with 15 member organizations, one of the largest international agencies with offices worldwide. The Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) was launched in 1945. Originally designed to deliver food to Europe's World War II nations, the CARE has now become the world leader in the fight against poverty. Lutheran World Relief, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and World Vision are among the largest religious humanitarian organizations emerging from World War II. Between 1945 and 1949, almost 200 NGOs were founded, most of them in the USA. (Barnett, 2011, p. 112).

Duffield (2007, p. 52) claimed that the Cold War was a fertile period for private and voluntary humanitarian action. During the Cold War, Europeans in need were the main beneficiaries of humanitarian aid to the needy of all parts of the world. The image of hungry African children became the dominant feature of Western views of the humanitarian aid, often spread over NGO fundraising campaigns. It coincided with the emergence, for the first time, of the third world as a geopolitical bloc. (Davey, Borton and Foley, 2013, p. 10). MacFarlane (2001, p. 10) argues that during the Cold War, the superpowers frequently used humanitarian aid to strengthen their proxy's capabilities to pursue conflicts. The US supported anti-government forces in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia, under the banner of anti-communism, whereas the Soviet Union justified intervening whenever there is a threat to the communist regime. The US policy for Nicaragua in the 1980s demonstrated how humanitarian aid had been pushed to achieve political goals. The Reagan government supported the Contras', which committed themselves to overthrowing the communist regime. Though the USA administration imposed an embargo on Nicaragua's trade in 1985, it exempted humanitarian aid items and provided humanitarian aid up to $27 million, including boots, tents, and telecommunications equipment (Minear and Weiss 1995, 33). The Washington Times editorial gave a summary on May 10, 1985 of the situation: "Anyone who examines the historical record of communism must conclude that any aid directed at overthrowing communism is humanitarian aid" (Minear and Weiss 1995, 34).

Linkages between the policies of the Cold War and NGOs and their national governments' priorities were often extremely close. For example, CRS was active in delivering food support to Vietnam's allies (Minear, 2012: 45–48). MacFarlane (2001, p. 9) argues that superpowers are capable of manipulating humanitarian access and action to their political goals and have degraded the humanitarian principles with aid agencies often acting as an extension of the superpowers' political and military agendas.

On the other hand, Chandler (2001) claimed that aid organizations had a high profile during the Cold War due to their universal approach and political neutrality. NGOs' played a significant role in providing aid when the international geopolitical divide meant that Western countries were not ready to help those in need. One of the first examples of NGO's that mobilized humanitarian aid against British and international disapproval is the 1968 Biafra Crisis. (Chandler 2001, p. 2). In 1960, Nigeria gained independence from the UK. Nigeria mainly consists of three different ethnic groups, divided into three different regions. Tensions grew between these three groups in the years after their independence, before a full-fledged civil war in 1968 began. The Nigerian government imposed a blockade on Biafra as part of its military strategy to have rebels and their supporters face hunger. The result was famine, resulting in some 25,000 people dying each day from one ethnic group alone (Barnett and Weiss, 2011, p. 55). The UN Secretary-General, U Thant argued that since Biafra was an internal affair and the UN mandate did not include domestic politics, there is little that could be done. (Barnett, 2011, p. 54).

It was only at its own risk, that the ICRC manages to negotiate access to provide relief to Biafra. Nevertheless, after Nigeria's government brought down an aircraft, the ICRC suspended its operations (Forsythe 2005, p. 67). NGOs like CARE and Oxfam and a coalition of curch agencies under the Joint Church Aid started their own aviation operations as famine conditions worsened. The Joint Church Aid operated 5,310 flights to Biafra, which conveyed 66,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid. (Stremlau, 1977: 244). The crisis demonstrated NGOs' ability to provide humanitarian aid in situations where the UN and ICRC could not provide humanitarian aid (Davey, Borton and Foley, 2013, p. 11). Some physicians sent to Biafra by the French Red Cross without Nigerian consent, including Bernard Kouchner, criticized the ICRC and rejected the neutrality principle as defined and implemented by the ICRC. In 1971, the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF: Doctors Without Borders) was created

by Kouchner, future UN Governor of Kosovo. Kouchner wanted to distinguish MSF from the ICRC by "rejecting the need for discount because it is a responsibility rather than a last resort to informing the public of its causes of pain." (Terry, 2002, p. 21).

There are two principles of "solidarity," which have developed from Biafra's experience and are now central in the new rights-based humanitarianism, according to Chandler (2001, p. 5). Firstly, the "freedom of criticism" or "denunciation". At the Nobel Lecture on behalf of MSF, James Orbinski stated in 1999: "Silence has long been confused with neutrality and has been presented as a necessary condition for humanitarian action. From its beginning, MSF was created in opposition to this assumption. We are not sure that words can always save lives, but we know that silence can certainly kill" (MSF, 1999). Secondly, the "subsidiarity of sovereignty" or the "right of intervention", the "sans frontières" of the MSF movement (Chandler, 2001, p. 5). Pugh (1998, p. 341) have cited MSF founder Kouchner, as the humanitarian official responsible for popularizing the legal theory of French academic Mario Bettati, who developed the concept of the "right of intervention".

Minear and Weiss (1995, pp. 32-34) argue that humanitarian agencies have gained more space in the post-Cold War era than before for their activities since they no longer subordinate themselves to the anti-communist or anti-capitalist political agendas. MacFarlane (1999, p. 548) argues that the end of the Cold-War rivalry has reduced the incentive for significant states to manipulate aid flows for political ends. In the post-Cold War era of unipolar power, with its dominant political ideology of liberal democracy, the funding available for humanitarian aid and the number of organizations assisting have grown significantly, according to Duffiel (2014). Barnett (2011) argues that the end of the Cold War was the start of "new wars" that created complex humanitarian emergencies. In the own ironic words of Barnett (2011, pp. 2–3) "These wars were not so new, and humanitarian emergencies had always been complex, but the international community acted as if they had never seen anything like them. The humanitarian community did not completely meet these challenges". Barnett and Weiss (2011, p. 76) argue that civilians are the intended victims of war in the "new wars" instead of the unfortunate victims or collateral damage.

Chandler (2001, p. 696) argues that the post-Cold War period would have been marked

by the emergence of a rights-based “new humanitarianism” and rejection of the humanitarian aid framework of ICRC neutrality and needs-based emergency relief, which was linked to respect for state sovereignty rather than human rights protection.

2.3.2. Legal Framework of Humanitarian Aid

The legal framework of humanitarian aid contains legally binding regulations, non-legally binding regulations, and commitments. The Geneva Conventions are the main legally binding legislation on humanitarian aid. The Geneva Conventions are key international humanitarian treaties aimed at protecting civil (innocent or non-combatants) in war. On August 22, 1864, the first Geneva Convention, the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, was signed and came into force on June 22, 1865. The 1864 Convention was the first multilateral agreement to affirm an international humanitarian law of armed conflict. The 1864 Convention was signed by 16 States. It was open to accession by non-signatories (Art. IX of the Convention) and quickly gained worldwide acceptance. The Convention of 1864 is remarkable for integrating the sphere of the inter-state relations with moral humanitarian ideas. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 10).

Two main concepts were put forward by the 1864 Convention. The first concept is the principle of the neutrality of medical staff, medical facilities, and residents of the country who help the wounded. (Art. I-V of the Convention) The second concept (Art. VI of the Convention) is that the wounded should have the right to be relieved of their nationality without distinction. The distinctive emblem of the “Red Cross” was recognized on a white background by Art VII. As an alternative symbol, the "Red Crescent" was mainly adopted in 1876 by Muslim nations (Lamb and Robertson-Snape, 2017, p. 126). The 1864 Convention was revamped in 1906 and 1929 and formed the foundation for the First Geneva Convention of 1949. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 10). The 1949 Convention (I), the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, contains 64 articles. They protect the wounded and sick, and medical and religious staff, medical units, and health transportation. (ICRC, 1949a).

The second Geneva Convention, the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, was signed for on July 6, 1906, and

entered into force August 9, 1907. The Convention of 1906 calls for adequate care on and off the sea for weakened soldiers and the protection of medical facilities. Before that, in the 1889 and 1907 Hague Conventions, which adopted the Geneva Conventions' principles on injured people and sick persons in the naval war, the provisions for the protection of injured persons, sick persons, and shipwrecked persons were codified. The 1949 Convention (II), the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, contains 63 articles. These Articles provide specific protection for hospital vessels, coastal rescue craft, medical aircraft, and other medical transportations on the sea, and religious, medical and hospital employees carrying on naval duties, as well as the protection of the wounded, ill and shipwrecked members of the armed forces of the sea. (ICRC, 1949b).

The third Geneva Convention, the Treatment of Prisoners of War, was signed on July 27, 1929. The Convention of 1929 covers conditions for soldiers captured. The Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War present Convention replaced the Convention of 1929. The Geneva Convention (III) contains 143 Articles, whereas the 1929 Convention had only 97. Due to changes in the conduct of war and its consequences as well as in the living conditions of populations, it became necessary to revise the 1929 Convention on a number of points. Experience has shown that the prisoners' daily lives of prisoners were dependent on the interpretation given to the general rules. In accordance with the Geneva Convention (I) and (II), the categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war status have been expanded. The conditions and places of captivity were more accurately defined, especially regarding the work of prisoners of war, their financial resources, the relief that they were given, and the legal proceedings against them. The Convention (III) lays down the principle of immediate release and repatriation of prisoners of war following the termination of active hostilities. (ICRC, 1949c).

The fourth Geneva Convention, the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, was signed on August 12, 1949, entered into force October 21, 1950. The Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War War requires humane treatment of civilians under the power of the millitary. Before 1949, the Geneva Conventions concerned combatants alone, not civil persons. The Regulations relating to the Laws and the Customs of War on Land attached to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions

provide for some provisions for protection of civilians from the consequences of war and protection in the occupied territories. During World War I, The Hague provisions were not sufficient. Air warfare was dangerous, and civil society was being mistreated in the enemy territories and occupied territories. The 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) adopted in 1949 takes World War II experiences into account. The Geneva Convention (IV) does not invalidate the provisions of the Hague Regulations of 1907 on the same subjects but is supplementary to them. The Geneva Convention (IV) requires an occupying power in an international armed war to provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population under their control and allow relief from impartial third parties subject solely to technical inspections. (ICRC, 1949d).

On June 8, 1977, two extra Protocols were added to the Geneva Conventions. The Protocol (I) provides that international conflicts should be considered as armed conflicts where people fight against colonial rule, alien occupation, or racist regimes. The Protocol (I) extends the protection of the Conventions to civilian medical personnel, equipment, and supplies and civilian units and transports and contains detailed provisions for medical transportation. Among the most important Articles are those for the protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities. They include a definition of military purposes and bans on civilians and objects. Further, the Protocol (I) addresses civil defense organizations' protection, relief actions, and the treatment of persons in the power of a party to a conflict (ICRC, 1977a).

Protocol (I) also contains a common provision known as the Martens Clause, which is found in various forms in a number of other humanitarian instruments and in the preamble to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As adopted in Article 1 (2) of the Protocol (I), the Martens Clause states: “In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.” (UN Documents, 2019a). This formula emphasizes the importance and binding power in the humanitarian sphere of the general principles of international law and prevents assumptions that what is not forbidden by the instrument in question must be allowed. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 23).

On the other hand, the Protocol (II) aims to extend the essential rules of the law of

armed conflicts to internal wars. Article 3 common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions were the only provision applicable to non-international armed conflicts prior to the adoption of Protocol (II). This article proved insufficient given that since 1945 around eighty percent of victims of armed conflicts are victimized by non-international disputes and non-international disputes are often crueler than international disputes. (ICRC, 1977b). Protocols I and Protocol II made the most crucial humanitarian contribution to the protection of non-combatants, in particular, civil ones. (Bugnion, 2000, p. 45).

Apart from the Geneva Conventions, many resolutions on humanitarian aid have been adopted by the United Nations Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations is of great importance among these resolutions. The resolution 46/182 begins by stating, "the need to strengthen further and make more effective the collective efforts of the international community, in particular, the United Nations system, in providing humanitarian assistance". The resolution 46/182 adopts the text of the Annex "for the strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system". (United Nations, 1991)

Part I, titled "Guiding Principles", of the Annex states that "humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality". Although the resolution 46/182 is not legally binding, the implementation of the principles of "humanity", "neutrality" and "impartiality" are considered as being mandatory. Under UN General Assembly Resolution 58/114, the principle of independence was added in 2004. Another general statement of Part I states that "The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country." (United Nations, 1991)

In accordance with Part I, the main responsibility lies with the State concerned for initiating, organizing, coordinating and delivering humanitarian assistance. (United Nations, 1991) The role of States in Resolution 46/182 is therefore clearly recognized. The resolution

46/182 also states that “Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations working impartially and with strictly humanitarian motives should continue to make a significant contribution in supplementing national efforts”. Part VI, titled “Coordination, Co-operation and Leadership”, of the Annex states that “Relevant non-governmental organizations can be invited to participate on an ad hoc basis.” (United Nations, 1991)

There are also humanitarian aid regulations in the European Union. Article 214 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that humanitarian aid operations of the European Union are carried out in accordance with international law principles and principles of impartiality, neutrality, and non-discrimination. The European Council adopted Regulation 1257/96, concerning humanitarian aid, on June 20, 1996. According to Article 1 of the Regulation 1257/96, “The Community's humanitarian aid shall comprise assistance, relief and protection operations on a non-discriminatory basis to help people in third countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, and as a priority those in developing countries, victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters”. (Official website of the European Union Law Eur-Lex, 1996) Article 6 of the Regulation 1257/96 states that “Humanitarian aid operations financed by the Community may be implemented either at the request of international or non-governmental agencies and organizations from a Member State or a recipient third country or on the initiative of the Commission”.

There are a large number of soft law instruments that are not legally binding in nature. These tools seek to regulate the humanitarian aid sector as a whole or a specific disaster management player. Among these instruments, “The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief” is of significant importance. The Code of Conduct was developed and agreed upon by eight agencies, namely, Caritas International, Catholic Relief Services, International Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, The International Committee of the Red Cross, The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and The World Council of Churches, in 1994. The Code of Conduct is voluntary, and it counts 805

signatories, including five agencies[1] from Turkey, at the beginning of April 2019. (IFRC, 2019b)

The Code of Conduct contains ten principles and recommendations addressed to the governments of disaster-affected countries, to donor governments, and IGOs. The principles are:

> i. The humanitarian imperative comes first.
> ii. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
> iii. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
> iv. We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
> v. We shall respect culture and custom.
> vi. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
> vii. Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
> viii. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
> ix. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
> x. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects. (IFRC, 2019a)

The first four principles reaffirm the ICRC's fundamental principles, and the last six principles define best practices and humanitarian aid methodology. Originally intended to guide natural disasters, it was also expanded to deal with conflict situations. Various agencies use this document to guide their activities in areas of war. (Barnett, 2005, p. 729) In order to monitor its reliefs, and to urge other institutions to set similar standards, the International Red Cross Federation uses the Code of Conduct. In 1997, the Sphere Project

[1] Independent Doctors Association (*Bağımsız Doktorlar Derneği*), International Association for Relief and Development (*Uluslararası Yardımlaşma ve Kalkındırma Derneği*), Lighthouse Aid and Solidarity Association (*Deniz Feneri Derneği*), Maram Foundation for Relief and Development (*Nur Derneği*), and Mercy Without Limits (*Sınır Tanımayan Merhamet Derneği*).

was initiated by a group of NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, another international initiative that standardized humanitarian aid rules and regulations. The project aims to improve the quality of aid to disaster-affected individuals and to increase accountability among States and humanitarian agencies. The philosophy of the Sphere is based on two fundamental convictions: "1) People affected by disaster or conflict have the right to life with dignity and, therefore, the right to assistance; 2) All possible steps should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of disaster or conflict." (Sphere Association, 2018, p. 4).

The Sphere Project has developed a guide to the international humanitarian aid community, entitled "Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response". The Sphere Project handbook was updated in 2004 and 2011, and on November 6, 2018, a fourth edition of the Sphere handbook was launched. The Sphere Project handbook reflects a commitment to a principled and rights-based humanitarian response. It is grounded on a fundamental respect for people's right to be fully involved in their recovery decisions. (Sphere Association, 2018, p. 5). The Humanitarian Charter provides the ethical and legal backdrop to the Protection Principles, the Core Humanitarian Standard, and the Minimum Standards that follow in the Sphere Handbook. The Humanitarian Charter is partly a declaration of legal rights and obligations, partly a declaration of common belief. The Humanitarian Charter summarizes the core legal principles, in terms of legal rights and obligations, which mostly influence the welfare of people affected by disasters or disputes. Concerning the shared belief part, it aims to establish agreement on principles governing disaster or conflict response, including the roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved, among humanitarian agencies. (Sphere Association, 2018, p. 28).

The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) sets out nine Commitments that organizations and individuals involved in humanitarian response can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the aid they provide. It is a voluntary framework for both individuals and organizations. The CHS, along with the Humanitarian Charter and Protection Principles, forms a strong foundation within The Sphere Handbook and supports all technical standards. (Sphere Association, 2018, p. 52). Another approach to standardization of humanitarian aid and commitments of actors is the "Principles and Good

Practice of Humanitarian Donorship". In June 2003, Governments of 16 donors[2], as well as the European Commission, OECD, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, relief organizations, and academia, adopted a framework of 23 principles and examples of good practice for providing official humanitarian aid. (Spieker, 2015, p. 141). There are now 42 members of the GHD group who contribute to the donors' key role in providing effective and accountable humanitarian aid through this forum. (GHD, 2019)

The first joint political declaration by the European Union on humanitarian aid, the "European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid" was signed on December 18, 2007, by the Presidents of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union on behalf of the 27 Member States of the European Union. The Consensus seeks to improve coordination throughout the EU, underlines the aspect of responsible donor practice, and highlights the different roles played by various actors in humanitarian action. The Member States, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and Council affirm their commitment "to upholding and promoting the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence" in the context of humanitarian aid. (Spieker, 2015, p. 141-142). The EU donors also commit to the "Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship" in the joint political declaration.

2.3.3. Institutional Framework of Humanitarian Aid

The humanitarian aid institutional framework is generally regarded as comprising four main types of agencies. The first is the donors from the state. The second is intergovernmental agencies, like the UN and other UN affiliates. The third is the national and international associations of the Red Cross and Red Cross Movement. The fourth is national and international NGOs. (Riddell, 2007, p. 315) At a conference held in San Francisco, in April 1945, the UN itself was formally established. Fifty countries endorsed its Charter of 111 Articles, ratified on October 24, 1945 by the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council. These institutional developments have been accompanied by a number of regulations on the most basic of all human rights, in particular, the universal declaration of human rights (Article 3): "Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person".

[2] Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, USA, Sweden, and Switzerland.

(Davey, Borton and Foley, 2013, p. 9)

UN humanitarian aid dates back to the beginning of the UN itself. A predecessor of the UN, the UNRRA, was set up in November 1943 two years prior to the end of the Second World War. The forty-two states founding the UNRRA have signed the UNRRA Agreement to provide relief to areas freed from the Axis powers and the refugees. (Zwitter, 2018, p. 113.) The UNRRA's founding mission was "to plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities." (Irwin, 2013, p. 206).

There was a remarkable achievement in the humanitarian aid operations of UNRRA. UNRRA existed from November 9, 1943, to September 30, 1948, and the total volume of UNRRA's shipments was $2.9 billion, of which $1.2 billion represented food supplies, in quantity over 9 million tons. (Woodbridge, 1952, p. 428-429 cited in Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 13). According to Curti (1963, p. 456-457), the USA financed more than seventy percent of UNRRA's humanitarian aid operations. The IRO, one of the UNRRA's successor organizations, was approved by the General Assembly on December 15, 1946. After UNRRA's dissolution the UNHCR, which was established as of January 1, 1951, took over its duties. (Zwitter, 2011, p. 53.) Later, IRO was replaced by the UNHCR, which was established as of January 1, 1951. (Davey, Borton and Foley, 2013, p. 9) On July 28, 1951, the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted, which became the legal foundation for helping refugees and the basic statute guiding UNHCR's work. Initially, the scope of the UNHCR's operations was limited to issues of forced migration in Europe to the exclusion of refugee movements in other areas of the world. In the 1960s, UNHCR expanded its geographical focus and turned to refugee crises in Africa. Western nations viewed the refugee populations in the South as sources of political and economic instability that the Soviet Union could exploit. Therefore, providing aid and protection to refugees in these regions was done, in part, as a tool of aggression in Cold War politics. As a result, "Western governments consequently came to see assistance to refugees as a central part of their foreign policy towards newly independent states" (Betts et al. 2012: 28). According to Betts et al. (2012), the primary motivation for Western governments to provide aid to refugee populations was not solely based on the well-being or interests of refugees; rather, it was a

technique to manage international political interests. The UNHCR is funded entirely by voluntary donations from governments and individual philanthropists and philanthropic foundations. UNHCR does not have a permanent budget set by the UN, and so it must continuously lobby for donations. The funding UNHCR secures is consistently less than what it requires to carry out its operations. The governments of the global north supply the majority of UNHCR's budget, and the U.S., as the largest donor providing roughly 30% of the total budget, "represents the hegemon within the global refugee regime" (Betts et al., 2012, p. 97). The increased operational and technical demand for humanitarian activities in countries of origin led the UNHCR to expand from "a refugee organization into a more broadly-based operational agency driven by emergencies" (Loescher, 2001, p. 15).

Another UNRRA's successor organization is UNICEF, which was approved by the General Assembly in December 1946. (Davey, Borton and Foley, 2013, p. 9) Established initially to continue the work of UNRRA amongst war-affected children, as this type of need subsided in the early 1950s, UNICEF decided to continue its work beyond Europe. This had not been the original aim, but it was made possible by the inclusion in UNICEF's founding resolution of a reference to its work "for child health purposes generally" (UNICEF, 2006: 5). In 1953 UNICEF retained its acronym, but simplified its name to the United Nations Children's Fund. The emergency phase was over, and permanent assistance for children and mothers was the goal of public health services. UNICEF has continued to play an active role as a disaster relief organization and has developed long-term aid objectives. It aims to ensure the survival and welfare of children in disaster relief, and UNICEF discharges this function, particularly where other donors do not react adequately. In many recent cases, UNICEF relief actions were part of wider international operations, but concentrates on meeting the special needs of children, which in the provision of basic relief are not always understood, or neglected. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 100)

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was created by the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1949. UNRWA was a temporary humanitarian agency in response to the urgent problem of the Palestinian refugees in the Near East. UNRWA replaced the short-lived, stopgap agency, UN Relief for Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR), created by the UN General Assembly in November 1948. UNPRP lacked the means and the authority to deal with the complex political problem. (Nachmias, 1997, p. 69) Bocco (2009,

p. 234) describe UNRWA as a “surrogate state” due to its scale and duration of operations, namely, 4,700,000 registered refugees, dozens of camps, hundreds of schools, and staff numbers in the tens of thousands.

The Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) established by the UN General Assembly in 1971. UNDRO was specifically in charge of coordinating the humanitarian efforts of the UN; however, its mandate applied to natural disasters only. (Wilhelm, 2015, p. 446) Although the expression “other disaster situations” occurs in UNDRO’s mandate, it was never clearly defined. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 136). Another obstacle was that UNDRO’s annual allocation for assistance. The General Assembly resolution 37/144 of 1982, authorized the Secretary-General to respond to requests for relief with grants up to a total of $600,000 per annum, with a normal ceiling of $50,000 per country per disaster. (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 141) UNDRO established partnerships with other UN agencies in addition to a multi-agency agreement with The International Labor Organization (ILO), The UN Environment Program (UNEP), The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), World Food Program (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO) and The World Meteorological Organization (WMO). (Macalister-Smith, 1985, p. 136) However, UNDRO faced difficulties in gaining acceptance from some UN agencies and member states. After 20 years, UNDRO was replaced by DHA as part of Resolution 46/182, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1991. (Davey, Borton, and Foley (2013, p. 32)

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) established in April 1992, incorporating UNDRO, various UN units that had been dealing with specific emergency programs, and the secretariat for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction. The UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations changed the UN’s humanitarian system in organizational and operational terms. This resolution was designed to strengthen the UN’s capacity and modus operandi concerning natural disasters and other emergencies. It established a new subsidiary body, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), created the position of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), and established the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). (Zwitter, 2011, p. 53.)

In the late 1990s, the OCHA was established to manage complex emergencies and other humanitarian crises. OCHA replaced the DHA and took over management and coordination of DHA's programs, including IASC, CERF, and CAP. In 2005, as an attempt to increase efficient and effective coordination between humanitarian actors in relief efforts, the UN implemented a coordination mechanism called the "Cluster Approach". It aims to enhance partnerships and complementarity among UN agencies, the Red Cross movement, international organizations, and NGOs at both local and international levels. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action. The Cluster Approach was applied for the first time following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. Nine clusters were established within 24 hours of the earthquake. Since then, two evaluations on the Cluster Approach have taken place. The first, finalized in 2007, focused on implementation. The second, conducted in 2010, focused on the outcome of the cluster approach in improving humanitarian aid. (OCHA, 2019). Some clusters correspond to the classic fields of humanitarian work, others to auxiliary services and others to issues of general scope. Each cluster is to be coordinated by a body specializing in the specific field covered so that the experience of each agency will be turned to maximum account. (Ryfman, 2007, p. 41)

Table 2. UN cluster approach

Cluster	Global Cluster Lead
Camp Coordination and Camp Management	International Organization for Migration (IOM) UNHCR
Early Recovery	UN Development Program (UNDP)
Education	UNICEF Save the Children
Emergency Shelter	IFRC UNHCR
Emergency Telecommunications	WFP
Food Security	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) WFP
Health	WHO
Logistics	WFP
Nutrition	UNICEF
Protection	UNHCR
Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene	UNICEF

Source: (OCHA, 2019)

Like the UN, the European Commission also established a number of agencies and programs in the 1980s and 1990s to provide humanitarian aid. The European Commission decided to establish an office that would hold sole responsibility for humanitarian aid. Thus, the DHA and the Department of the European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) was established in 1992. ECHO aims "to save and preserve life, prevent or alleviate suffering and safeguard the dignity of populations of third countries before, during and in the aftermath of humanitarian crises and to facilitate and obtain access to the affected people as well as the free flow of such assistance" (ECHO, 2008, p. 4). ECHO does not carry out projects, but channels the aid through private organizations, the UN humanitarian agencies, ICRC, IFRC, and NGOs. (Bien´czyk-Missala and Grzebyk, 2015, p. 245). Since 2010, ECHO has been functioning as the European Commission's Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. (Mikos-Skuza, 2018, p. 132). Thus, the European Commission brought together civil protection and humanitarian aid under one roof in order to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian policies (European Commission, 2017, p. 2). The ECHO's Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) uses a composite methodology to inform their efforts to identify and counterbalance the worst "forgotten" underfunding crises. This methodology includes field assessments, levels of humanitarian and development aid, vulnerability scores, and media coverage. ECHO allocates the annual budget of 15–20% to FCA crises (IFRC, 2018, p. 115)

The Organization of Islamic Co-operation (OIC), formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference, established the Islamic Committee for the International Crescent in 1977. This committee is mandated to "[help] alleviate the causes of the sufferings by natural disaster and war" in particular through the provision of medical aid. (Pacitto and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013, p. 14). The OIC also established a humanitarian affairs department in 2008. (Binder and Meier, 2011, p. 1144) This department implements humanitarian aid on behalf of the OIC in different countries and engages in policymaking and dialogue facilitation among humanitarian NGOs in OIC member states. (Binder, Meier, and Steets, 2010, p. 10).

The ICRC established in 1863. The ICRS is an independent and neutral organization, and its mandate stems essentially from the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The ICRC ensures

humanitarian protection and aid for victims of war and armed violence. The ICRC takes action in response to emergencies and promotes respect for international humanitarian law and its implementation in national law. (ICRC, 2019) The IFRC is the world's largest humanitarian network. IFRC brings together 190 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. IFRC coordinates and directs international aid following natural and human-made disasters in non-conflict situations. The IFRC works with National Societies in responding to catastrophes around the world. Its relief operations are combined with development work, including disaster preparedness programs, health and care activities, and the promotion of humanitarian values. (IFRC, 2019c).

In the first half of the 1990s, NGOs were increasingly involved in emergency relief because they intended to provide humanitarian aid as soon as possible. Humanitarian aid NGOs became significant executioners of relief activities financed by official and private sources (Donini, 1995, p. 426). This is likely a consequence of the international media coverage of humanitarian disasters like in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, and North Korea, and about the concerted relief actions that generated higher visibility of humanitarian relief action and greater public awareness in the donor countries. (Topçu, 1999, p. 2)

International, national, and local NGOs play a vital role is humanitarian aid operations. These NGOs provide emergency aid to people affected by natural disasters and complex emergencies. The activities of NGOs tend to concentrate on practical needs including, food, shelter, medical care, and sanitary drinking water. (Minear and Weiss, 1995, p. 1585) On the other hand, NGOs are also crucial to the implementation and funding of humanitarian aid missions. By 2004, the two largest government donors, the USA and EU, reported that at least sixty percent of their humanitarian aid was channeled through NGOs. (Riddell, 2007, p. 317-318). Humanitarian aid NGOs can be categorized whether they are "religious or faith-based" or "not". Some of the international humanitarian aid NGOs have religious roots, such as Islamic Relief, Christian Aid, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, and World Vision International. Apart from religiously motivated NGOs, they can be categorized as "Dunantist" or "Wilsonian". "Dunantists" NGOs, such as Save the Children, Oxfam, and MSF, strictly adhere to the humanitarian principles. These NGOs receive the majority of their funding from private sources to ensure independence from state policies. "Wilsonian"

NGOs, such as CARE (initially formed as the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, but now stands for Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.), work more in accordance with the foreign policies of their home states. “Wilsonian” NGOs are mostly funded by the state. (Andersen and Behmer, 2018, p. 96) On the other hand, regardless of the tradition from which they stem, humanitarian aid NGOs tend to show similar behavior in the field and share common options and approaches. (Ryfman, 2007, p. 27).

Consequently, humanitarian aid is an old phenomenon as human history and had experienced three main shifts. The first shift is the Battle of Solferino 1859, which led to the birth of the modern structure of humanitarian aid. The Geneva Conventions (1864) and the founding of the ICRC (1863) opened a new phase of humanitarian aid and provided a legal and institutional framework, respectively. At that time, the norms and interests of governments and organizations in Western states or in other words “traditional donors” dominated humanitarian aid, which is obviously not surprising, given that these states were mostly donors. The second shift is the rise of humanitarian NGOs after the Biafra crisis (1968). Numerous humanitarian NGOs complemented old and well-established humanitarian organizations. The third shift happened in the very beginning of the 21st century. The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 changed the tradition of there being non-Western states as recipients and Western states as solely donors. Nearly 100 countries, including Turkey, contributed to the global Indian Ocean tsunami humanitarian aid campaign in 2004. In nine years, Turkey had became the most generous country in 2012 and has remained so ever since. Finally, Turkey surpassed the United States in terms of total humanitarian aid volume in 2017 and ranked first not only among non-Western donors, but also among all countries.

