IRAQI- TURKISH RELATIONS 1990-2014

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ABSTRACT

IRAQI-TURKISH RELATIONS 1990-2014

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This thesis is planned to examine diplomatic relations between Iraq and Turkey during the period 1990-2014. It also makes an inquiry for the crucial historical developments which affected the relations between the two countries since the establishment of Iraq and Turkey. The question of Mosul which settled in 1926 and the Iraqi-Turkish relations which witnessed rapprochement with the signature of the Sadabad Pact of 1937 and then the Baghdad Pact of 1955 are examined in detail. From 1960 onwards Iraqi- Turkish were further improved as security concerns took priority in their relations and this continued till 1990s. During the 1990s Turkey supported for the international alliance against Iraq and participated in creating "no fly zone" in north Iraq to safe the Kurds from Saddam regime. Turkey herself also suffered from the economic embargo imposed on Iraq from 1990 onwards. Though Iraqi-Turkey's relations suffered from economic and political setbacks their relations swiftly recovered afterwards. Their relations have improved in different areas as both Iraq and Turkey recognized the need for each other to cooperate in security, economy, and energy fields.

From 2002 onwards the most important events which affected Iraqi-Turkey's relations were election of the new Turkish government and the American War on Iraq in 2003. This was because the Turkish Justice and Development Government (JDG) adopted a new

active foreign policy towards Iraq and the neighboring Arab countries. Iraq was one of the main pillars of this policy. Also, the relations between Turkey and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was developed because of the fundamental changes took place in Iraq's internal, regional and international environments. During this period "Zero Problem" policy adopted between Iraq and Turkey reached its peak during 2006-2011. For instance "High level Strategic Cooperation Council" was established between Iraq and Turkey in 2008 besides 48 memoranda were signed. However these fertile political and economic grounds were soon to replace by many obstacles and difficulties stemming from Arab uprisings and the rising of ISIS since 2011. This situation was more or less to continue in the same manner until 2014.

Keywords: Iraq, Turkey, Energy, Iraqi Kurds, Turkmens, Gulf Wars.

ÖZ

IRAK - TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ 1990-2014

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Mevcut tez, günümüzdeki Irak-Türkiye ilişkilerinin daha iyi anlaşılması için tarihsel altyapının ortaya konmasının bir gereklilik olduğu sonucuna ulaşmıştır. Bu sonuçtan hareketle iki ülke arasındaki tarihsel çerçeveyi teşkil temel olay ve sorunlara yoğunlaşarak 1923-26 yılları arasındaki Musul Sorunu, 1937 yılında imzalanan Sadabad Paktı ve 1955'te kurulan Bağdat Paktı gibi temel konuları ele almıştır. Özellikle Irak ve Türkiye arasında imzalanan bu paktların, iki ülke arasındaki iyi komşuluk ilişkilerinin tesis edilmesinde ve ikili münasebetlerin geliştirilmesinde büyük rol oynadığı ortaya kondu. Daha sonra, 1960'lardan itibaren İki ülke arasındaki ilişkilerde öncelikli konu güvenlik kaygıları oldu ve bu durum 1990'lı yıllara kadar devam etti. Türkiye, 1990'larda Kürtleri Saddam Rejimine karşı korumak için Irak'a karşı oluşturulan uluslararası koalisyona destek verdi ve Kuzey Irak'ta Uçuşa Yasak Bölge tesis edilmesi sürecine katıldı.

Ne var ki Türkiye, bu yıllarda Irak'a karşı uygulanan ekonomik ambargodan olumsuz yönde etkilendi. Bu dönemde Irak-Türkiye İlişkileri ekonomik ve siyasi ambargolardan kötü etkilense de sonraki yıllarda ikili ilişkiler hızla yeniden düzelmeye başladı. Fakat son dönemlerdeki Irak-Türkiye ilişkilerini etkileyen iç ve dış dinamikler, kuruluş yıllarındaki faktörlere oranla çok daha farklı alanlara kaymış ve farklı yönlerde şekillenmiştir. Değişen ve gelişen siyasi, ekonomik ve stratejik parametreler Irak-Türkiye ilişkilerini olumlu ve

olumsuz yönde ve pek çok alanda etkilemiştir. Ancak oluşan tüm güncel ve konjektürel şartlar her iki ülkenin yekdiğerine olan güvenlik, ekonomi ve enerji alanlarındaki işbirliği ihtiyacını azaltmadığı gibi tam tersine çoğaltmıştır. Mevcut tezin en önemli bulgu ve vurgularından biri bu durumun tespit edilmesidir.

2002 yılından itibaren Irak-Türkiye ilişkilerini etkileyen önemli olaylar incelendiğinde bunların, Türkiye'deki hükümet değişikliği ve 2003'te Irak'ta başlatılan Amerikan savaşı olduğu görülmektedir. Çünkü Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) Hükümeti, Irak ve komşu Arap ülkelerine karşı yeni ve aktif bir dış politika anlayışı benimsedi. Irak, bu politikanın önemli ayaklarından biri oldu. Ayrıca, Irak içinde, bölgede ve uluslararası siyasette meydana gelen köklü algı değişimleri Türkiye'nin Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi (KBY) ile ilişkilerinin gelişmesine neden oldu. 2006-2011 yılları arasında Türkiye'nin takip ettiği "Sıfır Sorun" politikası Irak'la ilişkilerinin gelişmesinde önemli bir rol oynadı. Bu çerçevede 2008 yılında iki ülke arasında "Yüksek Stratejik İşbirliği Konseyi" oluşturulmuş ve 48 anlaşma imzalanmıştır. Fakat bu verimli siyasi ve ekonomik zemin 2011'den itibaren Arap Ayaklanmalarının patlak vermesi ve DAİŞ'in yükselişi neticesinde yerini birçok engel ve zorluğun ortaya çıkışına terk etti. Söz konusu bu durum, az ya da çok benzer bir şekilde 2014 yılına kadar devam etti.

Anhatar Kelimeleri: Irak, Türkiye, Enerji, Irak Kürtleri, Türkmenler, Körfez Savaşları.

خلاصـــة

تحاول هذه الدراسة تسليط الضوء على الخلفية التأريخية للعلاقات العراقية- التركية منذ نشأة الدولتين. وكذلك البحث في مشكلة الموصل التي تم تسويتها من خلال عصبة الامم في عام 1926. شهدت العلاقات العراقية- التركية تقارباً ملحوضاً تتوج في ميثاق سعد اباد 1936 ثم حلف بغداد عام 1955. لقد شكل العامل الامني الاولوية واستمرت العلاقات بنفس الوتيرة الى فترة التسعينيات من القرن العشرين. شاركت تركيا في التحالف الدولي في عام 1991 وساهمت في انشاء منطقة الحظر الجوي في شمال العراق لحماية الاكراد من نظام صدام حسين. لقد انعكست آثار الحصار الأقتصادي الذي فرض على العراق بشكل سلبي ادى الى جمود العلاقات بين البلدين في الجوانب السياسية والاقتصادية، ثم بدات العلاقات بالنمو بعد عام 2002 نتيجة للتطورات الكبيرة والتي من بينها فوز حزب العدالة والتنمية بالانتخابات البرلمانية وتبنيه لسياسة خارجية منفتحة حيال دول الجوار والاقليم. ان العلاقات بين تركيا وحكومة اقليم كردستان نتيجةأملتها التغييرات الاساسية التي حدث في بيئة العراق الداخلية والاقليمية والدولية.

ان التطورات في العلاقات العراقية- التركية قد تتوجت بانشاء المجلس الاعلى للتعاون الاستراتيجي في عام 2008 والتوقيع على 48 مذكرة في مختلف المجالات. لكن واجهت العلاقات فيما بعد بعض المعوقات من بينها ثورات الربيع العربي وبروز تنظيم داعش الارهابي.

كلمات الوصول: العراق، تركيا، العلاقات، الأكراد، التركمان، الطاقة، المياه.

DEDICATION

To the Iraqi and Turkish Diplomats

For the Brotherhood and Affective Relations Based on Common Interests and Mutual Respect.

To My family

Wife,
And
Sons,
Ahmed
Mohammed
Adam

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partısı
BOTAŞ	Boru Hatları İle Petrol Taşıma A.Ş.
GAP	Guny Doğu Anadolu Projası
GCC	Arab Gulf Cooperation Council
IR	International relations
ITF	Iraqi Turkmen Front
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JDP	Justice and Development Party
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
MOFA	Iraqi Ministary of Foreign Affairs
MFA	Turkish Ministary of Foreign Affairs
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PKK	Party Karikaren Kurdistan
PMF	Peace Monitoring Force
PLO	Palestinian Liberation organization
SNC	Syrian National Council
TPAO	Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı
TBMM	Turkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
UNMOVIC	The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

INTRODUCTİON

This thesis aims to analyse and evaluate Iraqi- Turkish relations during the period 1990-2014 in the light of the political history and tries to analyse the developments in different periods through the descriptive methedology and diplomatic history. Iraq was under the British occupation until 1921 and establishment of the modern Iraqi state which had remained under the British mandate until it gained its independence by joining membership of the League of Nations in 1932.

The Turkish Republic was established in 1923, the two neighbouring countries had been entering in tension for the Mosul issue. However, Turkey has political, economical and strategical interests in Mosul and Kirkuk since the Turkish independence war (1919-1920). The two governorates were within "Turkish map" which was approved by Turkish Grand National Assembly "TGNA" in its secret session on January 28, 1920. The Anglo-Iraqi- Turkish treaty in 1926 resolved the Mosul issue after Ankara's recognition in the borders between Iraq and Turkey.

In general Turkish foreign policy in the late 1920s was to achieve a balance between Russia to the North and Britain to the South. However, the British Foreign Office thought that Turkey had not succeded in the following "true equilibrium". This was because it had pushed cordiality with Russia to far, though Britain had exerted pressure on Ankara no to.The British government government, at one stage, had even considered offering some minor concessions to the Turkish government on the Mosul issue in order to gain its sympathy. Bilgin, Mustafa Sıtkı, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era (London & New York: IB Tauris, 2008. P. 26).

Thereafter, the relations improved in July 1937 "Saadabad Pact" was signed between "Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan". This Pact obliged the four states to preserve common frontiers, not to interfere in one another's internal affairs, to commit no

aggression against one another territory, and consult each other on all matters of common interest.

It could be said that the Sadabad Pact was the first Pact in which the initiative came from the regional countries itself. It established a basis for further developments of the Iraqi-Turkish relations which led to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact almost two decades later. Moreover, the Sadabad Pact had shown Turkey's regional strategic importance to Britain and France in the Middle East.

In 1941, Iraq witnessed a revolution led by Rashid Ali Al-Gailani. His government refused to honor previous treaty commitments to Britain, a second British occupation that lasted until the end of the World War II.

Turkey played a mediation role between Iraq and Britain in 1941, the Turkish policy was most independent and it was not influenced by British policy which had asked Turkey to make maneuver close to the Iraqi borders, and tried to convince Turkey that would restore Mosul, but Turkey refused all offers. Turkey gave congratulations to the new regime in Iraq.

Iraqi-Turkish relations improved again in 1946, they signed a friendship and neighboring treaty. The treaty consisted of political articles in which Turkey and Iraq agreed to respect each other's independenceand territorial intergrity. It settled their disputes with each other or with third partiesin accordance with UN Charter. The most important issue they agreed on was to organize the using of water resources and developing the projects in the Tigris and Euphrates. According to this agreement, Turkey was obliged to share exchange and inform Iraq in any project built on the two above mentioned rivers. Bilgin, Mustafa Sıtkı, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era (London & New York: IB Tauris, 2008. P. 86).

In 1955 Iraq and Turkey singed the Baghdad Pact with Pakistan, Iran and United Kingdom. Turkey and most Arab countries, except Iraq were on different sides. The President of Egypt Jamal Abdul Nasser perceived the Baghdad Pact as the continuation of Western Colonialism, which supported to further their hegemony in an implicit manner opposid to the direct colonialism of the past.

However, Arab countries refused the Pact for two reasons: first, Arab countries would become bases for the American, British French and Turkish forces. Second, Egypt led a compaign against Iraq. As a result Egyptian Prime Minister called on January 16, 1955, Arab Prime Ministers were to meet in Cairo, Egyptain aims were: to isolate Iraqi government from Arab countries politically, to convince other Arab countries not to join the Pact and to support the non-alignment policy.

On July 14, 1958, the Monarchy regime was overthrown in the revolution. The Turkish government welcomed the revolution initially. The early declarations of the revolutionary government clearly indicated Iraqi government's willingness to follow a neutral policy towards the East and West conflict, which meant Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact; such a policy was natuarlly, a set back to Iraqi -Turkish collaboration.

In 1963 the Baathist party took the office in Iraq, and the Turkish government recognised the new Iraqi regime.The development of the relations reached a high level after 1968 becauce the Kurdish issue became the common dangers for Iraq and Turkey, and many trade agreements were signed during that period.

In addition to, in 1970s Iraqi-Turkish relations further improved since the energy crisis and increase of oil prices occured. Arab countries passed energy crisis with huge financial revenues. All these factors motivated Turkey to naturalize its relations with Arabs especially Iraq in addition to the Turkey's disappointment of the Western policy towards the Cyprus issue especially after the American embargo on Turkey in 1975. During Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, Iraqi- Turkish relations continued on good levels. Iraq exported its oil through Turkey and Turkey followed a neutralised policy towards that war.

However, two particular developments tremendously affected the nature of Iraq's relations with Turkey during the first decade rest of Cold War era: first the dissolution of the Soviet Union, whereas Turkey's joining the USA which led the international coalition that came into being with the mission of drawing Iraq out of kuwait both of these developments increased Turkey's power capabilities vi-a-vis Iraq.

The First Gulf War 1990 formed a radical change in Iraqi-Turkish relations. Turkey supported the international sanctions against Iraq and provided logistical assistance to the alliance forces.

Turkey supported the UN efforts against Iraq by Operations Providing Comfort which began on July 24,1991, and ended on December 31 this was a humanitarian aid operation that aimed at providing assistance to Kurdish refugees fleeing from Saddam's regime.

Operation Northern Watch was aimed at enforcing the no fly zone north of the 36th parallel. It began on January 1st 1997 and ended on May 1, 2003. It prevented Iraqi air force helicopter and gunship from targeting Kurds.

After September 11, 2001, American role increased in the Middle East in the context of so-called countering terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). As a result, in 2001 the USA waged its war on Afghanistan and in 2003 on Iraq and changed its regime. Before that new political developments happened in Turkey, JDP had won the election since 2001 and a new course of relations with Arab countries have started after a long time of political set-back. Iraq is one of the signaficance dimensions in these changes since it is neighboring country and interaction with it can be explained in terms of economy, energy and security. At the same time, changes in the structure of Iraqi regime have opened new opportunities for cooperation and challenge to Turkey. Turkey was worried after establishing the Federal system in Iraq. According to its strategy this development might lead to establish an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Turkey recognised that joining Kirkuk to the Iraqi Kurdistan will affect the Turkey from two aspects: first, Iraqi Kurdistan will be strengthened economically and it being easy to declare an independent state; Second, Turkmen could be affected and lose their preliviges after the changing of the ethno-nationality balance .

However, the JDP froreign policy had started to pursue "Zero Problem" policy, which reflects Ahmet Davoutoğlug's former Foreign Minister views. This policy was idealism in theory and practice. It might have achieved some goals at the beginning, but finally the events which have happened in the Middle East, especially in the Arab Countries which faced political changes approved impossibility to implement this foreign policy.

This could be eleborated on Iraqi –Turkish relation, establishment of the "High Level Strategic Cooperation Council" with Iraq in 2008 and signing in this context of 48

Memoranda of Understanding in different fields of cooperation: security, economic and energy. Both countries also witnessed high mutual officials visits.

Inspite of the relations which had reached an advanced level in different fields; both countries had have their own their policies regarding many issues for Iraq, considered Turkey interference in its internal affairs and hosting some of members who are in opposition to political process in addition to the relations between regional government of Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey in aspect of energy which upset Baghdad. Iraq's requirements for water needs also was formed a permanent controversial point in any meeting.

Turkey considered north Iraqi borders as a camp of PKK members. It moved some of its troops into Iraqi borders in the context of countering terrorism. This step led to tension with Iraq because it was not a coordination and consent with Baghdad. Turkey was also anxious about Turkmens nationality in Iraq. Furthermore, other regional issues like Syrian crisis because both countries have their own policy in light of their national security.

However, this thesis studies Iraqi- Turkish relations 1990-2014 since Iraq had faced two Wars 1990 and 2003 in addition to the ISIS war on June 10, 2014. Within this context the thesis focuses on Iraq as the main part and central point in this study throughout its political, security, economic and trade relations with Turkey. It also describes the relations between the two countries through the diplomatic history.

The research questions elicited in this study are: what are the factors which contributed to the developments of the Iraqi- Turkish relations since the establishment of the the two states? What are the factors which formed an obstacle to the relations? What was the Iraqi foreign policy towards Turkey after 2003, what is the Iraqi vision towards Turkey in the context of fighting ISIS? What are the main aspects of improving the Iraqi-Turkish relations? what are the papers that Iraq has and could use them in improving relations with Turkey?

The thesis is based on the hypothesis supposes that the Iraqi-Turkish relations have improved in different aspects, since the establishment of their states. Both countries have needed for each other to cooperate in security, economy, and energy fields. At the same time issues of the Turkmen, water and Turkey-KRG relations affected Iraqi-

Turkish relations negatively. However, it could be said that Turkey's relations with the "KRG" is a temporary strategy by Turkey for the dramatical changes in Iraq's internal, regional and international environments.

According to the research method, this study is based on descriptive and analytical approach. The books, articles, and documents in Arabic, Turkish and English languages are also used. Some diplomatic documents available in the archieves of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq and Turkey are included in the study.

The significance of the thesis emerges since it uses the Arabic, Iraqi resources and the views of Arabs towards Turkey.The most resources which written on Iraqi-Turkish relations in Turkey are either in Turkish or in Enghlish languages, in addition to,the thesis could be useful for Iraqi library since it contains Turkish resources. However, Iraqi people and statesmen consider Turkey as a significant neighbour country with which the relations should be improved for the interests of the both countries. At the same time Turkey's water policy towards Iraq was a critical point on Iraqi agenda.

Many studies have tackled Iraqi-Turkish relations, the main point is most of them focused on Turkey's policy towards Iraq. The available literature on Iraq's foreign policy focuses on the pre-2003 period. However, this study seeks to analyse Iraq's policy towards Turkey after 2003.

To achieve the aims of the study, it is divided into five chapters: chapter one is the Structural Frameworks which explains the main features, principles and decision making process in the Iraqi and Turkish political system, in addition to the factors which affect their relations both internal and external.

Chapter Two, studies the historical background of Iraqi- Turkish relations since the early 20th century up to the 1990s. The stages of cooperation and the tension during the Cold War era are also discussed.

Chapter Three, the American War on Iraq 1991 and its Impacts on Iraq's Relations with Turkey, in addition to the reasons, results and its impacts the Turkish interests and relations with Iraq.

Chapter Four, discusses the Impacts of the Second Gulf War in 2003 on Turkey and the Middle East from the security and economic prospectives, in addition to the consequences of 2003 war.

Chapter Five, deals with the developments of Iraqi- Turkish relations during the period 2004-2014.

At the end of the research conclusions are presented through the searching process in the books, articles, newspapers and documents.

Hence, the books, theses and articles which have been written on Iraqi- Turkish relations could be mentioned as follows:

Bilgin, Mustafa Sıtkı, "Britain and Turkey in the Middle East: Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era" (London & New York: IB Tauris, 2008). This book by Bilgin is a documentary study based on Turkish, British and American original documents and it is important not only for Anglo-Turkish relations in the Middle East but also great power politics in the region. It is also important for inter- state relations among the Arab countries as well as their relationships between Iraq and Turkey. Though Iraqi - Turkish relations took place a considerable space in this book the till 1953 the present study covers the rest of the periods for the relations between the two countries, especially by concentrating in the years between 1990-2014.

Ahmed Nouri Al-Naemi, Iraqi- Turkish Relations, Present and Future, Dar Zahran for Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 2012. He explained the Iraqi-Turkish relations within the historical background since the early 1920 century. The study descripted the developments just in political fields until 1980. It will cover the developments in economy and energy aspects, in addition to the peroid of the cooperation after 1980.

Colonel Shakir Sabir, History of Iraqi -Turkish Freindship "The Waters of Tigris and the Euphrates Bind Iraq and Turkey together in Eternal Brotherhood, Dar Al-Marifah Printing, Baghdad, 1955. He studies the significance of waters of Tigris and the Euphrates to improve the relations between Iraq and Turkey. The study did not mention the solutions of this issue or the motions which can contribute to resolve the matter . This study will deal

with the point of views of both countries towards this issue according to the international treaties, and the motions to resolve the water problem between the two countries.

Bayar Mustafa Saefaldin, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, "The Hesitant Neighbours" Dar Al-Zaman for Printing, Publishing and Distributing" Syria, 2009. This study deals with the development of Turkish-Kurdistan relations after 2003, it focused on the economy cooperation only. The study will concentrate on the political and strategic significance of Iraqi Kurdistan to the Turkey, especially after the rises of ISIS and PKK existance on the Iraqi-Turkish borders.

Bell Park, Turkey's Policies towards Nothern Iraq, Problems and Future Dimensions, Gulf Reseach Center, Dubai, 2005. This study analyzes the security problem and Turkey's policies towards Iraqi Kurdistan and countering PKK. The study focused on Iraqi Kurdistan as danger for Turkish national security since Iraqi Kurds have aspirations of independence state. We will deal with this issue from another corner, since Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan have mutual economy, security and policy interets, Iraqi Kurdistan could not be a threat to Turkey.

Ahmad Shikara, Iran, Iraq and Turkey: Strategic Impact on Gulf Security, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2001. The study explains the significance of the Iraq, Turkey and Iran to the Gulf security. It focused on the period of 1980 during Iran-Iraq war. We will deal with the developments after 2003 war which changed the regional balances in the Middle East. Iraq also became area of the regional and international struggle.

Dr.Ahmed Abdel –Halim, American War on Iraq, Causes and Sequences in (the Middle East after 9/11, Turkish and Egyptian perspectives) Center for Political Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2005. The study explains the impacts of American war in 2003 and the occupation of Iraq on the Middle East. It did not mention the impact of the war on Iraqi internal environment. It will be added the reflections of the war on Iraq's internal environment and its foreign policy.

Dr. Baqinam Alsharqawi, Turkish and Iranian views and Iraq Crisis, in (the Aggression on Iraq crisis Map and nation future), Dr. Hassan Nafaa, Dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 2003. The study

explains Turkish-Iranian policies towards Iraq after 2003. It did not explain the Iraqi views towards Iran and Turkey. We will explain the Iraqi foreign policy towards both countries after the regime's change.

Dr. Jalal Abdullah Muawath, Decision Making in Turkey and Arab-Tutkish Relations, Center for Arabic Unity, Beirut, 1998. The study discusses the mechanism of decision making in Turkish system towards the Arabs in different periods. It did not explain the influential factors of Arab- Turkish relations. The present study will discuss the factors and the obstacles of Arab-Turkish relations.

Dr. Hamid Mahmood Isa, Kurdish Issue in the Middle East, Midbuli Libirary, Cairo, 1992. The study explains the impact of Kurdish issue on the Middle East and the development of Kurdish issue in Iraq and Turkey within historical background. We will analyse the rise of Kurds as affective factor in Iraqi future after 1990.

Ali Abdulwahid Al-Saeq, the Position of Saad Abad Pact Countries from Regional Events (1937-1945), June, Damascus, 2013. This study tackles the policy of Turkey and Iran towards Iraq in the period 1937-1941 because Iraq had witnessed military coup and revolution in this period. It did not analyse the reasons which led to establishment of the Saad Abad Pact. We will explain the policy, economy, and security developments in the region which led to sign the Saad Abad Pact.

Zain Nooraldin Zain, Growing the Arab Nationalism with the Historical Study of Arab-Turkish Relations, Dar Al-Nahar of Publication, Lebanon, 1968. The study discusses the rise of Arab nationalism and its impact the Arab- Turkish relations. It focused on Arab nationalism as factor of tension between the Arabs and Turks. We will explain the views of both Arab and Turks nationalists towards each others.

Ammar Mari Al-Hasan, Turkish-Iranian Competition over Iraq's Control after 2003 (who inherits the sick man, Ottomanism Turkey or Persian Iran?) Dar Al-koutub Alilmya, Baghdad, 2003. This study explains Turkish-Iranian competition over Iraq's control after 2003 within a historical context. We will explain the strategic, economic and political significance of Iraq for Iran and Turkey after 2003.

Esam Al-Jalabi, Oil is Basic Factor in Iraq- Turkish Relations in (The Arabs and Turkey, Challenged of the present and Reckonings of the Futures) a group of the researchers, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Al-Doha, 2012. This study explain the importnace of oil in improving Iraq- Turkish relations. We will focus on the other political, security and social factors which improve the relations between two countries.

Mohammed Naji Isa, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Arab Issues, 2002-2006, study of Iraqi and Palestinian Crisis, Unpublished Master Thesis, Institute of Arab Studies and Research, Cairo, 2007. This study discusses the developments of Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq and the Palestinian crises after 2003. It mentioned that the reasons of changes in Turkish policy are belonged to the JD government. We will axplain the Turkish policy, economy and security internal environment developments which led to change the Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq and the Middle East, in addtion to the regional and international develpments.

Alev Dilek Aydin, Mosul Question (1918-1926) Unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, June 2004. This study analyses the impact of Mosul question on Iraqi-Turkish relations during the period 1918-1926 and the role of League of Nations and Britain in resolving this issue. It did not focus on the reasons which led to Turkish government to solve this issue. We will focus on the main reason which motivated Turkey to settle the Mosul question.

Sait Ocakli, Westernization, Modernization and Turkish- Arab Relations during Democratic Party Era, Unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2001. This study explains the improvment of the Arab- Turkish relations and the opening policy of the democratic party towards Arab countries. It did not point out the main reasons of these developments. We will explain the main internal and internationl factors which affected the foreign Turkish policy during that period.

Payman Abdullah Hamad Lak, Türkiye – Irak İlişkileri (1920 – 2010), Yüksek lisans Tezi, Kahramanmaraş Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Bölümü, Nisan, 2015. This study tackles Turkish-Iraqi relations within the historical stages. The thesis concentrated on the relations within historical context. We will explain the developments

of the relations according to the regional and international environments. We will focus on the British role in Iraqi political and security policy.

Mustafa Allbad, Europe and Turkish Middle Eastern Policy, Journal of International Politics, Al-Ahram Institution Cairo, No 182, 2010. This study analyses the Middle East region's impact on Turkish foreign policy towards EU. It concenrated on the Turkish disappoinment towrads EU's policy. We will explain Turkish policy towards EU after 2003 war and its role in countering terrorism after the rising of ISIS.

Abdullah Irfan, Economy in Turkish Policy towards Kurdistan, Journal of International Politics, Al-Ahram Institution, Cairo, No 182, 2010. The study analyses the economic dimension in Turkish relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. We will explain the other factors which are imprtant in Turkish foregin policy as security and energy, in addition to the Kurdish role in Iraq after 2003.

Dr. Walid Abdulnasir, Iraqi Kurds and Impact of International and Regional Environment, journal of International Politics, Al-Ahram Institution, Cairo, No 127, 1997. The study explains the impacts of the international and regional environments on the Kurdish issue. İt focused on the developments of Kurdish issue during 1980s. We will deal with the kurdish issue after 2003 as affective pillar in the Iraq and regional developments.

CHAPTER I

STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is devoted to studing the main features and principles of the Iraqi Foreign Policy. It focuses on the Iraqi political system and ideology since 1963. After 2003 the Iraqi state and government changed from the Republican Central System to the Federal and Parliamantery System, though the institutions that participate in the formulation of the foreign policy it was also changed because the Iraqi foreign policy drawn by Baathist ideology until 2003.

We also explain principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and decision making process in Turkey's Foreign Policy briefly.

There are also internal and external factors affected Iraqi- Turkish relations in all times which should be taken into the consideration like: Turkmens, Kurdish, and water issues, forces of nationalism, the impact of Baathist party rule, imapcts of Arab-Israeli problem, policies of the West and impacts of Imperialism and Colonialism, and impacts of Arab nationalism. All these issues are explained and analysed in this chapter.

1.1. The Main Features and Principles of Iraqi Foreign Policy

Iraq's foreign policy during the Monarchy period was conducted according to British trends and interests.[1] İraq had signed many treaties with Britain. Many factors contributed to drawing Iraq's foreign policy trends during that time: Iraq's geopolitical location is the shortiest road between West Europe and and South East Asia. Its military-

[1] د. نصير محمود شكر الجبوري، السياسية الخارجية للجمهورية العراقية 1958-1963 دراسة في ضوء مقررات مجلس الوزراء، دار ضفاف للطباعة والنشر والتوزيع، قطر، 2012، ص 11.
Naseer Mahmood Shukur Aljobory, Foreign Policy for Iraqi Republic 1958-1963, study in light of Council Ministers decesions, Dar Al-Difaf for Printing and Publishing, Qatar, 2012, p. 11

strategic location is viewed as a bridge between Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. All these make it being under the Great Powers pressure.[1]

However, since its independence İraq has some political and security problems with its neighbouring countries and tried to resolve them. Within this context King First Faisal wanted to establish good relations on the basis of good willingness, in order to promote Iraq's independence and prevent any interference in its internal affairs.[2]

The Monarcy system in Iraq has overthrown on July 14, 1958 revolution. As a result, Iraq's foreign policy was changed. The Republican government followed the opening policy towards the foreign countries and refused the alliances policy or alignment to the West. It established relations with East and West countries away from the British influence.[3]

However, military governments ruled from 1958 to 1968. In that year another military Coup brought to power the Iraqi branch of the Baathist Party, a pan-Arab political group supportive, in theory, of Arab unity. The President of the new regime was a Baathist army General named Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakir. But very quickly, by the mid-1970s a civilian party official named Saddam Hussein, who was responsible for internal security affairs, emerged as the real power in the regime. However, Iraq's foreign policy was based on the ideology of this party.[4]

However, coming to the Iraqi system after 2003. It could be said that Iraq regained full sovereignty over its territory after the USA troops left at the end of 2011. Although the country still faces the external pressures and internal manipulations, the Iraqi state has recovered the possibility to differentiate its foreign policy from that of the occupying power and the states that sought to influence or undermine its transition since 2003 by pursuing their own international and regional strategic plans. Therefore, the main objective of the Iraqi foreign policy has been to promote the neutrality of Iraq to avoid any conflict with other countries. Within this context, the Iraqi foreign policy focused on freeing the country from sanctions and reparation obligations to which it were subjected under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This was a crucial issue in fostering the development of the

[1] د. نصير محمود شكر الجبوري، السياسية الخارجية للجمهورية العراقية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 23.
[2] د. نصير محمود شكر الجبوري، السياسية الخارجية للجمهورية العراقية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 26.
[3] د. نصير محمود شكر الجبوري، السياسية الخارجية للجمهورية العراقية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 120.
[4]

country. At the same time, Iraq has been engaged in negotiations with Washington to reach a peaceful end to the USA military occupation, assuring full recovery of its sovereignty. Both objectives can be considered to be achieved.[1]

In addition, the Iraqi constitution mentioned that Iraq observes the principles of good neighborliness, adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, seeks to settle disputes by peaceful means, establishes relations on the basis of mutual interests and reciprocity, and respects its international obligations.[2]

However, WMD was one of the USA justifications of war on Iraq. The constitution stipulates that the Iraqi government shall also respect and implement Iraqi international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and shall prohibit associated equipment material, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons.[3]

The war on terrorism is also the main principle of Iraqi foreign policy; article 7 stresses that the State shall undertake to combat terrorism in all its forms, and shall work to protect its territories from being a base, pathway, or field for terrorist activities. The percept of these principles and values for decision makers and diplomats are the priorities in foreign policy.[4]

Since the restoration of its sovereignty in 2011, non-alignment stance has inspired Iraqi foreign policy favoring the improvement of relations with neighboring countries with many of which Iraq experienced various degrees of hostility in the past. At the same time, that same non-alignment has been considered the only option for a country so affected by deep ethno-sectarian divides. Although at present there are still diverging positions regarding non-alignment, this could lead to the reaching of a consensus between Iraqi distinct factions, putting to avoid direct involvement in regional conflict that could deepen

[1] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy: The case of the 2003 Iraq War, Stratejik Arıştırma Merkezi (SAM), Perceptions, Spring-Summer 2009.p. 35.

[2] Constitution of the Repulic of İraq 2005, Article 8.

[3] Constitution of the Repulic of İraq 2005, Article 9.

[4] د. غانم علوان الجميلي، السياسة الخارجية العراقية، وزارة خارجية جمهورية العراق، مطبعة كركي، لبنان، 2013، ص 28.

Ghanim Alwan Aljumaili, Iraqi Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Kirki Printing, Lebanon, 2013, p. 28.

domestic divisions. Hence, the success or failure of this strategy depends primarily on the capacity of Iraqi factions to agree on how to coherently implement the necessary policies to promote and consolidate Iraqi regional position and role. This is a sensitive issue, given mutual distrust among Iraqi political factions and the divisive effects that relations with neighboring countries could exert on the Iraqi internal field.[1]

Combining its non-alignment position with the aim to create the necessary internal and international conditions to maintain and reinforce the existing regime, Iraqi foreign policy pursued the goal of obtaining support from both the United States and Iran and of maintaining sufficient autonomy from them. The objective is to seek a more central regional role, improving relations with the Arab countries and overcoming the recent perception of being an Iranian puppet. It was not a coincidence that Iraq hosted March 2012 Arab League summit in Baghdad, seeking to mediate between Tehran and the international community on nuclear issues. This attempt was repeated in May 2012 during a round of talks. Accordingly, both P5+1 and Arab League meetings should be seen as an effort to demonstrate that Iraq is re-emerging as an actor in its own right and recovering from being the battlefield of competing regionalism.[2]

1.2. Decision Making Process in Iraqi Foreign Policy

Iraq has seen many constitutions. The first Iraqi constitution in 1925 after the establishing of the Iraqi state did not mention the institutions that participate in foreign policy making clearly.[3] However, the Council of the Ministers played vital role in foreign policy decision, e.g, supportting the the Arab countries: Tunnsia, Morroco, and Algeria 1 million Dinar because the French occupation crimes against them. Although the responcibility of foreign policy making belonged to the Council of the Ministers, the most affective members were Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Some times the personality of the Prime Minister was controlled over the Council of Minister, like Nouri Al-Said whose many decisions had been taken without the consultation the Council of Ministers. In

[1] Paolo Maggiolini, Iraq's Foreign Policy Directions and Regional Developments. Where does Iraqi Foreign Policy Start, international society for performance improvment, USA, Analysis No. 199, September 2013, p. 4.

[2] Paolo Maggiolini, Iraq's Foreign Policy op, cite, p. 16.

[3] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية 1953-1958، دار الرشيد للنشر: بغداد، 1978، ص 278.

Fikrat N. Abdul Fattah, the Foreign Policy of Iraq in the Arab Region for the Period 1953-1958, Dar Al-Raheed for Publishing, Baghdad, 1978,p. 278.

addion he had presented many motions to the Council of the Ministers and been accepted without any opposition. He negotiated with the Turkish government to establish the "Baghdad Pact" away from the Council of the Ministers. He also sent the Iraqi Army to Jordan on July 13, 1958 without consulting the Council of Ministers.[1]

The Most of Foreign Ministers kept their support for the political system at that time e.g Fadil Al-Jamali and Tawfiq Al-Swaidi. When the Prime Minister nominated the person to the Foreign Ministry, the political and personal features had been taken into the considerations. He chose the persons whom they shared in political the doctrine and they support the government policy.

Many foreign decisions had been taken by the Foreign Minister as recommended and motions by the Ambassadors, e.g on July 1956 the Iraqi plenipotantioary to Damascus Abduljalil Al-Rawi suggested to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry giving a gift of 10,000 Dinars to Mikael Alyan and 1000 Dinars per month for his supporting of the Iraqi policy in Syria and the Baghdad Pact. As a result, his suggestion was taken by the Foreign Minister had.[2]

However, the Monarchy constitution did not give the Parliament the right to participate in foreign policy decisions but its influence was limited. e.g the constitution gave the King the right to to make the treaties but should not be ratified before the approval of the parliament. If the parliament refused the treaty that means that it would not be active.[3]

However, after 1958 Iraq's regime was changed into the Republican led to the emergence of temporary Republican Constitutions on July 27, 1958, which was called first Republican period 1958-1963. The Legislature and Excutive Powers were combined in the Council of the Ministers under Abdul Karim Qasim. The constitution had given the powers to the Council of the Minister which executes the Legistlation Power after the approval of soveregnity council.[4] However, it seems that the constitution did not explain the institutions that participate in decision making clearly because the Republican regime was new at that

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[1] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية 1953-1958، دار الرشيد للنشر: بغداد، 1978، ص ص 79-81.

[2] فكرت امق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص82-84.

[3] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص286-287.

[4] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري ، العاتك لصناعة الكتاب، القاهرة، 2009، ص9.
Nabeel Abdulrahman Hayawi, Iraq's Republican Constitutions, Al-Atic for Books, Cairo, 2009, p. 9.

time. Aftter the collapse of the first Republic in February 1963, the legislature and excutive powers became under the National Council of the Revolutionary Leadership.[1]

On April 29, 1964, the constitution had given powers to the President of the Republic through appointing the Prime Minister, his deputies and Ministers, and ratifying the legislations and international treaties. He is a Commander in Chief of Armed Forces. He can also declare the state emergency after the consent of the Council of Ministers. The President declared the war and agreed to make peace after the consent of the Council of Ministers and National Defence Council.[2] He with the government forms the general policy in political, military, economic and social respects, and supervision of its implementation.[3] In 1968 Coup the council of the Revolutionary Leadership combined the legislature and excutive powers.[4]

The temporary 21 September 1968 constitution gave the full powers to the Revolutionary Leadership Council and considered it as a supreme power in the country through the following powers: electing the President of the Republic and his deputies, supervision of armed forces and internal forces, declaration of war, accepting peace, and ratiyfing the international treaties and agreements,[5] while this constitution gave the President role in foreign policy by appointing diplomatic representatives, recieving the representatives of foreign and international orgnizations in Iraq, and declaration of emergency.[6]

The temporary constitution of 16 July, 1970, also gave the revolutionary leadership council the following powers: formulating defence and security policy and taking the decisions in this aspect, declaration of war and accepting peace.[7] However, the legislature power consisted of two councils (Council of Revolutionary Leadership and National Assembly) the members of the first were not more than 12, and the second 250 members.

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[1] علي حسين حسن سفيح، السياسة العامة في النظام السياسي العراقي والعوامل المؤثرة فيها بعد 2003، دار المرتضى، بغداد، 2015، ص81.

Ali Hussein Hassan Safih, Public Policy in Iraqi Political System and the Influenced Fators after 2003, Dar Al-Murtadha, Baghdad, 2015,p. 81.

[2] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 17.

[3] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 19.

[4] علي حسين حسن سفيح، السياسة العامة في النظام السياسي، مصدر سبق ذكره، 2015، ص81.

[5] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص33.

[6] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 34.

[7] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري، مصدر سبق ذكره ، ص51.

The powers of the National Assembly were just to give legistlate to the projects of the laws which were presented by Council of the Ministers.[1]

However, the former regime formulated a project of new constitution in July, 1990. The President of the Republic has the main powers accordng to the constitution like the former constitutions, in addition to making peace treaties, negotiating for making international treaties and motion the laws.[2] The Advisory Council is the supreme board which the President of the Republic consult in political, economic, legal, social and cultural mattres and in any respect that relates to the maintenance of 17-30 July Revolution, in addition to in issues like security of the country, national unity and national interest. This council consists of 50 members 25 of which are appointed by the President of the Republic and 25 are elected by secret-direct election.[3]

However, according to the Article 167 joining and ratifying of the international treaties and conventions are conducted by the national council and advisory council through issuing legislatures, or by one of them each council having two-third votes, if the matters are: boundaries and territorial sovereignty, peace and establishing international orgnizations or joining their membership.[4]

However, in 2005 Iraq formulated a new constitution which changed the system of the state from central to Federal. The executive power in this system consists of the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers.[5]

Deep internal disputes over Iraq's post-2003 foreign policy have led to an impression, as stated by various participants in research workshops held as part of this project, that 'Iraq has no foreign policy'; or that it has multiple and sometimes contradictory foreign policies; or that it has foreign relations, but no clear policy. While this report goes on to discuss different actors' and factions' views of Iraqi foreign policy, its depiction of the determinants and dynamics as being contested, factionalized and personalized is not intended to suggest that this situation is unique to Iraq. Particularly over the past 25 years, foreign policy analysis has moved away from the traditional (realist)

[1] علي حسين حسن سفيح، السياسة العامة في النظام السياسي العراقي، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص82.
[2] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص79-80.
[3] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص83.
[4] القاضي نبيل عبد الرحمن حياوي، دساتير العراق الجمهوري، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 97.

[5] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 66.

approach that treats states as monolithic rational actors with fixed interests (just as other areas of social science, especially economics, have questioned traditional approaches based on 'rational choice'). The focus now is more on human decision-making in a context of imperfect information, competition between institutions or factions, misperceptions and other factors that create uncertainty and contestation, not only over power but over interests and identities. The notion of a fully institutionalized, objective and uncontested foreign policy is probably a myth in any country.[1]

According to the constitution the Republic of Iraq is a single Federal State.[2] It granted the Powers to the Federal Government in those matters: formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representation; negotiating, signing, and ratifying international treaties and agreements; negotiating, signing, and ratifying debt policies and formulating foreign sovereign economic and trade policy.

Formulating and executing national security policy, include establishing and managing armed forces to secure the protection and guarantee the security of Iraq's borders and to defend Iraq. Planning policies relates to water sources from outside Iraq and guarantees the rate of water flow to Iraq and its just distribution inside Iraq in accordance with international laws and conventions.[3] However, the constitution considers the water as strategic issue, though it gives the Fedrel Government the power to manage water policies.

According to the constitution the President of the Republic is the Head of the State and a symbol of the unity of the country and represents the sovereignty of the country. He shall guarantee the commitment to the Constitution and the preservation of Iraq's independence, sovereignty, unity, and the safety of its territories, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.[4] According to the constitution the President's role in foreign policy ratifies international treaties and agreements after being approved by the Council of Representatives. Such international treaties and agreements are considered ratified after fifteen days from the date of receipt by the President.[5]

It could be said that the powers of President are honourable; he does not play a big role in the foreign policy making, since the Iraqi political system is parliamentary.

[1] Jane Kinninmont, Gareth Stansfield and Omar Sirri, Iraq on the International Stage Foreign Policy and National Identity in Transition, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013. London, July 2013, p.7.
[2] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 1.
[3] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 110.
[4] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 67.
[5] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 73.

However, in the new constitution the powers of the President was changed to the Prime Minister because the change of the sytem from being Presidential to Parliamentry. He is the direct executive authority responsible for the general policy of the State and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. He directs the Council of Ministers, presides over its meetings, and has the right to dismiss the Ministers, with the consent of the Council of Representatives.[1]

The Council of Ministers shall exercise the following powers: to plan and execute the general policy and general plans of the State and oversee the work of the Ministries and departments not associated with a Ministry, to recommend to the Council of Representatives that it approve the appointment of Undersecretaries, Ambassadors, state senior officials, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and his Deputies, division Commanders or higher, the Director of the National Intelligence Service, and heads of security institutions, to negociate and sign international agreements and treaties, or designate any person to do so.[2]

It should be mentioned that the Council of Ministers shall take the opinion of the (State Advisroy Council) before sigining any treaty or pact. The advice of this council is not obligatroy to the government to be implemente.[3]

The National Intelligence Service also participates in foreign policy decision making process through collecting information, assessing threats to national security, and advising the government.[4]

However, in this constitution the Council of Representatives shall be competent in the following: Regulating the ratification process of international treaties and agreements by a law to be enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of Representatives approving the appointment of the President and members of the Federal Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the President of Judicial Oversight Commission by an absolute majority, based on a proposal from the Higher Juridical Council. The Ambassadors and those with special grades, based on a proposal from the

[1] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 78.
[2] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 80.
[3] د. حنان محمد القيسي، مجلس الوزراء العراقي، قراءة في دستور 2005، مكتب السيسبان، بغداد، 2014، ص ص 97-98.
Hanan Mohammed Alqaesi, Iraqi Prime Ministry " reading in 2005 constitution, Alseseban Office, Baghdad, 2014, pp. 97-98.
[4] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 9.

Council of Ministers. The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, his assistants, those of the rank of division commander and above, and the director of the intelligence service are based on a proposal from the Council of Ministers.[1]

To consent to the declaration of war and the state of emergency by a two thirds majority based on a joint request from the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister.[2]

However, the Council of Representatives plays a role in the foreign policy through the declaration of war and approving the appointment of the Ambassadors, in addition to the observation of the government.

However, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in any system also plays a role in the foreign policy. Article 7 of the Vienne on the law and treaties mentioned the person who is considered as representing a State for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty if: (a) he produces appropriate full powers; or (b) it appears from the practice of the States concerned or from other circumstances that their intention was to consider that person as representing the State for such purposes and to dispense with full powers. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their State: (a) Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty; (6) Heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the accrediting State and the State to which they are accredited; (c) Representatives accredited by States to an international conference or to an in ternational organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty in that conference, organization or organ.[3]

Generally, the main functions of the Foreign Minister are: receiving diplomatic envoys and introducing them to the head of state and negociating with them, following the international situation through the report sent by his mission abroad, protecting the political, economic, trade and cultural interests of his subjects and state, suggesting

[1] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 61.
[2] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 61.
[3] ttps://treaties.un.org/volume-1155-I-18232-English

diplomatic appointment in other states and coordination and supervision of his diplomatic mission abroad.[1]

However, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affair in Iraqi political system in the foreign policy is through nominating the Ambassadors,[2] whom they should get the absolute majority of the votes in the council of representatives and should be based on a proposal from the Council of Ministers,[3] in addition to recommending the government to take a policy towards any foreign policy matters. These recommendations almost are accepted by the government.

The Foreign Ministry has focused its efforts on issues of relative consensus: above all, negotiating with the UN and United States to restore the country's legal sovereignty and bring about an end to the international sanctions on Iraq. Strategic alliances – chiefly those with the United States and Iran – tend to be handled from the Prime Minister's office and are more contentious.[4]

The Iraqi Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim Aljaafari has his own ideas of Iraqi foreign policy and concept of collecting the common and neutralizing the differentiate. According to Aljafari the political differences in international relations are natural things. It is impossible to make zero problems among the states completely. In his ideas, states can deal with each other within the commons. The commons are much more than the differences. His view is to freeze the differences and reach agreements. In this point, his views are different from Ahmed Davuğtoğlu's "Zero Problem".[5]

The Concept of the Circle of Dangers is Larger than the Interests. Aljaafari sees that the Iraqi foreign policy is based on the static Iraqi national interest and regional changes according to the states that Iraqi deals with. Iraq shares geographical, historical and vital interests with the Arab and Islamic world that terrorism is the common danger which faces these countries.

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[1] د. سموحي فوق العادة، الدبلوماسية الحديثة، دار اليقظة العربية، بيروت، ط1، 1973، ص ص 113-114.
Samohi Fawq Aldada, Modern Diplomacy, Dar Al-Yaqtha Alarabya, Beirut, 1973, pp. 113-114.

[2] Iraqi foreign service law No 45, 2008, article 9.

[3] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 61

[4] Jane Kinninmont, Gareth Stansfield and Omar Sirri, Iraq on the International Stage Foreign Policy and National Identity in Transition, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013. London, July 2013, p.3.

[5] د. ياسر عبد الحسين، نحو استراتيجية للسياسة الخارجية العراقية، مجلة ابحاث استراتيجية، مركز بلادي للدراسات والابحاث الاستراتيجية، العدد 9، بغداد، 2015، ص ص 104-105.
Yasir Abdulhusin, towards Strategy for Iraqi Foreign Policy, Journal for Strategic Research, Beladi Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Baghdad, No 9, 2015, pp. 104-105.

The Concept of World War on terrorism, the reasons to describe this war internationally are: first, geographically there is no exceptional country; second, the aims are comprehensive and harmful. Iraq within this context fights on behalf of the other states and their national security.[1]

However, like any foreign policy, Iraq could not be away from the influence of the internal and regional environments. There are many media and press that play a role in the formation of the Iraqi public opinion by influencing its trends, doctrines, beliefs and values. One of the Iraqi community's characterstics is emotional, influenced and interaction with matters. Many factors influence Iraqi public opinion: religious, social political and media issues. All these contribute and play a role to formulate the public opinion in Iraqi community.[2] Iraq has seen many political parties in difference trends: religious, nationalism, secular and social, majority of them have affected the political process.[3]

As a basis the political parties in democratic countries paly a role in pressure the government in order to transfire the citizens orders as inputes for the political system, the government changes them as outputs in laws and decisions which aim to resolve the problems of the people.

However, the case in Iraq is different since the majority of political parties represented the sectarian or nationalist groups. Hence, the foreing policy becomes in effective. In addition the nature of the party system in Iraq is multi- party systems which make foreign policy more complex than the bilateral ones.[4] This can influence foreign policy decision making at the end.

In addition to the regional environment could be influential factors which make Iraq foreign policy more complex, due to some of political parties has strengthen ties with neighbouring countries make the decision making process unbalanced. Furthermore, the differences between political parties that participate in political process and the clashes in their interests and the multilaterlity of decision resources have resulted regional interference. As a result of the multilateralism of decision resources in Iraq the mutual statements between the President of the Republic Jelal Talbani and Prime Minister Nouri

[1] د. ياسر عبد الحسين، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 106-105.
[2] علي حسين حسن سفيح، السياسة العامة في النظام السياسي العراقي، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص131-133.
[3] علي حسين حسن سفيح، السياسة العامة في النظام السياسي العراقي، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 186.
[4] علي حسين حسن سفيح، السياسة العامة في النظام السياسي العراقي، مصدر سبق ذكره، 191.

Al-Maliki regarding the representation of Iraq according to the constitution during the Arab Summit in Qatar in March 2009.[1]

We can say that institutions which participate in foreign policy decision making are: Prime Minister, Council of Representatives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and national intelligence service in a limited scope.

1.3. Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy

Since the early times of the Turkish Republic, Turkish foreign policy has established on "Hobbesian vision" the fear policy; the fear forms the motive to get the security the priority to the military power in the international environment. This thing led to combine the foreign threats and internal fears in the political system.[2] It means that the Turkish foreign policy was based on realism vision, the containment of Russian ambitions in Bosphorus and Dardanelle, containment of regional powers "Arab countries and Iran", and containment of radicalism weither in the state itself, or in the region.[3]

Turkish foreign policy-makers as they led their nation through the mine field of wartime diplomacy was guided by two principles: the first was the priority of peace, sovereignty and national development over all expansionist- revisionist aims of foreign policy; the second was that the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to the security of the Republic. Their ruling elite in Ankara, whatever their individuals differences fully accepted those principles and for all their tactical flexibility, remained rigid, within the parameters established by them.[4]

Moreover, Westernisation can be one of Turkish foreign policy principles. Since start of the 19th century, the developments in economic, social, military and political aspects in Western Europe and later United States had attracted the Turkish society.5 The

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[1] علي حسين حسن سفيح، السياسة العامة في النظام السياسي، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 202.

[2] عقيل سعيد محفوض، السياسة الخارجية التركية (التغيير- الاستمرارية) المركز العربي للابحاث والدراسات الاستراتيجية، قطر، 2012، ص 168.

Aqil Saed Mahfood, Turkish Foreign Policy (continuation- changing), the Arab center for research and policy studies, Qatar, 2012, p. 168.

[3] عقيل سعيد محفوض، السياسة الخارجية التركية (التغيير- الاستمرارية) نفس المصدر، ص ص 156-157.

[4] Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945 Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics, Princeton University Press, 1973, p.3.

[5] Ramazan Gözen, Imparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe, Türkiye' nin Dış Politikası,Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2009,p.46.

aim of Westernisation is also to follow the modern Western standard by the Turkish state and society.[1]

The respect of other nations has been the main features of Turkey since the 1920s. Atatürk considered the equality and sovereignty between the states regardless its size and population the main principles of the Turkish foreign policy2. The vision of Atatürk was structured on a modern nation- state model that was based on sovereignty of the Turkish nation. Within this context Atatürk said "*the state should pursue an exclusively national policy... when I speak of national policy, I mean it in this sense: to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of our own strength in order to retain our existence*".[3]

Atatürk transformed the ideological norms of Turkish foreign policy through a socio- political program that restructures society. Completely aware of the influence of domestic forces over foreign policy behavior, Atatürk stated in 1927 "*what particularly interests foreign policy and\upon which it is founded is the internal organization of the state*". Thus it is necessary that the foreign policy should agree with internal organization.[4]

However, one of the main changes in the structure of social and political Turkish state made by Atatürk was the abolition of "*Caliphate*" since the Caliphate claimed a sovereignty rule over the whole Muslim world. Its contradiction with kemalist nation –state model was unavoidable fact. In order to structure the vision of state in his mind, Atatürk perceived overthrowing this position as a requirement.[5]

The normative standards of peace, sovereignty and national development over these expansionisms became operative in the Turkish foreign policy through two methods used by Atatürk to create a Turkish nation- state: Secularization and Westernization, Atatürk demonstrated how to cement nation with state. Prior to the Kemalist Movement, no nation that combined Turkish ethnicity with territoriality had existed.[6]

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[1] Ramazan Gözen, Imparatorluktan Küresel Aktörlüğe, Türkiye' nin Dış Politikası,Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2009,p.46.
[2] Akğin, Atatürk'ün Diş Politika Ilkeleri ve Diplomasisi, Türk Tarih kurumu Basimevi, Ankara,1991,p,36.
[3] Sait Ocakli, Westernization, Modernization and Turkish- Arab Relations during Democratic Party Era, Unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2001,p.8.
[4] Edward Weisband, Turkish foreign policy 1943-1945 small state diplomacy and great power politics, Princeton University press, 1973,p.4
[5] Sait Ocakli, Westernization, op, cite,p.9.
[6] Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy , op, cite, p. 5.

However, the principles of traditional the Turkish foreign policy were laid down by the founder of the Republic Atatürk: "peace at home, peace in the world" a policy which has been adhered to by nearly every government since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The second is to be the protector of oppressed nations. The third is the adaption of a passion for independence a basis for one's identity.[1]

For the sake of its security and Westernization before the Second World War, Turkey cooperated with England and France against Japan and Italy, after the second world war with Western Europe and United States against the Soviet Union within the NATO umbrella.[2]

It should be mentioned that realism has been one of Turkey's policy since the Ottoman Empire era. Careful diplomacy was thus the key to Ottoman survival. It rested on exploiting the balance of power between the main European States. Russia, Britain, France and Austria, with Germany emerged as a major power in last part of nineteenth century. Thus, their mutual fear was that if either one or a coalition of powers destroyed the Ottoman Empire, this would provoke a major war with their rivals.[3]

The Ottomans had to consider how to exploit the international situation to their advantage. Territorially, the principle threats arose in three main zones of conflict: first, in the Balkans, where emerging local nationalist movements were aided by Russia and sometimes by other powers threatened to end Ottoman rule. Second, in the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles which were assumed to be dominated by Russia as a mean of securing access to the Mediterranean and thus the world's oceans. Third, in Egypt and to a lesser extent the rest of Arab Middle East where France and Britain had ambitions.[4]

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkish foreign Policy makers found the realism adequate theory to the Turkish foreign policy since the fact that realism is *"State Centric Thoery"*.[5]

Realism also continued as one of the Turkish policy main principles during Atatürk period.[1] Distinctive features of the Turkish foreign policy in the last few years were a

[1] Ismail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, op, cite, p.2.
[2] Ramazan Gözen, imparatorluktan küresel aktörlüğe, Türkiye' nin Dış Politikası,Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2009, p.47.
[3] William Hale, Turkish foreign policy (1874-2000), op, cite, P.18.
[4] William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy (1874-2000), op, cite, P.19.
[5] Ramazan Gözen, Imparatorluktan küresel aktörlüğe, Türkiye' nin Dış Politikası,Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2009,S,103.

thoroughly realistic and flexible vision of the countries, policies, and conditions in Turkey's external environment. In the foreign policy, there is no place for wishful thinking or for illusions. Success is dependent on realistic assessments. In geography where tremendous interests are contending, the precondition for the success of regional power such as Turkey is realism.[2]

In the first press conference of the Former Foreign Minister *Ismail Cem* on July 14 1997 he mentioned three dimensions in the organization of foreign policy:

1- Classical Diplomacy: the main target and the basic function of the Ministry of Foreign affairs is to bring the contribution of foreign policy to Turkey's security to attain *"peace at home peace in the word"*.

2- Economic Diplomacy: to provide the contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Turkey's economic growth to her external economic and commercial relations.

3- Cultural Diplomacy: finally foreign policy is an essential tool to strengthen the image of Turkey in the world to promote its culture and people, to enhance its prestige. Turkic languages are expected to become the mother tongue of nearly 200 million people by the end of 21st century. This will provide an enhanced cultural cooperation and communication at the end.[3]

However, Turkey's strategic culture was dominated by the tradition of *realpolitik*. This tradition evolved, especially after the changing military balance between the Ottoman Empire and European powers, "from a dominant offensive character into a dominant defensive one." Since then the defensive *realpolitik* has been inherited by the Republic. The culture of *realpolitik* in the modern history manifests itself in the security focused and state-centric foreign policy perspective. This perspective highly colored Turkey's policies toward Iraq. The developments in Iraq since the Gulf War in 1991, the involvement of the external powers in the conflict, and the implications of these developments for Turkey's Kurdish question contributed to the sense of encirclement and vulnerability. Turkey's response to

[1] Atilla Sandikli, Atatürk Diş Politika Stratejesi ve Avrupa Briliği, Beta Basim Yayim Dağitim, Istanbul,2008,S,90.
[2] Ismail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, op, cite, p.13.
[3] Ismail Cem, Turkey in the New Century, op, cite, p.23.

this environment was largely reactive. The challenges were defined and therefore the responses were formulated largely in military terms.[1]

However, the turning point in Turkey's foreign policy was during the JDP era. Turkey had been pursuing Idealism once through Ahmed Davğutoğlu "Zero problem theory".

This policy offers a peaceful territorial security by means of the peaceful settlement of disputes and putting aside the current threat perceptions. It also encompasses eradication of the conflicts in cross-border relations. In the foreign policy-making process, diplomacy, international negotiation, political, economical and socio-political mechanisms to reinforce the mutual interdependence are offered as the mechanisms to cover the conflicted matters and to develop deeper relations.[2]

Zero problems foreign policy objective is also the most debated part of Turkey's new foreign policy vision within the academic society and foreign policy authorities. The zero-problems rhetoric has the risk of being an idealist one far away from the rigid necessities of realpolitik. Additionally, rising expectations from the surrounding region, which might tend to consider Turkey free from its own interests, might also endanger Turkey's own strategic calculations.[3]

The Turkish political elite perceptions provided their vision as the highest institution of the foreign policy decision – making process in accordance with the highest communal interests. Their decisions and initiatives were regarded as being for the whole Turkish society. Therefore, foreign policy matters stayed under the monopoly of the President and his closest associates and the environment could not be developed in order to discuss the foreign policy matters either in the Parliament or in Public Opinion.4 The priority of peace, for example, was non-intervention in implication by adhering to it. Turkish leaders rejected intervention policies that threatened to bring Turkey into war.[5]

[1] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security Culture and Policy towards Iraq, Stratijik Arıştırma Merkezi (SAM), Perceptions, Spring, Ankara, 2007, P. 70.
[2] Gübahar Yelken Aktaş, Turkish Foreign Policy: new Concepts and Reflections, Unpublished Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, December 2010,p. 65.
[3] Gübahar Yelken Aktaş, Turkish Foreign Policy, op, cite,pp. 65-66.
[4] Sait Ocakli, Westernization, op, cite,p.14.
[5] Edward Weisband, Turkish foreign policy, op, cite, p.4.

1.4. Decision Making Process in Turkish Foreign Policy

The political institutions that form the foreign policy in the Turkish political system are: MFA, President, Prime Minister, and the TGNA.Tratitionally, the Role of MFA in Decision Making Process since the Ottoman Empire was affected by the institutional resources available to it until the last years of the eighteenth century; the Empire had not permanent diplomatic representatives abroad, although temporary diplomatic missions were frequently sent abroad for specific purposes. This defect was remedied during 1793-1896 as Permanent Embassies were established in London, Vienne, Berlin and Paris, to be followed in due course by other Capitals. Besides representing their government, the staffs of these embassies were also supposed to find out about western technical and administrative advances, and came to play a major role in pushing forward the *"Tanzimat"* reforms.[1]

Originally, there was no separate Foreign Ministry. Foreign policy was decided at the center by the *"Grand Vizier" (Sadr-i- Azam) and its* administration by the office of the chief of scribes (Reisülküttab) an assistant to the grand Vizier, who also had a responsibility for a variety of other functions. However, in 1835, his foreign policy and diplomatic responsibilities were transferred to the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs *"Umur-i- Hariciye Nezareti".*[2]

However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an influential role in the Turkish foreign policy and decision making process. There is a historically rooted foreign policy culture among the officials of the Foreign Ministry. The Turkish government usually carefully has taken their ideas into consideration since the Ottoman Empire.[3]

However, this phenomenon was continued during Atatürk period, for instance "*Tevfik Rüştü Aras"The* Foreign Minister 1925-1938 was the priority in Atatürk's foreign policy planning. As a result, the Foreign Ministray Undersecretries were only the persons whom they get special car plates like the Ministers and they were able to participate in the Prime Ministry meetings. After the establishment of the National Security Council in 1980s, the Foreign Ministry views and recommondions were always taken by them .[4]

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[1] William Hale, Turkish foreign policy (1874-2000), op, cite, p.18.
[2] William Hale, Turkish foreign policy (1874-2000), opm cite, p. 18.
[3] Erkan Ertosun, the Turkish- Iranian Relation after 1990, Unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, September 2002, p. 11.
[4] Gül İnanç, Türk Diplomasisinde Irak 1978-1997. Türkiye Iş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008. p. 32.

Historically, Turkish diplomats like Menemencioğlu played an influential role in the foreign policy. In 1943 "*Cevat Açıkalın*" was appointed as Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry to bring him back from Moscow where he had been serving as ambassador. *"Cevat Açıkın*", therefore, played a role in decision- making during the period examined and he deserves special mention. *"Şükrü Saracoğlu*" also played a role in the foreign policy decision- making during the period of Alliance. Prime Minister was since a long-time a friend of Menemencioğlu who served as a Foreign Minister in the cabinet of *"Rafik Saydam"* during the period of German ascendancy.[1]

Ahmed Davutoğlu was the founder of zero problem policy with neighbouring countries. Since he was appointed as the Foreign Minister on May 2, 2009, he had played a central role in the Turkish foreign policy.[2] He was concerned with the Strategic Research Institutions. During his peroid, he established the Political, Economic and Society research Center (SETAV) which followed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[3] This center hostes many foregin and Turkish diplomats and discusses internal and international developments. Their views and ideas could contribute to the Turkish foregin policy trends.

However, according to the survey of the speeches made by earlier Turkish Foreign Ministers almost all of them include pledges to the effect "Turkey's traditional foreign policy which will continue unchanged". Every new Foreign Minister has taken office with such words as if they were in inaugural parties: Governments, or Ministers; the promise has always been that "our established foreign policy will not change".[4]

Generally, the main function of the Foreign Minister is transferring information to his government and recommends it. Accordingly, the final decision is to take by the government. However, it could be said that the Turkish Foreign Minister plays two roles in the decision -making process: recommendation and participates in decision -making.

The President of the Repbulic has also an influential role in the foreign policy. According to article 4 of the Turkish Constitution of 1924, the sovereignty of Turkish Republic rested in the hands of the people of the nation who delegated their authority to the Grand National Assembly. The Assembly in turn bestowed its authority upon the President

[1] Edward Weisband, Turkish foreign policy, op, cit, pp.55-57.
[2] Ali Balcı, Türkiye Diş Politikası. İlkeler. Aktörler, Uygulamalar, Etkileşim Yayınları, Istanbul, 2013.
[3] Ali Balcı, Türkiye Diş Politikası. İlkeler. Aktörler, Uygulamalar, Etkileşim Yayınları, Istanbul, 2013,p. 290.
[4] Ismail Cem, Turkey in the new Century, Rustem Publishing, Ankara, 2 nd edition, 2001, p.1.

of the Republic who had to be elected by the members of the Assembly from among their own number. The President appointed the Prime Minister from among the deputies in the Assembly; he also had to approve of the Prime Minister's selection of Ministers. The Assembly, therefore, exercised its authority through the President and the Ministerial Council.[1]

However, the role of the President in the foreign policy was mentioned in Article 104 of Turkish constitution of 1982, the powers of the President are: Appointment of Prime Minster and accepting his resignation; sending Turkish representatives to foreign countries; receiving the representatives of the foreign countries; signing the agreements and treaties with other countries; representing Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces; moving Turkish Armed Forces; appointing Chief of General Staff; recalling the National Security Council for meeting and presiding the National Security Council. The constitution also gives the President the authority to use the armed forces when the TGNA is on a holyday.[2]

Turkish history had seen some events which the leader participated in war without consultation of the legislature power, e.g the Ottoman authority during the First World War did not take the consent of the Chamber of Deputies about the Turkish participation in the War. The decision was taking by three leaders " Enver Pasha, Telat Pasha and Amed Jamal Pasha". Adnan Menders had not also taken the TGNA consent of Turkish participation in the Korean War 1950.[3]

Özal was able to neglect the 1982 constitution which was given constitutional powers to the military institution through the national Security Council. Many factors had contributed Özal to play that role: his political experiement since the seventiethes when he was a member in National Salvation Party, then leader of Motherland Party, in addition to the support of the international environment.[4]

However, the personality of President is important in decision making process. In the First Gulf War 1991, the role of "*Turgut Özal*" was clear. He did many contacts with the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of other countries. He did not give any role to the

[1] Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, op, cit. pp. 60-61.

[2] Tükiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası. 8/10/1982. Kanun Numarası : 2709. Maade 104.

[3] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، دار زهران للنشر والتوزيع، عمان، 2012، ص 128.

[4] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 124-125.

Council of Ministers and Foreign Minister.[1] Within this context Turkish President Özal issued resolution closed the Iraqi- Turkish oil pipline. That was without any discussion in Council of Ministers, even the Minister of MFA have had heard the news through the Turkish Televsion. Normally, taking decision like this, it is supposed to be discussed in National Security Council and Council of Ministers.[2]

"Necip Torumtay" says *"Turkish national policy was not clear during the first Gulf War crisis in 1991. It was just the repetition of Özal's statements who was concentrated on implementation of UN resolutions; the Turkish General Staff was able to implement any political attitude express the government's policy towards the crisis*".

Personal policy of Özal was clear by interfereing in strategic and military issues away from the principles of constituton.[3] That means the rise of concept of leadership in Turkish internal and foreign policy, e.g Mustafa Kemal's role in decision making during period 1924-1938 the role of government and TGNA was decreased. The difference is that the personality of Kemal was military, while Özal represented the civil tradition.

The USA war on Iraq in 2003 showed the role of the President in Turkish foreign policy clear. The President "*Ahmet Necdet Sezer*" was completely against the War because it was not supported by the UN. The President himself is a jurist and was selected as a President while he was the Head of the Turkish Constitutional Court. He has thus been very sensitive towards the principle of law.[4]

However, it could be said that there is a cooperative process between the Prime Minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). When foreign policy is formulated the Prime Minster cooperates with the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister is a member of the Ministers of Council. In this way, the Prime Minister often has his impacts on the Foreign Minister views.[5]

The Prime Minister plays a role in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy. for instance, in January 2003 the Prime Minister Abdullah Gul visited (Egypt, Saudia Arabia,

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[1] Ramazan Gözen, imparatorluktan küresel aktörlüğe, Türkiye' nin Dış Politikası,Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2009,SS,250-251.

[2] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 121.
Ahmed Nouri Al-Naemi, Iraqi- Turkish Relations, Present and Future, Dar Zahran for Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 2012, p. 121.

[3] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 122.

[4] Idris Bal, Turkey- Relations and Impact of 2003 Iraq War in (Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War) Idris Bal (ed) , Brown Walker Press. , 2004.p.138.

[5] Ramazan Gözen, Türk Dış Politikası, Barış Vizyonu,Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2006,P. 13.

Jordan, Syria and Iran) to reach a peacefull solution on Iraqi crises and prevent the war. In the 23rd of January the Foreign Minister of the aforementioned countries met in Istanbul. However they were not able to reach any concret conclusion.[1]

The most famous Turkish Prime Minister whom played effective roles in the Turkish foreign policy and its relations with neighbouring countries was "*Necmettin Erbakan*", who won the election of 1996. He tried to improve the Turkish relations with the Islamic world. while the Prime Minister "*Bülent Ecevit*" (1999-2002) trends were towards Western states and Turkish membership in EU.

Ecevit's trends were different from the President Özal is in the foreign policy towards Iraq since Ecevit aimed to cooperate with Iraq. He refused Özal's policy in supporting the USA during the 1990 war. He also tried to lift the economic embargo on Iraq. Turkey joined negotiation with Baghdad in order to open the second border gate.[2]

While Erdoğan's Prime Ministry trends was not Islamic completely, he tried to make a balance between Islam and political secularism by respecting the secularism doctrine.[3]

The main characteristics of decision making process during Erdoğan Prime Ministry was to limite the role of Turkish Armed Forces in decision making process. Within this context the constitutional change started to contain the role of the military in National Security Council in October 2001. On the 7th of August, 2003, the National Security Council was meeting once a month, but now once in two months, and its Secretary General should be civilian.[4] Erdoğan's personality was also effective in the Turkish foreign policy. He has many initiatives and visits like his Foreign Minister.[5]

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[1] Idris Bal, Turkey- relations and impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cit.p.135.

[2] بيل بارك، سياسات تركيا تجاه شمال العراق ، المشكلات والافاق المستقبلية، مركز الخليج للابحاث، دبي، 2005، ص 66.

Bell Park, Turkey's policies towards Nothern Iraq, Problems and Future Dimensions, Gulf Reseach Center, Dubai, 2005. P. 66.

[3] عمار مرعي الحسن، التنافس التركي- الايراني للسيطرة على العراق بعد عام 2003 (من يرث الرجل المريض تركيا العثمانية أم ايران الفارسية؟)، دار الكتب العلمية، بغداد، 2003، ص ص 33-34.

Ammar Mari Alhasan, Turkish-Iranian Competition over Iraq's Control after 2003(who inherits sick man Ottomanism Turkey or Perian Iran?) Dar Al-Kutub Al-Ilmya, Baghdad, 2003, pp. 33-34.

[4] Ali Balcı, Türkiye Diş Politikası. İlkeler. Aktörler, Uygulamalar, Etkileşim Yayınları, Istanbul, 2013,P. 261.

[5] Ali Balcı, Türkiye Diş Politikası. İlkeler. Aktörler, Uygulamalar, Etkileşim Yayınları, Istanbul, 2013,P.261.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) has been also infuential because the Turkish parliamentry system by taking stands and forging consensus, reviewing policies of the Council of Ministers, debating decisions, and constructing new legislations. What emerges from an examination of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in regard to the foreign policy decision-making is that the power as well as the authority to commit Turkey to a policy decision shifted far in favor of the executive.[1]

On August 12, 1990 TGNA passed a resolution that allowed the Turkish Armed Forces to participate in military actions inside and ouside Turkish borders to ensure Turkish safety during the Gulf crisis. On September 5, 1990, a resolution was taken which allows the Turkish Armed Forces to be deployed in foreign countries and the deployment of armed forces in Turkey and the use of these forces for the Gulf crisis.[2]

The TGNA plays also a role in the Turkish foreign policy. In 2003 war motion of the deployment of up to 62,000 USA troops in the Turkish territory was rejected by Turkish parliament on the 1st of March, 2003.[3]

The second motion that gives the permission to send Turkish troops to northern Iraq and allow foreign troops was accepted by TGNA on 20 March in 2003.[4]

Turkish opponents of the war argued that the primary concern of Turkey during the decision-making process is in its anti-war policy which cannot be reduced to any single factor, but rather, it can be analyzed at three levels of policy based on three different pillars representing different instruments of soft balancing against the USA: First, Turkey's foreign policy orientation at the regional level, (diplomatic soft balancing), second, Turkey's international and institutional orientation to seek legitimacy in the framework of international law (institutional soft balancing), third, Turkey's internal political balance, decision-making process, and national costs of territorial denial as an instrument of soft balancing. Turkish policy makers treated Iraqi crisis as a source of instability for the Middle East and Turkey's national security rather than treating it as an opportunity to advance Turkey's national interests. More to the point, when considered from the perspectives of Turkish foreign policy principles, both international/regional positions and domestic public

[1] Edward Weisband, Turkish foreign , op, cit, P. 62.

[2] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 129.

[3] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of the 2003 Iraq War, Stratijik Arıştırma Merkezi (SAM), Perceptions, Spring-Summer, Ankara, 2009,p. 35.

[4] Idris Bal, Turkey- Relations and Impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cit.p.135.

opinions were against the USA intervention in Iraq and they ultimately wanted a diplomatic solution. The main concern for Turkey during the crisis was to provide stability to the region and to protect its national security.[1]

However, Turkish constitution specifically did not mention the persons or institutions that are authorized to take foreign policy decisions.[2] It seems that the founder of the Turkish constitution realized the significance of the cooperation between military and civil officials in foreign policy decision making because of the sensitivity of these issues. Turkey has faced threats since the establishment of the Republic, so they did not clearly call the persons or the institutions that have full power in this case.

1.5. Factors Which Affected Iraqi-Turkish Relations.

A. Internal

1. The Turkmen Issue

The Iraqi regime during Saddam rule realised that the Turkmen could be a balance factor against the Kurds.[3] The Turkmen is a sensetive issue in the Iraqi -Turkish relations. It was the factor of tension in Iraqi-Turkish relations during the 1980s. On July 31, 1980, Turkey recalled its Ambassador in Baghdad as a protest against hanging for 8 business men and intellectual of Turkmen Saddam's regime.[4]

Turkey began to show interest in Iraq's Turkmen population in the mid-1990s. This interest was not based on expansionist plans, but rather on the desire to increase Turkey's influence over developments in Iraq and counter the weight of the Kurdish groups in the north of Iraq.[5]

Turkey has supported the foundation of the Iraqi Turkmen front (ITF) in the early 1996.[6] Turkish governments have sought to play the Iraqi Turkmen card in their attempts to

[1] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing, op, cite,p. 35.
[2] Ramazan Gözen, Türk Dış Politikası, Barış Vizyonu,Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2006,S, 13.
[3] Gül İnanç, Türk Diplomasisinde Irak 1978-1997. Türkiye Iş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008. p. 14.
[4] Baskın Orhan, Türk Dış polilitikasi, Kurtuluş Savaşından bugüne Olgulara, Begeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 11: 1980 -2001,S,130.
[5] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security Culture, op, cite . P.80.
[6] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood) Mustafa Kibaroğlu (ed), Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara,2008,p.179.

influence developments in northen Iraq. Ethnically and linguistically related to the Turks, the Iraqi Turkmen had been largely ignored by Turkey until the establishment of this front. The Iraqi Turkmen assumed more prominence when three-quarters of the 400-man peace monitoring force (PMF), were established in 1996 to separate KDP and PUK combat units, which consisted of Iraqi Turkmen who took orders from Turkish officers. The PMF became, in effect, a training school in which up to 2,000 Iraqi Turkmen received military instructions. The ITF repeatedly argued that Kirkuk and Mosul were traditionally Iraqi Turkmen and not Kurdish territories. The draft constitution prepared in september 2005 for the Kurdish autonomous region in northen Iraq was refered to the Iraqi Turkmen as a "national minority". The official Turkish line was that the Iraqi Turkmen should be recognized as one of the three main constituents of Iraqi society, along with Arabs and Kurds.[1]

However, the Turkmen become another factor that was connected to Turkey's ethno-social balance after 2003. Turkey realizes that Iraq's Turkmen community as a possible source that might counterbalance the rising of Kurdish influence.[2] However, Article 4 of the Iraqi constitution mentioned that the Turkmen language and the Syriac language are two other official languages in the administrative units in which they constitute density of Population.[3]

Turkey still worries about the Turkmen who live in the areas including "*Talafar, Mosul, Kirkuk, Arbil, and Tuzhurmatu"*∗. Some Kurdish maps included these area as a part of the Kurdistan Region.[4] And the Kurdish authorities have started "*digging trenches*" around the "*differentiated areas*", claiming that this is to "protect" these areas from ISIL attacks not as some resources in Baghdad said as being Borders for Kurdistan. The strategic locations because they contain oil fields of Kirkuk and piplines to the Turkish Mediterranean coast of Dortyol and Yumurtalik.[5]

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[1] Gareth Winrow, Turkey: recalcitrant Ally in (the Iraq war causes and consequences) Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebch (eds), Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 2006, p.199.

[2] Gareth Winrow, Turkey: Recalcitrant Ally , op, cite, p.199.

[3] Constitution of the Repulic of İraq 2005, Article 5.

∗ Tuzhurmatu is the city which i come from. It is 70 km south Kirkuk and from differentiated areas. It contains Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds.

[4] ليام اندرسون، غاريث ستانسفيلد، ازمة كركوك: السياسة الاثنية في النزاع والحلول التوافقية، عبد الاله النعيمي (مترجما) دراسات عراقية، بغداد، 2009، ص 92.

Lyam Anderson, Gharith Stansphild, Kirkuk Crisis: Ethnic Policy in the Dispute and the Compromise Solutions, Abdulelah Alnaemi (trans), Iraqi Studies, Baghdad, 2009,p. 92.

[5] David Kushner, Turkey: Iraq, op, cite,p.206.

The Turkmen have a strategic significance in Iraqi political internal affairs because the fact that the majority of them live in the city of Kirkuk, which is the richest oil city and locates on the strategic roads transportation, in addition to the areas which the Turkmen are live, interference with those of Kurds.[1] Turkey gradually saw Iraq's Turkmen as a possible source that might politically counter balance the rising Kurdish influence. To this end Turkey supported the foundation of the Iraqi Turkmen front in the early 1990s.[2]

Turkey's concern about Kirkuk city represents a national interest for it namely, protection of the rights and interests of the Turkmen in this city as part of its effort to develop a post-war policy justification for its interest in Iraq.[3]

However, Turkmen have not had any real political unity before and after Saddam's collapse for these reasons: first, Turkmen live in different areas in Iraq, the majority of them live in the modern cities and homogenecied with the Iraqi community, and %60 of Iraqi Turkmen are "Shiite", second, the majority of Iraqi Turkmen are members in ethnic parties not "ITF" and they know well that they are "Shiite" and for this reason many of them have voted to Muqtada Alsadir Movement, and other "Shiite" parties.[4]

However, other ethnic groups have also positions in Turkish strategic thinking, e.g Turkey had supported "Sunni" political forces and encouraged them to participate in the political process. It has also supported the liberal political forces that have ties with Arab countries "Iraqi coalition". In addition Turkey also improved its relations with "Shiite" political forces which have influenced the Iraqi political theater like the Islamic Supreme Council and Alsadir wing. Turkey has tried to rapproach between Ayad Alawi and the Kurds from one side, and Alsadir from the another side to form the last Iraqi government, as the latter has an infuencial role in Iraq and in the "Shiite" environment and has good ties with Ankara. It also tried to support the Presidency Republic to be Arab "Sunni" instead of Kurds.[5]

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[1] عزيز قادر الصمانجي، التأريخ السياسي لتركمان العراق، دار الساقي، لبنان، 1999، ص 108.
Aziz Qader Alsamanji, the Political History of the Iraqi Turkmen, Dar-Al-Saqi, Lebanon,1999, p. 108.

[2] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite, p.179.

[3] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's security culture, op, cit . P.80.

[4] بيل بارك، سياسات تركيا تجاه شمال العراق ، المشكلات والافاق المستقبلية، مركز الخليج للابحاث، دبي، 2005، ص 63.
Bell Park, Turkey's policies towards Nothern Iraq, Problems and Future Dimensions, Gulf Reseach Center, Dubai, 2005, p. 63.

[5] علي حسين حسن سفيح، السياسة العامة في النظام السياسي العراقي والعوامل المؤثرة فيها بعد 2003، دار المرتضى، بغداد، 2015، ص208.

The Turkmen issue also extends to Syrian Turkmen, on November 20, 2015; Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was summoned to Andrei Karlov, Russian Ambassador to Turkey. When the Russian aircraft has been conducting a heavy bombardment against the Turkmen villages in the Turkmen area near Jabal Al Turkman (Türkmendağı), in Northwest of Syria, which is in the immediate vicinity of Turkey's Yayladağ border crossing it was emphasized to Ambassador Karlov "*that the actions of the Russian side do not serve to the fight against terrorism but amount only to the bombardment of civilian Turkmen villages and that these actions may result in serious consequences*". Ambassador Karlov was informed that Turkey expects the Russian Federation to put an end to these operations as soon as possible".

Turkish warnings and demands have also been reiterated to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East, "Mikhail Bogdanov".[1]

2. The Kurdish Issue

The Kurds live in a very vital area to the regional and international balance. This point gives any scholar perception why kurdish issue was changed into the vagne element in the region, due to the geograhpical area that kurds are located on the internationl passages in the Middle East and Eurasia. Hence, it became the areas of regional and international competition.[2]

The kurdish conflict in Turkey, what has become known as "*Kurdish Question*" has deep historical and cultural roots which can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire and its demise. Efforts exerted by the Kurds in the broader region, which encompasses the kurdish populations in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, to move towards self-determination and political representation have continuosly been marred by political difficulties.[3]

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[1]http://www.mfa.gov.tr/qa_28_-20-november-2015_-statement-of-the-spokesperson-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-tanju-bilgiç-in-response-to-a-question-regarding-the-bombing-of-the-turkmen-villages-in-syria.en.mfa

[2] احمد داود اوغلو، العمق الاستراتيجي، موقع تركيا ودورها في الساحة الدولية، ترجمة (محمد جابر ثلجي، طارق عبد الجليل)، الدار العربية للعلوم ناشرون، بيروت، 2010، ص 474.

Ahmed Davğutoğlu, Strategic Depth the Position of Turkey and its role in international Area, Muhammed Jabir Thalji, Tarik Abduljalil (trans), Arab Scientific Publishers, Beirut, 2010, p.474.

[3] Kemal Yildiz, Turkey's kurdish Conflict: Pathways to progress, insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2012, p. 151.

The Kurds in Turkey formated of the works party of Kurdistan (PKK) in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan. Ocalan stressed Marxism and armed conflict rather than targeting intellectuals he aimed his message at the poor and less educated youth of the Kurdish Towns and villages most of which were concentrated in the areas joining the Kurdish regions of Iraq.[1]

While Turkish-Syrian relations deteriorated, Turkish cooperation with the Iraqi government of Hussein improved. Both had vested interest in crushing the Kurds. Not all Kurds supported the rebellions, but many did.[2]

For countering the PKK, Iraq and Turkey reached ***"arrangments"*** in May 1983 so-called (border security and cooperation) which gave both countries permission to engage territories of each other wide 12 km and depth 3 km for 72 hours. However, in 2009 the Iraqi Council of representatives abolished all pacts that would allow Turkey to enter Iraqi borders.[3]

However, the Kurdish issue also passed many stages in Iraq, in 1991 Iraqi government opened dialogs with the kurds, and, declared its readinss to applicate 1970 agreement which provided the kurds with self ruling. It also invited Kurdish leaders (Jala Talbani, head of PUK, Negirvan Barzani, Sami Abdulrahman, Head of Democratic people party, Rasool Mamand Social Party). The delegation began its negotiation in Baghdad with the Iraqi government which stated on April 25, 1991, its obligation on March 11,1970, agreement.[4] That agreement was an official recogination from the Iraqi government of the Kurdish rights, and granted the Kurds self-ruling in their areas, the appointment of Ministers and Governors of the Kurdish origin.[5]

However, the Kurdish issue was one of strategic containments in the Turkish foreign policy through: the priorities of Kurdish issue incited the agenda of foreign policy and defensive strategy, containment of the sources of the logistic and assistant to the Kurdish fighters whether financial supports networks from Kurdish areas in the region or,

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[1] Monte palmer, The Politics of the Middle East, Thomson Wadswath, Conda, 2nd edition, 2007,p,317.

[2] Monte palmer, the politics of the Middle East, op, cite, p,317.

[3] السفير هشام العلوي، محاضرة عن العلاقات العراقية –التركية، وزارة الخارجية، 4 شباط 2016.
Ambassador Husham Alalawi, lecture at Iraqi MOFA, on February 4, 2016.

[4] د. حامد محمود عيسى، المشكلة الكردية في الشرق الاوسط، مكتبة مدبولي، القاهرة، 1992، ص 273.
Hamid Mahmood Isa, Kurdish Issue in the Middle East, Midbuli Library, Cairo, 1992, p. 273.

[5] د. سعد ناجي جواد، دراسات في المسألة القومية الكردية، مكتبة مدبولي، القاهرة، 2005، ص 137.
Saad Nagi Jawad, Studies in Kurdish Nationality Issue, Midbuli Libirary, Cairo, 2005, p. 137.

from the Kurds in Europe, military operations against PKK fighters, establishment security coordination with Kurdish power and organizations in northern Iraq, pursuing political pressure on the states which support the PKK, and the security coordination with alliance states like the USA.[1]

Despite the ongoing violence in Turkey, claims of progress and moves towards peace building and democratic advancement have been made by the Justice and Development Party (JDP) since its election in 2002. The JDP government has in many ways been more pro- active than any previous government.[2]

The Justice and Development Party (JDP) has also been trying to develop a slightly different vision of Turkey's relations with the Middle East. Within that context the JDP also aimed a shift in Iraq policy by putting less emphasis on security issues and more emphasis on cooperation rather than conflict.[3]

One of the main steps taken by the government, which hints at a relinquishment of past attitudes and a move towards a change in stance, is its 2009 proposal of a much publicized initiative towards a solution of the kurdish Question, initially named the "National Unity and brotherhood project" and is widely refferred to as the "Democratic Opening" or the "*Kurdish Opening*".[4]

The Kurdish issue and (PKK) occupied an important position in the relations between Baghdad, Ankara and Iraqi Kurds. Since 1992 this party has entered clashes with two Kurdsih parties (PUK, PDK) in order to be effective and impose its control in northern Iraq. The PUK and PDK condemned its military operations against Turkey. They also refused Turkish military operaton in northern Iraq. In addition they accused the PKK of using violence against the Kurdish civilians and interfering in internal affairs of Iraqi kurdistan. They have described its operations against Turkish militray as "Terrorism". Some Kurdish resources refered that Syria and Iran manupulated PKK against Turkey because the communication among them. Although there is a coordination between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, however they refused to deliver the PKK elements to Ankara, but asked them to stop their military operations. Though, Ankara in different times accuesd the PUK

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[1] عقيل سعيد محفوض، السياسة الخارجية التركية " الاستمرارية- التغيير" المركز العربي للابحاث ودراسة السياسات، الدوحة، 2011، ص ص 158-159.

[2] Kemal Yildiz, Turkey's kurdish conflict, op, cit, p. 153.

[3] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security, op, cite. P.71.

[4] Kemal Yildiz, Turkey's Kurdish Conflict, op. cite, p. 154.

of assistanting the PKK. These charges make a gap between the two parties. The KDP and its leader "Masood Barzani" entered negotiations with Turkey and Iraqi Kurdish parties to expel the PKK from Iraqi lands. Besides, the personal factor, Barzani's hatred "Abdullah Ocalan" for the latter criticized the leaders of PDK as traditional tribals; whereas, the kurdish Iraqi socialist parties and tribal leaders did not agree to fight Kurds in Turkey and Iran.[1]

Turkey was concerned with the political status of the Iraqi Kurdish groups. It became upset by the existence of the "*no fly zone*" above the 36th parallel that would help Iraqi Kurds to strengthen their political status, this would affect the strategies and aspiration of Turkey's own Kurds, particularly those who pursue a separated agenda.[2]

However, Turkey had recently good relations with PUK and KDP. Economic aids given to these two parties by Turkey, multinational NGOs entering the region through Turkey, black market petroleum flew to Turkey from north Iraq. The Turkish military and special forces were present in the region and cross order operation . It also issued diplomatic passports to Mr. Masood Barzani and Mr.Jalal Talabani.[3]

Turkey also disappointed when the rival Kurdish groups, patriotic union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan democratic party (KDP) came together to declare the Kurdistan Regional government in the middle of 1992.[4] At the same time after 2003 the role of Kurdish forces Peshmerge was increased, Ankara's opinion was that Iraq should have national military under a unified command. The Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that: "*it is not healthy thing for a country to have armed* militias all over the country, but added that this is a question to be dealt with in long run".[5]

Although security issues were still an important factor in bilateral relations, their primacy was in decline and factors such as trade were increasingly playing a role in

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[1] د. وليد عبد الناصر، اكراد العراق وتأثير البيئتين الاقليمية والدولية، مجلة السياسة الدولية، مؤسسة الاهرام، القاهرة، العدد 127، 1997، ص ص 25-35.

Walid Abdulnasir, Iraqi kurds and Impact of International and Regional Environment, journal of International Politics, Al-Ahram Institution, Cairo, no 127, 1997, pp.52-53.

[2] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood ,op, cite,p.179.

[3] Anil Turken, The Iraq Conflict and Its Security Implication for Turkey (2003-2007) , Unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University University, Ankara, 2007,p.24.

[4] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cit,p.179.

[5] Asa Lundgren, the Unwelcome Neighbor, Turkey's Kurdish Policy, I.B.Tauris. New York, 2007, p.112.

Turkish-Iraqi relations. In terms of political relations, this thing also included the relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.[1]

Iraqi Kurds (Masood Barzani) form factor that prevent the PKK to lunch any attacks on Turkish territory from the North of Iraq, since there is economic interests for the cooperation with Turkey. There is also economic interests for Turkey to cooperate with Iraqi Kurds, the Kirkuk- Ceyhan oil pipline cross the Kurdish area.[2] However, Turkey uses different political, economic and cultural means with Iraq Kurdistan Region. From the political perspectives, mutual visits on the top level of the officials, Turkish Consulate General in Arbil was established. From the economical prospectives, Turkish- Iraqi kurdistan busnessmen forum was established in Arbil, this was as aforum which promote the trade relations between two sides.[3]

The contacts between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds continued after March 2003. The PUK and the KDP kept their representations in Ankara and maintained their contacts with the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Naturally because of the changes in Iraq after March 2003, the relations between Ankara and the Iraqi kurdish leaders had changed in some ways. First of all, the PUK and the KDP leadership were not only present in the Kurdistan Region in the north but are also part of the federal government in Baghdad, when for example, "*Jalal Talabani*" visited Ankara in November 2003, he came as the Interim President of Iraqi Governing Council and not just as a leader of an Iraqi political party, a status that Ankara had emphasized all his previous visits. Thus, since 2003, Ankara has had relations with Iraqi Kurds on two different levels, sometimes as representatives of the central government; Second, the leverage of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders increased after the end of Hussein's regime and they were able to strenghten their position.[4]

However, there have been wings of Turkey's Iraq policy since 2003, first, the nationalist line had been criticizing the official policy for being too timid and advocating a

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[1] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq in 2009, Stratejik Arıştırma Merkezi (SAM), Perceptions, Perceptions, Autumn – Winter, Ankara, 2010, p. 114.

[2] د. جلال عبد الله معوض، صناعة القرار في تركيا والعلاقات العربية- التركية، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت،1998 . ص 159.

[3] عبد الله عرفان، الاقتصاد في السياسة التركية تجاه كردستان، مجلة السياسة الدولية، مؤسسة الاهرام، القاهرة، العدد 182، 2010، ص ص 123-124.

Abdullah Irfan, Economy in Turkish Policy Towards Kurdistan, Journal of International Politics, Al-Ahram Institution, Cairo, No 182, 2010,pp. 123-124.

[4] Asa Lundgren, The Unwelcome Neighbor, op, cite, p.118.

tougher policy including the use of military force in order to protect Turkey's interests. For those groups not only an actual independence but even the current status of Kurdish autonomy is unacceptable. The possibility of endangering Turkey's relations with the EU or the USA over a tougher policy in Iraq did not also factor into their analysis; because, in their World view, these actors were also seen as working against Turkey's interests and even trying to divide Turkey up, second, the liberals line criticized the official policy for being too focused on the Kurdish issue and the use of military means. Thus, unlike the nationalists, they saw the policy as being unnecessarily though. They advocated a more cooperative approach, particularly with the Kurds of Iraq. Such a policy was seen necessary not only to achieve stability in the southeast of Turkey, but also to continue the EU process and close relations with the USA.[1]

However, in November 2015, After 15 months of living under so-called the Islamic State in Iraq "ISIL", the Iraqi city of "Sinjar" was taken back by Kurdish Peshmerga. In the immediate aftermath of the operation, "Masood Barzani" President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, stated that "*Sinjar is part of the Kurdistan Region, aside from the Kurdistan flag, no other flag will rise in Sinjar".* Not only did he assert that Sinjar was to be part of an enlarged Kurdistan, having previously been under the administration of the central Baghdad government, but he also claimed that the liberation was due to advances of Peshmerga forces alone. But while a large part of the operation was conducted by the Peshmerga, who were co-ordinating with the USA airstrikes, the PKK simultaneously stormed Sinjar. Such an operation contradicted Barzani's assertions that the Peshmerga single-handedly took control of Sinjar town, leading to widespread criticism that the role of other forces had been intentionally ignored by Barzani in an attempt to assert his own authority.[2] It seemed that Barzani targeted the PKK, Mahma Khalil the Governor of Sinjar had accused of what he called " foreign forces" that threatened the social peace, and divisions among the minorites in Sinjar. Furthermore, some of Arabs who lived in Sinjar accused the PKK of ethnic cleasing and expelling them from their Villages.[3]

It seems that the PKK strategy is to prolong their areas of the influences which will be extended from Northern Iraq crossing Turkish South borders and the area which Kurds

[1] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security, op, cite. P. 83.

[2] http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2015/11/18/sinjar-part-of-kurdistan-regardless-of-what-yazidis-want#sthash.BNEHr77o.dpuf

[3] http://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2015/11/16/

live in Syria to the Mediterranean Sea. This might be one of Turkish strategy which led to cross Iraqi borders and install camp for its troops in "Pashiqa" which is located about 20 km of Sinjar.[1] The Kurdish issue had impact on Iraqi –Turkish relations, when Turkey and KRG had signed in April 2012 an agreement for exporting oil from Iraq to Turkey without permission of Iraqi Federal government in Baghdad.[2]

Iraqi government considered this step as a breach of article 112 of the Iraqi constitution which mentioned that the Federal government, with the producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields, provided that it distributes its revenues in a fair manner in proportion to the population distribution in all parts of the country, Second, the Federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and encouraging investment.[3]

However, the rapproachement between Turkey and KRG is prolonged beyond the security and economic interests. The Turkish leaders realized that the best party which can achieve Turkish foreign policy's aim towards the future relations with Baghdad government is the "Kurds" since they have influenced the decision making policy in Baghdad. And this thing harmonized with Turkish defence policy to contain Kurdish nationality inside Turkey.[4]

Moreover, Turkey and KRG are secular systems, pro-western , democratic and nerighbours. Many reasons make them as ally: Kurds can get Turkish protection from danger from any Iraqi Arabic national or religious or from any anarchy could be arised in the other Iraqi areas, in order Ankara promote its influence in north Iraq. Turkey is able to make Iraqi Kurdistan Region as a buffer zone in any possible anarchy would be arised.[5]

The success of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in developing strong diplomatic and economic ties with Turkey, despite a history of mistrust, is an example of

[1] Look at Map 2 in the appendix.
[2] www.aljarid.com.article.
[3] The Consitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, Article 112.
[4] عمار مرعي الحسن، التنافس التركي- الايراني للسيطرة على العراق بعد عام 2003 (من يرث الرجل المريض تركيا العثمانية أم ايران الفارسية؟)، دار الكتب العلمية، بغداد، 2003، ص 144.
[5] بيل بارك، سياسات تركيا تجاه شمال العراق ، المشكلات والافاق المستقبلية، مركز الخليج للابحاث، دبي، 2005، ص ص 107-108.

the influence Iraqi actors could have on the regional stage. The relationship moved from being constrained by Turkey's fears of its own Kurdish separatist movement, to a situation in which the Iraqi Kurds have a positive role to play in helping Turkey deal with its own Kurdish question.[1]

3. Forces of Nationalism

Since the Turkish independence war (1919-1920), Turkey has been interested in Mosul and Kirkuk. The two governorates were within "Turkish map" which was approved by "TGNA" in its secret session on January 28, 1920. Atatürk said *"Mosul and Kirkuk might be restored, when Turkey would become strengthen and the international situation suitable"*. The Anglo-Iraqi- Turkish treaty in 1926 resolved the Mosul issue after Ankara's recognition in the boundaries between Iraq and Turkey, Mosul and Kirkuk became a part of Iraq.[2]

On 19th January 1937, the Anatolian Agency published an emphatic denial of the rumour (which was presumably fairly widespread in the Arabic world) that Turkey after claiming Alexandretta and Antioch would turn to renew its claim to Mosul. On his way to Tehran to sign the "*Saad Abad Pact*", Dr. Rüştü Aras stopped at Aleppo, and gave a further assurance to the Arabs "*we have been wrongly accused"* he declared, "*of being adversaries of Arab unity. we are in favour of union and we respect Arab nationalism"*. Furthermore, his speech ended on the signifcant note, *"we intend to contribute to European politics, remaining nevertheless at the service of the Orient"* The aim of these various declarations was clear that Turkey wanted its coming adherence to the Middle East Pact to be interpreted in a favourable light by the Arab countries.[3]

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[1] Jane Kinninmont, Gareth Stansfield and Omar Sirri, Iraq on the International Stage Foreign Policy and National Identity in Transition, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013. London, July 2013, p.2.

[2] بيار مصطفى سيف الدين، تركيا وكوردستان العراق " الجاران الحائران"، دار الزمان للطابعة والنشر والتوزيع، سوريا، 2009، ص 157.

Bayar Mustafa Saefaldin, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, "the Hesitant neighbours" Dar Al-Zaman for Printing, Publishing and Distriputing" Syria, 2009, w 157.

[3] Edward Reginald and Vere Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy 1918-1948, Ambilly, Geneva, 1950, pp. 101-102.

Look at Mustafa. Sıtkı Bilgin ,"Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu Politikası (1923-1938)", içinde Irak Dosyası, C.I-II, (Der.) A. Ahmetbeyoğlu ve diğerleri ,Istanbul: TATAV, 2003.

Another issue on this point came about Turkey's shares from Iraq Petroleum Company. Mehmet Yılmazcan Kahramanmaraş TGNA member, asked the Turkish Foreign Ministry in 2003 about the Turkish rights in Iraq Petroleum Company according to the Lausanne treaty in 1923 and then Ankara treaty in 1926. The response from Turkish MFA was on the line that Iraqi Government should pay 500.000 Sterling and %10 per cent of share from Iraq Petroleum Company for 25 years[1].

From the Arab side, the enmity towards Turks had grown up since the British occupation of Iraq 1914; the British had sent political leaders to the Arab and Gulf areas. They justified that War by saying *"the war did not relate to the religious*", after the occupation of Baghdad on March 11, 1917, the British General "Stanley Maude" issued the statement *"your citizens had been under the foreign tyrannous rule since Holacao, the Turks and Germany were the reason of that"*.[2]

4. Impacts of Baathist Party Rule

Since the Baathist party took power on July 17, 1968, Turkey had recognized this regime. Iraqi President "Ahmed Hussan Albakir" declared that *"Iraq would improve its relations with Turkey"*. Turkey's imports for goods and industrial materials had increased and this improved its economy. Iraq had oil reservs, there were many projects and investements opportunities in the country. Turkey was in need of improving its economy and Iraq was good area for that. on September 25, 1968, a transit agreement was signed in Ankara to improve and remove the obstacles of the movements of goods and citizens of both countries.[3]

On June 1, 1972, Iraq nationalised its oil, this policy was welcomed by Turkey. On September 19, 1972, Iraqi President "*Ahmed Hussan Albakir*" visited Turkey, and he agreed with Turkish President "*Cevdet Suny*" to establish oil piplines.[4] However, the

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[1] T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı. 026.21,2003,SPGY,231163. 05.06.2003. look at appendix 5.

[2] المقدم شاكر صابر، تاريخ الصداقة بين العراق وتركيا، ان مياه دجلة والفرات تربط العراق وتركيا برابطة الاخوة، مطبعة دار المعرفة، بغداد، 1955، ص 146.

Colonel Shakir Sabir, History of Turkish- Iraqi freindship " the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates bind Iraq and Turkey together in Eternal Brotherhood, Dar Al-Marifah printing, Baghdad, 1955, p. 146.

[3] Payman Abdullah Hamad Lak, Türkiye – Irak İlişkileri (1920 – 2010), Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kahramanmaraş Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Bölümü, Nisan 2015, P. 72.

[4] Payman Abdullah Hamad Lak, Türkiye – Irak İlişkileri (1920 – 2010), Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kahramanmaraş Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Bölümü, Nisan 2015, P. 73.

turning point in Turkish-Iraqi-Arab relations was in 1973. Turkey had supported the Arabs in their war against Israel by refusing to use "Incirlik airbase"∗ by the American Planes. It allowed the Soviet airplans to cross its space to provide military and logistic assistance to the Arab countries.[1]

The relations continued in positive, for countering PKK and Kurdish movements.[2] They reached "arrangments" in May 1983 so-called (border security and cooperation) which gave both countries permission to engage territories of each other wide 12 km and depth 3 km for 72 hours.[3]

During the Iranian-Iraqi war Turkey had maintained its neutralized policy. It had good relations with both countries. However, Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraq had changes after 1990 First Gulf War. The Baghdad regime appeared to pose a continued security threat to Turkey after the Gulf War. In February 1999, Hussein warned Ankara that it would face attack if it continued to allow the USA and British aircraft to launch air sorties against Iraq from Turkish territory. In July 2002 the Bush administration urged the Turkish authorities to take the Iraqi missile threat seriously and pushed Turkey to deploy surface-to-air missile Batteries.[4]

As a result,Turkey considered the regime in Iraq as a threat to its national security. On February 16, 1991, the Turkish President Turgut Özal referred to Iraq as a threat factor to its neighboring country. He would be planned to attack "Syria, Turkey" after Iran and

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∗ Incirlik Air Base is an important factor for America's interests in Turkey, in this frame. The US Air Force has been using the base since 1954, except a short time break with Turkey's response to America's arms embargo reaction to Turley's Cyprus intervention in 1974. In 1980 Turkey and America signed a bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) allowing US' usage of the Base. Besides, under NATO umbrella US uses the base for training. Incirli is still vital for the American military purposes in the region. And, any other alternatives would be very costly for the US. See , Gübahar Yelken Aktaş, Turkish Foreign Policy: new concepts and reflections, Unpublished Master Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, December 2010, p.22.

[1] Payman Abdullah Hamad Lak, Türkiye – Irak İlişkileri (1920 – 2010), Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kahramanmaraş Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Bölümü, Nisan 2015, P. 73.

[2] Payman Abdullah Hamad Lak, Türkiye – Irak İlişkileri (1920 – 2010), Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kahramanmaraş Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Bölümü, Nisan 2015, P. 53.

[3] السفير هشام العلوي، محاضرة عن العلاقات العراقية –التركية، وزارة الخارجية، 4 شباط 2016.
Ambassador Husham Alalawi, lecture at Iraqi MOFA, on February 4, 2016.

[4] Winrow, Turkey: Recalcitrant Ally in (the Iraq war causes and consequences) Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch (eds), Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 2006.199.

Kuwait, for this reason Turkey allowed USA and alliances to use Incirlik air base and end this "threat".[1]

5. Waters Issue

The first crisis of water issue happened in 1957 when Turkey informed Iraq of its intension to establish Kiban Dam on the Euphrates.[2] The crisis was increased in1975, when Syria reserved the water in Altabaka Dam, and the Iraqi water amount in Euphrates was affected by this step. The two countries were about to engage in war, Saudi Arabia and former Soviet Union had played mediation role between them. The second crisis was in January 1990, when Turkey interrupted the water flow from 13 January to 13 February to fill Atatürk Dam, when the impounding of the Atatürk Dam was interpreted, especially in Arab circles, as an act deliberately aimed to deprive its neighbors of water and cause them damage.

The deputy of Iraqi Foreign Minister "*Nizar Hamdoun*" visited Turkey and asked to reduce the period of reserving for 15 days. He also asked that Iraq, Turkey and Syria should reach an agreement to organize the use of water in the Euphrates and Tigers. As a result of the tension in the relations, Baghdad refused to discuss the security issue on May 5, 1990, Turkish deputy Prime Minister "*Yildirim Akbulut*" visited Iraq to discuss the renewing the security arrangements which was signed in 1983. However, Baghdad had refused.[3]

While Turkey's view that water as a natural source, it should be dealt economically like oil. Building Ports and any other water projects on its land are full rights that belong to it without any consideration of the rights of other countries. Iraq's policy is that water different from oil because there are legal and historical rights regarding the international rivers and these were maintained in many international law and agreements.[4]

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[1] محمد ناجي عيسى، السياسة الخارجية التركية تجاه القضايا العربية 2002-2006، دراسة حالة الازمة العراقية والقضية الفلسطينية، رسالة ماجستير غير منشورة، معهد البحوث والدراسات العربية، القاهرة،2007، ص 228.

Mohammed Naji Isa, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Arab Issues, 2002-2006, study of Iraqi and Palestinian Crises, Unpublished Master Thesis, Institute of Arab Studies and Research, Cairo, 2007,p.228.

Look at Mustafa. Sıtkı Bilgin , Yakın Dönem Türk-Irak İlişkilerinde Güvenlik Faktörünün Etkisi 1926-2002.

[2] ناجي علي حرج، المياه في العلاقات العربية- التركية، في (العرب وتركيا، تحديات الحاضر ورهانات المستقبل) مجموعة باحثين، المركز العربي للابحاث ودراسة السياسات، الدوحة، 2012، ص 410.

Naji Ali Haraj "et al" the Water in Iraq- Turkish Relations in (The Arabs and Turkey, Challenged of the present and Reckonings of the Futures), Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Al-Doha, 2012, p. 410

[3] Faruk sönmezoğlu, Türk Diş politikasinin Analizi, DR Yayınları, Istanbul, 2001, S.182.

[4] د. محمد نعمان جلال، دبلوماسية الحوار الدولي، مركز الدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية، القاهرة، 2003.