3. TURKEY AS A HUMANITARIAN AID DONOR

3.1. Norms and Identities

It is argued that from the beginning, "Turkish foreign policy has been an extension of considerations of national identity and that debates on foreign policy have revolved around issues of Turkish identity". (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2008, p. 72) Thus, understanding how the identities are formed is crucial in understanding the foreign policy choices made by the political elites. Identity, in some sense, functions as a source of foreign policy preferences. (Ashizawa, 2008) Foreign policy decisions are not made exclusively by the diplomats or statesman without any input from society. Foreign policy is formulated according to national interests, and national interests are produced by the interaction of shared ideas, national identity, inter-subjectivity and normative practices. (Burchill, 2005, p. 210) Especially for a "torn" country (Huntington, 1993) like Turkey, which faced continual identity crises in its recent history, understanding foreign policy decisions require analyzing identities and their effects on the policymaking process.

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk "succeeded in creating a nation that had acquired a new identity". (Ahmad, 2003, p. 92) The Kemalist "modern" identity was formed by the suppression or exclusion of other identities from the political process. (Bozdaglıoğlu, 2008) The rural population remained mostly unaffected by this process. This duality created a "dislocation in the mind and the life of ordinary Turks." (Lewis, 1961, p. 586) Kemalist identity and its foreign policy priorities remained largely unquestioned until the early 1960s. (Ahmad, 2003) Kemalist identity was increasingly challenged by the resurgent social identities and these identities began to play a larger role in foreign policy decisions.

In this part, the emergence of the identities and their roles in the foreign relations of the country beginning from Kemalist identity will be explained. Later, the norm of humanitarian and historical responsibility that mobilized public humanitarian aid and the norm of Islamic solidarity mobilized humanitarian aid of NGOs will be analyzed.

3.1.1. Kemalist Identity

After the struggle for independence, Ataturk launched a series of reforms that transformed Turkey and created an entirely new identity for Turkish People: secular, republican, and nationalist. To be successful, such a radical transformation required a complete break with the past. Ataturk and other reformers identified the Ottoman past as "the other" against which they built a new secular identity. The new regime took decisive steps to achieve a complete break. In a series of strokes, new regime abolished the Caliphate, closed down the Islamic seminaries and Shari'a courts, and banned the Sufi brotherhoods. In 1928, Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution that declared Islam to be the state religion was abrogated.

The most crucial step in putting the Ottoman past behind was the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928. "By changing the alphabet from the Arabic script of the Holy Quran to the Latin script, Turkish language and culture were emancipated from the influences of the Arabic script and Islamic culture". (Kongar, 1986, p. 32) A new national narrative that demonstrated the uniqueness of the Turks and their belonging to pre-Islamic and pre-Arab times began to emerge. (Nachmani, 2018) "The search for ….a new national identity was carried to such extremes in the 1930s that theories like the Sun Theory of Language were concocted." (Ergil, 2000, p. 50) New generations, trained along western lines without any exposure to traditional values in the education system, became ready to be proud, new Turks. (Nas, 2001; White, 2014)

At the beginning of the 1930s, main Kemalist principles, also known as six arrows, were identified and later incorporated into the constitution in 1937. These principles:

i. Republicanism,
ii. Nationalism/Patriotism,
iii. Laicism/Secularism
iv. Populism,
v. Revolutionism.
vi. Statism

Among these principles, republicanism gained almost universal acceptance among the

larger public, but the laicism principle generated the biggest controversies in the political and social life of the country. This principle became the backbone of the Kemalist identity in Turkey.

According to Kongar (1986) “reforms were designed to create a western-type society” (p. 43) in Turkey. Some commentators pointed out the paradox of adopting a western way of life after the struggle for independence that was carried out against the western states. Ülman and Sander explained this paradox by arguing that the War of Independence was a battle against western imperialism, but it was not about opposing western values. (Quoted in Ereker, 2010, p. 127) Aydın argued that the victory against the leading Western states gave the elites a “psychological boost” which enabled swift westernization to occur. (Aydın, 1999) According to Bağcı and Çalış, Turkey's modernization efforts had “provided a considerable input for foreign policy” in the 1930s (Bağcı and Çalış, 2003, p. 198) In the 1920s, however, this did not become apparent as the new elites of Turkey felt “a sense of insecurity” which was a “legacy of the Ottoman Empire” (Aydın, 1999, p. 162) This perception of insecurity led them to pursue a cautious foreign policy with the aim of preserving its hard-won independence and sovereignty. Focused on the vast and unprecedented modernizing effort, the main objective of foreign policy was to preserve stability inside the country. Atatürk himself later formulated this idea of a strong relationship between internal stability and international peace and order as the main foreign policy objective of the new republic: “peace at home and peace in the world”. One of the hallmarks of the Kemalist foreign policy is the rejection of adventurism and revisionism (Bağcı and Çalış, 2003; Kürkçüoğlu, 1980; Oran, 1996)

After the consolidation of the new regime, Turkey took steps in the foreign policy arena that were a natural extension of the country's reforms. Relations with the Islamic world were downplayed. As Fuller (2004) puts it, “Turkey behaved almost literally as if the Middle East did not exist. That region represented an unhappy association with Turkey's past.” (p. 59) The emerging identity of the new regime gradually steered the country into a strong relationship with Western powers that provided background for the institutionalization of Turkey’s Western alignment after World War II. (Bağcı and Çalış, 2003, p. 198) Turkey remained neutral in World War II. The perception of Soviet threats, however, pushed the ruling elites again to align with the western countries. The tension between the USA and

Soviet Russia provided Turkey with the opportunity to establish organic links with the West. (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 58) Turkey tried to be part of the newly established European Institutions such as the Council of Europe. Membership in these organizations was viewed as the realization of Ataturk's dream of making Turkey a part of Europe. (Müftüler-Baç, 1997)

After the reintroduction of multi-party politics, western alignment was not challenged by the opposition. After acquiring power in the 1950, the Democrat party wholeheartedly continued a western alignment process and achieved to make Turkey a member of NATO, successfully persuading once skeptical USA and Britain. The most controversial foreign policy decision of this period, sending troops to Korea, supported by the opposition Republican People's Party. (Aydın, 1999) There was a consensus about foreign policy orientation without any discussion about possible alternatives. During the 1960s, the first Cuban Missile Crisis and later more seriously, the problem of Cyprus put the western alignment on the agenda of Turkish politics. Events in Cyprus "unleashed a strong anti-West campaign in Turkey and after the Johnson letter was made public there were also calls for Turkey to revise its foreign policy". (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003, p. 63) Nevertheless, mainstream parties maintained their commitment to western alignment, and Turkey did not depart from traditional foreign policy. The fact that Turkey's foreign policy problems were mostly bilateral issues with the USA prevented a fundamental examining of the western alignment or other general foreign policy priorities.

Turkey did not have any official aid program until the middle of the 1980s. However, several forms of foreign aid had been provided to Outside Turks who remained in Balkan countries, immigrants coming mainly from Greece and refugees fleeing from the Russian revolution. Turkish diplomats, especially in the early Republican period, individually made efforts to provide aid to 'Outside Turks' mostly living in the Balkan countries. Most of this aid was provided in the form of education grants. (Akçay, 2011) In this period, the focus of efforts was the promotion of and successful adoption of the Kemalist reforms by the 'Outside Turks'. Tabak (2016a) who examined the Turkey's approach to "Outside Turks" made the following observation:

The Kemalist approach to Outside Turks .....resulted in the creation of ethnic

> *Turkish communities in the Balkans and Cyprus with bold nationalist sentiments [other than religious] who firmly committed to Kemalist principles and imagination of history, language, culture and religion.(p. 28)*

During the early years of Republic of Turkey, it received massive immigration inflows due to the population exchange agreement reached with Greece. Nearly one million immigrants came to Turkey, and the government struggled to provide necessary facilities and accommodation for the newcomers. The government spent approximately 30 191 851 Lira[3] from 1922 to 1937 for the new immigrants. (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1938, p. 395) Even though Turkey did not have any official aid program until the middle of the 1980s, in the case of the humanitarian emergencies Turkey provided aid to victims of famines or other disasters in different regions, including Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (Akçay, 2011, p. 89) and Bangladesh. One of the most famous examples of such an aid effort was the supply of food and medicine for the Greek people who experienced famine during the German occupation in World War II. Turkish Red Crescent and other professional associations collected aid and delivered this aid to people in Greece. (Featherstone, Papadimitriou, Mamarelis and Niarchos, 2011)

In 1985, Turkey initiated its first official foreign aid plan, drawn up by the State Planning Organization. The aid plan, worth 10 million USD, consisted of institutional capacity building programs in Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan. (MFA, 2020a) It could be argued that the Turkish ruling elite under the dominant Kemalist identity did not pay serious attention to foreign aid, as Turkey itself was a major recipient of aid from other countries, particularly from its western allies. Thus, when the issue of providing aid to emerging republics in the central Asia was discussed, Turkey had to begin from scratch to build "a full-fledged official aid agency." (Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun, 2010, p. 134)

3.1.2. Humanitarian and Historical Responsibility

Although Turkish foreign policy was influenced by many internal and external factors, the Kemalist identity was the basic line of foreign policy from the foundation of Turkey until

[3] The financial burden of new refugees was more than the sum of seven years of budget funds allocated for the Ministry of Health. (Baytal, 2009, p. 173)

the end of the Cold War, with the expression 'peace at home and peace in the world'. After the Cold War, in the early 1990s, the Turkish government pursued a more active foreign policy especially in the Middle East and Central Asia than in the previous six decades. The earliest examples of foreign policy activism that could run counter to Kemalist identity date back to the 1950's, when Adnan Menderes, one of the founders of the fourth opposition party (Democratic Party) of Turkey, was Prime Minister following the first free multiparty election.[4] Albayrak and Turan (2016) argues that "Before it came to power in 1950, the Democrat Party heavily criticized the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) for solely focusing on the relations with the West and neglecting Turkey's eastern neighbors and pushed for an 'active Asia policy'." (p. 142).

Democratic Party government attempted to pursue an active foreign policy towards the east during the Cold War when security was one of the foremost issues of the Turkish foreign policy. According to Albayrak and Turan (2016, p. 142) the Democrat Party had three main goals regarding the Middle East: to guarantee security and stability; reaching an acceptable solution in Arab-Israeli conflict; preventing communism from entering the region and these goals required an active foreign policy that would only be possible by abandoning neutrality. The Baghdad Pact[5] was signed during this era to strengthen Turkey's relations with Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. However, the impact of the Baghdad Pact remained very limited and it did not bring Turkey closer to the Middle East.

Demirdas (2015) made the following observation:

> *Similar to the earlier Kemalist approach, Turkey's Middle Eastern policy was a very important part of its policies of relations with the West. However, instead of the earlier Kemalist direction of its dealing with the Middle East consisting of being defensive and an extension of relationships with the West, Turkey was now an active participant in Middle Eastern politics along with the West. Turkey was actually a key component in the strategy put forth by Great Britain and the US to organize the Middle Eastern countries against the Soviets. (p. 80)*

After nearly a decade, the rule of the Democratic Party was ended by a military coup

[4] For further detail see Demirdas, A. (2015) The Turkish Foreign Policy Under The Justice And Development Party (AKP): A Paradigm Shift), PhD Thesis, University of South Carolina. Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/3712

[5] Pact of Mutual Cooperation Between the Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Iran (Baghdad Pact). For further detail see The Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/baghdad.asp

d'etat on May 27, 1960, resulting in death sentences for Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan. Turkish foreign policy activism during Menderes era was security-oriented. In terms of humanitarian assistance, Turkey was still a country that was a recipient of a significant amount of foreign aid, mostly from the US. The need for foreign aid due to Turkey's uneven economic situation continued in the 1960's and 1970's. After the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Turkish-US relations deteriorated and the US imposed a military embargo on Turkey. In response, Turkey improved its relations with the Soviets and received Soviet economic aid, and the Soviet Union therefore participated in many development projects in Turkey.

In the early 1980's, Turkey entered into rapid economic liberalization and saw the abolition of statism. After the Motherland Party (MP) election victory in 1983, Turgut Özal became Prime Minister and ended the protectionist economic policies of the Kemalists that had shaped political decision-making for many years. Prime Minister Özal mostly focused on domestic issues and economic reconstruction during the MP governments of the 1980's. Özal's main goal was to create a trade relationship with the wealthy Gulf States and attract investors to Turkey. Özal's biggest achievement was the transition to a market economy in the 1980's. Özal made the prognosis that the 21st century will be the 'Century of Turkey' and that its sphere of influence will extend from the Adriatic to Central Asia. The end of the Cold War gave Turkey the opportunity to diversify its foreign policy at the beginning of 1990. For the first time after Menderes, Özal challenged the '*status quo*' in Turkish foreign policy that had been blamed for the quiescence of Turkey on the international stage. (Ali, 2015, p. 138) Özal believed that Turkey's best interest was to extend its influence to territories which were formerly Ottoman. (Danforth, 2008, p. 88) Under the presidency of Özal, Turkey pursued an active and diverse foreign policy in the region based on the historical Ottoman heritage. The term "Ottomanism" or "Neo-Ottomanism" has become closely associated with Özal's active pursuit of foreign policy.

Neo-Ottomanism term was used both by Turkish writers like Cengiz Çandar, for whom it had positive connotations, and by writers from the Balkans and Middle East, for whom the Ottomans were associated with imperial rule, not multicultural harmony. These writers contrasted Neo-Ottomanism with the Kemalist tradition of neutrality and non-alignment, the term was not used at first to imply a particular focus on relations with Islamic

or the Middle Eastern countries. (Danforth, 2008, p. 90)

Colak (2006) made the following observation:

> *Both these characteristics of neo-Ottomanism are clearly seen in the efforts of Özal, who emphasized the necessity of constructing a new common cultural identity binding groups with different particular affiliations in Turkey, and who attempted to unify the heirs of the Ottoman Empire, especially by pragmatic and cultural means. But neo-Ottomanism is not an anti-Western, counter-hegemonic movement that challenges the universal ideals of the West. It rejects naıve dichotomies between the West and the rest, between modernity and tradition, emphasizing political and economic globalization (the prevalence of liberal democracy and free market economy) together with a localized common identity. (p. 588)*

President Özal, in his opening speech to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in September 1, 1991, described the situation created by the end of the Cold War and breaking up of the former Soviet Union as an 'historic opportunity' for the Turks to become a 'regional power', and urged the Assembly not to miss this unique occasion which presented itself for the first time in the past 400 years. (Murphy and Sazak, 2012, p. 4) Turkey invited the presidents of Azerbaijan[6], Kazakhstan[7], Kyrgzistan[8], Uzbekistan[9], and Turkmenistan[10] to Ankara for celebrations on the anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1992. President Özal emphasized the notion of the co-operation by saying:

> *"This cooperation of ours is beneficial for our people and region. Therefore, it is a contribution to regional and global peace and stability. No one should have undue worries or qualms. Let no one misunderstand us… Our policy, our cooperation is not detrimental to anyone, and will not be so in the future either. We are only concerned about the welfare of our peoples and the region. We believe that the closer we get to that goal the more will we have served regional and world peace. In our opinion this is a mission in the name of humanity and as such should be applauded."(Salom and Yucel, 2002, p. 198-199)*

Özal uttered the 21st century will be a Turkic century expression in his foreign policy overtures toward the Turkic republics of Central Asia. According to Aydin (2004, p. 141) "Turkey became a role model for newly independent Central Asia and Caucasus states and played a dynamic role in connecting them to the rest of the world and helping them in request for identity." Interestingly, Özal's pursuit of closer ties with the Turkic republics of Central Asia was often described as Neo-Ottomanism, despite the fact that the area was never part

[6] Ebulfez Elchibey
[7] Nursultan Nazarbayev
[8] Askar Akayev
[9] Islam Karimov
[10] Safarmurad Niyazov

of the Ottoman Empire and only became identified with modern Turkey through the rhetoric of Turkish nationalism. (Danforth, 2008, p. 90)

Çolak (2006) compared the "Ottoman" focus as:

> *The centre-right parties, including the Democrat Party (DP) (1950–60) to Justice Party (1960–80) line, saw the Ottoman era as part of Turkish collective memory; the nationalist rightist politicians, represented by the National Action Party, used the idea of the Ottoman Empire to portray the Turks' glorious past; and religious rightists, represented by the pro-Islamist National Salvation Party (1971–80) to Welfare Party (1983–98) line, strove to Islamize it in accordance with its general tendency of Islamizing Turkish historiography. Ottoman imagination and images continued to exist and even increased in Turkish popular social and political life until the late 1980s, but that imagination had not yet turned into a political vision combining the Ottoman system with modern political principles to produce policy. (p. 591)*

In terms of humanitarian assistance, during Özal's term as Prime Minister, Turkey provided comprehensive aid packages which were approximately 10 million USD to Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, Somali, and Sudan. (Murphy and Sazak, 2012, p.3) Also TIKA[11] was established in 1992 during Özal's term as President to provide technical, cultural, and development cooperation for new established Turkic republics. Özal could be described as a reformer and a revolutionary statesman, due to that his era was a departure from the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy. The change in Turkish foreign policy started with Özal in 1990's continued with Ismail Cem, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs between June 1997 and July 2002. According to Cem (2009, p. 15), distancing itself from the nations that it has shared history was a grave mistake, and this policy did not make Turkey more acceptable to Western Europe. Referring to a new foreign policy approach, Cem underlined that "Turkey is riding the wave of a new economic momentum, transforming its former regional role into a global one" by "combining economic progressivism with historical and cultural affinities" (MFA, 1998) Moreover, Cem defined Turkey as strategic center of Eurasia:

> *"This strategic change corresponds with a new consciousness in Turkey. The role of a shared history and of parallel cultural characteristics is highlighted and put into practice in all spheres of our foreign policy. It is worthwhile to note that there are twenty-six countries with which we shared for centuries a common history, a common state and a common fate. This background provides for strong economic relationships and a unique platform for political co-operation. In this vast socio-political geography, Turkey, having the most dynamic*

[11] It was established under the name of Economic, Cultural, Educational and Technical Cooperation (*Ekonomik, Kültürel, Eğitim ve Teknik İşbirliği Başkanlığı*) under the MFA.

economy, most advanced armed forces and the longest running democracy, has optimal conditions to contribute to stability and to enjoy the opportunities presented by the new "Eurasian Order". By virtue of its historical and cultural attributes and its privileged double-identity, European as well as Asian, Turkey is firmly positioned to become the strategic "Centre" of Eurasia." (MFA, 1998)

All in all, during certain periods an active foreign policy was pursued by politicians such as Menderes, Özal, and Cem under the power of various governments in Turkish foreign policy dominated by the Kemalist identity. Aforementioned Turkish foreign policy activism were influenced by many internal and external factors, including security in the cold-war era, economy and culture in the post cold-war era. During these periods, Turkish foreign aid was limited, most of it being development aid, which was not surprising since Turkey itself was also a recipient of development aid. Between 1990 and 2002, Turkey received ODA of USD 7,293 million and during the same period disbursed ODA of USD 655 million.

Table 3. ODA before 2003

Year	Oda Disbursed	Oda Received
1990	2.17	1815.01
1991	91.69	2237.16
1992	72.23	447.02
1993	50.67	640.01
1994	28.22	239.85
1995	95.11	390.53
1996	63.47	280.48
1997	61.93	10.91
1998	50.97	48.13
1999	43.58	45.97
2000	30.47	445.21
2001	28.78	283.28
2002	36.32	409.8
Total	655.61	7293.36

Data: OECD https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#

The countries that during this period received a total of more than one million USD in foreign aid from Turkey are shown in the table and figure below.



Figure 3. Countries that Received ODA from Turkey before 2003 (Bullet size relatively represents higher amount)

Data: OECD https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#

In the below figure, countries that received ODA from Turkey since 1992 are shown. While blue points in the map represent countries that received ODA before 2003, orange points in the map represent countries that received ODA after 2002. The below figure clearly represents foreign aid activism after 2002.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, former mayor of Istanbul (1994 to 1998), founded the Justice and Development Party (JDP) after the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey. The JDP won the majority of seats in parliament in the elections held in November 2002. The JDP government came to power in Turkey and this is widely regarded as a very significant milestone in Turkish policy and foreign policy. In the record eighteen years of the JPD's rule in Turkey, foreign policy in Turkey has been fundamentally transformed. During the major transformation of Turkish foreign policy after 2002, new political and intellectual concepts were introduced and some earlier concepts were significantly transformed.[12]

[12] For further detail on these concepts please see: Yesiltas, M. and Balcı, A. (2013) "Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map" *Sam Papers,* Vol. No 7.




Figure 4. Countries that Received ODA from Turkey (Blue color represents that country received ODA from Turkey before 2003 and orange represents others)

Data: OECD https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#

Some of these concepts are strategic depth, center state, zero problem with neighbors, multidimensional foreign policy, rhythmic diplomacy, self-perception, order-instituting actor, proactive foreign policy, self-confident foreign policy, public diplomacy, historical legacy, soft power, historical responsibility, historical legacy, and humanitarian diplomacy[13]. Because of this change that has taken place in Turkey since at the end of 2002 characterizes, a new term has also developed, namely "the new Turkey". This paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy is indeed an independent research subject and there is a large amount of literature on them. Turkey has also shifted its activism in various issues including humanitarian aid. In this regard, this sub-title is delimited to the JDP foreign policy activism regarding humanitarian assistance.

Ahmet Davutoğlu had been the JDP government's foreign policy architect. Davutoğlu

[13] For more details on Turkey's official perspective on humanitarian diplomacy please see: Ahmet Davutoğlu, (2013) "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges, and Prospects," Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 41 (6), pp. 865–870.

was first appointed Senior Advisor for Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, then Prime Minister Erdogan from 2003 to 2009. In 2009, he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs until 2014. Davutoğlu served as Prime Minister of Turkey between 2014 and 2016. As a professor of International Relations, Davutoğlu published a book called “Strategic Depth: The international position of Turkey” in April 2001. This work has been regarded as the “founding text” of Turkish foreign policy since 2002. In his book, Davutoğlu assesses Turkey's strengths and weaknesses in the 21st century and suggests ways in which Turkey could become a global power. Davutoğlu argues that in the post-Cold War era, a country's significance and power on the world stage rests on its "strategic depth". To be a "central state" country and a leading actor in international relations, a country must have "geographic depth", that is, meaning an exceptional geopolitical location and "historical depth", that is, a rich cultural and historical background. (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 87)

As for Turkey, Davutoğlu says it is uniquely endowed to be a central state. Given the geographic depth, Turkey is strategically positioned at the confluence of West and East, at the intersection of the Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Middle East, and Central Asia. Regarding its historical depth, it has a rich historical and cultural heritage as an heir to the Ottoman Empire. In Davutoğlu’s words:

> *“Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy. The unique combination of our history and geography brings with it a sense of responsibility. To contribute actively towards conflict resolution and international peace and security in all these areas is a call of duty arising from the depths of a multi dimensional history of Turkey” (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 142)*

According to İbrahim Kalın (2011, p. 5), the spokesperson for President Erdogan, contemporary Turkish public diplomacy is building on Turkey’s expanding soft power and he also asserts that Turkey’s soft power potential extends over the former Ottoman territories, representing the new geopolitical imagination. This articulation is represented in Davutoğlu’s foreign policy paradigm that imagines natural allies of Turkey in which Turkey is a “central state” (Özkan, 2014, p. 127) The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) was established in 2005 and co-sponsored by the Governments of Spain and Turkey. Rumelili and Suleymanoglu-Kurum (2017) argued that “Through this initiative, Turkish policymakers sought to present Turkey as a unique country that is the representative

of both the East (the Muslim world) and the West (particularly Europe), and as such well-placed to mediate between civilisations and contribute to global stability by finding common ground around the‘legacy of the humanity’” (p. 556)

AFAD was established under the Prime Ministry in 2009 during Erdogan's prime ministry and has become a very active actor, especially in all kinds of humanitarian aid, just like TIKA, which was established in 1992 under Özal's presidency. In 2014, Turkey became a member of the OCHA Donor Support Group that is a consultation mechanism in shaping humanitarian policies followed by OCHA. The World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was held in Istanbul on 23-24 May 2016. The WHS brought together 9,000 participants representing 180 Member States, including 55 Heads of State and Government, hundreds of civil society and non-governmental organizations, and partners including the private sector and academia. Report of the Secretary-General for the WHS titled “One humanity: shared responsibility” underlines the humanitarian responsibility.

Altunışık (2019) contends that “Humanitarian action is deeply embedded in the Turkish national identity, presenting Turkey as a moral actor.” (p.3) According to Cevik (2015, p. 127) “Goodwill in Turkey is predominantly based upon the Islamic school of thought - pillars of Islam such as zakat, sadaqah, and other forms of charity - as well as self-professed historical responsibilities.” Cevik (2015) also asserts “Humanitarian responsibility has assumed center stage in Turkish foreign policy, where discourse converges with value-based policies.” (p. 122) According to Yilmaz (2014) “One of the main elements of the Erdogan era foreign policy philosophy has been the historical responsibility of Turkey in its region emanating from Turkish history.” (p. 280) Davutoğlu stated in relation to humanitarian assistance to Somalia that, “This is our historical duty, besides this is our humanitarian duty and this is an integral part of our active diplomacy in Africa” (Cevik, 2016, p. 36) Tabak (2016b) argues that “for Turkey in particular, ‘historical responsibility’ or the ‘legacy of civilization’ greatly influences the normative framework of the country's foreign aid.” (p. 47)

At the Fifth Conference of Turkish Ambassadors titled “Humanitarian Diplomacy” in January 2013, the then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu used the humanitarian diplomacy concept for the first time and underlined that the main priority of this concept is not the state

but the citizens, and therefore since Turkey follows humanitarian diplomacy she should be interested in urgent humanitarian crisis in conflict-ridden areas. (Yesiltas and Balcı, 2013, p. 22) IRFC defines 'humanitarian diplomacy' as "persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles." (IFRS, 2020) Also, on 6 December 2013, at the "Humanitarian Diplomacy: Theory and Perspectives from the Field" international conference in Istanbul, "a group of scholars gathered together to address some of the issues that humanitarian diplomacy endeavors to cover." (Kirişçi, 2015, p. 2)

President Erdoğan often associates humanitarian diplomacy to the term "humanitarian foreign policy," which is also used by the MFA and the TIKA (Altunisik, 2019, p. 2). Cevik (2015) defines Turkey's vision of humanitarian diplomacy as "it has a humanitarian essence, speaks to the human conscience, and hence has a base built on morals." (p. 135) According to Altunisik (2019) "Turkey's HD [Humanitarian Diplomacy] represents AKP's [JPD's] worldview and its ambitions to reconstruct Turkey's global identity as both a rising non-Western leader and as the leader of the Muslim world." (p. 3)

In his paper examined the IHH's international humanitarian mission, Tabak (2015) concluded that "As can be seen in the examples above, the IHH follows conceptual categories created during the broader turn in Turkey's foreign policy (such as historical responsibility, and humanitarian diplomacy or mediation)" (p. 217) Altunisik (2019) underlines that "the current government position is that Turkey has a responsibility to reach out first and foremost to the people with whom it has historical, cultural and geographical ties." (p. 3)

On the other hand, in the "Main Issues" menu of the "Foreign Policy" page of the MFA website, twenty-three main issues are listed, including "Turkish Humanitarian Assistance". "Turkish Humanitarian Assistance" subpage[14] has noinformation about creating and updating information, but when the site is searched through http://web.archive.org then the first archive is on July 8, 2008[15]. This webpage was archived sixty-three times between July 8, 2008 and October 20, 2020. After comparing these archives, it is revealed that this

[14] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/humanitarian-assistance-by-turkey.en.mfa
[15] http://web.archive.org/web/20080708204934/http://www.mfa.gov.tr/humanitarian-assistance-by-turkey.en.mfa

webpage content was amended twice, thus having three versions.

The first version emphasizes that Turkey has a “strong tradition of responding to those in need”, not only in times of natural disaster, but also on a periodical basis. Second and third versions underline this strong tradition and explain the roots of it as “The Turkish nation has an enduring tradition of humanitarian aid emanating from its history and culture”, in other words “historical depth”. When explaining the variety of humanitarian aid, such as natural disasters, war, poverty and social clashes, providing humanitarian assistance is considered as “humanitarian duty”. These reflect the conformity of Turkish humanitarian assistance to the principle of "humanity". In addition, they also stress the norm of “humanitarian and historical responsibility” of Turkish humanitarian assistance. "Turkey exerts efforts to provide speedily humanitarian aid to those who need help within the bounds of its possibilities and without discrimination towards race, religion or gender.” The sentence emphasizes the principles of "impartiality" and “neutrality”. The content also give some insights concerning the principle of independence: “Turkey’s humanitarian assistance efforts, which were initiated in the mid-1980s by providing food aid, have gained a remarkable impetus in the last decade, expanded to many regions across the world and diversified in terms of quantity and quality covering a wide range of activities.” Regarding humanitarian assistance to the Syrians, it is stated that “the framework of its obligations stemming from international humanitarian law.”

The listing of Turkey's most important humanitarian operations has started with "the South-East Asia earthquake in December 2004". This highlights Turkey’s active involvement in the third shift in humanitarian aid around the world, which symbolized the rise of non-Western donors following the Indian tsunami in December 2004. Confirming the rise of Turkey as a non-Western donor, this list continues listing other important humanitarian operations conducted different regions of the world: the Pakistan earthquake in 2005, the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon in 2006, the Gaza Crisis at the end of 2008, the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile and the flood disaster in Pakistan in 2010, Japan’s earthquake in 2011, the typhoon in Philippines, floods in the Balkans and attacks on Gaza in 2014, the earthquake in Nepal and the conflict in Iraq in 2015, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and Libya in 2015-2016, and floods in Macedonia in 2016. As forementioned; the second shift in humanitarian aid around the world occurred in 1968, when neither the economic nor

political situation of Turkey was suitable for the establishment of numerous humanitarian NGOs. The first shift in humanitarian aid around the world had taken place before the Republic of Turkey was established, namely in 1860's when Geneva conventions were signed and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement started.

It can be said that the second shift in Turkish humanitarian aid started in the 1990's locally and after 2004 internationally. As a note about this change, the first version included the following sentence: "The Turkish Red Crescent and many Turkish NGOs are also very active in the world, so much so that their contributions are estimated to exceed those of the government". The international operations of Turkish humanitarian NGOs continue and this is expressed by "Turkish NGOs including Turkish Red Crescent Society being very active in conducting humanitarian operations over the world."

As a result, being a non-Western and emerging donor, Turkey combines narratives of the West's universal values and norms with its"humanitarian and historical responsibility", and practices humanitarian assistance operations around the world. Turkey's activism in the field of international humanitarian assistance based on "humanitarian and historical responsibility" norm stems from the legacy of the Turkish humanitarian assistance background[16] in its history which can be traced to the movement of Muslim and Jewish refugees to the lands of the Ottomans in the 15th century.