However, the controvential issues between Iraq and Turkey on water matters are: Iraq and Turkey were in disagreement as to how to locate the waters of rivers the Tigris and Euphrates. While Baghdad accused Turkey of cutting the level of Iraqi water needs for irrigation and other purposes, Turkey simply argued that Iraq got enough water yet misused it.The Turkish government insisted that the waters that pass through both countries cannot be classified as an "*international waters*". Iraq policy held the following views: that such waters are international and the riparian states had to come to an international agreement as to how share them.[1] The sovereignty on the Tigris and Euphrates is not submmited to the Turkey, but (Iraq, Turkey and Syria) should share their sovereignty on these rivers. Iraq also considers any projects without coordination with other riparian states as a violation of international law and customs. It is nessesary to reach an agreement which distributs the water resources on the rules equlity. The two rivers are separated, the economic and socials needs are been taken in any development of the water projects.[2]

However, Iraq was not satisfied with Turkey's South East Anatolian Project (GAP) because that if this project was completed the amount of water that Iraq receives from Turkey would decline.[3]

The GAP became a controvential issue but not in Iraqi-Turkish relations. However, in Turkey itself because of the politically sensitive area in which the GAP is situated, some Kurds mentioned that the GAP threatens the water rights of downstream neighbors, Iraq and Syria, and they also suggest that rather than developing the South East of Turkey, it actually transfers resources (i.e. hydropower) to develop the western part of the country. There is a concern that not enough has been done to prepare the population for the conversion to water intensive farming or transition a way from cotton which leaches the soil. One of the persistent criticisms is that there is no water pricing mechanism that would personalize land use. Some Kurdish nationalists accused the project of trying to divide and

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Mohammed Noman Jalal, International Dialogue's Diplomacy, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo,2003.

[1] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cit,p.177.

[2] عبد العزيز شحادة المنصور، المسألة المائية في السياسة السورية تجاه تركيا، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت، 2005، ص ص 152-123.

Abdulaziz Shahata Almansor, Water Issue in Syrian Policy Towards Turkey, Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2005, pp.152-153.

[3] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite,p.177.

rule. Literally by crisscrossing the Kurdish homeland with water barriers displacing people and flooding cultural landmarks.[1]

Other Turkey's Kurdish say that the roads are primarily defensive in nature allowing the government to move troops in the land around the Kurdish area and the dams are there to supply western Turkish cities and industries with electricity.[2]

To resolve this problem Turkey proposed a transfer of water from the Tigris to the Euphrates with a view to alleviating the water shortage of the latter, yet Iraq rejected this proposal.[3]

However, the United Nations convention on " International Watercourses" in 1997 mentioned the (Equitable and Reasonable Utilization) among the states in Non- Novigation of International Watercourses, which was voted by 103 states, (Turkey, China and Brundy) were abstioned.[4]

However, Article one of the Iraqi-Turkish friendship and neighboring treaty 1946 organized the using of water resources and project in the Tigris and Euphrates. Turkey was obliged to share exchange and inform Iraq of any project built on the two mentioned rivers.[5]

The contrary the Turkish view insists that the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that pass through both countries cannot be classified as international waters; it signed an agreement with Greece and Bulgaria to organise the use of common rivers. The Turkish Bulgarian treaty on October 23, 1968, included articles that obliged the two countries to cooperate and exchange the information about any projects built on their common rivers in a way that does not damage the other. This agreement was considered as a recognation from Turkey towards these rivers, as being international, but it refused to sign any agreement with Iraq.[6]

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[1] Andrew Finkel, Turkey What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press,2012,57.

[2] James Ciment, Conflict and Crisis in the Post Cold War World,(Kurds, state and minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran) Infobase Holding Company, New York,1996.p.10.

[3] Water issues between Turkiye, Syria and Iraq, a study by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Regional and Transboundary waters.p. 3.

[4] ناجي علي حرج، المياه في العلاقات العربية- التركية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 395.

[5] منير الحمش، وجهة نظر عربية في واقع وافاق العلاقات الاقتصادية بين العرب وتركيا في (الحوار العربي- التركي بين الماضي والحاضر) مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت، 2010، ص 260.

Moneer Alhamash, Arabic Points of View in Present and Dimensions of Arabs and Turkey, (Arabic- Turkish dialog between past and present), Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2010,p. 260.

[6] عبد العزيز شحادة المنصور، المسألة المائية في السياسة السورية تجاه تركيا، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 143.

Iraq also activated its strategy on the international level, United Nations, international Bank and states which help and support Turkey's projects. The water problem was included in all Arab league meetings. The Arab League issued many resolutions that stressed the support of the Iraq's rights in the Tigris and Euphrates, and recalled the Turkish government to reach a final agreement which includes the (Equitable and Reasonable Utilization) "through the negotiation, and according to the international law. In addition the League had expressed the concern of Arab countries because Turkey established Dams and projects without any coordination with Iraq, and called the western countries to stop finalizing Turkish projects.[1]

B. External

1. Policies of the West and Impacts of Imperialism and Colonialism

Previously, Baghdad and Basra formed a single administrative unit ruled from Baghdad by the Ottomans; but as a totality, the provinces that constituted Iraq that rather awkwardly together. On November 6, 1914, a week after the Ottoman Empire had entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, Indian Expeditionary Force landed at "Fao" in the southern province of Ottoman Iraq. By March 1917, however, reinforcements from Britain and the transfer of military command to London enabled the British to capture Baghdad. In November 1918, a few days after the end of the war, the city of Mosul was occupied, and the surrounding province fell into British hands.[2]

However, Britain, France, Italy, and Russia had entered into a series of agreements under which Anatolia and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were to be divided among the Allies. With a number of important modifications, these agreements formed the basis of a peace settlement in the Middle East under which France was assigned the areas that became Lebanon and Syria, while Britain was assigned the areas that became Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine.[3]

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[1] ناجي علي حرج، المياه في العلاقات العربية- التركية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 414.

[2] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, p. 26.

[3] Peter Sluglett, The British Legacy, in (USA Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq, lessions From the British Experience), Michael Eisenstadt and Eric Mathewson (eds), the Washington Institute For Near East Policy, USA, 2001, p. 3.

Iraq during the 1930s and 1940s depicted a struggle between various kinds of Arab nationalism and a more or less determined, if officially disguised, British imperialism. In fact, such accounts are exaggerated or wrong on both fronts. In October 1936, Iraq had the dubious distinction of hosting the Middle East's first military Coup, and the eight Iraqi governments that were formed over the next five years were largely dependent on the favor of a tightly knit group of army officers known as the Golden Square. In spite of occasional claims to radicalism, Iraqi Prime Ministers were generally careful not to fall out with the British prior to 1941. Yet, in April of that year, in the midst of World War II, Rashid Ali al-Gailani's government refused to honor previous treaty commitments to Britain, a second British occupation that lasted until the end of the war.[1]

Turkey had not recognized the new regime initially. The Turkish government issued instructions to its mission in Baghdad to work according to Britain and USA policy towards this revolution. Britain was worried that Algailani government would be neutralized in the war and would not break off diplomatic relations with Italy and Germany.[2]

For Arabs, the USSR did not pose an immediate threat since they were not geographically contiguous to that country. On the contrary, the Soviet Union became an important country supporting the Arab issues in international theater. Military and economic aid coming from the Soviet Union to the revolutionary Arab countries. The main threat for the Arab countries was Israel and the major area of contention was Palestine, which had to be resolved before peace was to be established in the Middle East.[3]

However, Turkey's policy was changed. Turkey played a mediation role between Iraq and Britain. The Turkish policy was most independent and it was not influenced by the British policy which had asked Turkey to make maneuver close to the Iraqi borders, and tried to convince Turkey that would restore Mosul, but Turkey refused all offers. Turkey's position was changed later. It gave congratulations to the new regime in Iraq. Turkey was

[1] Peter Sluglett, The British legacy, op, cite, p. 9.

[2] د. علي عبد الواحد حسون الصائغ، موقف دول ميثاق سعد آباد من الاحداث الاقليمية (1937-1945)، تموز، دمشق، 2013، ص ص182-183.

Ali Abdulhid Alsaeq, the Position of Saad Abad Pact Countries from Regional Events (1937-1945), June, Damascus, 2013, pp. 182-183.

[3] Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin, Türk-Irak İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Boyutu, ASAM, Ankara, 2003, P. 220.

significant to Iraq because it was the communication center with axis states especially Germany, and its role in mediation.[1]

As diplomatic resolutions to this tension motivated Turkish Foreign Minister to suggeste these points: withdrawing the Iraqi forces from Habbaniyah to its camps, stopping the military operation between the parties, the British Ambassador in Baghdad should present his credentials letter, the British forces should pass abroad from Basra, and Iraq should consent to reasonable increase in the British troops in its camps.[2]

However, for Turkey, the Cold War was characterized by the Soviet threat, which entailed territorial demands on its eastern region, specifically Kars and Ardahan and demands for bases on the Turkish straits. This threat led Turkey to join the Western bloc and membership of NATO in 1952. Russians were perceived as the source of threat against which Turkey allied with the United States. Turkish-Soviet friendship between "1921-1945" seems like an anomaly in the centuries long rivalry and the Cold War dynamics very much reminded the Turks of the expansionist neighbor from the north.[3]

2. Impacts of Arab Nationalism

Turkish-Arab differences became more manifest with establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 by which Turkey and most Arab countries, except Iraq were on different sides. The President of Egypt Jamal Abdul Nasser considered Baghdad Pact as the Continuation of western colonialism, which purported to further their hegemony in an implicit manner opposed to the direct colonialism of the past.[4]

However, in January 1955, the Turkish Prime Minister, "*Adnan Menderes*" tried to convince "Syria, Labanon, Jordan and Egypt" to join Baghdad Pact. However, Turkey tried to convince the other Arab countries of its redness to support them if they ask it. In June

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[1] د. فاروق صالح العمر، ثورة مايس 1941 ودول الجوار في الوثائق البريطانية، بيت الحكمة، بغداد، 2002، ص ص 26-30.

Farouk Salih Alomer, 1941 March Revolution and Neighbouring States in British Documents, Beit Al-Hikma, Baghdad, 2002, pp. 26-30

[2] د. فاروق صالح العمر، ثورة مايس 1941، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 31.

[3] For more information look for Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, *passim.* Look also for, Umut Uzer and Ayşe Uzer, Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War: Baghdad Pact as a Source of Conflict between Turkey and Nationalist Arab countries, Turkish, Turkish Yearbook, Vol .xxxvi, 2005.p.102.

[4] Umut Uzer and Ayşe Uzer, Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War, op, cite.p.102.

1955 "*Celal Bayar*" visited Jordan, he stated that *" if Israel engaged in any war against Jordan, Turkey would support Jordan"*.[1]

However, Arab countries refused the Pact. Egypt refused to join the Pact for the following reasons: Arab countries would become bases for the American, British French and Turkish forces, Egypt was suffered from British colonalism before. As a result its Prime Minister called Arab Prime Ministers to meet in Cairo on January 16, 1955. Egyptain aims were: to isolate the Iraqi government from Arab governments politically, to convine other Arab countries not to join the Pact and supporte the non-alignment policy.[2]

Egypt refused the alliances policy with major powers and perceived them as manifestations of imperialism. Nasser did not believe in the Soviet threat. Hence, he argued that Baghdad Pact was created to prolong Western domination. As for him the Pact built to counter the Soviet threat was unrealistic. The American administration supported the Baghdad Pact even though it did not become a party to it. The reason for this was the negative attitude of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the Pact and the fact that Eisenhower Administration wanted to improve relations with Nasser. Furthermore, joining such a Pact would lead to demands for extending security measures to Israel, an eventuality Dulles in particular was against.[3]

The rivalry between Egypt, Syria against Iraq and Turkey could also be seen as the competition for regional hegemony. Leadership in the Arab world and in the Middle Eastern Region was one of the main objectives of Nasser, whereas, Iraq with a large population wanted to enhance its power by aligning with Turkey and the Western powers. The moderate Arab states had a different conception of Arab nationalism of Nasser. For the latter, Arab unity meant Arab nationalism under the leadership of Egypt. According to King Hussein, this was a new kind of imperialism serving Egyptian interests. He believed in a different kind of nationalism that was based on the sovereign equality of Arab states.[4]

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[1] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, pp. 242-243; Hasan Kösebalaban, Türk Diş Politikası, BigBang Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, pp. 165-166.

[2] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية 1953-1958، دار الرشيد للنشر، بغداد، 1981، ص ص 233-235.

Fikrat Namiq Shafeeq, Iraq's Foreign Policy in the Arab area 1953-1958, Dar Al-Rasheed, Baghdad, 1981, pp. 233-235.

[3] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 347-349.

[4] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, pp.75-76, 80-81.

Syria also opposed to the Pact, it signed a common defence treaty on October 20, 1955. Its main aim was to contain Baghdad Pact. It had enetered in alliance with Saudia Arbia and Egypt, supported neutralised policy and gained political and military assistance from the Soviet Union, in addition to the Syrian people who were against any alliance due to the experince of the French colonialism.[1]

Iraq also tried to convince Jordan to join Baghdad Pact since the Hashimiat is pro-Western country. The Jordanian government wanted to join the Pact but many reasons had prevented it: the Arab public opinion was against the pact and it happened that many demonestrations refused the Pact, Suadia Arabia had given financial support to the Jordanian government, in addion to the Egyptian influence which polarised the Arab nationalism trends.[2] Other parties to the Pact was Saudi Arabia. It was suspicious of the Hashemites in Iraq and Jordan who were the traditional rivals of the Saudis during the time for the quest of Arabia. For this reason, it was against Baghdad Pact.[3]

However, many Arab countries considered Baghdad Pact for Israel's benefit. Israel had signed treaties with Turkey. It gained international gurrantees for its borders security, motivated the western countries to push the Arab countries to Sign peace treaty with Israel. In addion the Pact pointed to differences between Arab points of view and Iraq.[4]

However, it should be pointed out that the Baghdad Pact was signed between the parties as part of the American global strategy of containment and upon American encouragement.[5] It should be noted that Turkey and Iraq invited other members of the Arab League or any country that was interested in regional security for accession.[6]

However, Iraq through its membership of Baghdad Pact aimed to: deter any Soviet aggression; Nouri Al-Said recognized that Iraq's economic resources would not able to cover its weapons needs and participating in the Pact is good opportunity to gain the military assistance from the Western countries. Nouri Al-Said was also from the old Turkish school. His culture is Turkish rooted and he tried to be away from the Arab League which was under the Egyptian influence. In addition Nouri Al-Said believed that the Arab

[1] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 347-349.
[2] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية، مصدر سبق ذكره ، ص ص 359-363.
[3] Umut Uzer and Ayşe Uzer, Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War, op, cite.P.112.
[4] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 375.
[5] Umut Uzer and Ayşe Uzer, Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War, op, cite.P.112.
[6] Umut Uzer and Ayşe Uzer, Diverging Perceptions of the Cold War, op, cite.P. 114.

League is unable to provide for the defense of Arab countries in case of the Third World War would happen.

In 1930 Iraq and Britain signed a treaty, which its expire was of in 1957, the increasing in national feeling should be taken at that time, for this reason Britain recognised that signing the Pact would maintain its existence in an acceptance way.[1]

3. Impacts of Arab- Israeli Problem

One of the most challanges which impact on Arab- Turkish relations is the relationship between Turkey and Israel∗. However, Turkey does not want to break off its relations with Israel completly. Israel still occupies Arab lands, and threatens Arab national security, and refused the recognition of the Plastinian state. Turkey also has its interests and conditions to have relations with Isreal, but this relations should not be view as an obstacle element in the developing of Arab –Turkish relations.

In 1949, Turkey was the first Islamic country that recognition Israel and exchanged the diplomtic missions. That was after one week of the USA recognition of Israel. On November 1, 1949, "*Ismet Inönü"* stated " *we established political relations with newly growing state Israel, we hope that this state becomes a factor of peace and independence in the Near East"*. In 1952,Turkey and Israel exchanged the diplomatic representation on the level of Ambassadors.[2]

In 1958, Turkey and Israel signed a security treaty. Mossad established an intelligence center in Turkey. It provided technical and training assistance to the "MIT". Mossad realized Turkish Position and its relations with Islamic countries in order to eliminate the Arab embargo on Israel.[3]

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[1] فكرت نامق عبد الفتاح، سياسة العراق الخارجية في المنطقة العربية، مصدر سبق ذكره، 1981، ص ص 303-310.

∗ "Israel" as a state is not recognized by all Arab states, except three Arab countries (Jordan, Egypt and Moritania) have diplomatic relations with Israel. The Arabs consider it as an occupation entity for the Arab lands in Palestine.

[2] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, pp. 132-133.
Mohammed Naji Isa, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Arab Issues, 2002-2006, Study of Iraqi and Palestinian Crises, Unpublished Master Thesis, Institute of Arab Studies and Research, Cairo, 2007,p.219.

[3] خليل ابراهيم الناصري، التطورات المعاصرة في العلاقات العربية- التركية، مطبعة الراية، بغداد، 1990، ص 203.

The first official visit by a Turkish Foreign Minister since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1949 took place on November 14, 1993. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin paid an official visit to Israel.[1]

Çetin delayed his visit twice owing to Turkish domestic politics and Arab-Israeli conflic. These two postponements of Çetin's visit demonstrated that the extent to which Turkish-Israeli relations can be influenced by the Arab- Israeli conflict.[2]

Turkish- Israeli strategic relations were influenced in the 1990s by the following rationales: first, following the First Gulf War, the Kurdish insurgency exacerbated Turkey's not only in internal economic conditions but its relations with other states. In order to maintain its fight against the PKK, Turkey needed to employ the necessary combating equipment that includes various social and political measures which were exposed to harsh criticism of the Western World. For instance, as a consequence of their public pressure generating from the PKK's sympathizers' activities, Germany, Norway and Belgium decided to put an end to their arms sale to Turkey in 1995. Turkey particularly had chosen Israel because Israel is technologically an advanced country owing to its sophisticated weapon production and owing to its assistance to Turkey without putting any reserve or attaching human rights to its weapon sales; second, the peace process that began in Madrid in 1991 opened up a new foreign policy opportunity for Turkey. This process freed Turkey from the difficulty of balancing between Arab countries and Israel.[3] Israel reached peace agreements with PLO in 1993, and with Jordan 1994.[4]

Third, Turkey realizes the influence of Israeli government and lobbies in the USA. Turkey has always been well aware of Israel's strong influence in the international arena. Furthermore, Turkey wanted to improve its ties with Israel so as to offset the activities of Greek and Armenian lobbying groups through the support of the Jewish lobbies in the United States. Fourth, Turkish fear of the potential for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. Fifth, the Turkish military, whose imprints on Turkish foreign policy decisions were increasingly felt during those years, was regarded to have had an

[1] Alptekin Dursunoğlu, Stratijik Ittifak, Türkiye- İsrael İlişkileri Öyküsü, Anka Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2000, p.51.
[2] Mehmet Mücahit Ekinci, Turkish- Israeli relations, op, cit,p. 11.
[3] Mehmet Mücahit Ekinci, Turkish- Israeli relations, past and present, Ankamat matbaacılık Sanayim Ankara,2011,pp. 107-108.
[4] Alptekin Dursunoğlu, stratijik ittifak, Türkiye- İsrael ilişkileri Öyküsü, Anka Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2000.p. 50.
∗ during the JDP government the role of military in political issues has decreased.

upper hand in enhancing the relations with Israel. Although civil authorities had gained control over the governments, the military through the national Security Council continued to control the decision making process on two significant internal problems, Kurdish separatism and pro- Islamic government. Indeed, the military increased its influence on the foreign policy decision making process,* and supported the developments of close ties with a strong "state" like Israel in order to be able to perform efficient policies to secure Turkish national security. The modernization requirements of the Turkish army also contributed to the development of the Turkish – Israeli relations.[1]

Turkish government has always stated that Turkey does not form allaince with Israel against Arab World. The Turkish- Israeli relations are for the service of Turkish economic, political and military. The word "military" does not mean any foreign aims. however, to improve Turkish military capabalities. İn this way, Israel like any other state that Turkey has relations with it.[2]

Turkey and Israel have concluded military agreements in 1996. The first and most important agreement is the military training and co-operation agreement (AEIA) that was signed on 23 February 1996. This agreement has included the following points:[3]

a) A chieving cooperation on various levels on the basis of the exchange of personnel and their expertise.

b) Exchanging the visits between military academies, unites and camps.

c) The applicating of training and exercises.

d) Sending observers to follow up military exercises in the two countries.

e) Exchanging officials to collect and share information, especially in social and cultural fields that included military history, military museums, and military archives.

f) Exchanging the visits by military naval vessels.

The training of the Turkish and Israeli air forces in each other's air space was important. Within the scop of the agreement, both sides have agreed to hold air exercises

[1] Mehmet Mücahit Ekinci, Turkish- Israeli relations, op, cite,p. 109.

[2] عبد الحليم غزالي، الاسلاميون الجدد والعلمانية الاصولية في تركيا، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 90.
Abdulhalim Gazali, the New Islamists and Extremist Secularism in Turkey: in the Shadow of the Silent Revolution, Alshrooq International Library, Cairo, 2007, p. 90.

[3] Mehmet Mücahit Ekinci, Turkish- Israeli Relations, op, cite, p. 116.

eight time annually, four in each state. İsrael has benefited more from these joint trainings as Turkey has larger air space compared to that of Israel. Within this agreement, Israeli pilots began to be acquaint with areas or countries bordering Turkey, particularly that are hostile to Israel, (Iraq, Iran and Syria).[1]

The second agreement is the Defense Industry Cooperation Agreement that was signed on 28 August, 1996. This agreement has provided the technology transfer and training of technicians and reaserchers. Actually, this was a framework agreement which also called for intelligence sharing and holding of regular meetings between the security establishments of the two countries for the evaluation of the regional threats. Therefore, it was called "*strategic dialogue".*[2]

From the economic aspects Turkey signed a free trade agreement with Israel in 1996. When the "JDP" came to power the economic relations between them was 1, 2 billion, in 2008 reached 3, 6 billion, in 2009 Turkish exports to Israel 1, 5 billions and imports 1, 7 billions.[3]

The geopolitical scope of the joint Israeli- Turkish military operation was also extended to include Lebanon and Syria in order to confront the (so-called) Radical Islamic groups. Turkey's objective is to project military power and influence across the entire ill-defined Kurdistan nationalist activity into its territory from acrossing its borders. Israeli cooperation places Turkey in an advantageous strategic position when compared to Iraq and Iran. However, successive Turkish governments have made it very clear that Turkey will only cross the border into its neighbor's territory if and when its interests are threatened. This applies particularly to the Kurdish question.[4]

However, Israeli motives could be summarized: first, Israel is as follows country, which is surrounded and greatly outnumbered by Arab states. In an atmosphere of growing suspicion and distrust of the peace, the establishment of close relations with non- Arab and Muslim states was a priority of Israel. It is argued that Turkey might serve as a bridge to other Muslim states, second, Israel also believes that closer relations with a state like Turkey that has a large military, is west-oriented, and has a majority of Muslim population

[1] Mehmet Mücahit Ekinci, Turkish- Israeli Relations, op, cite, ,p. 117.
[2] Mehmet Mücahit Ekinci, Turkish- Israeli Relations, op, cite ,p. 117.
[3] Hasan Kösebalaban, Türk Diş Politikası, BigBang Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, SS. 336-337.
[4] Ahmad Shikara, Iran, Iraq and Turkey: Stratic Impact on Gulf Security, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2001, pp. 20-21.

that this would improve its position in the region and its strategic interests,[1] third, security concerns of Israel contributed to the development of the strategic relations between the two countries. Israel was concerned about Iraq, Iran, and Syrian's potential to produce weapons of mass destruction. The cooperation enabled Israel to fly in Turkish airspace, because Israel needs offshore strategic depth to sustain a credible and secure second strike capability. That is, in order to deliver preemptive or preventive strikes against ballistic missile launching sites, Israel could also take advantage of Turkish space, fourth, the trade relations, Israel has financially benefited from the arms and technology transfers sales to Turkey. Turkey has served as a huge market for Israeli high- technology products; fifth, Israel has attempted to have a firm hand in central Asia through the good offices of Turkey since Turkey has taken advantage of common ethnic and cultural ties with the new Republics of central Asia. Israel wanted to establish good economic and diplomatic relations with these Republics in order to prevent Iranian influences in the region, which might enable Iran to have access to nuclear weapons and the technology of central Asian Republics.[2]

Israel also has realized the Turkish role in achieving peace and security in the region. Ankara plays a role as a mediator of Arab- Israel, or Israel- Palestinian struggle.[3] Israel also can use Turkey to offset the hostile regimes in Iraq, Syria and Iran. Turkey can use Israel to stressful international position challenged by culturally aloof Europe.[4]

However, the Turkish- Israeli cooperation had impacted on Turkish-Islamic relations also on Turkey. At the Tehran Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in December of 1997. With the support of the host country, Syria and a number of other Arab countries at the summit's plenary session voiced strong criticism against Turkey and Turkey's relations with Israel. Then President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, found himself having to leave the summit Prematurely.[5]

From the prospective of the Arab states, serious concern is voiced over the strong Israeli- Turkish strategic ties because such a development may lead to profound Israeli

[1] Mehmet Mücahit Ekinci, Turkish- Israeli Relations, op, cite,.pp. 109-110.
[2] Mehmet Mücahit Ekinci, Turkish- Israeli Relations, op, cite,pp. 110-111.
[3] عبد الحليم غزالي، الاسلاميون الجدد والعلمانية الاصولية في تركيا، ظلال الثورة الصامتة، مكتبة الشروق الدولية، القاهرة، 2007، ص 90.
[4] Ahmad Shikara, Iran, Iraq and Turkey, op, cite, p. 19.
[5] Kemal Kirişci, The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State, New Perspectives on Turkey, No. 40 , 2009, p. 31.

influence in the Middle East and the Arab Gulf. Israel has established through Turkey, a window of opportunity and influence over both Iraq and Iran. The latter perceives Turkish – Israeli technological and military cooperation threat to its own territorial integrity. İn this context, Israel has edged dangerously close to the Iranian border. İn theory, Turkish cooperation would greatly facilitate Israeli air strikes on Iran's non- conventional weapons infrastructure. There is also another important dimension, that of the Turkey- Israel- US military cooperation, which creates an environment of increasing tension and bitter relations between Turkey and Iran. Such tension could adversely affect Gulf security.[1]

However**,** the Arab countries always hope that any development of Arab- Turkish relations shoud not be based on the nature of ruling political power in Turkey based upon the interests and the civilization of both parties.[2]

However, Turkish-Israeli relations have deteriorated when the Gaza war was started in the final days of 2008, which constituted the real turning point in Israeli-Turkish relations. Turkish officials perceived Israel's actions not only as a blow against regional peace and stability but also "a show disrespect for Turkey's peace efforts" referring to Turkey's efforts at mediation between Israel and Syria, which were disrupted by the invasion of Gaza.[3]

However, the turning point of deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations was in January 2009 the reasons were: **a)** Israeli military operation against Gaza were 926 Palestinians were killed and 1417 injured, **b)** in Davos conference the Prime Minister Erdoğan critisized Israeli President "Shimon Peres" by saying "*you know well how to kill children*" and he left the conference.[4]

c) In January, 2010, Israel summoned the Turkish Ambassador to protest on Turkish TRT T.V which was showing an advertisement how the Israeli armed forces killed the

[1] Ahmad Shikara, Iran, Iraq and Turkey, op, cite, pp. 19-20.

[2] محمد نور الدين، وجهة نظر عربية في التعاون والتنسيق العربي- التركي في (الحوار العربي- التركي بين الماضي والحاضر) مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت، 2010، ص 153.

Muhammed Nooraldeen, Arabic points of view in Arabic –Turkish cooperation and coordination (Arabic-Turkish dialog between past and present), Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2010,p. 53.

[3] Özlem Tür, Turkey-Syria Relations between Enimity and Amity, Raymond Hinnebusch (ed), Ashgate, England, 2013,p. 186.

[4] Hasan Kösebalaban, Türk Diş Politikası, BigBang Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, P.340.

Palestinian children. During his meeting with the Israeli Foreign Minister " *Danyy Ayalon*" the Turkish Ambassador was sitting on lower chair.[1]

d) On May 31, 2010 Israeli forces attacked "Mavi Marma" the flotria which was carrying humanitarian assistance to Gaza, in this operation 9 Turkish citizens were killed.[2]

[1] Hasan Kösebalaban, Türk Diş Politikası, BigBang Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, P. 341
[2] Hasan Kösebalaban, Türk Diş Politikası, BigBang Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, P.342

Conclusion

Iraq's political idiology was close to the Eastern block since the establishment of the Republic in the 1958. Iraq played a vital role in the Middle East, it was considered the leader of Arab world by adapting the Palestinian issue in the international forums and supporting other Arab issues. However, this policy had been making it to engage in competition with Egypt which aimed to play a leading role in the Arab World.

The President of the Republic was the main character who had the power in foreign policy until 2003. In 2003 Iraq's system changed into the parliamentary. The role of President of the Republic after 2003 became honorary and not exercise the real powers.

The Prime Minister became the most affective person in the foreign policy. Furthermore, the role of Parliament should not be neglected in the foreign policy making, as a declrataion of war and observation of the government's foreign policy .

Turkish foreign policy was based on the realism thinking. The security issue has always been the priority of any Turkish government. Although the Turkish constitution has clarified the powers in foreign policy decision, the personality of the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister has more influential than constitutional rules sometimes.

Since the ethno-social and cultural ties between Iraqi Turkmens and Turkey, Turkey realized that the Turkmens are the counter balance to the Kurdish influence in the Kirkuk. The Turkmens role with the Arabs could stop any Kurdish ambition to join Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region.

Turkey's relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has changed since 2003. However, the developments in internal, regional and international environment like the war on terrorism and KRG efforts in this war and many Euorpean countries deal with KRG as a semi-independent state.

However, Iraqi Kurdistan Region is significant to Ankara for strategical and tactical reasons: politically, Ankara could use Kurdistan as a card against Baghdad in any tension which might occur in the relations between the two countries. Iraqi Kurdistan is beneficial to Turkey in peace process and countering the PKK. Turkey needs energy resources and Iraqi Kurdistan is good environment to provide these needs, Iraqi Kurdistan is the gate to the Iraq, and Iraq is good market to Turkey.

There are some voices in Turkey which still have claims in Mosul and Kirkuk. In Iraq there are also some voices that consider Turkey the power that has ambitions in the Mosul and Kirkuk. However, both countries have to leave like these suspisions because they could be obstacled of improvement the relations.

The Baghdad Pact was one of Britain and USA strategy containments of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. It had isolated Iraq from the Arab World. Iraq on its side considered this Pact a good strategy to deter Soviet's threats and gain military and political assistance from Britain. For Turkey the Baghdad Pact was a good opprtunity to get military assistance and deter soviet's threats, in addition to promot Turkey's position in the Western community.

Iraqi-Turkish relations had been improved during the Baathist party. Both countries had sharing security dangers like increasing the Kurdish armed movement in both countries.

Water issue will still an obstacle to the Iraqi-Turkish relations. Each country has its political, legal and humanitarian justifications; however, this issue should be resolved according to the international law, good willingness and mutual interests.

Turkish-Israeli relations have impacted on Arab-Turkey's relations. The Arabs considered Israel as an occupated entity. They considered Turkish-Israeli military cooperation threats their national security.

However, we studied in this chapter the principles of Iraqi and Turkish foreign policy and decision making process in the Iraq and Turkey foreign policy. Moreover, the factors that impacted on Iraqi-Turkish relations. In the next chapter the historical background of the Iraqi- Turkish relations since the 1920s up to the 1990 will be discussed.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE IRAQI -TURKISH RELATIONS UP TO 1990

This chapter discuses the developments of Iraqi–Turkish relations since the establishment of Iraq and Turkey in the 1920s. It also analyses the Impact of Mosul issue on Iraqi-Turkish relations during the 1920s, and the British, and the League of Nations role in the settlement of this issue.

Furthermore, this chapter deals with relations between the two countries during the 1930s and signing of the Saad Abad Pact in 1937, and the impact of the Second World War on Iraqi- Turkish relations. It also explains the affect of political changes in Turkey in 1950 after the success of the democratic party in the elections and the new course of the relations with Iraq was started, in addition to discussing the 1958 developments. Iraq witnessed a revolution which changed its political system from Monarchy into Republican.

In addition to, this chapter explains Iraqi- Turkish relations during the 1960s and the role of the Baathist Party in the improvement of such relations. The 1970 developments in the regional and international environments which contributed conducting the relations between Arabs and Turkey. In addition to the Turkey's attitude towards Iran- Iraq war during the period 1980-1988.

2.1. Iraq, Turkey and the Middle East 1918-1950

Although some Arabs have been dissatisfied with Ottoman's rule, they have never thought of the separation from the Ottoman Empire. They asked for reforms in the political and economic system. During the period (1908-1918) the relations between the Arabs and

Turks were tensified and changed towards the requirement of independence for the Arab area within the Ottoman Empire.[1]

The Turkification programme applicated by Turkey "*Fatat*" association has been a strong motive for the Arab leaders to show concern in Arab nationalism and independence. The national agitation, the imagination and feelings in the Empire which had contained many nationalities led to new independence.[2] In addittion the policy of "*Jamal Basha*" towards the Arab nationalists and the support, encouragment of the alliance to the Arab to revolution against the Ottoman Empire,[3] led to the interets of the great powers England, France and Russia which motivated them to agree on the "Sykes-Bicot" Pact in May 1916 to divide the Arab area.[4]

Series of letters were exchanged between Alsharif Hussein Emir of Mecca and English representative in Egypt Sir "*Henry McMahone*". They agreed to declare the revolution against the Ottoman Empire. Britain supported the Arab tribes by weapons.[5] The existence of Faisal in "Sham" was aimed to start the War from there and extend it to other Arab areas.[6]

In the light of these developments "*Jamal Pasha*" adopted a number of pre-empative policies against the revolution. He sent a delegation to the Arab tribes to convine them to support the Ottoman rule and fight against the revolution.[7]

Jamal Pasha tried to clarify the real aims of "Sykes-Bicot" Pact. He sent three letters: first to King Abdullah Bin Alhussein on January 5, 1917, the second to the Faisal

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[1] زين نور الدين زين، نشوء القومية العربية مع دراسة تاريخية في العلاقات العربية- التركية، دار النهار للنشر، بيروت، 1968، ص 81.

Zain Nooraldin Zain, Growing the Arab Nationalism with the Historical Study of Arab-Turkish Relations, Dar Al-Nahar of Publication, Lebanon, 1968,p. 81.

[2] زين نور الدين زين، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 90.

[3] زين نور الدين زين، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 122.

[4] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, pp. 19-21.

[5] د.محمد علي الأحمد، سقوط الخلافة، عرب بلاد الشام والدولة العثمانية، دار حمورابي للنشر والتوزيع، عمان،ط1،2007 ،ص45.

Mohammed Ali Alhmad, the collaps of the Caliphate, the Arab of Sham and the Ottoman state, Dar-Hamorabi of Publication and Distrupution, Amman, 2007, p. 45.

[6] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, p. 20.

[7] د. إسماعيل احمد ياغي، الشيخ محمود شاكر، تاريخ العالم الإسلامي الحديث والمعاصر، مكتبة العبيكان، الرياض، ج1، ط5،2006، ص121.

Ismael Ahmed Yaqi, Alsheik Mahmood Shakir, Modern and Contomporary History of Islamic World, Al-Obekan Libirary, Al-Riyad, 2006, p. 121.

Bin Hussein; the third to Jafar Alaskari on November 26, 1917. These letters referred to the Islamic ties between the Arabs and the Ottomans, and the alliance plans to betray the Arabs.[1] In addition to the alliance plane to put Palestine and Mesopotamia under British mandate, and Syria under French rule. Then they would encourage the Jewish Migration to the Palestine in order to establish the "*Israel state*".[2]

After the establishment of the Iraq's state in 1921, Iraq under Faisal leadership, he tried to improve its relations with Turkey.

In the conduct of a foreign policy, Faisal's regim sought to formulate a number of priorities which were of considerable importance to the existence of the Iraqi state as a sovereign and territorially integrated entity in his quest for the establishment over the Mosul question.[3]

Faisal realized that the settlement of Mosul became a salient question in the Middle Eastern politics. The importance of Mosul province to Turkey, British and Iraq is strategic and politico-economic terms are very clear indeed.[4] Faisal visited Mosul in may 1923, in his speech, he stated *" they (the Turks) well know fale this claim is and they know too, that there are twice as many Arabs under their rule as there are Turks in Iraq. Truly there are Turks in Arbil and in Kirkuk, but have they forgotten that the people in Jazirate Ibin Umar, some of the people of Mardin and environs of Urfa are pure Arabs?... iam convinced that their claims were only political stratagen and that our neighbours know that Iraq is indivisible and that Mosul and its environs does not differ from Baghdad and Basra in its religion and nationality. The interest of these territories are interdepent and it is impossible for the people of Mosul to contemplate separation from their brothers...."*.[5]

However, the Mosul city was significant to Turkey. It was ruled by Ottomans for four centuries. This issue took long negotiations during the Lausanne conference which began on November 20, 1922 and ended on February 4, 1923. The second phase of the conference began on April 23, 1923 and was concluded with the signature of the peace

[1] د. محمد علي الأحمد، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص549.
[2] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, pp. 19-20.
[3] Ahmed A.R.Shikara, Iraqi Politics, op, cite, p.68.
[4] Ahmed A.R.Shikara, Iraqi Politics, op, cite p.80.
[5] Ahmed A.R.Shikara, Iraqi Politics, op, cite. pp.81-82.

treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923. According to this treaty, the Mosul question was left to direct negotiations between Turkey, Iraq and Great Britain.[1]

As stated in the 3rd Article of the treaty of Lausanne in the event of no agreement being reached between the Turkish, Iraq and the Britain governments within nine months, the dispute would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.[2]

On August 6, 1924, the dispute was transferred to the League of Nations by the British government. On September 30, 1924, the Council of the League established a special Commission∗ to gather local opinion on whether people of Mosul wanted to be included in Iraq or Turkey. This Commission prepared a report and submitted it to the League of Nations on July 16, 1925. According to this report Mosul would be incorporated into Iraq.[3]

Based on this report on December 16, 1925 the Council of the League of Nations, took the decision of leaving territory for Iraq. On March 11, 1926, the Council announced that the decision taken on December 16, 1926, was final.[4]

Prior to the arrival of the commission of inquiry in june 1924, Faisal reiterated his conviction that Mosul consitituted an oraganic part of Iraq, the view was drafted and then submitted to the league of commission in the following maner *" I consider that Mosul is to Iraq as the head is to the rest of the body, and it is my un shakeable conviction that though the question is only one of fixing a boundary between Iraq and Turkey, it is nevertheless and in fact the question of Iraq as a whole. Accordingly, the happiness of misery of four millions of human beings is placed in the hands of the members of your honourable commission".*[5]

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[1] د. فاروق صالح العمر، المعاهدات العراقية- البريطانية وأثرها في السياسة الداخلية (1922-1948)، منشورات وزارة الاعلام العراقية، بغداد، 1977، ص 145.

Farouk Salih Al-Omer, the Anglo -Iraqi- Treaties and their Affect the Internal Policy 1922-1948, Iraqi Ministry of Media, Baghdad, 1977, p.145.

[2] Alev Dilek Aydin, Mosul Question (1918-1926) Unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, June 2004,p.4.

∗ The commission consisted of three members agreed on by the two parties, the head was the former Hangarian Prime Minister, Swedish Minister Council in Romania and the retired officer in the Blgium military. The three members were belonged to the small states. One was ally to Britain, the second to Turkey and the third once was neutralised.

[3] Alev Dilek Aydin, Mosul Question, op, cite, p.5.

[4] Alev Dilek Aydin, Mosul questionm op, cite, p.5.

[5] Ahmed A.R.Shikara, Iraqi Politics, op, cite, p.83.

Although the majorıty of populatıon voted to join Iraq; there were also some of Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds supporting the idea of joining Turkey. On January 3, 1925, The " Manchester Guardian Journal" mentioned that the people who supported Turkey were two groups: first, the former officials in the Ottoman era who lost their jobs in the new regime; second, the groups that supported Turkey for political and religous reasons. They were from the old generation, and they considered that the Ottomans as symbol of Islamic political power.[1]

In compliance with Faisal's "*Good Neighbour*" policy, Turkey has joind the British and Iraqi governments including atripartite treaty in Ankara on June 5, 1926, to confirm the brussel line as a frontier line and to strenghten anglo-Iraqi-Turkish relations interests.[2] However, the brussel line became the borders between Iraq and Turkey as the League of Nations had decided and Turkey would take a 10% share from the revenue of Mosul oil for 25 years.[3]

It seems that Britain transferred the Mosul issue to the League of Nation because its realization that if the League resolved the Mosul issue by joining it to Turkey there would be no problem to Britain promises to the Arab by establishing their independence since the resolution issued by the league, and if Mosul joined Iraq that would explain Britain's support to the new Iraqi state.

Britain supported Iraq in Mosul issue as both countries signed oil an agreement including Article that if any oil company was established in Iraq, this would be under the British administration and Iraq would get % 20 from the company's royalities, but Iraq was obliged to abandon %20 in 1925 treaty for Britain promised Iraq to support its membership in the League of Nations, and refused all Turkish claims in Mosul.[4]

However, what is mentioned previously means, that Britain has supported the idea of Mosul to be restored to Iraq. It realised the significance of Turkey's geopolitical location

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[1] عزيز قادر الصمانجي، التأريخ السياسي لتركمان العراق، دار الساقي، لبنان، 1999، ص ص 79-80.

[2] Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin, the Historical Direction of Turkey's Foreign Policy towards the Middle East, Adam Akademi, Ankara, 2011, p. 68.

[3] Alev Dilek Aydin, Mosul Questionm op, cite, p.6.

[4] عصام الجلبي، النفط مرتكز اساسي في العلاقات البينية العراقية- التركية، في (العرب وتركيا، تحديات الحاضر ورهانات المستقبل) مجموعة باحثين، المركز العربي للابحاث ودراسة السياسات، الدوحة، 2012، ص 318.

Esam Aljalabi "et al", Oil is a Basic factor in Iraq- Turkish Relations in (The Arabs and Turkey, Challenged of the presentand Reckonings of the Futures), Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Al-Doha, 2012, p. 318.

as “abuffer state” in the Middle East after the growing of Soviet ideology. For this reason it reached the financial settelment in the oil issue with Turkey.[1]

Turkish claims on Mosul are based on its following points of view: first, Mosul was an integral part of Turkey and it was included in Turkish national Pact, second, Mosul and its Followers, Kirkuk and Sulaymanyia are mostly populated by Kurds and Turkmen (Turks) and the number of Arabs. According to Turkey, the Kurds are not different from Turks in terms of race, religion and tradition, third, the Kurds want to live with Turks and when the Turkish government was formed, it contained both of them and the Kurdish members in the “TGNA” had the same rights, fourth, Turkey believed that there is no legal basis for British mandate in Iraq since it was a part of the Ottoman Empire, fifth, Iraq had stayed under the Turkish rule since the 16 Century, sixth, Mosul is dependent on Turkey economically and close to it than to Iraq. It means that Turkey is dependent on political, ethnical, geographical and historical justifications which reflected its own points of view regarding Mosul.[2]

The Turkish claims could not stand according to the following legal and historical realities: Mosul is one of the oldest homelands that Arabs have lived in with the Assyrians in the year 1080 BC. The Assyrians had made Mosul as their Capital. The Arabs called it (Mosul) for being the concourse of several routes linking East and West.[3] The majority of Mosul population voted to join Iraq. Not only Mosul had remained under the Ottoman Empire; many states in Asia, Africa and Europe were under that rule**.** Turkey agreed to get %10 from Iraqi oil royalties for 25 years.[4]

In 1926 the Anglo-Iraqi- Turkish treaty resolved the Mosul issue for Iraq after Ankara’s recognation in the borders between Iraq and Turkey.[5] The Turkish government had received 500,000 pounds from Iraq as debts since Iraq was under Ottomans.[6]

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[1] وليام ستيفرز، السيادة والنفط (العراق- تركيا- والنظام الدولي الانكلو- امريكي 1918-1930) ترجمة د. علي البديري، بيت الحكمة العراقي، بغداد، 2010، ص 323.

William Stephers, the Soveregnity and Oil (Iraq- Turkey and Anglo-American international system 1918-1930) Ali Albedyri (trans), Beit Al-Hikma Al-Iraqi, Baghdad, 1010, p. 323

[2] Alev Dilek Aydin, Mosul Question, op, cite,pp. 39-42.

[3] www.mosulbaladiya.gov.iq\en\mosul-history.php

[4] www.almustakbalpaper.net\old\news\php. for more information look at table 2 in the appendix

[5] بيار مصطفى سيف الدين، تركيا وكوردستان العراق " الجاران الحائران، دار الزمان للطابعة والنشر والتوزيع، سوريا، 2009، ص 157.

Bayar Mustafa Saefaldin, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, “the hesitant neighbours” Dar Al-Zaman for Printing, Publishing and Distirbuting” Syria, 2009, p. 157.

[6] www.almustakbalpaper.net\old\news\php.

In order to win the trust of other countries, Turkey had approached for interaction especially with neighboring countries.[1] For instance, it appointed in 1929 "Tahir Lütfi" as a first Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad. [2]

In light of Atatürk's invitation, the First Faisal King visited Turkey on July 4, 1930.[3]

In December 1930 Faisal instructed the Prime Minister "*Nouri Al-Said*" to visit Turkey who was accompanied by the Minister of Finance. After the mutual visits both countries signed re-patriation, trade and residents agreements in January 1932.[4]

In October 1936, a crucial turning point occured in the Iraqi policy as a result of the first military Coup, a new regime headed by (Baqir Sidqi- Hikmat Sulayman) as being Iraqis nationalists orientations assumed the political power. The new ruler emphasized the importance of Iraq's political independence and for its need for socio-economy developments which should, perferably, be designed on the basis of Turkish patterns.[5]

Sulayman had close relations with non-Arab countries particulary Turkey, and became even more embarrasing when the latter sought to settle its perceived national interests at the expense of Arab national aspirations. That has been explained as a policy with the Turks to express their hostility towards the proposed establishment of the (United Arab State) in the fertile crescent.[6]

Sulayman government has played a mediation role between Syria and Turkey when their relations witnessed tension due to the borders claims. The Turkish Prime Minister "*Ismet Inönü*" asked the Iraqi Prime Minister "Nouri Al-Said" to convine the Syrian government to grant the Rights of Turkmen in Alexanderette.[7]

In July 1937 "Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan" signed the "Saadabad Pact".[8] This document obliged the four states to preserve common frontiers, not to interfere in one

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[1] William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy (1874-2000), op, cite, P.62

[2] Bağdat Elçiliği, 2166 Nolu ve 22 Eylül 1929 Tarihli. Ve 448 Nolu 24\11\1929 Tarihli Note.Look at appendix 1.

[3] Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin, Türk-Irak İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Boyutu, ASAM, Ankara, 2003, s. 219.

[4] المقدم شاكر صابر، تاريخ الصداقة بين العراق وتركيا، ان مياه دجلة والفرات تربط العراق وتركيا برابطة الاخوة، مطبعة دار المعرفة، بغداد، 1955، ص162.

[5] Ahmed A.R.Shikara, Iraqi politics , op, cite, p.131.

[6] Ahmed A.R.Shikara, Iraqi politics , op, cite, p.132.

[7] د. علي عبد الواحد حسون الصائغ، موقف دول ميثاق سعد آباد من الاحداث الاقليمية (1937-1945)، تموز، دمشق، 2013، ص 114.

[8] Aptülahat Akğin, Atatürk'ün diş politika ilkeleri ve diplomasisi, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara,1991,S,29. For more information look at Mustafa Bilgin, Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye' nin Orta Doğu Politikası (1923-1938), Tatav, Istanbul, 2003, pp. 21-25.

another's internal affairs, to commit no aggression against one another territory, and consult each other on all matters of common interest.[1] The members of the pact wished to extend their membership. Iraq insisted that Saudi Arabia also be included in the Pact. However, because of the suspicions of King Ibn Saud over the activities of Nouri Al-Said. Saudi Arabia has never been asked to participate in the Pact. Despite that Turkey does not share borders with Afghanistan, it elected it. Turkey preferred the membership for the countries that share their borders, and avoiding provoking the Soviet Union. In fact, Turkey did not support the idea of membership of additional Arab countries, since the strategic factor that could enable its domination on the pact. On the contrary Turkey called Egypt to the membership, even though there were no common borders.[2]

This pact was a Turkish project began to start from 1920s onwards as a result of a policy aimed 'to search for security and cooperation with the Turkey's Balkan neighbors in the West and collaboration with Iran, Afghanistan and Arab states in the East. With this policy Turkey first wanted to stabilize the geography around herself where she belonged to by overcoming political and strategic problems of the region and then to reinforce its international stance by undertaking a leadership role in the Middle East.[3]

As the documents reveal, the main motivation among the Sadabad Powers was to set up a collective security device free from Great Powers intervention. Since the mid-1920s the states of the Middle East have been caught between the USSR in the North and Britain in the South. Because of the pressures from the Great Powers the small states could not adopt an independent foreign poicy. Though these states wanted freedom of actions and political maneuvers in international relations they were unable to do so alone and they might, in their idea, manage to do it by means of collective cooperation.[4]

However, the "Saadabad Pact" was to ensure peace and security in the Near East.[5] It was important for the history of the Middle Eastern politics. The "Saadabad Pact" was the first Pact in which the initiative came from the region itself. For Turkey while the Pact

[1] William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, op, cite, P.62.
[2] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 2008, p. 29. Look at also Mustafa Bilgin, British attitute towards Turkey's policies in the Middle East, Turkish year Book, 2002, pp. 264-265.
[3] Mustafa. Sıtkı Bilgin, 'The Historical Direction of Turkey's foreign Policy Towards the Middle East' ADAM, c.I, no.1.
[4] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Acamdemic Studies, New York, 2008, p. 29.
[5] Edward Reginald and Vere Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy (1918-1948), Ambilly, 1950.p. 101.

increased its international status as Britain began to regard it "a leader of Eastern nations". It was established as a basis for further developments of Iraqi- Turkish relations which led to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact almost two decades later. Moreover, the Sadabad Pact was used by Turkey as a bargaining counter to show its regional strategic importance to Britain and France before and during the discussions related to the Triple Alliance.[1]

Although there had been some Western efforts to make the Pact active, President Inönü turned down the Anglo- French requests believing that they would not add anything to Turkey's security and could only bear its additional commitments. When Britain and France proposed to convert the Sadabad Pact into a military alliance in October 1939 Turkey thus responded that the Pact had only a consultative function and could not be turned into the alliance.[2]

On the 12th of January, 1937 "Ismet Inönü" himself gave the first talk in the Arabic language in which he stated that "*Turkey maintains and will maintain the friendliest relations with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen*".[3]

Once "*Rashid Ali*" had assumed the Premiership on March 31, 1940, the radical elements in his groups advocated the adaption of a neutralist policy, following the swift Nazi victories in a number of Euorpean countries. "Rashid Ali" became convinced that Germany would win the war and in that it would eventually lose Britain's influential position in the Middle East including Iraq. They threrefore, looked for Axis support as a means of obtaining important British concessions with regard to Iraqi demands for the emancipation of Syria and Palestine from Mandate.[4]

From the point of view of Turkish political officials, their country followed a friendly but neutral policy towards the Allies. As back as June 1940, the Turkish Foreign Minister "Sarajoğlu" advised the Iraqi delegation in Ankara (Nouri Al-Said, Iraq's Foreign Minister, and Naji Shawkat, the Minister of Justice) to follow a policy of neutrality similar to that pursued by Turkey. It did not therefore, encourage Iraq, to begin a rebellion against Britain, particularly as Turkey remaind neutral. Turkey in the event of an Anglo- Iraqi Wars

[1] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, Politics and Influence in the Early Cold War Era, Tauris Acamdemic Studies, New York, 2008, p. 40.
[2] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, op, cite, p. 78.
[3] Edward Reginald and Vere Hodge, Turkish Foreign Policy (1918-1948), Ambilly, 1950.p. 101.
[4] Ahmed A.R.Shikara, Iraqi politics, op, cite, p.168.

could block substantial military supplies, which were likely to be given by Germany to Iraq.[1]

However, on March 29, 1946, Iraq and Turkey signed a treaty which consisted of political articles in which Iraq and Turkey agreed to respect each other's independence and territorial intergrity. It settled their disputes with each other or with third parties in accordance with provisions of the UN Charter. Two convensions and six protocols were also included in the treaty. Some important provisions of the protocols were: the creation of Turkish institute at Baghdad, Turkish broadcasts from Baghdad and Arabic ones from Ankara (protocol 3); new telegraph and telephone lines to be created between Ankara and Baghdad (protocol 4); Turkey and Iraq to give the other certain port facilities at Alexandertta and Basra and each country to give the other most favoured nation treatment in respect of customs duties (protocol 5).[2]

2.2. Iraqi- Turkish Relations During Democrat Party Period 1950-1960

Since 1923, the Republican People's Party (RPP) continued to rule Turkey until 1950 in a single political party system. After the Second World War, the Turkish political system evolued towards a multiparty system affected by a number of internal and external factors. Four RPP members of parliament, *(Celal Bayar, Fuat Köprülü, R. Koraltan and Adnan Menderes)*, either resigned or were expelled by their party in 1946. They formed a new political party called the "Democrat Party" (DP), on January 7, 1946. It surprisingly succeded within a short period and could win a large majority in the general elections of May 14, 1950, obtaining 416 out of available 487 seats in the TGNA. They managed to defeat the RPP despite the continuous respect for its founder Atatürk, and the charisma of İnönü, Atatürk's successor. At the end of the elections the RPP transfired power to DP in an orderly manner.[3]

The DP's first chairman "*Celal Bayar*" was elected as the third President of Turkey by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on May 22, 1950. One of the founders of the DP, "*Adnan Menderes*", replaced Bayar as the chairman of the party simultaneously. His first government obtained the vote of confidence from the Assembly on June 2, 1950. The

[1] Ahmed A.R.Shikara, Iraqi Politics, op, cite, p.172.
[2] Mustafa Bilgin, Britain and Turkey in the Middle East, op, cite, p. 86.
[3] Cihat Göktepe, 1960 Revolution in Turkey and the British Policy Towards Turkey, the Turkish yearbook, Vol, XXX, 2000, p. 140.

transfer of the governmental power from the RPP to the DP became known as the "White Revolution" (Ak Devrim) for the DP supporters.[1]

During the first period of DP government, it was sensitive to the religious feeling of the public. In 1950 the DP abolished the 1928 law prohibiting the use of the Arabic form of call to prayer. The entire country immediately dropped the Turkish translation that the earlier law had required. The building of Mosques had been increased. In 1949 the RPP had agreed to allow religious instruction in schools that parents should be requested for their children in writing. The Democrats have altered this to provide religious instruction for all Muslim children unless their parents have requested in writing that the children had not received.[2]

The internal developments in Turkey influenced Iraqi- Turkish relations positively. On October 6, 1952, Iraq had changed its mission in Ankara on the level of Ambassador,[3] whereas, Turkey appointed its first Ambassador to Baghdad in 1929.[4] The reason that Iraq was late to take a step like this was that Iraq had signed a treaty with Britain in 1922,[5] which was approved by the Iraqi council of representatives on June 10, 1924.[6] This treaty made the a foreign relations under British supervision and authority, which even did not allow Iraq to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until the latter became the ally to Britain against the Axis states during the Second World War.[7]

Later on, this treaty was changed in 1930. These treaties had confirmed British control of Iraq on the matters of military and foreign relations.[8]

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[1] Cihat Göktepe, 1960 Revolution in Turkey and the British Policy Towards Turkey, the Turkish yearbook, Vol, XXX, 2000, p. 140.

[2] Cihat Göktepe, 1960 Revolution in Turkey, op, cite, p. 142.

[3] The Note of Iraqi Royal mission in Ankara No:T\3\142 in 16\10/1952. Look at appendix 2.

[4] Bağdat Elçiliği, 2166 Nolu ve 22 Eylül 1929 Tarihli.

[5] Karol Sorby Jr, Iraq from Faysal's Ascendancy to the Throne to the Ratification of the First Anglo- Iraqi Treaty, 1921-1924, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Asian and African Studies, Volume 21, Number 2, Cairo, 2012, p. 1.

[6] السيد عبد الرزاق الحسني، تاريخ الوزارات العراقية في العهد الملكي، دار الشؤون الثقافية العامة، بغداد، جـ 1، 1988، ص 241.

Abdulrazzaq Alhasani, History of Iraqi Ministries in the Royal Reign, Dar- Alshoon Al-Thaqafya, Baghdad, 1988, p. 241.

[7] د. علي عبد الواحد حسون الصائغ، موقف دول ميثاق سعد آباد ، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 87.

Ali Abdulwahid Hasson Alsaeq, the Position of Sa'adabad Pact of Regional Events (1937-1945), Tamoz, Damascus, 2013, p. 87.

[8] اللورد لويد دولبران، العراق من الانتداب الى الاستقلال (1914-1932) ، ترجمة الدار العربية للموسوعات، لبنان، 2002، ص 106.

Lord Lowid Dolbran, Iraq from Mandate to the Independence (1914-1932), Aldar Al-Arabia for Wikipidias Translation, Labnon, 2002, p. 106.

However, Turkey during 1950-1955 had refused the rapprochement between Iraq and Syria when both countries aimed to establish Union.[1] In 1955 Iraq and Turkey again joined in alliance, this time against Soviet Union in (Baghdad Pact).[2]

On July 14, 1958, the Monarchy regime was overthrown in revolution,[3] which was supported by the Soviet Union.[4] Iraqi internal environment witnessed two winges of political party's conflict between Nationalists and Communists.[5]

The reasons for the revolution could be summarized as follows: Arab Nationality ideas, most of leaders of the Arab Nationalist movement supported the Revolutionary movements and affected the Iraqi Youth, the disappointments of the rule's means and the Unity ideas. The unity between Egypt and Syria in 1958 increased the Iraqi feelings and weakened the Monarchy system that called for Hashemite Union, which they considered against the Arab national unity.[6]

Following the overthrown of Monarchy in Iraq in 1958, Iraq's relations with Western block had also negatively impacted the Iraqi-Turkish relations. While the Republican governments in Iraq tried to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Turkey continued to remain an ally of the west during the Cold War era.[7]

However, the July 1958 revolution indicated a major turning point in Iraqi foreign policy. The revolution was welcomed by the Turkish government initially, despite the fact that early declarations of the revolutionary government clearly indicated Iraqi government's willingness to follow a neutral policy towards the East and West conflict, which meant Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact; natuarlly such policy was a set back to Turkish Iraqi collaboration. The Turkish Interior Minister, Naim Gadik, elaborated Turkish views

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[1] ممدوح الروسان، العراق وقضايا المشرق العربي، القومية 1940-1958، المؤسسة العربية للدراسات والنشر، بيروت،ط1، 1979، ص166.

Mamdouh Alrosan, Iraq and Arab Eastern, nationalism 1940-1958, Arabic Institution for Studies and Publications, Beirut, 1979. P.166.

[2] David Kushner, Turkey: Iraq, European Neighbor in (Iraq's road to War) Amatzia Baram and Berry Rubin (eds) Macmillan, 1994,p.206.

[3] عزيز قادر الصمانجي، التأريخ السياسي لتركمان العراق، دار الساقي، لبنان، 1999، ص 142.

[4] عزيز قادر الصمانجي، مصدر سبق ذكره، 138.

[5] عزيز قادر الصمانجي، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 142.

[6] نوار سعد محمود الملا، العراق بين العهدين الملكي والجمهوري 1920-2003، الاهلية للنشر والتوزيع، لبنان، 2011، ص ص 32-33.

Nawar Saad Mahmood Almullah, Iraq between Republican and Monarchy Era 1920- 2003, Al-Ahlyah, Lebanon, 2011, pp. 32-33.

[7] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite.pp.176-177.

regarding Iraqi revolution on 26 July 1958, when he said *"first of all I would like to emphasizet the fact that our deepest wish is to maintain harmmonious relations with our Iraqi brothers. This consideration is one of the underlying necessities of the policy of close friendship, we are following towards all Arab states"*.[1]

The Turkish anxious towards political developments in Iraq had led Turkish military to move towards the Southern Turkey. Prime Minister "*Adnan Manderes*" decided to interfere in Iraq, because the American pressure Turkey did not take any action.[2]

On May 24, 1959 abdulkerim Qasim declared that Iraq would withdraw from the Baghdad Pact on February 24, 1960. He stated that*"staying in this Pact for system and security reasons would make us easily targets and interfere in our foreign affairs, would stay friends with the countries which we were established friendship with them". A*t the same time Iraq informed the Pact members of its withdrawing.[3]

It was expected that Iraq would withdraw from the Baghdad Pact for the following reasons: the opposition form the majority of Iraqis and political parties, Iraq became pro-western country, that means under the Soviet Union's threat, Iraq became an isolated country in the Arab world and non-alignment block, the pact was a gurranttee to Israel's security, and Baghdad Pact did not achieve peace in the Middle East due to the aggression on Egypt 1956.[4]

Nevertheless, the relations between Iraq and Turkey had not changed or affected more. Turkey sent a delegation to participate in the univerary occasion of the 1958 revolution.[5]

However, Turkish President *"Cemal Gürsel*" sent the letter of congratulation to the Abdulkerim Qasim in 1960 on the vocation of the second universary of 1958 revolution,

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[1] Mahboob Alam, Iraqi Foreign Policy since Revolution, Mital Publications, New Delhi, India, 1994,p.76.

[2] خليل ابراهيم الناصري، التطورات المعاصرة في العلاقات العربية- التركية، مطبعة الراية، بغداد، 1990، ص 47.
Khalil Ibrahim Alnasiri, the Modern Developments in Arabic-Turkish Relations Al-Raya Publication, Baghdad, 1990,p. 47.

[3] Payman Abdullah Hamad Lak, Türkiye – Irak İlişkileri (1920 – 2010), Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kahramanmaraş Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Bölümü, Nisan 2015, P. 53.

[4] د. قحطان احمد سليمان الحمداني، السياسة الخارجية العراقية من 14 تموز الى 8 شباط 1963، مكتبة مدبولي، القاهرة، 2008، ص422.

[5] Ramazan Gözen, imparatorluktan küresel aktörlüğe, Türkiye' nin Dış Politikası,Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2009, P. 213.

Abdulkerim Qasim replied and presented his thanks to Turkey by saying *" Iraqi –Turkish relations would improve, Iraqi people want to work together with Turkish people"*.[1]

2.3. Turkey, Iraq and the Arab States 1960-1980

On May 27, 1960, a military Coup Against the government of "*Adnan Menderes*" happened in Turkey,[2] and Iraq recognised the new regime in May 31, 1960.[3]

However, the improvement of the relations between Qasim and new government in Turkey has motivated Iraq to present on April 4, 1960 by its Ambassador to Ankara, Iraq's opposition from joining the Israel to common Eruopean Market. As a result Turkish government withdraw its Ambassador from Israel.[4]

The relations between Iraq and Turkey could not remain cordial. İraq's improving relations with Soviet Union and its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact had been matters of great concern for Turkey. Thus, in 1961 at the time of the Kurdish armed movement in northeren Iraq, tension mounted between the two countries.[5] During that period the Iraqi air forces was targeting the Kurdish forces in the Turkish Villages on the borders.[6] In its statement, the Iraqi government accused Turkey and other imperialist powers of supporting Kurdish "revolt" in northeren Iraq. During the atmosphere of the war between the two countries, Turkey recalled its Ambassador from Iraq in August 1962. Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement said: *"in view of the clearly negative attitude of Iraq shown by the statements of the Iraqi government, the organised demonstration and constantly hostile attitude of the Iraqi press and radio, in contrast to the dinified behaviour of our government the Turkish Ambassador had been ordered to return his country"*.[7]

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[1] BCA, Fon No: 30100-Kutu No: 4-Dosya No: 246-Sıra No: 2. Look at appendix 3.

[2] Mustafa Sıtkı Bilgin, Turkey's Arab relations have been more zigzag than stop-go. October1 2009,http://europesworld.org/commentaries/turkeys-arab-relations-have-been-more-zigzag-than-stop-go.

[3] د. قحطان احمد سليمان الحمداني، السياسة الخارجية العراقية من 14 تموز الى 8 شباط 1963، مكتبة مدبولي، القاهرة، 2008، ص323.

[4] د. قحطان احمد سليمان الحمداني، السياسة الخارجية العراقية من 14 تموز الى 8 شباط 1963، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص324.

[5] Mahboob Alam, Iraqi Foreign Policy since Revolution, op, cite,p.76.

[6] Ramazan Gözen, imparatorluktan küresel aktörlüğe, Türkiye' nin Dış Politikası, Palme Yayıncilik, Ankara, 2009, P. 213.

[7] Mahboob Alam, Iraqi Foreign Policy since Revolution, op, cite, p.76.

On February 8, 1963 the Baath regime assumed the power and killed Abdulkarim Qasim, and established a new government. Many reasons were behined that revolution: first, the disorder in Kurdistan areas and the weakness of Qasim, second, the economic crisis in the country and the difficulties of oil exporting, third, the arrests of the demonistrated students by security forces, fourth, the decreasing of the financial resources because the cost of war in the northeren Iraq, fifith, the common wishes beween the KDP and Arab nationalists which cooperated with Baath's party.[1] However, the Baathist party became one of the most parties that had powers; it got 16 from the total of 18 seats of the National Council of Revolutionary Leadership which was running the rule. It has the right to appoint the Ministers of Council, issuing the legislations, and the general supervision on the Republican affairs.[2] However, on November 18, 1963 the President of the Republic Abdulsalam Arif succeeded to expel the Baath's party member for he was not a Baathist.[3]

As a result of these developments, Turkish Prime Minister "*Ismet İnönü*" had given instructions to his Foreign Minister "*Feridun Cemal Erkin*" to recognize the new government. In Ferbruary 1963 the Turkish Ambassador in Baghdad Seyfettin stated that *" the Turkish- Iraqi freindship relations are very important"* after three days the Turkish government recognized the new Iraqi regime.[4]

Iraqi-Turkish relations improved during the moderate regime of Arif's brother. The first trade agreement with Turkey was signed on 3 August, 1965. It provided the export of Iraqi products such as cement, dates, petroleum to Turkey. Turkey exported to Iraq dried fruits, olive oil, cotton and wool products, tools and machines. Furthermore, cooperation increased in Februray 1967, when President Arif made a six-day state visit to Turkey. He was the first Iraqi President that visited Turkey since the establishment of the Republic in 1958. A commuinque issued after the visit stated that "*the Turkish delegation would visit Baghdad within one month to discuss the establishment of the gas project*". The communique also mentioned that there had been an agreement on need for talks on water resources which confirmed the formation of joint trade committee.[5]

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[1] نوار سعد محمود الملا، العراق بين العهدين مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 37.
[2] نوار سعد محمود الملا، العراق بين العهدين ، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 38.
[3] نوار سعد محمود الملا، العراق بين العهدين، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 39.
[4] Payman Abdullah Hamad Lak, Türkiye – Irak İlişkileri (1920 – 2010), Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Kahramanmaraş Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Bölümü, Nisan 2015, P. 61.
[5] Mahboob Alam, Iraqi Foreign Policy since Revolution, op, cite,pp.76-77

On June 5, 1967, Turkey stated that it would not use NATO military bases against Arabs during Israel- Arab war, and it had sent medical and food aids to Arab countires.[1]

On June 5, 1968, the second Baathist Party Coup happened. The relations between Iraq and Turkey were cooperative and improved.[2] During that period, both countries were against Kurdish ambitions of autonomy or independence.[3] When the Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Albarzani addressed Turkish Prime Minister Sülyman Demirel asking for help to Kurds and Turkmens from the Iraqi Baathist regime. After days the reply of Turkish Prime Minister was declared through Ankara Radio which reported *"Turkish government does not address the informal parties"*.[4]

Turkey also refused the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, and supported the 242 UN resolultion which asked the Israeli troops to withdraw from the Arab occupied areas.[5] Furthermore, Turkey did not allow the USA to use the NATO bases in the Arab-Israeli war in 1973.[6] At the same time, it refused the American request to close its airspace towards the Soviet plans which carried weapons and military equipment to Egypt and Syria.[7]

The turning point in Arab–Turkish relations occured, when Arab countries did not support the resolution of the UN General Asemmbly which prevented Turkey from interfering in Cyprus. These events made Turkey to change its foreign policy towards the Arab countries.[8]

There were additional reasons behined the changes of Turkish policy towards Arab as the campain against imperialism was led by Turkish redicals and socialists. The public opinion motivated the Turkish governmet to refuse Charging the American interests Section in Baghdad, when Iraq broke off its diplomatic relations with the United States after the 1967 war.[9]

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1 د. وليد رضوان، العلاقات العربية-التركية، دور اليهود والتحالفات الدولية والإقليمية و pkk في العلاقات العربية – التركية،العلاقات السورية-التركية نموذجاً، شركة المطبوعات للتوزيع والنشر، بيروت،ط1، 2006.ص138.
walid Ridwan,Arabian- Turkish Relations, the Role of Jewish , Regional and International Alliances and PKK in Arabian- Turkish, Syrian- Turkish relation as apptern,Beirut,2006.

2 Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy , Turkey, the EU the Middle East, Ashgat, England, 2008,p,130

3 Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy , op, cite,p,130.

4 عزيز قادر الصمانجي، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 197-198.

5 د .وليد رضوان، العلاقات العربية-التركية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص138.

6 محمد ناجي عيسى، السياسة الخارجية التركية تجاه القضايا العربية 2002-2006، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 222.

7 خليل ابراهيم الناصري، التطورات المعاصرة في العلاقات العربية- التركية، مطبعة الراية، بغداد، 1990، ص 51.

8 محمد ناجي عيسى، السياسة الخارجية التركية تجاه القضايا العربية 2002-2006، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 222.

9 د .وليد رضوان، العلاقات العربية-التركية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص139.

Furthermore, because of the energy crisis and increase of oil prices Turkey needed to invest in foreign countires. Arab countries have passed energy crisis with huge financial revenues. All these motivated Turkey to naturalize its relations with the Arabs.[1] In addition Turkey's disappointment from the western policy towards the Cyprus issue especially after the American embargo on Turkey in 1975.[2]

Moreover, Turkish needs of the Arab support as an intorudction to Islamic support. There were also two important elements of Arab Turkish naturalization, the international, after the succes of summits of diplomacy between Moscow and Washington which decreased the international tension, and the possibility of the conflict. The detorioration of the Arabism wing in the Arab homlands, has reactivated the national wing.[3]

However, from the bilateral prespectives, Iraqi-Turkish relations also impacted positively, on January 2, 1971, Turkish delegation from TAPO visited Baghdad, after four days of negotiation, Iraq and Turkey signed a protocol for cooperation in Gas field.[4]

The visit of Saddam Hussein to Ankara on February 3, 1977, demonstrated another step in consolidating cordial ties between the two countries. In a joint communique issued on 4 February 1977, the two sides *"expressed satisfaction at the development of bilateral relations and underlined their to strengthen their relations for serving the joint interests of the Iraqi and Turkish people".*[5]

In the 1980s, the economic relations between Iraq and Turkey were at their peak point. Turkey's positive neutrality policy in which Özal played an important role towards Iraq and Iran during the war were succeful in terms of economy and politics.[6]

Iraq, for its part found Turkish territory a convenient rout by which oil is exported to Mediterranean ports. It has the advantage of bypassing hostile Syria, which often shut down Iraqi piplines crossing Syrian territories (and closed them completely since 1982).*

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[1] د . وليد رضوان ، العلاقات العربية-التركية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص143.

[2] السياسة الخارجية التركية، سلسلة الدراسات السياسية، مركز البحوث والمعلومات، العدد115، بغداد، 1990، ص ص 44-45.

Turkish Foreign Policy, Political Studies Series, Center of Researches and Information, No 115, Baghdad, 1990.

[3] د. وليد رضوان ، العلاقات العربية-التركية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص143-144.

[4] For more information about the details of the protocol look at the appendix 4.

[5] Mahboob Alam, Iraqi Foreign PolicyS Revolution, op, cit,p.79.

[6] Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy , Turkey, the EU the Middle East, Ashgat, England, 2008,p,130.

Moreover, Iraq percepted to have another option of oil tranportation through Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea as an additional stream of that of Syria and Lebanon, which was targeted by Israel in October 1973 war.[1] It aslo avoid the risk of Iranian attacks on Iraq tankers sailing in the Arab Gulf. This mutual dependency led to the construction of two piplines, each about 800 miles long, running from Iraq's northern oil fields of Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean coast of Dortyol and Yumurtalik.[2]

The first line was completed on January 6, 1976. It was later expanded to carry close to 1 million barrels per day (about 45 to 50 million tons annually).[3] During his visit to Baghdad, the Turkish Prime Minister Turğut Özal, Iraq and Turkey agreed to construct the second pipline,[4] which was completed in 1987 and has about half that capacity. On the eve of Gulf crisis in 1991 Iraq transported %5 of its oil exports through the Turkish piplines.

Turkey also derived certain benefits from these piplines some royalties, amounting to some $250 to $300 million annually from the transportation of oil across Turkish territory. Significant revenues were also earned from the services provided to the Iraq along the piplines and at the terminals.[5]

2.4. Development of Iraqi -Turkish Relations 1980-1990

Apart from the paramount imperatives of any nations-state- national self preservation, maintenance of the integrity of the national territory, and independence, Iraqi's principles of policy objectives in 1980s were **:**

- To promote Arab unity of political action and purpose if not the political unification of several Arab states. This policy is a prerequiste for broader objectives.
- To establish Iraq's leadership in the Eastern Arab world.

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* that was happened during Irani-Iraqi war in 1980s because Syrian regime had supported Iran in this war and closed the oil piplines which cross its borders.

[1] عصام الجلبي، النفط مرتكز اساسي في العلاقات البينية العراقية- التركية، في (العرب وتركيا، تحديات الحاضر ورهانات المستقبل) مجموعة باحثين، المركز العربي للابحاث ودراسة السياسات، الدوحة، 2012، ص 327.

[2] David Kushner, Turkey: Iraq, op, cite,p.206.

[3] David kushner, Turkey: Iraq, op, cite,p.206.

[4] عصام الجلبي، ، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 331.

[5] David kushner, Turkey: Iraq, op, cite,p.206.

- To neutralize or eliminate the Iranian threat to Iraq and other regimes on the Arab side of the Gulf, to maintain cordial relations at least one superpower while endeavoring to reduce super powerinflunce in the Gulf.[1]

In 1979, the Islamic revolution exporting to the other Middle East countries made Turkey worried.[2] During Turkish Ambassador's" Turgut Tülumen" meeting in Tehran with the Iranian President "*Ayat Allah Khomani*", the lattar criticised "*the secular regime in Turkey by considering it the reason of fragmantation of Islamic world, he told the Turkish Ambassador that he would try to re-unite this world".*[3]

On October 12, 1980, Turkey witnessed a military Coup led by Chief of General Staff " *Kenan Evren*".[4] The military rule from 1980 to1983 increased the state capacity to squash the domestic Islamist movements as well as the PKK and to counter the pro-Islamist propaganda emanating from Tehran.[5]

Turkey had two primary concerns with the Islamic revolution in Iran. One is the worry that the latter's Islamist currents would affect Turkey; the other concern is that the failure of the revolution and the subsequent fragmentation of Iran would lead to the establishment of a Kurdish state. It is the threat of Kurdish nationalism and Islamism that mostly frightened Ankara. Turkey's policy towards the Iranian revolution is to prevent either of these two threats from " infecting" the body politics of Turkey. Turkey's policy is, therefore, one of caution.[6]

Howevere, during Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988 Turkey called both sides for peace, and played a mediation role. Hence, it changed its policy towards " Positive Neutralism" and maintained good relations with Iraq and Iran.[7] The economic relations between Iraq and Turkey were at their peak point where Turkey positives neutrality policy in which Özal played was successful interms of economic and politics.[8] The Trade between the two countries rose from less than $1 billion in 1980 to $ 2.5 billion by 1985.[9]

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[1] R.D.Mclaurin, Don Peretz, Lewis W. Snider, Middle East Foregin Policy, Issues and Prossesses, Prager Publisher,USA.1982,p.118.
[2] Ali Balaci, Türkiye Dış Polilitikası, (Ilkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar), Etkileşim Yayınlar, Isnabul, 2013, p. 177.
[3] Mehmet Saray, Türk- Iran İlişkileri, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 1999, p, 157.
[4] Hasan Kösebalaban, Türk Diş Politikası, BigBang Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, p, 223.
[5] Robert Olson, Turkey- Iran relations 1979-2004 (Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics), Mada Publishers, California, 2004. p.2.
[6] Robert Olson, Turkey- Iran Relations, op, cite, 2004.P. 1.
[7] Mehmet Saray, Türk- İran İlişkileri, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 1999, S. 155.
[8] Mesut Özcan, harmonizing Foreign Policy , op, cite,p,130.
[9] Robert Olson, Turkey- Iran Relations, op, cite, 2004, p. 2.

Conclusion

Mosul issue affected the Iraqi- Turkish relations. After resolving this issue the relations between two countries improved. In 1926 Iraq and Turkey signed Ankara agreement which recognized the borders between them. Mosul has strategic signaficance to Turkey for these reasons: first, its location which is opposit to the South Eastern Turkey's borders, majority of Turkey's kurds live there, second, it is rich city in oil resources and Turkey suffers from the energy, third, it contains Turkmens who have cultural, historical and social ties with Turkey. However, Britain had supported Iraq in Mosul issue since Iraq was under British mandate. The importance of Mosul has arisen again after the existence of the PKK and ISIS in this area. Turkey's concern that the Kurds planing to prolong their sphares to Syria and then to the Mediterranean Sea. However, Britain role rose in the Middle East after the First World War. In 1925 Iraq and Britain agreed to establish oil company, %20 of Iraq royallities abanded to Britain, Britain promised Iraq by supporting its membership in the League of Nations and prevented Turkey's claims in Mosul.

In 1936 Iraq faced a military Coup, the new Iraqi government improved its relations with Turkey and played a mediation role between Syria and Turkey when they had seen tension on their borders. The developments in their relations continued and both countries signed a friendship and neighboring treaty in 1946. The most important issue they agreed to organize was the using of water resources and developing the projects in the Tigris and Euphrates. Some important provisions of the treaty were: Turkey and Iraq had to give the other certain port facilities at Alexandertta and Basra and, each country had to give the other most favoured nation treatment in respect of customs duties.

During the 1950-1960 Iraqi –Turkish relations improved since the democratic Party rule was pro- Islamic trends. While Turkey nominated its first ambassador to Baghdad in 1929, on October 6, 1952, Iraq changed its mission in Ankara on the level of Ambassador because Iraq's foreign relations was under the British supervision and authority until the ends of the 1940s.

On July 14, 1958, Iraqi- Turkish relations faced a set back since the revolutionary government withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, and pursued a foreign policy close to the Eastern Block, then Turkey recognized the new government.

However, since Baathist Party assumed the power in February 1963 its relations with Turkey improved for fighting the Kurdish armed movements which arose during that period.

During the 1970s Iraqi-Turkish relations improved, for these reasons: first, Iraq started to establish the oil pipline, second, energy crisis and increasing of oil prices, Turkey needed to energy resources and investment in the Arab Countries were good environment, third, Turkey refused the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, and supported the 242 UN resolultion which requested the Israeli troops to withdraw from Arab occupied areas.

The turning point in Arab–Turkish relations emerged, when Arab countries did not support the resolution of the UN General Assembly which prevented Turkey from interfering in the Cyprus. These events made Turkey to change its foreign policy towards the Arab countries.

Turkey pursued a neutrality policy towards Iran- Iraq war in 1980-1988 for economic, security, and political reasons. Thus, Turkey kept its trade relations with Iraq and Iran, it did not want to be a part of the conflict between two islamic and neighbouring countries, it was also realised that supporting any party would reflect on its internal issue.

However, we studied in this chapter historical background to the Iraqi- Turkish relations since 1918 up to the 1990. In the next chapter Turkey's policy towards the American War on Iraq in 1991 will be discussed.

CHAPTER III

IMPACTS OF THE FIRST GULF WAR 1991 ON IRAQ'S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

This chapter studies Turkey's policy towards American War on Iraq in the First Gulf War 1991. It also explains the historical, geographical and economical reasons and justifications of the First Gulf War in 1991. In addition to the role of the Arab countries in the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait, and their attitute after the War.

It also deals with Turkey's general attitute towards the First Gulf War, and the impacts of that War on the Middle East and Turkey's economic and security.

Furthermore, it explains the role of the United States and Britain in this compaign by controlling over the UNSC resolutions.

3.1. The Reasons of First Gulf War 1991*

1. Historical reason

Kuwait had been a part of Iraq since 1775. In 1870 Kuwait was an Ottoman Municipl followed Basra. *"Midhat Pasha"* established a new administrative system in which Faw, Qurna and Kuwait became followed Basra. Britain tried to put Kuwait under its influence by making a secret agreement with Sheik Mubark on January 23, 1899. The Sheik got £5000 as an assistance from Britain. The Ottomans discovered this agreement later in 1900, they protested against Britain because sheik of Kuwait followed the Ottoman system and did not have right to negotiate with any state. Britain presented its apology on April 15, 1900 and recognised the Ottoman soveregnity over Kuwait.[1]

* In the Arab political literatures, they call Iran- Iraq War 1980-1988 the First Gulf War. 1990 the Second Gulf War and 2003 the Third Gulf War.

Iraq continued to consider that Kuwait is a part of it during the monarcy period, and after the establishment of the Arab Union between Iraq and Jordan on February 14, 1958, İraq tried to convince Kuwait to join this Union.[1]

In April 1958 Kuwait's Shiek Abdullah Al-Sabah visited Iraq and discussed with Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri Al-Said Kuwait's joining the Arab Union, but Al-Sabah wanted to take British views before. As a result Nouri Al-Said presented a note to the USA and UK which included these points: first, granting Kuwait its independence and joining the Arab Union, second, if the first motion did not have taken Iraq-Kuwait borders would redraw, Kuwait would be a part of Iraq, third, if the second motion, Iraq in this case would have its right to act according to its national interests.[2]

On June 19, 1961, the Arab League declared that Kuwait became an independent state. Iraq after one week, on June 25, stated by its Prime Minister Abdulkarim Qasim that *"Kuwait is a part of Iraq; there are no borders between Iraq and Kuwait"*

On February 8, 1963, Iraq faced a military Coup. The tension between Iraq and Kuwait decreased, and the new government recognised Kuwait's independence in October 1963. Iraq got 30 million Kuwaiti Dinars as loans.[3]

Although Iraq recognised Kuwait. It seemed that all governments in Iraq did not convince that Kuwait is an independent state. However, Iraq- Kuwait relations witnessed two crises: first, on October 1, 1966, Iraqi military troops had crossed Bubyan island, because the negotiation which were concluded beween Iran and Kuwait to drew the water boundaries without the participation of Iraq, second crisis, on April 18, 1967, Iraq warrined Kuwait and asked it to flow down its flag from Warba and Bubyan islands which are away nearly 10 miles from Iraqi borders.[4]

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[1] د. قحطان احمد سليمان الحمداني، السياسة الخارجية العراقية من 14 تموز الى 8 شباط 1963، مكتبة مدبولي، القاهرة، 2008، ص222.

Khatan Ahmed Sulyman Al-Hamdani, Iraq's Foreign Policy From 14 July to the 8 February 1963, Medbuli, Cairo, 2008, p. 222.

[1] د. حسن نوري حسين، ازمة الكويت واشكالية العلاقة مع العراق، دراسة سياسية تاريخية، مكتبة عدنان، بغداد، 2016، ص 151.

[2] د. حسن نوري حسين، ازمة الكويت واشكالية العلاقة مع العراق، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 153.

[3] د. حسن نوري حسين، ازمة الكويت واشكالية العلاقة مع العراق، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 156.

[4] د. حسن نوري حسين، ازمة الكويت واشكالية العلاقة مع العراق، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 164.

∗ There are some resources estimate Iraq's oil reserves 212 billion barrels.

However, the Ottomans lost Kuwait and other Arab areas after the First World War. Britain became the power in the Middle East and had redrawn the map of the region according to its strategic interests.

2. Economic Reasons

Kuwait has huge oil resources e.g in 1960 Kuwait oil production was 80,5 million tons. Iraq was about 45 million tons. It means that Iraq has half of Kuwait's production. At the same time Iraq's oil reserves were 27 billion barrels∗ form %9 of total world reserves, Kuwait had 62 billion barrels, %20 of the world researves. Kuwait was supporting %40 of British consumption.[1]

At the same time Iran- Iraq war reduced Iraqi economic capabilities. Although, the country emerged from the War with greatly enlarged and more potent military arms, there were factors that might have caused to misuse its regional and global position like reducing oil revenues and growing debts which ultimately increased Iraq's economic dependence on the West and its regional Arab Gulf alliances, the dependence on the other states it was not able to break in the War's aftermath. These new constraints led, in part, to the first Gulf war.[2]

The "OPEC" agreed in November 1989 to sale $18 per barrel. Saddam Hussein in the urgent Arab summit held in Baghdad on 30 May, 1990, addressed his speech to the Arab countries to reduce their oil exporting.[3]

On August 2 ,1990 , Saddam stated that after the war with Iran from 1980-1988, Iraq was trying to rebuild its infrastructure. He likened the situation with Kuwait as being similar to a quarrel when two individuals fight, the moment that the fight ends, and the two parties go to their separate ways. Thereafter, one of the previous disputing parties is

[1] د. قحطان احمد سليمان الحمداني، السياسة الخارجية العراقية من 14 تموز الى 8 شباط 1963، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص228.

[2] Phebe Marr, the Larger Arab World, Iraqi Foreign Policy in (diplomacy in the Middle East, the international relations and outside powers), L.Carl Brown (ed). I.B.Tauris, London, 2004,p.185.

[3] محمد المشاط، كنت سفيرا للعراق في واشنطن" حكاياتي مع صدام في غزو الكويت"، المؤسسة العربية للدراسات والنشر، بيروت، 2008، ص 99.

Mohammed Almashat, I was Ambassador for Iraq to Washington "my talks with Saddam of Kuwait Invasion, Arab Institution for Studies and Publication, Beirut, 2008, p. 99.

bothered by someone else who also wants to fight. Then, there is no choice but to fight again.[1]

However, Kuwait did not respond to the Iraqi orders, and increased its oil exporting. This policy was reflected negativelly on Iraq, and it sailled its oil $11 per barrel and it lost from the price of oil approximately $7 billion per a year. At the end of the war as Iraq began the rebuilding process In Saddam's opinion, Iraq could not possibly rebuild its infrastructure and economy with oil prices at this level. Kuwait was especially at fault regarding these low oil prices.[2]

Moreover, Saddam stressed that Kuwait stole $2.4 million of oil from Iraqi Rumaila oil field. Kuwait denied these accusitions and responded by seeking diplomatic support from other Arab states arguing that Iraq had longer record of violations of Kuwait territory.[3]

The Bush's administration showed inability to agree with Saddam's anger climaxed on July 25, 1990, when Hussein informed the Ambassador Cathrine Glaspie that Kuwait was a lackey of United States. Since the Arab League meeting of May 30, 1990 in Baghdad, they claimed that Kuwait had waged *"economic warfare"* against Iraq. On July 8, Iraq wrote to the Arab league that Kuwait and U.A.E were a part of *"imperialist Zionism"* plan to lower oil prices.[4]

The first and perhaps the most important opportunity to resolve the Gulf crisis was at Jidda meeting, held under the auspices of the Saudi government on July 31, 1990. However, neither the Iraqi nor the Kuwaiti delegation was ready to be flexible enough to reach an agreement, as each delegation had been given strict instructions about the fundamental demands that they had been ordered to make firmly. The head of the Kuwaiti delegation, Sheikh Saad, claimed that he had offered several flexible proposals that might be discussed at the Baghdad meeting, but those proposals seemed to the head of the Iraqi

[1] محمد المشاط، كنت سفيرا للعراق في واشنطن" حكاياتي مع صدام في غزو الكويت"، المؤسسة العربية للدراسات والنشر، بيروت، 2008، ص 99.

[2] Saddam states reasons for Kuwait Invasion, July 21, 2009.
http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/Saddam-states-reasons-for-kuwait-invasion-1.502105

[3] Lester H. Brune, american and the Iraqi crisis 1990-1992, origins and aftermath, Regina Books, California, 1993,p.51.

[4] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi crisis, op, cite,p.51.

delegation insignificant to warrant holding another meeting in Baghdad, and he left for home when the Iraq Army was ready to march on Kuwait a few hours later.[1]

Iraq presented list of orders which were: Kuwait should omit $13 billion of Iraq's debts, Kuwait should rent Bubyan and Warba island to Iraq for 99 years, Kuwait should stop stealing Iraqi oil from Rumaila fields and Kuwait should loan Iraq $10 billion for the reconstruction Iraq's infrastracutre.[2]

3. Geostrategic Reason

Iraq won the 1980-1988 war as regional power espcially after the normalization of Iraqi- American relations. All these were seen by Saddam that the United States would not be able to intervene in Iraq-Kuwait borders disputes, while it was busy in East Europe.[3]

According to Saddam *"Ayatollah Khomeini*" and Iran would have occupied the entire Arab world, if it had not been for Iraq. As such, Iraq expected the Arab world to support them during and after the War. Iraq saw the opposite regarding the support, especially from Kuwait.[4]

However, some reasons belonging to Saddam personalitly and perceptions, during the period from August 1988 to August 2, 1990, Saddam would discover that the wealthy Arab rulers praised his efforts against Iran, but did not recognise as the leader of the all Arabs he aspired to become.[5]

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[1] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, the Iraq- Kuwait Conflict its Impilications, Oxfored University Press, 1997, p. 258.

[2] د. حسن نوري حسين، ازمة الكويت واشكالية العلاقة مع العراق، دراسة سياسية تاريخية، مكتبة عدنان، بغداد، 2016، ص 158.

Hussan Nori Hussein, the Crisis of Kuwait and the Problem of Relations with Iraq, Historical and political study, Adnan Library, Baghdad, 2016, p. 158.

[3] د. تركي الحمد، الغزو: الاسباب الموضوعية والمبرررات الايديولوجية، (الغزو العراقي للكويت) مجلة المعرفة، الكويت، العدد 1995،195.ص 103.

Turki Al-Hamad, the Invasion : the Subjective Reasons and Ideological Justifications, (Iraqi invation of Kuwait), Al-Marifa Journal. Al-Kuwait,No 195,1995,p.103

[4]Saddam states reasons for Kuwait invasion, July 21, 2009.
http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/Saddam-states-reasons-for-kuwait-invasion-1.502105

[5] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.30.

However, according to Saddam only Arabs who seemed to welcome his leadership after Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 were the *(Palestine liberation orgnization, Jordan, Egypt and North Yemen, Tennesia, Algeria, Somalia, Djebuti,Moritania and Morroco).*[1] He believed in particular that King Fahad of Saudia Arabia and Kuwait's Emir Al-Sabah did not appreciate Iraq's sacrifices in saving them from Iran's faundamentalist threat.[2]

Two events before August 2, 1990, illustrated Hussein's extreme statements against the USA and Bush's failure to interpret what Saddam intended to do. First, on February 24, 1990, Saddam told ACC (Arab Cooperation Council) conference that Arab people would suffer because the Soviet demise during 1989 made the USA the predominant force in the Middle East. To limit USA power, he not only wanted the United States to withdrew all its naval vessels from the Arab Gulf region, but also wanted the wealthy Arab states to withdraw all their oil revenes from USA and western European companies and to invest in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[3]

As a result, the Western powers simply feared that if Iraq controlled the oil resources of the region, the regional balance of power would likely change to the disadvantage of the USA led Western international community.[4]

Iraq faced constraints and limitations (border problems, and limited access to the Arab Gulf).∗ İraq's geographic location in the region imposed special burden on its foreign policy. It is bordered by two non- Arab states (Turkey-Iran) and four Arab neighbors (Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait and Jordan). This geostrategic environment requires mutiple roles and a high degree of sophistication and flexibility to manage. Iraq's main port, Basra, lies seventy miles up the Shatt Al-Arab (the confluence of the Tigirs and Euphrates) a river it must share with Iran. These boundaries have been contested for decades.[5] The second port, Um Qasir, is situated on Khor Abdullah channel, second Gulf estuary which Iraq shares with kuwait two kuwaiti Islands, (Warba and Bubyan),[6] which they Control on the entrance

[1] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.30.
[2] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.50.
[3] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.30.
[4] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite,p.172.
∗ the Western resources refer to the Arab Gulf (Persian Gulf). All official resouces of Arab Countries call it (Arab Gulf).
[5] Phebe Marr, the Larger Arab World, op, cite,p.185.
[6] Look at the map 3 in the appendix.

of this channel. A story desire to modify these borders which limit Iraq's access to the Gulf, has been a powerful motive Iraq to incorporate Kuwait in the first Gulf War.[1]

However, Kuwaiti -Iraqi tensions then increased sharply in the summer of 2011. In early May, Kuwait began constructing a major new $1.1 billion deep-water container port (Mubarak Al-Kabir) on Bubiyan Island. This mega-port has been mooted for some time and the creation of a 'world class, multi-model logistics hub that can become a gateway to the North' was a recommendation of the *Vision of Kuwait 2030*.

Contracts for the Port were tendered in 2009 and awarded in June 2010 to a joint venture between the South Korean Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company *Gulf States* . The commencement of its construction in March 2011 was brought to a head the long-simmering issue of Iraq's access to Gulf waters and reinvigorated the lingering resentments (on both sides) listed above. Its geographical proximity to Iraq's only lines of access to open water (although within Kuwaiti territorial waters) was deemed provocative by Iraqi policy-makers, who expressed concern for their own efforts to build a major new deepwater port at Al-Faw. This was intended to form a cornerstone of Iraq's economic recovery and featured a free trade zone designed to attract much-needed foreign direct investment (FDI) to southern Iraq, although it was hampered by domestic political and security complications well before the Mubarak Al-Kabir port became a flashpoint**.**[2]

However, what we have mentioned before about the reasons of Gulf War and Saddam's aims to incorporated Kuwait into Iraq and Saddam mistakenly assumed that the West would not resist the incorporation of Kuwait into Iraq.[3]

3.2. Turkey's General Attitude Towards the First Gulf War 1991

Two particular developments tremendously affected the nature of Turkey's relations with Iraq during the first decade rest of Cold War era: first way the dissolution of the Soviet Union, whereas the other Turkey's inclussion in the USA led international coalition that

[1] Phebe Marr, the Larger Arab World, op,cite,p.186.
[2] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Basra, Southern Iraq and the Gulf: challenges and connections, research paper in (Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States), the London School of Economics and Political Science, No 21, February 2012, pp. 19-20.
[3] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite, P.71.

came into being with the sole mission of drawing Iraq out of kuwait Both of these developments helped increase Turkey's power capabities vi-a-vis Iraq.[1]

Iraq was no longer seen as constituting a traditional threat to Turkey's security. However, Turkey increasingly became exposed to neo-conventional security challenges emanating from Iraq's national developments.[2]

Turkey on August 2, 1990, issued a statement expressing its warrness towards the crisis between Iraq and Kuwait, and the reasons that led Iraqi military forces to enter into Kuwait, and violated Kuwaiti sovergnity and territorial entegrity. It called Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and respect Kuwait independence.[3]

However, the vice President "*Taha Yasin Ramadan*" told the President "*Turgut Özal*" that *"participating any party in this embargo or foreign intervension would be lost, we consider the security of Kuwait, Iraq's security and any intervension in Kuwait would be responed by us". Özal told Ramadan that " the matter is important because it is not concerned to the Kuwait only, beside Kuwait there are Suadia Arabia and Emarites, the issue is the Gulf oil".* It seems that Özal meant the West considered the Iraqi existence in Kuwait as threat to the American and Western oil interests in the Gulf since Iran's events in 1979.[4]

The main thrust of traditional Turky's foreign policy was to maintain a delicate balance between *" the requirments of Turkish membership in the western alliance (NATO) and those of preserving friendly relations with its neighbors".* An impetus was injected into the Turkish regional role, following its involvment in the Gulf War of 1991, and the subsequent permission to allow the deployment on its own territory of the Western multilateral force *" Provide Comfort"*.[5]

Turkey collaborated with the international alliance in that War, and then was ordered to be able to protect the Kurds in the north of Iraq from the Saddam regime, Turkey cooperated with the USA in the context of *"poised hammer"* and *"operation northern watch"*. Furthermore, although it undermined the Turkish economy, Turkey obeyed

[1]Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite.pp.176-177.

[2] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite.p.178

[3] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، دار زهران للنشر والتوزيع، عمان، 2012، ص 96.

[4] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 97.

[5] Ahmad Shikara, Iran, Iraq and Turkey, op, cite, p. 17.

sanctions from the beginning. Unless Turkey's cooperated with US, it would be too difficult to protect Kurds from Saddam's regime.[1]

Turkey supported the UN efforts against Iraq by Operations providing comfort which began on July 24th in 1991, and ended on 31th December. This was a humanitarian aid operation that aimed at providing assistance to Kurdish refugees fleeing from Saddam regime.[2]

Cooperation northern watch aimed at enforcing the no fly zone north of the 36th parallel. It began on January 1st 1997 and ended on May 1, 2003. İt prevented Iraqi air force helicopter and gunship from targeting Kurds.[3]

Turkish-Iraqi relations witnessed obviously changed in October 1994. Turkish government did not allow the American and Western states planes to use their bases to attack Iraq. It seems that Turkish policy aimed to achieve two goals: first, to get compensation from USA, western countries and Arab Gulf countries, for its damage during the first Gulf War, second, to present acceptable justifications when it would take policy for the restoration of economic relations with Iraq within this framework.

However, during 1990-1994 many Turkish Ministers visited Iraq, and a Protocol for Industrial and Trade Cooperation was signed, and a common trade center was established. Furthermore, a technical negotiation to reopen the Kirkuk – Yumurtalik line was started.[4]

Turkey was tremendously concerned with political status of the Iraqi Kurdish groups. It became upset by the fact that the existence of the "no fly zoon" above 30th parallel would help Iraq Kurds strengthen their political status.[5]

It accepted this operations to overcome the refugees problem and criticisms of the western countries. Turkey also did not have any interest in the continuation of the economic sanctions against Iraq, since sanctions were also contrary to its interests.[6]

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[1] Idris Bal, Turkey- Relations and Impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cite.p131.
[2] Anil Turken, the Iraq Conflict, op, cite, p.8.
[3] Anil Turken, the Iraq conflict, op, cite, pp.8-9.
[4] د. جلال عبد الله معوض، صناعة القرار في تركيا والعلاقات العربية- التركية، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت،1998، ص137.
Jalal Abdullah Muawath, Decision Making in Turkey and Arab-Tutkish Relations, Center for Arabic Unity, Beirut, 1998,p.137.
[5] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite, p.179.
[6] Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy , op, cite, pp,132-133.

However, Turkey's policy towards Iraq during the 1990s was based on the following points: first, Iraq's territorial integrity was considered as vitally important for the preservation of Turkey's own security. Despite repressive and authoritarian character of Saddam's regime, Baghdad rule over the whole country was seen as the most important break on the separatists and secessionist claims of Kurds. Looking from this angel, Turkey hoped that the sanctions on Iraq would be lifted soon and bilateral trades start immediately.[1]

3.3. Attitudes of Arab States Towards the First Gulf War 1991

On July 16, 1990, Iraq submitted a memorandum dated July 15, 1990 to the Arab countries in which Iraq accused Kuwait of aggression against Iraq, to which Saddam had referred in his speech at the celebration of the twenty-second anniversary of the Baath Revolution, and which brought the differences with Kuwait into the open. References to American support were made. On July 19 following discussions about American policy in embassies in the Middle East, Saddam expressed his doubt abdout American policy *"a new policy guidance on the Iraq- Kuwait dispute"*: first, all disputes should be settled by peaceful means, not intimidation and threats of use of force, second, the United States took no position on the substance of bilateral issues concerning Iraq and Kuwait. The dispatch also stated that the United States was committed to ensure free flow of oil and the independence and integrity of the Gulf countries.[2]

Before outbreaking of the first Gulf War there were many intiatives from Arab leaders. In the meantime, President Mubarak contacted the heads of state of four Arab countries, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the Amir of Kuwait, the King of Jordan, and the ruler of the United Arab Emirates to exchange views as to what should be done to reduce tensions. It was decided that their Foreign Ministers should meet in Alexandria on July 22, 1990. The upshot of the meeting was an agreement to ask President Mubarak to fly to Baghdad on July 24 and impressed Saddam Hussein the urgence need to settle his country's differences with Kuwait by direct negotiations before a serious crisis might be created.[3]

[1] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite.pp.178-179.
[2] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, the Iraq- Kuwait Conflict its Impilications, Oxfored University Press, 1997, p. 109.
[3] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p. 109.

Meanwhile, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Amir Saud Al-Faisal, visited Baghdad on July 22 to meet with Saddam Hussein. After a brief conversation, they agreed to propose a meeting between Sheik Saad, Kuwait's Premier, and Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, deputy President of the Iraq Revolutionary Command Council—the two highest ranking figures next to the heads of state of their countries—to be held in Jidda under the auspices of King Fahd in order to settle their differences amicably. At the meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers in Alexandria, to which Amir Saud reported Saddam's acceptance of the idea of an Iraq- Kuwait meeting in Jidda, Mubarak was requested to carry a message to this effect in person to Saddam Hussein.[1]

On July 24, Mubarak met with Saddam in Baghdad and the Jidda meeting was approved. Mubarak's main concern, however, was about the danger from the concentration of an Iraqi force near Kuwait's borders. Saddam did not deny the fact that military units had been moved to southern Iraq. But, it seems, a misunderstanding about the purpose of the force had developed between the two Arab leaders. Mubarak understood that Saddam had no intention of using force against Kuwait. Saddam maintained that he told Mubarak he had no intention of using force while the negotiations at Jidda were underway.[2]

At the meeting of the Arab League called by Mubarak on August 10, 1990, a resolution in which Iraq was condemned and called upon for immediate withdrawal from Kuwait, included the restoration of its legitimate government.[3]

At this meeting 12 of 21 League members eventually sent troops to Saudi Arabia, in addition to, 55,000 sent by the Gulf states of (Qater, Oman, Bahrain and U.A.E) The largest units were by Egypt which sent 40.000 and syria which sent 21,000 it also had armies on Iraq's North West borders. Other Muslim states such as (Pakistan, Senegal and Bangladesh) sent troops.[4]

However, The 12 states favoring resolution 195 were: Egypt, the six GCC states, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, and Djibouti. Three participants voted against Iraq, Libya and the PLO (which on the following day changed its vote to one of abstention); Algeria and Yemen abstained, and Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania expressed reservations. Tunisia had already expressed its position by not attending. Never before in the 46-year

[1] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p. 110.
[2] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p.110.
[3] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p. 129.
[4] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.57.

history of the Arab League had such a controversial resolution been adopted in the face of active or passive opposition by almost half of the member states. Since the early 1980s, there had been repeated talk among both Arab officials and intellecturals regarding the need for Arab majorities to make operative decisions even when.[1]

3.4. Turkey, the Policies of the Qualition Alliances and the USA

The USA Ambassador in Baghdad Cathrine Glaspie met with Saddam after the Iraqi- kuwaiti dispute became critical. Although she had been in Baghdad for nearly two years, Glaspie had never met privately with President Saddam before their session on July 25, 1990.[2]

Later the reports of Glaspie visit became a controversion, and on July 13, 1991, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times published excerpts from Glaspie's official reports to the State Department and from the July 26 letter which President Bush asked Glaspie to communicate to Hussein. These diplomatic excerpts indicated President Bush policy of placating Iraq. He did not warn the Iraqi leader about the USA interests in protecting stability in the Gulf region, or the need to solve the kuwaiti dispute peacfully.[3]

To Hussein's complaints about kuwaiti's unwillingness to help Iraq and to observe its oil quotas, Glaspie's response *"Saying she had not insufficiant time to answer his complaints. She told Hussein that President Bush wanted Iraq's frendiship and stability in the Gulf area, she added that the USA had not defense treaties with kuwait nor any defense or security commitments with kuwait but she stated diplomatic measures could best answer Saddam's problems"*.[4]

Cathrine Glaspie innocently told Hussein*" we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your borders disagreement with kuwait"* she was confident that Hussein would not invade kuwait or alternatly it would seize a smool amount of disputed land and at the very worst he would seize two kuwaiti small islands, as she remarked to New York Times.[5]

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[1] Bruce Maddy-Weitzman ,The Inter-Arab System and the Gulf War: Continuity and Change, The Carter Center November 1991. www.cartercenter.org/documents/1223.pdf.
[2] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.51.
[3] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.51.
[4] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite, p.51.
[5] A.K.Pasha, Kuwaiti Strategies of Survival, Har- Anand Publications, New Delhi, 1995,p.69.

In her report to washington, Glaspie has observed that she seemed to be sincere; recommended that the USA should relax its public criticism of Iraq. Bush's July 26 message to Saddam was similarly designed to placate him. Bush said *"he wanted a peacful solution to Iraq's problems with kuwait. His concerns about Iraq, he wrote were sent in a spirit of freindship and candor*".[1]

Cathrine Glaspie "a fourty-eight" year old career diplomat with a wide experience of the Arab world, supsequently defended herself in an interview with NewYork Times against the charge that she had failed to read the signals coming from the Iraq' " *obviosly I did not think and nobady else did that the Iraqis were going to take all kuwait".* Every Kuwaiti and Saudi, every analyst in the western was wrong too. That does not excuse me, but people who now claim that all was clear were not heard from at that time.[2]

On the 7 of August the USA President Bush announced in a televised address to the nation that 82nd airborne division was being dispatched to Saudi Arabia; it was the start of *" Operation Desert Shield"* the largest deployment of the American troops overseas since the Vietnamese war. Bush also listed his four quiting principles: immediate and uncondional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government, a reaffirmation of the USA commitments to stabilitly in the Gulf region and the American determination to protect the lives of its citizens.[3]

On August 9, 1990, hardly a week after the Iraqi conquer over Kuwait, Iraq suddenly declared that it had annexed Kuwait to become the nineteenth province of the country.[4]

As a result of Iraqi conquer of Kuwait between August 2 and November 29, 1990, UNSC passed ten resolutions, in addition to resolutions 660 and 661 which had condemed the conquest of kuwait and called for economic sanctions. The most crucial ones were resolution 665 and 670 which premitted the enforcement of a naval and air embargo against Iraq.[5]

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[1] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.52.
[2] John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Saddam's War, the origins of the kuwait Conflict and the International response, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1991, pp.13-14.
[3] John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Saddam's War, op, cite, p.110.
[4] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p. 140.
[5] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.59.