3.1.3. Islamic Solidarity

After the Thirty Years War, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), grounded the state on a secular basis, was the beginning of the secularization of world politics. (Barnett, 2015, p. 18-19) Most of the leading figures of eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and early twentieth- century Western social science thinkers, such as Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, François-Marie d'Arouet (Voltaire), and Max Weber, had one thing in common. All of these thinkers believed that "an age of enlightenment would replace religion as the basis for understanding and running the world". (Fox and Sandler,

[16] There have been numerous cases of helping people in need regardless of their language, religion, race, and geography in Turkish and Ottoman history, some of which are summarized in "3.2. Turkish Humanitarian Aid Background" title.

2004, p. 10). Thus, in Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos' words "religion was exiled from the modern constitution of international relations". (2003, p. 1)

In recent decades, several scholars[17] writing on international relations studied the role of religion, thus, religion has returned from the so-called 'Westphalia Exile'. Owing to the impact of the global studies of religion and international relations, the topic also attracted academic attention in Turkey[18]. Moreover, the United Nations has actively considered integrating religion into its halls. The former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's points to common ground between the UN and faith-based organisations:

> *As a secular organization, the United Nations has no common religion. But, like all the major faiths, we too work on behalf of the disadvantaged and the vulnerable. We share the same ethical foundation: a belief in the inherent dignity of all individuals. That is why we work in partnership with governments, corporations, civil society and faith-based groups. (United Nations, 2009)*

This is not surprising since that "an increasing percentage of humanitarian aid owes to religious motives - Christians, Jews, and Muslims are heavily involved in emergency aid as a way to fulfill their religious duties." (Barnett, 2015, p. 16) The responsibility to deliver aid to deprived people is one of the fundamental norms of the Islamic Faith. It is called "Zakat" and numerous injunctions in the Quran, and Hadith urged Muslims to assist other Muslims who are in dire situations. This activity is usually performed locally; local wealthy people identify the poor people in their areas and sometimes personally, but most of the time, with the help of religious intermediaries, delivers this aid to these needy people. When local economic conditions significantly improve, rich people in the local area may not find a sufficient number of poor people, and delivering collected amounts to other regions where

[17] To name a few, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Jeffrey Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion (London: Longman, 2007); Eric C. Owens, The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopolous, Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[18] To name a few, Çelik, N., and İşeri, E. (2016). Islamically oriented humanitarian NGOs in Turkey: AKP foreign policy parallelism. Turkish Studies, 17(3), 429-448. Kösebalaban, H. (2011). Turkish foreign policy: Islam, nationalism, and globalization. Springer. Polat, R. K. (2018). Religious solidarity, historical mission and moral superiority: construction of external and internal 'others' in AKP's discourses on Syrian refugees in Turkey. Critical Discourse Studies, 15(5), 500-516. Tabak, H. (2017) Manifestations of Islam in Turkey's Foreign Policy: Islamic Internationalism and Turkish Islam. The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies, No. 1/2017, pp. 5–23.

poor people lived becomes a necessity. In these circumstances gathering aid and delivering the aid to needy people requires organizational skills, and in some cases, institutionalization of this process is needed and many charities emerged to meet this need. In the 1970s, the oil boom brought enormous financial wealth to Gulf countries, and wealthy people began to deliver to poor people in other countries, and international relief organizations with Islamic orientations began to emerge in due course. (Burr and Collins, 2006) Responsibility to help deprived people is not restricted to just giving financial help. Muslims are required to help other Muslims when they suffer for other reasons. If some Muslim groups are subjected to oppression, other Muslims are also required to assist these Muslims. In this context, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of the 1970s could be seen as a turning point. Many young Muslims traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Afghan mujahedin. During this time, some Islamic relief agencies facilitated this move and even provided the mujahedin with some logistical support. (Petersen, 2012)

In the Turkish case emergence of Islamic charities came a little late. The country's strict laicism principle gave public organizations extensive authorities to regulate Islamic relief activities, and consequently, most of the charity work took place informally among people depending on personal relationships. The most famous Islamic humanitarian relief organization, IHH, was founded in 1995. The democratization and liberalization process and more tolerant approach to Islamic activities enabled the Islamic groups to establish associations in Turkey. IHH was registered in Turkey and moved the headquarters to Istanbul in 1995. Different Islamic groups, which operated with some secrecy, without any formal organization took advantage of this relaxation, and tried to establish distinct organizations, dedicated to their own groups' activities. These associations collected donations from the members and channeled these aids to finance their activities in Turkey, but also other Muslim groups outside Turkey, mostly in neighboring countries. Islamic aid associations "suffered" in the aftermath of the '28 February Process' and faced stricter bureaucratic controls and other restrictions. (Hansen, 2017, p. 32)

The restrictions put into effect after the '28 February Process' were gradually removed by the JDP, creating new opportunities for religious groups (Tabak, 2015, p. 195). In 2004, the parliament promulgated a new Law on Associations, which allowed associations to form partnerships with NGOs in other countries and receive donations from abroad. Turkish

Islamic associations do not have to work with the Turkish Red Crescent when they want to organize international activities. In addition, they were allowed to collect donations without prior bureaucratic permission and provided additional public incentives to donate, such as tax exemptions. (Çelik and İşeri, 2016, p. 435). In 2007, the JDP granted tax-exempt status to IHH and other NGOs, providing these NGOs with both governmental backing and the ability to be more proactive in the international arena. (Tabak, 2015, p. 196). Doctors Worldwide Turkey (*Yeryüzü Doktorları*), with their specialization in medical services, provides the medical and urgent treatment. Other organizations are involved in activities ranging from drilling wells, banking food, building mosques and clinics, and providing orphan care and education.

Turkish aid organizations stressed their unique circumstances which enabled them to establish warm connections with the recipients as Turkish people experienced similar feelings, especially the "feeling of inferiority in relation to the West. This shared experience of inferiority results in a sense of brotherhood and solidarity making the relationship between the recipient and the donor more equal, because in her words 'they are in the same boat'". (Hansen, 2017, p. 38) A robust Islamic identity shapes how these associations approach their aid work. Terms such as 'oppressed Muslims' and 'oppressed geographies' were commonly used by the workers of the NGOs. (Çelik and İşeri, 2016, p. 436)

Their focus on 'oppressed' Muslim people directed them to high conflict zones such as Palestine or Somalia. Their activities in these zones put them into highly tense confrontations, which sometimes resulted in violent encounters with local warlords or states. The Gaza flotilla incident was the most famous example of such an encounter, which directly affected Turkish Foreign policy. The Mavi Marmara initiative of the IHH was an attempt to break Israel's blockade of the Gaza strip in Palestine and bring some relief to Palestinian people living in Gaza. The raid by Israeli soldiers in international waters led to death of 10 activists and brought international condemnation of harsh and violent Israeli response and put the situation in Gaza in the limelight. Turkey's diplomatic relations with Israel were almost broken off, and Turkey placed itself at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Özcan, 2011)

Open support by government for Turkish aid organizations led some researchers to

examine what is the exact relationship between Turkish NGOs and the government. Aras and Akpınar (2015) noted that Turkish NGOs "become subsumed by the discourse, priorities and policies of the government and develop an interest in shaping official policies which carry the risk of politicizing aid." (p. 43). Çelik and Işeri (2016, p. 434) argued that Turkish NGOs contributed to Turkey's foreign policy and soft power efforts. Hansen (2017) claimed, "Turkish NGOs are in many ways closely related to the Turkish government and Turkish politics". (p. 53) It is certainly plausible to argue that JDP government and Turkish NGOS shared the same Islamic solidarity ideals and most of the time Turkish NGOs took the lead in implementing initiatives resulting from the idea of Islamic solidarity.

The question of Islamic values in Turkish Foreign Policy was analyzed by Tabak (2017). According to Tabak (2017), there are "… two forms of distinct, yet partly overlapping and at times conflicting practices and expressions of Islam that can be recognized in the context of Turkey's foreign policy: Islamic Internationalism and Turkish Islamic Stance." (p. 6) Islamic internationalism is based on the idea of Islamic solidarity and composed of different practices such as standing with oppressed Muslims against oppressor regimes or countries or delivering aid and other support to Muslims in conflict situations. Turkish Islamic stance is based on the idea that the form of Islam practiced in Turkey superior to Islam practiced by Wahhabism and Salafism in other rival countries, and great efforts are made to promote Turkish Islamic practices abroad. Tabak (2017, p. 7) argued that the first position puts Turkey under criticism for supporting religious extremists, but in reality, by emphasizing Turkish Islam's different and tolerant characteristics, Turkey is also fighting against extremism.

There is some evidence for activities which could be defined as Islamic internationalist posture: For example, during the JPD congress in 2015, Turkey was presented as the 'conscience of the Muslim world'; videos of suffering people from Myanmar, Gaza and East Turkistan were shown (Çelik and İşeri, 2016) Call for Islamic solidarity in some of the political announcements were more explicit (Quoted in Tabak, 2017, p. 12):

> *only we can solve our problems… The only condition to overcome the crisis in the islamic world is unity, solidarity and alliance. Believe me, we can resolve every problem as long as we are united islamic countries, which have developed economically recently, have been experiencing the biggest humanitarian and*

political crisis in their history simultaneously… if we act together, we will end the loneliness of Palestine which has continued for nearly one century… it is possible to end the bloodshed in Iraq and killing of Syrian children if we unite.

Based on the evidence, it could be argued that Islamic solidarity idea is a powerful norm in the Turkish Society and directs the energies and efforts of large segments of the population to help the Muslim people in desperate situations. The Turkish NGOs mentioned above are the products of this norm. Islamic solidarity is not a dominant norm in the sense that not all activities of the government in foreign policy are affected by this norm. This norm could be very effective in specific regions where Muslims are thought to be the victims of oppression or disasters. Invoking this norm in Turkish society could help to collect significant amounts of donations. Whether the Islamic solidarity idea could be construed as pan-Islamism is not examined here. We could only note that Tabak (2017), who examined the issue of Islamic values in Turkish foreign policy, stated that "Islamic values manifest itself more as an appeal for Muslim solidarity" (p. 17) rather than as a political idea.

After coming into power, JDP did not change the previous orientation of official aids. Turkey continued to provide significant amounts of aid to Central Asian Republics and the Balkan countries; one significant change was the position of the Palestinians. Previously their country did not show up on the list of significant recipient countries, but after 2003, Palestine became one of those countries that received significant aid from Turkey. (OECD, 2020)

The role of the NGOs was specifically mentioned in official development reports of TIKA beginning from 2006. In a special section that is six pages long, a small part was given to all the major NGOs to present themselves and their activities. From the report, it could be seen that the Light House Association (*Deniz Feneri Derneği*) and IHH were the first and second NGOS which provided most aid among other NGOs. (TIKA, 2007, p. 52) Most of the NGO's aid was directed to Pakistan, which suffered a major earthquake in 2005. In the second place, there was Lebanon, which was the target of an Israeli operation in 2006.

According to the last official aid report published in February 2020, the countries that received the most emergency and humanitarian aid from Turkish NGOs during 2018 were Syria, Bangladesh, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Indonesia, Ethiopia,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Myanmar, and Sudan. (TIKA, 2019, p. 120) Except for Ethiopia and Myanmar[19], all the countries in this list are Muslim majority countries, a fact that demonstrates the influence of Islamic solidarity on the activities of Turkish NGOs.

3.2. Turkish Humanitarian Aid Background

When we going back in time to backwards together with the Ottoman Empire, the Anatolian Seljuk Empire, and the Great Seljuk Empire, we see that the Republic of Turkey is the heir to the great Turkish states represented by the sixteen stars on the Presidential arms. In addition, the Republic of Turkey has a common heritage from the Ottoman Empire and the long-standing Muslim Caliphate; covering the vast lands on three continents from which many countries were later founded, and more than a billion Muslims worldwide. Therefore, the historical context of Turkish humanitarian aid is discussed in the context of the periods of the Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey.

3.2.1. Ottoman Empire

The origins of Ottoman humanitarian aid can be traced to the movement of refugees to Ottoman lands. The Ottoman Empire was known been subjected to large movements of refugees throughout its long history due to the fact that it opened its borders without discriminating against Muslims and non-Muslims expelled from their homelands. (Latif, 2002, p. 4) In this respect, let us analyze the response of the Ottoman Empire to; the expulsion of Muslims and Jews from the Iberian peninsula, to the asylum seeker Swedish King Charles X and Hungarian Prince Lajos Kossuth, the great Irish famine, forced political migrations, the Johnstown Flood, and the great Hinckley Fire are analyzed since these are the major traceable events which are at the origin of contemporary Turkish humanitarian aid can be traced back.

[19] Because humanitarian aid given to Myanmar was in fact provided to Rohingya Muslims (also known as Arakans) Myanmar's situation may not be viewed as an exception (TIKA, 2020, p. 114-115)




Figure 5. Ottoman Empire's Major Humanitarian Aid

3.2.1.1. The Exile of Muslims and Jews from the Iberian Peninsula

As the Ottoman Empire's borders expanded, people of different religions and sects began to fall within the borders of that state. This applies also to the Jews. In the mid-thirteenth century, the Ottoman Empire first encountered a large number of Jews in Bursa and allowed them to establish a synagogue there. (Gedikli Berber, 2012, p. 1783) Jewish emigration into the Ottoman Empire began long before the expulsion - at least as early as 1391. (Veinstein, 2013, p. 164) The major immigration of Jews to the Ottoman Empire began with the 'Reconquista' movement in the late 15th century. The Spanish word 'Reconquista' means 'recovery of lost places'. Reconquista as a concept refers to the goal of the Christian kingdoms to take back Spain from the Muslims who had conquered Andalusia eight centuries ago. (Bilgin, 2013a, p. 31) With the Christian conquest of Granada on January 20, 1492, the fall of the last Islamic dynasty in Spain put to an end 781 years of Muslim rule and doomed Spanish Jewry. The definitive expulsion of Jews from Spain and Sicily decreed on March 31, 1492 by Ferdinand and Isabella at the Alhambra palace. (Shaw, 1991, p. 14) Many Jews made their way to the Ottoman Empire, while about 120 000 crossed the border and settled in Portugal. The first expellees reached Istanbul in late summer 1492. (Rozen, 2010, p. 47)

On the other hand, due to a similar attitude by the Portuguese King Manuel I, Jews were forced into conversion and eventual exile from Portugal, starting with the decree of December 5, 1496. (Shaw, 1991, p. 14) Some of these Jews managed to escape from Portugal and reached the Ottoman Empire in the second wave of immigration from the Iberian Peninsula. (Rozen, 2010, p. 48) In 1497, the Ottoman Empire also funded Jewish immigration from Portugal to Asia Minor, following negotiations with the Portuguese Kingdom. (Latif, 2002, p. 4)

Here Hacker's (1982) observation deserves a lengthy quote:

> *Jews expulsion from Spain was the most critical and tragic events in Jewish history of the late Middle Ages, affecting not only Spanish Jewry, the largest and most culturally advanced of the Jewish communities, but also the entire Jewish world.*

> *While these exiled Jews were for the most part prevented from entering Christian lands, the Ottomans welcomed them. (p. 123)*

After the Jews' exile out of the Iberian Peninsula, the Andalusian Muslims (Mudejares and Moriscos[20]) were offered the choice of to becoming Christians or to leaving the country. (Bilgin, 2013a, p. 32) The last stage of immigration brought about by the Reconquista movement, which began in 1499 and lasted more than a century, commenced with the decision of exile announced by the King of Spain III on April 23, 1609. (Bilgin, 2013a, p. 33) During the reign of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha carried out seven expeditions to the beaches of Spain, and these expeditions saved 70 000 Andalusian Muslims. These people were settled on the North African coast. (İnân, 1987, p. 386 in Bilgin, 2013b, p. 845) During the last exile, which entered into force on September 22, 1609, around 400 000 to 600 000 Mudejares were exiled from Spain. (Bilgin, 2013a, p. 33) In the last exile covering the period 1609-1614, 80,000 immigrants emigrated to Tunisia, at that time which was under the Ottoman Empire rule during this period. (Bilgin, 2013a, p. 36)

The Ottoman Sultan Ahmed I sent a royal decree (*Ferman*) in 1613 and ordered the governor and judge of Tunis to assist refugees from Spain and collect them for transfer to the provinces of Adana, Azir, Sis, Tarsus, and Kars. Two years later, the Ottoman Sultan Ahmed I sent another royal decree (*Ferman*) to these Tunisian authorities. Ottoman Sultan Ahmed I reminded them of his commitment to guarantee the oppressed and persecuted Moriscos, free and peaceful life in his states. (Wiegers, 2010, p. 150)

Here Bilgin's (2013b) observation deserves a lengthy quote:

> *The Ottoman Empire made diplomatic attempts in France, Venice and England to ensure that the Moriscos - exiled from their lands of thousands of years - reach Islamic lands safely. As a result of these attempts, tens of thousands of Moriscos have reached North African and Ottoman lands. If the Ottoman Empire did not have these initiatives, as Ottoman Sultan Ahmed said in the edict he sent to doge of*

[20] "Müdeccen" is an Arabic name that means "anyone who lives and gets used to it somewhere". The Spanish equivalent is "Mudejar", which means "those who are allowed to stay in their places, thus paying taxes". In particular, Muslims in the cities of Andalusia, which came under the rule of Christians after the occupation of Tuleytula in 1085, started to be called by this name. After the occupation of Gırnata, the Muslims staying in Spain were "weak" and the word "Morisco" has been used to emphasize. Therefore, while the taxpayers kept their beliefs and lifestyles under the rule of Christians on the condition of paying taxes, Morisco's were forcibly baptized, and for this reason, they had to hide their faith. (Bilgin, 2013a, p. 32)

> *Venice, the security of life and property of the Moriscos would be threatened, perhaps thousands of Moriskos would be killed by captains and authorities on transit routes. During the last exile, given that around 80,000 Andalusian immigrants arrived in Tunisia under Ottoman rule, it will be better understood how vital the aid efforts of the Ottoman Empire were for immigrants. (p. 849)*

In this regard, the expelled Muslims and Jews from the Andalus due to the Reconquista and their acceptance with open arms by the Ottoman Empire can be considered as the birth of Turkish humanitarian aid regarding the complex emergency in a contemporary definition. In Wiegers (2010) words "The Ottoman authorities pursued a deliberate immigration policy in various parts of the empire". (p. 160)

3.2.1.2. Swedish King Charles X and Hungarian Prince Lajos Kossuth

Many other refugee movements also arose in the Ottoman Empire. When the Russians defeated Sweden, the Swedish King Charles X reached the Ottoman border in 1709 with around 2 000 men and sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman Sultan Ahmet III welcomed the Swedish King Charles X as a visitor and asked the Ottoman State to cover his expenses. In 1714, the Swedish King Charles X returned to his country. (Latif, 2002, p. 5) Another major refugee movement took place in the middle of the 19th century after the Hungarians started a war of freedom in 1848 to gain their independence. Although the Hungarians succeeded in the first months of the war, they began to lose the war against the Russian and Austrian armies. After the Timisoara defeat, on August 9, 1849, the revolutionaries lost all their hopes and dispersed to various parts of Europe, in particular to the Ottoman Empire. Prince Lajos Kossuth sought asylum in Vidin, within the lands of the Ottoman Empire, in 1849, with around 7 000 people. (Ayyildiz, 2017, p. 1507).

However, the unconditional extradition of Hungarian refugees was requested both by the Russia, referring to the second clause of the Kucuk Kaynarca treaty of 1774 and by the Austria, citing the 18th clause of the Treaty of the Belgrad, 1739. (Csorba, 2002. p. 224) The reaction of the Ottoman Empire is clearly expressed in a document of August 1849, which stated "since these soldiers have taken refuge under the noble wings of the exalted Sultan, their extradition and surrender from here will not be in accordance with established tradition, but they shall be taken away from the frontier and kept in a secure place". (Karpat, 2002, p. 171) After lengthy negotiations, an agreement was reached to settle the Hungarians far from

the Russian and Austrian borders, namely in Konya and Kutahya - the Asia Minor so-called. (Csorba, 2002, p. 226). The agreement with Austria and Russia stipulated that those refugees converted to Islam should be stationed far away in Eastern Anatolia. (Karpat, 2002, p. 177) Prince Lajos Kossuth and his 56 comrades arrived in Kutahya on April 12, 1850. After nearly eleven months, on March 3, 1851, the United States Congress approved a resolution by which Prince Lajos Kossuth and his retinue were invited to America. Prince Lajos Kossuth left Kutahya on September 1, 1851, and the Ottoman Empire paid 286 487 kurus for their transportation. (Csorba, 2002. p. 226).

In his speech in October 1851, shortly after he arrived in England, Prince Lajos Kossuth said (Karpat, 2002, p. 175):

> *The Sultan has protected my life and the lives of my companions. I shall say nothing about the circumstances, which have forced him to mix hospitality with detention. Finally, the Sultan placed himself above all threats by following his personal inspirations and with due respect for the human rights he allowed me to be free in the most dignified manner.*

In this context, The Ottoman Empire not only gave refuge, but she also took the risk of a war to protect the Hungarians, later she tried to facilitate their departure and allow those who remained to adopt the new lifestyle. (Csorba, 2002. p. 230) Here Laszlo's observation deserves a lengthy quote (Csorba, 2002. p. 230):

> *We were pleased to find that, while most of the Christian people look on our expatriation with indifference and some-even-chased us to death as bloodhounds do with renegade slaves, only the Turkish nation, which was called 'pagan' gave us shelter: not only giving food to the starving and clothes to the naked, not only ready to enter an expensive war against the powers demanding our extradition, but with their thoughtfulness and caring also trying to make us forget our own homelessness.*

3.2.1.3. The Great Irish Famine

Potatoes were introduced to Ireland at the end of the 16th century and were developed as a staple food for about two-thirds of the population in the early 19th century. When the population increased rapidly after 1800, dependence on the potato increased as it provided subsistence survival on either subdivided or poor quality land. A mysterious plague (*phythophthora infestans*) was observed on American potato plantations in 1843. It spread

across Europe in two years and emerged in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, England, and finally, in Scotland and Ireland. The new disease was first discovered in Dublin in late August 1845, and isolated cases were reported across the country, particularly in the east, within days. The heavy dependence of the Irish poor on potatoes means that its arrival of cases in the country is viewed with concern. (Kinealy, 2002, p. 31)

Following the poor performance of 1846, another disappointment was not expected in 1846, and thus, potato acreage reached a record level. The average yield fell from 6 to 7 tonnes to half a tonne per acre, while the price of potatoes rose from 2 shillings to 7 shillings per 50 kilograms, and therefore, famine loomed. (O Grada, 1989, p. 41) In the Irish great famine of the 1840s, more than one million people – nearly one of every nine - died. In reality, the Irish were starved not because of the shortage of food, but for lack of food, they could afford. Many had sold or pledged everything they had to buy food. These also included the tools with which they had made their living. Some people ate the food intended for rent. The landowners quickly evicted these people. (Japikse, 1994) The consequences of Irish famine peaked in 1847, generating an international outpouring of sympathy and relief for famine victims. At the same time, the British Association for the Relief of the Distress in Ireland and Scotland was established to organize national and foreign relief. (Celik, 2015, p. 15)

In the first instance, Queen Victoria had donated £1000. However, The Irish Secretary of the Association, Stephen Spring Rice, was not impressed by the donation, saying, "When I received this, I refused to subscribe, or I abstained, and I went to see G. Gray, secretary of state, to say that was not enough. It was raised to £ 2,000." Other royals contributed to the Association, including Prince Albert (£500), the Dowager Queen (£1000), the King of Hanover (£1000), the Duke of Cambridge (£500), the Duchess of Gloucester (£200) and Princess Sophia (£100). (Kinealy, 2002, p. 71) Royalty from outside Britain has also contributed to the Association. The best known international donation came from the Ottoman Sultan Abdülmedjid. He contributed £1,000 to the Association, although it was reported in the Irish press that he proposed a much larger amount, but was convinced by a British official who said it would violate the royal tradition to donate more money than the British monarch. (Kinealy, 2002, p. 72) Newspapers in England and Ireland praised the Ottoman Sultan Abdülmedjid's generous donation. The generosity of Ottoman Sultan

Abdülmedjid is noted in the Morning Post of April 21, 1847:

> *Turkey.... Constantinople, March 31.... The Sultan sent this day to Mr. Wellesley the sum of one thousand pounds for the relief of Ireland in the grievous famine under which that country is now suffering. This act of regal munificence on the part of his Imperial Highness is without precedent. For the first time a Mahomedan Sovereign, representing multitudinous Islam populations, manifests spontaneously a warm sympathy with a Christian nation. May such sympathies, in all the genial charities of a common humanity, be cultivated and henceforth ever be maintained between the followers of the Crescent and the Cross! (Simpson, n.d.)*

This is also confirmed by the Belfast Newsletter of March 2, 1853:

> *We cannot forget that Mohammedan Turkey has more than once shamed the nations which boast of their Christianity, by the practice of those principles which they only professed. It was the present Sultan of Turkey who, more generously than any other European potentate, contributed to the relief of our famine-stricken countrymen in 1847. (Simpson, n.d.)*

Irish writer James Joyce referred to Ottoman Sultan Abdülmedjid's donation in his modernist novel Ulysses. "*Even the Grand Turk sent us his piastres. But the Sassenach tried to starve the nation at home while the land was full of crops that the British hyenas bought and sold in Rio de Janeiro.*" (Gifford and Seidman, 2008, p. 358) one of the book's characters says, criticizing the lack of British's aid during those tough times. It was also claimed that the Ottoman Sultan Abdülmedjid had been personally planning to donate £10,000 for the relief of the Irish famine. However, British consulate officials in Istanbul urged him to reduce the amount, as Queen Victoria spent donated £2,000 on her own. They also said that the Ottoman Sultan Abdülmedjid had suggested sending ships full of food to Ireland, which was refused by Queen Victoria. (Celik, 2015, p. 17)

On the other hand, famed local historian Brendan Matthews found convincing evidence that three ships carrying supplies sailed up the Boyne River from the Ottoman Empire to the region during the Great Irish Famine. There is a reference in both the *Drogheda Argus* and *Drogheda Conservative* newspapers during the week of May 10 to May 14, 1847 to foreign ships that docked at Drogheda that week. These included three ships from the Balkans, two of which came from the Ottoman port of Thessalonica, now known as Salonika, while the third ship came from the port of Stettin at the same time. These three ships brought wheat and the dreaded Indian Corn for local merchants in the Louth and Meath

area. (Comyn, 2012)

According to Brendan (Comyn, 2012):

> *If the Sultan had indeed sent such ships after the money aid, these ships would then have reached Irish shores around the first or second week in May of 1847. The sultan of Turkey, Abdul Medjid Khan, may have sent the ships as a "hushed-up" gesture, not wanting to upset Queen Victoria*

A plaque on the wall of a central Drogheda building, unveiled in 1995 by Mayor Alderman Godfrey and the then Turkish Ambassador of Turkey to Ireland, Taner Baytok, reads, "The Great Irish Famine of 1847 – In remembrance and recognition of the generosity of the People of Turkey toward the People of Ireland." (Daily Sabah, 2020) On the other hand, during an official meeting ceremony at the Çankaya Presidential Palace on March 30, 2010, Ireland's then-President Mary McAleese made a full speech, contained in which was the following:

> *Contacts between Ireland and Turkey are not simply a recent tourist phenomenon however. In the mid-nineteenth century, a million of Ireland's citizens died of starvation. During that Famine, Turkey's then leader Sultan Abdul Majid sent three ships loaded with food to Ireland. In your state archives, there is a letter of profound thanks for that generosity, signed by a large number of Ireland's public figures and clergy. (Drogheda Independent, 2010)*

3.2.1.4. Forced Political Migrations

From West to South, from the Caucasus and Rumelia to Anatolia, forced political migrations began in the 18th century and gained momentum in the 19th century. Almost all of these large-scale migrations due to arising from the politico-religious reasons cover Muslims. These politico-religious migrations began with the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 1783. (Karpat, 2003, p. 15) A total of five to seven million Muslims were forced to emigrate and settle in the Ottoman lands between 1829 and 1914. (Karpat, 2002, p. 321) The forced political migrations in the 18th and 19th centuries are (Karpat, 2003, p. 15-16):

i. Migrations of Muslims living in the Caucasus, Crimea, and the Balkans to Anatolia during the Russian Ottoman War of 1828-1829.

ii. During the Crimea War (1853-1856), migrations from Dobrudja, Northeastern Bulgaria, and especially Crimea.

iii. With the end of Sheikh Samil's resistance to the Russian occupation in 1859, migrations from the Caucasus intensified between 1862-1865, and continued at intervals until World War I.

iv. Migrations of over a million Muslims after the deaths of 300 000 Muslims in western and central Bulgaria during the Ottoman War of 1877-1878.

v. Migrations from Bosnia, Montenegro, and Sanjcak after the occupation of Bosnia by Austria in 1878.

vi. Migrations from Thessaly and Crete, after the occupation of these regions by Greece.

vii. Migrations from Macedonia, Kosovo, Thrace, and Dobruca during World War I.

viii. Migrations from Balkans during World War I.

The vast Muslim migration to Ottoman Empire began with the integration of Crimea into Russia. From 1856, the forced expulsion of Muslims from Crimea became the policy of the Russian state and a large number migrated to the Ottoman territories. (Latif, 2002, p. 5) Russian ethnic cleansing as a national security policy ousted the Crimean Muslims, believed to have helped the Allies during the war of 1853. This policy was reasserted after 1862 by evicting Muslims from the Caucasus to prevent local revolts. As a result, a substantial number of mass migrations of Muslims and non-Muslims were driven by considerations of military and defense. (Karpat, 2002, p. 22) Not all immigrants had been Muslims; they included Jews, many Germans, and many Romanians. Ottoman Empire records confirm that most of Dobrudja's German-speaking populations came in two waves from Russia between 1829 and 1854. In addition, the German immigrants were given land and exempt from tax. (Karpat, 2003, p. 266)

According to Quataert (2005, p. 117), two sets of events triggered these politically compelled migrations. First, the Muslim states around the north and east coast of the Black Sea were conquered by Czarist Russia; among them was the Crimean Khanate, but there were many others. In the second, the Russian and Habsburg states occupied Ottoman territory or supported the creation of autonomous states on the western coast of the Black

Sea and the Balkan peninsula as a whole. The policy pursued by the Ottoman Empire towards immigrants is the acceptance of all immigrants in the country and the necessary humanitarian assistance, regardless of their religious and sectarian distinctions. The contours of aid to immigrants were determined before the Crimean War. With the certificate of October 28, 1852, which was prepared due to the arrival of a group of 47 people from Circassia, it was accepted that immigrants who were to migrate to the country were given land. These immigrants were exempt from all taxes for 4-5 years. (Taşkın, 2007, p. 106)

During immigration in 1856 and after that, attempts were made to ensure that the immigrants had their own jobs and occupations. The instructions, which were sent to the governorate of Silistra on May 3, 1856, and determined the principles of the policy aimed at ensuring the settlement and livelihood of the Crimean immigrants, contain certain significant points. (Taşkın, 2007, p. 106)

> i. Depending on the needs of those who come to the Balçık pier, they can be placed in tents or temporarily placed in the villages and districts in the surrounding area, and 2 000 purses of funds (*kese akçe*) were allocated for this work.
> ii. Asylum seekers, whatever their religion, enjoy ten years of tax exemption until their economic situation improves, and 25 years of exemption from military service.
> iii. Those who are wealthy immigrants will make their own houses, and state finance will cover the cost of housing for immigrants who are not wealthy.
> iv. To allocate oxen and cars to immigrants who will do farming and planting.
> v. Giving edible grains and seed cereals to immigrants who do not have the financial power for farming.