The resolution 662 by which it was declared the "annexation of Kuwait by Iraq. has no legal validity". Iraq was also ordered to "rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait."[1]

However, Arab countries had long enough time to consider ways and means for settling the crisis peacefully. The Security Council met again imposed economic sanctions on Iraq under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Despite the attempts of several Arab leaders, King Hussein of Jordan and others, who urged settling the crisis as an Arab question, the leading permanent members of the Security Council demanded settlement of the crisis through the United Nations on the grounds that it was not merely an Arab but also an international issue.[2]

While the Council's attitude was on the whole friendly to Iraq in its consideration of Resolution 660, its attitude in the adoption of Resolution 661 had completely changed four days later. The Council's hostile attitude was shown by the celerity with which it had adopted Resolution 661, due to the pressure which the American delegation exercised on other delegations.[3]

On November 29, 1991 the UN Security Council was quick to pass 678 resolution which gave Iraq a final date for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait on January 15, 1991,[4] after which the allies could use all necessary means "to force a withdraw".[5]

The United States and Britain were the two principal powers that provided the military forces necessary to achieve the objectives of the Gulf war. They were joined by France with a considerably small military force, as it did not want to be the only Western democracy that did not join the Coalition. Most of the Arab countries dispatched only symbolic forces, but the Saudi Army took an active part in the military operations.[6]

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[1] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p. 140.
[2] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p. 136.
[3] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p. 137.
[4] فاروق القدومي، شهادة للتاريخ: العرب تآمروا على العراق والرئيس مبارك لعب دورا تحريضيا في القمة، 13 شباط 2013. رأي اليوم. www.raialyoum.com

Faruok Alqadomi, Evedince to the History: the Arabs Concipirisied on Iraq and the President Mubarak has played an inducement role in the summit, Raialyoum newspaper 13 February, 2013.

[5] Lester H. Brune, American and the Iraqi Crisis, op, cite,p.59.
[6] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, pp.132-133.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia, as the host country, extended all the facilities necessary for the Coalition force to perform its task from the moment it set feet in the country until its departure.[1]

3.5. Impacts of the First Gulf War 1991 on Iraqi- Turkish Relations

On August 5, 1990, one day before the UN resolution to impose embargo on Iraq, the vice President "*Taha Yasin Ramadan*" visited Ankara. He delivered Özal, Saddam Hussein's message that included: first, requesting Turkey to be neutral in this crisis, and not to support the UN resolution in imposing the embargo on Iraq. It means that Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline to be open,[2] second, Turkey's recognation in the new established government in Kuwait, third, Turkey should not provide protection to the Kuwaiti Emir's family, fourth, if Iraq and Kuwait would be united Turkey should recognise that.[3]

However, on August 6, the UN issued the resolution which imposed embargo on Iraq and on August 8, Turkey closed the pipelines.[4]

However, the First Gulf War impacted on Turkey from three levels economic, security and humanitarian. From a security aspect, Turkey believed that the Iraqi regime seemed to pose a continued security threat to Turkey after the First Gulf War, if the regime would increase its military capabilities and would threat the South areas in Turkey, this might encourage the Iraqi regime to have more strength to isolate Turkey from the economic and political interactions in the Gulf region.[5] Hence, in February 1999, Hussein warrned Ankara that it would face attack if it continued to allow the USA and British aircraft to launch air sorties against Iraq from Turkish territories.

In July 2002 the Bush administration urged the Turkish authorities to take the Iraqi missile threat seriously and pushed the Turkey to deploy surface- to-air missile batteries.[6]

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[1] Majid Khadduri, Edmund Gareeb, War in the Gulf 190-1991, op, cite, p. 133.

[2] Baskın Orhan, Türk Dış Polilitikasi, Kurtuluş Savaşından bugüne Olgulara, Begeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 11: 1980 1980-2001,S S. 552-553.

[3] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 96.

[4] Baskın Orhan, Türk Dış Polilitikasi, Kurtuluş Savaşından bugüne Olgulara, Begeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 11: 1980 1980-2001,S S. 552-553.

[5] احمد نوري النعيمي، العلاقات العراقية – التركية الواقع والمستقبل، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 144.

[6] Winrow, Turkey: Recalcitrant Ally in (the Iraq war causes and consequences) Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch (eds), Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 2006.199.

However from an economic aspect some Turkish officials and businessmen had been eager to cultivate expanding commercial ties with the Saddam regime and were thus opposed to war with Iraq. In autumn 2002, a report released by the Turkey- Iraq business council noted that Turkey had lost $100 billions as a consequence of the Gulf War and UN economic sanctions against Baghdad. The report added that with another conflict, Turkey could incur losses totaling up to $150 billion because of the impact on trade, tourism, and oil prices, and because of military costs and other expenses.[1]

From a humanitarian perspectives, right after the Gulf War of 1991 refugees' crisis erupted when Saddam launched a military campaign to suppress the Kurdish forces in the north of the country, about 500,000 Iraqi Kurds escaped to the Turkish- Iraqi borders.[2]

[1] Winrow, Turkey : Recalcitrant Ally, op, cite, p.200.
[2] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's security, op, cite, p.73.

Conclusion

Iraq has its historical, geopolitical and economic justifications of the First Gulf War in the 1991. The Iraqi leadership mis-percepted that the USA and Western countries reaction would intervine in that war, if Iraq entered Kuwait. Iraq drew its estimations from some analyses like: the USA and Soviet Cold War. Some signals that came from the USA by referring to resolve the dispute within bilateral relations framework between Iraq and Kuwait since both countries are Arab. Iraq also believed that the Soviet Union would support its policy towards Kuwait.

The crisis might be resovled by peaceful means or within the Arab League. However, Some Arab states found this crisis as a good opportunity to deter or weaken the Iraqi regime which they considered it as a threat to the Arab World through its ambitions. In addition to the USA and Britain had great pressure on Arab countries to accept the alliance intervention, and their influence on the UNSC resolutions. Iraq and Kuwait were not seriously flexible to resolve the crisis by diplomatic means.

However, Turkey like any other countries could not be away from the American pressure since its relations with the USA and membership in the NATO. It joined the alliance by closing Kirkuk- Ceyhan piplines after one day of the UNSC resolution which imposed the economic embargo on Iraq. It provided logistical assistance to the alliance by airbases on its lands.

Turkey believed that it could get economic aids as a compensation of its support the alliance. However, its losses were more than what was expected, this thing led Turkey later on to change its policy towards Iraq, especially after the rising of Kurdish ambitions of the independence, when Iraq's government withdrew its institutions from the northern Iraq which created political and security vaccum.

The First Gulf War impacted on Arab- Arab relations by dividing them into four camps in the eve of the war: first against the War and the Arab League resolution, Libya and the PLO; second, Algeria and Yemen abstained, and the third, Jordan, Sudan and Mauritania expressed reservations. Tunisia had not attended, fourth, Egypt and Arab Gulf supported it.

It has also impacted on the Middle East; the peace process with Israel was started since Iraq was considered the country that had always been against Israel and any peaceful settlement with it.

The War isolated Iraq from the Arab countries, and international community, in addition to the economic embargo imposed on Iraq. Iraq started to give compensations to the Kuwait and this thing was reflected on the Iraq's economy. Thus the Iraqi people suffered more and faced economic crisis impacted their lives.

However, we studied in this chapter the reasons of the first Gulf War and its political, security and economic impacts of the Middle East, Arab countries and Turkey. The next chapter explains the Second Gulf War 2003 and the American occupation of Iraq under so-called countering of the WMD.

CHAPTER IV

IMPACTS OF THE SECOND GULF WAR 2003 ON TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

This chapter discusses the reasons which led to the American war on Iraq in 2003. It analyses the American policy after the September events and its justifications of the War. It also deals with the attitude of the international community before and after the war, the EU especially, Germany and France policy towards the American War. In addition to, discussing the Chinese and Russia's policy.

It also tackles Turkish policy and attitude towards the war. Moreover, the policy of some Arab countries and their role in supporting the war and other countries that refused it.

Finally the impact of that war on Turkey, the Arab World and the Middle East will be discused.

4.1. The Political Development Which led to the Outbreak of the Second Gulf War

When Bush declared the war on Iraq in 2003, he justified his war on the basis of the following: first, Iraq is a country that possessed (WMD) and it was aiming to disarmament these weapons, second, Saddam Hussein had close ties with some terrorist networks that were targeting innocent western people, third, innocent Iraqi civilians were suffering from the Iraqi regime and the USA coalition forces would bring (democracy and welfare) to the Iraqi people by this war.[1]

The major political strategic changes occured as result of the 9/11 events and we can state the following:

[1] Cagri Erhan, Reconstruction of Iraq- Major Uncertainties (the Middle East after 9\11) Turkish and Egyptian prespectivs, (Nadia Mamoud , Pakinam El-Sarkawy) (eds), Center for Political Research and Studies, Cairo,2005.p,133.

The United States initiated a four dimensional plans: the first dimension is homeland defense through changing internal laws, putting more intelligent units and circles, using military forces inside the USA. These are all symptoms of what the United states used to call "*symptoms of the third world"*.[1]

The second dimension which is *"preemptive strike"* is maximizing military actions abroad using a term that has been used by Israeli for quite a long time.[2]

In order to legalize this dimension, the USA claims that its security does not lie only within its borders and that natural safety of the USA, since its geographical position between two Oceans it is no longer a guarantee for security; thus they should start defending their security from abroad within countries or group of countries that form a threat to the USA and that was how they formulated the preemptive strikes, starting using military forces to achieve political objectives. The first stage in implementing this was in Afghanistan,while the second stage was in Iraq. Within that context they formulated what they called "military warfare" v.a using military force against less or non-military forces anywhere in the world.[3]

The third dimension "Distribution Warfare" which was declared by President Bush after 9\11 when he stated that the USA intends to fight terrorism for at least 10 years all over the world; thus they had to put their strategic concepts into operational ones and from operational unites to be used in different arenas.

The fourth dimension was the use of the nuclear power doctrine and they started by using conventional forces then going directly without any political decision to using nuclear power.[4]

However, the causes of the American war on Iraq can be summarized in the following points: first, since the second half of the 20th century, Iraq has stood out as one of the most strategic and prominent regional actors in the wider Middle East, whose developments, activities and exploits have always influenced its neighbouring countries.

[1] Ahmed Abdel–Halim, American War on Iraq, Causes Sequences in (the Middle East after 9|11, Turkish and Egyptian perspectives) Center for Political Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2005,p.139.
[2] Ahmed Abdel –Halim, American War on Iraq, op, cite, p.140.
[3] .Ahmed Abdel –Halim, American War on Iraq, op, cite, p.140.
[4] .Ahmed Abdel –Halim, American War on Iraq, op, cite, p.140.

Iraq has reached its dominant position due to different factors. Combining the second-largest oil reserves in the world.[1]

According to the report issued by American national policy for energy, Iraq has about 212 billion barrels oil reserves, Iraqi oil is the best in the quality as USA consumes 10 million barrels every day and it imports %55 from abroad so the estimate of local consumtion will reach 17 million barrels in 2020.[2] Iraq has a population of more than 32 million people, and it has the critical economic and demographic capacity to sustain dynamic regional politics, whatever significance and direction they could take, as the history of its turbulent international and regional relations has shown. Moreover, Iraq has a strategic geopolitical collocation within the region. It lies at the heart of the wider Middle East and borders on six different countries which have traditionally manifested conflicting and divergent internal and regional ambitions and politics. Iraq has wielded a regional influence from cultural and religious perspectives.[3]

Second, the exploiting the present international situation the USA being on the top of international system to end the problems of the Middle East and to remove all entanglements facing the peace process that they perceive.[4]

Third, ending the threats of Israeli security that both Iraq and Iran represent and that could be achieved by invading Iraq, threatening Syria and Iran, and enforcing regional stability according to American and Israeli viewpoint.[5]

However, the American war and military operation on Iraq called “Shock and Awe” aimed to quickly control Iraq. The declared goal of the USA was the Iraqi regime “Saddam Hussein” and “WMD” but the real aim; was to destroy the moral and psychology of Iraqi People. Some analysts made a comparison between Bush’s war on Iraq, and, Hitler’s to “ Gronica” in the Spanish Pacific region during the Second World War. That Village did not

[1] Look at Map 1 in the appendix.

[2] الحرب الامريكية على ما يسمى الارهاب "الحرب على العراق" التقرير الاستراتيجي، مركز دراسات الشرق الاوسط، الاردن، الجزء الثاني، 2003، ص 24.

The American War against so-called “terrorism” “ War against Iraq” the Strategic Report, Middle East Studies, Jordan, part 2, 2003, p.24.

Look at aslo, Mustafa. Sıtkı Bilgin, “Büyük Orta Doğu Projesi Ölü Doğmuş Bir Plandır” içinde Orta Doğu Kuşatması: Yeni Dünya Düzeni’nin Orta Doğu Ayağı, (Der.) Atilla Akar, Istanbul: Timaş Yay, 2004.

[3] Paolo Maggiolini, Iraq’s Foreign Policy Directions, op, cite, p. 2.

[4] Ahmed Abdel –Halim, American War on Iraq, op, cite,p.142.

[5] Ahmed Abdel–Halim, American War on Iraq, op, cite,p.142.

have any strategic, or military importance. But it was like Baghdad as a religous and cultural center, the attack was to fear the Spanish and destroy their resistance.[1]

4.2. The Policies of the West and the Arab States During and after the 2003 War

On November 8, 2002, after nearly two months of consultation, negotiation, and debate, the U.N. Security Council, by a vote of 15, adopted Resolution 1441 in 2002. In this resolution, the Council decided to give Iraq which "*has been and remains in material breach"* of U.N. resolutions, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations and to set up "an enhanced inspection regime. It decided that Iraq *"shall provide a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems"* by December.[2]

It decided that *"false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted"* and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute a further material breach and will be reported to the Council for assessment.[3]

The Council decided that Iraq "shall provide...immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview. It also directed UNMOVIC and IAEA to "report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations. In addition, the Council decided that it would convene immediately upon receipt of a report relating to Iraqi noncompliance and recalled. In that context, that it had

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[1] د. احمد محمد عبد الله، المعارك النفسية في حرب العراق في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003، ص324.

Ahmed Mohammed Abdullah, the Psychological Battle in Iraqi War, in (the Agression on Iraq crisis Map and nation future), Hassan Nafaa, Dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), Center for Research and political Studies, Cairo University, 2003,p. 324.

2www.un.org. S/RES/1441 (2002)

[3] Marjorie Ann Browne, the United Nations Security Council – Its role in the Iraq Crisis: the Brief Overview. http://fas.org/man/crs/RS21323.pdf.

repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.[1]

At the end of January 2003, a journalist asked USA Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld why Europe was not supporting the USA policy on Iraq?, Rumsfeld's defiant reply sent shockwaves across the Atlantic: *"You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the centre of gravity is shifting to the East and there are a lot of new members. The vast numbers of other countries in Europe are not with France and Germany, they're with the United States".*[2]

Rumsfeld believed that Europe could be divided into two parts: an 'Old Europe' of core EU member states which are anti-American and seek to create a European foreign policy that could challenge the USA; and a 'New Europe' of countries peripheral to the EU which have strong links to the USA and NATO. The governments of 18 European countries seemed to confirm this division the following week by publishing two letters of support for the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1441.[3]

Nonetheless, opinion surveys have produced some striking results according to EOS Gallup poll taken in January. At first glance, the East Europeans thought that "Iraq was much more of a threat to world peace than citizens of the current EU". In the Union, the Greeks were at one end of the spectrum, with a majority thinking Iraq did not represent a threat to world peace, followed by the French and Austrians. At the other end of the spectrum, the Irish, Italians and Portuguese had a near majority thinking Iraq was a threat, and 73 per cent of the British were of that opinion. On closer inspection, four countries are the cause of the higher perception of Iraq as a threat in the new members: the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. They all showed a greater fear of Iraq than did America's staunchest ally, the United Kingdom. Other countries in the East felt the threat less than the British public, but more than the Greeks – in other words, they fell within the extremes of view among the EU-15 countries.[4]

UK governments favoured a prominent American role in the world and in Europe. The current one's interest in maintaining it certainly influenced British Iraq policy. In the

[1]Marjorie Ann Browne, the United Nations Security Council, op, cite.
[2] John Springford, 'Old' and 'New' Europeans united: public attitudes towards the Iraq war and US foreign policy, Centre for European, 2003.Reform.www.cer.org.uk. reform Centre.
[3] John Springford, 'Old' and 'New' Europeans united, op, cite.
[4] EOS-Gallup Europe 'International crisis survey', January 2003.

first two dimensions of the conflict, diplomatic/political and then military, the UK was confirmed as the USA's most longstanding and important ally. Its history as a former global power with a record of intervention was also relevant. Some measure of this was retained through the political preparedness and technical capacity to project military force. Even if its policy directions were opposed, these countries arguments about 'decline' and emphasized the UK as an international actor that can act. British diplomacy and military upheld a high status during the Iraq crisis, one that impressed that there will be no coherent and affective common foreign and security policy without strong British commitment or, more likely, co-leadership.[1]

France used the UN quite effectively as a political and public relations instrument. In the USA administration context, relative moderate Colin Powell, was less prudent. While France tried to block Anglo-American action against Saddam Hussein its politicians had on other occasions showed little respect "and instead even derision" for UN procedures, international law or public opinion elsewhere if it was interpreted as hindering French goals. France also had hard financial interests at stake, being along with Russia, the biggest creditors to Iraq. In a political battle over oil, Elf-Aquitaine would need strong state support against Exxon, Standard Oil, and British Petrolium.[2]

On March 10, 2003, President Chirac declared in an interview broadcast live on French national television that France would veto the latest draft UN resolution "whatever the circumstances". However, Chirac left open the possibility that France might support, or at least abstain on, a different Security Council resolution authorizing military action down the road. In the same interview, the French President explained that the situation should a arise in which the UN inspectors informed the Security Council that "the progress isn't sufficient".[3]

For Chirac, the veto threat was partially a matter of principle. The Security Council, a symbol of France's continuing relevance on the world political stage, should not rubber-stamp what he believed would be an illegitimate war. Furthermore, Chirac viewed the veto threat as politically expedient. The war was deeply unpopular with European publics and French Muslims in particular, and the veto threat might conceivably improve France's standing in the Global South, especially the Arab world. Finally, there was a tactical

[1] Stephen Wood, The Iraq War: Five European Roles, National Europe Centre Paper No. 112, 13 June 2003, p.4.
[2] Stephen Wood, The Iraq War: Five European Roles, op, cite. p.7.
[3] Stefano Recchia, Did Chirac Say 'Non'? Revisiting UN Diplomacy on Iraq, 2002-03, Political Scince Quarterly, Vol. 130 Issue 4, USA, Dec, 2015.p 644.

dimension involved. Chirac and his advisers had concluded that by making the veto threat explicit, they could take some pressure off the council's nonpermanent members, thereby making it less likely that Washington and London could achieve a nine-member majority.[1]

La Sabliere, then France's ambassador to the Security Council, recalls that at the end of February, his Chilean and Mexican counterparts had told him, "the Americans are saying that you will abstain." When he sought to reassure them that France would veto the draft resolution under discussion, they asked, "well, could you make it public?".[2]

After 10 March, the adoption of a second resolution with an ultimatum foreseeing an automatic authorization of force in case of Iraqi noncompliance was most likely no longer feasible. The uncommitted six, with political cover from France, could now more openly resist the pressure from Washington and London to vote in favor of such a resolution. In this sense, Chirac's veto threat indeed "changed the game". However, even after Chirac's veto threat, an alternative approach involving what became known as the "benchmarks proposal" would have stood a good chance of breaking the impasse at the Security Council. A two-step process would have been necessary for this approach to ultimately yield a UN mandate for the use of force: First, the Security Council would have had to approve a second resolution containing a list of benchmarks as well as a deadline for Iraq's compliance, second, after the deadline expired and the weapons inspectors issued their final report, the Security Council would have had to adopt a further resolution, acknowledging Iraq's failure to comply with the benchmarks and thus authorizing the use of force.[3]

However, the French refusal of the American War on Iraq was motivated by political, cultural and social considerations. There are more than 4 million Arabs who live in France, half of them are French citizens, they refused that war and realized that its aim to occupate Iraq and control the Middle East.[4]

Germany also has joined France by refusing the war. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who had been accuring more foreign policy competences to his office, exercised what

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[1] Stefano Recchia, Did Chirac Say 'Non', op, cite.p. 643.
[2] Stefano Recchia, Did Chirac Say 'Non'?, op, cite.p. 644.
[3] Stefano Recchia, Did Chirac Say 'Non'?, op, cite.p. 644.
[4] د. عمر الشوبكي، المتغير الاوربي والموقف الفرنسي من الحرب على العراق في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003، ص ص 101-102.
Omer Alshobaki, the Euorpean Changing and France Attitude of War on Iraq ,in (the Agression on Iraq crisis Map and nation future), dr. Hassan Nafaa, dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), center for research and political studies, Cairo University, 2003,pp. 101-102.

many commentators perceived was a rather clumsy ‘diplomacy’. He painted himself into a political corner through early categorical statements that Germany would not participate in a war against Saddam and would oppose the USA if it did: firstly, on the international front, no one had actually demanded from the German government that it made ground troops available or take part in any bombing operations, secondly, in the domestic context, for nominally SPD or Green voters who opposed German participation, which parties would they have voted for otherwise, if the Social Democratic Party and Greens had offered some support for military action? The customary post-war German oscillation between the USA and France began to look quite comfortable in comparison to the emerging scenario. There were other considerations for the government including the fear of Germany becoming a terrorist target.[1]

Germany has tried to protect the Euopean soveregnity from the American presure. It pursued according to its national interests, independent Eourpen policy far a way from the USA influence.[2]

For Russia if we analyze its policy toward the Middle East under Putin and the impact of 9/11 and the war on Iraq on Russian policy, it is first necessary to note that only three countries in the region are of primary significance to Moscow, and these are Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria after Iraq’s occupation. Iran and Turkey border countries in Central Asia, Iran and Transcaucasia (Iran and Turkey) which are seen as the “soft underbelly” of the Russian Federation, and Moscow has been quite concerned that Turkish and Iranian influence in the two regions could significantly compete with Moscow’s own influence there.[3]

In seeking to explain Putin’s apparent hardening of policy during the Iraq war, there are: several possible explanations: first, with the Duma elections drawing closer, and the Russian public strongly against the war, Putin did not wish to leave the issue solely in the hands of the opposition communist party, especially since his own party, the United

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[1] Stephen Wood, The Iraq War: Five European Roles, National Europe Centre Paper No. 112, 13 June 2003,p. 8.

[2] د. زينب عبد العظيم، ادارة العلاقات الاوربية- الامريكية بعد الحرب في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003، ص286.

Zaineb Abduladeem, the Managing of Eourpean- American Relations after the War, in Iraq, (crisis Map and nation future), Dr. Hassan Nafaa, Dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 2003,p. 286.

[3] Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy toward the Middle East Under Putin: The Impact of 9/11 and The War in Iraq, Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.2, No.2, Summer 2003, p. 66.

Russia, was running into problems, second, with the Moslem world opposing the war, Putin may have felt that a strong anti-war position could keep Russia's 20 million Moslems, many of whom were unhappy with his policy on Checynya, in check. Indeed, Putin asserted, "Russia has a community of 20 million Moslems and we cannot but take their opinion into account. fully share their concerns". Finally, with Germany and France also strongly opposing the war, Putin may have felt that the newly created Franco-German-Russian bloc of states could serve as a check on USA unilateralism, and Russian opposition to the war would strengthen the prospects of what Yevgeny Primakov, one of Putin's predecessors as Prime Minister, called a multipolar world.[1]

Even before the USA attack in March 2003, Russia's policy toward Iraq was a mixed one. Russia first supported and then abstained on a UNSC vote in 1999 establishing the UNMOVIC inspection system which was a weaker version of UNSCOM, because the Bush administeration was not serious to give time to this commission in order to inspect and disarmament Iraq "WMD". İt exploied the commission to overthrow the Iraqi regim by charging Iraq with violating UNSC resolutions.[2]

UNSCOM was acussed not only by Iraq; but also by the France, Russia and China in aligning to the USA and submited to its pressure by presenting its famous report on Iraq in December 1998 which accused Iraq in non cooperation with the commission. As a result of this report and developments the USA and Britain found the opportunity to wage attack on Iraq in December from 16 until 20, 1998.[3]

However, despite UNMOVIC's weakness, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein strongly opposed the agreement and expressed his displeasure at Russia for supporting it.[4]

In part, this was due to the fact that the leading forces opposing a USA-British attack on Iraq were the French and Germans, and this provided diplomatic cover for Moscow, and in part it was due to the fact that the USA kept hoping for Russian support, or at least neutrality, during the war, hinting that it would in return respect Russia's economic interests in Iraq. Nonetheless, once Putin publicly sided with French leader Jacques Chirac, USA-Russian ties began to deteriorate. The situation was to worsen once

[1] Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy towards the Middle East Under Putin, op, cite, p.72.

[2] د. احمد ابراهيم محمود، عملية التفتيش الدولي في العراق في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003، ص70.
Amed Ibrahim Mahmood, the Operation of the International Inspection in Iraq, (crisis Map and nation future), Dr. Hassan Nafaa, Dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 2003,p. 70

[3] د. احمد ابراهيم محمود، عملية التفتيش الدولي في العراق، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص76.

[4] Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy towards the Middle East Under Putin, op, cite, p.69.

the war broke out in late March. Putin, while not being forced to veto a resolution called for UNSC support of the war, because the USA decided not to seek such a UN resolution, nonetheless it spoke out sharply against the Anglo-USA attack, calling it the most serious crisis since the end of the cold war, and asserting that it was *"a direct violation of international law, and a major political mistake that could cause the International Security system to collapse"*. Russian-American relations were further hurt by reports that Russia had secretly sold military equipment to Iraq, including night vision goggles, anti-tank missiles, and devices to interfere with USA GPS positioning systems. In addition, the Russian Ambassador to Iraq accused USA forces of shooting at a Russian convoy exiting Baghdad.[1]

However, Putin inherited three main goals in Iraq from Yeltsin: the first was to regain the more than $8 billion dollars owed to Russia by the regime of Saddam Hussein, the second was to assist in the pursuit of major Russian business interests in Iraq, especially for Moscow's oil companies and GASPROM, interests that could be developed only when the U.N. sanctions regime against Iraq were lifted. In the interim, Putin wanted to be assured that Moscow would continue to make millions of dollars through contracts awarded by Iraq under the U.N.'s "Oil for Food" program. The third goal was to secure a partial or full lifting of the sanctions so Russian firms could begin to work in Iraq.[2]

Once the war came to a speedy end, Putin had to rethink his position. With the USA occupating Iraq, calling for an end to the sanctions program, and even calling for some of Iraq's debts to be forgiven, Moscow stood to lose billions of dollars. Under these circumstances, Putin initially took a tough position, stating that U.N. sanctions should not be lifted until it was clear that the threat of WMD had ended.[3]

Sponsored UN Security Council Resolution No. 1483. While leaving the United States in full control of Iraq – a major Russian concession to the USA– and lifting sanctions on Iraq (except for the sale of military equipment) the resolution did have a few face-saving elements for Russia. Thus it provided a role for the United Nations in the form of a special representative "albeit with ill-defined powers" and noted that the goal of the resolution was for the Iraqis to independently decide their own fate and manage their own natural resources "thereby holding out hope for Russian oil companies to obtain lucrative contracts" Russia also benefitted from the Resolution's six month extension of the oil-for-

[1] Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy towards the Middle East Under Putin, op, cite, p.71.
[2] Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy towards the Middle East Under Putin, op, cite, p.69.
[3] Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy towards the Middle East Under Putin, op, cite, p.72.

food program, which gave Moscow hope that it would be able to cash in on a number of already signed agreements under the program including one of $700 million for Machinon import.[1]

Hence, Iraq conflict profoundly influenced relations amongst the present 15 member states and created a new division between 'old and new Europe'. The strong support of the British government for USA military intervention in Iraq, shared by most of the applicant states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), forced Germany into a new pacifist alliance with France.[2]

The EU countries realized the USA aims; hence they refused the war for two reasons: first, internal and economic, the EU public opinion realized that the USA control's of the oil resources in the world would influence the European political options, Iraq issue is not "WMD" only, but oil, if the main aim is to change the non- democratic regimes, the question is why Iraq is the first?; Second, regional, EU countries believed that the priority in the Middle East is to resolve the Arab-Israel struggle, not waging a new war.[3]

However, Chinese attitute was not strong in supporting Iraq as France and Germany. It called in February 14, 2003, to provide more time to the inspectors, refused the use of force, the problem should be resolved within security council. China did not declare to use veto against any resolution. It was the first state that has stopped its flights to Kuwait, and reduced its diplomatic staffs in Iraq. This attitute reflects the Chinese traditional policy which is based on non-confortation with the USA, in order to protect its economic growth which is connected to the American markets.[4]

However, the attitude of Arab countries was not serious and clear to stop the war. On March 1, 2003, Arab Summit in Sherem Alsheik adopted a resolution which refused

[1] Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy towards the Middle East Under Putin, op, cite, p.73.

[2] Chritian Schweiger, British–German Relations in the European Union after the War on Iraq, German Politics, Vol.13, No.1, March 2004 p,53.

[3] الحرب الامريكية على ما يسمى الارهاب "الحرب على العراق، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 31-32.

[4] د. محمد السيد سليم، اسيا والازمة العراقية الانكلو امريكية في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003، ص 115.

Muhamed Alsaid Selim, Asia and Iraq's Anglo-American Crisis ,in (the Agression on Iraq crisis Map and nation future), dr. Hassan Nafaa, Dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 2003,p. 115.

any war on Iraq whether under international umbrella or not, and called the Arab states not to participate in any war against Iraq.[1]

However, what happened was contrary to the summit resolutions. At least five of Arab Countries "Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahren, Emerates" opened their lands to host and provided logestic assistance to the Anglo-American troops.[2]

Kuwait has welcomed the American war on Iraq. It hosted the largist number of the Anglo-American troops. It supported USA by paying $200 million annually for storing the weapons and military equipment on its land.[3]

Qatar also hosted the American troops in Al-Saliya camp which contains 1400 homes for Anglo-American troops. It developed with USA airbase in Aladid area that contains the longest high way in the Middle East and which had the capability to host 120 planes and 4000 troops.[4]

Jordan has recieved 6000 American troops on its borders with Iraq since the first week of the war. It also installed pateriot missiles on its lands.[5]

Syria refused the American war, though it declared in November 2002 its consent of the 1441 Security Council resolution which prolonged the inspection mission. Syria realized that it might be the next target to the USA. These developments led to increase the tension between Syria and USA. As a result, Bush administration accused Syria of developing the chemical weapons. However, Syria could not stay away of American

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[1] د. حسن ابو طالب، سيناريوهات الازمة العراقية- اثار متوقعة على العالم العربي، افكار اولية للنقاش في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003، ص247.

Hassan Abu Talib, Iraqi Crisis Senarios, Expected Effect on the Arab World, initial ideas for the discussion, (crisis Map and nation future), dr. Hassan Nafaa, Dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), center for research and political studies, Cairo University, 2003,p. 247.

[2] د. احمد حسن الرشيدي، النظام العربي وجامعة الدول العربية في ظل الازمة الامريكية العراقية في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003، ص 189.

Ahmed Hussan Alrashidi, The Arab System and Arab League under the American Iraqi Crisis, in (the Agression on Iraq crisis Map and nation future), dr. Hassan Nafaa, dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), center for research and political studies, Cairo University, 2003,p. 189.

[3] داليا ابراهيم عبد الكريم، عرب الخليج والعراق الجديد: المكاسب والمخاسر، قراءات استراتيجية، مركز الدراسات السياسية والاسترلتيجية، القاهرة، العدد 9، ايلول 2003، ص40.

Dalya Ibrahim Abdulkareem, Gulf Arabs and the New Iraq: Gains and Losses, Strategic Readings, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, No 9, September 2003.p. 40.

[4] داليا ابراهيم عبد الكريم، عرب الخليج والعراق الجديد، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص40.

[5] د. حسن ابو طالب، سيناريوهات الازمة العراقية، مصدر سبق ذكره ص247.

pressure for long; after weeks it closed its borders with Iraq. It started to dialogue with the USA.[1]

However, the neighboring states had not have any political capability or would stop the war, the majority of them refused the use of force against Iraq, but they agreed to present logistic assistance to the USA. Some Arab countries like Qatar and Kuwait hosted the Anglo-American troops on their lands. Other Arab states as Jordan and Saudi Arabia received special troops for a logistic mission.[2]

4.3. The Political and Economic Impacts of the Gulf War on Turkey and the Middle East

In 2002 JD Party assumed the power in Turkey. It pursued many diplomatic initiatives as a strategy to resolve the problems in the Middle East. Until the Arab spring Turkish image in the Middle East was very attractive due to Turkey pursuit neutral policy. However, Turkish foreign policy was dramatically changed from neutralism.[3]

Davutoğlu Said " Turkish foreign policy analysis towards Arab World should take two dimensions: Historical and Geographical, these two dimensions should be taken into the consideration when foreign policy details are taken, that means Turkey should develop strong relations with Middle East which included West Asia and North Africa, and developed relations with Iraq and "Syria".[4]

He also introduced a new concept into Turkish foreign policy "Zero Enemies" guideline towards all its neighbors. This policy was also known as zero problems or "Sifir Sorun" approach. Within this concept Davutoğlu sharply challenged the traditional security based on Western *"Realism"* school of the Turkish foreign policy that Nations are driven primarily by *"interests"* and threats posed by enemies.[5]

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[1] سحر الابحر، سوريا والحرب على العراق، قراءات استراتيجية، مركز الدراسات السياسية والاسترلتيجية، القاهرة، العدد 9، ايلول 2003، ص 19.

Sahar Alabhar, Syria and the War on Iraq, Strategic Readings, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, No 9, September 2003.p. 19.

[2] الحرب الامريكية على ما يسمى الارهاب ، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 34.

[3] Tarik Oğuzlu, Komşlarla Sıfır Sorun Politikası ve Arap Baharı, Tıkanmışlık Durumunun Bir Analizi, Ortadoğuanaliz, Haziran Cit 4. Sayı 42.2012. S. 51-53.

[4] عبد الحليم غزالي، الاسلاميون الجدد والعلمانية الاصولية في تركيا، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 89.

[5] Graham E. Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, the Leadership in the Middle East, Bozorg Press, 2014,p.129.

The vision of JDP Government to the development of the economic relations with Arab World can be summarized in the following points: increasing the trade relations especially with Turkish neighbors because the common borders facilated the goods transformation, establishment of common investments projects whether in Turkey or, Arab Countries. This is another policy rapprochement, etablishing the scientific cooperation.[1] Within this context the JDP also aimed at a shift in Iraq policy by putting less emphasis on security issues and more emphasis on cooperation rather than conflict.[2]

However, there are two reasons of involving the Turkish role in the Middle East : first, the collaps of the Arab regional system, after the American war on Iraq in 2003 which created a gap in this region, second, Turkish foreign policy was supported by the USA, as the balancer to Iran role in the region, third, the Middle East is only the geographical scope (Turkey's neighbors) that Turkey can play a regional role without any clashes with any international powers, fourth, the acceptance of Turkish pattern from different Arab sectors, fifth, the common heritage, history and culturel between Arabs and Turks.[3]

The Arab countries could be good markets for Turkish goods, the Arab countries have energy resources that Turkey need, and Turkish concerning to transfom the energy and gas to Europe. This could increase a Turkish strategic position, the security interests, playing role in the region, this means participating in the interaction of the regional agenda, playing also regional role will be supported by EU to promot the regional peace in this area.[4]

With reference to Iraq, Ankara's official position on Iraqi state's structure is that it should be worked out by the Iraqis themselves and that neither Turkey nor any other external actor has the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of Iraq. Ankara has, nevertheless, made its preferences clear. A federation along ethnic lines would, according to Ankara, be very dangerous since it might lead to deepening of ethnic and religious divisions and, ultimately, to a break-up of Iraq. As long as it is not a question of "Ethnic

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[1] عبد الحليم غزالي، الاسلاميون الجدد والعلمانية الاصولية في تركيا، ظلال الثورة الصامتة، مكتبة الشروق الدولية، القاهرة، 2007، ص 90.

[2] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security Culture, op, cit, p. 71.

[3] مصطفى اللباد، اوربا وسياسة تركيا الشرق اوسطية، مجلة السياسة الدولية، مؤسسة الاهرام، القاهرة، العدد 182، 2010، ص 198.

[4] مصطفى اللباد، اوربا وسياسة تركيا الشرق اوسطية، مصدر سبق ذكره ص 198.

Mustafa Allbad, Europe and Turkish Middle Eastern Policy, Journal of international politics, Alhram institution Cairo, no 182, 2010,p.198.

Federalism", Turkish foreign policy makers have said that they did not oppose a federal solution.[1]

Ankara became more open towards the idea of a Federal Iraq after the invasion, probably for the fact that some kind of Federal solution seemed to be the only way to keep Iraq together as one state. Turkish policy preferences may have been adjusted to fit the changing realities, but the Foreign Ministry has, actually , defended the same basic principles both before and after the invasion . Iraq's people have the right to decide whatever political system they prefer, even a Federation, was Ankara's policy prior to the invasion as well. Neither before nor after the invasion did plans for decentralization of power and the creation of autonomous provinces create much stir in Ankara.[2]

The American war on Iraq in 2003 has been also the biggest test of American-Turkish relation since the American congress's reaction which imposed sanctions against Turkey, after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus 1974.[3]

Before war started Turkey realized that it did not get compensation for its damages in the First Gulf War 1991. However, the economic interests were given priority in American –Turkish negotiation. The professionality of Turkish negociator was clear by manipulatıng all diplomatic tools in order to convince Bush's administration in Turkish rights for compensation. Turkish side had always concentrated on the difficulty of "Turkish Grand National Assembly" approval. Turkish Ambassador in Washington mentioned that the economic compensation is not a crucial factor to reach an agreement, because %95 of Turkish people refuse the American war on Iraq.[4]

In January Prime Minister Abdullah Gul visited (Egypt-Saudia Arabia-Jordan-Syria and Iran) then on the 23 of January, Foreign Minister of the aforementioned

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[1] Asa Lundgren, the Unwelcome Neighbor, op, cite, p. 112.

[2] Asa Lundgren, the Unwelcome Neighbor, op, cite, p. 111.

[3] الديناميكيات المتغيرة في تركيا والتداعيات على العلاقات الامريكية- التركية، ترجمات، المركز الدولي للدراسات المستقبلية والاستراتيجية، القاهرة، العدد 45، ايلول 2008، ص 20.

The changeable daynamics Turkey and their Affects on American- Turkish Relations, translations, International Center for Future and Strategy Studies, Cairo, No 45, September 2008,p. 20

[4] د. باكينام الشرقاوي، المشهدان التركي والايراني وازمة العراق، في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003، ص 132.

Baqinam Alsharqawi, Turkish and Irani Views and Iraq Crisis, in (the Aggression on Iraq crisis Map and nation future), dr. Hassan Nafaa, dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), center for research and political studies, Cairo University, 2003,p. 132.

countries met in Istanbul. However, they were not able to reach any concret conclusion. Eventually, Turkey did not send its troops to Iraq and did not take an active role in the War and did not allow American troops to use its territory. Later on, in order not to further undermine relations with the USA after the War began, Turkey opened its airfield to USA planes.[1]

Turkish policymakers treated the Iraqi crisis as a source of instability for the Middle East and Turkey's national security rather than treating it as an opportunity to advance Turkey's national interests. Furthermore, when considered from the perspectives of Turkish foreign policy principles, both international/regional positions and domestic public opinions were against the USA intervention in Iraq and they ultimately wanted a diplomatic solution. The main concern for Turkey during the crisis was to provide stability to the region. As well as, protecting its national security.[2]

Therefore, Turkey supported diplomatic solutions under the United Nations umbrella, but in the case of an inevitable war, Turkey would have followed a foreign policy protecting its national and regional security priorities. Within this framework, there were two possible scenarios. First the USA-led operation would either succeed or fail. In the first case, if the USA was able to carry out its stated goals, the fate of both Turkey and the region would be dependent strictly upon USA intentions since its uniqueness in the international system, the second case was the failure of the USA-led coalition.[3]

At the beginning Turkey had refused USA demands; since Turkey is a neighbor of Iraq and strategic partner of USA in post cold War era. The USA wanted to use Turkish territory to attack Iraq from the north and wanted Turkey to take an active role in the crisis. The USA was planning to place 62000 USA troops, 255 Warplanes and 65 helicopters in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's situation was even more fragile and it was undecided and hesitant.[4]

The USA offered a lucrative package of some $26 billion in aid (between $4 billion and $6 billion in grants and about $20 billion in loans) to sway the Turkish parliament without mentioning trade concessions that would allow Turkish textiles easy access to the

[1] Idris Bal, Turkey- relations and impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cite.p.135
[2] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign policy: The case of the 2003 Iraq War, Stratijik Arıştırma Merkezi (SAM), Perceptions, Spring-Summer, Ankara, 2009,p. 34.
[3] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign policy, op, cite,p. 34.
[4] Monte palmer, the politics of the Middle East, op,cite,p.320.

American market. This package gave Turks pause, but the negotiations broke down over the Turkish desire to command its own troops into northern Iraq; the obvious goal of which would be to prevent an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. This was not a minor threat, for Turkey had already marshaled 20000 troops, supported by Tanks and artillery, on the Turkish Iraqi borders.[1]

However, Turkish- American relations witnessed transferred period after the visit of the American Secretary of state "Colin Paul" to Ankara on April 1, 2003, through: American promise prevented the Kurdish control over Kirkuk and Mosul and they would stay under the American Administration, countering the PKK through Turkish-American cooperation. Establishing" Safe Heaven" if necessary under the condition of Kurdish humanitarian cross borders. Turkish would participate in Iraq's reconstruction economically. Establishing Turkish-American committee resolving any problem would happen. Presenting $1 billion to Turkey as assistant. In contrast, Turkish military would not enter northern Iraq without coordination with the USA. Turkey would support the logistic operations by allowing the trucks cross the borders towards the north of Iraq and using the Turkish airports for the American crafts.[2]

However, Turkey and the USA reached a memorandum which was pushed to the TGNA to be approved but the latter refused it for the following reasons: first, the Kurdish armaments in Iraq, Turkey refused to supply them with anti air missiles as the USA wanted. It was worried that arms might be transferred to the "PKK", Second, disarmament of Kurds after the war, but the USA refused this idea and left it to the position after the war, Third, grant the Turkmens the original element with Arabs and Kurds of the new Iraqi constitution, Fourth, the Turkish public opinion towards the American behavior, the American President Bush had dealt with Foreign and Economic Ministers when he received them on February 14, 2003, as they were Ministers in his government by saying "*you have nothing to do on the American lands, you have to go and pass the memorandum by your country's parliament"*, in addition to the American media which described Turkey as it was bargaining for money.[3]

The motion that gives permission to send Turkish troops to northeren Iraq and allow foreign troops was accepted by the Turkish parliament on the 20th of march in 200.

[1] Monte palmer, the Politics of the Middle East, op,cite,p.320.

[2] د. لقمان عمر محمود النعيمي، تركيا في الاستراتيجية الامريكية المعاصرة، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 91-92.

[3] د. لقمان عمر محمود النعيمي، تركيا في الاستراتيجية الامريكية المعاصرة، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 77-78.

However, this step was to late, because the USA used the Kurdistan region to open a new front in the north.[1]

There were many reasons behind Turkish hesitation to help the USA. This could be summed up in the following:

Economic: Turkey was damaged in 1991 embargo. It had lost about $100 billions.[2] Turkey had not been compensated, hence America's promises were not trustworthy are taking an active role in the War will load heavy economical burdens onto Turkey.

External: supporting that war could cause opposition from Arab countries,[3] and Turkey's relations with EU with the same position against the war.[4]

Legal: there is no legitimate ground for this War.[5] Moreover, Turkey defended a peaceful resolution of the problem, demanded Iraq to obey the decision of the UN. If an operation was necessary, this should be taken by United Nations Security Council.[6]

Internal: the Turkish government was lacking sufficience experience at that time. The President "*Ahmet Necdet Sezer*" was completely against the War because it was not supported by the UN. The President himself also was a jurist and was selected President while he was the Head of the Turkish constitutional court. He had thus been very sensitive towards the principle of law.[7]

Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the Turkish population was against the war. % 94 by some estimates, Islamic sensitivities were clearly part of the picture.[8] Justice and Development Party (JDP) was divided into two wings the supporters of USA war,[9] and Parliament Speaker Bulan Arginc and more than 100 (JDP) government members who refused the war. In addition, members of the (JDP) recieved messages from *"Necmadeen Arbakan*" warming them from "God Punishment" if they would accept what he descriped " supporting unblievers in fighting against Muslims".[10]

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[1] Idris Bal, Turkey- Relations and Impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cite.p.135
[2] Winrow, Turkey : Recalcitrant Ally in (the Iraq war causes and consequences), op, cite, p. 200.
[3] Idris Bal, Turkey- Relations and impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cite.p.138.
[4] د. لقمان عمر محمود النعيمي، تركيا في الاستراتيجية الامريكية المعاصرة، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 73.
[5] Idris Bal, Turkey- Relations and impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cite.p.138.
[6] Idris Bal, Turkey- Relations and impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cite.p.135
[7] Idris Bal, Turkey- Relations and impact of 2003 Iraq War, op, cite.p.138.
[8] Monte palmer, the Politics of the Middle East, op, cite, p,320.
[9] Look at the table three in the penddixe
[10] عبد الحليم غزالي، الاسلاميون الجدد والعلمانية الاصولية في تركيا، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص86.

On the other hand, there was strong opposition from the Republican People Party against the March 1 motion[1], as well as from other political parties which had no seats in the Parliament at the time.[2]

However, two main sets of problems need further consideration. First, from the perspective of alliance formation and the structure of international system, Turkey's position before the 2003 Iraq war was very critical of the USA demands from the Turkish Government to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Therefore, the pressure of the USA as a global actor was important the implementation of Turkish foreign policy regarding the Iraq crisis, much more than other factors. In this respect, the USA pressure affected Turkey's perception of USA foreign policy towards the 2003 Iraq War, but it has not been determinant in the absolute sense. The main point to be emphasized here is that the USA cut diametrically Turkey's alternatives pertaining to the Iraq crisis.[3]

On the one hand, most of the studies examine this relationship from the perspective of a constant and unchangeable structural relationship between a superpower (USA) and a regional power (Turkey), and on the other hand, they analyze Turkey's foreign policy alternatives either as an option to be attached to the superpower or vice versa.[4]

However, the relevance of Iraq to Turkey's interests emanate from a number of reasons:

First, Iraq got its territorial independence after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Second, the institutional, administrative, and social structures of the modern Iraq have been significant to the extent that it was influenced by the ages of the Turkish rule. It is through the incorporation of Mosul, Basra and Baghdad governorates into a single entity that modern Iraqi state took place at the first instance. Any change of this structure will undoubtedly influence Turkey's interests,[5] and might have brought a process of conflict near Turkey's borders. Both scenarios were highly sensitive for Turkey. In this context, Turkish foreign policy towards the Iraq crisis was shaped by four multi-dimensional

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Abdulhalim Gazali, the New Islamists and Extremist Secularism in Turkey: in the Shadow of Silent Revolution, Alshrooq International Library, Cairo, 2007, p. 86.

[1] Look at the Table 3 in the appendix.

[2] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy, op, cit,p. 49.

[3] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy, op, cite,p. 27.

[4] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy, op, cite,p. 27.

[5] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cit, p.167.

alternatives: Turkey's position regarding the global balance towards the crisis, international law and the organizational orientation of Turkey; the foreign policies of regional states and regional balance towards the crisis; and the national and domestic decision-making process and opposition actors in Turkey. All of these factors affected Turkey's policy of soft balancing against the USA during the decision-making process.[1]

Third, Iraq's population includes substantial number of Kurds and Turkmen, who have kinship relations with Turkey's own people. Such kinship between two populations impacts the Turkey's luxury of keeping itself immune from Iraq's internal developments. For example any change in the socio-political status of Iraqi Kurds offers Turkey to "legitimate" pretext to get "involved" in Iraqi politics. That means that the Iraqi Kurds might impact the social political status of Turkey's Kurdish origin citizens.[2]

Fourth, Iraq's relevance to Turkey does also emanate from Iraq's geopolitical location. Just as a question that who rules Baghdad impact Turkey's approach towards Iraq in the past, the question of how the last changes in Iraq geopolitics might now potentially affect Turkey's regional interests. In the Middle East it is equally important that the traditional politics of influence in Iraq have now changed following the overhaul of the Saddam Regime, regional and international players like some of Arab countries and Turkey, Iran and the United states that have radically increased their spheres of influence in the region are now critical factors that need to be taken into consideration while determining Turkey's policy towards Iraq. Whether Iraq is going to remain as a unitary state or morph into three states or transform into a weak Federal structure, whether Iraq is going to become pro-western secular country or turns into a Theocratic state.[3]

Furthermore, Iraq proved to be an important market for Turkish industrial products and Turkey became Iraq's second supplier after Germany. On the eve of War Turkish exports amounted to more than $ 1 billion annually. At the same time Turkish contractors, technicians and laborers took part in Iraqi development projects.[4] In the last years Turkey's exports to Iraq in 2013 amounted to $11.9 billion.

The argument presented by "*Daniel Byman*", in an article entitled " Let Iraq Collapse" in support of Iraq's disintegration can only creat or incite more problems for

[1] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy,op, cite, p. 35.
[2] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood) op, cite, p.167.
[3] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite, p.167.
[4] Tarık Oğuzlu, Iraq in (Turkey's neighborhood), op, cite, p.206.

everyone. Byman's reasoning is neither " desirable" nor, as he claims, a safe idea, because the collapse of Iraq would harm the interests of almost all the concerned internal and external parties, including the Middle East, Gulf States and the United States. As for Israel, it may be the only party that can, for its own particular interests, capitalize on such a drastic development. Even the Kurds and the Iranians will not favor a divided or disintegrated Iraq, because of the possible implications for their own interests. Indeed not all Kurds support the notion of a secessionist independent Kurkish state, particularly if they can gain (through peaceful negotiation means) their own protected, self-acclaimed autonomy within their respective regions. As for Iranians, a divided or disintegrated Iraq will lead to spillover effects, with yet more ethnic and religious- sectarian conflicts across the Middle East region. It is also likely to exacerbate rather than contain the influences of the highly volatile, pluralistic internal structure of Iranian politics.[1]

Israel percepted that the war on Iraq was for its strategic interests, not just to destroy so- called "WMD" or changing the Iraqi regime. According to its strategic view, a new Iraqi regime would enter a political settlement as the main factor agreed to host the Pelastinian asylums. Lsrael viewed Iraq as a radical state which refused any political settlement in the Arab- Israel conflict. Hence, İraq refused the "Anwar Sadat" initiatives when he visited Israel and signed peace treaty in 1979. İraq led a campain, which isolated Egypt from the Arab world.[2]

Israel gained oppotunity to follow its policy of dividing the states in the Middle East, especially in the Arab region in order to dominate and drive the region to the anarchy. It could be said that September events provided a good oppotunity for Israel to achieve its policy fragmentation of countries.[3]

Hence, American war on Iraq in 2003 impacted the Arab-Arab relations: first, it discovered the problem in the mechanism and institutions of the common Arabic action, and its capabilities to maintain Arab states as independent entity, second, it was a very

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[1] Ahmad Shikara, Iran, Iraq and Turkey: Strategic Impact on Gulf Security, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2001, p. 13.

[2] د. عماد جاد، العامل الاسرائيلي في الازمة العراقية في (العدوان على العراق خريطة ازمة ومستقبل امة)، د. حسن نافعة، د. نادية محمود مصطفى (محرران) مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، 2003،ص ص 174-175.

Emad Jad, the Israeli Factor in the Iraqi Crisis, (crisis Map and nation future), dr. Hassan Nafaa, Dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 2003,pp. 174-175

[3] د. عماد جاد، العامل الاسرائيلي في الازمة العراقية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص ص 179.

dangerous action breached the rules of international law, third, the war was a starting point to target other Arab countries “Syria, Sudan, and Libyia”Syria, Libya and Sudan, fourth, the USA followed a policy to change the cutural, religious and social values of the Arab countries, fifth, it also impacted the Palestinian issue as Israel engaged its military operations and economic embargo against Palestinian people.[1]

The American occupation of Iraq in 2003 led the Arab Gulf countries to develop regional mechanism. These countries consider Turkey as a factor to balance the Iranian influence in the region ecauseb it had a nuclear program, and occupated three Emarates islands. In September 2008 the Arab Gulf and Turkey signed a memorandum for a strategic partnership in Saudia Arabia.[2]

[1] د. احمد حسن الرشيدي، النظام العربي وجامعة الدول العربي في ظل الازمة الامريكية- العراقية، مصدر سبق ذكره، ص 191.

Ahmed Hassan Alrashidi, The Arab System and Arab League in the American – Iraqi Crisis, (aggression on Iraq,crisis Map and nation future), dr. Hassan Nafaa, dr. Nadia Mahmood Mustafa (eds), Center for Research and Political Studies, Cairo University, 2003,p. 191.

[2] مصطفى شفيق علام، التقارب التركي الخليجي: الدوافع والمحفزات، مجلة السياسة الدولية، مركز الاهرام، القاهرة، العدد 182، 2010، ص 129.

Mustafa Shafiq Allam, the Gulf-Turkish Rapprochement: Motivations and Stimulations, journal of international politics, Al-Ahram Institution, Cairo, no 182, 2010, p. 129.

Conclusion

The American justifications of the War were not true; the USA occupied Iraq and could not find any "WMD". It seems that its main goals are to implement the project of the Wider Middle East, by dividing the states into small ethnic and religious entities, and changing the structure of cultural and social values in the Middle East societies to be dequite to its trends, since the majority of the people in the region consider the USA as main ally to Israel. In addition to, the USA is the main supporter for the dictatorships. It also aims to secure Israel because Israel is fear threats from any Arab countries. Israel also does not support the rise of any power in the region.

The 9\11 gave the USA good opportunity to wage its Wars under so-called fighting "Terrorism". Furtheremore, the structure of international system after the end of Cold War provided the factors in which the USA being on the top of the system.

Some of Euorpean countries "France and Germany" recognised that the USA waged the war on Iraq to conquer its oil resources. That war did not have any legal rules and they did not support any UNSC resolution by refusing the American demands.

The inspection commissions were weak and either they were under the American pressure or they did not deliver their reports to the Security Council neutrality, so their mission failed at the end. In addition to, the USA manipulated them to serve its goals.

The war divided Euorpe into two parts: Germany and France were against the war, while East Euorpe supported the war. France was firmly against the war for the economic interests in Iraq like Elf-Aquitain Oil Company which was invested in Iraq's oil fields, in addition to the personal relations between President Chirac and Saddam Hussein dated back to the 1970s. Furtheremore, France realized that the sensitivity of the war in its internal environment was to the fact that it has more than 4 million Arab Musilms, half of them are French citizens and they refused the war.

Russia has also geostrategic and economic interests in Iraq for example Gasprom Oil Company has investments in Iraq's oil fields. It considered that the aim of the American war is to contain Russian political and economy sphere in the Middl East. Hence, it declared that it would use a veto against any resolution legitimating the war.

Chinese policy was not as strong as France and Russia, it called Iraq to implement the Security Council resolutions, it did not declare of using a veto at all. However, China was the first country that reduced its diplomatic staff in its mission to Baghdad. It seems that China has pursuit pragmatic approach which does not want to be in any confortation with the USA, because its economic interests with the USA might be affected.

However, the Gulf countries supported the USA war on Iraq by hosting the Anglo-American troops and providing logistic assistance. Jordan also hosted about 6000 troops on its border with Iraq.

Syria was against the war, it was worried about the fragmentation of Iraq which nagetivelly would affect it. It realized that Iraq would not be the end; other countries in the region would be targeted by the USA.

Turkey at first did not support the war, and then it demanded gurrantees from the USA, being military or financial assistance. The USA offered packages $26 billion in aid from 4-6 in grants and $20 billion in loans. However, the negotiation between Turkey and the USA had broken down over Turkish desire to command its own troops into the north of Iraq.

Finally, Turkey refused the war for political, security, economic and legal reasons. JDP was new in the power and it had pro-Islamic trends, Turkey was worried that the war would lead to the independent Kurdish state, and the security vaccum provided the PKK environment to attack on Turkey, Turkey was damaged after 1990 war, it had not got compensation, it realized that the war would affect on Turkey's economy. Furtheremore, the war did not have any legal rules.

However, this war has maken Turkey face the security problems for the security vaccum in the area which was under the ISIS and the war provided an opportunity to the PKK's existence, especially on the Iraq and Turkey's borders.

The war has discovered the weakness of Arab World to prevente it. As a result, other Arab states were targeted by the USA like"Sudan, Lybia, and Syria".

Although this war changed Iraq's regime and brought democracy; Iraq has suffered from the security and economic crises and became an environment of the radical terrorist movements like Alqaede and ISIS. It also affected the Iraqi socio-ethnic religious structure.

However, we studied the impact of the Second Gulf War 2003 on Turkey and the Middle East. In the next chapter we will study the developments of the Iraqi-Turkish relations during the period 2004-2014.

CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENTS OF IRAQI- TURKISH RELATIONS DURING THE PERIOD 2004-2014

This chapter explains the transitional relations between Iraq and Turkey after 2004. Iraq has seen many political and security developments, two parliament elections were conducted, in addition to the referrandum on the consititution. This period has also witnessed many internal and regional developments which have affected the Iraqi-Turkish relations. It also focuses on the impact of Arab spring. It also focus on Iraq and Turkey's attitute towards these developments in the Middle East, especially Syrian crisis.

The most important turning point is the rise of the ISIS in Syira and then in Iraq which has resulted to the occupation of Iraq's cities like Mosul and Al-Anbar. These events have reflected on Iraqi- Turkish relations.

5.1. Iraqi- Turkey's Relations During Transitional Period 2004-2010

In November 2003, Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, persuaded Washington to speed up the transfer of power to representative Iraqi bodies, not least as a response to the worsening security situation in the country. Bremer's initial proposals were partly abandoned in the face of opposition on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). The interim agreement eventually arrived at by the IGC's membership in early March 2004 determined that direct elections which must take place by 31 January 2005. In early June 2004 the membership of Iraq's interim government to take over on 1ist July was announced.[1]

When the USA war on Iraq brokeout in 2003, the situation got almost completely out of Turkey's control. The invasion initially enabled Turkey to fill in the authority gap in

[1] Bill Park, Iraq's Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for USA Policy, Autumn 2004, p. 8.

Northern Iraq that it has been suffering since 1991. However, early transfer of authority to the Kurds (Arbil government) by the USA in the region created a total disappointment in Ankara. The disputes regarding Arbil's de facto independence, the PKK's expanding existence in the region created an urgent security matter for Turkey. Apart from that, the question of the Kirkuk's status started to occupy Turkey's foreign policy agenda increasingly for the existence of Turkmens in the city. Turkey, that defends in every international platform that Kirkuk must remain under the control of Baghdad, clearly expressed its undifficulty with Arbil's de facto control of the city.[1]

The USA war 2003 caused important changes in regional balances of the Middle East and created new security challenges for Turkey, such as an increase in Kurdish nationalism, an upsurge of violence by the PKK from training camps in Northern Iraq and the possible nuclearization of Iran. In particular, the emergence of the Iraqi Kurds as one of the most important actors in post-Saddam, obliged the JDP government to revise Turkey's traditional Northern Iraq policy and to create a pragmatic rapprochement between the Iraqi Kurds and Ankara on diplomatic and economic grounds.[2]

In the summer of 2003, the question of sending Turkish peace keeping troops to Iraq began to be discussed. The USA army was in need of reinforcemnts and, as in so many other cases, the symbollic –strategic value of Turkey as a muslim country was considered useful in advancing the argument that the invasion of Iraq was not a Western occupation. For Turkey, this was an opportunity to improve its relations with the USA and to increase its chances of having a say over the political and economic restructuring of Iraq by showing its willingness to cooperate.[3]

Turkey engaged in efforts to change that as it would like to have a role in Iraq so that it can prevent developments that it considers harmful to its interests. The use of military means to achieve this goal was highly limited after the decision of the Turkish TGNA. A second attempt to achieve Turkey's objective through the use of military power came when Turkey and the USA agreed in October 2003 to send approximately 10,000

[1] Nuri Yeşilyurt and Atay Akdevelioğlu, Turkey's Middle East Policy under the JDP Rule, the Turkish Yearbook of International Relations Vol. 40 ,2009, pp 58-59.

2 Emel Parlar Dal, The Transformation of Turkey's Relations with the Middle East: Illusion or Awakening?, Turkish Studies , Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2012. P.253.

[3] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security Culture and Policy towards Iraq, Stratijik Arıştırma Merkezi (SAM), Perceptions, spring, Ankara, 2007.p. 82.

Turkish troops to Iraq as a Stability Force. The Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a motion authorizing the deployment of troops in Iraq.[1]

But as soon as, the decision was taken, the Turkish soldiers were not welcomed in Iraq.The Iraqi Governing Council was firmaly against Turkey, or any other neighbouring country, and forced the USA to back dawn, sending troops might be faced with this reaction. Turkish government declared, *"that without any invitation from the Iraqi people, it would not send any peacekeepers"*. The most vehement objection came from the Iraqi Kurds. The KDP leader Barzani even threatened to quit the Governing Council if Turkey sent troops.[2] The Kurds feared, also, that the Turkish forces would use northern Iraq as a military base and a staging ground for operations against them, and as a supply route.[3] Turkish troops were to be deployed in the so-called *'Sunni Triangle'* where the American forces faced the fiercest resistance.[4]

The USA preference for a strongly unified Iraq that is administratively rather than ethnically Federal is partly rooted in the need to reassure Turkey. Ankara has repeatedly sought reassurance concerning Washington's commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity—for example, during the January 2004 visit to Washington of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. Concurrently with the Washington visit, the USA Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz argued in an interview with senior Turkish commentators that *"some degree of Federalism or Federation is probably going to be inevitable, but that should be based on administrative and geographic lines, not on ethnic lines. Our message to the Kurds is your future doesn't lie in separating yourselves from the Iraqis."*[5]

On June 16, 2005, Iraqi delegation headed by "*Saad Jassim Al-Hayani*" Undersecretary of Foreign Minister visited Turkey and discused Borders Gates, prisoners and open new consulates.[6] In the same year Turkey opened a Consulate General in Mosul and appointed Mr. Hüseyin Avni Postsalı as the first Consul General.[7]

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[1] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security Culture and Policy towards Iraq, op, cite, p. 82.
[2] Asa Lundgren, the Unwelcome Neighbor, Turkey's Kurdish policy, I.B.Tauris. New York, 2007,p.104
[3] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security Culture and Policy towards Iraq, op, cite, p. 82.
[4] Meliha Benli Altunışık, Turkey's Security Culture and Policy towards Iraq, op, cite, p. 82.
[5] Bill Park, Iraq's Kurds and Turkey: op, cite, p. 23.
[6] Irak ve Türkiye Konsolosluk Görüşmeleri Mutabakat Zaptı (16-17 Haziran 2005 Ankara).Look at appendix 6.
[7] The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Baghdad, Note No: 282\ 3300\2005 in 6\8\2006.Look at appendix 7.

In this sense, Turkey supported the constitution building efforts, Jalal Talabani's Presidency, government agencies and general elections in Iraq. Besides, Istanbul hosted a meeting between the representatives of "Sunni" groups and the USA Ambassador to Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad on the eve of December 2005 Iraqi elections. Although the meeting did not obtain any concrete results, it showed that Turkey started to contribute to state formation process in Iraq through its influence, though limited, on "Sunni" groups. Turkey's another important contribution to the Iraqi central government was the training of Iraqi diplomats and officers by supporting the new Iraqi constitution in 2005.[1]

Turkey played a mediation role between the "Sunni" and "Shiite"∗ groups to encourage them to participate in the constitutional referundom elections which happened on June 30, 2005.

Turkey actively began to rely on diplomatic visits and mediation efforts in Iraq to strengthen its influence and ensure Iraqi cooperation for its security concerns in dealing with PKK terrorism. For that purpose, high-level visits began between Turkish and Iraqi government representatives, intensified diplomatic visits between Turkish and Iraqi officials, and Iraqi Kurds continued. Most surprisingly, when the former Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, was elected as Iraqi President in 2005, the Turkish government recognized him as the legitimate ruler of Iraq. Similarly, even though Turkey initially was not willing to recognize the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), when it was finally set up, Turkey granted recognition, signalling a significant shift. This recognition meant that Turkish foreign policy towards northern Iraq had been completely remodelled.[2]

5.2. Iraqi- Turkey's Relations during First Al-Maliki Government 2006-2010

On July 7, 2006 Iraqi Foreign Minister "*Hoshyar Zebari*" visited Ankara and signed with his counterpart "*Abdullah Gül*" a memorandum of cooperation and understanding between Iraqi MOFA and Turkish MFA.[3] This has renewed again in July 19, 2009 new

[1] Nuri Yeşilyurt and Atay Akdevelioğlu, Turkey's Middle East Policy under the JDP Rule, op, cite, p. 60.

∗ we put "Sunni and Shiite" between two brackets for our preservation to divid Iraqi people into secterian or ethnic groups. Athough Iraq has different ethnic, religous, and nationalities, they still live in peace with each other homogeniouslly, some politicians try to divid Iraqi people into these divisions for their own interests; not to serve even their religous or enthic groups which they come from.

[2] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Changing Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq: new tools of engagement, Review of International Affairs, Cambridge, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2014.p. 544.

[3] The Memorandum of cooperation between Iraqi MOFA and Turkish MFA 2006. Look at appendix 8.

procedures discussed to remove the difficulties which face the moving of citizens of both countries on their borders.[1]

In 2008, Iraq, Turkey, and the USA signed an agreement to establish a trilateral mechanism to combat terrorism. During Zebari's visit, Turkey and Iraq agreed to establish a 'Command Center' in Arbil. This command center was just a small bureau and became operational in February. However, through this Iraq, Turkey and the USA aimed to coordinate their efforts against the PKK with the participation of military and intelligence personnel from the three above mentioned countries.[2]

In August 2009 two bombings in Baghdad targeted the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where 95 people died and around 600 were wounded. The Iraqi government blamed former Baathist members residing in Syria, relations between Iraq and Syria became tensioned. These attacks could be interpreted in different ways: First of all, the reputation of Prime Minister Al-Maliki, who was successful in the elections in the early months of that year because of his image as a powerful figure that could bring order and security to the country was damaged after these attacks, Second, these attacks on the two Ministries made even the heavily guarded 'Green Zone' was not secure enough. This fact was a serious blow to the image of Al-Maliki who had tried hard to build his reputation over the years. Consequently, Al-Maliki argued that the attacks were supported by Syria and mentioned that he had information about meetings of Syrian intelligence with the former Baathist members and other extremist groups, and he refused the Syrian policy of accommodating these people.[3]

Turkey entered the scene, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu visited Baghdad and Damascus to listen to the arguments of both sides and to try to mediate between them. Davutoğlu first went to Baghdad, had meetings with the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to try to understand their position on the relevant issues. While Iraqi officials had given the names of two Baath members and demanded that Damascus hand over these people, the Syrian side rejected the allegations. Davutoğlu made it clear that the aim of Turkey was to contain the issue and to build trust between the two Capitals.[4]

[1] The Memorandum of Cooperation between Iraqi MOFA nd Turkish MFA 2009. Look at appendix 9.
[2] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq in 2009, op,cite.p.121.
[3] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq in 2009, op, cite.p.124.
[3] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq in 2009, op, cite.p.123.
[4] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq in 2009, op, cite.p.125.

However, Turkish foreign policy changes since 2007 are remarkable in their scope: Firstly, Turkey began to follow a policy of diplomatic engagement, establishing diplomatic ties with all parties in Iraq. A radical departure from Turkey's earlier position came in 2008 when the Turkish government opened new cource with the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional government, Secondly, Turkey actively participated in the reconstruction of Iraq, investing heavily in the country and deepening its economic ties, both trade and foreign direct investment with Iraq. It became clear that Turkey would play a new political role in Iraq for the resolution of conflicts in the post- Saddam era, and at the same time, it used its economic and political factors in the postwar reconstruction. This change in Turkish foreign policy can be explained: emphasizing the importance of external factors, domestic power alterations or changes in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood.[1]

However, one actor in Iraqi politics, was the visit of Muqtada Al-Sadir to Turkey on May 2, 2009. Muqtada Al-Sadir, an important "Shiite" figure in Iraqi politics. In the past, Turkey had been criticized because of its focus on first Turkmen only, and then later on just Turkmen and "Sunni" groups in its policy towards Iraq. In the last years, Turkey established contacts with other actors in Iraq. Ankara now feels free to have contacts with actors like Al-Sadir. However, Turkey aimed to gain first-hand information about Iraq before the elections there in 2009, strengthening relations with different groups that might be influential in the elections, and communicating its expectations and views to several actors in Iraq. After his meetings with the President and Prime Minister in Ankara, Al-Sadir said that he was *"happy about the role played by Turkey in the region and was awaiting increasing help from Ankara in overcoming the problems in Iraq".* From Al-Sadir's point of view, this visit was important in boosting his influence in Iraq before the elections, since he was welcomed as an important actor in regional politics.[2]

Turkey's diplomatic engagement with Iraq reached a new level when Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Iraq and met with Jalal Talabani, the President of Iraq on July 10, 2008. This visit constituted a breakthrough development. The Iraqi Prime Minister "*Nouri Al-Maliki*" and his coounter "*Recep Tyyip Erdoğan*" they singed high level strategic cooperation council. The High Level Cooperation Council, was coheaded by the two Prime Ministers. The Council was created to oversee security cooperation, economic partnership and cultural dialogue between Turkey and Iraq. An

[1] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Changing Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq, op, cite.p. 544.
[2] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq in 2009, op, cite,p.118.

important component of the High Level Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq was the deepening of economic relations. Following that visit, the Iraqi Prime Minister *Nouri Al-Maliki* visited Turkey and confirmed that Iraq was ready to cooperate with Turkey in its fight against PKK terrorism thereby addressing one of the key concerns of Turkish foreign policy. [1]

Murat Özçelik, the Turkish ambassador to Iraq, summarized Turkey's position as follows: *"Turkey and Iraq decided to develop strategic relations and established mechanisms for this, including frequent meetings among high-level officials in every field*".[2]

Since the increasing activities and the environment of investments in Iraq in 2009 Turkey opened another Consulate General in Basra.[3] And Mr. "*Ali Rıze Özcoşkun*" was the first Turkish Consul General in Basra.[4]

In March 2009, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani visited Istanbul to attend the World Water Forum and to meet with the Prime Minister Erdoğan. At this meeting, alongside security issues, steps to be taken to improve relations between the two neighbours and preparations for the visit of Turkish President Gül were discussed.[5]

Turkish approach towards Iraq beginning in the autumn of 2007, among the reciprocal visits, the most important was Turkish President Gül's visit to Iraq on March 23, 2009. This had been the first visit of a Turkish President to Iraq since "*Fahri Korutürk*" visit in 1976. Security matters, the future of Kirkuk, and economic relations were the primary topics of discussions. On this visit, Gül met with the Iraqi President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Turkmen MPs. There was developments in bilateral relations that allowed for Talabani's visit during his meeting with President Gül, Iraqi President Talabani supported the Turkish concerns on security and said *"that there were two options for the PKK; either laying down their arms or leaving Iraq".* The Iraqi President declared that "*the Iraqi constitution forbids the existence of armed groups in*

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[1] For more information look at the appendix 10.

[2] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Changing Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq: new tools of engagement, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2014.p. 544.

[3] مذكرة وزارة خارجية جمهورية العراق المرقمة 11\ هـ\67 \ 6040 في 4\3\2009.

The Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, Note No: 11\ H\ 67\ 6040 in 4\3\2009. Look at appendix 11.

[4] The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Baghdad, Note No: 539\ 2125\ 2009 in 22\11\2009.Look appendix 12.

[5] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq in 2009, op, cite.p.118.

Iraq; thus, the trilateral commission of Turkey, Iraq and the USA would work together to end the existence of the PKK in Iraq".[1]

Another important example of this approach in 2009 was the visit of Ammar Al Hakim, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, who replaced his father, Abdelaziz Al Hakim, and who died in Tehran on 26 August 2009. Just a few months after taking over the leadership, Ammar Al-Hakim visited Turkey in November and met with President Gül and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu.[2]

Both Gül and Davutoğlu stressed Turkey's "*equal distance from different groups in Iraq"*, whereas Al- Hakim said *"that with its consulates in Mosul and Basra, Turkey had opened up to different groups in Iraq and they are respectful of Turkey's stance on issues relating to Arabs and Muslims".* Al- Hakim also visited Jafaris in Turkey, and his visit to Ankara was important both for Turkey and for Al Hakim to strengthen their positions before the coming elections.[3] In 2010 "*Mehmet Aydin Selcen*" as a Consul General in Arbil.[4]

5.3. Iraqi- Turkish Relations during second Al-Maliki Government 2010-2014

In March 2011, Erdoğan paid a high level diplomatic visit to Iraq in which he travelled to Baghdad, Najaf and Arbil. This visit refered to the Turkish desire to diplomatically engage with all parties in Iraq, the "Sunnis", the "Shiite" and the Kurds and to treat them all equally. This position had been explicitly clear since the 2005 elections in Iraq, which Turkey supported, making efforts to convince all parties to participate, in particular, convincing the Sunni Iraqis not to boycott the elections.[5]

However, in 2010 Iraqi national elections, the majority of Iraqi "Sunni" political groups competed within Iraqiyya, which had a central leadership under the former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. However, Since 2010, Iraqiyya has faced multiple internal and external challenges, beginning with Al-Maliki's contest to form the government despite

[1] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq in 2009, Stratijik Arıştırma Merkezi (SAM), Perceptions, Perceptions, Autumn – Winter, Ankara, 2010, pp. 114-115.
[2] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq in 2009, op, cite.p.118.
[3] Mesut Özcan, Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq in 2009,op, cite.p.118.
[4] Look at appendix 13.
[5] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Changing Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq: new tools of engagement, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2014.pp. 544-545.

Iraqiyya's numerical victory in the elections. Internally, Allawi had to contend with accommodating the various senior figures within Iraqiyya, each of whom had his own powerbase. This dynamic made it difficult for Iraqiyya to negotiate under a unified position. Iraqiyya's internal differences made it easy for Al-Maliki to splinter the group and gradually phase out Allawi's role as a coalition leader. Al-Maliki also weakened Iraqiyya by targeting for arrest two of its main leaders, Tariq Al-Hashami and Rafia Al-Issawi, who had placed in senior government positions in his administration. Al-Maliki internal policies affected Iraq's relations with the Arab countries and with the neibghours, especially, Turkey.[1]

In 2011 Iraq had became the second largest market for Turkish exports. At the same time, Iraq ranked as the first destination for Turkey's agricultural goods and food exports around 11.7 per cent of Turkish agricultural exports went to Iraq in 2009, bypassing Germany's share. According to Turkish foreign ministry reports, Turkish exports to Iraq in 2011 could be categorized as 'iron and steel ($1.06 billion); cereals ($721 million); electrical machinery and equipment ($610 million); vegetable and fruits ($479 million) and finished products from metals ($457 million).[2]

However, the deteroriation of Iraqi-Turkish relations started at the end of 2011 for many reasons: Turkey helped Iraqi Kurdistan Regional government for selling the oil without the permission of Baghdad government, and the differences in views and policies towards Syrian crisis. In August 2012 Turkish Foreign Minister "*Ahmed Davutoğlu*" visited Kirkuk governorate in coordination with (KRG), and hosted the Iraqi Vice President "*Tariq Al-Hashimi*" who was accused by Iraqi judge.[3]

In January 2012 the Turkish government asked the Iraqi government permission to open Consulate General In Kirkuk.[4] As a result of the deadlock of the relations, Iraq refused Turkish order.[5]

At the end of 2013 Turkey signed an agreement with "KRG" in establishing the pipeline to export oil and gas from northern Iraq to the international markets without the

[1] Ahmed Ali, Iraq's 2014 national elections, Middle Security East Report, No 20, April 2014, p. 15.
[2] Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Changing Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq, op, cite.p. 548.
[3] روبن ميلز، رقعة شطرنج شمال العراق، مجلة رؤية تركية ،القاهرة، العدد 2، صيف 2013، ص 147.
Robin Meliz, the Piece of Chess in North Iraq, Journal of Turkish Vision, Cairo, No 2,2013.
[4] مذكرة وزارة خارجية جمهورية العراق المرقمة 11/ هـ/ 67 في شباط 2012.
Ministry of the Republic of Iraq, Note No: 11\ H\67 in February 2012. Look at appendix 14.
[5] The Emassy of the Republic of Turkiye , Note No: 324\ 6250\2012, Baghdad 10\1\2012. Look at appendix 15.

permission of Baghdad government. However, "BOTAŞ" company tried to establish sub-Company in northern Iraq, but Baghdad refused that. Although "TPAO" had been working in Iraq and gained some tenders in southern Iraqi Gas and patrol fields. Iraq did not exert any pressures against Turkey.[1] However, during 2012-2013, Iraq was the first country in the list of foreign trade among twenty countries.[2] It seemed that the economic relations had not been damaged.

Iraqi Kurdistan, in the form of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), sought to establish an independent economic stream of revenue through an oil pipeline to Turkey. The flow in this pipeline started in December 2013. The Federal government in Baghdad, which asserts that exporting oil is the sole purview of the Federal government, rejected these steps.[3]

Baghdad attempted to exert pressure on Iraqi Kurdistan by delaying the salaries of KRG employees for the month of February 2014, which led Iraqi Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani to describe the delays as "*a declaration of war against the citizens of Kurdistan Region."* Al-Maliki denied the delay, countering that spending its portion of the funds it receives from the federal government is the KRG's responsibility. The dispute was seemingly resolved after possible USA government mediation on March 21, 2014 with an agreement that permited the export of 100,000 barrels of oil per day with the revenue to be deposited with the Federal government. This temporary agreement may have resolved the issue, but will prime the political parties involved to posture as extra-nationalist before the elections.[4]

However, a school of thought has emerged in Turkey which claims that good relations with Kurdistan Regional government KRG could benefit Turkish national interests. This argument claims that the KRG is already established. Therefore, getting along with KRG is the only variable alternative for Turkey. The JDP government is implementing policies that seems to go hand in hand with this school of thought. They claim that their effective foreign policy in the region is allows Turkish companies to gain an

[1] Serhat Erkmen, 2013 te Türkiye Irak ilişkileri için beklentiler ve olasıkılar, Ortadoğu Analiz, Cilt 15.Ocak 2013. SS. 94-95.
[2] Look at the table 1 in the appendix.
[3] Ahmed Ali, Iraq's 2014 National Elections, op, cite, p. 24.
[4]Ahmed Ali, Iraq's 2014 National Elections, op, cite, p. 24.

important foothold on the development projects in Iraq, thus contributing to the Turkish economy and eroding Turkish export/import deficit.[1]

After the 2014 Iraqi national election, the new Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi visited Turkey on December 25, 2014, and the meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was held.[2] In this visit the Foreign Ministers of both countries signed an agreement of aspects of cooperation between the Iraqi Foreign Service Institute and Turkish Diplomacy Academy.[3] However, these developments have not been continued because the ISIS rising and occupation Mosul and Alanbar cities.

5.4. The beginning of Arab Uprising and its Impacts on Iraqi- Turkish Relations

In 2009 the Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) refered to the growing issue of human security within Arab states. Tied to the quality of the services the governments have failed to provide anything in the fields of education, health and nutrition and human security which are identified by the authors of the report as a pivotal concept in overall state security. It was also pointed out that the pursuit of state security without attention to human security brought on suboptimal comes for the state and citizen alike. And in the long run, the government that pursues state security without investing human security is the government that achieves neither. However, this report has sent some signs that Arab countrires would face political, economic and security challenges.[4]

Many experts compare the Arab "*spring"* to the popular revolutions that shook communist states in the late eighties and early nineties of the twentieth century. After more than five decades of independence from European colonialism, autocratic rulers failed to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Arab people. These included political freedom, economic prosperity and human dignity. Starting with the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia, the shockwave swept through the area and threatened the stability of this oil-rich region with repercussions felt internationally.[5]

[1] Asa Lundgren, the Unwelcome Neighbor, op, cite, pp, 84-85.
[2] Jiont Declaration of the meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, Decembr 25, 2014. Look at appendix 16.
[3] The agreement between Iraqi MOFA and Turkish MFA in Decembre 25, 2014. Look at appendix 17.
[4] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, strategic research project, United States Army War College, 2012, p.5.
[5] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, op, cite, p.1.

Tunisia was the first country where the wave of unrest began, in mid- December 2010. When it became apparent that the police and security forces would not be able to stop the quickly spreading street demonstrations, President "*Ben Ali*" unleashed gangs of thoughts and his elite Presidential Guards against the protesters.[1]

When the self-immolated Tunisian citizen Mohamed El Bouazizi committed his final act of desperate protest on December 17, 2010, he was not aware that he was kicking the first domino piece in a long chain of events that is still unfolding today, having claimed four among the longest sitting Arab leaders.[2]

Social Media as a Powerful tool for Arab Spring. The uprisings in the Arab States have in common a wide and effective use of social media to communicate among themselves, mobilize their countrymen as well as to reach out to broadcasting channels and news media.[3]

As a result of Regional Reactions of the Arab Uprising. began its involvement in the Libyan crisis, the Arab League has been playing a bigger role in the Arab upheavals, its overall homogenenity has decreased and internal divisions have been magnified.

The reaction of the Arab governments to the Arab springs was not the same. Appears to respond to a double-standard approach, which is a reflection of different geopolitical dynamics, where the Arab League sided with the populations by supporting a foreign military action against Libya and pushed for a further isolation of the Al-Assad regime in Syria, a strong endorsement from the Gulf countries for the ideologically‘ closer rulers in Bahrain and Yemen should be noted.[4]

In both cases, the Arab League efforts were meant to lay the ground for international action. However, such a role contrasts with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sending security forces to share up Manama‘s efforts to curb Pearl Square occupants and hosting the Yemeni President for treatment while championing an agreement between the parties, which ultimately secured a face-saving retreat to President Saleh.[5]

[1] Zoltan Barany, Comparing the Arab Revolts, the role of Military, Journal of Democary, Volume 22, Number 4, USA, October 2011, PP. 30-31.
[2] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring, op, cite, p.2.
[3] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring, op, cite, p. 6.
[4] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring, op, cite, p. 6.
[5] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring, op, cite, p. 9.

Indeed, Syria's link to the Iranian agenda in the region and its dubious meddling in the Lebanese internal affairs paved the way for its isolation likewise, the Libyan.[1]

As a result of these events, some observers have seen the performance of the Arab League as another sign of its irrelevance.[2]

Although, it is still early to analyze the full regional consequences of the Arab uprisings, some trends have become discernible. Some continuity includes regional bipolarity, with rival pre- Arab spring alliances remaining to a large extent intact. The Syrian issue became the main issue where the fault lines were consolidated. On the one hand, Iran and Hezbollah supported the Al-Assad regime, although Hamas seems to have left this Axis. On the other hand, the USA and the "*GCC"* actively supported the opposition in Syria and hoped that the toppling of the regime would limit Iran's influence in the Middle East. In terms of actors in this group, however, there were two changes. First, Israel's position on Syria seemed to be more ambiguous, and Turkey adopted anti-regime stance. Furthermore, the sectarian element was also consolidated; Hamas and Turkey's positions on the Syrian issue increased such perceptions. The fallout of the intensification of sectarian politics was felt in Iraq and Lebanon.[3]

Iran, which has four decades of strategic partnership with Syria and its ally Hezbollah in Lebanon, has continued to back Al-Assad regime. The Iranian and Syrian governments have shared anti-Western and anti-Israeli positions, and both have been under international sanctions. Iran has been worried about the possibility of the establishment of a pro-American, pro-Saudi regime in Syria and that its links to Hezbollah in Lebanon would be severed after the fall of Al-Assad. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan, which are "Sunni" and pro-Western, have supported the opposition and do not want Al-Assad to stay in power. They see themselves as balancing the rise of Iranian and other "Shiite" influences in the region. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries see "Iraq" under the control of Iran and the "Shiite" camp. Therefore, the Gulf countries would gain an important advantage in the regional "Shiite-Sunni" balance by turning Syria's Shiite-affiliated Alawi regime into a "Sunni" one.[4]

[1] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring, op, cit, pp.9-10.
[2] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring, op, cit, p. 9.
[3] Özlem Tür, Turkey-Syria Relations between Enimity and Amity, Raymond Hinnebusch (ed), Ashgate, England, 2013,p. 187.
[4] Fahrettin Sumer, Turkey's Changing Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring, op, cite, P 22

Syria has succeded to manipulate the Iranian ambitions in the Arab Gulf, and the tension in relations to gain Iranian support in its current crisis.[1]

Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey's game seeking to fill that power vacuum, they rushed into ―a three-way competition based upon a sustainable race for resources and position. Syria is a case in point where this triangular relationship is shaping the future security design of the region. The USA seems to be at best only playing a supporting role instead of taking the lead. The USA Administration, which has been in a reactive mode thus far, seems to be watching a Turkish-Saudi ad hoc coalition designed to contain Iran in Syria after Tehran's success in Iraq and its game in Bahrain. And while it has been unable to break the traditional support given by China and Russia to the Iran, the USA is keeping a low profile on the humanitarian issues in Gulf countries and not interfering with Turkey's schemes with regards to Syria, even though Turkey's stance on Syria may trigger an open conflict with Iran.[2]

Within the regional context, the proposal by the GCC to extend its membership to Morocco and Jordan is yet another consequence of the Arab uprising. Indeed, in an unexpected step, the Secretary General of the GCC announced the decision of the Council to study a candidacy request from the two countries. The ambiguity of the timing, the fields of cooperation, and to whom the deal benefits – the two candidates or the GCC – cast serious doubt on the viability of such integration, which some experts rushed to qualify as a new club of Arab Sunni dynasties' against Iranian hegemony and social unrest.[3]

Russia has also been an important supporter of Al-Assad, and China went along with Russia on this matter. Vladimir Putin has been opposing any possibility of using force to topple the Syrian regime. On the Libyan case, "Russia is convinced that it was tricked into supporting a resolution to protect civilians, only to see it used as a cover for air strikes to get rid of Muammar Gaddafi". Therefore, Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolutions that implied intervention in Syria. It also has considerable interest in Syria, including a military base, and economic and military relations with regime. Russia lost

[1] محمد حسن الضاهر، السياسة السورية تجاه التسوية السلمية للصراع العربي- الاسرائيلي بعد مؤتمر مدريد 1991، رسالة دكتوراه غير منشورة، كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية،جامعة القاهرة، 2001، ص 99.
Muhamed Hussein Al-Thahir, Syrian Policy towards the Peaceful Settlement of Arab-Israel Struggle after Madrid Conference 1991, Unpublished Doctorate Thesis, College of Economy and Political Science,Cairo University, 2001, p. 99.

[2] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring, op, cite, pp.15-16.

[3] Lieutenant Colonel El Hassane Aissa, the Arab Spring, op, cite, p. 11.

most of its allies in the region and did not want to lose Syria. In addition, Putin has feared that if a pro-Saudi regime replaced the Al-Assad regime, Saudi influence would further spread and reach Muslims in the North Caucasus, as it happened in Chechnya.[1]

The USA position in the region also evolved to some extent. The Obama administration's policy of relying on the USA allies became more pronounced after the USA withdrawal from Iraq. However, anti-Iranian positions continue to dominate the USA regional policies. Furthermore, particularly the developments in Syria provided an opportunity for other major powers, like Russia and China, to get more involved in the Middle East, a development with global repercussions. As to competition among regional powers, the multilateral distribution of power (both hard and soft power) was the characteristic of the pre-Arab Uprising era persisted.[2]

However, Iraqi foreign policy towards Syrian crisis was clear about the security concerns which impacts its internal environment. Iraq called to resolve Syrian crisis through the dialogue among Syrian people without any foreign intervention. It has presented in August 2012 a common initiative throughout different points: establishment of transitional government that includes "*Bashar Al-Assad*", the violence should be stoped by all parties, non-interference in Syrian internal affairs, recalling all parties to the national dialogue under the supervision of the Arab League, holding the election under the international and Arab observation and supporting the efforts of the UN envoy to the Syria.[3]

However, the Syrian uprising is increasingly placing Iraqi decision-makers in an uncomfortable position. This is partially due to Iraq's divergent interest from Iran's position of supporting Al-Assad government, owing to the possibility of over-spilling violence within its territory that may destabilize its internal affairs. In parallel, Baghdad's contradictory approach to the Syrian crisis is damaging Iraq's relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey.[4]

Iraq lacks a strategy on the conflict in Syria. This is partly a reflection of its severe internal and competing external pressures. It is also because of its limited capacity to

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[1] Fahrettin Sumer, Turkey's Changing Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring, op, cite ,P.22.
[2] Özlem Tür, Turkey-Syria Relations, op, cite,pp. 187-188.
[3] خالد اسماعيل، السياسة الخارجية العراقية تجاه الازمة السورية عام 2011، مجلة أبحاث استراتيجية، مركز بلادي للدراسات والابحاث الاستراتيجية، بغداد، العدد 9، 2015، ص 166.
Khalid Ismael, Iraqi Foreign Policy towards Syrian Crisis 2011, Strategic Research Journal, Beladi Center for Strategic research, Baghdad, No 9, 2015, p. 166.
[4] Paolo Maggiolini, Iraq's Foreign Policy, op, cit, p. 7.

implement a policy, since the conflict is largely outside its control. Iraq's internal divisions complicate its ability to act as an effective mediator or facilitate a dialogue. Its stated policy is to support dialogue and a negotiated political solution, while opposing sanctions and militarization of the opposition. Meanwhile, however, Iraqi militants are involved on both sides of the Syrian conflict. There are accusations that the authorities have allowed fighters (as Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asaib Al-Haq) to enter Syria in support of the Al-Assad regime, and that "Sunni" tribes have facilitated the entry of fighters in support of the opposition, while the KRG has acknowledged that it has trained and supported Kurdish opposition groups.[1]

However, as Iraq's formal attitude, it has not supported any Syrian groups, because Iraq realizes that increasing the violence in Syrian crisis will impact Iraq's socio-economy and its political environment. Iraq has called all parts to the dialogue and resolving the crisis by peaceful means.

However, the Arab uprisings which also caught Ankara by surprise– have complicated Turkey's approach to the Middle East. Nevertheless, Turkey has been supportive of the transformation process in the region, wishing it would result in the establishment of relatively democratic regimes, which would eventually lead to greater peace and stability. Besides seeking stability in the region, Turkey has actively pursued to expand its regional influence. To this end, Turkey has increasingly relied on new tools of soft power such as trade, economic integration, and conflict resolution. The use of soft power to promote Turkish interests in the region is a direct result of Turkey's democratization process and recent economic growth. These are the indicators of the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, as the EU frequently uses its soft power as a foreign policy tool.[2]

However, during the JDP government, Turkish foreign policy changed its view from realism to idealism theory. For instance for many decades, Turkey saw Syria as an enemy, but the relations witnessed dramatical changes when the two countries agreed on October

[1] Jane Kinninmont, Gareth Stansfield and Omar Sirri, Iraq on the International Stage Foreign Policy and National Identity in Transition, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013. London, July 2013, p.33.
[2] Laura Batalla Adam, Turkey's Foreign Policy in the JDP era: has there been a shift in the axis, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol 11, No 3, year non, P. 145.

13, 2009 , to diminish the visa, the responsibility of both countries had removed the obstacles boundaries as a symbolic message of visa free regime.[1]

On April 2012 the Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu in describes Turkey's role in the Middle East even during the chaos of the Arab spring as follows*"Turkey leads the winds of change in the Middle East and will continue this way in the future- Turkey is regarded not only as a fraternal country in the Middle East but it also considered as initiator of new ideas".*[2]

Turkish foreign policy towards the Syrian crisis changed according to the political, security and humanitarian situations. Initially, Turkish policy was to try to convince *"Bashar Al-Assad"* to respond to the protests with the necessary reforms. Yet as the regime continued to brutally suppress the uprising, Turkey's policy gradually shifted to the support of the opposition. From the summer of 2011, Turkey became very active in supporting one of the opposition groups, the Syrian National Council "SNC". The SNC organized several meetings in Turkey and worked closely with Ankara. Similarly the so- called Free Syrian Army, an armed opposition group composed of the defectors from the Syrian Armed Forces, had its main base in Turkish territory. Both Prime Minster Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu were very critical of the Syrian regime and openly called for a regime change.[3]

In contrast to its initial hesitance and unwillingness to join the international consensus to stop Muammar Gaddafi in the Libyan crisis, Ankara condemned Bashar Al-Assad regime's actions against reform aspirations of opposition groups with an aggressive tone. The crisis broke out between Ankara and Damascus after the attacks on Turkish diplomatic missions in Damascus and the Syrian cities of Aleppo and Latakia by supporters of Al-Assad, who expressed anger at Turkey's decision to support the Arab League's decision to suspend Syria.[4]

Syrian crisis was the main point in Iraqi- Turkish relations, Erdogan who developed several years ago close strategic relation with "*Bashar Al-Assad*", dramatically changed his attitude when Bashar adopted harsh measures, involving mass killings against the rebels and innocent non- combatants. Turkey also did a good deal to castigate Bashar's highly

[1] عقيل سعيد محفوض، السياسة الخارجية التركية " الاستمرارية- التغيير" مصدر سبق ذكره ، ص 149.2011
[2] Graham E. Fuller, Turkey and the Arab Spring, op, cite ,p.126.
[3] Özlem Tür, Turkey-Syria Relations, op, cite,p. 189.
[4] Emel Parlar Dal, The Transformation of Turkey's Relations with the Middle East, op, cite. P. 257.

aggressive behavior, extended humanitarian assistance to many thousands of Syrian refugees, and provided various facilities for Syrian armed rebel groups. Turkey's major aim is to depose "*Bashar Al-Assad*" and his regime not only for humanitarian reasons but also for national strategic interest. The goal here is to help establish a *"Sunni"* Muslim democratic government distant from the Shiite Iranian orbit, and to contain Iran's regional advances.[1]

The Iraqi- Turkish relations have been also damaged after the Arab uprising. The events that started in Tunisia and then spread to the rest of Arab world have already affected regional politics, especially with the start of an uprising in Syria in March 2011.

Within this regional environment, Turkey faced opportunities and challenges. Despite increasing problems, compared to other regional powers, Turkey still seemed to sustain its soft power in the region. Its support for opposition movements seemed to pay off these movements which were successful in coming to power. However, the Syrian crisis loomed large as presenting significant challenges as well. In addition to the dangers of a civil war next door, there was also the possibility that the events could drag Turkey into a protracted conflict.[2]

As such, the Arab Uprisings have presented a serious challenge to Turkey's "zero problems with neighbors" policy. Turkey which had developed close relations with the regional countries in the pre-Arab Uprising period, now faced the difficulty of adjusting the new realities. Eventually the JDP government made the decision to support the Uprising. The government argued that there was no contradiction in Turkish foreign policy in the region and that Turkey was pursuing a principle foreign policy and Turkey's national interests. Thus, Turkey once again tried to locate itself differently from other regional powers.[3]

However, the principles of Turkish foreign policy towards Arab Uprising could be summarized in the following points: the respect of people will and their wishes in changes, democracy and liberty, maintaining of the security and independence of the states and the changes should happen peacefully, refusing any foreign intervention in the Arab states to avoid of any fragmentation, presenting the support and assistant to the internal

[1] Moshe Ma'os, the Arab Spring and the new Geostrategic environment in the Middle East, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2012, pp.18-19.
[2] Özlem Tür, Turkey-Syria Relations, op, cite,p. 188.
[3] Özlem Tür, Turkey-Syria Relations, op, cite,p. 188.

exchange a according to specific situation of each state, maintaining Turkish nation interests like investments and Turkish citizens, moving through the international legitimacy and United Nations Resolutions, the Turkish role should be concentrated on the humanitarian mission, and respecting the specialty and situation of each state and its foreign relations and Turkish interests with it.[1]

However, diverging responses to the Arab uprisings and a sense on both sides that the other party is becoming more motivated by sectarian impulses have led relations to sour. Turkey's involvement in Syria in particular has prompted Iraqi government officials to accuse it of a "*Neo-Ottoman' policy*" and raised their suspicion that it is trying to set up a de facto protectorate in Iraqi Kurdistan or even has designs on Mosul. Turkey's strong relations with Iraqi Kurdistan are further emphasized by the ongoing development of a bilateral oil pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan into Turkey against the wishes of the Baghdad government. This will allow the KRG to export energy directly to Turkey without the revenues going through the central government's exchequer. Turkey's foreign policy has been controversial within the country itself and was one of the issues cited by opposition activists during a wave of domestic protests in June 2013. This raises questions about whether the Turkish government may seek to moderate its regional position somewhat in response.[2]

As the Syrian internal war continued, refugees poured into neighboring countries, including Turkey, and hundreds of civilians died daily. Moreover, Syria became an area of geopolitical rivalry. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan worked for regime change and supported the opposition; whereas Iran, Russia, Iraq and Lebanon supported Assad. With international support along with considerable domestic support, Al-Assad has been able to hang on, perpetuating the crisis.[3]

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[1] محمد عبد القادر، تحولات السياسة الخارجية التركية في عهد حزب العدالة والتنمية، في (العرب وتركيا، تحديات الحاضر ورهانات المستقبل) مجموعة باحثين، المركز العربي للابحاث ودراسة السياسات، الدوحة، 2012، ص 588.
Muhammed Abdulqadir "et al", the Turkish Foreign Policy Transforming in JDP Era , in (The Arabs and Turkey, challenged of the present and Reckonings of the Futures), Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Aldoha, 2012,P. 588.

[2] Jane Kinninmont, Gareth Stansfield and Omar Sirri, Iraq on the International Stage Foreign Policy and National Identity in Transition, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2013. London, July 2013, p. 39.

[3] Fahrettin Sumer, Turkey's Changing Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring, op, cite, P. 21

5.5. The Impacts of ISIS on Iraqi -Turkish Relations

The ISIS rose in April 2013 when "*Abu Bakir Al-Baghdadi*"∗ the Head of this terrorist organization declared the establishment so-called Islamic State *(known as ISIS or ISIL, or by its Arabic acronym, Daesh)* Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Some of Al-Nusra Front "the official branch of Alqaida in Syria" members joined the ISIS.[1]

In order to make sense of the so-called "ISIS" and its sudden territorial conquests in Iraq and Syria, it is important to place the organization within the broader global "*jihadist*" movement. By tracing ISIS's social origins and comparing it with the first two jihadist waves of the 1980s and 1990s, it is an extent of continuity and change, and account for the group's notorious savagery.[2]

Although ISIS is an extension of the global "*jihadist*" movement in its ideology and worldview, some of its social origins are rooted in a specific Iraqi context, and, to a lesser extent, in the Syrian war that has raged for almost four years. While Al-Qaeda's central organization emerged from an alliance between ultraconservative Saudi Salafism and radical Egyptian Islamism, ISIS was born of an unholy union between an Iraq-based Al-Qaeda offshoot and some of Iraqi fundamentalists, which has proved a lethal combination.[3]

Unlike its transnational, borderless parent organization, ISIS has found a heaven in the heart of the Levant. It has done so by exploiting the chaos in Syria and the sectarian, exclusionary policies of former Iraqi Prime Minister "*Nouri Kamal Al-Maliki*".[4]

The key to weakening ISIS lies in working closely with local "Sunni" communities that it has co-opted a bottom-up approach that requires considerable material and ideological investment. The most affective means to degrade "ISIS" is to dismantle its social base by winning over the hearts and minds of local communities. This is easier said

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∗ He is an Iraqi citizen, His full name is (Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim) he has two nick name (abu Awad and abu Dua), in 2013 the United States declared 10 million Dollars for anyone who kills or help to a rrest Al-Baghdadi. Look at: Muhammed Aloosh, ISIS and its Sisters (from Alqaeda to the Islamic State), Riad El-Rayyes Books, Lebanon, 2015, p. 161.

[1] محمد علوش، داعش واخواتها (من القاعدة الى الدولة الاسلامية) رياض الريس للكتاب والنشر، لبنان، 2015، ص 134.

Muhammed Aloosh, ISIS and its Sisters (from Alqaeda to the Islamic State), Riad El-Rayyes Books, Lebanon, 2015, p. 134.

[2] Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism, Current History, No, 340, Landon, December 2014, p. 339.

[3] Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism, op, cit, p. 339.

[4] Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism, op,cit, p. 340.

than done, given the gravity of the crisis in the heart of the Arab world. The jury is still out on whether the Iraqi Prime Minister, "*Haider Al- Abadi*", will be able to appeal to mistrustful "*Sunnis*" and reconcile warring communities. Rebuilding trust takes hard work and time, both of which play to ISIS's advantage.[1]

However, as it was mentioned, for a long time Turkey has not played an effective role towards the regional developments. It was busy to find the solution of its internal problems. The non- peace and independence in the region affects negatively Turkish internal affairs. However the regional independence became the priority of Turkish foreign policy.[2] One means of Turkish foreign policy during the JDP government was the use of soft power, Turkey as military states was changed to economy as priority of its policy.[3]

There were accusations against Turkey, that Turkey has not supported KRG against "ISIS". In 1997, there were two competation powers Turkey and Iran which tried to increase their political, military and economic pressure on Kurdistan area. The memorandum was reached in Ankara with the attendance of the USA, and UK. It has fire-seized between the two parties PUK and PDK. Turkey maintained military existence and Special Forces in Amadiya, Sirdadiz and other areas. In an interview with official from KRG, he explained his opinion on Turkish assistance "*These forces are not important now they did not move against "ISIS" when became near to Arbil. There is intension in Kurdistan parliament to issue legislation that there is no need for these forces but this should be agreed on by the President of the Kurdistan Region or for political reasons this issue will not be discussed in the near future at least"*. There are 1350 Turkish registered companies and 30.000 Turkish registered citizens' in the Kurdistan. Kurdistan is economically important for Turkey. It is a good market for Turkey's goods and connected socially with Turkey. Iraqi Kurdish could be factors to reach peace process in Turkey.

According to Dr. Abdulsalam Rashid, Turkey claimed that it is unable to supported Iraqi Kurdistan against (ISIS) since 49 Turkish hostages taken by "*ISIS*". After their release Turkey supported Kurdistan by training 1500 Peshmerga in Sulymaniye and Dyana. Kurds

[1] Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism, op, cit, p. 343.
[2] Tarik Oğuzlu, Komuşlarla Sıfır Sorun Politikası, Kavraması bir analiz: Ortadoğuanaliz, Haziran Cit 4. Sayı 42.2012. S.9.
[3] Tarik Oğuzlu, Komuşlarla Sıfır Sorun Politikası, Kavraması bir analiz: Ortadoğuanaliz, Haziran Cit 4. Sayı 42.2012. S. 12.

look at crossing 250 Peshmerga from Turkish lands towards "Ayno Alarab" and carrying Kurdistan flag is an important development towards by Turkey's policy Kurdish issue.[1]

On August 18, 2015 the resigned Iraqi Vice President Nouri Al-Maliki accused Turkey of supporting "*ISIS*" and Turkish interference in Iraqi internal affairs since its relations with the Iraqi Kurdistan government.

On the other hand Ankara considered Al-Maliki among those responsible for the fall of Mosul. Turkey summoned the Iraqi Ambassador to Ankara to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to convey that the expressions concerning Turkey's Consul General in Mosul who was taken hostage by the "ISIS" in the report prepared by the Defense and Security Committee of the Iraqi Council or representatives and adopted in the Council's session of 17 August are unacceptable and Turkey strongly protests them.[2]

The turning point in the relations reached a critical situation when Turkey entered Iraqi territory on 3th December 2015 with 150 troops and about 20 Tanks installed in Bashiqa near Mosul. Iraq recalled Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad and handed over protest, furthermore, asked Turkey to withdraw urgently. In addition, Iraq filed a complain to UN Security Council. Turkey justified its step in protecting the Turkish trainers in Bashiqa.[3]

Turkey justified this movement by saying that the PKK increased its threates to Turkish security, there is "ISIL" and Iraqi military forces have no capability to "fight" it, there is agreement between Turkey and KRG and government of Mosul. While the Iraqi govenment clarified its position by: there is no agreement with KRG and this step had happened without coordination with it.[4] The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement "considered the entry of the Turkish forces into the Iraqi territory without the knowledge of the Iraqi Central Government as a breach and violation for Iraq's sovereignty also a surpass on the basis of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect, as Iraq

[1] Abdulsalam Rashid Ismail. Head of Turkish Department. Prime Ministry, Foreign Relations Office,KRG, an interview by the author on 31\03\2015 at 11:30 A.M.

[2] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/qa_21_-18-august-2015_-statement-of-the-spokesperson-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs_-tanju-bilgiç_-in-response-to-a-question-regarding-some-statements-by-mr_-al_maliki_-the-former-prime-minister-of-Iraq.en.mfa

[3] http://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/news/-20151205101432

[4] السفير هشام العلوي، محاضرة عن العلاقات العراقية –التركية، وزارة الخارجية، 4 شباط 2016.

considers the presence of any military force inside its territories, without the knowledge of the Central Government in Baghdad, as a hostile act".[1]

In the Light of this breach, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned up the Turkish Ambassador and gave him a note of protest in this regard. It asked the Turkish side to withdraw its military forces from the Iraqi territory. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also declares moving towards the international community to halt the Turkey's violation of the Iraqi sovereignty and its lack of respect for the Iraqi borders.[2]

It seems that Turkish goal is to pursue the PKK who were in Singer and to prevent them to wage any operation towards Turkish territories, had also, to prevent the Kurds to prolong their influence area from Singer to Syria.

[1] http://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/news/-20151205101432
[2] http://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/news/-20151205101432

Conclusion

Turkey tried to improve its relations with the USA after 2003. The relations were damaged since Turkey's refusal to take part in the 2003 War. Thus TGNA passed a motion to send peace keeping approximetly 1oooo Turkish troops were be deployed in the area so-called "Sunni Triangle" where the USA forces faced resistance. It seems that the USA objetives were: first, decrease the resistance there, since Turkey is a Muslim "Sunni" country, its troops might not be targeted, second, this step would be welcomed by Arab countries that they criticized the USA strategy in Iraq which increased the Iranian influence in the region.