The Ottoman Empire did not need to establish a special agency for a period of time related to the immigrants. With the notification it prepared in 1839, it held the Şehremaneti of Istanbul and the municipalities in other provinces responsible for the settlement of the immigrants. It was observed that the duties given could not be fulfilled due to the increase in the number of refugees over time. Upon these developments, the "Migration Commission" (*Muhâcirîn Komisyonu*) was established on January 5, 1860 under the presidency of Trabzon Governor Hafız Pasha. (Asan, 2016, p. 44) Possibly one of the world's first of its kind in the world, the Migration Commission was tasked with regulating immigration and developing a

settlement policy. The Migration Commission decided on the option of settlement sites and the allocation of land to foreigners, which also collected a number of figures on migration. (Karpat, 2002, p. 322)

Karpat (2002, p. 322) argued that the Ottoman Empire has widely used the Islamic ethics to helping migrants by making native communities to accept immigrants as brothers and to help them build houses and lead their everyday lives in the new country. He also claimed that the vigorous involvement of the Ottoman Empire in migration policies was a direct consequence of Islam's traditional support given to the migrants.

Table 4. Budget and expenses of the migration commission

Year	Budget		Expense	
	Kurus	**Money**	**Kurus**	**Money**
1859[21]	900 000		743 913	18
1860	2 819 907		3 659 333	
1861	1 254 760	20	1 633 931	
1862	321 559	20	336 886	
1863	554 265		616 886	9
1864	680 000		3 888 061	10
	2 777 676[22]	20		
1865	1 000 358		1 863 804	30
	207 614[23]	20		
	2 147 447[24]	3		
			856[25]	16
Total	12 663 586	83	12 743 670[26]	83[27]

Source: (Erdem, 2014, p. 77-78)

After the suspension of the “Migration Commission” in 1865, due to the increasing numbers of immigrants from Caucasia a new commission was founded in 1867. (Dündar, 2018, p. 170). After the Ottoman-Russian War (1877-1878) as part of an immigrant relief

[21] It is seen that the amount of first aid entered in the commission account was recorded in November and December 1859. (Erdem, 2014, p. 77)
[22] Oppenheim campaing transfer (Erdem, 2014, p. 77)
[23] Oppenheim campaing transfer (Erdem, 2014, p. 77)
[24] Aid from the public (Erdem, 2014, p. 77)
[25] Expense incurred while registering to the Treasury (Erdem, 2014, p. 77)
[26] Erdem (2014, p. 78) miscalculated the total as 12 126 784 kurus, but corrected in the above table as 12 743 670 kurus. Probably 616 886 kurus difference comes from the expense of 1863.
[27] Erdem (2014, p. 78) miscalculated the total as 110 money, but corrected in the above table as 83 money.

committee, numerous institutions for immigrants were established. (Erdem, 2014, p. 93) The Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II founded and directed three commissions: "General Commission for Migration" (*Umum Muhacirin Komisyonu*), "Commission for Muslim Migrants" (*Muhacirin-i İslamiye Komisyonu*) and "High Council for Migrants" (*Muhacirin Encümen-i Alîsi*). The fact that the issue of immigration and settlement gained more weight after the 1877-1878 Ottoman Russian War required the establishment of a separate unit. The fourth commission, the "General Administration of Migrants Commission" (*İdare-i Umûmiye-i Muhacirin Komisyonu*) was responsible for the technical aspects. (Dündar, 2018, p. 171). It is understood from the parliament meetings held between March 19, 1877 and February 14, 1878 that the amount of aid collected for immigrants was 1 747 625 kurus. This amount includes the aid of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II (500 000 kurus), almost all the members of parliament, merchants, and even students. (Aydın, 2015, p. 222-229)

Table 5. Distribution of tribes and immigrants

Tribes and Immigrants	Population
Immigrants (*Muhacirler*)	413 922
Refugees (*Mülteciler*)	407 900
Izmir Refugees (*İzmir Mültecileri*)	142 131
Armenians and Greeks (*Ermeniler ve Rumlar*)	300 000
Arap Families, Civilian Captives (*Arap Aileleri, Sivil Esirler*)	13 600
Total	1 277 553

Source: (Erdem, 2017, p. 65)

Table 6. Aid in Goods to the tribes and immigrants

Goods	Quantity
Land (*Arazi*)	1 598 300 dunam (*dönüm*, equivalent to 919 square meters)
Dwelling (*Hane*)	33 316
Clothe, Line, etc. (*Elbise, çamasır v.b.*)	142 131
Health material (*Sağlık malzemesi*)	6 car (*vagon*)
Weaving machine (*Dokuma makinesi*)	46
Fabric (*Kumaş*)	8 100 meters
Necessary material for tents and dwelling (*Çadır ve iskan için gerekli malzeme*)	11 027

Source: (Erdem, 2017, p. 65)

The General Directorate of Tribes and Immigrants *(Aşâir ve Muhâcirîn Müdüriyet-i Umûmiyesi*), established February 12, 1916, announced its activities during World War I and the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918) in a detailed report of May 24, 1920. The Directorate General of Tribes and Immigrants, published the number of people they were interested in and the aid it gave to this population in this report. (Erdem, 2017, p. 62-65)

Table 7. Monetary aid to the tribes and immigrants

Aid	Penny (*Kuruş*)
Agricultural tool (*Arazi*)	7 411 813
Animal (*Hane*)	33 316
Seed (*Tohumluk*)	10 635 572
Subsistence (*İaşe*)	447 526 270
Transfer	52 588 748
Housing	80 670 171
Capital Assistance	2 449 669
Total	613 540 073

Source: (Erdem, 2017, p. 65)

The establishment of the above-mentioned commissions in the form of a different administrative framework was essential for the increasing number of immigrants and the resolution of problems. The main objective of these administrative frameworks is to respond to the problems of immigrants. The commissions established were referred to from time to time by various names, but their general functions were as follows (Erdem, 2017, p. 58):

i. Working to ensure the well-being of both Muslim and Non-Muslim immigrants.
ii. Determine the settlement areas that will not entail burdens for the state (many criteria such as the climate, water resources, production and marketing, proximity to transport points, etc. are taken into account in determining these settlement areas).
iii. Assisting immigrants and those who will emigrate and placing them in suitable settlements.
iv. Providing food to immigrants.
v. Employing immigrants to work by creating employment areas.
vi. To speed up the immigrants starting production activities and becoming self-sufficient by distributing farm animals, land, and agricultural equipment.
vii. To ensure their adaptation to social life by bringing the tribes to settled life

3.2.1.5. Johnstown Flood (1889) and Great Hinckley Fire (1894)

Other significant examples of the Ottoman Empire's response to disasters occurred in 1889 and 1894, both in the USA. The South Fork Dam on Conemaugh Lake, 23 kilometers upstream from the town of Johnstown, collapsed catastrophically on May 31, 1889, setting off a massive wave of water that devastated most of downtown Johnstown. 2 209 people died, including 99 entire families. The American Red Cross mobilized aid for the city in the first major disaster relief campaign in peacetime. $3 742 818 was received from the USA and eighteen other countries for the relief of the Johnstown Flood. (Library of Congress, 2014) The Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II, who was very curious about the developments in the world, in particular American internal politics, having knowledge of the Johnstown Flood in time, was interested in the disaster relief campaign. The Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II announced his sadness by welcoming the USA ambassador Oscar Straus to his office and facilitated the transportation of aid, food, and 200 Ottoman Liras to the US. (Ürekli, 2007) According to Ürekli (2007) though there were some ongoing problems between the Ottoman Empire and the USA at the time, the above-mentioned humanitarian aid played a role, and the relations between the two nations were directed to the normal course. On the other hand, on September 1, 1894, Hinckley and five smaller villages, including Mission Creek, Sandstone, Miller, Partridge, and Pokegam were devastated by a massive firestorm. The 1894 Great Hinckley Fire destroyed 480 square miles in four hours and took over 400 lives. (Larson, 2014) While healing wounds of the 1894 Istanbul earthquake, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II donated 300 Ottoman Liras (1500 US Dollars) for the 1894 Great Hinckley Fire disaster relief campaign. (Ürekli, 2000, p. 91)

3.2.1.6. Anti-Bolshevik General Wrangel and White Russians

After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917, a struggle began between the CzTsarist forces and the Bolshevik forces. Against the Red Army of the Bolsheviks, a military movement called "White Army of Volunteers" was launched with the broad participation of broad opponents benefiting from the CzTsarist regime, which included Kazakhs, Tatars, small and large landowners, bureaucrats, politicians, and soldiers. On October 26, 1920, the Red Army of the Bolsheviks defeated the White Army, which was under the command of General Wrangel. Afterward opponents of the Bolshevik regime,

including General Wrangel fled to different regions, including the Ottoman Empire. (Karadoğan, 2011, p. 136-156) In November 1920, 135,000 Russian refugees, so-called "White Russians" arrived in Istanbul from Sivastopol by more than one hundred military and trade vessels. (Baran, 2006, p. 127-129) Following the landing, the military units were located in the peninsula of Gallipoli, and civilians dispersed mainly in Istanbul. (Lykova, 2007, 333)

In terms of reflecting the conditions of this period, Shaw's (1991) observation deserves a lengthy quote:

> *They received only limited help from private organizations, while the Ottoman government was far too poor and helpless and the Allies too diverted with more pressing problems to do much to relieve their suffering. (p. 240)*

Despite all the negative conditions after the armistice, the Ottoman Empire again welcomed vulnerable people with open arms without discriminating neither religion nor race. Hilal-i Ahmer Society launched a "People's Soup" campaign between January 1921 and April 1922 and distributed 600-700 bowls of soup a day with the support it received from the French Women's Union and the Geneva Red Cross. In addition, the society provided support for establishing a hospital and distributed wool blankets with the blanket campaign. (Baran, 2006, p. 131) The request to collect aid by the Russian Red Cross Society in order to cover the expenses of the refugees was not legal due to the fact that the authority to collect aid in the Ottoman Empire territory belongs only to the Red Crescent. However, the need to collect this aid has been taken into account, and a special authorization has been granted. (Günay, 2019, p. 370) The Russians were grateful to the people of their host country, who were themselves under occupation at that time. In a book titled "Spassibo" (Şükran), published in 1924 in Russian, French, and English, the Russians expressed their gratitude to many humanitarian organizations and individuals who have helped them, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Caliph Abdulmecid. (Baran, 2006, p. 137)

On the other hand, Russian emigrants played a critical role in establishing refugee status in the 1920s. They lost citizenship of the former Russian Empire, but they did not become citizens of Soviet Russia. The new Russian community appeared without a nationality of Russian origin, which required international protection. They had neither the

rights of the citizens of the host country nor diplomatic protection. At the Geneva Conference of July 5, 1922, a new refugee certificate bearing the name of the Supreme Commissar on Refugees affairs of the Council of the League of Nations, Mr. Nansen – the Nansen Passport was accepted. The system of Certificates for the refugees proposed by the Geneva Conference was accepted by twelve European states in November 1922. Then in the Geneva Interstate Agreement of May 12, 1926, "the Russian refugee" was defined as "every person of Russian origin without the citizenship of Soviet Russia and without the citizenship of any other country'. Two international agreements of July 5, 1922 and May 9, 1926 legitimized the Nansen passports, and 39 countries recognized them until October 1929. (Lykova, 2007, 337-338)

3.2.2. The Republic of Turkey

The migration of people during the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire has been continued in the Republic of Turkey as mainly in the form of the exchange of populations. The fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I left behind numerous minority Turkish populations in various areas of the Balkans. These communities had become the Republic of Turkey's first comprehensive source of immigrants. Huge numbers of people, mainly from Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia, migrated to Turkey. (Latif, 2002, p. 6) While the major Turkish humanitarian aid operations in the twentieth century were mainly aimed at migrants and refugees, from the beginning of the 2000s, these operations were also conducted for needy people of different religions and ethnicities in various regions of the world.

In this respect, the response of the Republic of Turkey to the forced exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, World War II, the Great Greek Great, and several natural disasters are analyzed since these are the major events which in Turkish humanitarian aid can be traced back. Also, the figures and trends of Turkish humanitarian aid are presented in the below subtitle. Since the famine in Somalia, the Syrian crisis, the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 and the floods in Pakistan in 2010 are three case studies in this thesis, and are analyzed in the fourth chapter, these cases are not mentioned in this section in order to avoid repetition.




Figure 6. Turkish Humanitarian Assistance before 2003 (Colors represent the earliest year that country received humanitarian assistance from Turkey)

Data: OECD https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#




Figure 7. Turkish Humanitarian Assistance after 2003 (Colors represent the earliest year that country received humanitarian assistance from Turkey)

Data: OECD https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#

3.2.2.1. Forced Exchange of Populations

On May 15, 1919 Greek forces, tacitly supported by Great Britain, occupied Anatolia. The strong resistance and then the counterattacks of Turkish nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk eventually annihilated the Greek army in 1922 and led to the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. The Convention of January 30, 1923 for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations appeared as part of the Lausanne Peace Agreement, as later it had been stated. The mandatory population exchange was regulated by the "Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations" (*Muhtelit Mübâdele Komisyonu*), which started its work on October 8, 1923. Only the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians identified ethnically and culturally with Hellenism were defined as "Greek" in the agreement. On the other hand, all Muslims who had become Ottoman subjects regardless of language or ethnicity were considered "Turks" in the agreement. (Karpat, 2002, p. 769-771)

The "Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations" had duties such as immigration control, the liquidation of movable and immovable property of the exchange of populations, the valuation of movable property of the exchange of populations. The Commission also had the obligation to issue documents indicating the amount of the debt of the government of the country of residence to the exchange of population in exchange for the remaining goods. (Çelebi, 2006, 108) In the fifth Cabinet of Executive Ministers (*İcra Vekilleri Heyeti*), which was established on August 14, 1923, it was decided to establish the "Ministry of Property, Settlement and Population Exchange" (*İmar, İskan ve Mübadele Vekaleti*), and İzmir Deputy Mustafa Necati Bey was appointed as minister. (Capa, 2001, p. 15)

On September 5, 1923, between the Council of Executive Ministers and the Hilal-i Ahmer Society, the issues regarding the aid of the Hilal-i Ahmer Society were determined. Accordingly, there would be a fully equipped delegation (*Imdad-i Seferiye Heyeti*) for each of the export gates (exit gates, piers) in Greece. During the trip, the patients' treatment and food would be provided by the Hilal-i Ahmer Society delegations. Dispensaries of ten beds would be opened at the landing piers, and underwear, undershirt, socks, and shoes would be distributed to those in need. In order to move the sick, the elderly, children, and disabled

people from the landing piers to the settlement residences, trucks that would be provided by Hilal-i Ahmer Society with all kinds of supplies and expenses from two to five would be allocated at each pier. For the temporary resettlement of the people, the barracks and tents that Hilal-i Ahmer Society bought from the British will be used. (Capa, 2001, p. 31)

The Hilal-i Ahmer Society in Thessaloniki has built a guest house that can accommodate 5 000 people in the Kara Hüseyin district in order to prevent the people coming to Thessaloniki from being robbed through having to pay high rents or to be exposed when exploring the city. There were clean water outlets nearby, and 4 500 Drachma was taken from the "Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations" to bring this clean water to the camp. The Imdad-i Seferiye Delegation (*Imdad-i Seferiye Heyeti*), by establishing a guest house, saved the exchanged populations from paying high rents and protected them from infectious diseases such as typhoid, malaria, and dysentery, through the provision of drinking clean drinking water. (Erdal, 2006, p. 209) Although unable to determine with certainty the number of immigrants from Greece to Turkey, the initial estimate of the population exchange, as well as the records of the Hilal-i Ahmer Society, showed that through the exchange of populations until the end of 1924, 400 000 people came to Turkey. (Çapa, 2010, p. 165) The aid of Hilal-i Ahmer Society to the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations is presented in the below table.

Table 8. The aid of Hilal-i Ahmer society to the exchange of populations

Aid	Lira
Clothing	132 085
Underwear	52 716
Shoe	8 008
Socking	7 003
Blanket	64 722
Bedding collection	10 829
Food	69 646
Medicine	38 000
Various Clothing	7 594
Vehicle	36 500
Tent	69 880
Construction Material	10 236
Timber	44 620
Plaster Board	38 465
Sheet Iron	71 075

Shed	325 800
Hospital And Kitchen Supplies	33 547
Various Cash Expenses	161 486
Total	1 182 212

Source: (Akgun & Ulutekin, 2001, p. 65)

3.2.2.2. World War II

On the morning of September 1, 1939, the German armies began to occupy Poland. It was the event that started World War II. On September 3, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany. After this date, the war quickly spread to a vaster geography. During World War II, Turkey, on the one side made political efforts to remain outside the war, on the other side, undertook a vital task; she has transformed into a bridge for transferring humanitarian aid requested by the belligerent states. In particular, many countries under German occupation had requested assistance from Turkey. Turkey has responded positively by assessing the humanitarian aspects, and aid operations were carried out by the Red Crescent. (Koç, 2018, p. 99) The British Embassy in Ankara had been authorized to export chocolate and candy to British prisoners of war in Germany via the Red Crescent Society, as well as other substances, not to exceed 100 packages per month, and the weight of each package does not to exceed five kg. (Koç, 2018, p. 100) As the war went on, Turkey delivered 13 602 humanitarian aid packages, containing clothing and food via Kizilay to the British, French, Polish, Belgian, Norwegian and Bulgarian prisoners of war. Besides these, especially in the last period of the war, Kizilay delivered seven tonnes of hazelnuts and 15 tonnes of raisins, worth 9,632 liras, in order to be distributed by the International Organization of the Red Cross to the refugee women and children in France. (Keser, 2009, p. 193-194) In addition, 20 tonnes of wheat, ten tonnes of rye, and six tonnes of sugar were sent to Romania, which had been suffering from famine. (Keser, 2010b, p. 821) While pursuing a neutral position during World War II, Turkey, via the Red Crescent, delivered tea, nuts, figs, pork, and salted fish to captured German soldiers who were in Britain. Turkey also delivered 400 cotton quilts to British soldiers who were captured in different regions. (Pınar, 2016, p. 152) Exchanges of Italian and British wounded and sick prisoners of war were carried out under the surveillance of the Turkish Red Crescent. The first exchange of prisoners of war took place in 1942 in Izmir, and the second was carried out in Mersin, and the third was again carried

out in Izmir. (Keser, 2009, p. 194)

3.2.2.3. Great Greek Famine

Immediately after the start of World War II, the Italians attacked Greece; this was the beginning of the tragedy of the Greeks. They defended their country with a resistance that surprised the world and repelled the Italians coincides with this time. Germany, whose military power equalled as the Greek population, considered this situation as harming its reputation and immediately attacked Greece. There was not much that the Greeks could deal with this attack, and the country soon surrendered unconditionally. Thus, from April 1941, Greece entered into the German occupation. (Keser, 2010b, 11) German soldiers confiscated food items such as flour, cheese, bread, and meat, from the very first days of the famine in Greece. The Germans also turned into the raw materials sources of the defeated states to meet the raw material needs of its war industry. This has led to the depletion of food stocks in Greece as well as the depletion of raw materials. The Germans didn't only answer to their military needs, but also began to extract all kinds of minerals extracted in Greece and remove them from out of the country. As a result, there was significant unemployment in the country, as well as a severe decline in industrial production, and factories began to close due to the lack of raw materials. (Keser, 2010a, p. 382)

Here Keser's (2010b) observation deserves a lengthy quote:

> *The painful face of war has started to manifest itself especially since 1941 and the country entered a terrible period, which has passed in recent history as the great period of hunger. It was common for thousands of Greek citizens to mix trash cans in the streets to find a slice of bread, even hope for dead animals and try to eat grass in parks and gardens. The corpses of people who lost their lives due to starvation and malnutrition on the streets were piled up or thrown in a corner. Mortality rates were much higher, especially in big cities like Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki, and requests for help from the Greeks have not been processed by any country in the world for a long time. Even Great Britain, which was accepted as patron saint of Greece, withdrew its military power in Greece immediately after the German occupation and increased the agony of Greece with the embargo which it began to apply in the region. (p. 12-13)*

Famine in Greece during World War II was mainly caused by the German occupation, and the blockade policy implemented by the Allied states further increased hunger. In this

context, the fight against hunger has also been versatile and multilateral. (Tağmat, 2010, p. 467) The Turkish Aid Plan, which provided food aid to Greece between October 1941 and August 1942, was the first aid activity implemented within the blockade. Following negotiations between the UK and Turkey, the "Kurtuluş" ferry, prepared by the Red Crescent for aid activities for Greece, left the port of Izmir on October 13, 1941. In this first mission, the "Kurtuluş" ferry delivered 403 kilos of chickpeas, 404 kilos of beans, 253 kilos of onions, 500 cases of eggs, 300 kilos of milk powder, ten tons of rice flour, 1 650 kilos of red lentils, five tonnes of sugar, five tonnes of miscellaneous food, *lakerda*[28], red lentils and 45 bags of black lentils. (Keser, 2010b, p. 221-222). In its second mission, on October 27, 1941, the "Kurtuluş" ferry delivered 2 500 tonnes of aid in total containing beans, chickpeas, lentils, eggs, onions, and l*akerda* and also 51 tonnes of products supplied by the British Red Cross. (Tağmat, 2010, p. 469) The "Kurtuluş" ferry was carrying 1 800 tonnes of humanitarian aid in the third shipment on November 24, 1941. (Keser, 2010b, p. 327) In the fourth mission, on December 12, 1941, the "Kurtuluş" ferry delivered 428 tonnes of beans, 812 tonnes of chickpeas, 180 tonnes of onions, 300 tonnes of potatoes, 60 tonnes *lakerda*, 300 cases of eggs, and 650 parcel cloth materials and drugs. (Keser, 2010b, p. 284). The fifth shipment of the "Kurtuluş" ferry was on December 28, 1941. (Keser, 2010b, p. 328) On January 20, 1942, while its sixth mission, the "Kurtuluş" ferry sank near an island in the sea of Marmara. According to Greek researcher Procopis Papastratis, the Kurtuluş ferry had transported a total of 6 735 tonnes of product in five shipments until its sinking on January 20, 1942 and on its unfinished crossing, she was carrying 1 800 tons of products. (Tağmat, 2010, p. 470) Then "Dumlupınar" ferry was hired to transport relief supplies to Greece. On its first mission to Greece on February 21, 1942, "Dumlupınar" ferry was carrying; 88 tons of food items loaded by the British Embassy, 158 tons of salted fish, 100 tons of figs, 20 tons of eggs, 302 tons of potatoes, 1 374 tons of red beans, one ton of onions, 3.5 tons of pork, 823 pieces (4.2 tons) of Red Crescent boxes, 1 000 pieces (five tons) of Istanbul Municipality boxes, 303 pieces (1.5 tons) Press Union packages, and 500 pairs of socks. "Dumlupınar" ferry had transported tonnes of products in twelve shipments, which the last one delivered on August 24, 1942. (Kalemli & Erdem, 2011, p. 224-232)

Besides the ferries Kurtuluş and Dumlupınar there were ferries: Attila, Tavil Tunç,

[28] dry salted bonito slices

Konya, Erzurum, Adana, Tuna, Solvet, Yeni Kurtuluş, Aslan, Akanın, Zengin, Yılmaz, İstanbul, Güneysu, Şadan, Enginer ve Hasankale, Üçyıldız, Sarıçam, Cemal, Azmi, Mesut, Cengiz, Bozkurt, Amasya, Sevim, Lütfihüda, Saner, Mercimek, Hasankale, Zafer-i Milli Savlet, Yeni Kurtuluş, Engin, and Enginer ferries and freighters which had also transported relief supplies to Greece. In addition to these ships, military ships named TCG Şimşek, Hızır Reis and Sus were also involved in relief and evacuation activities. (Keser, 2009, p. 187) German troops began to withdraw from Greece in October 1944. Turkish humanitarian aid to Greece during war activities, as well as at the end of the war, has continued without interruption. From December 1, 1946 to February 1, 1947, two tonnes of sugar, valued 3 166 Liras were sent from Turkey to Greece. (Koç, 2018, p. 107-108) Although Turkey was out of World War II, she was also facing economic hardship, on the one hand, trying to meet its defense expenses, on the other hand, taking measures to use its resources economically. In these conditions, it was vital to bring humanitarian aid to Greece, which tried to invade Anatolia a quarter of a century ago but which was then and later a 'friendly and fraternal country'. (Keser, 2010b, 821).

3.2.2.4. Humanitarian Aid to Natural Disasters

On January 7, 2010, a severe earthquake struck the Caribbean island nation of Haiti, the poorest country in the Americas. At 7.0 on the Richter scale, it was the strongest earthquake in that region in at least two centuries, and the consequences were devastating. After the earthquake, 32 strong aftershocks occurred, the capital, Port-Au-Prince was largely destroyed. Following the 41-second earthquake, 360 000 people died, 300 000 were injured, and 1 million are homeless. The Presidential Palace, the Parliament building, and the ministries were largely destroyed and 250 000 houses, 30 000 commercial buildings collapsed or were badly damaged. (AFAD, 2010) The Turkish Government provided one million US dollars humanitarian aid in cash to Haiti after the earthquake disaster that hit the country. In addition to this financial aid, the Turkish Ministry of Health provided one million US dollars worth of supplies. Besides, Turkish Red Crescent built tent cities and a field hospital for Haitians who had been affected by the disaster. (MFA, 2020c) On February 27, 2010, a severe earthquake at 8.8 on the Richter scale struck Concepcion, Chile. After the earthquake, the president of the Turkish Red Crescent team in Haiti, Aydın Özdemir, arrived

in the region on February 28, 2010. Turkish Government provided five hundred thousand US dollars humanitarian aid in cash to Chile. In addition, Red Crescent delivered humanitarian aid materials weighing 18 tonnes to Chile via two military cargo planes. (MFA, 2020d)

3.2.2.5. Turkish Humanitarian Aid Figures and Trends

Turkey began providing humanitarian aid globally to various geographic regions in the 2000s. Turkey, providing humanitarian aid of 10 million US dollars in 2004, began to take its place in the global humanitarian assistance statistics. Turkey was the fifth non-DAC donor in terms of total humanitarian assistance in that year. (GHA Report 2005, p. 17) The humanitarian aid figures for the top 10 non-DAC donors in the 2000 and 2004 periods are presented in Table 9.

Table 9. Top 10 non-DAC donors 2000-2004 (million US dollars)

Top 10 non-DAC Donor	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Total
Saudi Arabia	11.7	656.7	28.8	59.2	35.1	791.5
South Korea	53.9	68.8	94.5	26.6	118.1	361.9
UAE	0.5	0.01		2.5	101.4	104.41
Russian Federation	1.8	0.8	17.8	17.2	17.5	55.1
Kuwait		0.4	3.2	27.7	11.0	42.3
South Africa	1.5	0.5	19.8	8.5	5.1	35.4
India	0.2		7.4	12.9	0.4	20.9
Turkey	3.1	0.03	4.1	1.1	10.0	18.33
Qatar	0.6	1.0		15.3		16.9
China	6.0	0.8	0.2	0.3	3.2	10.5
Top 10 non-DAC Total	79.3	729.04	175.8	171.3	301.8	1457.24

Data: GHA Report 2010, p. 31

During this period, 2000-2004, the share of Turkish humanitarian aid in the top 10 non-DAC donors was the highest (3.9%) in 2000, and this percentage was 1.3% on average. In 2007, Turkey, providing humanitarian aid of 10 million US dollars, was the seventh non-DAC donor in terms of total humanitarian assistance. (GHA Report 2009, p. 40) Between 2004 and 2009, only five non-DAC donors, namely, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Russia, and Turkey, have been ever-present in the top ten list of contributors in the global

humanitarian assistance statistics. (GHA Report 2010, p. 30) In 2009, Turkey provided humanitarian aid of 4.8 million US dollars. The humanitarian aid figures for the top 10 non-DAC donors in the 2005 and 2009 periods are presented in Table 10.

Table 10. Top 10 non-DAC donors 2005-2009 (million US dollars)

Top 10 non-DAC Donor	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Saudi Arabia	115.9	131.1	212.5	727.2	51.8	1,238.5
UAE	99.8	43.8	45.1	110.6	35.3	334.6
Kuwait	13.3	24.2	11.0	95.6	34.2	178.3
Russian Federation	20.5	19.9	2.9	44.0	32.5	119.8
Turkey	78.7	11.4	11.1	9.7	4.8	115.7
South Korea	3.8	18.1	30.3	30.7	13.2	96.1
China	65.8	1.1	6.9	9.2	0.5	83.5
Qatar	45.7	4.5	0.2	2.5	12.9	65.8
India	25.0	1.0	1.0	5.2	14.6	46.8
South Africa	5.9	15.6	1.2	1.3	1.0	25.0
Top 10 non-DAC Total	474.4	270.7	322.2	1,036.0	200.8	2,304.1

Data: GHA Report 2010, p. 31

During this period, 2005-2009, the share of Turkish humanitarian aid in the top 10 non-DAC donors was the highest (% 16.6) in 2005, and this percentage was 5.0% on average. It can be inferred that Turkish humanitarian aid to Pakistan after the devastating earthquake in 2005, which is analyzed in the fourth chapter as one of the cases, was a significant trigger in this incremental trend of Turkish humanitarian aid. Between the period of 2000-2009, Turkey, donating a total of 134 million dollars in humanitarian aid, was the 29th in the world in terms of total humanitarian aid and was the 47th in terms of humanitarian aid per capita. Turkey, providing humanitarian aid of 61 million US dollars in 2010, was the second non-DAC donor after Saudi Arabia, and 22th in the world in terms of total humanitarian assistance in that year. (GHA Report 2011, p. 16) Turkish humanitarian aid to Haiti and Chile after the severe earthquake in 2010, and to Pakistan after the flood in 2010 were devastating disasters that shifted Turkey into the top donors of global humanitarian aid. Turkey has remained one of the most generous countries and in 2011 donated 64 million US dollars in humanitarian aid. (GHA Report 2012, p. 97) Top ten recipients of Turkey's humanitarian assistance are presented in Figure 1 below.




Figure 8. Top 10 recipients of Turkey's official humanitarian assistance, 2007–2011

Data: GHA Report 2013, p. 37

During this period, 2007-2011, Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, and Libya are the top recipients of Turkish donations, making up a total percentage of 78. Turkey, providing humanitarian aid of 1 039 million US dollars in 2012, was ranked first among non-DAC donors, and fourth in the world in terms of total humanitarian assistance in that year. That year, That year, in terms of the percentage of humanitarian aid in gross national income, Turkey was the third most generous donor after Luxembourg and Sweden. (GHA Report 2013, p. 23) In 2012, Turkey was the 15th country in terms of humanitarian aid per capita and has the highest share of humanitarian aid in official development aid, namely 40%. (GHA Report 2013, p. 122) Here the Global Humanitarian Aid Report's (2013) observation deserves a lengthy quote:

> *Turkey was the fourth largest government donor of humanitarian assistance in 2012, contributing over US$1 billion – 0.13% of its national wealth. Turkey, in particular, contributed just over US$1 billion in 2012, ranking it the fourth largest government donor that year after the United States (US$3.8 billion), EU institutions (US$1.9 billion) and the United Kingdom (US$1.2 billion). … It is likely that a significant proportion of Turkey's contribution was spent on housing Syrian refugees within Turkey. (p. 19)*

Turkey, providing humanitarian aid of 1 638 million US dollars in 2013, retained its positions as fourth-largest donor and third-largest government donor. (GHA Report 2014, p. 128) With a humanitarian aid contribution value of 0.21% of its gross national income, Turkey was the most generous country in 2013. The other generous countries in 2013 were Kuwait, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland with those rates, respectively, 0.20%, 0.15%, 0.14%, 0.12%, 0.12%, and 0.08%. (GHA Report 2014, p. 30) In terms of humanitarian aid as a percentage of official development assistance, in 2013 Turkey has highest figure, namely 50%, the other countries are Ireland, the Russian Federation, Estonia, USA, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, and Canada with these percentages respectively, 18%, 18%, 17%, 15%, 15%, 15%, 14%, and 14%. (GHA Report 2014, p. 30) Turkey had continued to contribute to Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2014, and a total of 2 416 million US dollars in humanitarian aid has been disbursed, of which 2 280 million US dollars are made up of aid to "Syrian guests". (TIKA, 2015, p. 44)

Turkey was the second-largest donor of humanitarian aid in 2015, with contributions of 3 176 million US dollars. Nearly all (%97) of this humanitarian aid was directed to Syrian refugees within Turkey's borders. With a humanitarian aid contribution value of 0.37% of its gross national income, Turkey remained the most generous country in 2015. (GHA Report 2016, p. 45) Turkish humanitarian NGOs dedicated 335.9 million US dollars to humanitarian aid operations in 2015. (TIKA, 2016, p. 11) The humanitarian aid of Turkish humanitarian NGOs was even more than the humanitarian aid of Belgium and Spain. Turkey remained the second-largest donor of humanitarian aid in 2016, with a total of 6 billion US dollars disbursed in humanitarian. (GHA Report 2017, p. 45) Turkey also remained the most generous country in 2016 with a humanitarian aid contribution value of 0.75% of its gross national income. (GHA Report 2017, p. 46) In 2016, almost all (%99) of Turkish humanitarian aid was directed towards Syrian refugees. (GHA Report 2017, p. 44) Turkish humanitarian NGOs contributed 429.1 million US dollars in humanitarian aid in 2016. (TIKA, 2017, p. 8) Therefore, in 2016 Turkish humanitarian NGOs have dedicated more humanitarian aid than advanced economies such as Saudia Arabia, Belgium, Australia, and Spain.

For the first time, Turkey surpassed the USA in terms of total humanitarian aid volume in 2017, and she provided 8 070 million US dollars in humanitarian aid. (GHA Report 2018,

p. 9) The proportion of gross national income dedicated to humanitarian aid increased to 0.85% in 2017. In addition to Turkey, five other countries most generous in 2017 were: Norway (0.17%); Luxembourg (0.17%); Denmark (0.16%); Kuwait (0.16%); and Sweden (0.15%). (GHA Report 2018, p. 39) Turkish humanitarian NGOs dedicated 384.6 million US dollars in humanitarian aid in 2017. (TIKA, 2018, p. 12) So, in 2017 humanitarian aid contributions of Turkish humanitarian NGOs were even more than that of Belgium, Australia, the UAE, Spain, and Ireland. Turkey remained the largest donor of humanitarian aid in 2018, with a total of 8 399 million US dollars dedicated to humanitarian aid. (GHA Report 2019, p. 36) With a humanitarian aid contribution value of 0.79% of its gross national income, Turkey remained the most generous country in 2018. (GHA Report 2019, p. 38) Turkish humanitarian NGOs contributed 590 million US dollars in humanitarian aid in 2018. (TIKA, 2019, p. 11) In 2018, total humanitarian aid of Turkish humanitarian NGOs surpassed contributions of European countries such as France, Netherlands, and Denmark. There were only 11 countries contributing humanitarian aid more than Turkish humanitarian NGOs. The humanitarian aid of the Turkish Government is presented in Figure 2 below.




Figure 9. The humanitarian aid of the Turkish government, 2010–2018 (Million US Dollar)

Data: (TIKA, 2019, p. 24)

3.3. Institutional Framework of the Turkish Humanitarian Aid

The institutional framework of Turkish humanitarian aid is generally regarded as comprising three main types of agencies. The first one is the government institutions, the second one is the Turkish Red Crescent, and the third one is humanitarian NGOs. (Binder, 2014, p. 6)

3.3.1. Government Institutions

The obligation for humanitarian aid is within the MFA and the AFAD in the Turkish Government. The Turkish International Co-operation and Development Agency (TIKA) also implements humanitarian projects to a limited degree, although its primary mandate is development aid. (Binder, 2014, p. 6) The MFA is associated with the political dimensions of inbound and outbound humanitarian aid, such as funding decisions or diplomatic co-operation with affected countries, other donor governments, and international organizations. (Binder and Erten, 2013, p. 5) The MFA manages emergency humanitarian aid through the Department of Humanitarian Assistance, which coordinates relief activities with Turkish Red Crescent, and AFAD as well as the embassies. The MFA also coordinates its humanitarian aid efforts with international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Food Program. (Cevik, 2016, p. 61) Embassies launch the Turkish humanitarian response, giving recommendations on where, how, and when Turkey should be active. They only act based on appeals from the governments of the states affected or international organizations. (Binder, 2014, p. 6) In cases of a humanitarian emergency, embassies and consulates coordinate relief activities with AFAD and Kızılay. To sum up, the MFA serves as a coordinating agency for international humanitarian aid, thus reiterating the positioning of Turkey's nation as a 'generous country' abroad. (Cevik, 2016. p. 61)

AFAD is primarily concerned with disaster response in Turkey but coordinates operations and in close coordination with the MFA on external humanitarian aid. (Binder and Erten, 2013, p. 5) In 2009, the Turkish Parliament passed Law No. 5902 on the Organization and Functions of the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority. Thus, various agencies regarding disaster response were abolished, and AFAD was established under the Prime Ministry. After the presidential governance system was adopted in Turkey,

AFAD was therefore reformed as an agency under the Ministry of the Interior by Presidential Decree No. 4, published in the Official Journal on July 15, 2018. In terms of humanitarian aid, besides emergency aid to international disasters, AFAD is also responsible for the management and coordination of the humanitarian response to the large influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey. On the other hand, in some cases, line ministries are also involved in international humanitarian aid operations. In particular, the Ministry of Health takes part in humanitarian aid operations both inside and outside of Turkey. One of the duties and the functions of the General Directorate of Emergency Health Services of the Ministry of Health is to participate in health and humanitarian activities in co-operation with national and international organizations and non-governmental organizations in the event of disasters and emergencies abroad.[29] Jerablus Turkish Hospital in Jerablus in order to provide health services to the people of Syria (TIKA, 2017, p. 49), Sudan - Turkey Training and Research Hospital, Somalia - Turkey Training and Research Hospital, The Sahara hospital in response to civil war in Yemen, and Bangladesh Sahara hospital in response to immigrants from Arakan are some of the most recent examples of these humanitarian aid operations carried out by the Ministry of Health. (TIKA, 2018, p. 54)

In addition, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Interior, and other public institutions and organizations were also involved in the operation of the humanitarian response to the Syrian refugees. (TIKA, 2014, p. 45) The Religious Affairs Directorate (*Diyanet*) is another government institution that plays an active role in Turkish humanitarian aid. For example, in 2011, while the total donations collected were 42 128 454 TL in the humanitarian aid campaign accounts organized for Somalia and other African countries at risk of hunger, Diyanet collected 32 540 269 TL of donations. (TRT Haber, 2011) According to Ozkan (2014), "it is estimated that the Diyanet spent more than 3.5 million dollars in total for its activities in Somalia since 2011." (p. 42) TIKA was established in 1992 by Decree-Law No. 480. Founded after the Cold War, under the MFA, TIKA was responsible for meeting the needs for restructuring, adaptation, and development of the Turkic republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. TIKA was entrusted to the Prime Ministry with a Presidential Order in 1999. More recently, within the Presidential Decree published in the Official Gazette dated July 15, 2018, TIKA was described as having a public legal entity

[29] Article 356(1)-d of the Presidential Decree No. 1 published in the Official Journal on July 10, 2018.

that has a private budget and carrying out activities under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. (TIKA, 2020a) Co-ordinating humanitarian aid and technical support to foreign countries and communities when necessary is among TIKA's duties and responsibilities. In this context, the duties of the "Department of Foreign Relations and Partnerships" include "developing and implementing development assistance, technical support and humanitarian aid in co-operation with non-governmental organizations and volunteer organizations". (TIKA, 2020b) The Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was founded in 2014 and is responsible for centralizing all migration and asylum matters in Turkey. In this regard, the DGMM is the responsible authority for the registration and status decisions for Syrian refugees, who are registered under the scope of the 'temporary protection' regime.

3.3.2. Turkish Red Crescent

The Turkish Red Crescent, established during the Ottoman Empire to help soldiers wounded during the war, is the largest operational humanitarian aid organization in Turkey, which has been able to continue its success for more than a century. Established in 1868 as The Society for Assistance to the Wounded and Disabled in Action (*Mecruhin ve Mardayı Asakir-i Osmaniyye'ye İmdat ve Muavenet Cemiyeti*), the name was changed into the Ottoman Red Crescent Association (*Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti*) in 1877, the name converted to the Turkish Red Crescent Association (*Türkiye Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti*) in 1923, renamed as the Turkish Red Crescent Association (*Türkiye Kızılay Cemiyeti*) in 1935, and finally in 1947 the society took its current name the Turkish Red Crescent Society (Türkiye Kızılay Derneği), the society serving humanity throughout the world. The Turkish Red Crescent has helped 147 countries from its establishment to the present day. Over the past 10 years, the Turkish Red Crescent has conducted humanitarian aid operations in 138 countries in response to natural and human-made disasters. (Kızılay, 2020a) Most recently, The Turkish Red Crescent accepts donations for international humanitarian aid operations, including humanitarian reliefs in Albania, Arakan, East Africa, Gaza, Idlib, Indonesia, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. (Kızılay, 2020b)

On the other hand, although AFAD and the DGMM[30], have been in charge of the Syrian refugee population, the Turkish Red Crescent has also played a crucial role in complementing these two agencies, and provided first aid assistance and temporary accommodation. (Batalla and Tolay, 2018. p. 3, 8) Regarding Syrian refugees, the Turkish Red Crescent signed several cooperative and partnership agreements with international humanitarian organizations, including UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, and IFRC. As an example of successful international humanitarian aid operations, the Turkish Red Crescent carried out the first humanitarian 'decongestion' in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake by setting up a small tented encampment for around 200 families in a relatively safe area. (IFRC, 2010)

3.3.3. Non-Governmental Organizations

Turkish humanitarian NGOs are components of Turkey's image abroad as soft humanitarian power. Turkish humanitarian NGOs active abroad work mainly in the field of humanitarian aid, with a particular focus on emergency relief. There are different sources of NGOs funding, including private donations and institutional donations, namely from international NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector. The majority of the Turkish humanitarian NGOs are faith-based, in other words, Islamically oriented. Besides the faith-based humanitarian NGOs, there are also secular humanitarian NGOs in Turkey such as Support to Life (*Hayata Destek*)[31], focused on emergency relief, (Binder and Erten, 2013, p. 6-7), Mavi Kalem[32], and Mahalle Afet Gönüllüleri Vakfi[33]. (Binder, 2014, p. 8)

Islamically oriented humanitarian NGOs have been established in the 1990s and early 2000s, primarily for providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia. The first of these Islamically oriented humanitarian NGOs was the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri İnsani Yardım Vakfı, İHH)[34], established in 1992. Four years later, Deniz

[30] The Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was founded in 2014, is responsible to centralise all migration and asylum matters in Turkey. In this regard, the DGMM is the responsible authority for the registration and status decisions for Syrian refugees, who are registered under the scope of the 'temporary protection' regime. (Refugee Rights Turkey, "Introduction to the Asylum Context in Turkey", http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/introduction-asylum-context-turkey, accessed February 12, 2020).
[31] https://www.hayatadestek.org/
[32] https://www.mavikalem.org
[33] http://www.mag.org.tr
[34] https://www.ihh.org.tr/

Feneri[35] was established in 1996. (Celik and Iseri, 2016, p. 434). A contemporary legislative structure consisting of amendments to the law on associations in 2004 encouraged the growth of Turkish humanitarian NGOs. These amendments allowed humanitarian NGOs to forge alliances with NGOs in other countries and to collect donations from abroad, while relieving them of the duty to operate through the Turkish Red Crescent while coordinating activities outside. In addition, humanitarian NGOs have been allowed to accept contributions without prior regulatory approval and have received various public incentives to donate, such as annual tax credits. (Celik and Iseri, 2016, p. 435)

Here Celik and Iseri's (2016) observation deserves a lengthy quote:

> *With the coming to power of the JPD, changes in the legal framework have boosted donations, giving Turkish HNGOs increased resources; this has enlarged the geographical scope of their activities and made them representatives of Turkey abroad while also contributing to its soft power. In other words, the domestic transformation in Turkey, the more hospitable approach by the government bureaucracy and modifications to the legal framework have paved the way for the successes of Turkish HNGOs. (p. 439)*

After legal regulations in 2004, Turkish NGOs became more active in the world and almost a year later began to be more seen in the international disasters and humanitarian crises. Turkish humanitarian aid of NGOs and state increased so much after the 2005 Pakistan earthquake that Turkey ranked third among non-DAC donors in that year. Again in 2010, following the flood disaster in Pakistan, NGOs provided cash assistance at a level exceeding state cash assistance. In the case of Somalia, Turkish humanitarian NGOs were actively involved and also triggered state aid to Somalia. In terms of the amount of humanitarian aid provided to Somalis, NGOs provided almost as much humanitarian aid as the state. These cases show the growing role and power of NGOs in Turkish humanitarian aid during the JDP era.

[35] https://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/

4. TURKISH HUMANITARIAN AID TO VICTIMS OF NATURAL DISASTERS IN PAKISTAN AND TO VICTIMS OF COMPLEX EMERGENCIES IN SOMALIA AND SYRIA

4.1. Pakistan Case: 2005 Earthquake and 2010 Flood

The first case of this thesis is Turkish humanitarian aid to the victims of natural disasters in Pakistan. Thus, the subtitles below give a brief overview of the significance of this case, of the earthquake of 2005 and the floods of 2010, a review of the scope of Turkey's humanitarian aid to Pakistani victims and an overview of the historical ties with Pakistan. Finally, how norms and identity shape this Turkish humanitarian aid decision is analyzed.

4.1.1. The Significance of the Case

Both the 2005 Earthquake and the 2010 Flood were major disasters in the history of Pakistan. The 2005 Earthquake was the biggest earthquake and the 2010 floods were the most devastating floods. The earthquake, 7.6 on the Richter scale, hit Pakistan on 8 October 2005. The floods were not a one-time event and affected Pakistan over several weeks starting on 22 July 2010 in Baluchistan. The Government of Pakistan's response to the earthquake was swift and effective. Observers considered the earthquake response "one of the best ever implemented in the context of a natural hazard of such a scale." (Péchayre, 2011, p. 5)

In the 2010 floods, over 1.7 million homes were destroyed, and almost 18 million people were severely affected. At the worst point, approximately 20% of Pakistan's total area was underwater. In contrast to the 2005 earthquake, Pakistan Government's response in the 2010 floods was slow and earned widespread criticism. (Péchayre, 2011) In both disasters Turkish response was strong. Official Turkish pledge for aid was around 150 Million USD was the largest aid pledge at that time. (BBC, 2011) Other countries closely followed Turkey's lead, and commitments increased. Similarly, in the 2010 floods, Turkey responded promptly. Pakistan ambassador said that Turkey was the first country to come to help Pakistan after the floods. (Milli Gazete, 2010)

Different public or private organizations launched their own campaigns and initiatives.

For example, the Minister of National Education started a campaign and invited donations from Turkish public. (CNN Türk, 2005) Religious Affairs Directorate, via mosques, collected significant sums of money. (Yeni Şafak, 2005) Konya municipality decided to send a team of physicians to the disaster region. The Mayor of Konya, Tahir Akyürek, citing Indian Muslims' help in the independence struggle stated that they wanted to extend assistance to Pakistani "brothers."(Konya, 2005) İş Bankası, whose initial capital was partly made up of the Indian Muslims' donations, made a 1.7 million TL grant in 2005 (Hurriyet, 2005b), and 1 million TL grant in 2010. (Hurriyet, 2010b) Civil society also contributed to the campaign. For example, the President of Erzurum Development Foundation Erdal Güzel stated that they were very worried about the earthquake in Pakistan, and they started a campaign to help friends and brothers, the people of Pakistan. Güzel said that in the campaign, they collected two trucksloads of necessary supplies. Many other organizations started their own campaigns and contributed to overall aid efforts. The common theme among all these initiatives was assisting the brotherly people of Pakistan who were in serious need.

The Pakistan government appreciated Turkish help in the relief effort. The Pakistan Prime Minister said that Pakistan would never forget the Turkish aid. The Pakistani ambassador expressed his feelings of gratitude and said that he was impressed by the widespread aid effort. (Hurriyet, 2006). During the 2010 floods, as the scale of disaster became evident, Turkey stepped up the efforts to collect donations and reach the disaster victims who were stranded in inaccessible areas. The government assigned a military cargo plane to alleviate access problems. In a similar way to the response to the 2005 earthquake, public organizations and civil society actors organized public campaigns. (TIKA, 2011) To comprehend what makes the overall aid effort for Pakistan distinctive, we need to look at the amount of aid for Pakistan over the years. In Figure 4 below, Turkish assistance to Pakistan is illustrated:




Figure 10. Turkey's humanitarian assistance to Pakistan

Source: OECD (2020)

The Turkish response to disasters in Pakistan followed a distinct pattern. Whenever a major disaster struck Pakistan, Turkey swiftly took action and provided substantial assistance to Pakistan. Turkey's rapid response to the disasters in Pakistan was reflected in the overall aid numbers, and Pakistan became the top recipient of Turkish assistance in the years 2005, 2010, and 2011. After the initial humanitarian effort, aid amounts declined. In this sense, Turkey's aid to Pakistan was different from the aid provided to Somalia. In Somalia, Turkey modified its approach, and after an initial emergency aid period, the Turkish government followed an extensive development assistance program, which some observers called as "state-building." In Pakistan's case, Turkey stuck to its earlier approach that focused on helping disaster zones. To lay out the particular characteristics of the Turkish Humanitarian assistance to Pakistan, it is useful to compare the aid amount provided by Turkey to other countries with the aid amount to Pakistan. As could be seen from the table below, Pakistan received much more assistance from Turkey than other countries.

Table 11. Disasters and Turkish humanitarian assistance

Country	Disaster Year	Type of Disaster	Total Deaths	Turkish Assistance (In the disaster year) (USD Millions)	Turkish Assistance (After the disaster year) (USD Millions)
Iran[36]	2003	Earthquake	26 000	12.93	3.61
Indonesia[37]	2004	Tsunami	226 000	24.52	21.23
Haiti	2010	Earthquake	223 000	5.31	0.19
Pakistan	2005	Earthquake	73 000	116.59	51.01
Pakistan	2010	Floods	1 800	95.12	148.81

Source: Author's compilation from World Disaster reports and OECD (2020).

4.1.2. The Scope of the Humanitarian Assistance

Turkish humanitarian assistance to Pakistan in both disasters mainly comprised of emergency assistance to disaster victims who needed urgent help. After the Pakistan floods in 2010, Turkey undertook a large housing project for the victims, but in 2005 Turkey did not launch such a development program.

4.1.2.1. Humanitarian Assistance in the 2005 Earthquake

After the 2005 earthquake, Turkish public organizations quickly responded and made valuable contributions to relief efforts in terms of personnel assigned, and materiel provided: 421 personnel were sent to the region, and field hospitals and mobile bakeries were established. (TIKA, 2006, p. 40) Several public organizations together were involved in

[36] Because earthquake in Iran occurred in the last weeks of December, aid amounts are from the one-year later after the disasters took place.
[37] Because earthquake in Indonesia occurred in the last weeks of December, aid amounts are from the one-year later after the disasters took place.

providing relief to Pakistan people. Public institutions and the assistance they gave are listed below: (TIKA, 2006, p. 40)

i. 11 000 tents and 1 024 containers were sent to the region by the central government.
ii. Istanbul Municipality granted 400 housing units
iii. Ankara Municipality donated one million blankets
iv. State-owned agricultural corporation donated 50 000 tons of flour

Some small-scale development assistance was provided to Pakistan in 2006; a new administration building was constructed, and TOKI provided technical assistance to the Pakistan Government in rebuilding towns and villages damaged in the earthquake. (TIKA, 2007, p. 78) Several NGOs also worked to reach victims of disaster and provided help. (TIKA, 2006, p. 47)

i. 6.7 million USD cash assistance
ii. 5.3 million USD in-kind assistance
iii. 31 000 blankets
iv. Two tent-villages were built and operated.
v. Two tent-schools were built

In 2006, Turkey continued to assist to Pakistan via Turkish Red Crescent and the personnel in the region: (TIKA, 2007, p. 73)

i. 56 000 tons of basic food supplies were distributed
ii. 11 800 tents and 1 024 container units that could house 103 000 people were sent to the region
iii. In Muzafferabad, the main disaster zone, in-kind assistance to 1.4 million people was distributed
iv. In total, 116 707 people were treated in 50-bed mobile hospital unit and Abbasi Hospital.

4.1.2.2. Humanitarian Assistance in the 2010 Floods

After the 2010 floods, Turkey again came to the assistance of Pakistan and provided timely help. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, 5 million USD cash assistance was disbursed to the Pakistani Government, and the emergency assistance of 35 tons was promptly dispatched. (MFA, 2010) In the following months, Turkey mobilized a wide range of resources to bring help to the Pakistan population. 14 170 tons of basic supplies were sent to the region, which were made up of food, tents, blankets, etc. Additional medical supplies were sent to the disaster zone to prevent contagious diseases. The Ministry of Defense assigned a C-130 plane for use in disaster zones. In Sindh and Baluchistan provinces, which were disaster zones, two field hospitals were built, and 31 personnel were assigned to each hospital. (TIKA, 2012, p. 24)

Turkish NGOs again contributed to the overall aid effort. Some of the NGOs provided cash assistance, some of them donated in-kind assistance, and the other granted livestock or other materials to sustain their livelihoods. (TIKA, 2011, p. 45, 47-48) In 2011, Turkey continued to provide humanitarian assistance to disaster victims with essential food, medical supplies, and other necessary items. Turkish health staff assigned to field hospitals served disaster victims with necessary medical examinations. (TIKA, 2012) Turkey, besides providing humanitarian assistance, undertook a major long-term project called "The Pakistan Collective Housing Project" designed to provide shelter to disaster victims and other amenities in three different provinces. The project comprised the building of 4 620 residential units, 12 commercial centers, two clinics and six social facilities. A total of 136 million USD was spent on this project. This project was described as "a unique example" of project program assistance in the aftermath of a disaster. (TIKA, 2012, p. 42-43) Turkey provided some help in 2012 on a much-reduced scale, and Turkish NGOs continued their work in flood zones by constructing houses and donating basic food supplies, medical supplies, and other equipment. (TIKA, 2013, p. 26, 80, 89)

4.1.3. Historical Ties with Pakistan

Turkey's relations with Pakistan officially started with the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. Turkish people usually consider Pakistan as the successor to Indian Muslims whose

timely help in the independence struggle contributed to the positive perception of Pakistan in the eyes of the Turkish public. At the 1950's, Pakistan's policymakers tried to entice the attention of the USA by pointing out the similarities between Turkey and Pakistan, emphasizing Pakistan's significance as a possible eastern bulwark against Soviet expansion. (Sattar, 2010, p. 41) The USA's initial reaction to Pakistan was lukewarm as India's possible negative reaction to a military assistance for Pakistani army raised questions among USA policymakers who feared that entangling themselves in the Pakistan-India disputes. In the end, the USA decided to go along with an alliance with Pakistan impressed by the feelings of friendship expressed by the Pakistani policymakers. Dulles, Secretary of State of USA, said that "Pakistani [was] one country that has the moral courage to do its part in resisting communism." (Quoted in Sattar, 2010, p. 48).

Pakistan also tried to develop closer ties with Turkey, and Turkish policymakers responded positively. The two countries announced that they would sign a defense pact. The USA encouraged new steps between NATO ally Turkey and Pakistan. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, opposed such a defense co-operation between Turkey and Pakistan claiming that such a step would threaten regional peace. Without taking into account Soviet objections, Turkey and Pakistan signed a pact on April 2, 1954 in Karachi. According to article 4 of this pact parties agreed to provide weapons or ammunition to each other in case of need. (Serbest, 2016) Pakistan later joined the Baghdad Pact originally signed between Iraq and Turkey. After Pakistan, another important regional actor in Iran entered the Baghdad pact. As members of the Pact countries came together and tried to develop common policies on the regional issues. For example, when the USA announced the Eisenhower doctrine, the prime ministers of Turkey, Pakistan, with the other members of the organization, Iraq and Iran, came together and declared their endorsement of the doctrine. (Erhan, 2009, p. 568)

However, western states and the western-backed organizations were deeply unpopular in the Arab countries, and membership of Iraq created considerable opposition inside the country. Iraq premier, Nuri Said was toppled in a coup in 1958. Learning of the Iraqi development while they were in a meeting, policymakers from Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan criticized the event in a sharply worded statement. (Serbest, 2016) According to Serbest (2016, p. 520), Turkish Prime Minister Menderes suggested intervening in Iraq, but Pakistan

and Iran refused such an initiative. Iraq officially left the pact in 1959. The remaining members of the pact came together and changed the pact into CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). However, the new organization was not an effective force in aligning the foreign policies of the member countries and operated mostly as an economic and technical co-operation platform. (Serbest, 2016) After the downfall of the Shah, Iran left CENTO, and Pakistan followed. In the end, CENTO was dissolved in 1979. (Akdevelioğlu, Kürkçüoğlu, 2009) Mostly at Pakistan's demand to create an organization that would not need the assistance of the outside countries, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan came together and established a new organization called Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) in 1964. Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu (2009, p. 804) stated that RCD replaced CENTO and became the main conduit for the management of trilateral relations among the three countries.

During the 1960s, both countries provided timely support to each other in different settings. Pakistan sided with Turkey on the issue of Cyprus. When the general assembly of the UN passed an unfavorable resolution on the Cyprus issue, Pakistan was one of the four countries (others were Albania, Iran, and USA), which opposed the resolution. In the 1970s, the relations remained warm, but both countries focused on their regional problems and domestic economic and political issues. Pakistan was mainly preoccupied with overcoming the negative effects of the disastrous 1971 India war, which resulted in the separation of Bangladesh. Turkey tried to manage the fall-out from the Cyprus intervention in 1974. In the 1980s, Pakistan and Turkey were both under the military leaders who had toppled democratic governments. Zia-ul-Haq visited Turkey and received a warm welcome. (Masood, 2016) Both countries continued to support each other in crucial issues. Turkey began to seek to develop closer relations with the Muslim countries; a policy Pakistan had begun to pursue much earlier. Pakistan's efforts yielded economic advantages for the country as Saudi Arabia became the largest aid provider for Pakistan, with annual assistance reaching 1 billion USD. (Bishku, 1992, p. 46) Pakistan also became a close partner of the USA in efforts to oppose Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

At the end of the Cold War, the two countries launched a common initiative on Bosnia to highlight the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Tansu Çiller together visited Bosnia in 1994 and appealed to world leaders to take action to prevent fighting in Bosnia, which had taken thousands of civilian lives. The foreign policies of the

two countries diverged on the issue of Afghanistan. Pakistan became the main supporter of the Taliban regime; Turkey, on the other hand, provided support to opposing Northern Coalition. The bilateral relations probably reached its worst point when Prime Minister Ecevit visited India but bypassed Pakistan in 2000. During the visit, Ecevit issued a statement against 'international terrorism', which implied that Turkey shared India's concerns about the Pakistan-supported struggle in the Indian-administered Kashmir. This statement was sharply criticized in the Pakistan press. (Ahmad, 2000, p. 3) The overtly pro-Turkish attitude of Musharraf and strong diplomatic ties prevented the further deterioration of relations, and Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid a visit to Pakistan in October 2001. After the JDP's coming into power, bilateral relations improved further. Foreign minister Abdullah Gül visited in May 2003, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan followed, visiting Islamabad with a large group of business persons in June 2003. Pakistan president Musharraf returned the visits in January 2004 and became the first Pakistani leader to address the Turkish parliament. (CNN, 2004) When the earthquake hit Pakistan, bilateral relations between the countries had already recovered from its low point and returned to its usual pattern of warm relations.

4.1.4. Norms and Identities in Turkish Humanitarian Assistance to Pakistan

Foreign-aid programs could have mixed motives. Some could be driven by pure humanitarian instincts without any ulterior motive. Some could be given with strings attached, and the recipient country could obtain assistance only if it followed certain policies. On the other hand, some programs could be based on achieving several objectives and determining which one is the dominant one requires closer analysis. To make such an analysis, it is instructive to compare the assistance given to a whole range of countries which were found in a similar situation. In our case, this means we need to compare the aid amounts given to the countries after these countries experienced natural disasters. If the humanitarian grounds were the main drivers of the overall aid program, aid amounts should not vary much among the countries. Analyzing Table 11 in the first part of this section demonstrates that there are substantial differences between the countries. Even though in Haiti, the 2004 earthquake took more human lives, Pakistan was given more aid. In the case of Indonesia, which is an Islamic country, the tsunami took significantly more lives, but Pakistan was

again provided more assistance after the 2010 floods. If the only reason had been the humanitarian instincts, these differences should not have happened. To understand what accounts for these differences, we need to examine the role of norms and identities in the humanitarian assistance to Pakistan. Identities lay out appropriate behavior towards those perceived as sharing common history as well as towards the other. Norms, on the other hand, serve as "collective understandings of appropriate behavior", which can be invoked by the policymakers to mobilize their societies. (Risse-Kappen, 1996) A dominant identity may demonstrate different levels of concern for a set of countries, even though they share the same cultural characteristics. Some countries could be preferred simply because of the close historical ties. As Wendt noted (1992, p. 398) "Actors do not have a "portfolio" of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of a defining situation." To understand why Turkey provided much more aid to Pakistan, we need to look into how influential actors in Turkish society defined the situation and justified their pleas for aid to Pakistan. In Turkish aid to Pakistan, besides the humanitarian grounds, the rationale laid out by the policy makers or civil society actors revolved mainly around the idea of "brotherhood" with the Pakistan population. This "brotherhood" feeling is mostly the result of the support of the Indian Muslims in the Turkish independence struggle. When the Pakistan population is in a severe need, Turkish policymakers could easily invoke this historical precedent. Thus, it is not surprising that humanitarian assistance given to Pakistan surpassed the aid given to other countries, which also suffered catastrophic disasters. Nevertheless, answering the question of which norms or identities played a more substantial role in the aid effort requires an examination of the overall aid campaign and the discourse utilized to persuade the general public to participate in the aid campaign.