However, many Iraqis, especially the Kurds refused any foreign troops. They considered it as breach of the sovereignty. The Kurds feared that Turkish troops would be an obstacle towards their aspiration of independence in the future.

Turkey encouraged the Iraqi "Sunnis" to take part in the 2005-2006 elections, the majority of them had boycotted the political process in Iraq since the American existence troops. Turkey has also pursued opened policy towards Iraqi KRG, it has received many Kurdish officials. At the same time many official visits were paid by Turkish officials to the Kurdistan region.

Iraq, Turkey and the USA agreed in 2008 to establish "Commend Center" in Arbil for fighting terrorism.

Turkey realized the importance of other factors in Iraq. Turkey's policy before was concentrated on Turkmen only. However, the developments in its policy opened new lines with other factors as Muqtada Al-Sadir and Ammar Al-Hakim. This policy will improve the relations not on the official levels, but also on the social and religious once, since both countries have similar socio-ethnnic structure.

Turkey realized the importance of Iraq's reconstruction on its economy, thus it increased its economic activities and investments. The turning point was on July 10, 2008 when the two countries singed a high level strategic cooperation council. The Council was created to oversee security cooperation, economic partnership and cultural dialogue between Turkey and Iraq. An important component of the High Level Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq was aimd at enhancing economic relations. However in 2011 the economic

relations reached $11 billon. However the most important development was in 2010, Turkey had a role to form Aliraqyya list under the Head of Ayyad Alawi.

After 2012 Iraqi-Turkih relations witnessed some tensions for these reasons: first, Turkey hosted Iraqi vice President "*Tariq Al-Hashimi*" who was accused by the Iraqi judge.

Second, Turkey supported Iraqi Kurdistan government for exporting its oil without any permission from Baghdad, third, in August 2012 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuğtoğlu visited Kirkuk through Iraqi Kurdistan Region, Baghdad protested towards this action because the sensitivity of Kirkuk city, fourth, in 2013 Turkey and KRG signed agreement to establish piplines in order to export oil from northen Iraq to the international markets, fifth, the rises of ISIS and its conquest of two Iraqi cities Mosul and Al-Anbar, some Iraqi officials have accused "Turkey" by helping the Syrian oppositon fighters or foreigners to participate in the war against Syrian regime, some of them whom they crossed into the Iraq and supported ISIS.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Iraq and Turkey have common historical, cultural heritage and share a vast amount of economic and political interests. However, their relations have not been free from strategic and security setbacks. From a political aspect the respect for sovereignty and national integrity and non-interference in internal affairs is the key stone for the development of the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Although politicians, media and public figures could make negative explanations against each others' interests for domestic reasons, these should not be taken into account without knowing official and formal statements made by Iraqi MOFA and Turkish MFA.

From the economic aspect, Turkey's need for oil, gas and other energy resources can easily be supplied by Iraq, a country which has a vast amount of energy resources. Iraq needs to export its oil to the world markets and Turkey is to be a good corridor for that and this will be beneficial for Ankara as well. Iraq is a good country for Turkish companies as the majority of them work in Iraq in construction, infrastructure, and other fields. The trade relations during the last years reached more than $11 billion. On the one hand Iraq's location could be a bridge for Turkey if she wanted to extend its trade to Arab Gulf Countries. On the other hand Turkey has occupied a location which contains a corridor for Iraq to Europe. Iraq also has huge gas reserves, and during the 1980s there were attempts to cooperate in this field, but the 1980-1988 war prevented this and affected many other projects. However, Iraq and Turkey can collaborate in reviving these previous projects. Any cooperation and improvement in this respect will provide for the two countries to play a significant role in regional and international energy politics. Bearing in mind that the European countries are depended on the Russian gas and they have a deteriorated relationship with Russia over the issues related to Ukraine and Syrian crises, the collaboration between Iraq and Turkey on energy field will increase their importance vis a vis Europe.

From the security aspect, there is a common interest to fight the terrorist groups which they use the violence, targeting the civilians and the integrity of both countries. This

could be reached through the coordination, cooperation and the exchange of the information, since Iraq has possessed adequate information regarding the structure and places of the terrorist groups. However, what is happening in one country affects the other definitely. Turkish national security has been threatened after the ISIS occupation of Mosul on June 10, 2014. The PKK exploited the political and security vacuum and increased its existence there. All these developments have created an opportunity for security cooperation between Ankara and Baghdad to fight common enemy which is targeting their national security.

The problem of the water could be an obstacle to develop the relations, since it became the issue of public opinion in Iraq. The decrease of water amount affected the agriculture from north of Iraq to the south. This problem could be resolved according to international and bilateral agreements and the principles of good neighborhood which grant the waters rights of both countries. In addition to, Turkey could have good opportunity to invest and develop Iraq's water and irrigation projects.

The JDP government have opened new source of relations with Arab and neighboring countries, that was designed according to the zero problem policy which can be called as idealism in practice. It might be success in early period within limited scope. However, the events in the Middle East later forced Turkey to adopt realist thinking in its foreign policy, especially after the ISIS and PKK terrorist attacks against Turkey were increased.

In many aspects, the results of the First Gulf War in 1991 were not good for Turkey. Ankara realized that Turkish policies during 1991 had badly affected her economy in return she did not get any compensation for its damage. From a political standpoint, the Kurdistan Region formed and became a semi- independent state. In addition to the humanitarian crisis after the war, many Kurdish refugees flow to Turkey. Taking good lectures from these events, Ankara had been against the American war of 2003 as she was worried about what would happen after the change of Iraqi regime and its implications over the future of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Furthermore, Turkey recognized that the war was not legal and it was not supported by European countries and the United Nations. On March 1, 2003 "TGNA" refused to approve the war on Iraq and this Turkish rightful and justly decision had deep and wider positive impacts not only in Iraq but also in the entire Arab World. It positively affected

Iraqi-Turkish relations and Turkey's relations with the Middle East countries. Turkey has also long considered Turkmens as an essential element to reinforce Iraqi-Turkish relations whereas Iraq saw them as important group to achieve political balance with Kurds in northern Iraq. The developments of Turkey- Iraqi Kurdistan relations especially in the economic aspect are not huge as some Arabic, English and Turkish sources referred. At about % 20 per cent of Turkish trade goes with KRG and the rest of 80 percent of Turkish trade materials goes to the other Iraqi governorates. However this thing could be changed in the future if both countries come to an agreement to open new gates within the Mosul borders, if Baghdad and Ankara continue to stick on the grand strategy for limiting Kurdish political and economic designs.

The improvements on the relations between Iraq and Turkey will contribute to the spread of peace throughout the Middle East. It should be noted that the respect of sovereignty and national integrity and non- interference in the internal affairs have always been the keystone for the development of relations between the two countries, since this will be for their strategic, political and economic interests. Iraq should occupy a central place for the development of Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan. Since this region is under the control of constitutional structure of Iraq any political developments towards this region requires for the collaboration of central Iraqi Government. Last but not least, Iraq and Turkey have historical, cultural, and social common ties. The encouragement of organizations of civil society, authors, arts and educational cooperation could be additional factors to further develop the relations between the countries.

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Appendix 1

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti
Hariciye Vekâleti
Şifre Müdürlüğü
№ 2166

Bağdat Elçiliği
Yazıldığı tarih 22 eylül 929
Geldiği tarih 23 " 929
Nümerosu ooo

Hariciye Vekâletine

17 eylül tarihli telgrafnamei Vekâletpenahilerile talebi emir buyrulan , Tahir Lûtfu Bey hakkındaki agremana Irak hükûmeti tarafından muvafık cevap verildiğini arzeylerim efendim .

ST.

Kaya Alp

D.I § 2

Yat İşleri müdürü
Cüneyt Takdiri
24.9.29

D.I § II
3586
24.9.29

24-9-29

147
496
29690

1

36

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti
RİYASETİ
kâtibi
umumiliği

4
448

23.a

Ankara : 24 / II / 1929

Hariciye vekâleti celilesine

19 / II / 1929 tarih ve 7714/116 numaralı teskereleri cevabıdır .

Irak elçiliğine tayin olunan Tahir Lûtfi beye ait itimatnâme Reisicümhur hazretleri tarafından imza buyrulmağla leffen iade kılınmıştır efendim .

Kâtibi Umumî
M. Tevfik

Protokol U. M. 3/12/29

Teşrifat Umumi Müdürlüğü
Tarihi 3.12.1929
Numerosu 283

Basri Beyf.
3/12/1929 HS.

1

Evrak umumî müdürlüğü	
Tarihi	3 . 12 . 29
K. No.	68
S. No:	28

11

Elem'alemale,
5/12/929 N 1785
العالم

مجلية

نص الخطاب

الذي ألقاه به معالي الوزير التركي المفوض
بين يدي جلالة الملك المعظم
اثناء تقديم اوراق اعتماده

حشمتپناه

تورکیا رئیس جمهوری غازی مصطفی کال حضرتلرینك بنی فوق العاده مرخص واورطه ایلچیسی اولهرق نزد ملکانه لرینه تعیین واعزام بیوردقلرینه دائر اولان نامه‌یی تودیع ایتمکله شرف کسب ایلرم

تومنوز ودوستمز عراق ایله درین وصمیمی دوستلق حسابنی تقویت ایتمك اوزره نزد حشمتپناهلرینه ایلك تورکیا ایلچیسی صفتیله مأمور ایدلمکلکم طولایسیله شرف وافتخارمك تزاید ایتدیکنی عرض ایدرم

تورکلر ایله عراقلیلر بینلرنده چوق اسکی زمانلردنبری موجود اولان قلبی وفکری رابطه‌لر بو کونکی عراق ایله اولان دوستانه‌مزك اساسنی تملئی تشکیل ایتمکده‌در

بیوك رئیس جمهورمز حضرتلرینك جمهوریت حکومتلرینك وتورکیا خلقنك دوغرولری یومرکزده اولدیغی کبی ذات حشمتپناهلریله عراق حکومتلرینك وعراق اهالیسینك ده عین صورتله متحمس

[illegible] بیمی دوستلقك دها زیاده انکشافنه جالشمق
[illegible] برنجی وظیفهم اوله جقدر
[illegible] بو بولده کی مساعیمك معاونت ملکانه لرینك
[illegible] کومت قرالیه‌نك مظاهرتنه مظهر اولهجغنی
[illegible] له امید ایدر وذات حشمتپناهلرینك سعادتی
[illegible] راق اهالیسینك رفاه وتعالیسنی تمنی ایلرم

﴿ ترجمة هذا الخطاب ﴾

[illegible] صاحب الجلالة

[illegible] اتشرف وارفع الى جلالتكم ان حضرة الغازي
[illegible] طفى كال باشا رئيس جمهورية تركيا قد تفضل
[illegible] يبني وارسالي الى جانبكم الملكي وزيراً مفوضاً
[illegible] في العادة وسفيراً

[illegible] واعرض ان مما يزيدني شرفاً وافتخاراً هو
[illegible] يني بصفة اول سفير لتركيا لدى جلالتكم
[illegible] وية عواطف الصداقة العميقة الصميمة مع
[illegible] راق جارنا وصديقنا

ان الروابط القلبية والفكرية الموجودة من
[illegible] نة قديمة جداً بين الترك والعراقيين تشكل
[illegible] وم امتن اسس الصداقة مع العراق

وحيث اني قانع بان جلالتكم وحكومة
[illegible] راق واهاليه متحسسون بنفس الاحساسات
[illegible] نحس بها حضرة رئيس جمهوريتنا الكبير
[illegible] حكومة الجمهورية واهالي تركيا فاعرض ان
[illegible] ل واجبي هو السعي الى ان ازيد اكثر فاكثر
[illegible] لي هذه الصداقة القديمة الصميمة

[illegible] وأؤمل وثيقاً ان احظى بمعاونة جلالتكم
[illegible] ظاهرة حكومتكم الملكية . وانمي لجلالتكم
[illegible] سعادة ، ولاهالي العراق الرفاه والتعالي

جواب جلالة الملك

Appendix 2

AMBASSADE D'IRAK
ANKARA

No. T/3/ 142

Irak Büyük Elçiliği Dışişleri Bakanlığına saygılarını sunar, ve Irak Hükûmetile Türkiye Hükûmeti arasında varılan anlaşmaya binaen, iki memleket arasındaki dostluk ve iyi komşuluk bağlarını takviye etmek gayesile, Türkiyedeki Irak Elçiliğinin, Büyük Elçilik payesine yükseltildiğini Sayın Dışişleri Bakanlığına bildirmekle şeref kazanır ve bu vesile ile derin ihtiramatını teyid eyler .

Ankara, 16 Ekim 1952

AMBASSADE D'IRAK ANKARA

S F T
15
17/10

Dışişleri Bakanlığı
Ankara

acil Protokol'a
Örnek

S U R E T

T.C.
Başbakanlık
Muamelât Umum Müdürlüğü
Kararlar Müdürlüğü
Sayı :
1 - 74
6/2869

30 Eylül 1962

Dışişleri Bakanlığına

5.9.1962 tarihli ve 2.Da.U.Md.22279-308 sayılı yazıya karşılıktır.

Bağdat Elçiliğinin Büyük Elçiliğe yükseltilmesi hakkındaki Bakanlar Kurulu kararının sureti sunulmuştur.

Dışişleri Bakanlığına yazılmış ve Resmî Gazeteye verilmiştir.

Başbakan yerine
Müsteşar
Ahmet Salih Korur

imza

S U R E T

T.C.
Dışişleri Vekâleti
İkinci Daire U.Müdürlüğü
Şube : 5
Sayı : 25389/162

10.Ekim.1952

Lef : 1

Bağdat Büyük Elçiliğine

18 Temmuz 1952 tarihli ve 6017/207 sayılı yazı karşılığıdır.

Elçiliğinizin Büyük Elçiliğe yükseltilmesi hakkındaki 17 Eylül 1952 tarihli Bakanlar Kurulu kararı örneğinin ilişikte sunulduğunu saygılarımla arzederim.

Dışişleri Vekili Y.

K A R A R S U R E T İ

T.C.
Başbakanlık
Muamelât Umum Müdürlüğü
Kararlar Müdürlüğü
Karar sayısı
3
15587

Bağdat Elçiliğinin Büyük Elçiliğe yükseltilmesi; Dışişleri Bakanlığının 5.9.1952 tarihli ve 22279/308 sayılı yazısı üzerine Bakanlar Kurulunca 17.9.1952 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.

CUMHURBAŞKANI
C.Bayar

Başbakan	Devlet Bakanı Başbakan Yardımcısı	Devlet Bakanı	Adalet Bakanı
A. Menderes	S.Ağaoğlu	M.Alakant	R.Nasuhioğlu

Millî Savunma Bakanı	İçişleri Bakanı V.	Dışişleri Bakanı
H. Köymen	E.Menderes	F.Köprülü

Maliye Bakanı	Millî Eğitim Bakanı	Bayındırlık Bakanı
H.Polatkan	T.İleri	K.Zeytinoğlu

Eko.ve Ticaret Bakanı	Sa.veSo.Y.Bakanı	G.ve Tekel Bakanı
E.Güreli	Dr.H.Üstündağ	S.Yırcalı

Tarım Bakanı	Ulaştırma Bakanı	Çalışma Bakanı
N.Ökmen	S.Kurtbek	N.Özsan

İşletmeler Bakanı
N.Özsan

T.C.
Dışişleri Bakanlığı
İkinci Daire U.Müdürlüğü
Şube : 5

U. No. 24786-85
H. No. 24787

Ankara, 2 Ekim 1962

Hulâsa : Irak ile Türkiye'nin Elçiliklerini Büyük Elçiliğe yükselttikleri H.

U Ç A K L A

T A M İ M

Büyük Elçilik ve Elçiliklere

Başkonsolosluk ve Konsolosluklara

Hükûmetimiz ile Irak Hükûmeti beyninde varılan bir anlaşma sonunda iki taraf Elçiliklerinin karşılıklı olarak, 30 Eylül 1962 tarihinden itibaren Büyük Elçiliğe yükseltilmiş olduğunu saygılarımla arzederim.

Dışişleri Bakanı V.

M. Erkin Soyak

Tarih : 3 Ekim 1962
Numarası :
Dosyası :

Bilgi için Protokol Umum Müdürlüğüne takdim

II.Daire Umum Müdürü

Appendix 3

DEVLET ARŞİVLERİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ

EKSELANS CEMAL GÜRSEL

ANKARA

Temmuz İhtilâlinin 2 inci yıl dönümü münasebetile Zâtı Devletlerinin Irak Milletine ve şahsıma göndermek lütfunda bulundukları tebrikler için derin minnettarlığımı ve en samimi teşekkürlerimi arzederim.

İki memleketimiz arasındaki kardeşlik bağlarının devamlı olarak kuvvetlendirilmesi lüzumuna inanıyorum. Irak Milleti, Türk Milletine karşı büyük hürmet beslemekte ve sulh ve terakki yolunda daha sıkı bir iş birliği ve ileri bir inkişaf arzu etmektedir.

Zâtı Devletlerine, Türk Hükümetine ve Türk Milletine Hükümetim, Milletim ve şahsım namına refah ve saadetler dilerim.

Abdul Kerim Kasım
Irak Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı

Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü

030	01			41	246	2

Fon No: 30 1 0 0 - Kutu No: 41 - Dosya No: 246 - Sıra No: 2

Appendix A

Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü

MINUTES OF MEETINGS
Held
Between The
TURKISH AND IRAQI DELEGATIONS
During
2 JANUARY 1971 - 6 JANUARY 1971
At Baghdad

and

P R O T O C O L

2

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sıra No: 2

P R O T O C O L

5

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sıra No: 2

SECTION - I

GAS SUPPLY

1) Quantities to be Supplied

It is agreed that IRAQ will continuously allocate to TPAO as minimum an average of 100 million cubic feet per day of natural gas with a calorific value of not less than, and not limited to, 1000 British Thermal Units(BTU) per cubic foot at standard conditions, to be increased to 200 million cubic feet per day, for which the schedule of supply, operational tolerance and quality will be defined as foreseen in Article 7 hereinafter. The duration of the supply will be twenty years from the commencement of commercial operation. This period may be extended as foreseen in Article 13 hereinafter.

2) Commencement of Commercial Operation

Commencement of the commercial operation shall be understood as the beginning of the continuous flow across the IRAQI-TURKISH border not including the case, as it may be, when the flow is only for testing purposes of the trunk line. The date of the beginning of the commercial operation will be certified by the two parties in a joint protocol.

3) Interruption of Supply

IRAQ shall, except in cases of force

.../.

6

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sira No: 2

majeure, guarantee the availability of the quantities of natural gas specified in Article 1 of this Protocol and accept, in cases of non-fulfillment of its obligations in this respect, to compensate TPAO its direct loss due to reduction in, or stoppage of, committed volumes of natural gas in a manner and scope to be agreed upon and specified in the gas sales contract referred to in Article 8 of this Protocol.

4) Payment for Gas:

The price to be paid by TPAO for gas delivered by INOC to TPAO hereunder shall be computed as follows :

a) Royalty payment of THREE U.S. Cents or its equivalent per one million BTU, throughout the duration of the Gas Sales Contract.

b) An additional payment equal to TEN U.S. Cents or its equivalent per one million BTU from the date of ownership transfer as defined in Article 12 hereinafter.

The manner and form of payment will be agreed upon and stipulated in the Gas Sales Contract.

5) Terms of Gas Transport

A pipeline scheme between Kirkuk

.../.

2

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sira No: 2

Area in IRAQ and Batman Area in TURKEY is envisaged as the best means of transport of the quantities of natural gas referred to in Article 1 hereinabove from IRAQ to TURKEY. The pipeline shall also make provisions for two separate outlets to supply natural gas for IRAQ's requirements in the Mishraq and Mosul areas of a maximum of 60 million cubic feet per day in total. Additional operational costs incurred due to this extra volume will be borne by INOC .

6) Data Collection Studies

Before the arrangement for the feasibility studies, referred to in Article 7 hereinafter, TPAO will be assisted by INOC to facilitate studies and research, along with data collection work necessary for the final definition of the scope of the project as a whole to be undertaken by its engineers with a view to establish sufficient reference material regarding the availability, quantities, quality and pressure limits and other relevant properties of the natural gas to be allocated to the scheme. Such work will start not later than February 1st and be completed not later than April 30th, 1971.

7) Feasibility Studies

Subsequent to the studies referred

.../.

8

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sıra No: 2

to in Article 6 hereinabove, TPAO will secure the preparation and completion of the preliminary design and feasibility studies of the pipeline scheme as a whole as well as the overall economics of this system. The payments for the consulting services to be utilised will be borne by the TPAO. In such work TPAO and the consulting engineers, if any, will be fully assisted by INOC to the extent that it is rendered necessary for the design of the system in Iraqi territory.

8) Gas Sales Contract Finalization

The two parties agree that they shall form a joint team in order to prepare a draft Gas Sales Contract to be finalised upon completion of the feasibility studies referred to in Article 7 hereinabove. The date for beginning such work will be set after the feasibility studies have been started.

.../.

9

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sıra No: 2

9) Financing and Construction

TPAO accepts to undertake the financing of the overall project, subject to the following provisions :-

Upon the completion of the above-mentioned studies and on condition that the results are deemed favourable by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation, the corporation will endeavour to find the necessary credit facilities for the foreign exchange required to realize the scheme as a whole. When credit facilities for the project are made available, a contractor will be selected by TPAO, subject to agreement by INOC, for the actual construction of the pipeline.

If need be INOC and TPAO may reconsider jointly the guarantees.

10) T I M I N G

The Gas Sales Contract shall stipulate a schedule of minimum quantities of gas to be made available by INOC which are to be the minimum purchase committment of TPAO.

It is agreed that the commercial operations, i.e. when payments become due to INOC as per the above mentioned scheduled quantities, shall be in effect within a date not later than 36 months from the date of the Final Agreement as defined in Article 17 hereinafter.

11) O p e r a t i o n

The operation of the project within the territory of IRAQ shall be made jointly between TPAO and INOC, it being understood that the operator for the period prior to ownership transfer, as defined in Article 12 hereinafter, shall be nominated by TPAO and thereafter by INOC, for which purpose

..../.

10

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sıra No: 2

a detailed scheme for the organization of the operation will be decided after the feasibility studies, to define the full extent of responsibilities and authorities of both parties.

It is further understood that the operator will bear the operational cost inclusive of payable land rentals if any.

12) Ownership

INOC and TPAO will be the legal owners of the facilities within the territories of Iraq and Turkey respectively. For the first TWELVE years of operation TPAO will be given exclusive right of use of all such facilities in Iraqi territory.

The right of way within the territory of Iraq will be provided, in accordance with international standards, by INOC free of charge.

13) Extension of Gas Sales Contract

On the fifteenth year of operation any of the parties may submit a written request so that the duration of the "Gas Sales Contract", as defined in Article 8 hereinabove, may be extended for a further period, the terms and conditions of which are to be negotiated and agreed upon between the two parties. If no such agreement for an extension is reached within a maximum of twenty four months subsequent to the written request referred to above, then the Contract may be terminated on a three years' written notice by any of the parties. Failing the serving of the said notice at the end of the 17th year of operation then the contract shall be considered extended for a period such as to allow the serving of a 3 year termination notice.

.../.

11

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sıra No: 2

14) Settlement of Disputes

In case of any dispute arising from the interpretation or execution of this Protocol and the contracts concluded thereof, while the operation shall continue under the same terms and conditions previously agreed upon, the two parties shall, within 30 days from the date of the dispute, meet in Baghdad in order to find an amicable solution. If no agreement could be reached within six months from the date of the beginning of the dispute, such dispute shall be referred to the Arbitration Court of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris.

15) Force Majeure

The scope and extent of force majeure referred to in this Protocol will be defined and elaborated in the Gas Sales Contract.

16) Governmental Agreement

The above provisions will be submitted by TPAO and INOC to their respective Governments and feasibility studies will begin after their approval.

17) Final Agreement

It is envisaged that the Governments of the Republic of TURKEY and the Republic of IRAQ will, upon completion of the feasibility studies and subject to their being found satisfactory, make the necessary preparations for concluding a final general agreement and this Agreement will be signed by the two Governments when the necessary credit facilities to finance the system are secured. The Gas Sales Contract shall also be subject to governmental approval.

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Signed in Baghdad on the 6th January 1971.

FOR TPAO *FOR INOC*

PROF. KORKUT OZAL *DR. CADOON HAMADI*

NELIH GENCA *ALI HADI AL JABIR*

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TÜRKİYE VE IRAK HEY'ETLERİ ARASINDA
2 OCAK 1971-6 OCAK 1971
TARİHLERİNDE
BAĞDAT'TA
AKDOLUNAN TOPLANTILARIN ZAPTI
VE
İMZALANAN PROTOKOL

Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kutu No: 261 - Dosya No: 5 - Sıra No: 2

TÜRKİYE VE IRAK HEY'ETLERİ ARASINDA
2 OCAK 1971-6 OCAK 1971
TARİHLERİNDE
BAĞDAT'TA
YAPILAN TOPLANTILARIN ZAPTI

Türkiye'ye Irak menşeli Tabiî Gaz temini konusunda, Ankara'da, 1970 yılı, Ağustos ayında, Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO) ve Irak Millî Petrol Şirketi (INOC) arasında vaki görüşmelerin ve müteakiben yapılan yazışmaların sonucunda, Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı Genel Müdürü Prof. KORKUT ÖZAL'ın başkanlığında, UBEYDULLAH SEVEN, MELİH GENCA, DEMİR ALUNUR ve UMUT ARIK'tan müteşekkil bir hey'et 1 Ocak 1971, Cuma günü, Bağdat'a gelerek, ALİ HADİ AL JABİR başkanlığında, Dr.ABDULLAH AL SAYAB, Dr. RAMZİ SALMAN A. HUSSAIN, Dr. KAMAL THARWAT, MAHDİ AL HADİ VE ADNAN AL JANABİ'den müteşekkil bir INOC Hey'etiyle müzakerelerde bulunmuşlardır.

Türkiye'ye, Irak menşeli tabiî gaz ve ham petrol temini konularında umumî bir görüş teatisini müteakip, hey'etler müzakerelerini Kuzey Irak'taki Kerkük Bölgesinden, Türkiye'de Batman Bölgesine Tabiî Gaz temini projesine inhisar ettirmişlerdir.

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PROTOKOL

BÖLÜM- I

G A Z T E M İ N İ

1) Temin olunacak miktarlar :

INOC'un, TPAO'na, asgarî, standart şartlar altında, beher kübik foot başına kaloru değeri 1000 İngiliz Isı Birimi (BTU)'nden az olmayan, ancak bu had ile sınırlı da bulunmayan evsafta tabiî gazdan, devamlı olarak günde, ileride 200 milyon kübik foot'a çıkarılmak üzere, ortalama 100 milyon kübik foot tutarındaki bir miktarı, ikmal programı, işletme toleransı ve kalitesi, aşağıda 7 nci Maddede öngörülen usûlle tesbit edilecek şekilde, devamlı olarak tahsis etmesi kabul edilmiştir. İkmal müddeti ticarî işletmenin başlangıcından itibaren yirmi yıl olacaktır. Bu devre aşağıda 13 ncü Maddede öngörülen şekilde temdit edilebilir.

2) Ticarî işletmenin başlangıcı :

Ticarî işletmenin başlangıcı, gaz akımının sadece ana hattın dönenmesi maksadıyla yapılması halleri hariç gazın, IRAK - TÜRKİYE hududundan devamlı olarak akışının başlaması olarak anlaşılacaktır. Ticarî işletmenin başlama tarihi iki tarafça ortak bir Protokolle tesbit olunacaktır.

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3) İkmal teminatı :

INOC, mücbir sebep halleri dışında, tabiî gazın, işbu Protokol'ün 1 nci Maddesinde tarif edilen miktarlarda teminini garanti edecek ve bu hususdaki vecibelerinin yerine getirilmemesi halinde, taahhüd ettiği hacimdeki tabiî gazda vukubulacak bir azalma veya durmanın T.P.A.O.'na tevlid edeceği doğrudan zararı, işbu Protokol'ün 8 nci Maddesinde atıfta bulunulan gaz satış mukavelesinde uyuşulacak ve tesbit edilecek şekil ve vüs'atte tazmin eyleyecektir.

4) Gaz için ödeme :

INOC'nin, TPAO'na teslim edeceği gaz için TPAO tarafından ödenecek fiat aşağıdaki şekilde hesaplanacaktır :

a) Gaz Satış Mukavelesinin devamı müddetince beher bir milyon BTU için ÜÇ A.B.D. Cent'i veya eşidi tutarında " Royalty " ödemesi.

b) 12 nci Maddede tarif edilen şekilde mülkiyetin devri tarihinden itibarin beher bir milyon BTU için ON A.B.D. Cent'lik veya eşdeğerde ilâve bir ödeme.

Ödemenin şekil ve mahiyeti Gaz Satış Mukavelesinde tesbit edilecek ve üzerinde uyuşmaya varılacaktır.

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5) Gazın nakil şekli X

Yukarıda 1 nci Maddede atıfta bulunulan miktarlarda tabiî gazın IRAK'tan, TÜRKİYE'ye nakli için en iyi vasıta olarak, IRAK'ta, Kerkük Bölgesiyle, TÜRKİYE'de, Batman Bölgesi arasında bir boru hattı projesi düşünülmüştür. Boru hattı aynı zamanda IRAK'ın, Mishraq ve Musul sahalarında azami, günde 50 milyon kübik foot tutarındaki ihtiyaçları için tabiî gaz temini maksadıyla iki ayrı çıkış imkânı da sağlanacaktır. İşbu ilâve hacim dolayısıyla ortaya çıkacak ek işletme masrafları INOC tarafından yüklenilecektir.

6) Bilgi toplama çalışmaları :

Aşağıda, 7 nci maddede zikredilen fizibilite çalışmalarının tertibinden evvel, INOC, TPAO'nun, mühendisleri vasıtasıyla, sisteme tahsis olunacak tabiî gazın mevcutları, miktarları, kalitesi, tasfiyik hadleri ve diğer alâkalı vasıfları konusunda kâfi miktarda referans malzemesi temini maksadına matuf olarak projenin bir bütün halinde şumûlünün nihaî şekilde tesbiti için lûzumlu bilgi toplama çalışmaları da dahil olmak üzere, yapacağı incelemeve çalışmalarda, yardımcı olacaktır. İşbu faaliyetlerin başlangıcı 1 Şubat'tan geç olmayacak, bitimi de 30 Nisan 1971' den sonraya kalmayacaktır.

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7) Fizibilite çalışmaları :

Yukarıda 6 ncı Maddede belirtilen çalışmaları müteakip, TPAO, bütünüyle boru hattı projesinin ve bu sistemin toplu ekonomisini fizibilite etüdleri ile ihzarî plânının hazırlanmasını ve ikmalini temin edecektir. Müracaat olunacak müşavirlik hizmetleri için yapılacak ödemeler TPAO tarafından deruhde edilecektir. Bu çalışmalarda, sistemin Irak arazisinUdeki bölümünün plânlanmasının lûzumlu kıldığı ölçüde INOC, TPAO'na ve, eğer mevcutsa, müşavir mühendislere, tam manasıyla yardımcı olacaktır.

8) Gaz Satış Mukavelesinin ikmali :

İki taraf, yukarıda 7 nci Maddede zikredilen " fizibilite " etüdlerinin hitamını müteakip nihaî hale getirilecek bir Gaz Satış Mukavelesi tasarısı hazırlamak üzere bir müşterek grup kurmayı kabul ederler. Anılan çalışmanın başlangıç tarihi, " fizibilite " etüdleri başladıktan sonra tesbit olunacaktır.

9) Finansman ve İnşaat :

TPAO, aşağıdaki şartlara bağlı olarak tümüyle projenin finansmanını deruhde etmeyi kabul eyler:-

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Yukarıda sözügeçen çalışmaların ikmalini müteakip ve sonuçları Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı tarafından uygun bulunmak şartıyla, Ortaklık, bütün sistemi gerçekleştirmek için lûzumlu dış finansman bakımından gereken kredi imkânlarını bulmaya gayret edecektir. Proje için lûzumlu kredi imkânlarının temini halinde, boru hattının fiilen inşaatı için TPAO tarafından, INOC'un muvafakatına bağlı olarak bir müteahhid seçilecektir.

Gerektiği takdirde INOC ve TPAO garantileri müştereken yeniden gözden geçirebileceklerdir.

10) Zaman Plânlanması :

Gaz Satışı Mukavelesi, INOC tarafından temin edilecek ve TPAO'nun asgarî mübayaa taahhüdü olarak kabul edilecek gazın asgarî miktarlarına müteallik zaman programını tesbit eyleyecektir.

Ticarî faaliyetlerin başlangıcının, yani, yukarıda anılan zaman programına bağlanmış miktarlar için INOC'ye yapılacak tediyatın ecelinin, aşağıda 17 nci maddede tarif olunan Nihaî Anlaşmanın tarihinden itibaren 36 ayı geçmeyecek bir tarihte olması kabul edilmiştir.

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11) İşletme :

Projenin IRAK arazisindeki işletmesi, mülkiyetin, aşağıda 12 nci Maddede belirtilen şekilde, devrinden önceki devrede işletmecinin TPAO, bilâhare INOC tarafından seçilmesi ve bu maksatla fizibilite etüdlerini müteakip, her iki tarafın mesuliyet ve selâhiyetlerinin tam ölçüsünün tarif olunacağı, işletmenin teşkilâtına müteallik teferruatlı bir şemanın kararlaştırılması kaydıyla, TPAO ve INOC arasında müştereken yürütülecektir.

Ayrıca, gerektiği takdirde ödenebilecek arazi kiraları da dahil olmak şartıyla, işletme maliyetinin, işletmeci tarafından deruhde edileceği de mukarrerdir.

12) Mülkiyet :

INOC ve TPAO, sırasıyla, IRAK ve TÜRKİYE arazileri içindeki tesislerin hukukî malikleri olacaklardır. İşletmenin ilk ONİKİ yılında, IRAK arazisi üzerindeki bu gibi bilcümle tesislerin inhisarî istimal hakkı TPAO'na verilecektir.

Irak arazisi üzerindeki geçiş hakkı, beynelmilel standartlara uygun olarak, INOC tarafından bilâbedel temin olunacaktır.

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13) Gaz Satış Mukavelesinin Temdidi :

İşletmenin onbeşinci yılında taraflar, kayıt ve şartları iki taraf arasında yapılacak müzakerelerle tesbit edilmek üzere, yukarıda, 8 nci Maddede belirtilen " Gaz Satış Mukavelesi " müddetinin yeni bir devre için temdidini teminen yazılı olarak talepte bulunabilir. Böyle bir temdit için, yukarıda mezkûr yazılı talebi müteakip azami yirmidört ay içinde bir uyuşmaya varılamadığı takdirde, Mukavele, taraflardan herhangi birince yazılı olarak üç sene mühletle feshi ihbarda bulunularak sona erdirilebilir. İşletmenin 17 nci yılının sonuna değin mezkûr feshi ihbarda bulunulmadığı takdirde, Mukavelenin, üç yıl mühletli fesih ihbarını mümkün kılabilecek bir devre için uzatıldığı kabul edilecektir.

14) Uyuşmazlıkların çözümü :

İşbu Protokol veya buna müteallik olarak akdolunan mukavelelerin tefsir veya tatbikatından doğan uyuşmazlıkların halli için iki taraf, işletme önceden mutabık kalınmış kayıt ve şartlarla devam ederken, uyuşmazlığın çıkışından itibaren otuz gün içinde, dostâne bir hâl caresi bulmak maksadıyla Bağdat'ta toplanacaklardır. Uyuşmazlığın çıkışından itibaren altı ay içinde herhangi bir anlaşma hasıl olmadığı

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takdirde, uyuşmazlık Paris'teki Beynelmilel Ticaret Odası'nın Tahkim Mahkemesine havale eylenecektir.

15) Mücbir Sebep :

İşbu Protokolde atıfta bulunulan mücbir sebebin şümûl ve hududu Gaz Satış Mukavelesinde tarif ve izah olunacaktır.

16) Hükûmet Tasvibi :

Yukarıdaki hükümler TPAO ve INOC tarafından kendi Hükûmetlerine arz olunacak ve " fizibilite " çalışmaları Hükûmetlerin tasvibinden sonra başlayacaktır.

17) Nihaî Anlaşma :

TÜRKİYE Cumhuriyeti ve IRAK Cumhuriyeti Hükûmetlerinin, " fizibilite " etüdlerinin ikmalini müteakip ve tatminkâr bulunmaları şartıyla, nihâî umumî bir anlaşma akdi maksadıyla ger eken hazırlıkları yapması ve sistemi finanse etmek için lûzumlu kredi imkânları temin edildiğinde söz konusu Anlaşmanın imzası derpiş olunmaktadır. Gaz Satış Mukavelesi de Hükûmetlerin tasvibine iktiran eyleyecektir.

Bağdat'ta, 6 Ocak 1971' de imzalanmıştır.

TPAO ADINA	INOC ADINA
(İMZALAR)	(İMZALAR)
PROF.KORKUT ÖZAL	DR.SADOON HAMADİ
MELİH GENCA	ALİ HADİ AL JABİR

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Hey'etler, bir Protokol hazırlayarak, imzalamışlar ve Hükûmetlerinin tetkikine sunulmak üzere işbu Zapta eklemişlerdir.

Toplantılar, TPAO ile INOC arasında mün'akid ve tetkiki maksadıyla Hükûmetlerine sunulacak ekli Protokol'ün imzası ile sona ermiştir.

Bağdat'ta, 6 Ocak 1971' de imzalanmıştır.

TPAO ADINA	INOC ADINA
(İMZALAR)	(İMZA)
PROF.KORKUT ÖZAL	ALİ HADİ AL JABİR
MELİH GENCA	

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T. C.
BAŞBAKANLIK
KANUNLAR VE KARARLAR TETKİK DAİRESİ BAŞKANLIĞI

KARARNAME

Sayı: 7/ 1872

Ekl
/

6/5/1967 tarih ve 6/8087 sayılı kararnameyle verilen yetkiye dayanılarak 6/1/1971 tarihinde Bağdat'ta Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı ile Irak Milli Petrol Şirketi arasında imzalanmış bulunan, Irak'tan Türkiye'ye tabiî gaz nakli ve bu amaçla bir boru hattı projesi hazırlanması konusundaki ilişik Protokol'ün onaylanması; Dışişleri Bakanlığının 15/1/1971 tarih ve İBEİ. 360-130-3-71-32 sayılı yazısı üzerine, Bakanlar Kurulunca 23/ 1 /1971 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.

CUMHURBAŞKANI

Başbakan | Devlet Bakanı | Devlet Bakanı | Devlet Bakanı | Devlet Bakanı

Adalet Bakanı | Milli Savunma Bakanı | İçişleri Bakanı | Dışişleri Bakanı | Maliye Bakanı

Milli Eğitim Bakanı | Bayındırlık Bakanı | Ticaret Bakanı | Sağ. ve Sos. Y. Bakanı | Güm. ve Tekel Bakanı

Tarım Bakanı | Ulaştırma Bakanı | Çalışma Bakanı | Sanayi Bakanı | En. ve Tab. Kay. Bakanı

Turizm ve Tan. Bakanı | İmar ve İskân Bakanı | Köy İşleri Bakanı | Orman Bakanı | Genç. ve Spor Bakanı

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Appendix 5

7/558

T.C.
DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI
Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdür Yardımcılığı

Sayı : 026.21/2003/SPGY/231163
Konu : Yazılı Soru Önergesi

05.06.2003
SÜRELİ - ÇOK İVEDİ

TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ BAŞKANLIĞINA

İlgi: 28.05.2003 tarih ve A.01.0.GNS.0.10.00.02-7/558-1780/7392 sayılı yazıları.

Kahramanmaraş Milletvekili Sayın Mehmet Yılmazcan'ın yazılı soru önergesinin yanıtı ilişikte sunulmaktadır.

Saygılarımla arzederim.

Abdullah GÜL
Dışişleri Bakanı ve
Başbakan Yardımcısı

EK: Soru önergesi yanıtı

KAHRAMANMARAŞ MİLLETVEKİLİ SAYIN MEHMET YILMAZCAN'IN YAZILI SORU ÖNERGESİ

SORULAR:

Irak petrollerinden Türkiye'ye bir pay verilmesi veya belirli bir para karşılığında bu haktan vazgeçilmesi yolunda 1926 tarihli Ankara Antlaşması'nda hüküm olduğu söylenmektedir. Bu antlaşmanın yazılı metnine ulaşmak mümkün olmamıştır. Ancak 1954 yılına kadar bu antlaşma hükümlerine dayalı olarak Irak'tan belirli bir gelir elde edilmiştir. 1954'ten sonra böyle bir durum olmamıştır. Ama basından öğrenildiğine göre Turgut Özal dönemine kadar Bütçe Kanununun gelirler bölümünde sembolik olarak buradan bir gelir gelmesi gerektiği yolunda hükümler yazılmış ve Turgut Özal döneminde bu hükmün Bütçe Kanunundan çıkarıldığı iddia edilmektedir.

1. Irak petrolleri üzerindeki haklarımız hangi antlaşmalar ile belirlenmiştir?
2. Lozan Antlaşması, 1926 tarihli Ankara Antlaşması, 1954 Bağdat Paktı'nın ülkemize Irak petrolleri ile ilgili olarak tanıdığı haklar nelerdir?
3. Bu antlaşmalarda ülkemiz lehine hükümler olduğu halde bunların detaylarının milletimizden gizlenmesinin sebebi nedir?
4. Lehimize olan bu hükümlerin yer aldığı antlaşmaları tüm detaylarıyla açıklamayı düşünüyor musunuz?
5. Bu haklarımızın korunması ve tahsili için neler yapmayı düşünüyorsunuz?
6. Irak petrollerindeki haklarımızdan dolayı şimdiye kadar ülkemize ne kadar ödeme yapılmıştır? Daha ne kadar alacağımız vardır?
7. Irak petrollerindeki alacağımız daha sonraları hangi gerekçelerle Bütçe Kanunundan çıkarılmıştır?

YANITLAR:

1. Türkiye'nin Irak petrolleri üzerindeki hakları 5 Haziran 1926 tarihli Ankara Antlaşması ve 24 Temmuz 1923 tarihli Lozan Antlaşması ile belirlenmiştir.
2. Türkiye, İngiltere ve Irak arasında 5 Haziran 1926 tarihinde Ankara'da imzalanan Sınır ve İyi Komşuluk Antlaşması'nın 14. maddesi uyarınca, Irak hükümeti bu antlaşmanın yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren 25 yıl süreyle Turkish Petroleum Company'den (şirketin adı 1929 yılında Iraq Petroleum Company olarak değişmiştir) alacağı tüm aidatın yüzde 10'unu Türkiye hükümetine ödemeyi taahhüt etmiştir. Antlaşmanın ekinde yer alan ve tamamlayıcı cüzünü teşkil eden nota teatisinde, antlaşmanın 14. maddesine atfen antlaşmanın yürürlüğe girmesini izleyen 12 ay içinde Türkiye hükümetinin anılan maddede sözü edilen aidattaki hissesini sermayeye tahvil etmek arzusunda bulunduğu takdirde Irak hükümetini bu arzusundan haberdar edeceği ve Irak hükümetinin bildirimi izleyen 30 gün zarfında Türkiye hükümetine 500.000 Sterlin ödeyeceği kaydına yer verilmektedir. Hükümetimiz bu seçeneğe itibar etmeyerek Irak hükümetinin Iraq Petroleum Company'den elde edeceği tüm aidatın yüzde 10'nun 25 yıl süreyle kendisine ödenmesini yeğlemiştir.

Irak petrolleri üzerindeki haklarımız bakımından değinilecek bir nokta da yurttaşlarımızın malik oldukları petrol arama ruhsatnameleridir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan ayrılan

topraklar üzerinde mal, hak ve çıkarları bulunan yurttaşlarımızın hukuku 24 Temmuz 1923 tarihli Lozan Antlaşmasının 65, 66 ve 139. maddeleriyle korunmuştur. 65. madde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan ayrılmış arazi üzerinde bulunup Türkiye uyruklulara ait olan mallar, haklar ve çıkarların iadesini öngörmektedir. 66. madde, bu iade keyfiyetinin cereyan tarzından ve çıkacak uyuşmazlığın çözüm şeklinden söz etmektedir. 139. madde ise, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan ayrılan arazide ve Türkiye'de bulunan, fakat diğer devlet uyruklularını ilgilendiren evrak, defterler, planlar, senetler ve benzerlerinin iade edilmesi hakkındadır. Bunun dışında münhasıran ruhsatname hükümlerinin saklı tutulması amacıyla Irak hükümetiyle yapılmış bir anlaşma mevcut değildir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu yıllarında sağlanan bu ruhsatnamelere ait tasarruf hukuku Cumhuriyet döneminde de tanınmış olup bu amaçla Bakanlar Kurulu Kararnameleri çıkartılmıştır.

24 Şubat 1955 tarihli Bağdat Paktı'nda Türkiye'nin Irak petrolleri üzerindeki haklarına dair bir hüküm bulunmamaktadır.

3ve 4. Sözü edilen antlaşmaların metinleri T.C. Resmi Gazetesinde yayımlanmış olup gizli yönleri bulunmamaktadır.

5. Irak'ta normal yönetim kurulduğunda Hükümetimiz aşağıda 7. maddede kayıtlı alacak konusunu gündeme getirebilecektir.

6. Irak hükümeti, 5 Haziran 1926 tarihli Ankara Antlaşması ve Irak ile Iraq Petroleum Company arasında 14 Mart 1925 tarihinde imzalanan imtiyaz sözleşmesi uyarınca, 25 yıl süreyle Iraq Petroleum Company'den alacağı tüm aidatın yüzde 10'unu ödemeyi üstlenmiştir.

   Irak hükümeti 1931'den başlayarak 1950'ye kadar 20 yıl boyunca Irak petrol aidatından Türkiye'nin hissesine düşen yüzde 10 kapsamında 3,5 milyon sterlin ödemiştir.

   Irak hükümeti 1951-1956 yıllarında ise Türkiye hükümetine herhangi bir petrol aidat hissesi ödemesi yapmamıştır.

7. Türkiye'nin Irak petrol gelirlerinden hissesi konusu 1931 ile 1985 yılları arasında Bütçe Kanunlarının gelirlere ait B cetvelinde "varidatın nevi" ana başlığı altında bazı yıllar dokuzuncu kısımda "fevkalade varidat", bazı yıllarda da altıncı ve yedinci kısımlarda "umumî müesseseler ve şirketler hasılatından devlet hissesi" alt başlıklarıyla "mukavelesi mucibince Musul petrollerinden alınan" veya "5 Haziran 1926 tarihli mukavelenamenin 14. maddesine müsteniden Irak Petrol Şirketinden yüzde on Hazine hissesi" ibareleri şeklinde yer almaktadır.

   Bütçe Kanunlarına bağlı B işaretli cetvele konulan 100 milyon liralık bakiye Irak petrolleri alacağımıza dair hükme 1986 yılından sonra rastlanmamaktadır. Hükümetimizin bu hareketi o dönemde Irak'la gittikçe gelişen ekonomik ilişkilerimiz muvacehesinde sembolik bir nişane olarak görülmelidir. Bu uygulama Türkiye'nin 1926 Antlaşmasından doğan beş yıllık alacak bakiyesinin anaparası ve bunun gecikme faizinden feragat ettiği anlamına gelmemektedir. Devletler hukukunun genel ilkeleri uyarınca da devletlerin alacakları süre aşımına uğramamaktadır.

Appendix 6

IRAK- TÜRKİYE KONSOLOSLUK GÖRÜŞMELERİ MUTABAKAT ZAPTI
(16-17 HAZİRAN 2005-ANKARA)

Irak ile Türkiye arasında konsolosluk görüşmeleri 16-17 Haziran 2005 tarihinde Ankara'da yapılmıştır.

Dostane bir hava içinde geçen görüşmelerde, Irak Heyetine Irak Dışişleri Bakanlığı Müsteşarı Saad Jassim Al-Hayany, Türk Heyetine ise T.C Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk İşleri Genel Müdürü Büyükelçi N. Murat Ersavcı, başkanlık etmişlerdir.

Heyetlerin listeleri ile görüşmelerin gündemi ekte kayıtlıdır.

Taraflar, konsolosluk ilişkileri alanında önemli bir sorun bulunmamasından duydukları memnuniyeti dile getirmişler ve aşağıdaki konuları görüşmüşlerdir:

1. Taraflar, İstanbul ve Musul Başkonsolosluklarının yeniden faaliyete geçirilmesi konusundaki mutabakatlarını teyid etmişler ve Irak Tarafı Bağdat'a dönüşünde "Türk Tarafının görüşmelerde bulunmak üzere, Bağdat ve Musul'a bir teknik heyet göndermesinin beklendiğini" içeren bir Nota'yı T.C. Bağdat Büyükelçiliğine tevdi edeceğini ifade etmiştir.

2. Taraflar, ikinci sınır kapısı açılması ve yol güvenliği konularında görüş alış verişinde bulunmuşlar ve bu konuların sırasıyla Haziran ve Temmuz aylarında yapılacak toplantılarda ele alınacak olmasından duydukları memnuniyeti dile getirmişler, Türk şöför ve kamyonlarının can ve mal güvenliğinin sağlanmasının önemini bir kez daha vurgulamışlardır.

3. Türk Tarafı:

a. Adli yardım taleplerinin mümkünse daha kısa sürede yerine getirilmesi,
b. T.C Bağdat Büyükelçiliğinin mahalli makamlarla ilişkileri,
c. Irak'da tutuklanan Türk vatandaşları hakkındaki bildirimlerin hızlandırılması,
d. Irak'da bulunan Türk hükümlülerin iadesi,
e. Kendilerinden haber alınamayan veya kaçırılmış olan vatandaşlarının akibetinin belirlenmesi,
f. Yaralı vatandaşlarının ve cenazelerin Türkiye'ye nakli,
g. Irak'a taşımacılık yapan vatandaşlarından çeşitli isimler altında tahsil edilen ödemeler,
h. Hayatını kaybeden kamyon şöförleri ve zarar gören araçlara ilişkin belge taleplerinin karşılanması,

konularında Irak Dışişleri Bakanlığının yardımlarının şükranla karşılanacağını belirtmiş, Irak Tarafı, bu konuları hayırhahlıkla değerlendireceğini, Türk

TÜRKİYE-IRAK KONSOLOSLUK GÖRÜŞMELERİ
GÜNDEM ÖNERİLERİ
(16 Haziran 2005-Ankara)

1. Genel Konsolosluk Konuları
   a.Adli Yardımlaşma
   b.Mahalli Makamlarla İlişkiler
   c.İki Ülke Vatandaşlarının Karşılaştıkları Sorunlar
   d.Çeşitli Belge İhtiyacı
   e.Tutuklu ve Hükümlüler/Mahkum Transferi
   f.Sığınmacılar-Mülteciler
2. Musul Başkonsolosluğumuzun Yeniden Faaliyete Geçirilmesi
3. İkinci Sınır Kapısı Açılması
4. Vize Konuları
5. Emlak Konuları
6. Taşımacılık Konuları
   a.Saldırıya Uğrayan Türk Kamyonları
   b.Akıbet Tahkikleri/ Kaçırılan Türk Vatandaşları
   c.Yaralı-Cenaze Nakilleri
   d.Çeşitli İsimler Altında Tahsil Edilen Harçlar

TÜRK HEYETİ LİSTESİ

1. N. Murat ERSAVCI	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk Genel Müdürü -Büyükelçi Heyet Başkanı
2. Haldun OTMAN	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk İşleri Genel Müdür Yardımcısı-Elçi
3. Şevket ILGAÇ	Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı Anlaşmalar Genel Müdür Yardımcısı
5. M. Sertaç SÖNMEZAY	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk Prensipler Dairesi Başkanı
6. Haluk AĞCA	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Vize ve Dış İrtibatlar Dairesi Başkanı
7. Mehmet TERZİOĞLU	İçişleri Bakanlığı Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Yabancılar, Hudut , İltica Dairesi Başkanı
8. Hüsamettin KILIÇKAYA	Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı Anlaşmalar Genel Müdürlüğü Daire Başkanı
9. Hasan SEKİZKÖK	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Orta Doğu Dairesi Şube Müdürü
10. Mustafa GÖNÜLTAŞ	Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Plan ve Harekat Dairesi Başkanlığı
11. İlhan TURGUT	İçişleri Bakanlığı Nüfus ve Vatandaşlık İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü Şube Müdürü
12. Şener DALYAN	Adalet Bakanlığı Uluslararası Hukuk ve Dış İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü Tetkik Hakimi

13. Erhan POLAT	Adalet Bakanlığı Ceza ve Tevkifevleri Genel Müdürlüğü Tetkik Hakimi
14. A. Nursel DOĞMUŞÖZ	Gümrükler Genel Müdürlüğü Şube Müdürü
15. Fatma PİHAVA ÜNLÜ	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk Daire Başkanlığı, II.Katip
16. Ülkü BURAK	Tercüman

IRAK HEYETİ LİSTESİ

1. Saad Jassim Al- HAYANY	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Müsteşar-Büyükelçi Heyet Başkanı
2. Sabah J. OMRAN	Irak'ın Ankara Büyükelçisi
3. Salah ABDUSSELAM	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk İşleri Genel Müdürü Büyükelçi
4. Riyad Hassun JEWAD	Dışişleri Bakanlığı İran Dairesi Başkanı-Başkatip
5. Khalil Selman SALİH	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Türkiye Dairesi Başkanı-Başkatip
6. Abdulhadi Fadhil AHMED	Dışişleri Bakanlığı İran Dairesi-Başkatip
7. Rana KADHİM	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk Dairesi-II.Katip
8. Velid Mustafa Salih Al CENABİ	Dışişleri Bakanlığı Hukuk İşleri Daire Başkanı
9. Munthir N. ABDULLA	Irak Büyükelçiliği Elçi Müsteşar
10. Hussain A. BaQUR	Irak Büyükelçiliği Elçi Müsteşar
11. May Mufid M.R.Al HASANİ	Heyet Sekreteri

مذكرة تفاهم

بشأن المباحثات القنصلية العراقية-التركية

(١٦-١٧ حزيران-٢٠٠٥ /أنقرة)

جرت المباحثات القنصلية بين وفدي وزارة خارجيـــة جمهورية العراق ووزارة خارجية الجمهورية التركية فـــي أنقرة للمدة من ١٦-٢٠٠٥/٦/١٧م الموافق ١٠-١١ جمـــادي الأولى ١٤٢٦ هـــ، فـــي جو مـــن الصداقة، إذ ترأس الوفد العراقي السيد سعد جاسم الحياني، وكيل وزارة الخارجية العراقية، وعن الطرف التركي السفير ن. مراد أرساوجي، المدير العام للشؤون القنصلية في وزارة الخارجية التركية. (برفقته جدول الأعمال وقائمة بأسماء الوفدين).