4.1.4.1. Humanitarian and Historical Responsibility

In the 2005 earthquake, after Pakistani leader Musharraf's complain that international aid commitments were "totally inadequate", Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkey would donate $150 million in aid. According to the BBC, at the announcement date the pledged amount was the "biggest donation by a country so far." (BBC, 2005) In the 2010 floods, the Turkish government again was at the forefront in giving

aid and publicizing the need for helping Pakistan. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took a critical stance against other Islamic countries and severely denounced their aloofness towards the disaster in Pakistan. He especially took aim at the oil-producing Arab countries and asked that if the oil wealth were not used for helping Pakistan when would that wealth be used? (Hurriyet, 2010) Turkey officially declared its intention and readiness to play a more significant role in organizing international platforms to assist Pakistan. (Dünya, 2010) Davutoğlu (2013, p. 867) noted that "in the case of a humanitarian tragedy, Ankara feels obliged to extend its assistance". This feeling of obligation is the result of the humanitarian and historical responsibility, which increasingly became dominant in the second half of the 2000s. This norm pushed Turkish policymakers into the frontlines whenever people suffered in natural disasters or under the regimes JDP politicians regarded as oppressive. In the case of Pakistan, two other norms boosted JDP politicians' efforts to mobilize Turkish society: Islamic solidarity and mutual partnership.

4.1.4.2. Islamic Solidarity

In both disasters, the norm of Islamic solidarity was invoked by the Religious Affairs Directorate and other NGOs in the aid campaigns they organized. (Hurriyet, 2005; Hurriyet, 2010) For example, the vice president of the Religious Affairs Directorate Izzettin Er stated that after the 2010 floods the Pakistani population was undergoing severe hardship and called for sending Zakat and Fitr to disaster victims. (Milli Gazete, 2010) Across Turkey after communal Cuma prayers, donations were collected and sent to Pakistan. (Hurriyet, 2010) We do not have any information about the proportion of aid collected in the 2005 campaigns via the Religious Affairs Directorate; but in the 2010 campaigns, Bülent Arınç, who was the Deputy Prime Minister in 2010, said that most of the aid was collected by the way of the Religious Affairs Directorate. (Sabah, 2010) While it might be true that most of the money could be collected via the Religious Affairs Directorate we do not have reliable surveys to indicate that donors gave the money because of the Islamic solidarity norm. In fact, even religious figures, when calling for help for disaster victims, said that it was a "national duty" and a "result of the indebtedness to Indian Muslims" to assist Pakistan. (Hurriyet, 2005). Accordingly, we could say that an Islamic solidarity norm played a role in giving humanitarian assistance to Pakistan. However, the Islamic solidarity norm could not be the

dominant force, because if this norm had been the most influential factor in determining aid amounts there should not be a significant difference between the aid given to Indonesia and the aid provided to Pakistan. Nevertheless, as this is not the case, then we need to examine the role of another norm, the norm of "mutual partnership" in Turkish humanitarian assistance to Pakistan.

4.1.4.3. Mutual Partnership

Reciprocity is one of the oldest social norms in human history. (Gouldner, 1960) Returning favorable behavior is an imperative of the human social system. Indian Muslims who rushed to the help of the independence movement in Anatolia occupy a special spot in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Turkey and Pakistan later continued to provide each other with moral and diplomatic support in different international platforms. Mutual partnership could shape the behavior of both countries. (Cafiero, Karim, 2020; Masood, 2016) When we examined the aid campaign, we could see that mutual partnership was the dominant theme, and politicians almost always emphasized the history of Indian Muslims' help. For example, Osman Pepe, Minister of Environment in 2005, said that "The Pakistan people" made great sacrifices and contributed mightily to the independence movement in the past. He added that in response to their assistance, Turkish people should have made efforts to help them in their hour of need. (Yeni Şafak, 2005) Bülent Arınç, in an aid organization for Pakistan flood victims, pointed out the special relationship between Turkey and Pakistan and Indian Muslims' efforts for Turkish people and underscored the necessity of bringing help to the Pakistan population. (Sabah, 2010) Egemen Bağıs, Minister of State in 2010, noted the unique relationship between Pakistan and Turkey and invited the Turkish public to participate in aid efforts for the Pakistan population. Tahir Akyürek, Mayor of Konya in 2005, pointed to the assistance given in the Turkish war of independence and stressed the need to alleviate the sufferings of the Pakistani people. (Konya, 2005) It seems the feeling of the necessity of helping Pakistan people was not restricted to the JDP electorate or religious communities in Turkey. The idea that there is a mutual partnership with Pakistan is widespread and shared across the political spectrum certainly contributed to the collection of significant amounts of money both in 2005 and in 2010. Judging from the available evidence, it is plausible to argue that mutual partnership norm was the most influential force

in mobilizing Turkish society as well as policymakers in helping Pakistan.

4.2. Somalia Case: 2011 Famine

The second case of this thesis is Turkish humanitarian aid to Somalia. Hence, the subtitles below give a brief overview of the significance of this case, a review of the scope of Turkey's humanitarian aid to Somalia and an overview of the historical ties with Somalia. Finally, an analysis is given of how norms and identity shape this Turkish humanitarian aid decision.

4.2.1. The Significance of the Case

The best description of the impact of Turkish assistance to Somalia came from an official report that detailed Turkish relief operations in Somalia. The report noted that what began as a response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, "…. transformed both Somalia and Turkey's approach to humanitarian aid fundamentally (UNICEF, 2016, p. 28) After evaluating foreign policy announcements coming from MFA it is also plausible to argue that the relief operation changed Turkey's formulation of its foreign policy approach as well. As to why the relief is so transformative an experience for the Turkish humanitarian assistance we need first to understand the Somalia's troubled history and the international aid community's indifferent attitude, which was partly a reaction to very challenging conditions in the country.

The significance of the Somalia case is examined under these three subtitles:

i. Somalia's Conditions
ii. Famine and the International Community's Apathetic Attitude
iii. High profile Turkish response and its effects

4.2.1.1. Somalia's Conditions

Today's Somalia is a product of European power struggles. The British, French, and the Italians partitioned what is called greater Somalia among themselves and in the process

ceded some Somali territory to Ethiopia. French-occupied Somaliland later became Djibouti. Italian and British occupied parts merged to form Somalia. There were other Somalis whose aspirations to unite with their fellow Somalis were ignored and were left in Northern Kenya. (Lewis, 1988) The arbitrary nature of borders separating the Somali people and subsequent efforts for unification were among the main causes of the Somali conflicts in the 20th century. After the defeat of Italy in World War II, Somalia was put into trusteeship by the UN for ten years. Somalia gained independence in 1960 and the government of the first state of Somalia was determined to unite all the regions under 'Greater Somalia'. (Elmi, 2011, p. 16) The five-pointed star on Somalia's national flag represented Somalis in former French Somalia (Djibouti), British Somaliland, and Italian Somalia, as well as the Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden Province and those of the north-eastern region of Kenya. (Oluoch, 2017, p. 93) Somalia was in a border dispute with Kenya between 1963 and 1967, known as the Shifta War. (Miyandazi, 2012, p. 2-3)

The military coup in 1969 led by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre overthrew the democratic government. Barre took power and established an oppressive military dictatorship. (Leeson, 2007, p. 692) On October 21, Barre proclaimed Somalia a socialist state, launched many socialist economic programs and sought aid from the Soviet Union. (UNDP, 2001, p. 213). On October 24, in his first address following the coup, Barre said "The imperialists, who always want to see people in hunger, disease and ignorance, will oppose us in order that we may beg them… let us join hands in crushing the enemy of our land." (Faisal, 2019). On November 1, the Constitution was revoked, Parliament was dissolved, political parties banned and the Supreme Court abolished. Equipped by the Soviet Union, the Somali army invaded the disputed 'Ogaden' region of Ethiopia in 1977. (UNDP, 2001, p. 213). However, Soviet Union switched its support to Ethiopia and in less than a year, Somalia lost the war after suffering some 25 000 casualties. (Hesse, 2010, p. 247) Thousands of Somalis have fled Ethiopia to Somalia as refugees. The staggering defeat and the refugee influx upended existing clan demography in the country. There were attempts to topple the military regime, and one powerful clan from northern Somalia formed a Somalian National Movement (SNM) to overthrow the Barre regime. Operating from camps established in Ethiopia, SNM launched several military operations. (Lewis, 1988, p. 252-252) In 1988 the regime in Ethiopia agreed to close these

camps, and SNM was forced into a desperate attempt to seize the lands in northern Somalia. In the initial struggle, SNM prevailed and conquered many villages. Regime ferociously counter-attacked and armed non-Isaaq clans to fight against SNM. Using aerial power destroyed cities in northern Somalia, including the second-largest city of the country. The government took control of devastating cities, but was unable to completely subjugate the country-side where SNM was still powerful. (Lewis, 2008, p. 71-77) In 1989 a mutiny by Hawiye troops set off communal reprisals against the Hawiye clan. The resistance to the regime spread across the country, and the national army became predominantly under the Marehan clan and came to be regarded as a threat to other clans. Clans resorted to clan-based volunteers to fight against the state, and efforts to build a broad-based opposition group ended in failure.

Eventually, Siad Barre's regime fell, and with the regime, all the state entities also collapsed. In northern Somalia, SNM declared its independence as Somaliland in 1991. Although de facto independent and relatively stable compared to the turbulent southern Somalia, it has not been recognized by other states. Three years of United Nations intervention (1992-1995) failed to end the civil war, and the country was split into areas under the rule of various groups and warlords. In 1998, the region in northeast Somalia, called Puntland declared itself as a self-autonomous entity. In the other areas of Somalia, the economy and infrastructure were destroyed as the country descended into chaos. After the failure of several attempts to form a government, after EU's involvement and great support a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established and mandated to design statutes and institutions that could govern Somalia. However, the TFG was still viewed by many Somalis as a narrow coalition and criticized as being a "puppet" of neighboring Ethiopia. (Menkhaus, 2007, p. 376) In north Mogadishu, in August 1994, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)[38] first appeared. ICU decisions were enforced by militias recruited by the local clan. (Barnes and Hassan, 2007, p. 152). The rise of ICU, its brief reign, and an ensuing Ethiopian invasion to stop the ICU changed the scene and led to armed resistance against the TFG and Ethiopia. The violence caused almost half of the population of Mogadishu to flee from their

[38] Muslim clerics from the Abgal subclan of the powerful Hawiye clan founded the Union of Islamic Courts, which served from 2000 to 2006 in Mogadishu. ICU's have ruled in accordance with Islamic law (*shari'a*) on personal status and criminal law. In 2006, the courts posed a major threat to warlords controlling the areas of Mogadishu. (Barnes and Hassan, 2007, p. 152). For further reading see: Barnes, C. and Hassan, H. (2007) The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1(2), pp. 151-160.

homes. In 2008, a UN-brokered peace accord was reached in Djibouti between the TFG and moderate leaders from the ICU. Al-Shabaab[39], the youth militia of ICU, assumed the role of the main opposition movement against the reinstated TFG. After a series of attacks by Al-Shabaab and the assassination of the top national officer for the UN Development Program in Somalia, many aid workers were re-located in Kenya, diminishing their reach and effectiveness. Renowned expert Meckhaus (2009) described the overall situation of Somalia in very stark terms:

> *There was no peace for peacekeepers to keep, no state to which state-building projects could contribute, and increasingly little humanitarian space in which aid agencies could reach over 3 million Somalis in need of emergency relief. The gap between Somali realities on the ground and the set of assumptions on which aid and diplomatic policies toward Somalia have been constructed is wide and deep (p. 223)*

Relatively stable regions in north Somalia still refused to recognize the TFG's authority, and Al-Shabaab controls much of southern and central Somalia. The position of the government did not improve and international organizations at the beginning of 2011 began to issue alarming reports that depicted worsening conditions in the country and warned that there was a real risk of mass starvation but the government was simply too weak. A report published in February 2011 just before the big famine crisis International Crisis Group (ICG) described Somalia as a "quintessential failed state", without an effective national government for more than twenty years. (ICG, 2011):

> *"The TFG is in no position to deal with a humanitarian catastrophe or to protect its citizens from Al-Shabaab and other violent groups. Despite substantial financial assistance and many other help, it remains a caricature of a government; dysfunctional and deeply corrupt."* (p. 1):

4.2.1.2. Famine and the International Community's Apathetic Attitude

On July 20, 2011, the UN (2011) announced a famine in southern Somalia, affecting more than 3 million people, with an estimated half-million children suffering from malnourishment. Although the drought was regarded as the principal cause of the famine,

[39] Al-Shabaab, which means "youth" in Arabic, is an insurgent terrorist organization that emerged in the mid-2000s. (Miyandazi, 2012, p. 1) For further reading see: Barnes, C. and Hassan, H. (2007) The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1(2), pp. 151-160.

the famine and resulting humanitarian disaster were the result of the combination of several factors:

i. Significant increase in global food prices,
ii. The conflict between TFG/AMISOM and Al-Shabaab
iii. Use of anti-terrorism legislation by the USA government to prevent aid reaching Al-Shabaab
iv. Al-Shaabab's hostile attitude to aid delivery in southern Somalia.

Even though early warnings about the effects of drought with "alarming predictions" had been published since the summer of 2010, this information did not lead to any large-scale action that could have prevented the threat of famine. (Lautze, Bell, Alinovi and Russo, 2012, p. 43) One reason behind the ineffectiveness of the early warning system was its remote location from the regions or populations affected by the crises, and therefore treated with some indifference by local authorities or stakeholders. (Lautze, Bell, Alinovi and Russo, 2012) Another important cause of the famine was a significant increase in the price of essential food items. Somalia generally imported most of its food, even in the years when production was plentiful. The rise of global food prices led to a reduction in the amount of food Somalia imported and, this situation "drastically increased the price of food at exactly the time when the value of what people had to sell declined." (Maxwell and Majid, 2016, p. 52)

The conflict between Al-Shabaab and the TFG was another critical factor behind the famine. The fighting forced the civilian population to flee from their homes and aggravated the impact of the drought and the increase in food prices. The displaced people in their new and unfamiliar surroundings faced significant hurdles in obtaining sufficient food. (Maxwell and Majid, 2016) The counter-terrorism measures of Western countries put onerous conditions on humanitarian activities in Somalia. On February 2008, the USA government added Al-Shabaab to the list of foreign terrorist organizations. US-funded aid organizations had to certify that any aid they had provided to Somalia did not reach Al-Shabaab. However, local circumstances made it very difficult to verify such an attestation. Consequently, aid amounts considerably declined. (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012) International attempts to blockade Al-Shabaab controlled regions made famine in those areas more likely. (Seal and

Bailey, 2013, p. 3)

Actions of Al-Shabaab were also among the chief causes of the famine. Al-Shabaab considered some of the UN-based relief organizations hostile and beginning from 2010 restricted activities of these organizations or banned them from working in its area of control. Because of the restrictions imposed by Al-Shabaab much of the western aid organizations' response was limited to the periphery of the actual famine. These actions exacerbated the crisis and led directly or indirectly to the absence of a number of the international humanitarian agencies that could have both mitigated the crisis and been in a position to respond rapidly. According to Maxwell and Majid (2016, p. 3), this was the first major food security crisis in recent memory in which the World Food Program was not present.

All of the above causes combined to produce the worst famine disaster in the last 25 years. (The Guardian, 2013) However, traditional donors did not act on the repeated warnings coming from food security experts who were pointing out the impending risk of famine. (Hillbruner and Moloney, 2012) Oxfam, a global aid and development charity, accused several European governments of "willful neglect" over the crisis in Somalia. (The Guardian, 2011) In the end, famine took the lives of 258 000 people, including 133 000 children under the age of five. In some regions, nearly 20% of children under five died. (FAO, 2013) Some researchers pointed out there were deeper structural reasons that paved the way for humanitarian disaster in Somalia. In Africa, the international community's tolerance for "appalling level of human suffering" (Lautze, Bell, Alinovi and Russo, 2012, p. 47) was high, and this apathetic attitude was one of the contributing factors leading to the death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

4.2.1.3. Raising Awareness of Turkish Society about Dire Situation in Somalia

After receiving the news of famine, a huge public campaign was launched in Turkey. Public and private organizations and NGOs each started independent initiatives to collect aid to help people in Somalia. To show the grassroots nature of the initial campaign, some representative examples are summarized below:

Esenler municipality launched a campaign named “Brotherhood of Iftar with Somalia” on August 8, 2011. On the municipal website, information was given about the dire situation in Somalia and the necessity of urgent help was stressed. (Esenler Municipality, 2011) Hak-İş, a conservative labor union, also started a campaign of its own to help Somalia. Mahmut Arslan, president of the union, in a press conference held on August 11, 2011, told that as a labor union they began an assistance campaign for Somali people named “Help And Save a Life” (Hak-İş, 2011) Turkish NGOs also joined the movement. Almost all of the conservative NGOs launched their campaigns. Yardımeli Eğitim Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Association started a campaign named “Do Not Let Somalia’s Children Die” Osman İlhan, president of the association informed that with the partner organization Al-Birr association they wanted to reach and help vulnerable people in the region. (Yeni Şafak, 2011) IHH informed the press on August 5, 2011 that the association was in the process of sending a shipload of aid to Somalia on August 15, 2011. IHH representatives said that even before the declaration of famine, they were helping people in the region. (İHA, 2011) Even in the relatively impoverished regions, such as Mardin, Van, Adıyaman civil society organizations announced their intention to participate overall campaign to help Somalia. (Habertürk, 2011) It was impossible to list all the initiatives launched in many different regions of Turkey. Almost all of Turkey mobilized to do something for Somalia. It seems the Islamic holy month of Ramadan affected the Turkish population deeply as they felt in their daily fasting the effects of hunger themselves.

4.2.1.4. High Profile Turkish Response and its Effects

Turkish Government and especially Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took notice that famine in Somalia had drawn the attention of the public opinion. The Prime Minister took part in the public campaign, showing up in a special television program organized to collect donations from the Turkish public. At the end of the program, 25 million of Turkish Lira had been collected. In the same television program, Erdoğan announced that he would personally visit Somalia in the next week, and he would devote his UN speech to the issue of Somalia. (Habertürk, 2011) Prime Minister visited Somalia with his wife, four ministers, and an entourage of 200 people from the political, business and cultural elite. The visit was a brilliant display of public support for the Somali people who were under the risk

of starvation. Erdoğan, with the highly publicized visit, drew the world's attention to the plight of Somalis. During the visit, Prime Minister told the press that the West did not provide adequate assistance to Somalia and Muslim countries should contribute more. (Al Jazeera, 2011) Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu who came with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told the BBC's Focus on Africa Program (BBC, 2011):

> *"There was a perception that nobody can go to Mogadishu; we try to destroy the perception. We came - many others can come…..We came to Somalia to show our solidarity with the brothers and sisters of Somalia, but this is not just for one day, we will continue to work for our brothers and sisters and we will never leave them alone,"*

Local journalists emphasized the unprecedented nature of Erdoğan's visit by pointing out that he was the first foreign leader who could drive in Mogadishu. (Ali, 2011)

> *"What made Erdoğan's visit to Somalia particularly important is that, unlike leaders of neighboring countries, who routinely make fleeting appearances in Somalia, typically confined to military bases, Erdoğan drove into the city—or what's left of it—and appeared remarkably calm."* (p. 66)

The Prime Minister's visit and the Turkish public campaign for Somalia made a huge impact on Somalia and the international community's approach to Somalia. Kilian Kleinschmidt, the UN's deputy humanitarian coordinator in Somalia, summarized the overall effect of Turkey's aid efforts: "In a few months, the Turks accomplished more than any other nation or aid group in 21 years." (Harte, 2012, p. 28) The Somali ambassador to Turkey, Nur Sheikh Hamud Mursal, portrayed the donor nation as "a savior sent by God to Somalia." (Harte, 2012, p. 28) The overall impact of Turkish assistance efforts for Somalia can be described in four points. The most important short-term result of the Turkish aid effort was to highlight the plight of the population. Turkish effort prompted other countries to follow Turkey's footsteps and increase their presence in Somalia. Many Arab agencies previously not active in Somalia came into Mogadishu. After Turkish Red Crescent workers arrived in Mogadishu, Qatar sent its workers, and Iran decided to enter into Mogadishu and distributed basic supplies to the population. In this sense, Turkey's most "valuable contribution" to Somalia was to provoke other countries to offer more aid to Somalia. (Harte, 2012, p. 34)

Erdoğan's visit and the presence of Turkish aid workers in Mogadishu demonstrated

that aid workers could work in Somalia. Before Prime Minister's visit, almost all aid organizations operated in Nairobi and tried to organize aid activities remotely, reducing the effectiveness of their activities. As International Crisis Group notes (ICG, 2012): "The bold, on the ground and hands-on Turkish relief efforts put Nairobi-based international organizations on the defensive after maintaining for two decades that Mogadishu was too unsafe for their operations." (p. 10) Mary Harper, Editor of BBC Africa, emphasizing the same point, said that Turkish ground operations in Mogadishu were "like a slap in the face to the rest of the World". (Harte, 2012, p. 34) After Erdoğan had left Somalia, Iran sent its foreign minister to Mogadishu, and several European countries followed suit, sending their cabinet members to the city for the first time in 20 years (Ali, 2011) Official Turkish aid to Somalia may be unprecedented, but the amount of assistance provided, especially when compared to other traditional donors, certainly was not big. However, Turkey's overall assistance was viewed as superior and "eclipsing many traditional donors both in quantity and quality of its assistance". (Wasuge, 2016, p. 4) High praise earned by Turkish assistance efforts in Somalia made Turkish leaders talk about a "Turkish-type development model". (TIKA, 2019, p. 11) According to Sazak and Woods (2017) Somalia aid model became a "template replicated in other countries". (p. 177) According to this model, first comes the opening of a new embassy; after that, TIKA offices are established, Turkish Airlines arrive, and last but not least, an influx of development programs and commercial activities is planned and implemented.[40]

The most significant long-term result of Turkey's aid to Somalia was to give confidence to the small, secluded transitional government to initiate new efforts and build a working government that could unite the divided country, which did not have a central government since 1992. Previous efforts in forming a central government had been a failure. In the face of some skeptical observers who claimed (Meckhaus, 2012) that transitional government was weakening, Turkey's steadfast support helped to overcome hurdles and doubts and the first permanent central government in the country since the start of the civil war was formed. The new government created a sense of hope among the Somali people,

[40] Assessing Turkish development aid Haşimi (2014) made a sweeping argument. He claimed that Turkey's distinctive approach to development aid brought about *"**re-locating of national-identity**, critique of the established world system, re-description of international politics and the march of Turkey into the political space of a globalized World."* (p. 141)

and international observers began to talk about (Hammond, 2013) rising Somalia and "a sense of optimism… which is a marked departure from the previous two decades." (p. 183) The new government managed to maintain its unity, despite a major terrorism threat from Al-Shabaab and unruly regions that do not recognize its authority.

4.2.2. The Scope of the Humanitarian Assistance

Turkey's humanitarian assistance policy towards Somalia from the beginning was multi-faceted with many actors including public organizations as well as Turkish NGOs. (Özkan, M. 2014) While the initial campaign focused on ending the immediate danger of starvation, later Turkey undertook a far-reaching assistance program. It should be emphasized that the method of Turkish assistance delivery was different from the assistance of conventional donors. Turkey preferred a recipient-driven, risky, but on the ground aid delivery method that earned high praise from the Somali government.[41] Turkey's approach was viewed as more business-friendly. On the other hand, this method prompted criticism from traditional donors as they claimed that Turkey's aid efforts were not transparent, were duplicitous, and not based on a long-term strategy. (Besharati, Rawhani, Stearns and Sucuoglu, 2017) Turkish Humanitarian assistance could be examined in two parts. The first part is about emergency assistance in 2011 and 2012; the second part is about the delivery of development assistance, which is more diverse from emergency assistance as it was ranging from social and health services to the transport area.

4.2.2.1. Emergency Assistance in 2011

Turkish emergency assistance comprised official aid efforts, NGO assistance, and private donations as well. While the Turkish government gave $47.54 million and NGO's $58 million, total private $365 million. (Harte, 2012, p. 28; TIKA, 2012, p. 57) The fact that the private sector's contributions greatly exceeded official aid demonstrates the effectiveness of the public campaign as well as the willingness and desire of the Turkish people to help

[41] Especially the visibility of Turkish assistance in Mogadishu created a perception of more effective Turkish assistance in Somalia. This apparently successful Turkish assistance approach was examined by the researchers. A report on this issue published by a Somali based organization, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, is comprehensive and balanced: "Turkey's assistance model in Somalia: Achieving much with little." http://www.heritageinstitute.org/turkeys-assistance-model-in-somalia-achieving-much-with-little/

the Somali population. According to TIKA 2011 Annual Development Report (TIKA, 2012, p. 48) only about 30% of the total emergency assistance was directed towards Somalia. Below, some of the activities performed by the Turkish public organizations are listed:

i. The construction of a logistics center (10 000 m²), a supply storage building (5 000 m²) and the commissioning of 45 logistics staff.
ii. The construction of a transfer camp made up of 2 000 tents that could house 12 000 refugees. Each tent in the camp was given five blankets, a kitchen supply set, and an aid box that consisted of food supplies.
iii. A total of 6 620 animals (5 870 small cattle and 750 large cattle) was slaughtered in order to provide meat.
iv. Twelve cargo planes and eight ships were fully loaded with aid supplies and sent to Somalia. Tons of food, clothing, medication, and other supplies were distributed to people in the camps.
v. Two field hospitals were constructed, and eight fully equipped ambulances were sent to the region.
vi. The assignment of 143 doctors and health staff to Somalia and medical examinations for 70 786 people, of whom 2 895 were put under medical observation.
vii. 41 Somali patients with their 30 attendants were brought to Turkey for medical treatment

AFAD also implemented an emergency assistance program, and some of its main activities are listed below (AFAD, 2012, p. 45)

i. On sixteen aircrafts and eight vessels, 22 128 tons of humanitarian aid was delivered to the region,
ii. 87 tons of medicine and medical supplies were sent to Somalia
iii. AFAD in partnership with other public agencies, brought more than 400 young Somalis to continue their education at the high school level in Turkey
iv. 57 Somalis brought to Turkey for medical treatment.

Turkish Red Crescent collaborated with other public organizations or other country

red crescents and implemented an emergency assistance program in Somalia. Aside from providing essential food and medical supplies to the affected Somali population, Turkish Red Crescent established a tent city that could shelter up to 25 000 people. (Özkan, 2014, p. 39-40) According to TIKA, Turkish NGOs delivered $199.52 million of aid assistance throughout the world, and $58 million of this aid was provided to Somalia. (TIKA, 2012, p. 68) Almost all NGOs provided humanitarian assistance to Somalia. As an example, some of the activities performed by the Doctors Worldwide in Somalia are presented below (TIKA, 2012, p. 72):

i. The construction of Shifa Hospital in Mogadishu (with 73 staff and 62 beds) and the conduction of 500 clinical operations, 20 births and 10 surgeries on a daily basis.
ii. The assignment of 27 health workers to Mogadishu Benadir Hospital,
iii. The training of 13 Somali health workers in Turkey,
iv. The opening of two Medical Nourishment Centers in Hodan and Lafole.
v. Transportation of 143,135 boxes of medicine and 16 boxes of medical supplies to Somalia

4.2.2.2. Assistance After 2011

While the Turkish officials did not use a "state-building discourse", comprehensiveness of development assistance efforts suggests that Turkey, in fact, engaged in a state-building effort in Somalia. (Özkan, 2014, p. 24) Various Turkish ministries and public organizations took part in assistance efforts under the umbrella of TIKA. Below, acts of assistance to education, health, social services and transportation for the Somali people are summarized. Education assistance to the Somali people had a significant place in the overall Turkish humanitarian assistance and could be seen as a "strong element" of Turkey's activism in Somalia. (Çöğen, 2016, p. 68) Educational assistance could be summarized under two parts: the first part was supporting education in Somalia itself by construction of new schools or providing equipment and educational materials for the older schools, thus improving their capacities to deliver educational services to Somali students. The second was providing scholarships to Somali students to fund their education in Turkey.

The Mogadishu Agricultural School, established in 2013 with the co-operation of IHH, was an important example of Turkish aid efforts that aimed to build a self-sustained Somalia. (TIKA, 2016, p. 25) The school offered theoretical and practical training courses to farmers in different areas such as seeding, weeding, irrigation, soil cultivation, and apiculture. According to the TIKA report, the school "introduced" the greenhouse technology to Somalia; new agricultural products like melon and eggplant are being cultivated for the first time, as well as the use of drip irrigation techniques. Upon the completion of the courses, various agricultural equipment and seeds were given to the graduates free of charge. Turned into a Faculty of Agriculture under Zamzam University in 2015, the school aims to bring modern agricultural methods to Somalia.

Some of the similar educational aid efforts are listed below (TIKA, 2016, p. 25):

i. Furnishing of a Computer Laboratory for Hargeisa Middle School
ii. Galkayo Vocational Training and Youth Sports Center (Construction and furnishing of the building, training program for the trainers)
iii. Furnishing Computer Laboratories for Universal Islamic Cultural Trust (Furnishing of computer classes for 15 students and equipment support)
iv. Hargeisa Regional Training Administration (Construction and furnishing of a new building, training program)
v. Renovation and Furnishing of the Berbera Training Centre.

Turkish Housing Development Administration (TOKI) constructed the Mogadishu Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Training and Research Hospital, which is one of the most advanced hospitals in the East Africa Region in terms of equipment and capacity. (TIKA, 2016, p. 17-18) Built on the site of the former Dikfer Hospital in Mogadishu; the hospital has polyclinics including internal diseases, gynecology, pediatric and urology services; as well as a 28-bedded Emergency service, four operating rooms, 20 intensive care units, a delivery room with 20 incubators, five x-rays units, four ultrasound units, three echography units, one tomography unit, one mammography unit, one MR unit, various laboratories and 200 patient beds. In the hospital, 6 000 patients are treated, and 100 operations are carried out monthly. Some of the other aid efforts under the health area are as follows (TIKA, 2016, p. 17-18):

i. Renovation of Berbera Hospital (Renovations of hospital's laboratory, morgue, and laundry sections and equipment support
ii. Donation of five Ambulances for Various Hospitals in Somaliland Region
iii. Rehabilitation of Galkayo Hospital's Emergency Ward (Construction of an annex, reparation of the existing building, short-term training programs, donation of two ambulances)

In the social services area, Turkey also provided assistance to Somalia, where two decades of conflict had generated high levels of violence among the population. TIKA constructed two new orphanage buildings in Hargeisa of the Somaliland region, fully equipped Derbil and Ileys Orphanages, and supported the children with educational and other basic supplies. In co-operation with some NGOs, TIKA also organized educational courses for female victims of gender-based violence in Somalia, supporting them with necessary equipment to set up their businesses and providing them with food aid during the four-month courses. (TIKA, 2016, p. 19,21) TIKA repaired and rehabilitated the Mogadishu city roads, damaged severely during the Civil War. TIKA also constructed new 34 km-long roads which linked the major areas of the city, helping with the normalization of the social and economic life in Mogadishu. (TIKA, 2016, p. 13) Turkey provided support to open Mogadishu Aden Abdulle Airport to international flights. Rehabilitation of the airport made possible the beginning of Turkish Airlines' daily İstanbul Mogadishu flights in 2012. TIKA reported that Mogadishu Aden Abdulle Airport, with an annual capacity of 400 000 passengers, was transformed into a fully functioning airport where 40-60 flights to four different countries could take place. (TIKA, 2016, p. 14) Thus, TIKA's support enabled Somalia to connect with the outside world.

4.2.3. Historical Ties with Somalia

Historically, relations between Somalia and Turkey date back to the 16th century. After receiving a request for assistance, the Ottomans sent an expeditionary force to Somalia to help them against Ethiopian and Portuguese expeditionary forces. Some regions in Somalia came under the reign of the Ottoman Empire. However, the Ottoman Empire was not able to resist the colonization efforts of European countries, and Somalia was divided and controlled by Britain and Italy. (Lewis, 1988) After Somalia switched sides in the Cold War

and came into the Western side, Turkey took the first step to establish relations between two countries, and in 1979, embassies were opened in both countries. Somalia also became one of the first states which received development assistance from Turkey in 1985. (MFA, 2020b) In the 1980s, as described above, internal conditions deteriorated, and the government collapsed, bringing the country to the brink of civil war. Considering the anarchical conditions in Somalia's capital Turkey closed down the embassy in 1991.

Following the escalation of the civil war, a famine broke out. However, humanitarian assistance could not be provided to people due to the conflict within the country. The UN Security Council adopted a decision to establish a peacekeeping force to ensure the protection of relief efforts. Turkey became one of the countries that participated in the peacekeeping operation, and General Çevik Bir was appointed as the force commander of the UN operation. The peacekeeping mission ended in failure as some of the country's warlords opposed and actively fought against the mission. After the failure of the UN mission Turkey did not show any further interest in the country and there was no official relationship between two countries. The absence of formal relations did not prevent some Turkish NGOs from launching operations in Somalia. Beginning from 1996 IHH opened wells to provide fresh water to people in the region (Alegöz, 2013, p. 87)

The first official contact between Turkey and Somalia took place at the African Union summit in 2007. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the President of the TFG of Somalia Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed came together in the Adiba Summit, and Erdoğan was invited by the Somali President to Somalia to discuss the current situation in Somalia. However, this meeting never took place. The two leaders again met in 2009, at the General Assembly of the UN, to discuss the general situation in Somalia. (Çöğen, 2016) The Somali ruling elite was eager to re-build formal relations as the TFG President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed visited Turkey three times before the Prime Minister had visited Somalia. (ICG, 2012) Judging from the course of relations between the TFG and the Turkish government, there is nothing to suggest that a close relationship was to be established between Turkey and Somalia. However, Turkey's enthusiastic response to famine and its aid efforts for the Somali population transformed the relationship. According to Mehmet Özkan (2014, p. 11) Somalia became a "litmus test" for Turkey's policy on sub-Saharan Africa, as the success or failure of Somali policy became a key indicator of its commitment to relations with sub-

Saharan Africa.

4.2.4. Norms and Identities in Turkish Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia

Turkey's foray into Somalia gained widespread admiration. This unprecedented attempt in Somalia also prompted questions among academicians and researchers. There are several attempts to explain the reasons behind the Turkish aid effort. Some saw behind the Turkish intervention an imperialist push, Somalia being the "gateway" into East Africa. (Antonopoulos, Villar, Cottle and Ahmed, 2017, p. 9) According to this view, the main goal of Turkish drive is to expand Turkey's influence in the region and to compete against other imperialist rivals. China made significant investments in the region, and Turkey did not want to fall behind other great powers. The failure of leading Western states to dominate Somalia provided an opportunity for Turkey to enter into the region. Besides, Turkey's resource needs require the country to invest in resource-rich countries. Taking all these into account, Turkish leaders decided to enter Somalia. While neatly argued, this view lacks the most critical component for an argument: evidence to back up the claims. There is no empirical basis for the argument that Turkey's involvement was a result of a long-term plan that foresaw a neocolonial expansion into East Africa. Another view, which is more widespread than the above, Turkey simply tries to expand its soft power. (Cannon, 2016) Providing timely help to Somalia, a region abandoned by the international community, this soft power investment reaped considerable gains in terms of prestige and status. However a soft power concept does not explain why some specific countries are selected for aid, and other countries are not. Almost all aid efforts naturally contribute to enhancing the soft power of the donor country. We need more pertinent explanations that point out the underlying reasons behind the exact timing, selection of the region, and intensity of the aid effort. In this context, identity and norms give us more insights into explaining the Turkish foray into Somalia. The Islamic solidarity norm was an effective force for the initial relief effort, but for the subsequent development assistance, humanitarian and historical responsibility guided Turkey's overall aid approach to Somalia.

4.2.4.1. Humanitarian and Historical Responsibility

There may be some overlap between the Islamic solidarity norm and the humanitarian and historical responsibility norm in shaping the preferences of policymakers in response to events in neighboring countries or Islamic countries. The Islamic solidarity norm is effective in mobilizing the resources of civil society for helping fellow Muslims wherever they are. However, humanitarian and historical responsibility norm is more effective in allocating public sources to alleviate the suffering of needy peoples, Muslims and non-Muslims. As a state policy, solidarity with Muslims was not stressed; instead, common humanitarian values are emphasized. Judging from the discourse of JDP politicians, the initial relief effort for Somalia was mostly portrayed as Islamic solidarity for fellow Muslims. (Cumhuriyet, 2011) President Gül in his remarks on August 1, 2011, praised the efforts of civil society actors and Red Crescent said that he was proud of what NGOs were doing in Somalia. (Yeni Safak, 2011) On his remarks on August 12, 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pointed out that public agencies would play a larger role. However, he did not mention any step other than one of alleviating the suffering of the Somali population. (Haberturk, 2011) From the initial remarks of the Turkish politicians, it was hard to deduce that Turkey was about to involve itself in an ambitious state-building effort. The focus was absolutely on humanitarian relief. Only after Erdoğan's visit did Turkey begin to pay attention to the structural and long-term problems of Somalia. It seems the Somali government's "enthusiastic welcome" (ICG, 2012, p. 11) impressed Turkish leaders, and they began to think about establishing a long-term relationship with Somalia. In the past, when Muslim states requested help in the face of aggression, the Ottoman Empire came to their assistance. In fact, the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century did exactly the same for Somalia. As modern successors of the Ottomans, Turkish leaders also could not refuse a plea for assistance coming from a Muslim State which was in a very dire situation. While traditional donors of Somalia were dealing with the effects of the 2008 economic crisis, Turkey quickly had rebounded from economic crisis and became one of the fastest-growing countries in the world. In these circumstances, Turkey was well-placed to assume its historical role of helping other countries.

Turkey's development assistance from building roads, schools, and hospitals to providing scholarships to Somali students was the result of humanitarian and historical

responsibility norm, which made it easier to provide assistance to a "failed state" with no apparent economic gain. In Somalia case, humanitarian and historical responsibility norm prescribed that Turkish policymakers should continue to help Somalia as the country's leaders obviously wanted Turkey's further involvement. The President himself explicitly referred to Turkey's "historical responsibility" with regard to Somalia and said that Turkey supported Somalia because of this responsibility. (TCCB, 2015)

4.2.4.2. Islamic Solidarity

As detailed above the Islamic solidarity norm requires every Muslim to provide assistance to fellow Muslims who face deprivation. Pictures of the starving people from Somalia brought out an immense relief effort in Turkey. The Turkish Government and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan commanded the efforts and visited the country being the first prime minister to visit the country. As Alons (2007) puts it, "in order to understand the preferences and behavior of states in international relations, we need to take both domestic considerations and international considerations of states into account." (p. 211) Alons argues that as the levels of mobilizations increase, the political benefits of a policy option also increase, and the governments are more likely to react positively to society's demands. If the power in the international system is not concentrated, states have more room for independent action, and in this case, domestic considerations are expected to play a dominant role. (Alons, 2007, p. 222) In Somalia, Turkey does not need to be concerned with international systems constraints as Turkey intervened in a neglected area in East Africa. This intervention did not produce any opposition from the regional powers or traditional donors. The domestic considerations shaped the decisions of the policymakers. The campaigns of NGOs and civil society propelled Erdoğan to take advantage of the mobilization and lead the effort himself.

Norms as shared expectations, raise the question of how many adherents must share this expectation before it could be called a norm. Answering this question requires empirical observations. Sociological surveys conducted in Turkey indicate that some segments of Turkish society consider religious considerations crucial factors in decisions to give aid. (Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, 2016) Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) noted that norms could be regional as well as global, so the existence of religious norms that could play a role only in some of the states' foreign policies is also possible. As norms are ''continuous, rather than

dichotomous, entities," they can "come in varying strengths''. (Legro, 1997, p. 33) Some norms may have strong allegiance while others do not. Islamic solidarity norm could be said to command strong adherence on the part of religiously-observant individuals in Turkey. For other individuals who are not religious, this norm is not expected to have any effect on individual decisions at all.

International law and political science literature suggest that there are two main "norm empowerment" processes: bottom-up and top-down. (Checkel, 1998, p. 87) An Islamic solidarity norm could be spread across Turkey only by a bottom-up process. Turkey being a secular country, the expectation that one should help fellow Muslims could only be propagated by private actors. Individuals may prefer to maintain traditional family values or adopt on their own some religious values and decide to give Zakat or alms to needy people. This is a private matter. Public agencies, other than the Religious Affairs Directorate (*Diyanet*), which is an anomaly of Turkish secularism, do not explicitly transmit religious messages such as the necessity of giving assistance to suffering Muslims. This situation explains why the conservative NGOs and other Islamic groups played, initially, a major role in raising the awareness of the Turkish public with regard to the dire situation of the fellow Muslims in Somalia. Religious communities across Turkey mobilized to help the Muslim Somali population.

It must be stressed that the holy month of Ramadan gave a huge boost to collecting donations from the Turkish public. In the long hot days of August, fasting puts people in a similar position to those people who face hunger and starvation. The plight of starving Somalis seen on televisions was thus deeply felt, and an outburst of compassion followed. A brief look at the campaign slogans such as "Brotherhood of iftar", or "One iftar and fitr[42] from every home to Somalia" shows that activists utilized the power of Islamic solidarity norm to receive donations from the public. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took part in the public campaign later, but his contribution to the campaign was outstanding. He completely energized the campaign, as he was a very popular figure in the country; JDP took nearly 50% of the vote in June 2011. His personal support and involvement also motivated others who might not have participated in the aid campaign. In the end, the success

[42] Fitr is a small amount donated to the poor a few days before the end of fasting in the holy month of Ramadan.

of the aid effort owes as much to the initial mobilization of religious groups whose main purpose was to show solidarity with other Muslims, and it does to the leadership of Erdoğan.

4.2.4.3. Protecting the Vulnerable

Protecting vulnerable persons or groups is an accepted social and legal domestic norm in most countries. International legal norms related to saving and supporting vulnerable groups in disaster situations are currently not complete and in the draft stage. The International Law Commission, a body of the UN, drew up a document called "Draft articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters" regulating the principles of humanitarian intervention in the event of disasters. In this document, the need for special care for vulnerable persons is specifically mentioned. (UN, 2020) To understand whether this norm had any effect on the Turkish campaign in Somalia, we need to examine the discourse and behavior of policymakers and civil society actors. If we look at the aid campaign, we could see that images of starving children were displayed and the critical condition of children was emphasized. For example, in his press conference, Hak-İş president Arslan specifically pointed out the fact that because of famine a child dies every six minutes. (Hak-İş, 2011) Other civil society actors such as the chief of the Adıyaman Red Crescent Office also mentioned the same point in his remarks to the press. Yardımeli Eğitim Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Association used the motto "Do Not Let Somalia's Children Die" as a campaign rallying cry. Ministers from the Government also referred to the precarious situation of children in Somalia and the need for help. On one occasion, while sending the food supplies to Somalia, eight little children carried a banner called "We thank you on behalf of our brothers and sisters" which stirred the participating high-ranking officials visibly. (Sabah, 2011) One of the clearest signs that secular concerns also played some role in the collection of aid was the involvement of opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in the aid campaign. In response to growing public concern for Somalia, Kılıçdaroğlu himself visited refugee camps. There is no mention of Islamic solidarity in any of his remarks before or after the visit to Somalia. (Milliyet, 2011) Evaluating all the evidence, it is clear that we could not view all the aid collected as a product of public effort completely emanating from the Islamic solidarity norm. The concern for vulnerable groups, namely the protection of children, played a role in the aid campaign. However, it is very hard

to pinpoint the exact effect of “protecting the vulnerable norm” as we do not have surveys that could give us information about the proportion of donors who gave aid because of the concerns about the vulnerable groups. However, it is safe to say that, based on the evidence, protecting the vulnerable norm contributed to the overall aid program to Somalia.

4.3. Syrian People Case

The last case of this thesis is Turkish humanitarian aid to the Syrian people. Hence the subtitles below give a brief overview of the significance of this case, a review of the scope of Turkey's humanitarian aid to Syrians and an overview of its historical ties with Syria. Finally, how norms and identity shape this Turkish humanitarian aid decision is analyzed.

4.3.1. The Significance of the Case

A wave of political upheavals rolled over the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in 2010. In spring 2011, in response to the brutal repression of political protests by the Gaddafi regime, the UN Security Council approved an intervention in Libya. (Murray and McKay, 2014, p. 13) In March 2011, an uprising began in Syria with the demonstrators demanding the end of almost five decades of domination by the Ba’ath party as well as the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad. In order to quell the mass demonstrations, the Syrian government responded with extreme violence against civilians. The army was deployed and soldiers were ordered to open fire on civilians. Protests gradually turned into a violent revolt. (Murray and McKay, 2014, p. 14) From the beginning of the conflict in 2011, more than 10 million Syrians, half of the pre-war Syrian population, escaped the violence to reach safety. If we compare the Syrian situation with other conflicts, we can clearly see that the extent of the dislocation was exceptional. For example, the civil wars in South Sudan and Somalia produced a displacement of around a quarter of the population. Such an enormous movement of people was bound to affect the region deeply- Turkey along with other countries of the region, Lebanon and Jordan have been profoundly affected.

The Syrian crisis and the Turkish response to the crisis had enormous effects on the country. From the perspective of Turkey’s foreign aid probably the most significant effect of the Syrian crisis was the tremendous increase in the amount of Turkish foreign aid. Before

2011 such aid was relatively stable at around 700 million USD. After 2011 it simply exploded. The magnitude of the crisis compelled Turkey to dispense unimaginable amounts for Syrian refugees. Another consequence of giving immense assistance to Syrian refugees is that Syria went from having a very small share in the overall aid to becoming the number one country among the recipients. In the 2000s, Turkey's relations with Syria improved, but its foreign aid to Syria did not change much during this period. The Syrian conflict and the influx of people into Turkey transformed Turkey's aid outlook.

Table 12. Turkish Aid to Syria as a Percentage of Development Assistance

	Before Syrian Conflict							
	2003	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**
Share of Syria	0.16%	0.57%	0.76%	0.51%	0.95%	0.53%	0.65%	0.98%
	After Syrian Conflict							
	2011	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**
Share of Syria	12.73%	40.26%	49.54%	63.81%	68.74%	90.19%	89.24%	77.78%

Source: OECD https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A#

Turkey's humanitarian approach towards the Syrians gained widespread admiration and praise from around the world. In terms of the humanitarian assistance provided, the Syrian crisis catapulted Turkey into the number one position in the world.[43]

Table 13. Global humanitarian assistance in 2019

Country	Humanitarian Assistance (USD Millions)
Turkey	8,399
USA	6,646
Germany	2,962
EU Institutions	2,194
United Kingdom	1,968
United Arab Emirates	1,272

[43] According to international organizations Turkey's humanitarian assistance is not "strictly comparable" to other donors because Turkish assistance includes amounts spent for Syrian refugees who are living in Turkey. According to OECD guidelines only the amounts spent in the first 12 months for refugees could be included in the humanitarian assistance. (OECD, 2017, p. 12) However Turkey does not designate Syrians legally as refugees and count the overall aid spent for Syrians in the humanitarian assistance numbers.

Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2019, p. 12

All of the above are in fact the consequence of Turkey's decision to accept all Syrians fleeing from Syria. Turkey, in the process, became the country hosting the highest number of refugees in the world. Pursuing a completely different policy from its previous policy of placing all the refugees in the camps set-up in the border regions, Turkey allowed all those with passports to enter Turkey and permitted them to settle wherever they wanted. Syrians who did not have valid passports were placed in temporary refugee camps. (Dinçer *et al.*, 2013, p. 5; Batalla and Tolay, 2018, p. 4) Evaluating Turkish public attitude to the Syrian refugee influx, Frank Düvell (2013 p. 279) who at the time was a senior researcher at the University of Oxford's Centre on Migration, made the following prescient observation: in most European countries such an influx of refugees would have caused a "moral panic" but in Turkey "incredible social and political resilience [was] shown with regard to these inflows." It is worth remembering that in 2013 the number of Syrian refugees did not exceed one million. It is clear that such an exemplary stance requires a closer inspection. Turkish policy towards Syrian refugees could be examined in two periods. In the first rather short period, hoping that the conflict would end quickly, Turkey allowed all Syrians to enter Turkey and treated them as guests. The numbers of Syrians were low and did not put much pressure on public services. Adopting the unilateral approach, Turkey did not participate in any international groupings preferring informal co-operation with like-minded countries. The second period from the end of 2012 to the beginning of 2018[44] could be characterized by greater control over refugee flows, especially over those who did not have passports, and, as well, Turkey's willingness to accept international help.

4.3.1.1. Uncontrolled Open Door Policy

After the Syrian regime's violent reaction, the Syrians began to flee from Syria, and the first Syrian refugees arrived in Hatay province in April 2011. The first Syrians who arrived in Turkey were generally small groups of political activists who fled to Turkey to

[44] Beginning from 2018 Turkey increasingly emphasized the return of Syrian refugees to their home country only viable option. While officially maintaining open door policy Turkey in fact closed doors to Syrian refugees. According to Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan In Response to the Syria Crisis (3RPSyria, 2020, p. 18) "in particular cases, Turkey continues to grant admission on humanitarian grounds, including for medical treatment and for family reunification as stipulated in the Temporary Protection Regulation*."*

avoid punishment at the hands of the Syrian Government. Later with the rise of armed opposition and escalation of conflict, the civil population began to flee from Syria. (Hoffman and Samuk, 2016, p. 7) Turkey did not have a separate government agency that could have managed the refugee situation in this period. As the Syrian case was viewed as a short-term emergency, the management of refugee camps was assigned to the central governmental agency, which oversees response to emergency and disaster conditions in Turkey. All the expenditures relating to managing refugee camps came from the AFAD's budget. Refugee camps set up by Turkey received lavish international praise. The provision of high quality care for the residents of camps was found impressive. (Hoffman and Samuk, 2016, p. 8)

At the initial stage, the Government did not define a clear asylum policy. The assumption behind this non-policy was that the civil war would be a short one, and the numbers of Syrians who came to Turkey would remain low. They were expected to return to their country as soon as the conflict ended. (Batalla and Tolay, 2018, p. 3) UNHCR interviewed some of the Syrians who entered Turkey in May and started to process their files. However, later UNHCR stopped registering Syrian refugees, as it was very difficult to process asylum applications for such a massive number of asylum seekers. (Özden, 2013, p. 5) The legally non-existent nature of "guest" status for Syrian refugees forced the Turkish government to look for other instruments that could be more appropriate for defining the status of Syrian refugees. In October 2011, the Interior Ministry announced that all the Syrian refugees in Turkey would be granted the status of "temporary protection" (Dinçer *et al.*, 2013, p. 25). The expectation of a short-lived conflict and Syrians rapidly returning led the government to tackle the Syrian refugee situation in a unilateral manner. Turkey did not actively seek international help, and according to Metin Çorabatır, who worked at the UNHCR, refused the offers of assistance from international organizations. (T24, 2013) According to Kale, avoiding "sharing sensitive information" with international organizations might be the main reason behind Turkey's distant and unco-operative attitude towards international organizations. (Kale, 2017, p. 65)

4.3.1.2. Controlled Open Door Policy

Turkish Foreign Minister in August 2012 announced that Turkey would remain committed to the open door policy until the number of Syrians reached 100 000, meaning

once this threshold was exceeded, limitations would be put in place. (Batalla and Tolay, 2018, p. 3) By October 2012, the self-declared limit for Syrian refugees was reached, but the policy response did not change much. Turkey again allowed the Syrians into Turkey, and valid passport holders could settle in any province of their choice. According to Batalla and Tolay (2018), Turkish policy in this period demonstrated an example of "interesting and rather successful exercise of policy crafting". (p. 4) During this period, the Turkish population displayed a high level of acceptance for Syrian refugees. (Batalla and Tolay, 2018, p. 4)

İhlamur-Öner, in 2013, suggested that Turkey should be ready for further refugee flows in the region and pointed out that migration and asylum were one of the least elaborated dimensions in the new Turkish foreign policy. She added that Turkish foreign policymakers should integrate migration and asylum aspects into their new humanitarian foreign policy vision. This requires a human rights-oriented and sustainable refugee regime based on long-term planning. (İhlamur-Öner, 2013, p. 216-218). In a perceptive report titled "Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of Hospitality" several experts offered insights and recommendations to the Turkish government. Its conclusions deserve a lengthy quote here:

> *Most likely long term response to the refugee crisis for the Turkish government will be to continue muddling through the refugee crisis with all the risks that this entails.* (Dinçer *et al*, 2013, p. 33-34)

> *…an easy resolution of the conflict in Syria very difficult. As much as the Turkish government's preferred position was to see the removal of the Syrian regime (if necessary by force), this has not occurred and does not seem likely to occur. Turkey is a key player in the region and it will be critical that it adopts a policy based on both realism and diplomacy in support of two objectives. The first is to advocate measures to prevent the humanitarian situation from worsening and the second is to ensure that whatever settlement emerges from the Syrian crisis is that addresses the need for Syrians to find solutions to their displacement, including their return and rehabilitation in their home communities in Syria."* (Dinçer *et al*, 2013, p. 36)

These astute recommendations mostly went unheeded. After 2013, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the separatist Syrian Kurdish movement made the situation more complicated. The international attention increasingly shifted to fighting ISIS. The unending mass inflow of refugees began to test the limits of Turkey's reception capabilities. (Tolay, 2014, p. 5) Realizing that its proposal for a "no fly zone" would not be

implemented, Turkey gradually recognized the necessity of international support. (Kale, 2017, p. 68) During this period, Turkey demonstrated that "even in a situation of massive refugee inflows, it is possible to uphold a humanitarian approach and enact policies that prioritize the needs of refugees over the immediate security interests of the state." (Tolay, 2014, p. 6) While other Arab countries such as Jordan limited free access to healthcare to Syrian refugees. (Beaujouan and Rasheed, 2020, p. 57) Turkey took steps to facilitate access of the Syrians to the health system by establishing migrant health units. All things considered, Turkey's humanitarian approach was exceptional and requires a more detailed examination to understand why Turkish policymakers demonstrated such a welcoming attitude to Syrian refugees with its attendant costs.

4.3.2. The Scope of the Humanitarian Assistance

Turkey has assumed the large share of the financial costs for hosting the refugees living in the country. Turkey provides Syrians temporary protection, with extensive access to services in national systems, such as health, education, and social services. The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan In Response to the Syria Crisis (3RPSyria, 2020, p. 7) reports that Turkey "stepped up to the challenge" of delivering services to a huge number of refugees who are increasingly integrated into public service systems, particularly in areas of health and education. On the other hand, in provinces where high numbers of refugees live, public agencies come under pressure to provide necessary services. This has led to social tensions between the host communities and the Syrians. (3RPSyria, 2020, p. 18)

4.3.2.1. Shelter

From the beginning, Turkey preferred not to put all Syrian refugees in camps permitting them to live in places wherever they wanted to live. However, Syrians who did not have passports, at least initially, were placed in camps called Temporary Accommodation Centers. (Dinçer *et al.*, 2013) The camps have been managed and financed by AFAD. In the Temporary Accommodation Centers, a broad range of services has been provided to camp residents. These include psychosocial support, interpretors, grocery stores, laundry rooms, bakeries, playgrounds, sports fields, television rooms, and computer rooms

with internet. (Ombudsman, 2018, p. 61) Electronic food vouchers, or e-cards, were distributed to camp residents to enable them to go into nearby shops and buy food. (Benner, Uraz, Berry and Wiseman, 2015) 3RPSyria (2015) found Turkish-financed camp management as "emergency response of a consistently high standard." (p. 1) The Turkish government, with the support of international organizations, decided to close the camps.[45] Currently, over 98 percent of registered Syrians live in urban and rural areas, only around 59 000 Syrian refugees are still living in camps. (3RPSyria, 2020, p. 80) However, according to 3RPSyria (2020, p. 7) 66 percent of the Syrian households live in overcrowded or substandard shelters with inadequate sanitation and hygiene facilities. Turkish Ombudsman (2018, p. 60) also mentioned the same problem in its comprehensive report on Syrian refugees.

4.3.2.2. Education

Turkey committed to provide education services to all Syrian children of school age. Syrian children could enroll without paying any fee in Turkish public schools. From the beginning, Syrian children could have enrolled in the public school system, but few attended initially. (Makovsky, 2019, p. 18) McCarthy argues that at least initially, the education of Syrian children was broadly neglected by the Turkish government for non-camp refugees.[46] Educational services based on the modified Syrian Arabic curriculum were provided by non-state actors as an ad-hoc manner in facilities called temporary education centers. (McCarthy, 2017, p. 5) Ministry of National Education later introduced a regulatory framework and offered Syrian families to select either enrolling in public schools or temporary education centers. Beginning from 2016 Ministry of National Education decided that all Syrian children would be integrated into the public school system. (Ombudsman, 2018)

The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, in partnership with UNHCR, offered students who had finished high school an opportunity of learning the

[45] According to a UNHCR official, the Turkish government's objective was "to facilitate integration of refugees residing in camps to the host communities with a view to self-reliance and social cohesion, and also to mitigate the consequences of long-term residence in camps to refugees." (Makovsky, 2019, p. 17)

[46] Minister of National Education Dinçer in 2012 said that that they had no "intention to teach Turkish language to Syrian children" or integrate them into the Turkish public school system as such an approach could encourage Syrian people to stay in Turkey. (Quoted in Mccarthy, 2017)

Turkish language via intensive programs. Thus, students were able to achieve the proficiency level required for admission to university programs. These initiatives supported over 4 000 students in 2018. (UNHCR, 2020). Following various decisions of the Council of Ministers, Syrian refugees studying full-time in public universities have been exempted from tuition fees. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities supports higher education for Syrian students by covering their tuition fees in state universities. (Official Gazette, 2015) The number of Syrian students who enrolled in universities across Turkey in the 2018/19 academic year was 27 034. (3RPSyria, 2020, p. 50) Since the beginning of the crisis, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities has provided 5 386 fully-funded scholarships for Syrian students. There are currently 2 530 Syrian students in the Türkiye Scholarship Program. In addition to formal education activities, the Ministry of National Education also provides "non-formal education activities" for Syrian adults in Public Education Centers. According to the Ministry of National Education 258 260 Syrians participated in Turkish courses, and overall the number of participants in "non-formal education activities" is 345 927. (Ministry of National Education, 2019)

4.3.2.3. Health

Turkey provides all registered Syrian refugees full access to the health care system. Turkish government also established Migrant Health Centers and units to serve the needs of Syrian refugees. 3RPSyria noted (2020) that Migrant Health Centers "alleviate the pressures placed on hospitals and increase access to healthcare through reducing language barriers and increasing human resource capacity." (p. 64) To expand health services for Syrian refugees, Syrian health personnel work alongside Turkish doctors and nurses in migrant health centers and units. There are 179 Migrant Health Centers in 30 provinces across Turkey, and 42 of them could provide specialized services that are not available in primary health care units. Each Migrant Health Center has at least one migrant health unit with a Syrian doctor and one Syrian nurse. As of September 2019, 674 migrant health units were operational, while approximately 790 migrant health units are planned to be established. In addition, the Ministry of Health established 10 community mental health centers. (3RPSyria, 2020. p. 64) The Ministry of Health also provides Syrians in the remaining seven Temporary Accommodation Centers with free on-site health services. Syrians who are not registered

have limited access to primary or referral health care, but are provided with emergency care and essential public health services free-of-charge, and then referred for registration. (3RPSyria, 2020. p. 64) The ombudsman report (2018) gives the following information about the medical services provided to Syrian refugees:

> *31,449,800 medical examinations were carried out, 1,326,849 patients were hospitalized and treated, 1,112,058 Syrian patients were operated on, 276,158 Syrian babies were born in hospitals, and 3,215,128 doses of vaccines were administered to Syrian babies and children in accordance with the vaccination schedule.* (p. 90)

4.3.2.4. Social Services

Turkey, under various programs and mostly with the co-operation of international agencies, provides different kinds of social services and aid programs for Syrian refugees. Some examples of these programs are given below. In a project called "Non-Food Support Project" Turkish Red Crescent and UNHCR agreed to distribute 10,000 items of non-food material goods to urban Syrians living in Adana, Mersin, Bursa, İzmir, Ankara, Konya, Kayseri, and Osmaniye and 50,000 hygiene sets in Hatay, Kilis, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, and Kahramanmaraş. (Ombudsman, 2018, p. 106) The Emergency Social Safety Net is a program designed to assist vulnerable Syrian refugee families by providing cash to cover their essential needs. This program is a partnership between the European Union and Turkey, implemented through the co-operation of the World Food Program, the Turkish Red Crescent, and other Turkish public agencies. According to 3RPSyria (2020, p. 6), during 2019, a total of 1.9 million Syrian refugees have benefited from cash assistance programs.