أعرب الطرفان في المباحثات عن إرتياحهما لعدم مواجهتهما أية معوقات في مجال العلاقات القنصلية، وقد تناولت هذه المباحثات المواضيع الآتية:-

١. بحث الطرفان موضوع إعادة فتح القنصلية العراقية العامة في إسطنبول والقنصلية التركية العامة في الموصل، وتم التوصل إلى أن إعادة فتح القنصليتين المـــذكورتين أو أي منهما سيتم العمل به في كلا البلدين، ورحب الوفد العراقي برغبة الجانب التركي في إرسال وفد فني لغرض الكشف الميداني على بناية القنصلية التركية العامة في الموصل وسيتم إشعار الطرف التركي بمذكرة رسمية حول الموضوع لاحقاً.

٢. تبادل الطرفان الآراء بشأن أمن الطرق وفتح البوابة الحدودية الثانية، وأعربا عن إرتياحهما لتناول هذين الموضوعين خلال شهري حزيران وتموز ٢٠٠٥ من قبل اللجان الفنية المختصة. كما أكد الطرفان على موضوع حماية السواق الأتراك وحماية شاحناتهم وأموالهم.

٣. عبر الطرف التركي عن شكره للدعم الذي تقدمه وزارة الخارجية العراقية بشأن:-

أ. النظر في طلبات المساعدة القضائية في أقرب وقت ممكن.

ب. دعم وزارة الخارجية العراقية للسفارة التركية في بغداد من خلال تأمين الإتصال بالجهات العراقية المختصة.

جـ. سرعة إبلاغ السفارة التركية في بغداد عن المواطنين الأتراك المعتقلين في العراق، وسرعة إتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية المتعلقة بإعادة المحكومين الأتراك في العراق.

د. المساعدة في تحديد مصير المواطنين الأتراك المفقودين أو المختطفين في العراق.

هـ. تسهيل نقل المواطنين الأتراك الجرحى والمفقودين من العراق إلى تركيا.

و. تأمين الوثائق المتعلقة بسواق الشاحنات التركية الذين فقدوا حياتهم في العراق وكذلك بشأن شاحناتهم المتضررة.

ز. أكد الطرف العراقي على إستعداده لتقويم المواضيع ضمن إطار حسن النية والتعاون في جميع المجالات.

٤. عبر الطرفان عن تطلعات بلديهما نحو تطوير علاقاتهما الثنائية من خلال:-

أ. منح سمات الدخول وبشكل متبادل في المنافذ الحدودية الرسمية لحاملي جوازات السفر الدبلوماسية والخدمة (الرسمية) من كلا البلدين على أن يبدأ العمل بذلك بعد (٣٠) يوماً من تاريخ التوقيع على هذه المذكرة.

ب. منح سمات الدخول لمواطني كلا البلدين لحاملي جوازات السفر الإعتيادية في المطارات في المرحلة الأولى، ويمكن منح هذه السمات في المنافذ الحدودية الرسمية لاحقاً وذلك بعد (٣٠) يوماً من تاريخ التوقيع على هذه المذكرة وبعد توفر الشروط المطلوبة. وفي ضوء هذه

الإجراءات فإن الطرف التركي بدأ بمنح سمات الدخول في مطار أتاتورك في إسطنبول للمواطنين العراقيين وسيستمر بذلك.

٥. بحث الطرفان موضوع مدة صلاحية العقد الخاص بالحقوق العقارية الموقع بتاريخ ١٩٨٤م من أجل تمديده وعلى هذا الأساس أكد الجانب العراقي على تقويمه للموضوع ضمن إطار حسن النية بعد الحصول على نسخة من العقد المذكور.

٦. إقترح الطرف التركي موضوع التوقيع على إتفاقية التعاون بشأن إعادة الأشخاص والمكافحة ضد تجارة الرقيق، ورحب الطرف العراقي من جهته بهذا الإقتراح، وأكد إستعداده إنتظار مسودة الإتفاقية التي سيتم تزويده بها من قبل الطرف التركي.

٧. إتفق الطرفان على تشكيل لجنة قنصلية مشتركة، من أجل متابعة ما ورد في هذه المذكرة، إضافة إلى النظر في الأمور الأخرى التي من الممكن أن تظهر في مجال العلاقات القنصلية، وتجتمع اللجنة كلما لزم الأمر.

حررت مذكرة التفاهم هذه في أنقرة بتاريخ ٢٠٠٥/٦/١٧ الموافق ١١ جمادي الأولى ١٤٢٦ هـ، ويعتمد على كلا النصين بصورة متساوية عند الإختلاف.

ن. مراد أرساوجي
المدير العام للشؤون القنصلية
في وزارة خارجية الجمهورية التركية

سعد جاسم الحياني
وكيل وزارة خارجية
جمهورية العراق

Appendix 7

T.C.
TELÇILIK

Note No : 282/3300/2005

The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq and, with reference to the Former's's Note of 29 June 2006 and No: 234/3300/2006, has the honour to enclose herewith the original copy of the letter of appointment together with its English version granted for Mr. Hüseyin Avni Botsalı, Consul General of the Republic of Turkey in Mosul.

It will be appreciated if the esteemed Ministry could deliver the Exequatur to the Embassy so that the foregoing Consulate General shall start exercising fully its functions.

The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republiic of Iraq the assurances of its highest consideration.

Baghdad, 6 August 2006

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq
Baghdad

Encl.: as stated

Appendix 8

مذكرة تفاهم وتعاون
بين وزارتي خارجية جمهورية العراق والجمهورية التركية

في ضوء الظروف والتطورات التي تشهدها المنطقة، وفي ظل واقع العلاقات الثنائية المتنامية التي تربط جمهورية العراق والجمهورية التركية وتطلعهما لتطويرها نحو الأفضل، فإن وزارتي خارجية البلدين (اللذين سيُشار إليهما لاحقاً بالطرفين) تؤكدان الرغبة المشتركة في العمل على تعزيز وتمتين العلاقات بينهما وبما يخدم قضايا الأمن والاستقرار على الصعيدين الإقليمي والدولي ويحقق المصالح المشتركة للبلدين ويعزز من التزامهما بأهداف ميثاق الأمم المتحدة ومبادئه، وتحقيقاً لهذا الهدف فقد اتفق الطرفان على ما يأتي:-

(١)

إجراء اتصالات سنوية دورية بين وزيري خارجية البلدين من خلال تبادل الزيارات، وعقد الاجتماعات كلّما اقتضى الأمر بهدف مناقشة تطوير العلاقات الثنائية وكذلك عقد لقاءات على هامش اجتماعات الدورات السنوية للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الإقليمية أو الدولية الأخرى لتنسيق مواقفهما إزاء القضايا ذات الاهتمام المشترك.

(٢)

يعقد الطرفان اجتماعات تشاورية دورية كل (٦) ستة أشهر على مستوى كبار المسؤولين في وزارتي الخارجية في عاصمتي البلدين بالتناوب.

تُحَدَّد تواريخ وأماكن المشاورات وكذلك جداول الأعمال ومستويات وعناوين المشاركين فيها عبر القنوات الدبلوماسية بين الطرفين.

(٣)

استنادا إلى روح التعاون التي تعززها هذه المذكرة، يتعاون الطرفان في المواضيع والقضايا ذات الاهتمام المشترك وعلى مستوى البعثات الدبلوماسية والقنصليات العامة المقيمة وغير المقيمة في عاصمتي ومدن البلدين (بغداد/والموصل/وأنقرة/واسطنبول) وفي جميع دول

(٤)

تبادل الخبرات في العمل الدبلوماسي بين البلدين من خلال إقامة البرامج والندوات التدريبية للكوادر الدبلوماسية العاملة في وزارتي خارجية كلا البلدين.

(٥)

في حالة ظهور أية مسائل خلافية أو مشاكل طارئة تشوب العلاقات بين البلدين، يجري تحقيق اتصالات فورية بين الطرفين بالطرق الدبلوماسية والعمل على حلها.

(٦)

لن يكون لأحكام مذكرة التفاهم هذه أي مساس بأي إلتزام دولي يكون أحد الطرفين مرتبطاً به بما في ذلك المعاهدات والاتفاقيات الدولية الأخرى.

(٧)

تدخل مذكرة التفاهم هذه حيز التنفيذ إبتداءً من تاريخ توقيعها من قبل الطرفين، وتبقى نافذة المفعول لمدة سنة واحدة على أن تجدد سنوياً بصورة تلقائية ما لم يُخطر أحدهما الطرف الآخر كتابياً وقبل ثلاثة أشهر من تاريخ إنتهاء المذكرة.

وقعت هذه المذكرة في أنقرة بتاريخ ٧ من شهر جمادي الثاني لسنة ١٤٢٧ هـ. الموافق ٣ من يوم الإثنين من شهر تموز لسنة ٢٠٠٦م، باللغات العربية والتركية والإنكليزية، وتتمتع بالحجة القانونية نفسها ويعول في حالة الإختلاف على النص الإنكليزي.

عبد الله غول
وزير خارجية
الجمهورية التركية

هوشيار زيباري
وزير خارجية
جمهورية العراق

Appendix 9

TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ – IRAK CUMHURİYETİ
KONSOLOSLUK GÖRÜŞMELERİ MUTABAKAT ZAPTI
(18 Haziran 2009, Ankara)

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti arasında Konsolosluk Görüşmeleri 18 Haziran 2009 tarihinde Ankara'da yapılmıştır.

Dostane bir hava içinde geçen Görüşmelerde, Türk Heyetine T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk İşleri Genel Müdür Yardımcısı, Elçi Songül OZAN, Irak Heyetine Irak Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Konsolosluk İşleri Daire Başkanı Büyükelçi Ershaed Tawfeek Ismail başkanlık etmişlerdir.

Heyet listeleri ilişikte sunulmaktadır.

Görüşmelerde Heyetler, "Ahdi Durum, "Vize ve ikamet konuları", "Tutuklu ve hükümlüler", "Vatandaş sorunları" ve "Adli Yardımlaşma" başlıkları altında ikili konsolosluk ilişkilerini görüşmüşlerdir.

Heyetler aşağıdaki hususlarda görüş birliğine varmışlardır:

- İki ülke umuma mahsus pasaport hamili vatandaşlarına karşılıklı olarak belirli koşullar çerçevesinde belirli havaalanlarında vize verilmeye taraflardan biri itiraz etmedikçe devam edilmesi,
- İki ülkenin diplomatik ve diğer resmi pasaport hamili vatandaşlarının birbiri ülkelerine yapacakları turistik ve transit ziyaretlerin vizeden muaf tutulmasının değerlendirilmesi,
- 20 Aralık 1989 tarihinde Ankara'da imzalanan Konsolosluk Sözleşmesi'nin ileride tadil edilmesi ya da yenilenmesinin tezekkür edilmesi,
- Türk tarafınca iadesi talep edilen suçlulara ilişkin iade süreçlerinin hızlandırılması
- Türk temsilciliklerinde ve Bağdat Türk İrtibat Timi'nde görevli asker ve emniyet mensuplarının ikamet izni ve çıkış izni işlemlerinin kolaylaştırılması,
- Kayıp Türk vatandaşlarının akıbetlerinin tahkikine yardımcı olunması,
- Irak özel araçlarının ve taksilerinin Habur sınır kapısından giriş imkanlarının araştırılması.

İşbu Mutabakat Zaptı 18 Haziran 2009 tarihinde Ankara'da her biri eşit derecede geçerli Türkçe ve Arapça ikişer nüsha olarak imzalanmıştır.

Türk Heyeti adına

Songül Ozan
Elçi,
Dışişleri Bakanlığı
Konsolosluk İşleri
Genel Müdür Yardımcısı

Irak Heyeti adına

Ershaed Tawfeek Ismail
Büyükelçi,
Dışişleri Bakanlığı
Konsolosluk İşleri
Daire Başkanı

مذكرة تفاهم بشأن المباحثات القنصلية العراقية التركية
18-19/6/2009/انقرة

جرت المباحثات القنصلية بين وفدي وزارة خارجية جمهورية العراق ووزارة خارجية الجمهورية التركية في انقرة للفترة 18-19-6-2009 في جو من الصداقة والتعاون .

رأس الوفد العراقي السيد السفير أرشد توفيق اسماعيل رئيس الدائرة القنصلية في وزارة الخارجية، ورأس الجانب التركي السيدة السفيرة صونكول اوزان مساعد المدير العام للدائرة القنصلية في وزارة الخارجية التركية.

بحث الطرفان مواضيع العلاقات القنصلية الثنائية وفق الاتي:

الاتفاقيات:

- تأشيرة الدخول والاقامة.
- السجناء والموقوفين.
- المشاكل التي تواجه مواطني البلدين.
- التعاون القضائي.

اكد الجانبان على:

1- استمرار العمل بمنح تاشيرات الدخول لمواطني البلدين في المطارات المحددة من حملة الجوازات الاعتيادية ويجدد هذا الاتفاق تلقائياً ما لم يعرب احد الطرفين تحريرياً عن رغبته في انهائه.
2- النظر في امكانية منح حملة الجوازات الدبلوماسية والخدمة من كلا البلدين تأشيرات دخول في المطارات والمنافذ الحدودية لاغراض المرور والسياحة في كلا البلدين.
3- اجراء تعديل او تجديد الاتفاقية القنصلية الموقعة بين البلدين في عام 1989، او ابرام اتفاقية قنصلية جديدة.
4- التعجيل في اتخاذ الاجراءات الضرورية لتسليم المطلوبين من المواطنين الاتراك الى السلطات التركية المختصة.

5- تسهيل اجراءات منح الاقامة للعاملين الاتراك في مكتب ارتباط حلف الناتو في العراق وحمايات السفارة والقنصليات التركية في العراق.

6- المساعدة في تحديد مصير المواطنين الاتراك المفقودين في العراق.

7- البحث في امكانية السماح بدخول السيارات الخاصة للمواطنين العراقيين الوافدين الى تركياعبر منفذ ابراهيم الخليل الحدودي.

حررت مذكرة التفاهم هذه باللغتين العربية والتركية في انقرة بتاريخ 2009/6/18 ولكلا النصين الحجية القانونية ذاتها.

السفيرة

صنكول اوزان

مساعد المدير العام للشؤون القنصلية

وزارة الخارجية التركية

السفير

ارشد توفيق اسماعيل

رئيس الدائرة القنصلية

وزارة الخارجية /جمهورية العراق

تشكيلة الوفد العراقي

١. السفير/ارشد توفيق اسماعيل	رئيس الدائرة القنصلية
٢. ريسان جاسم عبد اللطيف سكرتير ثان	سفارة جمهورية العراق/انقرة
٣. بلال محمود عطية/ سكرتير ثالث	وزارة الخارجية/الدائرة القانونية
٤. مهند احمد عبد محسن/ سكرتير ثالث	وزارة الخارجية/دائرة شؤون الدول المجاورة
٥. مي مفيد محمد رؤوف/ملحق	سفارة جمهورية العراق/انقرة
٦. شيماء حسن علي/ رئيس ملاحظين	وزارة الخارجية/الدائرة القنصلية

Appendix 10

TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ İLE IRAK CUMHURİYETİ HÜKÜMETLERİ ARASINDA YÜKSEK DÜZEYLİ İŞBİRLİĞİ KONSEYİ'NİN KURULMASINA İLİŞKİN ORTAK SİYASİ BİLDİRGE

Türkiye ile Irak arasındaki ilişkiler, ortak bir tarihsel birikimin getirdiği güçlü toplumsal kültürel bağlar ve kardeşçe komşuluk ilişkileri temelinde şekillenmiştir.

Türkiye ve Irak, bölgeye yönelik hedefleri çerçevesinde ortak idealleri paylaşmaktadır ve bu hedefler barış, istikrarın güçlendirilmesi, özgürlük, refah, ekonomik işbirliği ve eşgüdüm için geliştirilmiş diyalog mekanizmalarıdır.

Türkiye ve Irak ortak hedeflerinin yanı sıra, birlikte ve uyum içerisinde çaba göstermelerini gerektiren sınamalarla karşı karşıya bulunmaktadır. Bu sınamalar ve beraberinde getirdiği fırsatlar, Irak Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı Nuri El-Maliki ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tarafından 7 Ağustos 2007 tarihinde Türkiye'de imzalanan "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Arasında Mutabakat Muhtırası"na temel teşkil etmiştir.

Taraflar, Mutabakat Muhtırası'nda benimsenen ilke ve esaslara bağlılıklarını ve ortak bir geleceğe yönelik vizyonlarını yineleyerek aralarındaki işbirliğini Irak Cumhurbaşkanı Celal Talabani tarafından 7-8 Mart 2008 tarihlerinde Ankara'yı ziyareti sırasında ilk kez gündeme getirilen bir "Yüksek Düzeyli Stratejik İşbirliği Konseyi"nin kurulması aşamasına taşımak hususunda mutabakata varmışlardır.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Irak Cumhuriyeti hükümetleri, iki ülke halkları arasındaki dayanışmanın güçlendirilmesi amacıyla uzun vadeli bir Stratejik Ortaklık ilişkisi geliştirmeyi bu vesile ile taahhüt etmektedir.

Konsey'e Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Irak Cumhuriyetinin Başbakanları başkanlık edecektir. Konsey'in çalışmalarının eşgüdümü ve her bir toplantının gündemine nihai şeklinin verilmesi, iki ülke Dışişleri Bakanları tarafından gerçekleştirilecektir. Enerji, ticaret, yatırımlar, güvenlik ve su kaynakları konularından sorumlu Bakanlar da Konsey'in üyesi olacaklardır. İşbirliği, ortak menfaatlerin bulunduğu diğer iktisadi alanları da kapsayacak şekilde zenginleştiği ölçüde; Başbakanlar, ilgili konudan sorumlu Bakanların da Konsey'e dahil edilmesi yönünde karar alabilirler. Yüksek Düzeyli İşbirliği Konseyi, iki ülke Başbakanlarının eşbaşkanlığında yılda en az bir kez toplanacaktır. Konsey ayrıca, yılda üç kez de Bakanlar düzeyinde toplantılar gerçekleştirecektir. Taraf ülke başkentlerinde her üç ayda bir kez üst düzey yetkililer toplantıları düzenlenecektir. Taraf ülkelerin Bakanları, görev alanlarına giren konularda işbirliğini geliştirmek için Eylem Planları geliştirileceklerdir.

Stratejik Ortaklık, aşağıda maruz ilkeler temelinde başta, siyasi, ekonomik, enerji, su kaynakları, kültürel, güvenlik ve askeri alanlarla ilgili konular olmak üzere çok çeşitli işbirliği alanlarını kapsayacaktır:

A - Siyasi, Diplomatik ve Kültürel Alanlar

1. Irak hükümetinin, ülkenin bağımsızlığının, tam egemenliğinin, toprak bütünlüğünün ve ulusal birliğinin korunmasında tehditlere ve terörizme karşı mücadelesinin desteklenmesi,

2. İki ülke arasında daha güçlü bağların kurulmasını kolaylaştırmak amacıyla, ikili anlaşmaların ivedilikle ve zamanlıca imzalanması,

3. Komşu Ülkeler ve Genişletilmiş Komşu Ülkeler toplantılarının Irak hükümetini ve onun Irak halkının hür, bağımsız, birleşik, demokratik, federal ve müreffeh bir Irak hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek yönündeki çabalarını desteklemek konusundaki taahhütlerinin gözetilmesi,

4. Birleşmiş Milletler Şartı'nın ilkelerine sadık kalınması, uluslararası toplumca kabul edilmiş sınırlara saygı gösterilmesi ve içişlerine müdahale etmeme ilkesine bağlı kalınmasının taahhüt edilmesi,

5. Irak'ın geleceği için, ülkenin çok kültürlü, çok dinli ve farklı etnik grupları bir arada bulunduran karakterine saygı gösterilmesi, tüm grupların barış içinde bir arada var olması ve Iraklılık kimliğinin korunmasına gereken önemin atfedilmesi,

6. Diplomasi, kültür, bilim ve eğitim alanlarında öğrenciler ve kamu görevlilerine yönelik olarak değişim programlarının düzenlenmesinin teşvik edilmesi, yükseköğretim, teknoloji ve teknik bilgi paylaşımı konularında kurumlar arası işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi,

7. Diğerleri meyanında uluslararası ve bölgesel örgütler, komiteler ve görevler bünyesindeki adaylıkların desteklenmesi yoluyla siyasi eşgüdüm ve işbirliğinin sağlanması,

B. Ekonomi ve Enerji ile ilgili alanlar

1. İki ülke arasında stratejik ekonomik işbirliği ve entegrasyon anlaşmalarının 2008 yılı sonuna kadar sonuçlandırılması,

2. Türkiye ile Irak arasında turizmin gelişmesi için iki yönlü tur operasyonlarının kolaylaştırılması konusunda işbirliğinin teşvik edilmesi,

3. Her iki ülke vatandaşlarının ortak yararı için ticari ilişkileri zenginleştirmeye yönelik işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi amacıyla Türkiye ile Irak arasında Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması imzalanması,

4. Irak'taki yerel istihdam ve yatırımların artmasına katkıda bulunmak üzere hem serbest ticaret ve yatırım bölgeleri oluşturacak ortak programların teşvik edilmesi hem de komşu ülkeler arasında ticari ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi,

5. Irak halkının temel ihtiyaç ve hizmetlerini karşılamak amacıyla yeniden yapılandırma çalışmalarında işbirliği yapılması,

6. Irak'ın tarımsal ihtiyaçlarının ve sulama dahil su gereksiniminin karşılanmasına yardım etmek amacıyla, su kaynakları ve ziraat alanlarında işbirliğinin Türkiye'nin bu alanlardaki zirai gereksinimleri ve su ihtiyaçları göz önünde bulundurularak teşvik edilmesi,

7. Irak'ın Türkiye üzerinden Avrupa ile entegrasyonunun sağlanması amacıyla Irak ile ulaşım altyapısı alanında işbirliğinin desteklenmesi,

8. Irak ile Türkiye arasında ticari ilişkilerin ve yatırımların artırılmasını teminen, kamu ve özel sektör kuruluşlarının her iki ülkede yatırım alanlarında işbirliğini arttırmaları yönünde teşvik edilmesi,

9.Küçük ve orta büyüklükteki şirketlerin istihdam ve refahın yükseltilmesi alanlarında artan rolünü dikkate alarak, her iki ülkedeki bahsekonu şirketlerin ekonominin tüm alanlarındaki işbirliğinin desteklenmesi,

10. Her iki ülkede ilgili iktisadi ve mali sektörlerde faaliyet gösteren kuruluşlar arasında değişim programlarının başlatılması; bahsekonu kuruluşların finans ve bankacılık alanlarında ortaklıklar geliştirmeleri hususunda teşvik edilmesi,

11. Irak'ın serbest piyasa ekonomisine geçiş çabalarının ve Irak'ın ekonomik kalkınmasının yardım programları aracılığıyla desteklenmesi,

12. Türk ve Iraklı şirketler arasında ortaklıklar kurma yoluyla enerji alanında işbirliği yapılması; bu kaynakların en uygun ihraç yolları üzerinden dünya pazarlarına ulaşmasının sağlanması; bu çerçevede, Kerkük-Yumurtalık petrol boru hattının ihya edilerek mevcut kapasitesinin arttırılması ve Irak doğal gazının Türkiye üzerinden uluslararası pazarlara taşınması için bir boru hattı ağının inşa edilmesi,

13. Her iki ülkenin elektrik ihtiyacının karşılanmasına yardımcı olacak projelerin gerçekleştirilmesi; bunun yanında elektrik sektöründe görevli Iraklı personelin eğitilmesi için programlar düzenlenmesi,

14. Türkiye ve Irak arasında yeni sınır kapıları açılması yönündeki çalışmaların hızlandırılması.

C. Güvenlik ve askeri işbirliği alanları

1. Her iki ülkenin, topraklarının güvenliğine saygı gösterilerek, Irak ile Türkiye'nin, Irak'tan Türkiye'ye veya Türkiye'den Irak'a teröristlerin ve yasadışı silahların geçişini önlemeye yönelik ortak çabalarının desteklenmesi, ortak sınırları denetlemede Türkiye ile Irak arasındaki işbirliğinin güçlendirilmesi ve teröristler ve terörist örgütlerin mali, lojistik ve tüm diğer kaynakları dahil olmak üzere her türlü yasadışı ticaretin önlenmesi, şiddet ve terörü teşvik eden tüm söylemlerin kullanımının reddedilmesi,

2. İki ülke Genelkurmay Başkanlıkları arasında Askeri Çerçeve Anlaşması'nın tamamlanması,

3. "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ile Irak Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı arasında İlkeler Bildirgesi"ne atıfla ve buna uygun olarak, Türk ve Irak Genelkurmay İkinci Başkanları arasında Iraklı subayların eğitimine yönelik Askeri İşbirliği Anlaşması'nın tamamlanması için devam eden işbirliğinin desteklenmesi,

4. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Irak Cumhuriyeti arasında Terörizmle Mücadele Anlaşması'nın tamamlanması,

5. Bölgeye barış ve istikrar getirecek muhtemel güvenlik düzenlemeleri hususunda işbirliği yapılması,

6. Savunma sanayi alanında ve yan sektörlerinde faaliyet gösteren kamu ve özel sektör şirketleri arasında ticari ilişkileri ve yatırım ortaklıklarını teşvik ederek savunma sanayi ile ilgili ticari ilişki ve yatırımların gelişmesinin sağlanması.

İşbu Ortak Siyasi Bildirge, 10 Temmuz 2008 tarihinde Bağdat'ta yapılmış ve imzalanmıştır.

Sayın/Ekselansları Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı

Sayın/ Ekselansları Nuri El Maliki
Irak Cumhuriyeti Başbakanı

JOINT POLITICAL DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HIGH LEVEL STRATEGIC COOPERATION COUNCIL BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

The relationship between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq is characterized by strong social bonds of common history, culture and brotherly neighboring relations.

Turkey and Iraq share the same ideals in their regional objectives and these objectives are the promotion of peace, stability, freedom, prosperity and enhanced mechanisms of dialogue for increased economic cooperation and coordination.

In addition to their shared objectives, Turkey and Iraq face challenges and opportunities which require their concerted efforts. These challenges, together with the opportunities formed the basis of the "Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Iraq and the Republic of Turkey" signed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan on August 7, 2007 in Turkey.

The two sides, reiterating their commitments to the elements and principles of cooperation enshrined in this Memorandum of Understanding as well as their vision for their common future have decided to culminate their cooperation by forming a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Turkey and Iraq, based on the initiative of President Jalal Talabani during his visit to Turkey dated 7-8 March 2008.

Governments of the Republic of Turkey and Republic of Iraq are hereby committed to developing a long term Strategic Partnership with the aim of enhancing solidarity between Turkish and Iraqi peoples.

This Council will be headed by Prime Ministers of the Republic of Turkey and Republic of Iraq. Coordination of the work of the Council and finalization of its agenda for each meeting will be undertaken by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries. Ministers in charge of energy, trade, investments, security and water resources will be members of the Council. With the development of cooperation to cover other economic areas of mutual interest the Prime Ministers may decide to enlarge the Council to include ministers responsible for such areas in their respective countries. High Level Strategic Cooperation Council will convene at least once a year under the Co-Chairmanship of the Prime Ministers. The Council will also have three meetings every year at Ministerial level. Senior level official meetings will take place once every three months in their respective capitals. Action Plans will be developed by the respective Ministers to accelerate cooperation in their areas of responsibility.

This Strategic Partnership will include a wide range of issues, foremost of which is cooperation in the political, economic, energy, water, cultural, security and military fields on the basis of following principles:

A. Political, Diplomatic and Cultural spheres

1. Supporting the efforts of the Iraqi government in fighting terrorism and preserving Iraq's independence, full sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity against threats,

2. Concluding bilateral agreements in a speedy and timely manner to help establish stronger bonds between the two countries,

3. Emphasizing the Neighboring Countries as well as the Expanded Neighboring Countries meetings' commitments in support of Iraqi Government and its efforts to attain the goals of the Iraqi people for a free, independent, united, democratic, federal and prosperous Iraq.

4. Committing to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in respecting internationally recognized borders; and pledging adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs,

5. Respecting the richness of the multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic structure of Iraq and the importance of securing and respecting peaceful coexistence of all communities, as well as the Iraqi identity, for the future of Iraq,

6. Encouraging diplomatic, cultural, educational and scientific exchange programs for the government officials, as well as the students between the two countries and enhancing cooperation between institutions in the fields of higher education, technology and technical know-how,

7. Cooperating and coordinating their policies in international and regional forums, inter alia, by reciprocally supporting requests for candidacies in international organizations, committees and posts.

B. Economic and Energy Related spheres

1. Concluding strategic economic cooperation and integration agreements between the two countries before the end of 2008,

2. Encouraging cooperation to increase tourism and to facilitate tour operations in both countries,

3. Enhancing cooperation to increase their trade relations to the mutual benefit of their people and concluding a Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Iraq to this end,

4. Encouraging and working on joint programs to establish free trade and industrial zones to contribute to increasing local employment and investments in Iraq; as well as to enhance trade relations among neighboring countries,

5. Cooperating in reconstruction work with a view to meeting the basic needs and services of the people of Iraq,

6. Encouraging cooperation in the field of water resources and agriculture to assist Iraq in meeting its agricultural needs and water requirements including irrigation by taking into account Turkey's agricultural needs and water requirements to provide such assistance,

7. Supporting cooperation in the field of transport infrastructure of Iraq with the aim of integrating Iraq with Europe through Turkey,

8. Encouraging public and private sector companies to increase cooperation in investments in both countries as well as enhancing trade relations between Turkey and Iraq,

9. In view of the increasing role the small and medium size companies play in terms of employment and welfare, supporting cooperation between small and medium size companies in all walks of economic life with a view to increasing employment opportunities in their respective countries,

10. Initiating exchange programs among the relevant economic and financial institutions of both countries to encourage these institutions to develop partnerships in the financial and banking sectors in their countries,

11. Supporting Iraq's economic development through assistance programs in its efforts of transition into a market based economy,

12. Cooperating in the field of energy by establishing partnerships between Turkish and Iraqi companies as well as transporting Iraqi natural resources to the world markets through most viable export routes, in this context upgrading and expanding the existing capacity of Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline; and building a pipeline network to transport natural gas from Iraq to international markets via Turkey,

13. Realizing projects which would assist Iraq and Turkey in meeting their electricity needs, as well as organizing programs for the Iraqi personnel in the electricity sector.

14. Expediting the opening of new border gates between Turkey and Iraq.

C. Security and Military Cooperation spheres

1. Respecting the security of the territories of each other and supporting the joint efforts of Iraq and Turkey to prevent the transit of terrorists and illegal arms to and from Iraq and emphasizing the importance of strengthening cooperation between Iraq and Turkey to control their common borders and prevent all kinds of illicit trafficking, including financial, logistical and all other support for terrorists and terrorist organizations; as well as rejecting all use of language that encourages violence and terror,

2. Finalization of the Military Framework Agreement between the General Staffs of the two countries,

3. With reference to and in accordance with the "Declaration of Principles between the General Staff of the Turkish Republic and the General Staff of the Iraqi Republic",

3. With reference to and in accordance with the "Declaration of Principles between the General Staff of the Turkish Republic and the General Staff of the Iraqi Republic", supporting the ongoing cooperation between the Turkish and Iraqi Deputy Chiefs of General Staff in their efforts to finalize the Military Cooperation Agreement, for the training and education of Iraqi officers,

4. Concluding the Agreement on Combating Terrorism between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq.

5. Enhancing trade relations and investments in defense related industries by encouraging trade relations and investment partnerships between their respective public and private companies.

This Joint Political Declaration was concluded in Baghdad on July 10, 2008 and signed by

H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey

H.E. Nouri Al Maliki
Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq

Appendix 11

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

جمهـــورية العـــراق
وزارة الخـــارجيـــة
دائرة المراسم



Republic of Iraq
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Protocol Dept.

العدد: ١١/هـ/٦٧/ ٦٠٤٦
التاريخ: ٢٠٠٩/٣/

(عـــاجـــل)

تهـدي وزارة خارجيـة جمهوريـة العـراق أطيـب تحيـاتهـا إلى سفارة الجمهورية التركية فـي بغـداد , بالإشارة إلى مذكرتيها المرقمتين ٢٠٠٩/٢١٢٥/٦ والمؤرخـة فـي ١٢ كـانون الثـاني ٢٠٠٩، و ٢٠٠٩/٢١٢٥/٧٥ والمؤرخـة فـي ١٥ شـباط ٢٠٠٩، وتعزيـزاً للعلاقـات الثنائيـة بـين البلـدين تتـشرف بأعلامهـا بحـصول موافقـة الجهـات العراقيـة المختـصة علـى افتتـاح القنـصلية العامـة لجمهوريـة تركيـا في محافظة البصرة وسيتم ترتيب كافة الإجراءات المطلوبة من اجل إعفاء مختلف المـواد المستعملة في القنصلية العامة عند استيرادها إلى جمهورية العراق من الرسوم والـضرائب الكمركية ، وكذلك اتخاذ الإجراءات الأمنية حول بناية القنصلية العامة وأمام الفنـدق الـذي سيحل فيه موظفي القنصلية في المرحلة الأولى في ضوء أحكـام اتفاقيـة فيينـا للعلاقـات القنصليـة المتعلقـة بالامتيـازات والحصانـات الدبلوماسيـة والقنصليـة.

تغتنم الوزارة هذه الفرصة للإعراب عن فائق تقديرها واحترامها.

سفارة الجمهورية التركية/ بغداد

Appendix 12

MOST URGENT

Note No : 539/2125/2009

The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq and has the honour to submit herewith the Letter of Commission, appointing Mr. Ali Rıza Özcoşkun, in his capacity, as the head of the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey in Basra, having the rank of Consul General.

The Consul General of the Republic of Turkey in Basra will excercise his functions in the consular district comprising the provinces of Basra, Dhi-Qar and Meysan.

The Embassy would be grateful to receive the Exequatur accordingly.

The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq the assurances of its highest consideration.

Baghdad, 22 November 2009

Encl: Letter of Commission sealed by the
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq



ABDULLAH GÜL

PRESIDENT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

In view of the friendly relations so happily existing between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq and being desirous to develop further the commercial relations between the two countries, we, upon the proposition of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, have chosen and appointed ***Mr. Ali Rıza ÖZÇOŞKUN*** *as* ***Consul General*** *of the Republic of Turkey in* ***Al Basra*** *for* ***the cities of Al Basra, Dhi-Qar*** *and* ***Meysan*** *to exercise, in this capacity and in conformity with the stipulations of the treaties and agreements concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq, as well as the principles of international law and on that of a complete reciprocity, the functions entrusted to him with the charge of protecting all the rights and interests of the Turkish nationals who are in his consular district and of lending his assistance to the development of the commercial affairs.*

We, consequently, invite all our citizens to recognize ***Mr. Ali Rıza ÖZÇOŞKUN*** *as such and request the local authorities that he be permitted to exercise freely his functions and enjoy all the privileges and immunities thereunto appertaining.*

witness whereof, these Present Letters Patent have been signed by us, sealed by the seal of the Presidency of the Republic and delivered to him.


Done in Ankara, the twelfth day of the month of October in the year two thousand nine.

Signed: Abdullah GÜL
President of the Republic

Signed: Ahmet DAVUTOĞLU
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For Certified Translation
Director General of Protocol

Appendix 13



ABDULLAH GÜL

PRESIDENT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

In view of the friendly relations so happily existing between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq and being desirous to develop further the commercial relations between the two countries, we, upon the proposition of our Minister of Foreign Affairs, have chosen and appointed ***Mr. Mehmet Aydın SELCEN*** *as* ***Consul General*** *of the Republic of Turkey in* ***Arbil*** *for* ***Dahuk, Arbil*** *and* ***As Sulaymaniyah*** *to exercise, in this capacity and in conformity with the stipulations of the treaties and agreements concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Iraq, as well as the principles of international law and on that of a complete reciprocity, the functions entrusted to him with the charge of protecting all the rights and interests of the Turkish nationals who are in his consular district and of lending his assistance to the development of the commercial affairs.*

We, consequently, invite all our citizens to recognize ***Mr. Mehmet Aydın SELCEN*** *as such and request the local authorities that he be permitted to exercise freely his functions and enjoy all the*

In witness whereof, these Present Letters Patent have been signed by us, sealed by the seal of the Presidency of the Republic and delivered to him.

Done in Ankara, the fifteenth day of the month of February in the year two thousand ten.

Signed: Abdullah GÜL
President of the Republic

Signed: Ahmet DAVUTOĞLU
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For Certified Translation
Director General of Protocol

Appendix 15

جمهورية العراق
وزارة الخارجية
دائرة المراسم



Republic of Iraq
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Protocol Department.

العدد: ١١/هـ/٦٧
التأريخ: /٢/٢٠١٢

تهدي وزارة خارجية جمهورية العراق أطيب تحياتها إلى سفارة الجمهورية التركية بغداد، وبالإشارة إلى مذكرة السفارة المرقمة (٣٢٤/ ٦٢٥٠/٢٠١٢) والمورخة في ١٠/١/٢٠١٢، وتتشرف بأعلامها أعتذار الوزارة بمنح الموافقة على فتح قنصلية للجمهورية التركية في محافظة كركوك في الوقت الحالي.

تغتنم الوزارة هذه الفرصة للأعراب عن فائق شكرها وتقديرها.

سفارة الجمهورية التركية/بغداد.

Appendix 15

T.C.
BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİ

وزارة الخارجية
الادارة المركزية
الصـــــادرة
العدد :
التاريخ :

Sayı: 324/6250/2012

The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq and with a view to further promote the existing friendly relations between Turkey and Iraq, has the honour to request the consent of the Government of Iraq in order to establish a Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey in Kirkuk, covering the Kirkuk Province as consular district.

The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq the assurances of its highest consideration.

Baghdad, 10 January 2012

T.C.
BÜYÜKELÇİLİĞİ
1923

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq
Baghdad

Appendix 16

JOINT DECLARATION REGARDING THE OUTCOMES OF THE SECOND MEETING OF HIGH LEVEL STRATEGIC COOPERATION COUNCIL BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

(25 December 2014)

Turkey and Iraq, sharing strong social bonds, common history and culture as well as brotherly neighboring relations and aiming at promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in the region, had agreed on establishing "High Level Strategic Cooperation Council" on 10 July 2008 in order to develop long term Strategic Partnership to the mutual benefit of their brotherly nations as enshrined in the Joint Political Declaration on the establishment of the Council.

The First Meeting of the Council was held under the co-chairmanship of two Prime Ministers in Baghdad on 15 October 2009, which resulted in signing of 48 Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding.

The Second Meeting of the Council co-chaired by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey and H.E. Haidar Al Abadi, Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq was held in Ankara, on 25 December 2014.

Both parties;

- Reiterated their commitment to the principles of cooperation in the Joint Political Declaration establishing the Council.

- Agreed on convening of the Council at least once a year and holding reciprocal visits of the Ministers within a regular basis as envisioned in the Declaration.

- Underscored the significance of reinvigorating the cooperation and solidarity in the face of common threats and challenges stemming from the presence of terrorist organizations such as DAESH in the region and appreciated the international support given to Iraq including Turkey's readiness to train the Iraqi security forces and Turkish role in the fight to defeat DAESH. Similarly, Turkey and Iraq will continue to cooperate against the threat posed by PKK terrorist organization.

- The Government of Turkey welcomes the formation of the Iraqi Government under the leadership of Mr. Al-Abadi. Both sides expressed the significance of preserving Iraq's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and implementation of policies embracing all segments of Iraq irrespective of their identities.

- Reiterated their commitment to enhance cooperation to increase their economic, trade, energy, oil, electricity, water and cultural relations with the conclusion of agreements in these fields.

- Welcomed the agreement of 2 December 2014 between the Central Government of Iraq and the KRG on the Iraqi oil which belongs to all the people of Iraq.

- Also welcomed the significant contributions of Turkish contractors to infrastructuring of Iraq, and supported the continuation of these in the future and decided to facilitate all possible efforts in this direction.

Council has decided to hold the third meeting in Baghdad in 2015.

Haidar Al-Abadi
Prime Minister of the
Republic of Iraq

Ahmet Davutoğlu
Prime Minister of the
Republic of Turkey

Appendix 14

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AND THE DIPLOMACY ACADEMY OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

The Foreign Service Institute of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq and the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, hereinafter referred to as "Parties", wishing to establish and further develop mutually beneficial cooperation for training in the field of diplomacy and the exchange of information on international law, diplomatic law and other academic disciplines that are relevant for the practice of diplomacy and international relations, be they political, economic, cultural, financial or otherwise, have agreed to sign the present Memorandum as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties will maintain an active exchange of information about their respective study programs and other relevant academic activities.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will facilitate the exchange of academics, conference speakers, experts and researchers in areas of common interest. The Parties will encourage lectures and presentations particularly by their officials in the framework of their training programs.

ARTICLE III

The Parties will consult on the possibilities of organizing courses and seminars that could be held alternately in Baghdad and Ankara.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will facilitate the exchange of their respective publications, as well as pertinent texts from other public or private institutions in their respective countries.

ARTICLE V

The Parties will exchange information related to activities of common interest, taking into special consideration the participation in meetings of regional and international character that involve academies and other academic institutions offering training for diplomats.

ARTICLE VI

Each Party will fulfill its obligations undertaken by this Memorandum in conformity with the legislation of their respective countries. This Memorandum shall not constitute or be interpreted as an international agreement between the States of the Parties. No provision of this Memorandum shall be interpreted and implemented as creating legal rights or commitments for the States of the Parties.

ARTICLE VII

The present Memorandum shall enter into force on the day of signing and shall be valid for 3 years. Unless one of the Parties notifies the other of its intention to terminate the Memorandum of Understanding in a written form at least 90 days before the date of expiry, its validity will be extended for periods of three years.

Signed in duplicate in Ankara on 25 December 2014, in the English language, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

Ibrahim al-Jaafari
Minister of Foreign Affairs

FOR THE DIPLOMACY ACADEMY OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu
Minister of Foreign Affairs

En Çok İhracat ve İthalat Yapılan 20 Ülke, 2012 - 2013
Foreign Trade by Top Twenty Countries, 2012 - 2013

Bin $ -Thousand $

Ülkeler	Aralık December 2012 Değer Value	(%)	Aralık December 2013 Değer Value	(%)	Değişim Change (%)	Ocak-Aralık January-December 2012 Değer Value	(%)	Ocak-Aralık January-December 2013 Değer Value	(%)	Değişim Change (%)	Countries
İhracat											**Exports**
Genel toplam	**12 605 476**	**100,0**	**13 220 463**	**100,0**	**4,9**	**152 461 737**	**100,0**	**151 866 551**	**100,0**	**-0,4**	**Total**
1- Irak	1 024 868	8,1	1 223 773	9,3	19,4	10 832 144	7,1	11 968 853	7,9	10,5	Iraq
2- Almanya	966 565	7,8	1 160 517	8,8	17,6	13 124 375	8,6	13 706 980	9,0	4,4	Germany
3- İngiltere	687 500	5,5	716 995	5,4	4,8	8 693 599	5,7	8 777 301	5,8	1,0	United Kingdom
4- İtalya	567 432	4,5	570 588	4,3	0,6	6 373 080	4,2	6 729 577	4,4	5,6	Italy
5- Fransa	585 249	4,6	561 661	4,2	-4,0	6 198 536	4,1	6 378 847	4,2	2,9	France
6- Rusya Federasyonu	502 553	4,0	546 141	4,1	8,7	6 660 777	4,4	6 985 969	4,6	4,9	Russia
7- ABD	544 672	4,3	527 621	4,0	-3,1	5 604 230	3,7	5 623 308	3,7	0,3	USA
8- BAE	692 166	5,5	396 221	3,0	-42,8	8 174 607	5,4	4 967 539	3,3	-39,2	UAE
9- İspanya	317 082	2,5	388 646	2,9	22,6	3 717 345	2,4	4 337 679	2,9	16,7	Spain
10- Çin	306 635	2,4	311 519	2,4	1,6	2 833 255	1,9	3 682 109	2,4	30,0	China
11- Hollanda	318 185	2,5	279 265	2,1	-12,2	3 244 429	2,1	3 539 907	2,3	9,1	Netherlands
12- İran	240 656	1,9	277 018	2,1	15,1	9 921 602	6,5	4 193 950	2,8	-57,7	Iran
13- Mısır	259 817	2,1	267 693	2,0	3,1	3 879 195	2,4	3 202 545	2,1	-17,5	Egypt
14- Libya	247 316	2,0	251 675	2,0	1,8	2 139 440	1,4	2 753 476	1,8	28,7	Libya
15- Azerbaycan	231 436	1,8	253 834	1,9	9,7	2 564 671	1,7	2 941 258	1,9	14,7	Azerbaijan
16- İsrail	196 546	1,6	246 012	1,9	25,2	2 329 501	1,5	2 651 438	1,7	13,8	Israel
17- Suudi Arabistan	295 670	2,3	232 177	1,8	-21,5	3 678 812	2,4	3 192 192	2,1	-13,2	Saudi Arabia
18- Belçika	225 368	1,8	228 231	1,7	1,3	2 359 575	1,5	2 575 759	1,7	9,2	Belgium
19- Ukrayna	154 421	1,2	193 352	1,5	25,2	1 829 297	1,2	2 190 928	1,4	19,8	Ukraine
20- Romanya	171 832	1,4	174 059	1,3	1,3	2 466 427	1,6	2 587 682	1,7	4,9	Romania
Diğerleri	4 050 344	32,1	4 398 260	33,3	8,6	45 980 102	30,2	48 945 644	32,2	6,5	Others
İthalat											**Imports**
Genel toplam	**19 827 509**	**100,0**	**23 137 238**	**100,0**	**16,7**	**236 545 141**	**100,0**	**251 650 560**	**100,0**	**6,4**	**Total**
1- Almanya	2 105 858	10,6	2 477 393	10,7	17,6	21 400 614	9,0	24 184 950	9,6	13,0	Germany
2- Rusya Federasyonu	2 475 808	12,5	2 434 333	10,5	-1,7	26 835 266	11,3	25 983 530	10,3	-3,2	Russia
3- Çin	1 753 766	8,8	2 145 485	9,3	22,3	21 295 242	9,0	24 686 554	9,8	15,9	China
4- İtalya	1 651 545	8,3	1 126 158	4,9	-31,8	13 344 468	5,6	12 885 901	5,1	-3,4	Italy
5- ABD	852 420	4,3	1 044 288	4,5	17,0	14 130 545	6,0	12 596 163	5,0	-10,9	USA
6- İsviçre	164 291	0,8	868 215	3,8	440,2	4 564 864	1,9	9 841 275	3,9	124,1	Switzerland
7- Iran	771 577	3,9	920 864	3,5	6,4	11 964 779	5,1	10 383 184	4,1	-13,2	Iran
8- Fransa	687 853	3,5	707 129	3,1	2,8	8 589 898	3,6	8 079 740	3,2	-5,9	France
9- Güney Kore	605 332	3,1	651 327	2,8	7,6	5 669 693	2,4	6 098 467	2,4	7,6	South Korea
10- İngiltere	475 447	2,4	639 269	2,8	34,5	5 629 455	2,4	6 270 860	2,5	11,4	United Kingdom
11- Hindistan	402 642	2,0	570 454	2,5	41,7	5 843 836	2,5	6 367 869	2,5	9,0	India
12- İspanya	350 180	2,6	587 829	2,5	3,2	6 023 625	2,5	6 416 650	2,5	6,5	Spain
13- Ukrayna	366 604	1,8	422 445	1,8	15,2	4 364 200	1,9	4 514 767	1,8	2,7	Ukraine
14- BAE	216 427	1,1	378 929	1,6	75,5	3 566 545	1,5	5 384 408	2,1	49,7	UAE
15- Hollanda	308 049	1,6	366 110	1,6	18,8	3 660 634	1,5	3 362 319	1,3	-8,1	Netherlands
16- Japonya	340 054	1,7	356 378	1,5	5,4	3 601 427	1,5	3 453 184	1,4	-4,1	Japan
17- Belçika	334 172	1,7	348 619	1,5	4,3	3 660 300	1,6	3 843 361	1,5	5,1	Belgium
18- Yunanistan	389 219	1,9	319 295	1,4	-18,0	3 539 869	1,5	4 205 205	1,7	18,8	Greece
19- Romanya	253 895	1,3	317 494	1,4	25,0	3 236 425	1,4	3 592 567	1,4	11,0	Romania
20- Polonya	227 200	1,1	284 000	1,2	25,0	3 058 076	1,3	3 184 302	1,3	4,1	Poland
Diğerleri	5 475 186	27,6	6 268 368	27,1	14,5	62 955 148	26,6	67 499 310	26,8	7,1	Others

Table 1 Turkish foreign Trade Relations

http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=16670

Table 2

Iraqi Government Royalties and Payments to Turkish Budgets

	Iraqi Government Royalties	Calculated 10% Royalty		Payment to Turkish Budget (£)	
	Pounds	Pounds	Turkish Lt.	Estimated	Realized
1924	401,400	40,140			
19	370,400	37,040	429,335	450,00	13,11,052
19					
19	1,[illegible]176	118,413	945,385		
19	1,009,400	100,940	922,500		
19	1,[illegible]	100,[illegible]	850,145		
1927	1,[illegible]40	115,150			
19	1,[illegible]332	133,[illegible]	1,[illegible]268		
19	[illegible]15	[illegible]	764,[illegible]		
1930	1,[illegible]421	[illegible]	[illegible]		
19	[illegible]541	[illegible]	[illegible]		
19	[illegible]46	[illegible]	[illegible]		
19	[illegible]181	[illegible]	[illegible]		
19	[illegible]	243,[illegible]	[illegible]		
1938	[illegible]147	[illegible]			
1939	[illegible]	272,[illegible]	[illegible]		
1940	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1941	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1942	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1943	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1944	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1945	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1946	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1947	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1948	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
1949	[illegible]116	312,652	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1950	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1951	15,100000	1,510000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1952	40,600,000	4060,000	[illegible]	6,000,000	[illegible]
1953	58,300,000	5,830,000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
1954	[illegible]	6,840,000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	7,[illegible]0,000	[illegible]	[illegible]	


Nevin Coşar, Sevtap Demerci, the Mosul question and the Turkish Republic, before and after the frontier treaty 1926, THE Turkish Year Book, Vol, XXXV, P , 56.

Table 3 Positions of Major Political Actors in Turkey before the Iraq War Started. [1]

Agency	Position
The President	Turkey should act according to international norms. No foreign troop deployment in Turkey; no support for the US military campaign.
Government	Turkey should act according to international law. Conditional support for the U.S. requests if inevitable in order to protect national interests.
TGNA	
JDP (AKP)	363 seats. It was estimated that 40 percent of party members were against the war. There as no block decision taken by the party board.
RPP (CHP)	178 seats; block "No" vote; no foreign roops; conditional cooperation with the US.
Turkish Military (TSK)	No clear public declaration. There was "limited support" in order to balance and limit the U.S in northern.


[1] Murat Yeşiltaş, Soft Balancing in Turkish foreign policy: The case of the 2003 Iraq War, Stratijik Arıştırma Merkezi (SAM), Perceptions, Spring-Summer, Ankara, 2009,p. 49.

Map 1 the Iraqi Oil fields and reserves



www.worldsof.com

Map 2 the Kurdish areas



http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33747980

Map 3 The location of Bubiyan Island



http://globemuslims.com/en/news/147/kuwait

CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information.

Surname, Name: Abdulrazzaq Rabeea Ahmed
Nationality: Iraqi
Date of Birth: 15 December 1979
Place of Birth: Iraq
Phone: 0096407706601766
abdulucky@yahoo.com

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
B.Ch	Baghdad political Science	2002
M.A	Baghdad International Relations	2005
B.Ch	Baghdad English Language	2007
Diploma	Ankara Turkish Language	2009

Subject of Master Thesis (Nuclear Capabilities of North Korea and its Impacts on Northern Asian Security).

Professional Experience.

Year	Place	Enrollment
2007-2011	at Iraqi MOFA	Diplomat
2011-2015	Embassy of the Republic of Iraq	Consulate Section
2015- until now	at Iraqi MOFA	

Foreign Languages.

Good English, Good Turkish, Excellent Arabic.