In another program called the "conditional education assistance for refugee children", participant families are encouraged to send their children to school by providing cash assistance. The program is implemented by the co-operation of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, the Ministry of National Education, the Turkish Red Crescent, AFAD, the Directorate General of European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and UNICEF. The objective of the program is to reach 230 000 children who might not attend school because of economic difficulties of their families. (Ombudsman, 2018) Besides projects and programs, particularly targeted to themselves, Syrian refugees could also access all social services Turkey offered to its citizens, such as services for elderly and

disabled people and cash assistance from the local Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations. Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation can provide assistance under the title of “aid to foreigners” to the Syrians under temporary protection. (Ombudsman, 2018, p. 103) Municipal administrations also deliver in-kind or cash assistance based on their assessment of the living conditions of Syrians who live in city centers. (Ombudsman, 2018, p. 103)

4.3.3. Historical Ties with Syria

The unstable nature of Syrian politics prevented Turkey from establishing close diplomatic relations with Syria. In 1949 three coup d’états took place. In the first coup d’état Husni al-Za'im, Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army, took control of government. He pursued a decidedly conciliatory policy towards Turkey and announced that Syria relinquished all its territorial claims on the province Hatay. However, he could not implement this policy as he was swiftly toppled and executed in another coup d’état in the same year. (Sanjian, 1956) After the downfall of Za’im, Turkish – Syrian relations became a side issue of the emerging bipolar world and could be examined only after taking into account larger regional and systemic developments. The founding of the Israeli state and the four wars (1948, 1967, 1973, 1982) fought with Israel deeply affected Syria. As Turkey became the first Muslim country to recognize Israel, Syrians viewed Turkey’s attempts to build a Middle East Defensive Alliance with suspicion. Turkey’s courtship of Syria ended in failure, and Syria increasingly positioned itself closer to Egypt, which was the center of the opposition to western designs in the Middle East. After the Suez Crisis in 1956, Syria was increasingly drawn to the Soviet Union. The Syrian government made some critical changes in the army and a colonel with allegedly “communist sympathies” was appointed as chief of Army staff. Turkey concerned about these developments and fearing that a communist take-over was happening warned the USA that it could not tolerate Syria as a Soviet satellite and conveyed its determination to take action. Consequently, the Turkish Government began to mass thousands of troops along the Syrian-Turkish border. There were some clashes between Turkey and Syria, and Soviet premier Bulganin threatened Turkey with reprisals. The USA urged Turkey not to intervene in Syria unless attacked. Later, the Soviet Union took a conciliatory step towards Turkey by Khrushchev’s visit to the Turkish

Embassy on 29 October, which reduced tensions among the parties. (Ayrancı, 2006)

Turkish – Syrian relations until 1998 had not experienced a crisis like the one in 1957. After 1961, Syria came under the control of the Baath party, whose radical Arab nationalist identity and championship of the Palestinians shaped that country's foreign policy. (Hinnebusch, 2009) In the 1980s, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK: *Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan*) terrorism and the apportionment of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris became problems between the countries. The Turkish Prime Minister, Özal, visited Syria in 1987, and a security protocol was signed, but Syria failed to adhere to the promises. As a response to the violation of the security protocol Özal said that Turkey would scrap the economic co-operation protocol and reduce water flowing to Syria. (Kösebalan, 2011) According to Aras and Köni (2002) Syria "exploited the Kurdish problem of Turkey through supporting the PKK in different ways and attempted to use it as leverage against Ankara in the water question and some other minor regional issues." (p. 54) In the 1990s, as a result of the Madrid peace process, Turkey felt that improving its relations with Israel would not damage relations with Arab countries and took steps to upgrade the relationship with Israel, which put considerable pressure on Syria.

In 1998, Turkey and Syria came again to the brink of a clash. In a series of speeches, high-ranking Turkish officials warned Syria and demanded and ending of its support of PKK. In response, the Syrian side brought up the Hatay question and declared that "the Iskandarunah [Hatay] question is a national cause on which one cannot make concessions" (Quoted in Jörum, 2015, p. 99) Explicit military threats prompted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to start shuttle diplomacy for the peaceful resolution of the crisis. In the end, Syria expelled PKK leader Ocalan from the country, and subsequently, Turkey and Syria signed a security agreement called the Adana Accords. This agreement established a monitoring mechanism, which enabled Turkey to verify whether Syria complied with its commitments in the Adana Accords. Afterward tensions between two countries eased, and Turkish President Sezer's participation in the funeral of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 showed Turkey's willingness to improve relations with Syria further. (Sarı, 2018) The Hatay question, however, still posed as a serious problem; in 2001, Syria refused to sign a Declaration of Principles, which included formal recognition of Hatay as Turkish territory. (Jörum, 2015, p. 100)

After JDP's coming into power, its "zero problems with neighbors" policy helped the blossoming of relationships between the two countries, and Syrian President Bashar al-Asad visited Turkey in 2004. Turkey rejected following USA's policy of isolation towards Syria and played a "key role in bringing Assad out" from international isolation by increasing economic, cultural, and diplomatic ties with Syria. (Taşpınar, 2012, p. 137) Syrian President Bashar al-Asad had started to develop close relations on the one hand with the West and on the other hand, with Turkey and Iran, the two major powers in the region. (Mercan, 2011, p. 89) Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, establishing close contacts with Turkey, Iran and the European Union, had managed to create an important counterweight to the policy of the USA. (Mercan, 2011, p. 103) Warming relations softened the Syrian attitude towards the Hatay question, and in 2006, the Syrian Arab News Agency for the first time referred to Hatay as 'the Turkish province Hatay'. (Jörum, 2015, p. 104) In 2007, Davutoğlu (2008), in his assessment of Turkish Foreign Policy, noted, "In contrast to that of 5-10 years ago, Turkey's level of relations with Syria today stands as a model of progress for the rest of the region." (p. 80) The relationship between the two countries continued to strengthen; some scholars began to talk about a "strategic alliance." (Kösebalan, 2011, p. 184) Nevertheless, such a hope was cut short by the uprising in Syria. The Syrian government's harsh suppression of public demonstrations, which led to the death of hundreds of civilians, escalated the civil unrest into open civil war. Writing in 2011, Kösebalan (2011) claimed that "Turkish public shared the wishes of the Arab street for democratization and implementation of reforms." (p. 186) Consequently, Turkish leaders could not ignore the bloodshed and "remain indifferent to the violence." (Hurriyet Daily News, 2012) After several futile attempts to convince Bashar al-Asad to launch a reform process, Turkey gradually severed the relations with the Syrian regime and became one of the main supporters of the opposition in Syria.

4.3.4. Norms and Identities in Turkish Humanitarian Assistance to Syrian People

Turkish government's generous approach to Syrian refugees was a result of the marked change in its immigration and asylum policies. In the Syrian crisis, Turkey's generally restrictive attitude towards non-European refugees gave way to an open stance

towards Syrian refugees. As Kirişçi (2006) said, “who you let into the country very much determines who you are.” (p. 184) In this sense, varying attitudes might show underlying identity changes in Turkey. This was a change from an old state identity that displays a disdainful attitude to Arabs to a new identity that views them as fellow Muslims who need solidarity. However, this change was not a result of the deliberate policy process. Other actors in the political scene were not consulted. There was not an overall public discussion about the issue. Over time this lack of public discussion has fuelled increased resentment towards the Syrians in Turkey. Nevertheless, in the beginning, Turkey was willing to present ample assistance to the Syrians. According to Dawn Chatty (2017, p. 31), former Director of the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford, Turkey was “far more humane and practical in its approach to the mass influx of refugees from Syria”, despite the language barrier that did not exist in other Arab countries. Why Turkey undertook so much for Syrians could seem perplexing at first but looking at the issue from the perspective of norms and identities may help in understanding the issue. Countries do not act always consider all the consequences of their actions, but rather assess whether a given action is appropriate or not. Called “logic of appropriateness” this mode of action implies that before deciding on a question, an actor essentially takes into account relevant norms, and its identity, and pursues a policy in line with its identity and relevant norms. (Checkel, 1998; March and Olsen, 1998)

In the Syrian case, Turkey simply followed a similar logic. When the Syrians appeared on the borders, Turkish policymakers cognizant of their “historical responsibilities” as defenders of fellow Muslims. Turkey permitted all Syrians who fled from oppression into the country. Treating them as guests, Turkish leaders offered generous humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees. Given the perspective of norms and identities, the response of the Turkish government to the influx of Syrian refugees could not be different, since refusing the entry of neighboring Muslims fleeing persecution was undeniably contrary to Islamic solidarity norm and humanitarian and historical responsibility norm. As noted above, the Turkish government’s approach to Syrians was not overtly popular among the general public. While the JDP electorate was generally content with the government’s approach, large segments of the public were vehemently opposed to the admission of Syrian refugees. According to research conducted in 2014 by the Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center (Erdoğan, 2014, p. 26), 30.6% of respondents supported the proposal that

"the Refugees should be sent back to their country even though the war is ongoing." In another question, 41.6% of the respondents agreed with the proposal of "Syrian refugees are not our concern. We should not be involved." Over time, attitudes were hardened, and more research that is recent unequivocally demonstrated that public opinion views Syrians negatively and does not want to live with the Syrians. (Euronews, 2019) As the refugee situation becomes more and more protracted, it is becoming clear that the norm of Islamic solidarity is not powerful enough to sustain a positive attitude towards Syrians over the years. As Bozdağlıoğlu (2008, p. 18) stated, "States may have multiple identities and which identity will be the more salient depends on the specific social context." The increasingly negative stance of Turkish public opinions towards Syrians may signify the resurgence of the Kemalist identity in Turkey at least on the issue of the Syrians. Nevertheless, Turkey's humanitarian approach to Syrians during the initial years of the crisis is indisputable and the role of norms and identities in the shaping of Turkey's approach is explored below.

4.3.4.1. Humanitarian and Historical Responsibility

Hospitality is a very old custom in Turkish culture. Protecting people who seek sanctuary is one of the defining characteristics of the Ottoman Empire. Without making any discrimination, Ottomans welcomed both Muslims and non-Muslims who were expelled from their homeland. Prominent examples of Ottoman policy are analyzed in the third chapter. These include the responses of the Ottoman Empire to the expulsion of Muslims and Jews from the Iberian Peninsula, the asylum seeker Swedish King Charles X and Hungarian Prince Lajos Kossuth. In their speeches, Turkish leaders frequently referred to this historical precedent, and embracing Syrian refugees was presented as a continuation of old customs. (İnal and Nohl, 2018) Refusing to welcome Syrians would be a violation of age-old customs. Davutoğlu (2013) made the point:

> *When the "container cities" were dismantled in the city of Van, which recently experienced the tragedy of an earthquake, and moved to the Syrian refugee camps, the message given to the world was: we do not make a distinction between Van and Aleppo. In our conduct of humanitarian diplomacy, we act on the same principle without differentiating between our citizens and the people with whom we share a common history.* (p. 867)

A common history or historical responsibility discourse clearly showed that JDP

leaders assumed the mantle of humanitarian and historical responsibility norm. Once norm was taken up, this norm largely shapes the policy response on the relevant issue. It was impossible to force all Syrians to live in camps set up in border zones as Turkey had done in 1991 when there was a refugee influx from Iraq. Norms also indicate what is preferable and what is imperative. Turkish leaders declared that there is no difference between Van and Aleppo, so all Syrians should have access to public services as Turkish citizens normally do. In fact, they should also have freedom of movement even when their status was under evaluation. This humane policy was a sharp contrast to European attitudes to Syrian refugees. Exactly as Düvell (2013) had predicted, a panic broke out in Europe when the Syrians attempted to enter Europe. Some Europeans tried to prevent Syrians entry; some other Europeans tried to confiscate their valuable belongings. (NYTimes, 2016) In the end, Europeans sought the assistance of Turkey, which handled far larger migratory pressure without any crisis. This was the confirmation of the moral superiority of humanitarian and historical responsibility norm. Europeans praised Turkey's approach and accepted that Turkey was far more humane to Syrians than Europeans were.

4.3.4.2. Islamic Solidarity

Turkish leaders profusely used religious symbols in their speeches, such as "ensar" (host), muhacir (migrant), and refugees are defined as 'emanet' (God's trust) to Turkish people. (Polat, 2018, p. 6) Syrians who fled from the oppression of the Syrian regime have been referred to as 'muhacir' a term "rooted in Islamic history used to denote those who had to move from Mecca to Medina in the 7th century because of religious persecution." (Polat, 2018, p. 6) Other Islamist oriented writers also supported the Islamic solidarity discourse of Turkish leaders. Adnan Demircan (2017), a professor from the Theology Faculty of Istanbul University, wrote that the Islam religion calls fellow Muslims to be 'Ensar' to Syrians and to show solidarity to them as long as they live in Turkey.

According to the surveys, religious values played a role in the admittance of Syrians in Turkey. More than half of respondents (53%) referred to "religious fraternity" as a motivation to accept Syrians as refugees. (Erdoğan, 2014, p. 35) Interestingly the majority of respondents (72.6%) supported the proposal that "Refugees should only be sheltered in the camps" and the support of a policy of integration of Syrians into Turkish Society was

quite low (20.6%). Apparently, most of those who answered "religious fraternity" as a reason to accept Syrian refugees were quite content with just giving shelter and were not ready to give Syrians more help. Probably the most crucial indicator of the strength of Islamic solidarity norm in Turkish society was revealed by the answers to the question of 'how you describe Syrians in Turkey'. In two different surveys, answers came remarkably close. In the Hacettepe survey in 2014, 12% replied that Syrians are "Our brothers and sisters in religion", and in the Konda survey in 2016, 10.6 % replied that "They are our religious brothers/sisters."

4.3.4.3. Protecting the Vulnerable

Turkish leaders mentioned the "vulnerability" of Syrian refugees as one of the reasons for providing shelter and protection to them. Particularly the condition of children was frequently referred in the speeches, and the necessity of helping them was emphasized. For example, in a speech to the fourth congress of his party in 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told the story of three Syrian siblings whose parents had been killed by "the planes of Al-Assad: "The three siblings walked for a full 10 hours. When they arrived at the Turkish border, when they delivered themselves to the security of Turkey, one could see that blood dropped from their feet due to the walking" (Quoted in İnal and Nohl, 2018, p. 10). In a speech in 2015, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emotionally drew attention to a child who told of his/her exhaustion and readiness to embrace death in a letter. (Yeni Şafak, 2015)

Turkish public, in general, shared the Turkish leaders' approach to Syrian refugees as people who were trying to escape from persecution. The majority of the population supported government position on the need for giving shelter to the Syrians. (Erdoğan, 2014) Whether this approach contains giving assistance to Syrians requires a closer analysis. The majority of the Turkish people were against tax-monies to be spent on Syrian refugees (67%) when there were other Turkish citizens in need of help. (Erdoğan, 2014, p. 28) Only 28 percent of respondents approved the idea of helping the Syrians in this situation. If we subtract from this number the proportion of people who regarded Syrian refugees as religious

brothers/sisters,[47] we could find the percentage of people who view Syrians as a vulnerable group that were seriously in need of help. In this case, we could say that approximately at least 15% of Turkish people share the view that protecting the vulnerable norm was specifically applicable to the Syrians, and humanitarian concerns are far more important than citizenship ties. This situation could also imply that the number of people who value the norm of protecting the vulnerable was higher than the people who value the Islamic solidarity norm.

[47] This group could be expected to see both Syrians and Turkish citizens as fellow Muslims, without any difference between them, so the existence of needy Turkish people would not prevent them from assisting Syrians.

CONCLUSION

Humanitarian aid is a phenomenon old as human history. Historical evidence of philanthropy dates back to the twenty-third century BC, when people provided food to hungry people in Upper Egypt. Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and other religions and faiths make moral claims that are universally applicable. Respect for life and human dignity, as signs on the road that lead humanity to help others, are examples of these moral claims found in all faiths. Until the middle of the 19th century, when the non-governmental institutionalization of humanitarian aid began, global humanitarian aid was mainly provided by states. The Solferino Battle of 1859 may be termed a triggering catastrophic event that led society to take actions concerning international humanitarian aid. The adoption of the First Geneva Convention in 1864 was the first brick of the legal framework of humanitarian aid in battles. Later, other conventions were adopted, which extended the legal framework beyond the battlefields. As independent and neutral organizations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were also established in almost all countries in the 19th century.

In the 20th century, humanity experienced two world wars and, thanks to global humanitarian aid legal framework, millions of people in need, during and after the world wars, had access to humanitarian aid. However, the 1968 Biafra crisis led to the reinterpretation of the humanitarian aid principles and the creation of numerous non-governmental humanitarian aid organizations. Subsequently, many non-governmental humanitarian aid organizations took place in the framework of global humanitarian aid, complementing old and well-established organizations. Another turning point was seen in the very beginning of the 21st century. Historically, in most cases, global humanitarian aid has been represented by Western donors, and non-Western states have been the recipients of these donations. The Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 changed this tradition, and nearly a hundred countries, including Turkey, contributed to the global humanitarian aid campaign. The global humanitarian aid contributions of the non-Western donors were not limited to the tsunami in 2004. In the event of a humanitarian crisis, non-Western donors such as Brazil, China, India, South Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have started to contribute to relief operations. Traditional Western donors have no

longer been dominating global humanitarian aid campaigns.

The Republic of Turkey has inherited many cultures, traditions and institutions from the Ottoman Empire, including the legacy of humanitarian aid and the Red Crescent. The Ottoman Empire accepted Muslims and Jews expelled from Andalusia with open arms, covered the expenses of the asylum seeker, Swedish King Charles X and his men, and even took the risk of a war to protect the Hungarians when the Hungarian prince Lajos Kossuth requested asylum. The generosity of Ottoman Sultan Abdülmedjid is noted in the Irish newspapers, after donating for the relief of the Irish famine. While healing wounds of the 1894 Istanbul earthquake, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamit II donated for the 1894 Great Hinckley Fire disaster relief campaign. The Ottoman Empire and Anatolia were a safe haven for the forced political immigrations from the Caucasus and Rumelia. Inheriting all this heritage of humanitarian aid, the Republic of Turkey responded to the exchanges of populations in the first years of its establishment. Although facing economic difficulties, Turkey provided humanitarian aid to the 'neighboring' Greeks, suffering from the great famine in Greece.

A major shift occurred in the global response of the Turkish humanitarian aid at the very start of the 21st century. Turkish humanitarian aid to Pakistan after the earthquake of 2005, to Haiti and Chile after the severe earthquakes of 2010, and to Pakistan after the 2010 floods were devastating disasters that made Turkey one of the main donors of global humanitarian aid. The rise of Turkish humanitarian aid was not limited to natural disasters. Turkey also entered the donor pool for the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, where one of the most prolonged and most complex emergencies in the world. Last but not least, Turkey's humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis has had an enormous impact on Turkish humanitarian aid figures. Turkey was ranked first among non-DAC donors and fourth in the world in terms of total humanitarian aid in 2012. That year, in terms of the percentage of humanitarian aid in gross national income, Turkey was the third most generous country after Luxembourg and Sweden. After a year, with a contribution value for humanitarian aid of 0.21% of its gross national income, Turkey was the most generous country in 2013. For the first time, Turkey surpassed the United States in terms of total humanitarian aid volume in 2017 and ranked first not only among non-Western donors, but among all countries. Not to mention that Turkey has also remained to be the most generous country since 2013.

This thesis analyzes Turkey's humanitarian aid as part of its foreign policy and questions why Turkey grants humanitarian aid and how norms and identity shape the country's humanitarian aid decisions. In terms of methodology, the qualitative research methods, namely discourse analysis, process tracing method, and case studies, used to answer the research question of this exploratory study. Speeches of key political figures and policy makers analyzed as primary sources. The secondary sources of this thesis are academic literature, official political documents, statistical data, reports of humanitarian NGOs, and other documents and publications that share light on this research question. The periods of the Ottoman Empire, the first years of the Republic of Turkey and the era of the JDP governments of 2002 and 2018 were included in the analysis; therefore, the process tracing method was also used in this thesis. In order to select the cases, three parameters were used. First, there must be at least one natural disaster case and one complex humanitarian emergency case, so that all forms of humanitarian emergencies can be covered in the study. Secondly, in order to assess also Turkish humanitarian aid actors, cases in which the Turkish government, Turkish Red Crescent and NGOs have been actively involved are selected. The last criterion is about the public policy and politics. The cases, which were on the agenda of Turkish policymakers and attracted a high degree of public awareness, were chosen. In these regards, Turkish humanitarian aid for complex emergencies in Somalia and Syria, and for natural disasters in Pakistan are the three cases selected in this study.

The theoretical base of the thesis is the constructivist theory that pays particular attention to the roles of identities and norms of actors in the international community. Constructivism claims that socially constructed rules, common values and cultural traditions shape the behavior of states and other actors. Turkish humanitarian assistance activism experienced during the JDP era is based on shared beliefs and values of Turkish society and its cultural traditions. The attitudes of decision-makers are also based on these social values. Therefore, changes in the beliefs and common values of society are reflected in the decisions of policy makers. During the period of the JDP goverments, the value placed by society on historical values, religious and cultural elements increased, so norms such as humanitarian and historical responsibility and Islamic solidarity came to the fore. These norms have shaped JDP governments and NGOs, which led them to be more active in humanitarian assistance in a global scale. Last but not least, basic norms such as the protection of

vulnerable people, contructed, existed before the JDP era, and accepted by all segments of society, also contributed to this humanitarian assistance activism.

This thesis analyzes Turkey's humanitarian aid to victims of natural disasters in Pakistan, as a first case study. On October 8, 2005, a severe earthquake, at 7.6 on the Richter scale, struck Pakistan, and the consequences were devastating. After Pakistani leader Musharraf complained that the international aid commitments were 'totally inadequate', Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Turkey would give 150 million US dollar in aid. According to the BBC, at the date of the announcement, the amount pledged was the largest donation in any country so far. The 2010 floods, starting on July 22, 2010 in Baluchistan, were not a one-time event and affected Pakistan for several weeks. The Turkish government has again been at the forefront in providing aid and raising awareness of the need to help Pakistani people. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has taken a critical stance against the other Islamic countries and has severely denounced their distancing from the disaster in Pakistan. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has mainly targeted the Arab oil-producing countries and asked that if the oil wealth were not used to help Pakistan, when would it be used? In the two disasters, the norm of Islamic solidarity was invoked by the Religious Affairs Directorate and other humanitarian NGOs in their aid campaigns, and the Turkish people called to send 'Zakat' and 'Fitr' to the victims of the disasters. Throughout Turkey, after Cuma's communal prayers, donations were collected and sent to Pakistan. Meanwhile, the mutual partnership was the dominant theme in aid campaigns for Pakistan, and politicians highlighted the help of Indian Muslims to the Turkish independence movement. The mutual partnership norm was not restricted to the ruling party electorate or religious communities in Turkey. The mutual partnership norm has been shared across the wide political spectrum and it has certainly contributed to the collection of significant amounts of donations both in 2005 and in 2010. Overall, Turkish policy of humanitarian aid to the Pakistani victims of the two disasters was even distinctive from that of Muslim countries, and humanitarian and historical responsibility norm, the Islamic solidarity norm, and the mutual partnership norms shaped Turkey's decisions regarding humanitarian aid to Pakistan.

This thesis analyzed Turkey's humanitarian aid to Somalia, as a second case study. On July 20, 2011, the United Nations announced a famine affecting more than three million

people in southern Somalia, a ‘failed state’, as described by the International Crisis Group. Although the drought was considered the main cause of famine, famine and the resulting humanitarian disaster were results of a combination of several factors; including a significant increase in world food prices, the conflict between TFG/AMISOM and Al-Shabaab, the United States government’s application of anti-terrorist legislation to prevent aid from reaching Al-Shabaab, and the hostile attitude of Al-Shabaab towards aid. A tremendous public campaign has been launched in Turkey after receiving news of the famine in southern Somalia. The government institutions, the Turkish Red Crescent, and humanitarian NGOs have each launched independent campaigns to collect aid to help the Somalis. Islamically oriented humanitarian NGOs and religious groups played, initially, a significant role in raising the awareness of the Turkish public with regard to the dire situation of the fellow Muslims in Somalia. Campaign slogans such as “Brotherhood of Iftar” or “One Iftar and Fitr from every home to Somalia” show that the power of the Islamic solidarity norm has been used to collect donations from the public. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Somalia, and during the visit, he criticized the western donors for not providing adequate aid to Somalia and called on Muslim countries to contribute more. Afterward, Iran sent its Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mogadishu, and many Arab agencies that were not active in Somalia came into Mogadishu. Turkey has provided about 470 million US dollars in humanitarian aid, including private donations of 365 million US dollars, for famine relief in Somalia. These are generous outpourings of Turkish humanitarianism and generosity and reflect a commitment to the Turkish humanitarian tradition. The success of the aid effort owes as much to the initial mobilization of religious groups whose main purpose was to show solidarity with other Muslims, and as much to the leadership of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In addition, protecting the vulnerable norm has also played some role in the collection of donations. The images of starving children and slogan of the “Don't let the children of Somalia die” were also used in the Somalia donation campaigns. In response to growing public concern for Somalia, the main opposition party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu also visited refugee camps in Somalia. Turkey later provided development assistance to Somalia, including providing scholarships to Somali students and building roads, schools, and hospitals. This assistance is the result of humanitarian and historical responsibility norm, which made it easier to provide assistance to a ‘failed state’ with no apparent economic gain or no political ‘strings attached’. UNICEF (2016) clearly described

the Turkish humanitarian aid operations in Somalia in these words "[they]…. transformed both Somalia and Turkey's approach to humanitarian aid fundamentally". (p. 28) In short, Turkish humanitarian aid operations in Somalia are based and motivated by norms, namely Islamic solidarity, the protection of vulnerable people, and humanitarian and historical responsibility norms, and not by Turkish economic interest or an imperialist push.

This thesis analyzed Turkey's humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees, as a third case study. After the violent reaction of the Syrian regime, the Syrians began to flee Syria, and the first Syrian refugees arrived in Hatay province in April 2011. The first Syrians to arrive in Turkey were generally small groups of political activists who fled to Turkey to avoid being punished by the Syrian regime. At the initial stage, the Turkish Government did not define a clear asylum policy under the assumption that the civil war would be a short one, and the numbers of Syrians who came to Turkey would remain low. However, later, a huge number of asylum seekers crossed the Syrian border, and even the UNHCR stopped registering Syrian refugees. The Ministry of Interior announced in October 2011 that all Syrian refugees in Turkey would be granted the "temporary protection" status. At the end of 2018, the number of Syrians located in Turkey under the "temporary protection" status is more than 3.6 million according to the United Nations. Turkey provides Syrians under "temporary protection" status, extensive access to services in national systems, such as health, education, and social services. Officially, the aid from Turkey to Syrians during 2018 amounted to 6.7 billion US Dollars. Turkey has permitted the mass influx of refugees from Syria since 2011. Given the perspective of norms and identities, the response of the Turkish government to the Syrian refugees could not be different, since refusing the entry of neighboring Muslims fleeing persecution was undeniably contrary to the humanitarian and historical responsibility norm and to the Islamic solidarity norm. This policy was a sharp contrast to European attitudes to Syrian refugees. Turkish leaders have used religious symbols extensively in their speeches, such as 'Ensar' and 'Muhacir', and defined refugees as 'Emanet' (trusting God) to the Turkish people. In addition, faith-oriented writers supported the Islamic solidarity discourse of Turkish leaders and called fellow Muslims to be 'Ensar' to Syrian refugees and to show solidarity to them as long as they live in Turkey. On the other hand, another pillar of the Turkish leaders' discourse was the protecting the vulnerable. In particular, the condition of children was frequently mentioned in speeches,

and the need to help them was stressed. For example, in a speech to his party's fourth congress in 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told the story of three Syrian siblings whose parents were killed by the Syrian regime. In summary, humanitarian and historical responsibility, Islamic solidarity, and the protection of vulnerable people norms have shaped Turkey's decisions concerning the policy of humanitarian aid towards Syrians located in Turkey under the "temporary protection" status, and this approach was quite different from that of western countries, in particular, European ones.

This thesis analyzed three cases, first, the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and the 2010 floods in Pakistan were analyzed, as they are examples of the response of Turkish humanitarian aid to natural disasters, then two cases, Somalia and the Syrian people have been analyzed as these are examples of the response of Turkish humanitarian aid to complex emergencies. When we compare these three cases, focus of Turkish humanitarian aid in Pakistan case was "natural disaster", in Somalia case was "Failed State", and in Syrian People Case was "Oppressive Regime". Regarding the direction dimension, while only affected people and area were the direction of Turkish humanitarian assistance in Pakistan case, Turkey provided humanitarian assistance towards all people and regions in the Somalia. In the Syrian People case, by allowing entry of all vulnerable Syrian Civil people into Turkey, Turkey has provided those victims humanitarian assistance. There were no statebuilding efforts in Pakistan, but this was existed in the case of Somalia, and also in Syria with a limited level lately. The humanitarian assistance strategy in Pakistan has not been revised, but with regard to the cases of Somalia and the Syrian people, the Turkish humanitarian assistance strategies have been revised partially and completely, respectively. In conclusion, based on the findings and the relative inclusiveness of these three cases, it is plausible to argue that; Turkey's humanitarian assistance policy under the governments of the Justice and Development Party has been shaped mainly by the humanitarian and historical responsibility, Islamic solidarity, protecting vulnerable, and mutual partnership norms.

During the governments of the Justice and Development Party, Turkey provided humanitarian aid to 109 different countries between 2003 and 2019. Although natural disasters resulting in people in need of humanitarian assistance differ in each case, the focus of humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters is primarily for emergency

assistance. Regarding the direction of aid, Turkey has provided emergency assistance to victims of natural disasters in the "affected region" of Pakistan. Turkey has also launched a major residential project called Mevlana Houses, for Pakistani survivors, in the "affected regions". Unlike natural disasters, complex humanitarian emergencies arise from a very different range of causes, so does the objective of providing humanitarian assistance. Although the complex Somali emergency results from multiple causes and is worsening due to natural and human disasters; among them, we can say that the civil conflict was the first and most visible underlying cause. Considering this, Turkey not only provided fundamental humanitarian assistance to Somalia's, but it also focused on "failed state" problem, and contributed to the state building process of Somalia. Regarding the direction of aid, Turkey has provided humanitarian assistance to Somalis in all regions of Somalia and has been at the center of state building efforts, invited by the TFG and also gained the trust of Somalis. "Humanitarian and Historical Responsibility", "Islamic Solidarity", and "Protecting Vulnerable" norms have led Turkey to provide humanitarian assistance to all regions including civil conflict areas in Somalia and revise its initial strategy regarding complex humanitarian emergencies in Somalia, towards the state building process. The last case of this thesis concerns the Syrian people, a complex humanitarian emergency emanating from the civil war and exacerbated by massive migration of the Syrian people. Therefore, the focus of Turkish humanitarian assistance to Syrian People was to help the victims of an "oppressive regime". In this case, the direction of Turkish humanitarian assistance may be summarized as "allowing entry of all vulnerable Syrian Civil people into Turkey and providing them humanitarian assistance". "Humanitarian and Historical Responsibility", "Islamic Solidarity", and "Protecting Vulnerable" norms required Turkey to open its arms to victims of an "oppressive regime", and provide them humanitarian assistance in its lands. In this process, Turkey has revised its strategy and may be considered to launch "quasi state-building" efforts to accommodate Syrian victims and provide humanitarian aid on their own lands.

As a further research topic, Turkey's humanitarian aid policy regarding the global Covid-19 pandemic is recommended because, during the pandemic, Turkey delivered health devices and personal protective equipment related to Covid-19 to several countries, including Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Colombia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq,

Italy, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Pakistan, Serbia, Spain, United Kingdom and United States.

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